Kim Jong-un

U.S. President Barack Obama stated clearly immediately following North Korea’s fifth nuclear test that “the United States does not, and never will, accept North Korea as a nuclear state. Far from achieving its stated national security and economic development goals, North Korea’s provocative and destabilizing actions have instead served to isolate and impoverish its people through its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities.” There are three primary reasons that support President Obama’s statement that, indeed, the United States will never be able to accept North Korea as a nuclear state. First, the United States cannot accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state for normative reasons; North Korea had signed onto the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state and then abandoned the treaty in order to pursue nuclear capabilities. Tolerating North Korea’s nuclear status would be equivalent to setting a precedent for other NPT signatories to violate the treaty. Second, the United States cannot accept the North Korea’s nuclear weapons program because of the threat that a nuclear North Korea poses to South Korea’s security, both through possible extortion and potential use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with a conventionally stronger South Korea in which nuclear weapons are the North’s only real advantage. If North Korea attains a strike and survival capability against the United States, the U.S.-South Korea alliance will also come under considerable pressure in ways that will complicate military planning and political coordination within the alliance, even as the United States seeks to maintain its commitment to extended deterrence, which includes the premise that if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons, it would spell the end of the North Korean regime in relatively short order. Third, political power in North Korea, a totalitarian state, is considerably more concentrated compared to other nuclear weapons states such as Pakistan. This means that internal North Korean decision-making on nuclear use would be unchecked and would ultimately depend on a single individual, Kim Jong-un, compounding the risks and dangers of living with North Korea with a survivable nuclear deterrent and direct strike capability on the United States. It should not be surprising that the North Korean foreign ministry criticized President Obama’s statement, arguing that his denial of North Korea’s status as a nuclear weapons state “is as foolish an act as trying to eclipse the sun with a palm.” But in this context, it is worth some reflection in Pyongyang about exactly what North Korea has accomplished since 2009, when the regime abandoned six-party negotiations and argued that the United States must first abandon its “hostile policy” toward North Korea and then pursue mutual nuclear disarmament. As a result, there has been almost no space for diplomacy between the United States and North Korea. By taking advantage of the last American presidential transition to double down on nuclear development by conducting four tests since Obama’s inauguration in 2009, North Korea has made itself a threat to global security, while Myanmar, Iran, and Cuba were each able to take advantage of diplomacy with the Obama administration and establish more normal relations with the United States. It feels ironic and surreal when I recall conversations in Beijing with a Chinese Korea analyst on Election Day 2008, at which time the Chinese analyst asked: “Where will Obama visit first: Tehran or Pyongyang?” In this context, North Korea’s nuclear breakout—and Kim Jong Un’s decision to build his legitimacy on the nuclear accomplishments of his father and grandfather—will likely be regarded as an enormous strategic misjudgment. The North Korean foreign ministry stated: “We will continue to take measures for increasing the nuclear force of the country in quality and in quantity to safeguard the dignity and the right to existence of the DPRK and ensure genuine peace from the U.S. increasing threat of nuclear war.” It is sobering and sad to think that one young man persists in raising the risks, costs, and likelihood of nuclear war at the possible cost of hundreds of thousands of innocent lives against the failing legitimacy of his own hereditary state.

The seventh congress of the North Korean Workers’ Party (WPK) held from May 6 to 8 was a carefully choreographed affair designed to show the world that its newly installed Chairman Kim Jong-un is fully in control of the North Korean state. By taking the title of Chairman, Kim has signaled that he is no longer reliant solely on the legacy of his father and grandfather, that he is determined to lead, and that he expects the international community to accommodate his absolute leadership of a nuclear North Korea. Through his speech at the conference, Kim Jong-un revealed big plans to safeguard North Korea’s security through its nuclear accomplishments and grow its economy. But Kim has not yet shown how he will gain international acquiescence to North Korea’s nuclear development or how he can secure international support for North Korea’s economic growth. Kim’s plans for economic development are laudable. In his first public speech in 2012, Kim stated that his people should “never have to tighten their belt again.” Since then, North Korea has improved its agricultural production, experimented with limited agricultural reforms, transferred some decision-making responsibility from the state to the firm level, and has stopped opposing private market transactions. The North Korean economy is reported to have grown by one or two percent per year, with the Hyundai Research Institute reporting that North Korea’s annual GDP growth may have reached as high as seven percent. Kim’s reestablishment of a new five-year economic plan at the Party Congress provides needed leadership designed to stoke North Korea’s economic growth. But Kim’s twin emphasis on nuclear and economic development—his Byungjin policy—stands in the way of a real economic take-off because it starves North Korea of opportunities for external economic cooperation. Kim may exhort his people to improve agriculture, construction, and light industry and to become a scientifically and technologically powerful state in areas including information technology, nano-technology, bioengineering, energy, space, and nuclear technology. But the North Korean economy will fail in these areas unless his country is connected to the outside world. International opposition to North Korea’s nuclear development results in sanctions that generate economic pressures on North Korea and cut the country off from the outside world. As much as Kim needs connection to the outside world in order to achieve economic growth, he needs political isolation for his system to survive. Kim may regard North Korea’s nuclear deterrent capabilities as an insurance policy against growing challenges to the legitimacy of his single-man rule. Kim’s power depends on his ability to stand atop a system in which he commands absolute loyalty by suppressing both internal and external political competition. The Party Conference affirmed Kim’s monopoly on power and showcased both his demands and the rewards for absolute fealty among the highest-ranking members of North Korean society. In this respect, Kim’s nuclear program serves two purposes: it helps to ensure North Korea’s isolation by engendering international hostility to the regime while also defending an otherwise vulnerable North Korean state against the possibility of attacks from external enemies. Thus, Kim may regard his formula as his best chance to both preserve his system and maintain the status quo. This is why Kim declared: “We will consistently take hold on the strategic line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force and boost self-defensive nuclear force both in quality and quantity as long as the imperialists persist in their nuclear threat and arbitrary practices.” By declaring the permanence of a nuclear North Korea at the Workers’ Party Congress, Kim Jong-un has used the issue to shore up his power internally, but at the expense of North Korea’s international standing. Instead of accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, the international community has consistently condemned its nuclear pursuit and is bent on increasing pressure on Kim through economic sanctions. This makes the nuclear program a primary obstacle to North Korea’s ability to achieve its economic goals. Kim asserted at the Workers’ Party Congress that North Korea would be a responsible nuclear power, pledging only to use nuclear weapons if it is attacked with nuclear weapons. He also called for global denuclearization, perhaps in an attempt to align North Korea with the position of the five legitimate nuclear weapons states originally recognized in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But North Korea’s unilateral exit from the NPT, its failure to meet past denuclearization pledges, and the extreme concentration of political power in the hands of Kim Jong-un are insurmountable barriers to international acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. In response to Kim’s claim that North Korea would be a “permanent” nuclear weapons state, South Korea’s Unification Ministry spokesperson reiterated that; “it is only when the North shows sincerity about denuclearization that genuine dialogue is possible.” The United States has rejected North Korean peace overtures, insisting that peace talks are meaningless without talks on denuclearization. Even China’s proposal for talks envisages the United States and North Korea engaging in parallel peace and denuclearization talks. The international community insists that Kim must choose between economic and nuclear development because the last thing the world thinks Kim Jong-un needs, even at his own party coronation, is two slices of cake. This article originally appeared on TheMarkNews.com.

Theresa Lou is a research associate for the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  This article originally appeared in The Diplomat. What explains Beijing’s acquiescence to unprecedented sanctions at the UN Security Council? In response to North Korea’s latest nuclear test and ballistic missile launch, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 (UNSCR 2270), which contains some of the strongest sanctions ever adopted against Pyongyang. We have seen this play out before: North Korea provokes the international community with nuclear or missile tests, global leaders condemn the North’s brazen behavior, and the UNSC tightens sanctions. Years or months later, the tests resume. Repeat. UNSCR 2270 is particularly significant, however, given that China, North Korea’s sole ally, worked with the United States to craft the tough sanctions, following nearly two months of negotiations.  Frosty China-North Korea relations, Beijing’s reduced tolerance, and change in North Korea’s weapons capability have all likely contributed to China’s recalibration. Should the world expect these sanctions to push Kim Jong-un towards denuclearization? No, but Beijing’s acceptance of the strict sanctions is nonetheless a significant step. Importantly, China’s tougher stance against Pyongyang increases the likelihood of future U.S.-China cooperation in taking measures to reign in the Kim regime. Beijing’s policy shift can first be explained by the deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang. By executing his uncle Jang Song-Thaek—a fixture of Pyongyang elite—just two years after assuming power, Kim cut off China’s primary channel to the North Korean leadership. This brash act of avunculicide effectively silenced senior figures in Pyongyang who would have advocated for closer relations with Beijing, thereby reducing the influence China previously wielded. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented decision to meet South Korean President Park Geun-hye in Seoul without having first visited Pyongyang further exemplified Xi’s displeasure with Kim. As Beijing’s control of North Korea wanes, so too does its patience. Kim has repeatedly embarrassed China in the short amount of time he’s been in power. In October 2015, Beijing reportedly received North Korean assurances from Pyongyang that it would cease nuclear testing. Hardly two months had passed and Pyongyang tested an alleged hydrogen bomb roughly 50 miles from China’s border six days into the New Year. Instead of heeding Beijing’s calls of restraint in November 2012, Kim thumbed his nose at the Chinese leadership and launched a ballistic missile anyway. The same thing happened in February 2016.  When Chinese diplomat Wu Dawei urged Kim not to conduct another missile test, the young leader ordered the launch a day earlier than planned so that it fell on the eve of Chinese New Year instead. China has been cleaning up after North Korea for decades, but past North Korean leaders have not blatantly flouted Beijing’s warnings when in possession of as little political capital as Kim Jong-un. It seems the young leader is close to exhausting what little capital he has remaining. Though the two countries used to be close, support for North Korea among the Chinese public has waned. Each time Pyongyang lashes out, China sustains international pressure to take decisive action. The Chinese Communist Party seems increasingly split on whether Pyongyang is an asset or a liability, and has (uncharacteristically) allowed increased intraparty debate on China’s North Korea policy. Additionally, North Korean provocations have inspired the United States and South Korea to take unprecedented deterrent action. Discussions between Seoul and Washington regarding the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery to South Korea has drawn Chinese ire; Beijing argues that such a deployment would jeopardize its national security interests. China has long been wary of foreign involvement in the Asia-Pacific, and additional North Korean provocations will only increase U.S. attention in the area. Finally, the Chinese are likely realizing the dangers of allowing North Korea to further advance its weapons technology. Though the specifics of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program remain unclear, the technology has progressed at a considerable pace given the sanctions imposed upon the regime. Chinese concerns of a nuclear North Korea are further amplified given Kim’s record as a mercurial, untrustworthy ‘frenemy’ who has not heeded China’s calls for restraint. To be sure, there is good reason to question Beijing’s sincerity in implementing these new sanctions. Despite having voted in favor of each of the four previous resolutions, China’s track record on sanctions enforcement against North Korea has been spotty. Beijing’s actions underscore a fundamental difference between it and Washington over the intended goal of sanctions. Whereas the United States imposes harsh sanctions to curb North Korea’s nuclear program, Beijing aims to push Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, preferably through the long-defunct Six-Party Talks. China regards maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula as its primary interest. It fears that crippling sanctions would destabilize the Kim regime and either exacerbate tensions or worse: cause the regime to collapse, sending millions of refugees fleeing across Chinese borders. Even if these new sanctions were fully enforced by all United Nations member states, they would likely fail to push Pyongyang toward denuclearization. North Korea’s economy may tumble and Kim might find it increasingly difficult to continue financing his weapons program, but these sanctions are not crippling. China would not have agreed if it believed UNSCR 2270 was enough to destabilize North Korea. For example, the resolution does not address Chinese crude oil exports to North Korea or the trading of goods at their mutual border. These allowances are Beijing’s way of ensuring that these sanctions do not trigger a humanitarian crisis and state collapse. Despite these causes for pessimism about the effectiveness of UNSCR 2270’s implementation and effectiveness, the United States should build upon the momentum of China’s significant step and lay the groundwork for more decisive cooperation in the future. It would be a mistake to assume the sanctions will have a significant impact on Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Rather, the success of the resolution must be assessed by whether Beijing stands by its commitments and enforces the sanctions in earnest. China’s level of follow-through will allow the United States to gauge Beijing’s readiness to engage discussions for longer-term solutions for the North Korean question. Beijing seems to be slowly realizing that the devil it knows is not better than the alternative. The United States should seize this opportunity to further engage China and discuss mutually acceptable outcomes for the Korean peninsula. It is unlikely that Beijing will fully trust Washington’s intentions in the region, but open communication is an essential step toward getting China to realign its priorities with those of Washington. However, the United States should refrain from action that the Chinese may perceive as further U.S. encirclement. THAAD deployment, for example, may already be pushing Beijing’s tolerance limits. If these trends continue, China could come to accept that maintaining the peace and stability of the region cannot be divorced from efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

The White House moved quickly to debunk North Korea’s exaggerated claim that a Jan. 5 "artificial earthquake" at the site where Pyongyang had conducted three previous nuclear tests was a breakthrough detonation of a hydrogen bomb. The size of the blast was similar to that of North Korea’s January 2013 test and had a yield thousands of times lower than the yield expected of a hydrogen blast. But in downplaying North Korea’s claim so as not to feed Kim Jong-un’s cravings for international attention, the Barack Obama administration risks underplaying the growing danger posed by North Korea’s unchecked efforts to develop nuclear and missile capabilities needed to threaten a nuclear strike on the United States. Instead, the Obama administration is conducting what then-Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice in February of 2013 called the "usual drill" in responding to a North Korean nuclear test: Condemnation of North Korea, expressions of assurance to allies including nuclear-capable B-52 overflights of the peninsula, diplomacy to strengthen U.N. sanctions on North Korea, and temporarily increased pressure on China to squeeze North Korea. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has expressed outrage and is seeking to impose additional sanctions on North Korea, but such sanctions will bite only if China cooperates. North Korea’s calculation in creating another nuclear provocation is that China’s need for stability on its periphery and its geostrategic anxiety about a unified Korea allied with the United States will protect Pyongyang from retribution and give it the space it needs to survive. North Korea’s decision to conduct a fourth nuclear test in defiance of Chinese opposition shows the extent to which Kim Jong-un has taken Beijing’s extensive food and fuel support for granted. Instead, Kim rationally bets that China will not stomach the consequences of regime change by U.S.-led or supported military coercion in North Korea; Pyongyang is likely correct in its assessment. In the absence of a strategic end and unified political will among the concerned parties, particularly the United States, China and South Korea, the "usual drill" will likely be ineffective in convincing or coercing North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. From the beginning of the Obama administration, North Korea has rejected the extended hand that President Obama offered to other U.S. adversaries, instead clenching its fists and doubling down on the goal of developing a survivable nuclear strike capability. The young Kim’s claim to have developed hydrogen bomb capability underscores the fact that the nuclear program has become a useful tool for maintaining domestic legitimacy of the Kim regime. The Obama administration tried to talk the North Koreans into denuclearization through a failed 2012 "Leap Day understanding" that sought a North Korean pledge to freeze nuclear and missile testing and come back to the negotiation table. But that effort failed three weeks later as the "Great Successor" sought to burnish his credentials with further "satellite" launches and later another nuclear test. The 2013 push for sanctions, which the Chinese reluctantly accepted, may have slowed North Korea’s progress. But last week’s test shows that North Korea has not yet digested the international community’s message that North Korea’s nuclear development will endanger rather than enhance the Kim regime’s prospects for survival. To show the North Koreans that nuclear development is indeed a dead-end option, the United States must work with its allies to expand sanctions to target businesses and banks that refuse to cease cooperation with North Korea. North Korea must bear a tangible cost for its defiance of repeated warnings from its neighbors to desist from further nuclear and missile tests. Such a course is a necessary self-defensive step short of regime change to contain North Korea’s continuing nuclear and missile development efforts and to impose a de facto freeze on its program. China’s cooperation toward this end is an essential litmus test of Beijing’s willingness to work together on a clear and present common threat to regional and global security. Only if the international community can impose a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and missile development will there be a prospect that Kim might move back to denuclearization. Otherwise, it is reasonable to expect North Korea to continue its quest to obtain a survivable nuclear deterrent and strike capabilities that the Kim regime has judged to be critical for survival. This piece originally appeared on the Washington Examiner. See the original op-ed here.