Islamic State

Multiple Nigerian media outlets reported last week that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has died or been mortally wounded in a confrontation with fighters from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a group that separated from Shekau’s Boko Haram in 2016. The Nigerian government has not confirmed the reports and is investigating. The caution is well-placed: Shekau has been reported dead at least four times since he became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009 following the police killing of founder Mohammed Yusuf. This time, however, the reports have more credibility. The story is that ISWA fighters tracked down Shekau, killed his fighters, and then demanded that he swear allegiance to Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the head of ISWA. After a fruitless parley, so the story goes, Shekau tried to kill himself—and some within ISWA leadership—using a suicide vest. Another version has it that he shot himself in the chest, and a few of his followers escaped with the badly wounded Shekau, living to fight another day. The split [PDF] between ISWA and Shekau's faction in 2016 was over Shekau's brutality against other Muslims and his use of child suicide bombers. Otherwise, the goals of the two were the same: destruction of the secular state, creation of a polity based on Islamic law, and the end of Western influence. Since the split, relations between the two factions have varied. Shekau was the recognized successor to Yusuf, while al-Barnawi was the latter's son. Sometimes, they appear to have cooperated tactically. Of late, however, relations have been murderous. That ISWA tracked down Shekau and sought to compel him to accept al-Barnawi's leadership is credible, as is that the erratic Shekau chose suicide instead. Assuming Shekau is, indeed, dead, what difference will it make? ISWA has become the much stronger and better organized of the two factions. It trumpets its ties to the Islamic State (IS) group and cooperates with other jihadi groups under the IS umbrella active in the Sahel. ISWA could well absorb Shekau's jihadi fighters. Shekau's faction appeared focused on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin while ISWA has looked further beyond its borders. If ISWA is able to establish dominance over the various jihadi factions across the Sahel, it will become more formidable than Shekau's faction was and a greater threat to the fragile states in the neighborhood. Shekau was a monster, known for his brutal executions that he publicized, his use of women and children as suicide bombers, and his wholesale kidnapping: he orchestrated the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls, more than a hundred of whom remain in captivity. He mastered the politics of terror. He was charismatic and erratic with some education: he deliberately misquoted Abraham Lincoln. He was also a religious leader and drew on the well of Islamic grievance in northern Nigeria to produce a belief system largely regarded as a perversion of Salafist-inflected Islam but one which has spread in the Sahel.

The Western media is focused on the struggle between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, with searing images of the humanitarian disaster that is unfolding. Yet the magnitude is tiny compared to the humanitarian crisis in northern Nigeria. Total confirmed deaths number 239 in the current round of fighting between Hamas and the Israelis. In comparison, there have been at least 755 deaths since January 1, 2021 in northeastern Borno State, the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency; in northeastern Nigeria alone, over 2.9 million are internally displaced. In northwestern Kaduna and Zamfara states, both heavily afflicted by armed banditry, cumulative deaths since the turn of the year are at least 705. (Many more have been kidnapped.) Reporting from northern Nigeria is difficult, and thus casualty figures are likely an undercount. Now, the World Food Program is sounding the alarm over the looming prospect of famine. Already, a large majority of Nigerians (86 percent) lack access to a safely managed source of potable water. In northeastern Nigeria, food and other relief is provided almost entirely by UN agencies and some 150 Nigerian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Yet their personnel are under attack from Boko Haram and other jihadi organizations who accuse aid workers of, among other things, "Christianizing" the indigenous Muslim population. The other bookend of humanitarian frustration is that relief workers credibly complain that their efforts are too often thwarted by the army and the police in the name of "security." At least some security operatives complain that humanitarian relief reaches jihadis. Why does the ongoing tragedy in northern Nigeria—and indeed much of the rest of the Sahel—attract so little attention in the developed world? Part of the answer is that the Sahel and northern Nigeria are far away. Few Americans have a personal link to it, unlike the large number that are invested in Israel and Palestine in one way or another. Many, perhaps most, Americans are convinced that what happens in Israel and Palestine directly affects U.S. interests. Further, issues in the conflict in northern Nigeria and the Sahel, in many ways a civil war within Islam, are obscure to twenty-first-century Americans. Popular media coverage is also limited: for a long time, media access to the war zone has been inhibited both by jihadis and the security services. "Compassion fatigue" in the aftermath of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria also plays a role. Whatever the reasons, the bottom line is that the ongoing tragedy in the Sahel and northern Nigeria merits more humanitarian attention from the United States than it receives.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 8 to May 14, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     (March 23–April 2 and April 19–May 3: Nigerian troops reported that they killed fifty-three bandits in and around Maradun, Zamfara.) May 8: Gunmen killed six police officers during an attack on a police station in Ini, Akwa Ibom. May 8: Bandits killed three in Jema'a, Kaduna. May 8: Bandits killed eleven in Safana, Katsina. May 9: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Essien-Udium, Akwa Ibom. May 9: Gunmen killed five in Ekwusigo, Anambra. May 9: A Nigerian soldier killed one civilian in Gusau, Zamfara. May 10: Bandits kidnapped forty from a mosque in Jibia, Katsina; thirty were rescued immediately. May 10: Police killed three kidnappers in Oredo, Edo. May 10: Kidnappers abducted a pastor from his church in Akure, Ondo. May 10: Herdsmen killed one in Iwajowa, Oyo. May 10: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Bakassi, Cross River. May 11: Bandits killed one police officer in Sokoto, Sokoto. May 11: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, killing nine militants in Maiduguri, Borno. May 11: Kidnappers abducted two in Akoko North-West, Ondo. May 11: Gunmen killed two in Ife North, Osun. May 12: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Etim Ekpo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Pirates killed two in Mbo, Akwa Ibom. May 12: Security operatives killed two gunmen in Obowo, Imo. May 13: Customs officers killed five civilians in Iseyin, Oyo. May 13: Herdsmen killed eleven in Bali, Taraba. May 13: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at twenty total) in Chikun and Birnin-Gwari Local Government Areas in Kaduna. May 13: A cult clash resulted in eight deaths in Esit Eket, Akwa Ibom. May 14: Gunmen killed one in Port Harcourt, Rivers.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 1 to May 7, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     May 1: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Onicha, Ebonyi. May 1: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Ikono, Akwa Ibom. May 1: Gunmen killed a commissioner and kidnapped the local government chairman in Yagba West, Kogi. May 1: One civilian died during a battle between Nigerian troops and Boko Haram in Kala/Balge, Borno. May 2: Boko Haram killed two soldiers and six civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 2: Herdsmen killed nineteen in Gwer West, Benue. May 2: A task force killed two kidnappers in Dekina, Kogi. May 2: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa North, Oyo. May 3: The Nigerian Air Force killed bandits (no number given; estimated at ten) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. May 3: Bandits killed one journalist and kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Jibia, Katsina. May 3: Boko Haram killed fifteen Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) members, five soldiers, and ten civilians in Mafa, Borno. May 3: Communal violence led to four deaths in Akoko North-East, Ondo. May 3: Bandits killed one in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. May 3: Communal violence led to six deaths in Agatu, Benue. May 4: Kidnappers abducted four in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 4: Kidnappers abducted two in Jos North, Plateau. May 5: Gunmen abducted university students (no number given; estimated at ten) in Isuikwua, Abia. May 5: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Idemili North, Anambra. May 5: Bandits killed two and kidnapped thirteen in Chikun, Kaduna; the kidnapped victims were later rescued after a gunfight with police. May 5: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped another police officer and three others in Abeokuta North, Ogun. May 6: Eleven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)/Eastern Security Network (ESN) militants and one Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officer were killed during a clash in Orlu, Imo. May 6: Gunmen killed one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ohaozara, Ebonyi. May 6: Robbers killed two during an attack on a bullion van in Ondo, Ondo. May 6: Bandits killed seven in Magama, Niger State. May 7: Protestors killed a police officer in Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT). May 7: Communal violence led to the deaths of one police officer and two others in Iwo, Osun. May 7: Gunmen killed five police officers in Port Harcourt LGA and two police officers in Emuoha LGA while losing two of their own during attacks on police stations in Rivers.

Asch Harwood, a former research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations' Africa program, is the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker and the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  The Nigerian state security apparatus has a long history of human rights violations. Most recently, the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), a notorious Nigerian police unit, made international headlines for its brutality and a wave of massive protests calling for its disbandment—which were then quashed by security services in a horrifying massacre of peaceful protestors. In many instances, the military’s response to Boko Haram has been similarly heavy-handed and indiscriminate. Abuses have been well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and even the State Department. A former colleague of mine gained access in 2017 to a prison holding suspected Boko Haram operatives, where he confirmed the abhorrent conditions and presence of significant numbers of women and children. Nevertheless, members of the military and police have also been victims of Boko Haram in their own right. The impact of the Boko Haram conflict on security services has been far-reaching, but in this analysis, the focus is on the geographic heart of the conflict—Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in Nigeria, the Lac region in Chad, Diffa in Niger, and Extreme-Nord in Cameroon.     Since 2012, the Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) has documented roughly 3,384 state security service deaths in the Boko Haram conflict. The epicenter of the violence is Borno State, which accounts for nearly 70 percent of all security personnel deaths in the NST dataset. Though the militaries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria cooperate under the guise of the African Union-authorized Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the NST does not distinguish the nationality of security personnel victims, only the approximate geographic location.   The deadliest years for security services overall have been 2018, 2019, and 2020, with 2019 the deadliest at an estimated 719 security personnel killed. This represents a shift from the height of the conflict in 2014-2015, when security personnel deaths were relatively low compared to the astronomical number of Boko Haram and civilian deaths, as can be seen in the chart below.   Since 2014, at least, Boko Haram has split into factions which sometimes cooperate. New factions are especially hostile to the police and the security services. In response to high casualty rates, the military and security services have withdrawn into highly fortified encampments. Their death rates have declined, but the jihadi factions are able to move about the countryside almost at will.   In 2019 and 2020, security personnel deaths jumped in Chad’s Lac region. In one incident in Bohoma in 2020, over ninety Chadian troops were killed. But Nigeria, and Borno State in particular, still remain the geographic center of the conflict. The borders in northeastern Nigeria, and particularly around Lake Chad, are porous, facilitating both Boko Haram and MNJTF’s regular movement across them. While these numbers appear to bring a sense of precision to the conflict, important to remember is that the NST relies on open-source reporting of casualties, which is subject to a number of biases in the context of the Boko Haram conflict. For one, many incidents take place in remote areas. As a result, estimates come from the military or Boko Haram themselves, both of which have incentives to downplay the number of deaths on their respective sides while overstating enemy casualties. Nevertheless, they provide a sense of the shape and trajectory of the conflict. The data shows that Boko Haram is far from defeated, and that the decline in military and security-service casualties are likely the result of their withdrawal from much of the countryside.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 24 to April 30, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 24: Gunmen killed eight security personnel in Ikwerre, Rivers. April 24: Gunmen killed nine farmers in Doma, Nassarawa. April 24: Security forces killed seven Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) members in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Gunmen killed eight in Oru East, Imo. April 24: Bandits kidnapped five in Dandume, Katsina. April 24: Kidnappers abducted ten in Ogo-Oluwa, Osun. April 24: Kidnappers abducted three in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 24: Bandits kidnapped thirty-five in Shiroro, Niger State. April 25: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four at a church in Chikun, Kaduna. April 25: Kidnappers abducted three students in Makurdi, Benue. April 25: Bandits killed nine police officers and two vigilantes in Sakaba, Kebbi. April 25: Bandits kidnapped two in Zaria Local Government Area (LGA), killed six in Birnin-Gwari LGA, and killed one in Kachia LGA in Kaduna. April 25: Boko Haram killed thirty-three Nigerian soldiers in Kaga, Borno. April 25: The Nigerian Air Force accidentally killed twenty soldiers during an airstrike meant to target Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno. April 26: Sectarian violence led to nineteen deaths in Oyi, Anambra. April 26: Gunmen killed six police officers and kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Ehime-Mbano, Imo. April 26: Bandits killed two Kaduna private varsity students in Chikun, Kaduna. April 26: Bandits killed six in Sabuwa, Katsina. April 26: Six were killed during a clash between okada (motorcycle taxi) riders and transport union members in Ojo, Lagos. April 26: Gunmen killed five soldiers in Abua/Odu, Rivers. April 26: Gunmen killed two soldiers and one civilian in Afikpo, Ebonyi. April 26: Boko Haram attacked Gwoza, Borno; no casualty figures were given. April 27: Herdsmen killed seven at a camp for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Makurdi, Benue. April 27: Gunmen killed two police officers in Ika, Akwa Ibom. April 27: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Onitsha, Anambra. April 27: Herdsmen killed two in Guma, Benue. April 27: Kidnappers abducted seven in Toto, Nassarawa. April 28: Kidnappers abducted four students but three escaped from a school in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. April 28: Police officers killed three bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. April 29: Boko Haram attacked Yunusari, Yobe; no casualty figures were given. April 30: Bandits killed one and kidnapped four in Musawa, Katsina. April 30: Herdsmen killed five in Gwer West, Benue. April 30: Bandits killed ten and kidnapped four in Chikun, Kaduna.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 17 to April 23, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 17: Nigerian troops killed five bandits who had killed seven in Makurdi, Benue. April 17: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Gwer West, Benue. April 17: Police officers killed six bandits in Shiroro, Niger State. April 18: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. April 18: Nigerian troops repelled a Boko Haram attack, resulting in "heavy casualties" for the militants (estimated at twenty) in Dikwa, Borno. April 18: Bandits killed one in Kajuru Local Government Area (LGA) and two in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. April 19: Police officers killed three bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 19: Two police officers and three gunmen were killed during a clash in Dunukofia, Anambra. April 19: Bandits killed two in Zurmi, Zamfara. April 19: Bandits killed ten as police officers repelled the attack and killed thirty bandits in Maradun, Zamfara. April 19: Kidnappers abducted five in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 20: Kidnappers abducted three in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 20: Bandits killed an Amotekun operative in Afijio, Oyo. April 20: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 20: Kidnappers killed one and abducted twenty-three from a university in Chikun, Kaduna; three of the kidnapped students were later found dead. April 21: Gunmen killed two police officers during an attack on a police station in Uzo-Uwani, Enugu. April 21: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Makrudi LGA, two in Agatu LGA, and two in Guma LGA in Benue. April 21: Bandits killed sixty in Gusau LGA, fifteen in Maradun LGA, and fifteen in Bakura LGA in Zamfara. April 21: Bandits kidnapped seventy-seven in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted two nurses from a hospital in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 22: Kidnappers abducted eighteen in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 23: Bandits kidnapped twenty in Dandume, Katsina. April 23: Nigerian troops killed twenty-one Boko Haram militants who killed eleven civilians during an attack on Geidam, Yobe. April 23: Sectarian violence led to seventeen deaths in Guma, Benue.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 10 to April 16, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 10: Gunmen killed four in Faskari, Katsina. April 10: Three soldiers, six civilians, and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on UN facilities in Mobbar, Borno. April 10: Boko Haram killed three soldiers in Maiduguri, Borno. April 11: Civilians killed three bandits in Jibia, Katsina. April 11: Kidnappers abducted fifteen people in Safana, Katsina. April 12: Bandits killed four in Zangon Kataf Local Government Area (LGA) and one in Giwa LGA while one bandit was killed in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. April 12: Bandits killed five vigilantes in Shiroro, Niger State. April 12: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 12: Bandits kidnapped three in Ibadan North, Oyo. April 12: Communal violence led to nineteen deaths in Balanga, Gombe. April 12: Bandits killed three while residents and vigilantes killed thirty bandits in Kankara, Katsina. April 13: Bandits killed four in Igabi LGA and one in Zangon Kataf LGA in Kaduna. April 13: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped four who were later released in Gwagwala, Federal Capital Territory. April 13: Fifteen beheaded bodies were found in Calabar, Cross River. April 13: Boko Haram killed seventeen civilians and lost one militant in Mobbar, Borno. April 13: Police officers killed four pirates in Oron, Akwa Ibom. April 14: Gunmen killed three police officers in Izzi, Ebonyi. April 14: Communal violence led to thirteen deaths in Guyuk, Adamawa. April 15: Gunmen killed three in Wukari, Taraba. April 15: Gunmen killed six at a beer parlor in Riyom, Plateau. April 15: Gunmen invaded the palace in Oye, Ekiti and kidnapped the monarch. April 15: Bandits killed nine in Rabah, Sokoto. April 15: Nigerian troops killed thirteen Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) fighters in Mobbar, Borno. April 15: Communal violence led to eleven deaths in Fika, Yobe. April 16: Clashes between bandits and vigilantes led to the deaths of twenty civilians in Maru, Zamfara. April 16: Boko Haram killed five soldiers in Gujba, Yobe. April 16: Gunmen killed seven traders in Orlu, Imo.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from April 3 to April 9, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     April 3: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Anambra East, Anambra. April 3 Gunmen killed two civilians and two police officers in Uvwie, Delta. April 3: Gunmen killed seven in Orlu, Imo. April 3: Kidnappers killed two in Sapele, Delta. April 4: Bandits killed five soldiers in Shiroro, Niger State. April 4: Kidnappers abducted five in Akoko North-West, Ondo. April 4: Nigerian soldiers killed eleven Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. April 5: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese mineworkers in Atakumosa West, Osun. April 5: Kidnappers abducted eight in Damnusa, Katsina. April 5: Gunmen killed two police officers in Takum, Taraba. April 5: Bandits killed two soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 5: Gunmen killed three and released 1,844 prisoners from a prison in Owerri, Imo. April 6: Bandits killed two in Kachia Local Government Area (LGA), two in Chikun LGA, and killed nine and kidnapped twenty-five in Kajuru, Kaduna. April 6: One assailant was killed when police officers repelled an attack on a police station in Ebonyi, Ebonyi. April 6: A military operation killed "several" (estimated at ten) criminals in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. April 7: Gunmen killed two police officers and one other in Ukum, Benue. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Awka South, Anambra. April 7: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Port Harcourt, Rivers. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three quarry workers in Oluyole, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted a monarch and seven chiefs in Ihitte Uboma, Imo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted three in Ibarapa, Oyo. April 7: Kidnappers abducted two in Imeko-Afon, Ogun. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twenty-four bandits in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. April 7: Gunmen killed three farmers in Wuarki, Taraba. April 7: Nigerian troops killed twelve bandits in Konshisha, Benue. April 8: Gunmen kidnapped one police officer during an attack on a police station in Mbaitolli, Imo. April 8: Nigerian soldiers allegedly killed seventy civilians in Konshisha, Benue. The military disputed these claims. April 8: Gunmen killed one officer and ten soldiers in Konshisha, Benue. April 9: Bandits killed one and kidnapped ten in Shiroro, Niger State. April 9: Boko Haram killed five and kidnapped thirty in Hong, Adamawa. April 9: Gunmen killed eight at a mining site in Jos South, Plateau.

Violence attributed to Islamist groups has dramatically increased in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, and continues to infect new venues where it has been absent. In the recent attacks on Palma in northern Mozambique, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) is claiming responsibility. In other instances, say, in the Sahel and the Horn, al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups make the claim. Some analysts see a Faustian bargain between IS or al-Qaeda and insurgencies that are driven by local grievances associated with corrupt governments that have marginalized those far from the national capital. The essence of the bargain is that IS and al-Qaeda are able to demonstrate their prowess despite reverses in the Middle East—valuable for recruitment and fundraising. For locally based insurgencies, ties, no matter how tenuous, enhance their prestige and win international publicity. The extent to which these bargains translate into tactical, strategic, or financial partnerships with IS or al-Qaeda varies from one insurrection to another. However, for both sides of the bargain, incentives are to exaggerate its importance. Insofar as Western policy makers associate IS and al-Qaeda with the insurrection, the prestige and therefore the power of both grows. However, perceiving local insurgencies as primarily an aspect of international terrorism, rather than as a response to local grievances, can lead to policy mistakes recalling some made in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After all, IS and al-Qaeda are core Western security concerns, while local African insurgencies are not.

Jihadi attacks in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province are accelerating, with heavy fighting breaking out around the town of Palma. In response, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa sent South African troops to evacuate South African nationals. The French oil and gas company Total has evacuated its employees from its Afungi gas facility and suspended construction on a $20 billion project. The Maputo government has, for much of the insurgency, routinely declined international help. But with the jihadi group Ansar al Sunna (ASWJ) increasing in strength, international assistance is now being accepted with greater regularity. Thus far, the Biden administration has sent a special forces detachment to provide counterinsurgency training to Mozambican forces. Portugal and the European Union are offering assistance as well. Maputo has requested military assistance from South Africa, but Ramaphosa declined on the basis that the insurgency is too big for a bilateral response. Meanwhile, the contract with South African private military contractor Dyck Advisory Group will not be renewed. The relevant multilateral security pact in the region is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which will meet on Thursday to discuss the situation in northern Mozambique but apparently lacks the necessary funding to provide significant assistance. Further potential outside financial assistance from the European Union, South Africa, or the United States should not be ruled out, though it is unclear at present what the method of providing such assistance would be. SADC has not been particularly successful at conflict resolution and donors may well seek a different vehicle for providing their assistance.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 27 to April 2, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 27-28: A cult war resulted in four deaths in Awka North, Anambra. March 28: Gunmen killed a Peoples Democratic Party chieftain and kidnapped his wife in Tafa, Niger State. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Ogbadibo, Benue. March 28: Sectarian violence resulted in eight deaths in Uzu-Uwani, Enugu. March 28: A cult war resulted in three deaths in Osogbo, Osun. March 29: Herdsmen killed twenty in Ishielu, Ebonyi. March 29: Gunmen killed three in Ezza South, Ebonyi. March 29: Kidnappers abducted three in Oluyole, Oyo. March 29: Kidnappers abducted a Catholic priest and three others in Kagarko, Kaduna. March 29: Sectarian violence resulted in three deaths in Bassa, Plateau. March 29: Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) killed four police officers in Essien-Udim, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Gunmen killed a Catholic priest and three others in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 30: A bank robbery resulted in the deaths of one police officer, one robber, and four civilians in Aniocha North, Delta. March 30: Kidnappers abducted two Chinese farmers in Obafemi-Owode, Ogun. March 30: Bandits killed six in Chikun Local Government Area (LGA), one in Giwa LGA, and one in Kajuru LGA in Kaduna. March 30: Communal violence led to seven deaths in Ibiono Ibom, Akwa Ibom. March 30: Communal violence led to three deaths in Owan West, Edo. March 31: Gunmen killed three police officers and kidnapped a commissioner at a rally in Aguata, Anambra. March 31: Boko Haram claimed responsibility for gunning down a Nigerian Air Force jet with two pilots around Gwoza, Borno; the air force rejected this claim. April 1: Bandits killed five soldiers and nine civilians and kidnapped twenty in Shiroro, Niger State. April 1: Kidnappers abducted five in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. April 1: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Ekeremor, Bayelsa. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed eight Boko Haram militants in Monguno, Borno. April 2: Nigerian soldiers killed five youths in Ardo-Kola, Taraba. April 2: Bandits killed two in Kokona, Nassarawa.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 20 to March 26, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 20: Three were killed in election-related violence in Ekiti East, Ekiti. March 20: Gunmen killed a police inspector during an attack on a police station in Isiala Mbano, Imo. March 20: Boko Haram killed two Cameroonian soldiers and lost "several" (estimated at ten) militants in Ngala, Borno. March 21: Herdsmen killed three in Ukwuani, Edo. March 21: Cultists killed four in Ibeju/Lekki, Lagos. March 22: Gunmen killed three police officers in Ohafia, Abia. March 22: Bandits killed one in Jema'a Local Government Area (LGA) and three in Igabi LGA in Kaduna. March 23: Nigerian troops and police officers killed sixteen members of the Indigenous People of Biafra's Eastern Security Network in Aba, Abia. March 23: Gunmen killed twelve in Takum, Taraba. March 24: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 24: Kidnappers abducted four in Kuje, Federal Capital Territory. March 24: Bandits killed three in Illela, Sokoto. March 24: Bandits killed two civilians and troops retaliated, killing two bandits in Katsina-Ala, Benue. March 24: Bandits killed one soldier and twenty vigilantes in Mariga, Niger State. March 24: Bandits killed two in Kaura-Namode, Zamfara. March 25: Bandits killed eight in Birnin-Gwari LGA and one in Giwa LGA in Kaduna. March 25: Kidnappers abducted three from airport quarters in Barkin Ladi, Plateau. March 25: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Ohaukwu, Ebonyi. March 26: Kidnappers abducted eight in Kachia, Kaduna. March 26: Nigerian troops killed forty-eight Boko Haram militants in Chibok, Borno.

On March 17, around one hundred assailants, traveling on motorcycles and pickup trucks, killed thirty-three soldiers and wounded an additional fourteen in an attack near Tessit in central Mali. Peacekeepers operating under the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) assisted the evacuation of the dead and wounded; the French-led counterinsurgency force stationed in West Africa, Operation Barkhane, helped the Malian military secure the area after the attack. About four days later, perpetrators killed 137 in coordinated attacks in the Tahoua region of southwest Niger. The attacks took place near the border with Mali and also not far from Tillabéri, another Nigerien border region, where at least fifty-eight people were killed recently by gunmen on motorcycles. The Islamic State’s “West Africa affiliate” has apparently claimed responsibility for the Tessit attack. This likely refers primarily to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is known to operate in the tri-border region where the frontiers of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet; reporting on the attacks at Tillabéri and Tahoua suggests ISGS involvement. If so, there are additional reports that militants from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA)—a splinter group of Boko Haram—provided reinforcements to ISGS in the Tahoua attack. That would indicate a new expansion of ISWA’s geographic scope: the hotbed of ISGS activity is located well over one thousand kilometers from Boko Haram and ISWA’s main area of operations in northeastern Nigeria. Much closer to the tri-border area, however, is northwestern Nigeria, where criminal and jihadi activities are converging as the Nigerian region becomes more insecure. Banditry, particularly kidnapping for ransom, is prevalent; Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau claimed responsibility for a mass kidnapping in Nigeria’s Katsina State in December last year, though his claim is unverified. With regard to the latest atrocities in Mali and Niger, it remains possible that some level of coordination took place between jihadi groups and groups regarded as primarily criminal in nature. But, if so, why? Victims were killed, not kidnapped, and looting does not seem to have been the goal. However, outside observers lack the granular knowledge of the region to divine the motivation for the attacks. Revenge or rivalry over control of smuggling routes are plausible explanations, as is jihadi militancy. Or, perhaps, elements of all three are present.  With regard to the counterinsurgency effort against the jihadis, Barkhane is considered the most effective fighting force in West Africa. But the French deployment is not popular in France; public opinion perhaps fears Barkhane could become bogged down in West Africa like the United States in Afghanistan. Looking to the 2022 presidential elections, President Emmanuel Marcon raised the possibility of a whole or partial military withdrawal, but he has of late backed away from his earlier comments. MINUSMA was established in 2013 after the French Operation Serval and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) failed to stabilize Mali in the face of Islamist rebellion. The deployment under MINUSMA is large, with more than 16,000 total personnel as of January 2021. So, too, have been its fatalities: some 235 since it was established. Its mandate is “stabilization,” not peacekeeping per se, as there is no peace to keep. The recent string of violent episodes, along with rumored cooperation between jihadi cells, shows that stability and security in the Sahel are far from achieved, and that a significant French withdrawal or a winding down of MINUSMA could lead to jihadi and criminal forces severely threatening the survival of Mali's military-led government.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from March 13 to March 19, 2021. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     March 13: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 13: Gunmen killed six in Irewole, Osun. March 13: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants and lost four soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. March 14: Vigilantes killed nine bandits in Lapai, Niger State. March 14: Gunmen kidnapped ten in Suleja, Niger State. March 14: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Safana Local Government Area (LGA) and kidnapped four in Danmusa LGA in Katsina. March 14: Boko Haram killed twenty-two herdsmen in Monguno, Borno. March 15: Three teachers were kidnapped from a school in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed forty-one Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno. March 15: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. March 15: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Dikwa, Borno. March 15: Bandits killed two in Kauru, Kaduna. March 15: Herdsmen kidnapped five in Ayamelum, Anambra. March 15: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) Nigerian soldiers during an attack on a military base in Mobbar, Borno. March 16: Bandits killed three soldiers and five civilians in Gusau, Zamfara. March 17: Bandits killed one police officer and kidnapped three civilians in Chikun, Kaduna. March 17: Bandits killed one and kidnapped two in Bakori, Katsina. March 17: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped two in Birnin Kudu, Jigawa. March 17: Police officers killed two bandits in Lere, Kaduna. March 18: Gunmen killed four naval officers in Oyi LGA and three police officers in Anaocha LGA in Anambra. March 18: Nigerian soldiers killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Mobbar, Borno. March 19: Gunmen killed two police officers and two prison warders in Aguata, Anambra. March 19: Bandits killed one in Zangon Kataf LGA, ten in Kauru LGA, and two in Chikun LGA in Kaduna.