Latin America

  • Immigration and Migration
    Reporting on U.S. Immigration Policies and Migration
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    Paul Angelo, fellow for Latin America studies at CFR, provides background on immigration policies and context for the rise of migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border. Dianne Solis, senior immigration reporter at Dallas Morning News, speaks on best practices for reporting on immigrants themselves and the policies governing their status. Carla Anne Robbins, adjunct senior fellow at CFR and former deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times, hosts the webinar. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations Local Journalist webinar series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president for the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. As you know, CFR’s an independent nonpartisan organization and think tank focusing on U.S. foreign policy. This webinar is part of CFR’s Local Journalist Initiative, created to help you draw connections between the local issues you cover to national and international dynamics. Our programming puts you in touch with CFR resources and expertise on international issues and provides a forum for sharing best practices. This webinar is on the record and the video and transcript will be posted on our website after the fact at CFR.org/localjournalists. Today we’ll be talking about reporting on immigration policies and migration with our speakers Paul Angelo, Dianne Solis, and host Carla Anne Robbins. We circulated their bios, so I will just share a few highlights. Paul Angelo is a fellow for Latin America studies at CFR. His work focuses on U.S. Latin American relations, transnational crime, violent actors, military and police reform, and immigration. He was formerly an international affairs fellow at CFR and in this capacity he represented the U.S. State Department as a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Honduras. Dianne Solis is a reporter at the Dallas Morning News, where she covers immigration and social justice issues. Prior to her twenty-two years at the Dallas Morning News, she spent thirteen years as a correspondent for the Wall Street Journal in Mexico City and Houston. And she was a Nieman fellow at Harvard University. And Carla Anne Robbins is an adjunct senior fellow at CFR. She is also faculty director of the Master of International Affairs Program and clinical professor of national security studies at Baruch College’s Marxe School of Public and International Affairs. And previously she was deputy editorial page editor at the New York Times, and chief diplomatic correspondent at the Wall Street Journal. Welcome to you all. Thank you very much for being with us today. I’m going to turn it over to Carla to have the conversation with both of you, and then we will turn to everyone on this call for their questions, comments, and to share best practices. So, Carla, take it away. ROBBINS: Thank you so much, Irina. And thank you, Paul and my old friend Dianne. It’s so great to see you again. I’m not going to talk about how many decades it’s been since we went to Nieman summer camp together. And thank you, everybody, for joining us and for doing the extraordinary work that you do as local reporters. It’s incredibly important and an incredibly challenging time in local journalism. So with that, I’m sure everybody has a lot of questions for our experts. So I’m not going to get in the way much, but I am going to take the prerogative and pitch some questions. So, Paul, I’m going to start with you, because you’re the policy wonk. And I’m going to ask a policy wonkish question of you. So why is there such a surge? And the surge is enormous with Biden, of course, but it predates Biden. Just a few recent stats, you know, border patrol agents apprehended a million people in the first nine months of the fiscal year, which is an enormous number of people. Nearly 56,000 family members and 15,000 unaccompanied minors in June alone. Those are really big numbers. But it’s not just all Biden, despite what President Trump would suggest. You know, what’s the push factor here? And when did it start? ANGELO: Thanks, Carla. And I’d like to thank Irina for the opportunity to join all of you today. I’m looking forward to hearing from all of our local journalists, seeing that so many of you have your finger on the pulse of the border beat. Unfortunately, I’m located in Washington, D.C., so I don’t get down to the border as much as I’d like. But I look forward to hearing your perspectives. And it’s also a real honor to be on the panel with Dianne and Carla. So, you know, turning our attention to the border, of course we have a new administration in the United States. And among the first foreign and domestic policy challenges that the Biden administration faced was on the migration front. For me and for people who have been watching the border, like many of you, this isn’t surprising. For anyone who’s been paying attention to the border in recent years we could have all predicted this. And there are a handful of reasons that stand out to me from the get-go. The first is that this surge is a natural evolution of an ongoing trend. We look over the past decade, the year with the highest spike in migrant apprehensions at the U.S. border was 2019. And this is when President Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric, migrant protection protocols, the safe third country agreement with Guatemala and the asylum cooperation agreements with Honduras and El Salvador were all in full swing. Despite all of those measures, migration was at a ten-year peak in 2019. 2020, with the pandemic, we saw a bit of a reprieve for the U.S. government due to COVID-19 restrictions on movement that were imposed in places like Mexico and Central America. But once national governments reopened their borders, all that pent up demographic pressure was going to result inevitably in an increase in migration. Second thing I would say is that the Trump administration very much was kicking the ball down the court. Asylum cooperation agreements, for instance, were more symbolic than they were substantive. Places like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador never had robust asylum systems, nor do they have the resources or interest in developing them. And so it was more of a symbolic measure than it was one that was actually going to push asylum applicants to the Northern Triangle, rather than to Mexico or the United States. Likewise, we always see an uptick in migration at the beginning of a calendar year due to seasonal labor and weather patterns. And similarly, on the eve of Joe Biden’s election—excuse me—I meant the eve of Joe Biden’s inauguration, we had more than 42,000 asylum applicants or candidates camped out on the Mexican side of the border due to programs like migrant protection protocols and metering. And so inevitably the Biden administration’s decision to reactivate our asylum system, to bring the U.S. in compliance with its international humanitarian legal obligations was inevitably going to result in more asylum requests. And then there were other things, particularly the conditions—or, what we call the root causes of migration in Central America—that have, you know, been fueling migration from that region and southern Mexico for much of the past decade. Most immediately I would say that back-to-back category five and category four hurricanes in the fall, which killed off 140,000 livestock, 90 percent of Honduras’ bean and corn crops, in an economy that is largely subsistence in rural spaces, fueled migration. But moreover, what we’re seeing in Central America is an acceleration of democratic backsliding. And you know, I think if we look to where Central America was even five years ago, there was—there was still a lot more hope for the region. There were—you know, the anti-corruption crusade was in full swing in places like Guatemala and Honduras. But during the Trump administration, a lot of those priorities took a backseat for U.S. policy in Latin America. And so now what we’re seeing is a real sense of malaise or frustration that these are political systems and economies that no longer—or, that don’t take into account the needs of their people. And this is precisely what’s fueling this recent surge in migration. ROBBINS: So that’s all very cheery. Thank you, Paul, for starting it off. (Laughs.) So, Dianne, to continue on with the policy perspective, so President Biden ran promising to address the Trump administration’s, well, frankly, abusive immigration policies—separation of families, denial of asylum rights which are under international law, his constant demonization of immigrants. You know, has he? Is he? Is it any better at all, from what you’re seeing on the ground? SOLIS: I think there’s a real pivot in language. But on a practical level, the change has been really slow. The biggest change that hasn’t happened is with the policy from the Trump era related to the pandemic called Title 42. And that’s put a tourniquet on asylum at the border—largely put a tourniquet on asylum. And it’s a big challenge. Biden has to decide whether he’s going to end it or not. It looked like he probably would have this summer, but then we had this new surge in COVID cases and, you know, the monster Delta variant. So it’s slow change. On DACA there’s been a lot of support— ROBBINS: So just a minute, 42, which probably everybody knows, is the CDC, which allows them to just remove anybody or deny entry to anybody based on health reasons. SOLIS: Right. And it’s named after its location in the—in the immigration code, I believe. ROBBINS: Yeah. SOLIS: Not in the immigration code, but in the general federal code. It’s in the area that’s called Title 42 and deals with health policy. And that’s still in place, except for unaccompanied minors. And they can come across. That’s a big change that he made—that Biden made, the Biden team made. And we’re seeing a surge in those numbers. Most notably in the increase of people coming, one should note that it’s really hot right now. And yet, there’s an increase. And that’s not normal. And it indicates that there are serious problems back in the home countries, and a belief that things will change under the Biden administration. And also, some of the people that are coming across are repeat crossers. The government estimates that 33 to 40 percent of those who come across are repeat crossers. So it’s not an increase or spike in individuals who come across, but it’s an increase in what the government now calls encounters. ROBBINS: So one of the things that was most horrifying about the Trump administration policy—I’m not sure whether I’m allowed to use words like that—which was the separation of children, and separation of families, the treatment of unaccompanied minors. That is a difference with Biden, in both the way they’re dealing with people in the near term, in the first forty-eight hours, or whenever the term is, as well as supposedly, you know, they’re trying to find housing and dealing with family members. What do you think about that? Are they dealing with these kids any better? And do they—you know, have they come up with a plan? Is the housing OK? Are they dealing with their schooling? I mean, this a pretty fundamental issue of humanity here. SOLIS: Indeed, it is. And it’s one that I think troubles people perhaps most deeply, because these are really vulnerable children. Some are teens, but they’re still quite vulnerable, still quite young. Some are, you know, very young—eight years old, for example. And in Dallas, we were faced with all these migrant teens in downtown Dallas, in our convention center, when an emergency pop-up housing site was placed, I believe, in April. And as many as 2,200 migrant children were placed there. And it didn’t have the same licensing that the normal shelters have in the state of Texas and around the nation. And so there wasn’t the same kind of scrutiny for health and safety procedures. And we started hearing a lot of bad things about children being clustered in one big room, and the children being depressed, and crying, and complaints about the food. And it proceeded to get a little bit better, and then it went on to decline. And recreational activity was minimal during some periods of their time in Dallas. Eventually— ROBBINS: And— SOLIS: Oh, sorry. ROBBINS: So overall it means—yesterday they announced that they were returning to a policy of expedited removal. Which means that asylum officers can interview families in a fast-track screening process to determine if they have, what, a credible fear of persecution. Is this an act of desperation call on their part? And should we just have more faith that the Biden administration is going to deal with this in a responsible way? You certainly don’t want to have people hanging around indefinitely, and one of the complaints about the asylum process more generally under the Trump administration is that it took—for the people who did get in, it took forever. And for the people who were waiting, they couldn’t even get their number called. But, you know, the complaints for the people who did get called up is that basically they, you know, walked in, and somebody, you know, banged out a gavel, and they were out again. You know, desperation on their part, political pressure? Or is there a sign that this might be done in a more responsible way? ANGELO: Yeah, I mean, I think that in terms of determining credible fear, the burden of proof is actually quite light. And so for families that don’t necessarily meet what is a fairly minimal threshold, I think that this is a policy that necessarily incents. I also think that the Biden administration is attempting to move in the direction of in-country refugee processing, so as to prevent people from trying to make the dangerous journey across Central America, across Mexico—where they can fall into the hands of traffickers. The idea would be to process these individuals in places in Central America—Costa Rica, for instance. And we’ve already seen, from the very earliest days of the Biden administration, reactivation of something known as the Central American Minors Program, which allows children who have family members in the United States, and who themselves are vulnerable to things like gang recruitment or who are victims of violence or repression, to apply for refugee status in their countries of origin. And so I think that that—I mean, it’s a proof of concept for where the Biden administration might like to take asylum refugee policy in the future. I would also note that on the issue of children—I don’t know if this needs to be said, but I think just to make sure that we’re all clear—something that the Biden administration was emphatic in doing in differentiating itself from the Trump administration is that it stopped separating children from their parents and guardians at the door. And in fact, it facilitated the reunification of those children who were previously under the Trump administration separated from their parents and guardians at the border. But more broadly speaking, when we—when we look at some changes that are taking place to immigration policy during the Biden administration, we saw that under intense public pressure the Biden administration quadrupled the refugee cap to 62,000—62,500, excuse me. We also saw that the Biden administration sought to demarcate a difference between itself and the Trump administration by revoking the travel and immigration limits that had been imposed on thirteen countries, many of which were Muslim-majority countries from Africa. The Biden administration has also extended temporary protective status to vulnerable populations like Haitians, Venezuelans, Burmese, Yemenis. And more—I think also symbolically, but also practically, the Biden administration has halted the construction of the border wall. And just in the past couple of weeks we’ve seen House—the House appropriations bill for fiscal year 2022 providing zero funding for that border wall, and instead focusing on nonintrusive image technology for ports of entry as a way of curbing illegal activities along the border. And so I think, you know, for as much as we’ve seen some continuity, there have been significant changes that have taken place. But, again, as Dianne said, I think the Biden administration is just waiting to see what’s going to happen with this Delta variant before it takes any rash decisions about, you know, what its policies specifically at the border are going to look like. ROBBINS: So, Dianne, there has been major personnel changes. You know, the sort of chaos at DHS and all these people who never got confirmed and people who were pretty strong ideologues when it came to migration. And Trump got a very strong endorsement from the unions, from the Customs and Border people, and felt that, you know, they really had his back. And there were very, very strong ideological statements there. Does it feel better on the ground from the people who are doing the enforcement? You know, is this—do you find, as a reporter, you have a better relationship with them? Do the people who are being stopped feel that they’re being treated better? Has the word drifted down from Washington that we want to have a kinder and gentler face? Or is it basically the same? SOLIS: I think there is a change on the ground. I go most frequently to the Rio Grande Valley. And in the relationship with CBP I think for the press, from my view, is much improved. But having said that, on the ground—physically on Highway 83, which goes east to west through the Rio Grande Valley, there’s so many—so much law enforcement now, from Texas Public Safety, to constables, and to of course the Border Patrol, and others. And it seems a little chaotic. And regular folk don’t like it. You know, they feel very over-surveilled. So that’s different. And depending on your point of view, different in not a good way. Maybe if you’re a rancher, and it’s your property that’s being litter nightly, maybe you’re more unhappy. But if you’re a regular citizen, I don’t think you’re happy with all this surveillance. ROBBINS: And there is—what’s the—what’s relationship between—you know, Abbott called on people to come from around the country to go and reinforce the border to make up for, you know, what is allegedly being pulled back by the Biden administration. Are there tensions between these different—you know, between the Feds versus the locals? Or is that—are they being deconflicted? Or is there not all that much happening as what Biden claims is happening? Is it all hat and no cattle, as we hear people from the east think you people in Texas say? (Laughs.) SOLIS: You know, it’s a great question. And it’s one that I’d like to explore in my next trip down there, what is it really like with this handful of states that are sending people to the border? I don’t know. I don’t know the question. I don’t—I know the question, but I don’t know the answer yet. I think it’s an important one. But now— ROBBINS: I mean, it seems like a potential for, you know, conflict, particularly if you’re sending National Guard people, people who are less—you know, who are less than full-time, you know, disciplined soldiers. It potentially to me seems a little scary. SOLIS: There is an important legal conflict. Federal immigration law is the purview of the Border Patrol. They’re the ones in charge of apprehending people. So one wonders, well, what does a constable do then? You know, do they hold people? And how long do they hold people? And when does that become not just holding somebody but a full apprehension? And these are legal questions that I think need to be addressed, and probably will be addressed in the future, maybe in the courts. ROBBINS: So that’s one sort of area of coverage that I—as a consumer of news—I would love to read more about. And I think that’s one of the things we always try to do in these meetings is start thinking about stories that we could be doing. Paul, as a consumer of news, what do you want—you know, we’ve got a lot of good journalists on this call. What do you want to be reading from people who have the opportunity to do what you and I can’t do, which is to get out of the major metropols right now? ANGELO: Yeah. You know, something—a story that I think would be really fascinating, I think we’re starting to see some hints of this percolate in the news—is because normally we see a reduction in migration during the hot months of June, July, August, and this year we’re seeing the opposite. The migration levels are increasing or stabilizing. You know, and already taking into account that this has been among the most lethal years in the past thirty years for migration to the United States. I would love to see more coverage of people who are taking very significant risks—I mean, they risk drowning, heat exposure, dehydration, animal attacks, and whatnot. And profiling individuals who may have deceased on their journey to the United States, knowing that the deadliest months of the year have not been accounted for yet in this fiscal year. Something else that I think, you know, bears some exploration is the increasing trend of asylum applicants preferring to file their asylum applications in Mexico instead of in the United States. Mexico is no longer being seen as a transit country for migrants, but also a destination. And we’re particularly seeing this for populations like Haitians and Cubans. And so Mexico’s highest year historically for asylum applications was 2019, when it received some 30,000 asylum applications. But this year it has already received 51,000. And so I think that those are—those are stories that could really use some more texture, and we would benefit from some personal profiles of individuals who are affected by these trends. ROBBINS: So I want to throw it open to the group but, Dianna, I want to ask a question about that. Which is, is that a success of the Trump administration? That, you know, he kept saying, you know, why aren’t these people going to Mexico? I’m going to cut a deal with the Mexicans. They stay there, maybe they want to end up staying there. I mean, you see that on the one hand. At the same time, we’re also seeing certain states in Mexico that aren’t letting—aren’t letting people be pushed back. They’re just saying, no, forget it. You know, I think Tamaulipas is. I mean, there are certain states that just saying: Forget it. We’re not taking you. So, you know, where are the Mexicans in this? What role do they play in it? And how much did the bullying from the Trump administration help or hurt, versus what the Biden administration is doing? SOLIS: Help or hurt whom? ROBBINS: Good question. (Laughs.) Very good, my dear. Please jump in anywhere. (Laughs.)  SOLIS: (Laughs.) OK. So there’s the relationship—the huge financial relationship between the U.S. and Mexico. And my dear colleague Alfredo Corchado just had a series of interviews in Mexico City at the Foreign Relations Ministry. And it seems like they’re working well with the Biden administration, and some of the Biden administration policy is really, frankly, the same as the Trump administration. And you raise a really good point about asylum applications in Mexico increasing. It reminds me a bit—going way, way, way back, I think, to the ’70s or ’80s—when there were a lot of Central Americans who came to Chiapas and had—there were huge camps there. And some of them must have settled out in the area, or else they were there for a time. And there are parts of Mexico that are really beautiful and are relatively safe. Granted, there is the other half of the nation—the other half of the states, where our U.S. State Department has travel warnings out. A very dangerous state is Tamaulipas, which is in the highest category for danger for our U.S. State Department, and where migrants cross the most. It’s the quickest route. I also think that the smugglers have something to do with that too. They push people through there—through that migratory route into the Rio Grande Valley. ROBBINS: So we want to, you know, throw this open to the group. You guys must have questions or, you know, give us some insight into the challenges you’re facing, stories that you’re trying to do, interested in doing. So please raise your hand or write it into us, into the Q&A. Because if not, I’ll just keep going. Or I’ll call on you. I have enough of a professor in me that I—(laughs)—started off calling on people. But while you compose your questions, I’m going to ask another one. Which is, you know, immigration policy is a lot like climate change, in the sense of nothing can get fixed easily or quickly. These are generational challenges. And at the same time, the suffering is immediate. And so you know, to deal with the push factors—you know, Vice President Harris charged with the notion of going down to El Salvador and Honduras and saying, you know, we’re going to try to help fix your problems so so many people don’t want to leave. I mean, it’s the right impulse. It absolutely should be. I mean, you talked in the beginning about the push factors there. Do they have an idea? The Obama administration had an idea for Central America. They allegedly invested a bunch of money in Central America. I mean, do you have a sense that they have an idea that, A, will try to deal with some of the, you know, backsliding democratically with all the terrible economic troubles that are going on there, to make up for the—speaking of, the economic devastation that happened from the weather, which is only going to continue? And do any of these things going to have any impact at all on migration in the near term? So, Paul, I’ll start with you and then, Dianne—Dianne’s looking very skeptical. (Laughs.) ANGELO: I’d love to. (Laughs.) So I will say that when I was an international affairs fellow with CFR I was on sort of the implementing end of the Obama administration’s Central America strategy, which was being shepherded by then-Vice President Joe Biden. And so President Biden has a real intimate knowledge of the challenges that are faced, particularly in the Northern Triangle region. And I think that the Biden administration’s initial instincts are to go back to what we know works. I will remind everyone that in 2019 the Trump administration froze all of the assistance—the development and security assistance that was being administered to the Northern Triangle countries, some of which had been approved during the last year of the Obama administration. And a lot of that assistance was to fund programs that were ongoing. And one of those programs is the program that I worked on, known as the place-based strategy. And it was a citizen security crime and violence prevention strategy that was being implemented in the homicidal neighborhoods of the biggest cities in the Northern Triangle countries. And two of the neighborhoods where I was working, we saw reductions of homicide in just over two years by over 60 percent. It’s a model that works, but it’s a model that also requires that you continue to build on the momentum in a geographic sense. And when the Trump administration pulled the rug out from underneath that program, when the Trump administration froze U.S. assistance to the region, a lot of that momentum was lost. I think some of the things that the Biden administration will do differently, I think there’s an increasing sense that climate change is to blame for a lot of the migrant flows that we’re seeing in the past decade—things like coffee rust or black sigatoka, which ravaged banana and plantain crops, you had bark-eating beetles which, in Honduras, affected the timber industry. All of these things put people who work in the agricultural space out work. And many of them ended up moving into cities where they found that their skills were not valued, where they could not find meaningful work, and where they were probably at greater risk of violence or crime being committed against them. And it was at that point that many of them would then decide to emigrate northward. And so to the extent that the Biden administration will seek to build climate resilience as part of its broader strategy to help combat climate change globally, I think that this will be a valuable pillar that Vice President Harris will structure as part of her engagement with the countries of the Northern Triangle. Likewise, something that we’re seeing differently this time around, as opposed to what we saw in—during the Obama administration. As I mentioned initially, the Obama administration benefitted from the fact that many of civil societies and democratic institutions in the countries of the Northern Triangle were engaged in an anti-corruption crusade. Well, that’s no longer the case. And so now the Biden administration has decided that it’s going to condition the dispersal of U.S. assistance to the countries of the Northern Triangle on anti-corruption progress. Still not very clear how that’s going to work in practice, but to the extent that the United States cannot partner with public officials or institutions in the countries in question, then it has decided that those resources really ought to be divided amongst civil society—things like universities, NGOs, journalists, whatnot. You know, in many ways to serve as the kind of anti-corruption watchdogs that the region absolutely needs. ROBBINS: That worked well in Haiti. You can see all the capacity building that happened for thirty years of not dealing with the government—or, fifty years of not dealing with the government. But OK. (Laughs.) So we’ll go—we need to go back to this. It’s, as Dianne said, a very tough question. It needs to be dealt with. And there’s a question here, Alex Nussbaum was asking: For those of us not at the border much of the debate still centers on ICE and the treatment/deportation of detainees. Can you talk about how that agency is changing, or not changing, under Biden? And, Alex, before Dianne jumps into that, you’re in New Jersey. I mean, is ICE—it’s a huge issue in local communities in New Jersey. And has that gone down? I’m going to ask Alex a question first. Has that declined since the—since the Biden administration came in, or is it still a fierce political issue? Q: It is—thank you for letting me take part in this. It is definitely an issue for immigration activists here in New Jersey. I think what we found is that during the pandemic a lot of the numbers of detainees actually went down quite a bit in this area, as ICE and the local jails they work with tried to reduce the population because of COVID. And a number of the local jails that worked with ICE have been convinced to say they’re going to end their relationships at some point soon. But there is still a lot of pressure from activists to free or stop transferring those detainees out of the area. And it’s a major political issue up here, even though in absolute numbers the number of detainees may have actually been going down—at least, you know, around here. ROBBINS: Great. Thanks. So, Dianne. Is it different? SOLIS: The thing that’s quite different is that the number of detained migrants has gone down. It’s less than half what it was. And a lot of that is because of the pandemic. But to me, it raised the question: Do you really need to detain all those people for a civil offense? And I think therein is a legitimate story that needs to be explored by journalists. ICE has a huge budget for enforcement and for detentions specifically. And there are these agreements with jail-like facilities around the nation that, to some extent, put money in the coffers of municipalities. And we should ask as a nation, do we really need it? I was going to say we should ask as a nation, post-pandemic, if we really need it. And I caught myself from saying that—unfortunately, very unfortunately. But, you know, we are incarcerating about half the amount of people we incarcerated previously. ROBBINS: Is there—is there a sort of prison industrial complex in immigration the way there is just more generally in prisons in the United States? I mean, how much of these ICE detention centers and how much—including the new centers that are being built by the Biden administration to deal with—that aren’t centers, but they’re for housing children and all—how much of these are being built by private contractors who have an interest in keeping people in them because—and then they have an interest in paying off politicians because it becomes what people refer to as the prison industrial complex? I mean, is that the same thing in the world of immigration? SOLIS: Absolutely it’s the same thing in the world of immigration. And we saw it as well in all these emergency influx sites. That’s the government’s word—emergency influx sites and in the contracting of private industry to run these places, and then get subcontracts. And many of them didn’t have much experience in dealing with children. ROBBINS: And so do you have the same—I mean, you say that it’s easier to deal with Border Patrol now. Do you find that you’re also having better relations with ICE? And are they more willing to deal with the press than they were in the Trump administration? SOLIS: I’ve been at this a while. (Laughs.) I mean, so I have relationships with different people within ICE. And I had it during the Obama years, and the Trump years, and they continue today. And I guess, given the depth of that relationship, things are as they were before. I know that they’ve—some of them feel whiplashed by the changes. ROBBINS: So if I were a reporter, which I am, but if I were a reporter covering this beat, and I worked in Washington but I needed to get out on the ground and reality test, which is always very good thing, where should I go and what should I see? Because there’s always this huge gap between what people in Washington think the policy is versus what the reality is. So I’m going to start with Dianne, and ask her what they should see on the border, and what you think the best places are to go to understand what the policy is now. And then I’m going to go to Paul to ask where they should go in the region to understand what the push factors are. SOLIS: OK, the best place to go on the border would be the Rio Grande Valley, I think, and then perhaps El Paso-Juárez. You really get a sense of the challenges when you’re there. And it’s relatively easy to talk to people on the Texas side. And if you’re willing to take the risk of going across into Reynosa or Matamoros, you know, you can—you can do so. And you’ll really get an eyeful and an earful of the dangers that people go through, their desperation. I think if you go to El Paso-Juárez, you’re going to see more of the shades of gray. And when I think of underreported stories, one of the topic areas is shades of gray topics. And I wonder, you know, if every single border crosser is really an asylum seeker with a credible fear of persecution. And how many of them are just Mexicans who need to provide for their families, or want to provide more amply for their families? And therefore, that becomes a prism from which we can look at the need for work visas, so that people can come across with greater ease. Or the need to open up the legal immigration system to people like that. And we have a lot of labor shortages, or skills mismatch going on all around the country right now. And one way to look at that might be through the prism of a visit to El Paso-Juárez. And if you look at the data that comes from the Border Patrol, you’ll see that the largest number are single adult males, many of them from Mexico. And through that, again, you can look at, well, is this a really, truly an asylum seeker, or is this just a guy who wants to provide for his wife and two kids back in Guanajuato, back in central Mexico. ROBBINS: So when you said the dangers of going to, would you say, Reynosa, you mean the dangers of getting mugged, is that what you mean, the dangers of getting kidnapped? You’re talking about crime. SOLIS: I’m talking about crime. ROBBINS: Yeah. So—OK, so I’m a reporter based in Washington, or based in Philadelphia, or based somewhere. And God bless my editor, says, OK, you’re right. I’m going to send you out there. You’ve been such a pain. You’re always telling me to send you on the ground. I’m going to send you out there. Go do a story on both sides of the border. And you have some Spanish. And how do you mitigate those risks? Who do you hire to help you as your guide? How do you do it on the ground, if you’re basically going in? But you got a week—you got a week to do it. That’s a, you know, reasonable amount of time. How do you find the people to make it safer, but so that you also don’t just end up interviewing cab drivers? SOLIS: Right. You need to talk to people who go across regularly, to the NGOs that go to help people—either to feed people, to clothe people, to provide some legal help. You have to assess what geographic area you’re willing to go into. Are you going to stay very close to the bridge, where there is a fairly large encampment now of migrants in Reynosa, or are you going to go further in to one of the bigger shelters? And you have to know—you have to talk to people and know that if you decide to go to the big one, Senda de la Vida, that, you know, it’s right by the river, it’s not in the greatest place. It may look like it is on the map, but it’s not. And you go with somebody who knows that geography. And you have to watch what cab driver you hire. And you’ve got to be talking to people who go regularly to find out who that cab driver is that you’re going to hire, and why they believe that they’re OK, why they’re not working with organized crime. ROBBINS: And, Paul, so I want to go to Central America. And I want to see what organizations or government officials are worth investing billions of dollars into, OK? Skeptical, you know, my member of Congress has to vote on this aid, OK? And so before the vote, my editor wants me to go down there and ask the question. If you want to give them the good and you want to show them a place that really we could build a partnership with, are there any governments in Central American right now, or local state, you know, provincial leaders, or, you know, mayors? Is there any place where you—where someone could say, OK, well, here’s something you could build on? ANGELO: Sure. I think there are, you know, individuals or institutions with which the U.S. government has a long relationship in Central America that—you know, that still serve as a glimmer of hope for the region. I would point to the FECI, which is the special attorney general’s office for anti-corruption crimes in Guatemala. Unfortunately, one of the principal prosecutors was just forced out of the office this week by the country’s attorney general. But nonetheless, there are U.S.-trained individuals, prosecutors, investigators in that division that worked previously with the CICIG, which is the U.N.-backed anti-corruption commission in Guatemala, I think would be a very good place to start and a story that’s worth telling, because it’s something that’s worth salvaging. But I also think that there are stories to be told from places like the dry corridor, which is a tract of territory that spans across—starting in Costa Rica and all the way up into southern Mexico. Some of the most unproductive land in Central America, but not coincidentally it’s the place where many of the region’s campesinos, over centuries of land concentration in the hands of a very few, have been pushed and have been pushed into subsistence existence. And now that we’re seeing less—you know, 40 percent less annual average rainfall than were even two decades ago, we’re seeing a region that’s been battered by hurricanes year after year, you know, I think it’s worth capturing those stories and telling the story of climate migration. I would also say that it’s worth going to the Guatemala-Mexico border for—you know, this has been a flashpoint—geographic flashpoint over much of the past decade. You know, the Obama administration worked with the Peña Nieto administration in Mexico to implement something known as the southern border strategy, which sought to curb the flow of migrants across the Guatemala-Mexico border. The Trump administration engaged in the same—pushed the AMLO government to do the same, and to militarize the southern border. And inevitably, if the United States seeks to control the flow of migrants to its own border, it’s going to have to help Mexico get a handle on its own southern border. And so, you know, I think that going to the Usumacinta River, which is where a lot of the river crossings happen for migrants, is a good place to go and get stories and, you know, a place as well that you’ll be able to capture not just the dynamic as it pertains to the migrants, but also the other illicit economies that tend to exist in these borderlands, which I think are, you know, certainly worth documenting and reporting on. ROBBINS: So I’m going to throw a question out to the participants. And I hope that we’ll get more people to jump in here. So how big a deal is migration in your local communities? How much pressure is there? I mean, if you look at the polling data, consistently President Biden has incredibly stable approval numbers and, you know, pretty good numbers even now on handling the economy, handling of—handling of COVID. One thing that he consistently gets negative numbers on is handling of the border and migration issues. So as I always like to say to people, to my students who study polling, I always say to them: Don’t look at the poll—look at the straight numbers on the polls. Look at the salience issue, which is it’s not just what people feel, it’s whether or not they’re going to vote on it, you know, are they willing to spend money on it, are they willing to vote on it? How important is it to them? So how salient is this issue in your local community? If you live—as Dianne said—if you live near the border and you’re a rancher, obviously it’s a salient issue. So you guys showed up for today. How salient is this in your communities? Alex talked about immigration activists. And we certainly know this was a huge issue when the ICE detention facilities were overflowing. But I’m just wondering how salient this is and how much this—potentially this issue will have an impact on the midterm elections if Biden can’t get this under control? So we have a chance to actually do a little bit of polling for local reporters. So come on, you guys. I want somebody to jump in here. I’m pleading with you because I want to know the answer, too. So while you formulate your answers, Dianne, obviously, in Texas this is, you know, a hugely big deal, but maybe not as straightforward an issue as everybody thinks, as everybody caricatures. I mean, Abbott is taking his positions but, you know, what’s the politics of it right now inside the state? SOLIS: We just did a poll on that. And it showed it was a huge issue—immigration was a huge issue. But if you delved into the data, it showed that it was very different depending on whether you were a non-Hispanic white or Hispanic. And we saw a divide, and quite a distinct divide. And I would imagine that it’s like that in other places, but it’s very important to look at that in a state like Texas or California, where Hispanics do vote and are a large voting bloc. And— ROBBINS: Although, we’ve seen intolerance among—or, shall we say—refer to it as the lifeboat syndrome, but there is a certain lifeboat syndrome quality to it—from certain Hispanic voting blocs of, you know, certainly, you know, anti-open borders and—you know, Trump did get a reasonable amount of votes from Hispanics. I mean, voting maybe on immigration, certainly on more conservative cultural values. You know, so that maybe becomes a salience issue. But some of the people who analyzed it thought it also had to do with immigration. Do you think that’s not right? SOLIS: I think that that’s correct for certain regions of Texas. For the border, I think that is true that a large number of folks voted for Republicans, voted for Trump. And I wrote about that. And in tight elections, that little sway matters. It matters a lot. But when you compared the Rio Grande Valley, the four counties that people generally talk about of the Rio Grande Valley, to a place like Dallas, you know, it was much different—you know, much more likely to vote for the Biden-Harris ticket in Dallas, compared to Hidalgo County, which holds the largest population. It’s where McAllen is. ANGELO: And, Carla, I would just say, in terms of the Trump candidacy’s appeal to Latino voters, you know, a lot of that—you know, in terms of the slight uptick that we saw in terms of his approval and his popularity among Latino voters happened in Florida. And this issues in Florida are very, very distinct from the debate that we’re having about immigration. I mean, there it really was a misinformation campaign that was targeting the Biden campaign with the baseless accusation that Biden was a socialist and was going to turn the United States into a socialist country. And it was toying with the trauma of people who had fled socialism from places like Cuba, Florida—excuse me—Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela to Florida that really tipped the election in favor of Trump’s candidacy. And so I would say that, you know, it’s really sort of difficult to generalize about Latin voting across the nation because—(inaudible)—vote differently. ROBBINS: It’s not a generalized bloc. ANGELO: But I would say, on the issue of how salient this issue nationwide, I mean, we saw a poll in June that was conducted by Reuters that only 10 percent of Americans ranked immigration as a top priority, which was down 5 percent from where it was in April. And we even saw that number plummet against people who identify as Republicans from 29 percent to 19 percent. So, you know, it seems to be that in the United States, as immigration or the border crisis has dropped out of the news, people appear to be caring less about immigration than they did in the early months of the spring. ROBBINS: I think it’s interesting. I mean, is this a crisis? And that raises a really interesting question for us as reporters about how we—the language that we use when we write these things. I mean, what makes something a crisis? Is it a crisis because it’s defined by politicians as a crisis? Is it a crisis because it is a crisis for the individuals who are experiencing it? You know, we have a very large country. We can certainly absorb lots of people. So what made this a crisis, other than the political definition of a crisis? And you’re right, dropped out of the news, or certainly gone—you know, become—it’s certainly less frontpage news itself. And it would be interesting to track to see, you know, the language versus the polling data on that, which I think that is—which is why I sort of threw the question out about the salience issue. And Republicans do not seem to be pushing this with the same enthusiasm. At the same time, we don’t hear—I mean, after the ruling on DACA, which was, what, late last week, you didn’t, unless I missed it, was the White House out there really pushing back? You know, we’re going to make this—we’re going to get this legislation through, we’re going to—we’re going to champion it? I mean, they don’t seem to be, you know, pushing this in a—they seem to, I think, maybe—shall I be cynical about it? If nobody’s talking about it, they were happy to not talk about it. Do you get that impression as well? That’s certainly my impression. Dianne. SOLIS: I doubt—they reacted the next day. It came out on a Friday. ROBBINS: They did? SOLIS: On Saturday they reacted, yeah. And they said they plan to appeal. MALDEF, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, also I think will appeal. And I think we’ll be hearing about that soon. And I think there is a shift in news focus right now on the immigration beat to a reconciliation measure that might provide legalization for so-called DREAMers and other categories. It depends on who’s pushing how big this will be—whether it will be only two million people, or whether it will be as large as five million. And yesterday we saw more than eighty mayors say that they back this effort. ROBBINS: So Cindy Carcamo from the L.A. Times has precisely this question: Can you talk about DACA and what you think will need for some sort of DREAMer legislation to pass? It seems like CIR is dead. OK, now you’ve so beyond my level of competence I don’t even know what that is, but I’m sure that Dianne or Paul will explain it. But what about something just or DACA recipients? Oh, comprehensive immigration reform. I got it. Yay. OK. I did understand. So thank you, Cindy. I did get it before you said it. (Laughs.) Thank God. So can you guys both in the remaining few minutes we have, give us a little bit more of a deep dive into the possibilities of DACA and broader immigration reform? SOLIS: Well, I think the reason that what’s happening this week with this reconciliation effort in this particular bill is so interesting is it is a smaller group. And I think that it is going to be very hard to see something that will cover more people. There are eleven million people who are undocumented in the U.S.—roughly eleven million. And I think it’s doubtful that what you’re going to see, you know, is something for ten million of them, and much more likely that we’re going to see something small. Whether it would be DACA-specific, I don’t know because—I kind of doubt it, because the DREAMer movement themselves has leadership that doesn’t support something that is for them alone. They want more people on board. ANGELO: Yeah, I would—I would agree with Dianne on this. I mean, the Biden administration, you know, out of the blocs prevented a comprehensive immigration reform bill to Congress that would provide a pathway to citizenship for the approximately eleven million undocumented immigrants in the United States. And, you know, that’s a pipedream, frankly. Depending on the poll, anywhere between 57 and 69 percent of Americans support the measure, but there doesn’t appear to be that kind of support in either chamber of Congress for comprehensive reform. So I think that, you know, the House is leading the way by considering smaller bills related to assistance for dreamers or, you know, more quotas for agricultural workers, temporary agriculture workers, to come into the United States and work for a time. And sort of this piecemeal approach is, like, the most feasible way of getting essential relief as quickly as possible. I would note that any kind of legislation that’s going to pass through Congress is going to have to see border security initiatives baked into the text. And that will be a common theme for anything related to immigration reform that we see coming out of Capitol Hill. ROBBINS: And who are the wizards to pull this off, the people to watch on the Hill? I mean, is this a—is this a priority for Pelosi, or is this just going to be pushed by the White House? ANGELO: I mean, I think the White House is going to have to assume the protagonism in this. You know, I think the space for consensus on Capitol Hill right now is so limited that it’s going to require sort of the bipartisan spirit that Joe Biden brought to the ticket, and what made him an appeal or attractive moderate candidate to many voters, to get something like this taken care of by—on Capitol Hill. SOLIS: And I’d like to add, because of that I think you need to watch for policy changes within the White House, and whether or not they come up with a new version of DACA. And it’s also very significant I think to look at something called TPS, which stands for temporary protective status. And it covers folks who already are in the U.S. and got here because of some national disaster or some great civil unrest. Under the Biden administration, he’s quietly increased the countries that have that kind of protection. It doesn’t put them on a pathway to citizenship, just like DACA doesn’t put them on a pathway to citizenship. It puts them in kind of a limbo, but it’s something. ROBBINS: Yeah, it’s a—it is this weird half position, you know, which means that we’re all going to be waiting for some great amnesty somewhere down the road, when sanity returns to Washington. This has been a great conversation. Thank you, Irina, for bringing us together. Thank you, Dianne, so great to see you again. Thank you, Paul. Thank you, Alex. Thank you, Cindy. And thank you everybody else. And I’m going turn it back to Irina. FASKIANOS: I echo your thanks, and just want to encourage you all to follow our speakers on Twitter. Carla, @robbinscarla; Paul, @paul_ange; and Dianne, @disolis. And of course, please visit CFR.org, ThinkGlobalHealth.org, and ForeignAffairs.com for the latest developments and analysis on international trends and events and how they’re affecting the United States. And as always, we encourage you to send us your suggestions for future webinars. Email us at [email protected]. And I hope everybody says cool and safe and well. So thank you all again. (END)
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    BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you very much. Welcome everyone to our roundtable, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations Women and Foreign Policy program, as well as the Think Global Health program, which has assisted with the development of today's roundtable. The subject today is equality in constitutional democracies, and we'll be exploring the Equal Rights Amendment, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Chilean plebiscite and looking at the developments of these themes both in the United States and Chile. So, as you read about in preparation for the event today, women's human rights and civil rights leaders, both in the United States and in Chile, have long championed systemic reforms in the United States. The championing of the Equal Rights Amendment and CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, to constitutionalize and legally advanced gender equality has been an important area of advocacy and growth in recent years. We've seen the Biden-Harris administration pledge to support, both during their campaign and more recently, a new gender policy council that was established through an early executive order by President Biden and has taken unprecedented steps to center gender equality and equity at all levels of federal policymaking. And recently, also in Chile, Chileans overwhelmingly voted to adopt a new, historic constitution that must be drafted and adopted by a constituent assembly that requires gender parity. So, we're so thrilled to welcome our speakers Lisa Valdez and Julie Suk as they consider the meaning of these constitutional and human rights developments for the state of gender equality in the United States, Chile, and globally. We have several goals for our roundtable today. First, we want to explore the state of constitutional gender equality in the United States and, more briefly, in Chile. Second, we want to discuss the localization and implementation of CEDAW, as well as the history and the future of the Equal Rights Amendment (the ERA) and the recent Chilean plebiscites. We want to explore how an international legal framework such as CEDAW is internalized and constitutionalized, and how different levels of government can interact with the norms, the law, and the politics. And finally, we want to consider where and how human rights implementation can happen in the United States, given the history of United States exceptionalism and the reservations, understandings, and declarations, also known as RUDs, that create non-self-executing treaties. So, I will be presiding over this roundtable for the next hour with our speakers, whom I would like to briefly introduce. Professor Lisa Valdez is a professor of government and Latin American, Latino, and Caribbean studies at Dartmouth College. Her research examines the extent to which informal institutional roles shape the possibilities for achieving gender equality. In 2014, she published a really excellent book Defying Convention: U.S. Resistance to the UN Treaty on Women's Rights, which examines the history of CEDAW, the reasons why the U.S. hasn't ratified it, and what impact it might have on the U.S. if it were ratified. Our second speaker Julie Suk is the Florence Rogatz visiting professor of law at Yale University, and she is also a senior research scholar at Yale Law School and a professor of sociology, political science, and liberal studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Her 2020 book, just published, We the Women: The Unstoppable Mothers of the Equal Rights Amendment describes the ERA’s long legislative history, and she's authored dozens of articles, books, and book chapters about comparative constitutional law, the procedural implementation of equality norms in the United States and Europe, gender quotas, and women, work, and family. You can read more about our speakers, including their bios in your meeting packets for today. I'd also like to thank Sam Kiernan, who is a research associate with us in the CFR Global Health and Women and Foreign Policy programs, who has very thoughtfully assisted with the preparation of this round table. So, in terms of our roadmap for today, we will start out where Professor Valdez and Professor Suk each take a few minutes to outline some general thoughts on the subjects they'll be speaking about. And then we will go into a discussion between the three of us, where we aggregate some of these themes, and then we'll open it up in the last twenty-five minutes or so of this session to all of you to ask questions. We invite participants to think about your questions as you move along and send them forward in the chat. And then our moderator will be able to call on you, and when you are called on, if you could please just state your name and affiliation. I'll remind you later on in the program. So, with that, we'll go in alphabetical order, and so, we will start with Professor Baldez first. Lisa Baldez, welcome. BALDEZ: Thank you so much, it's really an honor to share the screen with you, Carrie, and with Julie. Your work, both of you, have really influenced my own thinking on domestic violence, sexual violence, and on the Equal Rights Amendment. So, it's a real honor to be here. So, let me start by talking about what CEDAW is, and then I'll move into how it works and what it would mean for the U.S. to ratify it. So, you know, it's really kind of an international bill of rights that outlines in thirty articles global standards for women's rights in every area of society. The CEDAW was approved by the UN General Assembly in 1979, after many years of wrangling and editing and amendments and revisions. And then it opened for signature in 1980. Since then, 189 countries member countries of the UN have ratified it. Six have not: Iran, Palau, Somalia, Sudan, Tonga, and the United States. So, the question of why the United States hasn't ratified it and what difference would be would it make if we did is an important one, given that this is not the typical company that the U.S. thinks of itself as keeping when it comes to women's rights. So, as I said before, CEDAW defines global standards for women's rights policy. They're really benchmarks for domestic policy for countries to work toward. ratification would commit the United States, as it commits other countries, to engaging in an ongoing and continuous process of reporting on compliance—making progress toward complying with the provisions of the convention. So, the way that that works is the very first step that governments do is they write a comprehensive report on the de facto status of women's rights—sorry, the de jure status of women's rights law and policy and the de facto status of women in the country and all these different areas, and submit it to the UN committee that oversees compliance with CEDAW. Now writing a report may sound like "Okay, we've got a million reports." But, as I'll talk about in a minute, the United States has never done something like that, and so that, in and of itself could be really significant. From there, civil society organizations are invited to issue shadow reports to the to the UN committee, where they can critique, offer more information, challenge, add to the government report, and they are invited to present before the CEDAW committee. The government of the country then sends a delegation to present the report before this committee in Geneva. And that delegation can be as, you know, twenty, thirty, forty people representing all branches of government to come and make the case about women's rights. They engage with a what's called a constructive dialogue with CEDAW officials and experts on that committee. And that is a really, really interesting exchange. It’s uncomfortable for countries to do that—to participate in that process—because there is no country in the world that is in full compliance with the provisions of CEDAW. So, everyone, every delegation is going to get asked hard questions about their failures to comply. But I think the fact that every country is subjected to that is a really important aspect of the convention and how it works. The committee then writes a series of what are called concluding observations—records assessing here's what you're doing well, here's what could be better—and recommends issues for follow up. And then there's a built-in accountability building mechanisms. So, this happens every four years. And the CEDAW committee writes in between then to say, “How are you doing with those recommendations?” So why hasn't the United States ratified it? Well, it's not for lack of trying. The convention has been—come up before the Senate many times. But CEDAW is an Article II treaty, right. It's governed by Article II of the Constitution, which requires executive approval, and a two-thirds Senate vote on advice and consent on a treaty. That’s a really high threshold. It's among the highest for treaty ratification in the world, and it's very difficult to reach, but it's particularly difficult to reach when any kind of controversy comes up. Now, initially, when CEDAW was first approved—actually, when it was being drafted, it was not at all controversial. President Nixon, President Ford, and President Carter sent delegations during the 1970s to Geneva to draft the convention. And those delegations were always bipartisan. They included leaders from the Democratic and Republican Party, and they were headed by Republican Party leader Patricia Hutar. So those who were present—when CEDAW opened for signature in 1980, the people from the United States who went to sign it, and signing is kind of in an intent to ratify, those people were: Sarah Weddington, who was the lawyer in Roe who represented Roe in Roe v. Wade, and also Barbara Mikulski, a U.S. senator from Maryland. From things that they said and reported on later, they felt that that moment was the end of discrimination against women. They felt this is it: we’re done. And there was this incredible hope and optimism about what was about to happen, which didn't happen. Because with the election of President Reagan and a very conservative shift in the ideology of the Republican Party, that support for women's rights was no longer provision a plank within the Republican platform. Now, there were some moderate republican women who supported CEDAW. And when President H.W. Bush held the presidency, they wrote him a petition asking him to put CEDAW under consideration. But slowly, over the course of the Bush administration reviewing CEDAW, those women peeled off that coalition one by one under pressure from party leaders with regard to abortion. And since then, the Republican Party has basically viewed CEDAW as a carte blanche for abortion on demand. The last big push for ratification came in 2010. Conditions looked really favorable. You had Barack Obama as president, Joe Biden, who was an early supporter of CEDAW, as vice president, Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, and Milan Verveer as the ambassador for global women's issues. Senator Kerry headed up the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and there were more than a hundred organizations that supported ratification. But there are also more than a hundred organizations that opposed ratification, and they opposed it very strenuously. The Republican Party is generally opposed to human rights treaties on the grounds that they are international treaties that shape domestic law, or at least intend to shape domestic law. And the Republican Party has been very successful in framing CEDAW as a very direct threat to American women and to American families, and they've had all kinds of rhetoric about this will end Mother's Day, will create abortion on demand, which I think are quite over-exaggerated. Whereas the supporters’ rhetoric about what would happen if we ratified CEDAW has pointed to benefits that are more diffuse. We will be able to help the world's women and expand women's rights abroad, or we will further ensure rights that many Americans think American women already have. So, there's a long and ongoing history. It is, as Carrie mentioned, was on the platform of the Biden-Harris campaign by both. Biden supports ratification. My academic view is that the odds of ratification are vanishingly slim. It's up to advocates about whether or not people want to pursue that form. But what we can do in the meantime is something I'm going to call “domestication without ratification.” And I'm happy to talk about this more in the Q&A. But one is advocates could push for a comprehensive report on women's rights in the country to be written. And I think the Gender Policy Council, which reports directly to Biden, is a logical place to start with that. We can continue to enforce the treaties that the United States has ratified. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does have some planks on women's rights. And really importantly, there is a campaign going on right now called Cities for CEDAW that looks at translating the principles of CEDAW into local and state level policy and creating laws or ordinances that adopt the principles of CEDAW to local government, and that's a way to circumvent deadlock in the Senate at the federal level. I'll stop there. I want to just leave two questions about this domestication without ratification issue or effort. Does tying local women's rights to an international treaty, to CEDAW, does that strengthen the claims, or does it, in this context, weaken them? And then what would it take to ensure compliance about local efforts to comply with CEDAW, given that what I view is important about CEDAW is this ongoing process that ensures accountability over the long term? So, without that, and without a lot of mobilization on behalf of it, it's really hard to hold local efforts to account. So, I'll stop there, and I look forward to the questions. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you so much, Professor Baldez. Professor Suk, now over to you. We would love to hear from you about some of these themes as they play out in the context of the Equal Rights Amendment. SUK: Right. Thank you so much, Carrie, for organizing this forum. It's such a pleasure to appear with you and with Lisa Valdez, whose work I admire, both of you. So, thank you so much. So, one anomaly of the U.S. Constitution is that it does not have a provision guaranteeing equal rights between women and men. That principle was explicitly articulated in the UN Charter and Article 2.A of CEDAW instructs all nations to enshrine this principle in their constitutions, and almost every constitution currently enforced in the world has such a provision, which has been considered a staple of modern constitutionalism since World War II. Sex equality is a basic human right. And as the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in her many writings on the Equal Rights Amendment and congressional testimonies in the 1970s, the sex equality guarantee should be thought of as a human right, on par with any guarantee of freedom of speech or religion belonging in every modern constitution. And like CEDAW, the absence of gender equality rights in the U.S. Constitution is not for lack of trying. Women's movements have proposed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing equality of rights not to be denied or abridged on account of sex since 1923. The U.S. Constitution’s rule for amendment, however, at Article 5, requires two-thirds of Congress, which is to say both houses of Congress and then ratification by three-fourths of the states, typically by the state legislatures, to make a constitutional amendment. So, ERA proponents struggled for about fifty years, from 1923 to 1972, just to get the two-thirds of both houses of Congress to act. That did not happen. We didn't get both houses of Congress, two-thirds, to act in the same session until 1971–72. And when it finally did, there was a political compromise. And it was a compromise that was unduly shaped by a vocal, relentless, and small minority in the Senate. It led to the inclusion of a seven-year deadline on ratification for the state legislatures. And so, the fact that we got this compromise, I mean, the ERA did go out to the states for ratification by way of this compromise in 1972, but that deadline was something that was inserted because a few members of the vocal minority really felt strongly about it. And it raises questions about the relationship of gender equality to democracy and the structures and procedures in the context of lawmaking, including constitutional lawmaking, to legitimize this to legitimize constitutional democracy itself. So, what happens with the ERA? There's that seven-year deadline, and thirty states—and that's a super majority of the states, that's 60 percent of the states—ratified it quite quickly. By the end of 1973, within a year and a half, we got thirty states. But at that point, ratification stalled, and only thirty-five states ratified the ERA by 1977. Ratification stalled largely because a Stop ERA Movement, led by Phyllis Schlafly, really brought attention to and caused a lot of fear and confusion about what the ERA would do in terms of the status of mothers, children, and families. But because ratification stalled, Congress extended the deadline once in 1978, just by a few years to 1982. But no additional states ratified before 1982. And in 1982, the ERA was presumed dead and long forgotten. But in recent years, the ERA has been revived. So, after the women's march in 2017, Nevada actually ratified the ERA just that year in March 2017. And the Me Too Movement, that really gained steam in the fall of 2017, really led Illinois to ratify the ERA in 2018 in the spring. And then with the nineteenth amendment centennial on the horizon for 2020 and women running in record numbers for Virginia state legislature, that led to Virginia ratifying the ERA in 2020. So now, thirty-eight states have ratified, albeit three states ratifying decades after the last congressionally imposed ratification deadline. And what's really interesting about this revival is that the state, particularly women of color, who have led the effort in Nevada, Illinois, and Virginia, they've really emphasized that a new meaning for the ERA. It's not only about the 1970s agenda, which was largely about getting rid of gender classifications that were explicit in the law. That project what has had some success through litigation in the federal courts and certainly through landmark Supreme Court decisions. So, by the time we get to the twenty-first century revival, the ERA is not just about getting rid of sex discrimination in the law, but actually empowering legislature to put gender equality front and center in policy agendas. You might think of that—this idea of legislators being in the driver's seat, rather than courts, centering gender in all policy agendas—as a form of gender mainstreaming that you see in many other countries around the world and the European Union. The idea that gender and the impact on women is something to be considered before any policy is adopted. And this is not a totally new twenty-first century idea. I think it is an idea that's been in CEDAW, as well. But also, domestically, women in Congress in the 1970s, when they adopted the ERA, sure, they talked about getting rid of gender discrimination and the law. But many of the leaders including some of the first women of color elected to Congress, in the late 1960s, when they argued for the ERA, they also talked about the need for legislatures to implement real equality through legislation. And that's something—they were explicit about it. They were talking about childcare and infrastructure that they worked on in the 70s, but which we still don't really have at the federal level. So, when the ERA was revived in Nevada, Illinois, and Virginia, so much of the floor debate discourse about what it would mean had to do not just with getting rid of sex discrimination, but with passing laws at the state and federal level to really address the problem of unequal pay, the unequal burdens of childcare, the unfair treatment of pregnant workers. And these policy agendas, which I think have been around since the 70s, have really not been addressed fully or adequately, even today in 2021. And those agendas, I think, have achieved a renewed sense of urgency because of the effects of the pandemic economy on women and particularly working mothers. So, I just want to say a few words about where we are today, after those three late ratifications. One huge question obviously, both legally and politically is whether or not the late ratifications can be counted to validate the ERA and actually add it to the Constitution. And there is pending litigation and legislation in an effort to resolve this issue. After Virginia ratified, the House actually passed a resolution in 2020. And then they passed it again in 2021, declaring the ERA to be ratified as soon as thirty-eight states ratify it, notwithstanding any prior deadlines. The Senate didn't take action last legislative session. In this legislative session, it's been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the House Resolution can be brought up by the majority leadership on the floor. But the real issue now, even though it's believed that there are enough votes to actually pass the resolution in the Senate, the filibuster effectively requires sixty votes for cloture before it could be voted on in the Senate. And so, it's believed that the ERA deadline removal in the Senate would have fifty-two votes, but not sixty. And that's what's holding that up and, currently, as a matter of removing the deadline. At the same time, the three states that ratified most recently have brought litigation arguing that deadlines—that the ratification deadline on the ERA, and in general, is not legally binding, and therefore the ERA is part of the Constitution now and should be recognized as such. So, there are clearly those issues that need to be resolved, whether in litigation or legislation. I'm happy to talk more specifically about them in the Q&A if there's an interest. But I think most importantly, there are substantive issues that are raised by the ERA’s revival because of the intervening legal developments in judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, that because of the litigation pioneered by Justice Ginsburg as a lawyer in the 1970s, we actually have constitutional law under the Equal Protection Clause that prohibits sex discrimination by government. But what we've never really done is interpret our constitutional right to equality more robustly to obligate the government to promote gender equality on the ground. And the court has actually struck down Congress's efforts to legislate gender equality, including through the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) civil remedy provision. And that stands in stark contrast to many other countries— Germany and France, for example—that have adopted new constitutional amendments that explicitly authorize and obligate the state to promote real equality, whether through access to positions of power, or also, in Germany, a 1994 constitutional amendment that obligates the government to eradicate disadvantages that now exist in an effort to actually implement the principle of equal rights between women and men. And so, I think these ideas are important. And the way that the ERA resolves has tremendous implications, not only for the future of gender equality, but the process by which we amend the Constitution and whether or not that process is a democratic one. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you so much, Julie. Wonderful. So, we've got two examples of historic efforts that have present day manifestations and lots of law and policy implications in our current administration, our current world, and so, we'd like to do a little bit of a deeper dive into a few of the themes that you both have flagged. So, I'd like to start with you, Lisa, to talk a little bit more about the domestication of CEDAW. You spoke a bit about both national level as well as local and municipal efforts to domesticate CEDAW. I was wondering if you could give us a little bit more granular detail about examples of local or municipal governments that have taken efforts to domesticate CEDAW, the Cities for CEDAW campaign, the C for C campaign, and your thoughts on the future of domestication and localization of CEDAW in the U.S. or elsewhere. BALDEZ: Thanks. So, the Cities for CEDAW campaign is really capitalizing on the city of San Francisco, which adopted a CEDAW ordinance I believe in 1998, and created a CEDAW task force. And so, that involved a couple of different steps. The first thing was to look at CEDAW and figure out how to translate the articles of CEDAW into something that would make sense in the context of what the city government does in the city of San Francisco. And so, they focused on three areas: economic development, health care, and violence against women. And that's not exactly the language that CEDAW uses, but that's how San Francisco or this group at this taskforce interpreted it. So that was the first step. The second was creating a series of steps. So one, the first step was creating a plan for action. So, what is this going to entail, and who is going to do the work of talking to various agencies and government bureaus throughout the city to talk about what they needed to do to come into compliance? They also adopted a training module—so a process of how to train municipal officials to think about gender equality, and how to perform a gender analysis and then to actually do this work. I think a really important piece of it is a gender analysis of the budget, right? What does the budget entail in terms of benefits to men and benefits to women? And to what extent does that support, does the budget support promoting women's rights? I think that's the third. So that's one way in which this happened. And there are—Cities for CEDAW is a really active campaign. There have been a lot of efforts. There's some activist on the issue of sex trafficking in the state of Kentucky that landed on CEDAW, and article six of CEDAW in particular, which talks about trafficking and prostitution, and used that to persuade the legislature to adopt an anti-trafficking law and policy in the state of Kentucky. So, that was a really kind of almost ad hoc domestication of an international treaty that had really powerful effect in the state of Kentucky. And then the third thing I want to mention is more of a germ of possibility. I was giving a talk on CEDAW to a high school organization a few weeks ago. And I talked to them, they said, “Well, what would it look like if we domesticated CEDAW here?” And I said, “Well, you could go to town meeting, and talk, raise questions, ask about gender inequity or the gender nature of the budget or just, you know, ask questions and see how people respond and try to figure out, you know, how you might make that relevant. And I could see their eyes like, honing in and thinking like, “Yeah, we're totally gonna do that.” Town meeting is a is a big deal around here, and it's open to everyone. And it suddenly gave them a way to connect that kind of advocacy work they're doing on a broader level to their own communities. So, I see there's a lot of hope there. You know, I have concerns about the domestic, the local process because unless you build in these accountability mechanisms, or unless, if someone violates them, you can bring out, you know, protest or people mobilizing to say, “Hey, you're not allowed, you can't do that.” It's really dependent on the kind of will of political leaders. And anytime you're dependent on the will of political leaders that, you know, that places a lot of weight on the shoulder of the leader. So, those are my concerns about it, but also some possibilities for hope. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you so much. And I want to acknowledge my own county mayor, Daniella Levine Cava, who was a champion of having CEDAW implemented in Miami Dade County, and I know, one of her colleagues from the county is participating in this session, and I would invite her to join the conversation during the question and answer period. We want to make sure that we touch on Chile as a comparative example. And to think about the developments in the gender parity requirements with the Chilean plebiscite, and to think about how that maps on to these questions of gender equity and parody that we're speaking about in the CEDAW context. So Lisa, can you talk a little bit about what has happened recently in Chile in this context? BALDEZ: Sure. I think to make sense of it, there's a little bit of background that needs to happen. One is that, you know, for at least the past five, maybe ten years, feminist movements have been so highly mobilized and active on issues relating to abortion and reproductive freedom, femicides—femicides are murders of women on the basis of their gender—and other public policy issues, sorry violence against women and sexual violence of all of all kinds. And so, these movements have been out there, the equivalent of what Black Lives Matter protests have looked like in United States, for several years. In 2015, the Chilean legislature adopted a quota law that requires 40 percent of legislative candidates for office to be women. Now, that sounds pretty progressive, but Chile is almost the last country in Latin America to adopt a law like that. Argentina was the first in 1991. And these laws have been incredibly successful at raising the percentage of women in elective office. Now, the constituent assembly grew out of a protest in Chile that started with students protesting a fare hike for the metro—for the subway. And it almost instantly exploded into a nationwide anti-system estallido, uprising, in Chile. And out of that process, came a demand for a new constitution and to get rid of the constitution that was fraudulently approved under General Pinochet in 1980. The coalition of women—it's an across the political spectrum coalition of women who mobilized to get the quota law in Congress—quickly realized that there's going to be a constituent assembly in Chile, that they wanted to quote a law approved of that. And these women had been in the political parties, and they knew the ways that party leaders could circumvent or ignore the provisions of the quota law. So, they were ready. And they had a very specific proposal for the constituent assembly that was approved. And here's the way the parody law works with a with regard to choosing delegates for the constituent assembly. So first of all, the different parties and independent coalitions of citizens can advance lists of candidates from whom voters can choose and elect the 155 members of the constituent assembly. And these elections are taking place on May 15. So, all of those lists must be headed by a woman. The second provision for the lists is that—they call it the zebra rule in Chile, others countries call it the zipper rule—there has to be alternation, has to go woman, man, woman, man throughout, to the bottom of the list. And that means if there is an odd number of seats, then there's always going to be one more woman than man. But the law also applies to the results of the election. So, in a district with an odd number of seats, the difference between the number of men and women elected cannot be more than one. So there has to be, you know, close. And if that is not the case, then they have a system where the best loser replaces the worst winner. And what that means, let's say you have a district with eight seats in it. And then the election result is you get six men and two women. That's out of compliance with the quota law or the parity law. So, the two women with the highest votes will replace the two men with the lowest votes. And the women have to be from the same list. So that's a way that this parity law is, I would say, ironclad to have parity at the list level and at the outcome level, which is really powerful. Now, when election lists were submitted to the electoral commission, and last January, January 2021, thirty-seven of the lists did not comply with the zebra principle. So, women immediately mobilized to demand that the list be fixed. And this is that where the mobilization of women—this ongoing kind of massive protest in Chile and other countries—comes to the fore. And there is immediately press conferences and calls for the electoral commission to correct the list, which they did. So, when Chileans go to the polls on May 15, they'll select 155 people who will rewrite Chile's constitution, and half of them will be women. I should say that there are also seventeen seats reserved for indigenous people, and 5 percent of the seats will go for people with disabilities. There was a request to have reserved seats for Afro-Chileans, but that was not approved. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you, for that comparative example. Very interesting. Julie, I'd like to turn to you. Back to the theme of kind of the Equal Rights Amendment in the age of COVID. Right, we're in the age of a global pandemic, a national and a global reckoning on race, a surge in white male supremacist violence in the U.S., a global recession that's deeply impacted women and communities of color. My colleague, Catherine Powell, has referred to this as the gender and the color of COVID. So, I want to ask you, first of all, what does the ERA mean, in this moment? You started to touch on some of those themes previously, and then second of all, if you could take us, comparatively, to think about other countries that have engaged in gender mainstreaming, and what that has looked like? And again, kind of reflecting on COVID times what that looks like, now or in the future? SUK: I think we're at a real crossroads. And the two questions you asked are quite related. Because, I mean, Lisa was explaining the gender parity provisions of the process by which a gender parity constituent assembly will be elected in Chile, and that grows out of prior laws that existed for a few years in Chile, requiring gender parity for electing the legislature. And that's related to similar laws that have existed in Europe for a few decades now. But the laws requiring gender parity, essentially gender quotas for certain positions of power that emerged in Europe after intense constitutional fights at the domestic level in countries like France and Germany that produced constitutional amendments that you can see as analogous to the ERA. But those amendments, so in Germany in 1994, specifically to authorize positive measures to promote gender equality, like quotas for elected office or quotas for corporate boards, they put into—there was already a nondiscrimination provision that dates back to post World War II: no discrimination on grounds of sex. But they added language that said that the law shall eradicate disadvantages that now exist; shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights between women and men. And in France, the struggle over gender quotas, both for electoral office and gender quotas, the constitutional court struck that down as being against equality. And so there were new amendments, in the late twentieth century and in the early 2000s, that explicitly said the law shall promote equal access by men and women. And I tell the story because you could see these new amendments, these late twentieth century amendments, as saying equality is not mere formal equality. Authorizing the legislature to actually take gender into account, and in fact, obligating the legislature to take gender into account to achieve real quality is what the constitutional principle of gender equality is about. And I think this is something we're at a real crossroads with in the United States. Because we actually have, in response to the Me Too Movement, California passed a law requiring at least one woman—some form of gender balance, or at least gender inclusion—on corporate boards. And that's being litigated right now, and it's being argued that that's actually sex discrimination because under a formal understanding of gender equality, taking gender into account in that way, including gender representation and gender empowerment, could be by some understanding, a violation of equal protection rather than an advancement of equal protection. And this is where I think having a new amendment could be helpful. But that new amendment, the Equal Rights Amendment, it just says equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. And so, if the men's movement, for example, wants to mobilize and say that efforts to promote women's empowerment is actually a violation of the ERA, that is something that could be available to them unless a particular legislative history that makes clear the meaning of the ERA as actually promoting women's equality, particularly in COVID times where if you want to do a real infrastructure of gender equality, it might involve things like childcare policy. It might involve what some people are calling the Marshall Plan for mom's—actually compensating women for unpaid care work. And some of those policy proposals may have to be gender sensitive and gender conscious, rather than formally gender neutral. And that's something that I think it's not clear from the text of the ERA itself—if the ERA requires gender neutrality or gender consciousness. But I think that when it's not clear, it's up to the people to mobilize to make clear what it is they want if they're making a constitutional amendment now. And so, while it's midstream in Congress, I think it is important for people to speak out, and for hearings to be held, so that the new public meaning of the ERA for the twenty-first century, addressing the gender displacements and inequalities that have been occasioned by the pandemic economy. But that conversation is absolutely crucial to the ERA doing anything useful for gender equality in the future. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you so much. This is wonderful. Okay, so we're going to open it up now to the panelists. And Lisa, if you have a few—I'm going to just say, folks can start to think of your questions, please raise your hands. I'm going to turn it over to Lisa to say a couple of words about gender-based violence or anything else she'd like to wrap up this piece of the conversation on and then turn it over to a question and answer. I see a couple of hands up. And please, when you are called on if you could please identify your name and your organizational affiliation. So, Lisa, some closing thoughts here. BALDEZ: Thanks. Thanks for asking that. It's obviously fundamental. So, I talked about the way in which the parity law is going to affect the numbers of women who will be elected. But there's another question about what will they do once they're there. And a lot of people in mobilizing for parity or gender quotas have a view that they have a particular set, a particular way to define what they think women's interests are. But women rarely share interest across all the different intersectionalities of our identities. And there, you know, so that's an open question. I think, is a particularly open question because I suspect that women on the right will be a quite a powerful bloc, or B-L-O-C, within the constituent assembly, and the degree to which they're likely to share an agenda with women to the left of them is unclear. However, I think domestic violence and gender-based violence is one of the issues on which we are most likely to see agreement across the political spectrum. And that is where the, the Me Too Movement, the very creative and dramatic world-influencing protests that have happened in Chile will have, will connect with this institutional focus to raise the issue of gender-based violence and, hopefully, to make some real progress there. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Wonderful. Thank you. Okay. Is the CFR manager going to call us out? EVENT MANAGER: Yes. So, just as a reminder to ask a question, click on the raise hand icon on your Zoom window, and when you were called on accept the unmute now prompt before proceeding with your name and affiliation, followed by your question. We will also be sharing the roster of registered participants in the chat. So, our first question comes from Ryan Kaminsky. KAMINSKY: Thank you very much, and this was a terrific conversation. And I hope one of many to come. And just a big thank you to all the panelists and CFR. My name is Ryan Kaminski. I’m with the Truman National Security Project. I have two quick questions. First, on misinformation that came up earlier specific to CEDAW, what are the panelists’ thoughts on combating some of the misinformation we see on these human rights treaties time and time again? With CEDAW it was you know, Mother's Day is going to be eliminated. With the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, there was, you know, the UN is going to come after your kids. What, you know, are some tactics that we can really use to help address this problem of complete misinformation about these agreements? And second on CEDAW, you know, one opportunity coming up on the Biden-Harris administration might be a voluntary national review of the United States on the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). And that would open the door for a national conversation and a national update and reporting on Sustainable Development Goal five on gender equality. I'm just wondering if any of the panelists have thoughts on that? And if so, what would be ways to really make sure that this is a national conversation and that this reporting opportunity on SDG five and other goals related to gender equality really maximize on such an opportunity that can potentially happen in 2022? Thank you very much. BALDEZ: Yeah. Thanks, Ryan. That's a great a great question. It's a really important question. So, one of the concerns that has always motivated my research as a political scientist is looking for possible coalitions across the political spectrum. And, you know, you can see I mentioned moderate Republican women and their support for CEDAW and how that kind of breaks apart in 1980 and remains quite apart. And I think that the argument about CEDAW obligating participation in a process that does not guarantee any particular outcome, I think it's empirically valid—there's data to support it—but it's also, I think, politically, one possibility. And I may be naïve here, but I think, you know, focusing on CEDAW as a set of questions, and a set of procedures, and a set of accountability is something that that I could see people getting behind. Now, I'm a political scientist. I'm not an advocate. I study framing, but I am not an expert in framing in ways that will make people kind of shift their position. But my hope is that there's that some way to create some middle ground where clearly very little exists right now. And then with regard to the Sustainable Development Goals, I'm really happy to hear that. I wasn't aware of that. And I think that's really, really important. And that too, will play a role in, you know, raising people's awareness of where we're at as a country with regard to the status of women. SUK: So just to add on to that, some of the misinformation you mentioned about CEDAW was also misinformation about the ERA, specifically, that it was going to be, whether by getting rid of Mother's Day or otherwise, really bad for mothers to have legal mechanisms for gender equality, largely based on understanding that it would mean always never being gender conscious of anything. And I think there are two major issues. One is that I think there are mechanisms at both in both state legislatures and at the national level in Congress that actually inhibit real debate. And so, for example, part of the reason the ERA doesn't get ratified in Nevada, Virginia, and Illinois in the 1970s—Virginia is actually a great example—is that it's bottled up in committee. And so, there isn't actually a floor debate. In a lot of sessions, there aren't real possibilities for having an open debate. And I think one fear right now, is that there, you know, there have been very few hearings on the ERA. And in the Senate, I think, there's—even though very ironically, the filibuster rule was designed because unlimited debate was supposed to be a good thing—the specter of unlimited debate ensures that there's actually no debate. Until you think you have sixty votes for something, nobody wants to bring it to the floor. And so, I think that the old-fashioned view is, of course, that you have to have an open and rational debate in proper channels in order to combat misinformation. But if you have a whole bunch of rules that are actually going to inhibit debate or keep the debates within certain concentrated places, like specific committees, then I think that's going to allow the misinformation to have more influence than it ought to. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: Thank you very much. We are now going to turn it over to Ellie Smeal for the next question. SMEAL: Thank you. I have two different ones, totally different ones. One is that I'm sure you're all aware that Afghanistan had an equal rights amendment, or has an equal-rights-amendment–type thing, in its constitution. And many of us are extremely worried about what is going to happen to Afghanistan if the Taliban has a dominant role. And how do we raise—I think we have to raise—a worldwide women's movement to the dangers of Afghanistan? Here we are in 2021, and we could be taking all rights away from women again. This other part is the ERA in the United States, where there is an act of movement to get rid of the filibuster. And we are—I should have said Ellie Smeal, Feminist Majority—there's a whole group, a huge coalition now to eliminate the filibuster as an anti-democratic—with a small “d”—an anti-democracy measure in which a small minority controls. And you're absolutely right, Julie, that in many states, we have not—it's been bottled up in committee, the Equal Rights Amendment. Virginia was one; there was never a vote in the House until we literally had to flip the House and the Senate to progressive control. And, or, in this case, Democratic control. When we started this fight in the South, the Democrats were the Dixiecrats, and they bottled it up. When we—now, the Dixiecrats are Republicans, but the whole time, there never was a vote, until we actually flipped everything. And then, it took us all this time; it isn't like we weren't working on who was being elected. It took—it's very hard with gerrymandering, with so many other problems, to flip in certain states. And Nevada, by the way, the reason we could pass it in 2017 is the flip election was 2016. In Nevada, we finally got a progressive Democrats majority in Nevada, both houses, and they immediately passed the ERA, because there had been a movement, and there has been a movement in the states all the way through. It’s amazing how people have just stuck to it, even though the process is actually so undemocratic that it's outrageous. BALDEZ: And I like to respond to the first part of the question, if I may. First of all, getting asked a question by Ellie Smeal—big goal of mine, so thank you. The Feminist Majority Foundation, as you know well, was active on raising awareness about the status of women under the mujahideen, under Taliban rule long before 9/11 happened. And Afghanistan and CEDAW—U.S. ratification of CEDAW—have always kind of walked hand-in-hand. During the war on terror, when Bush was president, Democrats framed CEDAW ratification in terms of if you really want to protect the status of women in Afghanistan, you will ratify CEDAW, and brought Afghan leaders to the floor of the House and the Senate and really used that as a mobilizing tool. And that's really when it came closest to being ratified. The United States has ratified three of the nine UN human rights treaties. And my explanation for which ones get ratified, have to do with some kind of international incident or foreign policy response that the president wants to make and decides to use ratification as a way to address or signal support for a particular issue. The Genocide Convention, the Convention Against Torture, these all came in a particular context. What I would love to see is the status of women around the world being connected to the status of women in the United States, and this global movement connecting, and we're so close to being connected. We have the means at hand. But it might take—you know, actually, I don't know what it would take to get a president to put that kind of capital on the line. But certainly, the kind of work that you have done for a long time and the prospects of mobilizing and pulling together all these Me Too Movements around the world is that what I think it would take too. SUK: So Ellie, it's always wonderful to hear your voice. And your voice has been such a crucial part of how we've gotten as far as we've gotten on the ERA. So, thank you so much for being here and for sharing your thoughts about the movements. And I think it's a real reminder that the ERA has been going on for generations, has been mobilized by women for generations, and that's part of the importance of why it needs to be added to the Constitution now, as much for what it will do as law, as it is to just recognize the political work that women have done across generations, standing on each other's shoulders. And so, it's like Pauli Murray said in 1970 in an ERA hearing, she said that the Equal Rights Amendment was not just about winning cases in court, it was about women's empowerment. And, and I think Ellie's comment really shows how it's really by empowering women that the next step could be taken. So, in addition to just thinking in terms of rights, it's about women through—and of course, in other countries, the parity mechanisms has made it much faster in many respects, than here. But we really have to think about who's in power, and what our structural mechanisms are in our democracy to empower everybody who's previous like, especially people who have previously been marginalized and excluded. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: I would just also add to the chorus of thanks to Ellie for your question and note that during my time, when I had the opportunity to serve as the White House advisor on violence against women to then Vice President Biden, one thing that I really learned was that framing women's equality and women's human rights issues and intersectional equality issue, when that can be framed in terms of, for example, national security and other areas that are not thought of as “gendered” those can be very effective ways of advancing conversations into spaces where people in silos don't necessarily have a meeting of the minds. And so, I think about an op-ed that Valerie Hudson has published in the New York Times—and she's spoken at previous CFR roundtables about this—about framing women's human rights as a national security issue. And in Afghanistan, in particular, as well as in the United States, incorporating that into U.S. foreign policy and finding ways to make it a foreign policy prerogative of the United States and other countries can be a way to drive this through various political as well as legal channels. So, okay, and yes, and Catherine Powell, also writes we may need a woman U.S. president to also accomplish some of these goals. Yes. Great. In our last minute. I'd like to read a question that, Yana, I'm sorry, I don't know your last name, who works with Representative Jackie Spear placed in the chat to us her mic is not working. So, I will read the question, and turn it over to Professor Suk and Baldez for some final thoughts. She says, “Beyond the Morrison case, the case that Professor Suk referred to in regarding the VAWA civil rights remedy, what are some concrete examples of ways that the Equal Rights Amendment can have an impact? Do you think the ERA would usher in strict scrutiny for sex discrimination? And would that be a positive development? SUK: Great, this is a really important question. So, section two of the ERA gives Congress the power to legislate to implement the Equal Rights Amendment. And I think that's becoming increasingly important not only because of the Morrison case in 2000, but because other ways in which the federal judiciary has been limiting Congress's power to act, both with regard to the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, as well as a very limited and then understanding of Congress's power to promote equality under section five of the fourteenth amendment. So, I think that having an extra set of tools under the Equal Rights Amendment that would make it really clear that Congress can actually pass national legislation to promote gender equality, and remove barriers that exist, particularly after the pandemic, to women's economic security and advancement, that that's really important because a lot of things that are being done right now that are proactive on the federal level, are being challenged as not properly within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. People are bringing litigation, attacking things like moratorium on evictions at the federal level as being not properly authorized by the Commerce Clause. So, I think expanding or making clear Congress's power to enact robust gender equality policy is actually very important because some of it will be challenged in litigation in the future. With regard to strict scrutiny, I think that's a complicated question because it meant something different in 1972 than it means today. In 1972, ERA proponents wanted strict scrutiny not just for gender classifications, but for policies that desperately impacted and adversely impacted women. The Supreme Court in the late 1970s said that they weren't going to strictly scrutinize disparate impact, and then started strictly scrutinizing race-based affirmative action. So even though strict scrutiny started out as substantive race- and gender-equality promoting, the courts started using it to scrutinize measures to actually promote racial equality and gender equality. So now, it's just a little, it's not really clear that having strict scrutiny for sex classifications under the law for any form of gender consciousness is going to be a useful tool if the goal is to remove the disadvantages that women face. On the other hand, if strict scrutiny were reinterpreted to actually mean strict scrutiny for disparate impact, then you could see it as being doctrinally useful for removing women's disadvantages. But I think one thing that's clear from 1970 to now, is that the point of the ERA is to remove women's second-class citizenship and disadvantage. But I don't think I don't think that strict scrutiny would necessarily do that. But I don't think strict scrutiny is necessarily part of the text of the ERA. So, then it's really up to the ERA’s proponents to be very clear in the legislative history now as to whether or not strict scrutiny is desirable, and if it is desirable, what it means: strict scrutiny of classifications versus strict scrutiny of disparate impact. BALDEZ: I'm going to conclude with just two quick observations. Countries that have equal rights amendments, other countries, in many of them the equal rights amendment covers both state action by state actors, government officials, public officials, and private actors, individual citizens. And the question I have about the Equal Rights Amendment, I think it's really a question for another panel, would be to what extent is the ERA likely to address state action solely versus also private action? And that's very relevant, as Carrie’s work has shown many times, to the issue of violence against women. SUK: Oh, well to that question that the ERA that's currently working its way through Congress says equality of rights shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state. So as a textual matter, even though I think it's an interesting idea, and there were earlier drafts of the ERA that just said women and men shall have equal rights, period. But that's not in what's actually working its way right now, has state action language in it. So, it'd be harder to argue that the ERA that's now being completed, if it is completed, actually addresses anything other than state action. And as a general matter, I think, some state constitutions notwithstanding, I think, in terms of the enforcement of federal constitutional rights, the state action doctrine has been so central that I don't really envision the federal judiciary abandoning that with regard to the ERA unless both textually and legislative history wise that were made explicit. BETTINGER-LOPEZ: We are a little bit past the hour, so we are going to conclude at this point. Thank you to our wonderful panelists. We had a great discussion today and we are looking forward to continuing this conversation. For any attendees who didn't have a chance to ask their questions, please feel free to contact us offline, and we'd love to continue to engage with you. Thank you very much.
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