The Korea Summit

North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of nuclear weapons and the modernization of its already large conventional force.

President Trump’s approach to summits is fueling, rather than mitigating, global instability.

President Trump prides himself on being a "dealmaker." In one of his biggest deals yet, he brokered a joint statement between the United States and North Korea. To what extent did he use his eleven-step method from The Art of the Deal?

The Singapore summit lessened the chances of conflict in the short term, but the ultimate legacy of the summit could still be a march toward war.

Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong Un changed the trajectory of the U.S.-North Korea relationship from confrontation toward cooperation and provided dramatic images of reconciliation with their well-hyped June 12, 2018 summit meeting in Singapore. This meeting has bought time to address North Korea’s nuclear threat and reduced the risk of near-term military conflict. But the four points of the joint statement signed by the two leaders underscored the magnitude and difficulty of the work remaining to be done. The document signed by the two leaders for the first time envisioned a normal relationship between the United States and North Korea and reiterated Kim Jong Un’s commitment first made to South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the April 27, 2018 inter-Korean Panmunjom declaration to “complete denuclearization,” and pledged to renew joint work toward prisoners of war/missing-in-action (POW/MIA) recovery of remains from the Korean War. It also authorized a process of follow-on negotiations to be led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and a North Korean counterpart. By normalizing Kim Jong Un as an actor on the world stage, by pledging efforts to establish “new U.S.-DPRK relations,” and by pledging to curtail U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, Trump has moved dramatically in the direction of meeting longstanding North Korean demands to end the “hostile relationship” between Washington and Pyongyang and offering security guarantees as a requirement for denuclearization. But Kim Jong Un does not appear to have reciprocated U.S. concessions. This is concerning given North Korea’s track record of pocketing concessions rather than delivering quid pro quos. North Korea reiterated an aspiration to achieve “complete denuclearization” and pledged to destroy a missile engine test site, but the timeline and scope of such a process are not clear. In this respect, the United States appears to have given more than expected, while there are no concrete North Korean actions envisioned that might validate Kim Jong Un’s seriousness of purpose to denuclearize. Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un is being normalized on the international stage despite North Korea’s status as an illegal nuclear weapons state. The joint statement did not directly address North Korea’s missile development, chemical and biological weapons programs, or human rights situation, underscoring the limited time and progress made during technical negotiations. Likewise, U.S. and UN sanctions will stay in place pending tangible progress toward complete denuclearization, although no additional U.S. sanctions will be added. But the symbolism of the meeting ensures that the maximum pressure campaign has peaked and that, in practice, China and South Korea will push for relaxation of economic pressure on North Korea. Nor did the U.S.-North Korea joint statement provide any sense of linkage to the processes between peace and denuclearization or to inter-Korean commitments outlined in the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom declaration. All these issues must go onto the agenda of the Pompeo-led process to come, but the likelihood of rapid progress is not high given the apparent vagueness of the commitments contained in the joint statement between the two leaders. Despite the drama and historic nature of the meeting, the outcome did not live up to the hype. As a result, Trump faces a huge challenge in selling a turn in U.S.-North Korea relations as an historic accomplishment. The best way to do that will be for Pompeo and his team to roll up their sleeves and get back to work, together with our allies, to make a real peace on the Korean peninsula.

The agreement between President Trump and Kim Jong Un may be the start of denuclearization, or another failed effort brought down by North Korean cheating. But if the United States and North Korea are to have a new relationship, it must include the human rights dimension. There’s no reason to rehearse here in detail the astonishing nature of the regime’s tyranny. The size and vicious nature of its prison camp system, the punishment of family members for what the regime appears to believe is a blood taint, the number of deaths, the murder of Otto Warmbier—all are well known. It is the most brutal regime on Earth.  The first point to make is that raising human rights issues will not destroy the effort to change North Korea’s nuclear conduct. President George W. Bush raised freedom of religion repeatedly with Chinese leaders and that did not prevent a working relationship. President Reagan put human rights issues at the center of his relations with the Soviets, and that did not prevent remarkable progress in the relationship. As George Shultz wrote in his memoir Turmoil and Triumph,  Ronald Reagan and I both gave pride of place to human rights. He took up the subject at each of his meetings with Gorbachev and with most visitors from the Soviet Union to the Oval Office.  I pounded on the subject at every opportunity....” Indeed he did, making it the first subject at meetings rather than a throwaway in the final minutes. Yet relations with the Soviets prospered. The second point to make is that the only possible guarantee that a nuclear deal with North Korea will last over the years is some change in that society. As long as there is brutal one-man rule, the only thing needed to destroy any progress that has been made is a whim by that man. If and when there are others with influence—some day, one can dream, a journalist or legislator or mayor or clergyman—there can be something called “public opinion.” It exists even in dictatorships. Shultz described Reagan’s approach to the Soviets this way: “I’m not playing games. I’m not trying to push you into a corner publicly. I understand politicians even in your circumstances have to worry about how they look and don’t want to be pushed around in public.” So pressing for change in North Korea is not utopian and foolish idealism. Shultz noted that he and Reagan “increasingly emphasi[zed] to the Soviets the advantages to them, in the emerging knowledge and information age, of changing the way they dealt with their own people.” That is the kind of argument worth making, and to some extent the Trump administration has been making it to North Korea.  The third point is that how we act toward North Korea must reflect who we are as Americans, even if the impact over there is slight. That regime killed an American named Otto Warmbier, and not in the distant and murky past: next week is the first anniversary of his death. The Trump administration must recognize that among our nation’s greatest assets is our association with the cause of liberty. Working for the peaceful expansion of the frontiers of liberty is not a sucker’s game, or a disadvantage or liability, or a waste of resources. It is in very concrete ways one of the greatest advantages of the United States in world politics. It is ultimately what ties allies like Australia, South Korea, and Japan to us: the knowledge that what we seek for them is what we seek for ourselves—peace, security, and liberty.   The alternative is to leave those allies, and others, with the sense that our relations with North Korea exclude them and their interests, which we have forgotten. That is what happened in the Obama administration's nuclear agreement with Iran: close allies situated near Iran, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel, came to believe their own interests were simply being forgotten. We saw in 2009 that the Obama administration viewed protests in Iran askance, not as the people's call for freedom but as an inconvenience to negotiations with the regime. Japan and other allies in Asia have critical security interests at stake in our relations with North Korea, and we should always give maintaining close and longstanding alliances pride of place as we undertake to open new relationships with hostile powers.  This is not to say that the President should return to Washington and suddenly blast human rights abuses in North Korea. That should be a steady, constant theme in American diplomacy, never abandoned and never diminished. When we did the nuclear deal with Libya in 2003, we did not take Qadhafi’s weapons and then turn around and commence a human rights onslaught meant to weaken or to bring down his regime. I believe we bit our tongues and actually said less than we should, but one can understand why: we were starting a relationship with Libya that we thought would lead in the medium run to a political opening there as the economy and society changed and pariah status was replaced by international engagement. But the goals and the American standards of conduct must be clear and our disgust at the Kim regime’s treatment of its people should always be equally clear. As in the Soviet case, that will not destroy our bilateral relationship; instead it will push the regime toward change and in any event will remind the regime who we are and what we believe. To put it another way, a nuclear agreement with North Korea is not a single transaction--or if it is, it will fail. It must be the start of an effort to change relations between our two countries, and to change the relationship between the regime in North Korea and both the international system and its own people. In that effort, a constant assertion of our belief in human rights is essential to success and to our own self-respect.     

With less than one week to go before the first-ever encounter between an American president and a North Korean leader, there is all manner of speculation about whether the historic Trump-Kim summit can deliver even more meaningful firsts: Voluntary abandonment of nuclear knowhow by a relatively weak and vulnerable state, despite decades of efforts cultivating such a capability, and the melting of "the last glacier" of the cold war — that is, the frozen Korean conflict. The opening positions of both the United States and North Korea are long-standing, well-known, and seemingly non-convergent. The US must hold to its demand for comprehensive denuclearization of North Korea to uphold the validity of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), deny North Korea the ability to use the nuclear threat to intimidate South Korean and Japanese allies, and eliminate risks of nuclear proliferation to other bad actors. North Korea seeks a deterrent against more powerful adversaries to guarantee its regime survival and to establish mutual nuclear vulnerability with the United States — unless the United States abandons its "hostile policy" toward North Korea and engages in mutual nuclear arms reductions — as well as to improve its strategic position and standing as a normal and "responsible nuclear state." But because the realization of a US-North Korea meeting has been so unexpected, unprecedented, and personalized, it will provide a unique opportunity for both sides to test their assumptions about the intentions and motivations of the other. Answers to the following questions can help to assess the likelihood of success or failure of the Trump-Kim summit: 1. Can North Korea accept and reciprocate Trump's gesture of reconciliation? North Korea has a reputation for pocketing rather than reciprocating unilateral concessions. By giving Kim the respect that comes with interaction on an "equal footing," Trump has front-loaded symbolic expressions of his intent to improve relations, end the Korean war, and reduce military tensions on the peninsula — presumably in return for North Korea to indicate their intent to denuclearize. Will Kim Jong Un reciprocate, and if so, how? 2. Will Kim Jong Un finally choose between nukes and economic development? As part of his consolidation of power, Kim Jong Un established a policy of simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development. Subsequently, North Korea announced a series of domestic special economic zones, while also ramping up missile testing to over twenty tests per year in 2016 and 2017. As of April of 2018, the country's party line has been amended to focus primarily on economic development on the rationale that North Korea has achieved its nuclear goals. But without additional North Korean cooperation and involvement in implementing a denuclearization process, it's too soon to say that the country has abandoned nuclear efforts. 3. Will Trump end up tacitly accepting a nuclear North Korea? A delicate aspect of the Trump-Kim summit is that the United States is meeting with a de facto nuclear state that desires détente without denuclearization, while the US wants détente in exchange for denuclearization. There is a risk that leaning too heavily into an attempt to end the Korean war and replace it with a permanent peace might change the relationship without addressing the underlying risk that accompanies a nuclear North Korea. Without defining, in detail, a mutual "action for action" process, the United States could change the window dressing around the threat — without getting at the root of the threat itself. 4. Will Trump offer or accept a reduced US commitment to the defense of South Korea? Bringing the Korean War to an end could call into question the purpose and level of American forces needed on the Korean peninsula to meet its security commitments to South Korea. Trump has already indicated that he expects allies not to be free-riders when it comes to footing security bills. As reiterated by Defense Secretary Mattis at the Shangri-la Dialogue, this is ultimately an alliance issue the United States and the Republic of Korea should manage separately from negotiations with North Korea. At the same time, though, reduced tensions will justify tangible force withdrawals if the inter-Korean border is truly to become demilitarized. As part of this process, it would be reasonable to negotiate with Seoul — not Pyongyang. 5. What role should China play in facilitating peace and denuclearization? Since Kim Jong Un's New Year's speech, which marked North Korea's turn toward diplomacy, China has more often than not stood on the outside, looking in. Xi Jinping is a partner of Trump's in sanctions implementation, but China's role in peacebuilding has not yet been clearly defined, and it is making Beijing nervous. The Korean conflict is multi-sided, with peninsular, global (nuclear), and regional dimensions, and all sides must move in tandem if a real resolution is to be achieved. 6. What will happen if the summit fails? Some analysts suggest that, rather than lead to a US-North Korea confrontation, a failed summit will result in renewed diplomatic efforts by South Korea — and possibly others — to restore stability and maintain North Korean restraint, so as to avoid the prospect of renewed escalation of military conflict. Less than two days after Trump initially cancelled his plans to meet with Kim Jong Un, the second inter-Korean summit was held on May 26, which shows the two Korean leaders are able act together, and limit the prospects of the US considering preventive military action. In the event of a Trump-Kim summit failure, the result may be to enhance North Korean dependency on Seoul and Beijing as safety valves against the prospect of renewal of US-North Korea confrontation. This circumstance in and of itself provides a new buffer against the prospect of military escalation in Korea that was not present at the end of 2017. This post originally appeared on Business Insider.

By Hunter Marston Many analysts have noted the advantages Singapore provides as a setting for the upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. As Joshua Kurlantzick recently wrote on this blog, “Choosing Singapore reduces the expectations (slightly) of the summit, making it a (slightly) more low-key affair than if the two leaders had met in the DMZ or North Korea where the summit would have been even more dramatic.” The Singapore location, in this argument, may allow the two leaders more time to hammer out some kind of deal, while Singapore’s skillful diplomatic corps and experience with summit could help prevent any gaffes and possibly bridge any divides. But the location of the summit alone will not significantly impact the outcome of this high-stakes meeting; the choice of Singapore may not even have the modest impact on the summit that Kurlantzick predicts. Indeed, optics given Singapore’s neutral diplomatic position (it maintains diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and has close ties with the United States) are unlikely to dictate the summit’s end result. In fact, rather than lowering expectations for the summit, if anything the location significantly elevates North Korea’s prestige by providing an opportunity for the two leaders to meet on an equal footing. Moreover, Singapore’s openness to international media means that coverage of the event will be far more intensive than if the event had been held at the DMZ or in North Korea, where Kim’s regime would have some control of the optics, along with South Korea. From a logistical point of view, Singapore indeed presents an ideal place to hold such a weighty meeting between two bitter adversaries. In 2015, Singapore successfully hosted the historic meeting between former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese president Xi Jinping, the first such face-to-face between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders. The city state has a wealth of experience in organizing high-profile conferences bringing together heads of state. The well-known annual Shangri-La Dialogue, which just wrapped up this past Sunday, this year featured a keynote address by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as well as notable speeches by U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen. Yet Singapore’s eminent status as an economic and diplomatic hub—enhanced by the rush of international journalists filling the country’s hotels—ups the ante for both sides and shifts the world’s attention onto city-state. Expectations are at a fever pitch this week, as U.S. foreign policy analysts have weighed in with a litany of op-eds outlining the prospects for a diplomatic breakthrough – or failure leading to war. As Bruce Jones of the Brookings Institution warns, “The risks of war are higher now than before the drive to the summit.” As Rosa Brooks of Georgetown Law School points out, by denigrating the efforts of past presidential administrations, Trump has significantly raised expectations that he will secure a better deal and in so doing has reduced the likelihood of an agreement that favors the United States. Moreover, the divide in perceptions between Washington and Pyongyang remains acute: each side insists on its own understanding of what a satisfactory outcome for a summit would look like. The White House has doubled down on its definition of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.” But the North has so far refrained from embracing this point. As such, when the two leaders show up to the negotiating table this week, there are no guardrails for the road ahead. As policy analysts have noted, lower-level meetings typically lay the groundwork for such a meeting to finalize certain details by way of a formal agreement. But without certain parameters for the leadership summit in place ahead of the discussion (not to mention the diligent policy work that must take place behind the scenes in a gutted State Department), Trump and Kim may find themselves with little guidance. If the event were to be held on the Korean Peninsula, it would entail certain tradeoffs. If it took place in Pyongyang, Trump would have to bestow Kim the honor of an unprecedented official visit (Bill Clinton had considered such a trip in 2000 but decided against it). If the event took place on the Demilitarized Zone (or DMZ), the focus would remain on the Koreas as host nations with the United States as a foreign interloper. As laid out above, Singapore presents unique advantages for the meeting: world-class security and intelligence personnel, quality infrastructure and luxury hotels, and above all a neutral political atmosphere. Nevertheless, instead of reducing expectations or lowering the potential for drama, Singapore’s attractiveness as a venue for such a high-stakes meeting only elevates the nature of the summit and intensifies the pressure cooker for high-wire diplomacy. Yet few are more adept at controlling the media spotlight than President Trump. That fact may grant some reassurance of the United States’ advantage. But anything could happen with this unprecedented meeting between two of the most unpredictable personalities in world politics. Hunter Marston (@hmarston4) is an independent Southeast Asia analyst in Washington, DC. He co-authored a chapter on Singapore in a forthcoming volume, Asia’s Quest for Balance: China’s Rise and Balancing in the Indo-Pacific (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018).

In the context of resolving the North Korean nuclear challenge, Russia rarely makes the news. South Korea is the reverse image; China is the enabler; the United States is the tough guy; and Japan is a one-man band seeking the return of its abductees. What role, then, does Russia play? In fact, Russia plays a critical role as a behind-the-scenes negotiator, spoiler, and unholy ally. It is not front and center, but it is central. The Negotiator: Moscow’s greatest strength is its relatively equal relationship with both North Korea and South Korea. While the United States, Japan, and China maintain closer ties with one side of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) or the other, Russia has maintained steady economic and political relations with both sides of the DMZ. Over the years, as journalist Samuel Ramani has noted, Moscow has sought to carve out its own unique role in the negotiation process, encouraging inter-Korean diplomacy as the primary means of resolving the conflict. Like China, Russia has called on South Korea to downgrade its military relations with the United States, advocating that Seoul reject deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system and referring to it as a threat to Russian security. At the same time Putin has publicly proclaimed North Korea’s nuclear program a “threat to security in North-east Asia” and has urged the DPRK to refrain from provocative actions. While there is no evidence that Russia’s negotiation efforts have proved decisive at any juncture, at the very least, it appears to have the ear of both parties. The Spoiler: Its efforts to help bring about resolution through inter-Korean diplomacy notwithstanding, Russia also pursues its own interests, even when they are at odds with other major actors. It has been a relatively unenthusiastic participant in sanctioning North Korea. As President Trump pushed ever-tougher sanctions through the United Nations Security Council, he accused Russia of violating the sanctions to aid North Korea. Russia watered down UN sanctions that sought to repatriate North Korean workers in order to shut down the flow of money back to the DRPK; and some of its companies have been sanctioned for attempting to evade sanctions on the provision of energy to Pyongyang. Russia’s aversion to sanctioning North Korea likely has several sources: it does not believe that the sanctions will produce change in the DPRK’s behavior; it does not want to be seen as simply following the lead of the United States; and, as the target of international sanctions itself, it does not want to support sanctions as matter of policy. The Unholy Ally: Ultimately, Russia’s most important and often overlooked role with regard to North Korea may be its shared willingness to use chemical weapons. While the United States and the rest of the world have focused attention on addressing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, North Korea’s stockpile of chemical weapons and failure to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention also pose a significant threat to global security. In what was widely suspected to be a DRPK government plot, VX nerve agent was used in the killing of Kim Jong-un’s half-brother in Malaysia; and Russia, itself, stands accused of using chemical weapons as a means of individual assassinations (despite being a signatory to the treaty). In addition, over the past two years, Russia has backed the Syrian government in its denials of chemical weapons use, and worked assiduously to prevent UN condemnations or western military action in response. As President Trump and Chairman Kim meet in Singapore, Russia is unlikely to be leading cheers from the sidelines. Like China, it has its own set of complicated interests with regard to North Korea that do not align fully with those of the United States. Yet Moscow cannot be ignored. Despite its relatively low public profile as a player in the North Korea negotiations, Russia’s behind-the-scenes ability to throw a wrench in the process should not be underestimated. And perhaps even more important, it will be an essential player in any future discussions around North Korea’s chemical weapons stock.

Getting Kim Jong Un to give up his nuclear weapons will be hard. Getting him to give up North Korea's formidable offensive cyber capability will be even harder. 

Among the possible contenders mentioned for the summit between U.S. President Donald J. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un—Sweden, the Korean DMZ, Mongolia, Switzerland, as well as much more unlikely possibilities like North Korea itself—Singapore was probably the right choice for the event, and ultimately not such a surprising one. The city-state’s diplomatic corps and security and intelligence personnel are highly respected globally and shown repeatedly that they can host a major summit without allowing any significant security or intelligence slip-ups. The city state indeed has for decades hosted a wide range of regional security summits for Southeast Asian states, and, increasingly summits involving officials from across the world. Singaporean officials also have handled, many high-profile bilateral meetings, like the meeting in 2015 between Chinese President Xi Jinping and then-Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou. The country has an extensive array of hotels and other facilities whose staff are used to preparing for major events with tight security. The wealthy city-state also has said that it will assume some of the costs of the summit, a bonus that some other possible choices like Mongolia would not have been able to add. The city-state also is much closer physically to North Korea than other potential sites like Switzerland or Sweden, which makes it easier for the North Koreans to travel. Yet it is not as remote as Mongolia, which possibly would have struggled to host an event of this potential importance. Just as importantly, Singapore—like a number of countries in Southeast Asia—long has maintained ties with North Korea, as well as close links to the United States. Singapore has had diplomatic ties with Pyongyang for more than forty years, and had trade relations, like many Southeast Asian states, until the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, Kim Jong-un’s half-brother, in Malaysia last year and the Trump administration’s campaign of applying greater pressure on the North through further economic sanctions. Before 2016, North Koreans also could travel to Singapore visa-free, which allowed some North Korean elites, including probably ruling party officials, to visit the city-state for services like medical care and shopping, and give them some familiarity with Singapore. Before that killing, and the ramping up of international sanctions on the North for its nuclear program, many Southeast Asian states appeared to be soliciting greater trade ties with Pyongyang, which was beginning to reform its economy and invite in outside investment. Last November, Singapore suspended trade with North Korea. Still, this history of links may make Kim Jong-un and other North Korean leaders relatively comfortable with a summit in Singapore. China and Singapore also have longstanding, if sometimes wary, relations, and Beijing probably preferred Singapore to a summit in Mongolia, Sweden, or Switzerland. Meanwhile, although Singapore is not an official U.S. treaty ally, it is probably, at this point, the United States’s closest security partner in Southeast Asia, as well as a major trading partner. U.S. officials, throughout multiple administrations, generally have a high degree of trust in Singaporean intelligence, political leaders, and diplomats, and have worked closely with Singapore on a wide range of strategic issues. In addition, as some other commentators have noted, choosing Singapore reduces the expectations (slightly) of the summit, making it a (slightly) more low-key affair than if the two leaders had met in the DMZ or North Korea where the summit would have been even more dramatic.