Iraq

Anthony H. Cordesman, a leading expert on the Middle East and intelligence matters, says three years after the invasion of Iraq, the United States has left a destructive legacy. Cordesman, of the Center on Strategic and International Studies, echoes concerns about civil war erupting and tells cfr.org that U.S. officials must confront Iraq’s economic problems more honestly if they want to achieve true progress and secure more aid from Congress.

Richard N. Haass, president of CFR and head of policy planning at the State Department during the outbreak of the Iraq war three years ago, says that in hindsight, while history’s judgment will depend on how things turn out in Iraq, the impact on U.S. foreign policy at this point is "clearly negative."

This publication is now archived. What are the specific charges against Saddam Hussein?The first case to be brought against Saddam Hussein at the Iraqi Special Tribunal involves his role in the 1982 execution of 148 Iraqi civilians in Dujail, a predominantly Shiite town north of Baghdad. Saddam is charged with ordering the executions following a failed assassination attempt. Several of his top deputies have also been charged in the massacre. Among other charges, Saddam stands accused of ordering the slaughter of some 5,000 Kurds with chemical gas in Halabja in 1988, killing or deporting more than 10,000 members of the Kurdish Barzani tribe in the 1980s, and invading Kuwait in 1990. He could face the death penalty if convicted. Who else is being charged by the court?In addition to Saddam, eleven high-ranking Iraqi officials have been indicted or are awaiting indictment, including Abid Hamid al-Tikriti, a former presidential secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid (“Chemical Ali”), Saddam’s cousin and adviser, and Tariq Aziz, the former deputy prime minister. It’s not clear how many individuals or cases will be tried by the court in total. Several Iraqi war-crimes suspects remain at large, experts say.  Under which body of laws will they be tried? A combination of international and Iraqi national law that existed prior to Saddam’s ascension to power, legal experts say. One source of law is the 1971 Iraqi Criminal Procedure Code, which some experts say is an outmoded legal code that requires little burden of proof and makes convictions too easily obtainable. There was some early speculation that Saddam might be tried under sharia, or traditional Islamic law, which has not been officially applied in Iraq since 1925. Most legal experts, however, say this is unlikely and would be a mistake. “It’d be an ad hoc creation,” says Neil Hicks, director of international programs at Human Rights First, formerly the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. “You’d be sort of inventing law to try a certain set of detainees, and your interpretation of sharia would have to be written in the form of a modern penal code.” What is the jurisdiction of the tribunal?The IST has jurisdiction over crimes committed in Iraq or abroad (e.g., in Iran or Kuwait ) between 1968 and 2003 by former regime members. Unlike previous ad hoc tribunals—temporary courts set up to try suspected war criminals—the IST is not under the auspices of the United Nations but run instead by Iraqis, with U.S. support. There is also no clear timeline for the court’s termination. “I don’t think there is a judge in the world who could predict when it will be finished,” said Raid Juhi, the tribunal’s chief judge, in a Washington Post interview March 22. Some legal experts say the case against Saddam could wrap up as soon as early next year. Has the tribunal’s legitimacy been challenged?Yes. Saddam’s defense team refuses to recognize the court’s legitimacy based on a provision in the Geneva Conventions that they argue prohibits occupying forces from establishing judicial systems in another country. M. Cherif Bassiouni, a professor of law at DePaul University’s Human Rights Law Institute, says the tribunal lacks legitimacy because its statutes were passed by L. Paul Bremer’s U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, whose occupation of Iraq technically ended June 30, 2004. Under international law, he says, “the powers of an occupying force end at the time the occupation ends.” Bassiouni, who directed a project in Iraq to restructure the country’s legal education, suggests Iraq’s parliament pass a new law that confers legitimacy to the tribunal. What is the makeup of Saddam’s legal team?In mid-August, Saddam Hussein’s family dismissed his Jordan-based legal team, which consisted of some 1,500 mainly Arab volunteers and approximately twenty-two legal specialists from countries including the United States, France, Iraq, and Libya. Among them were Aicha Muammar Qaddafi, daughter of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, and Ramsey Clark, a former U.S. attorney general. The family was unspecific about the reasons for their dismissal but hinted they were upset that Arab and Western members of his legal team had leaked information to media outlets and spoken on Saddam’s behalf. Saddam has since been represented by Khalil Dulaimi, an Iraqi lawyer. Two lawyers representing Saddam’s codefendants were killed in November 2005, prompting criticisms that administrators were not providing adequate security. Who are the judges on the tribunal? The Iraqi Special Tribunal comprises roughly sixty-five judges, native Iraqis mostly of Shiite or Sunni ethnic origin, who will independently investigate each case and prepare indictments. Each judge is nominated and vetted by the Iraqi Governing Council. Five judges preside over each trial with no juries present. Concerns over the safety of judges persist; a judge and a lawyer were slain in March 2005, and two lawyers for Saddam’s codefendants were killed in November of that same year. The chief judge in Saddam’s case, Rizgar Mohammed Amin, resigned in January 2006 amid criticism that he had been too lenient in allowing Saddam to speak out of turn and question the court’s legitimacy. A Kurdish judge, Raouf Abdul Rahman, was named interim chief judge after another candidate, Saeed Hamashi, was accused of having ties to Saddam’s Baathist party. What else is controversial about the court? Human-rights advocates have accused the court of not upholding international legal standards of due process or sufficiently protecting the rights of the accused by not allowing sufficient access to legal counsel. Some international legal experts would have preferred a so-called mixed tribunal, similar to the court set up to try crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone. That court was co-established by the United Nations, includes both local and international judges, and operates under both domestic and international law; the IST allows non-Iraqis only to serve as advisers or observers. In contrast, “you have this chicken and egg role in Iraq,” Hicks says. “The United Nations hasn’t played a role because of a lack of safeguards, and it’s opposed to the death penalty.” The court is criticized for its acceptance of capital punishment by Amnesty International and other human-rights groups. Will the trial be open and fair?It’s unclear, experts say. On one hand, the trial is accessible to the Iraqi press, held in Arabic—Iraq’s lingua franca—and expected to be partially broadcast on Iraqi television to ensure openness. Its judges and lawyers will also have been trained by U.S. legal experts in human-rights law, and international monitors will be in the courtroom. “This is not going to be a political trial,” assured Mouwafak al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national-security adviser, in a July 31 interview with CNN.On the other hand, some human-rights lawyers have charged that the IST does not offer sufficient protections for the accused, nor does it uphold Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees a defendant’s right to a “competent, independent, and impartial tribunal.” Hicks accuses the court of holding detainees for months without access to legal counsel. Others say IST’s procedures are in violation of international law, including the court’s lack of requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt (judges must merely be “satisfied” of guilt) and its allowance of trials in absentia.Then there are those who say that recent inflammatory statements made by Iraqi leaders have compromised the tribunal’s ability to be fair and impartial, particularly Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s comments last month that “Saddam deserves a death sentence twenty times a day.” What is the U.S. role in the trial?The tribunal, whose costs are covered by the new government of Iraq, was originally established with the help of around $75 million in U.S. funds. The United States also supplies the court with legal experts and training. Some critics, however, accuse the tribunal of adopting too many traits of the U.S. justice system, including the proposed use of plea bargains, which are viewed in most parts of the world as an Anglo-Saxon style of adversarial criminal justice. Others say the tribunal is too beholden to U.S. interests to be truly impartial and fair. For instance, in a March 12 article in The Nation, Ari Berman, Ralph Shikes fellow at the Public Concern Foundation, questions whether the court would be willing to call U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to testify about his meetings with Saddam in 1983 and 1984. Why has the tribunal taken two years to get off the ground? The prosecution has spent the bulk of its time trolling through an estimated two tons of data from over two million documents, collecting information from some 7,000 witnesses, and reading reports by forensic experts from roughly 200 mass graves throughout Iraq. "It’s not as easy as trying someone who simply pulled a trigger," says Nathan Brown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pointing to the difficulty of proving that atrocities committed were under Saddam’s direct authority. The tribunal, originally slated to begin operation in 2006, has accelerated its timetable under pressure by the U.S. government to help combat the growing insurgency, and, as Brown points out, "to show the Iraqi government is able to get something done." Some critics of the court have accused the U.S. government of accelerating the tribunal’s timeline to fit its own domestic political calendar.   How is the trial expected to affect most Iraqis?Most Iraqis, particularly Kurds and Shiites victimized under the former regime, want to see justice served and crimes punished. Experts say the trial will provide some form of closure to a grim and gruesome chapter of Iraq’s history. Others, however, warn that the trial could further inflame the pro-Saddam and ex-Baathist elements of the Sunni insurgency. Unlike past war-crimes tribunals, legal experts expect a speedy trial and a swift death sentence. “It’s going to be a pro-forma trial for public consumption,” Bassiouni says. “Everyone’s convinced he should be hanged high and dry, but they need to put on some sort of show.” Another problem, Bassiouni points out, is most Iraqis still have little knowledge about the workings of the tribunal; he favors establishing a “public information campaign” or “Iraqi truth commission,” not unlike South Africa’s, “to teach generations of Iraqis about the horrors of the past.”

Three years after the war in Iraq began, experts weigh in on whether U.S. forces are winning or losing.

Wayne White, who was the State Department’s top intelligence analyst on Iraq from 2003-2005, says he is “very gloomy” about the situation in Iraq, and advocates that the United States set a “date certain” two years from now for a U.S. troop withdrawal.

W. Patrick Lang, former head of Middle East Affairs and Counterterrorism at the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, tells cfr.org the attack on the Askariya Shrine will not scuttle Iraq’s political process or impede the insurgency. In this interview, he discusses the looming threat of a general civil war, the role of Shiite militias in stoking violence, and what this all means for U.S. forces in Iraq.

Iran continues to raise concerns in Washington that it is intent on destabilizing postwar Iraq. Most recently, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad accused Iran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by financing and training militia groups that sow sectarian violence.

Matthew Sherman, former deputy senior adviser and director of policy to Iraq ’s Ministry of Interior, discusses the influence of militias, U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, and Iraq ’s rise of organized crime with cfr.org’s Lionel Beehner.

Kenneth Pollack of the Brookings Institution outlines a plan to re-shift the U.S. strategy in Iraq as it relates to security, economics, and politics.

This publication is now archived. IntroductionThe December 15 elections in Iraq for a four-year, 275-member parliament were, for the most, successful, say Iraq’s leaders. Voter turnout, particularly among Sunnis, was high by Iraqi standards. Early estimates show that more than 10 million Iraqis—or some 70 percent of the registered voters—cast ballots last Thursday. Violence was also relatively low, notwithstanding a few explosions in central Baghdad. And accusations of voter fraud and other abuses have been minimal. In a series of speeches, President George W. Bush called the elections “a major step forward,” but admitted they are not a cure-all forIraq’s ongoing violence. What is the timeline for forming Iraq’s government?Iraqi officials predict the ballot-counting will take around two weeks. The new government is supposed to assume office by December 31, but Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned last week that Iraq’s government might not be up and running for at least four months. According to Nathan Brown, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the parliament has fifteen days to convene once the results are certified by the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq (IECI). What is the process for picking Iraq’s top government positions?Once in power, the parliament’s first order of business is to select a president and prime minister. This requires selecting a so-called presidential council, comprising a president and two vice presidents, which must be approved by a two-thirds majority in parliament. Experts say the presidential council will likely be made up of a Kurdish president and two vice presidents, one Shiite and one Sunni Arab. The presidential council then selects a prime minister, ostensibly the leader of the largest bloc represented in parliament, who must then win parliamentary approval. Experts say the prime ministerial post will likely go to a Shiite, while the speaker of the parliament will be a Sunni. The prime minister, once approved, has thirty days to nominate a cabinet, which comprises approximately thirty ministerial portfolios and includes the two deputy prime ministerial posts. The cabinet, whose makeup will not necessarily reflect the ethnic breakdown of parliament, must be approved by a simple majority. Which political faction fared best in the elections?Results are not finalized. But with roughly 89 percent of the ballots tallied in Baghdad province, the biggest of Iraq’s eighteen governorates, Iraqi officials say the main Shiite bloc, the clergy-backed United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), has won roughly 58 percent of the votes. The UIA is a collection of mostly conservative Islamist parties—some with alleged ties to Iran—that favors strictly enforcing the new Iraqi constitution, strengthening Iraq’s regional governments, and prosecuting ex-Baathist criminals. Experts predict the political coalition will take at least 120 seats—it currently holds 140 seats in parliament—allowing the alliance to pick the prime minister. The alliance’s main party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), has said it would not support the nomination of current Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, whose tenure has been criticized by Shiite clerics. The early frontrunner, experts say, is Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iraq’s interim finance minister and a high-ranking SCIRI member. How did the Kurdish bloc do?Preliminary results suggest the Kurdistan Coalition List fared well, though its representation in parliament—roughly a quarter in the interim government—is likely to shrink because of the surge in Sunni voting. The bloc, which consists of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), looks likely to win around fifty-five seats in the new parliament. Its splinter group, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), will probably take five seats. The KIU recently broke from the alliance over accusations the main Kurdish parties wielded too much power in Kurdistan’s politics. Both blocs, however, say they will vote in unison on major Kurdish issues like federalism and the status of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city. It looks likely that the position of president, a largely ceremonial post, will go to a Kurd. Some say Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s current president, may retain his title, though recent press reports suggest he wants more political power. “There is a bit of debate going on because Talabani is not just a figurehead,” says Howar Ziad, Iraq’s ambassador to Canada. How did Sunnis fare?One of the biggest surprises of these elections, experts say, is the high turnout of Sunni Arabs, who comprise at least 20 percent of Iraq’s population and largely boycotted the interim elections last January. Even in Ramadi, a Sunni insurgency stronghold, turnout reportedly eclipsed 75 percent; in Fallujah, the turnout was as high as 95 percent. Experts expect Sunnis to win at least fifty to fifty-five seats in parliament. The main Sunni political bloc, the Iraqi Accord Front, has three main goals: expelling U.S. forces from Iraq, ending de-Baathification, and amending the constitution, which the group’s spokesperson, Zafir al-Ani, recently called a “readymade recipe for civil war.”  Which parties fared worst?So far, it appears the political bloc of interim Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi, the National Congress Coalition, has fared much worse than expected. Preliminary results in Baghdad seem to indicate that Chalabi’s political bloc—a loose collection of mostly liberal, secular, and Shiite parties that defected from the UIA—only won 1 percent of the vote. Other secular Shiite coalitions fared only slightly better. The Iraqi National List, led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, may win between twenty and twenty-five seats. How much behind-the-scenes jockeying is expected by political players? Lots, experts say, particularly given that UIA does not look likely to win a majority of the seats. Because the cabinet’s executive officers require two-thirds parliamentary approval, many of the main political leaders will need to set aside ethnic and ideological differences to make political deals and form coalitions. Some experts predict radical shifts in alliance formations. For example, the UIA, which needs around ten more seats for a majority, is reportedly already reaching out to members of Allawi’s Iraqi National List and the Sunni-led Iraqi Accordance Front to forge a political partnership. Allawi’s group, which includes a number of ex-Baathists and shares several common interests with the main Sunni groups—among them ending the de-Baathification process and pushing for a strong central government—may link up with the main Sunni bloc. Another scenario, though highly improbable, is a so-called national-unity government comprising leaders of all the major political blocs. Others predict that the secularist Shiite parties, which have a long history of political feuding, may partner up with the Kurdish coalition to prevent Iraq’s leadership from becoming too Islamist. Such behind-the-scenes negotiations are likely to last for several weeks, if not months, until a new government is formed. What is the process for amending the constitution?By April, Iraq’s parliament is expected to put forth a series of reforms to the country’s constitution. But significantly altering the document, a primary goal for most Sunni politicians, is a complex process, Brown says. Parliament must first form a committee, which then proposes a package of amendments. Next, the parliament votes on the amendments as a package, not individually, and this requires a simple majority. If passed, the bloc of amendments must then win approval from the public in a nationwide referendum, similar to the one held on the constitution October 15. “[The system’s] structured so that the constitution will not develop significant changes,” Brown says. What about investigating instances of voter fraud?There have been some complaints of voter irregularities, by both Sunni and Shiite leaders, most of them leveled against the UIA. More than 200 complaints were filed before December 18, the deadline for registering an irregularity with the IECI, according to the Christian Science Monitor. Moqtada al-Sadr, a radical Shiite cleric, has called for an independent commission to be formed to recount the ballots. Saleh al-Mutlaq, a prominent Sunni leader, claims there was voter obstruction in several polling stations in Sunni areas. And two days before the December 15 elections, Iraqi border police seized an Iranian tanker reportedly filled with thousands of forged ballots. A spokesperson for the IECI told the Christian Science Monitor that voter irregularities would be investigated by the electoral commission but that no re-votes would be held.