Islamic State

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 22 to 28, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1583163551729'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 23: Cult clashes resulted in three deaths in Ikorodu, Lagos. February 23: Herdsmen killed one and kidnapped one in Aniocha North, Delta  February 23: Police killed five crime suspects in Kankara, Katsina.   February 24: Police killed three protestors in Sagamu, Ogun.  February 24: Cultists killed five in Okpokwu, Benue.  February 26: Kidnappers abducted a Civilian JTF official among "others" (estimated at five total) in Chibok, Borno.  February 26: A Nigerian army corporal killed four of his colleagues and then himself in Abadam, Borno.  February 27: Police killed seventeen bandits and bandits killed four civilians in Kankara, Katsina.  February 27: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno. February 27: Over the last two months, a combination of military offenses and infighting between ISWA and Boko Haram has led to the deaths of twenty-five militants in and around Kukawa, Borno (LGA estimated). 

According to The Washington Post, jihadi groups with ties to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are working together to gain control of a large part of the Sahel, the border region between the Sahara and the better-watered pasture and agricultural lands to the south. The story’s sources are identified as U.S. and local officials on the ground. “What we’ve seen is not just random acts of violence under a terrorist banner,” says Brigadier General Dagvin Anderson, head of U.S. Special Operations in Africa. “But a deliberate campaign that is trying to bring these various groups under a common cause. That larger effort then poses a threat to the United States.”  Perhaps. As the story acknowledges, al-Qaeda and IS are enemies in the Middle East. In Africa, allegiances are fluid, tactical rather than strategic, and often tribal ties and practical matters are more important than theology or ideology. There is also an important criminal dimension: the Sahel has long been a center of smuggling of everything from people to weapons to narcotics. Indeed, jihadi activity in the Sahel appears to be intensely local in its causes and its goals. If this conclusion is sound, it would mitigate against the success of a long-term unification strategy. The article notes that there seems to be distinct, “mutually agreed-upon areas of influence” allocated to the different jihadi groups.  The Sahel is huge, poor, and characterized by weak states whose authority exists primarily on islands in a sea of spaces governed without the state or not at all. Despite more than a decade of jihadi activity, remarkably little is actually known about the various groups’ internal workings or their links to each other and to the world outside the Sahel. Evidence is slight for meaningful material support from outside of Africa. Where exactly these groups are is also not always clear, and allegiances can shift. It does seem clear that there are thousands of jihadi fighters, but not tens of thousands, and that jihadi leaders are skilled at exploiting local grievances. It also appears that the jihadi groups enjoy some local support in a region where governments and the elites that they serve are detached from the vast majority of the population.   

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 15 to 21, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582558147228'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 16: Gunmen kidnapped six in Lokoja, Kogi. February 16: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Marte, Borno.  February 16: Gunmen killed four soldiers and two civilians in Ekeremor, Bayelsa.  February 16: Kidnappers abducted twelve in Ofu, Kogi.  February 16: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  February 17: A cult clash resulted in three deaths in Lokoja, Kogi.  February 17: Gunmen killed two policemen in Irele, Ondo.  February 17: One bandit and one vigilante member were killed during a clash in Kurfi, Katsina.  February 18: Gunmen killed two soldiers in Jos, Plateau.  February 18: Herdsmen killed two in Ovia North-East, Edo.  February 18: Four Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) officers were kidnapped in Ofu, Kogi.  February 19: Cultists killed six in Ikpoba-Okha, Edo.  February 19: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) ISWA militants in Kukawa, Borno.  February 19: Bandits kidnapped "many" (estimated at ten) in Rafi, Niger.  February 20: Nigerian police killed two Hausa traders in Abeokuta, Ogun.  February 20: Airstrikes killed "some key" (estimated at five) ISWA leaders in Abadam, Borno.  February 20: Bandits killed two and kidnapped one in Chikun, Kaduna.  February 20: A cult clash resulted in ten deaths in Oredo, Edo.  February 10–20: Troops killed thirteen bandits in Katsina and Zamfara; estimated at identified location of Shinkafi, Zamfara.  February 21: Police killed two robbers in Abuja, FCT. February 21: Boko Haram killed "some" (estimated at five) vigilantes in Damaturu, Yobe.  February 21: Thirteen children were kidnapped in Ilorin West, Kwara. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 8 to 14, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1582044380307'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 8: Bandits killed three in Shiroro, Niger.  February 8: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  February 8: Gunmen killed two in Dutse, Kaduna.  February 9: Herdsmen killed three in Riyom, Plateau.  February 9: Boko Haram killed thirty and abducted "many" (estimated at ten) in Konduga, Borno.  February 9: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  February 10: Two soldiers and one Boko Haram militant were killed in a clash in Konduga, Borno.  February 10: Boko Haram killed one soldier in Magumeri, Borno.  February 10: Three CJTF and "several" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash in Kala/Balge, Borno.  February 11: Gunmen killed twenty-one in Giwa, Kaduna.  February 12: Gunmen killed seven in Kachia, Kaduna.  February 13: Herdsmen killed eight in Ughelli North, Delta.  February 13: Four people were killed during a riot in Orhionmwon, Edo.  February 14: Herdsmen killed one in Bokkos, Plateau.  February 14: Bandits killed thirty-three in Batsari, Katsina. 

The security situation around Borno’s capital, Maiduguri, appears to be going from bad to worse. On February 9, The Boko Haram faction Islamic State in West African (ISWA) shot or burned alive some thirty people sleeping in their cars and trucks that night outside the town of Auno, some ten miles from Maiduguri. They also kidnapped others. The victims had arrived in Auno after curfew, the gates to the town were closed, and the military had departed, presumably for their supercamp in Maiduguri, according to media.  The Nigerian army is following its own version of the “fortified hamlets” strategy, employed by the United States and its allies in the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan and generally regarded as a failure by counterterrorism experts. By consolidating their forces in highly fortified “super camps,” the Nigerian army reduces their own casualties, but in the evening, when soldiers withdraw back to these camps, ISWA appears to have close to free rein in the countryside and smaller towns. On February 12, ISWA killed five security personnel in three separate attacks near Maiduguri. That city, the capital of Borno state, has essentially been cut off from the rest of the country by ISWA and Boko Haram. The one remaining highway, to Damaturu, is subject to frequent attacks. The airport, however, remains open. The governor of Borno state is accusing the military of failing to protect civilians.  Military and security service failure is an old song. Though about 20 percent of the national budget goes for security, accountability for how the funds are spent is weak. Security service morale is widely reported to be low. Coordination among the agencies is bad. Trust of the security services among local people is low, and ISWA operatives appear to have better knowledge of the countryside than the security services. Though documentation is hard to find, security may be increasingly devolving from the central government to states and local communities. Local vigilante groups are active, in Yorubaland, for example, local governors have joined forces to organize a force to “assist” the security services.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from February 1 to 7, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1581350858423'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   February 1: ISWA (Boko Haram) killed three soldiers in Askira/Uba, Borno.  February 1: Bandits killed one and abducted twenty in Borgu, Niger.  February 2: Cult clashes led to seven deaths in Etche, Rivers. February 3: Three were killed during a clash between the police and protesters in Apapa, Lagos.  February 3: Bandits killed six vigilantes in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna.  February 3: Bandits killed five in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara. February 3: Gunmen killed four in Etche, Rivers.  February 4: Herdsmen killed three policemen in Oshimili North, Delta.  February 4: Boko Haram killed two in Extreme-Nord, Cameroon. February 4: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Arochukwu, Abia.  February 4: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 4: Gunmen killed four in Eleme, Rivers.  February 5: Gunmen killed three in Kaura, Kaduna.  February 5: Nigerian police killed 250 members of the Ansaru terrorist group (Boko Haram faction) in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost two officers.  February 5: Bank robbers killed four in Ile Oluji/Okeigbo, Ondo.  February 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at five) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Ngala, Borno.  February 6: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ibi, Taraba.  February 6: Nigerian police killed two more Ansaru (Boko Haram faction) commanders in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna and lost one police inspector.  February 7: Boko Haram killed six in Bosso, Diffa, Niger.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 25 to 31, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580746166255'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   January 25: Bandits killed eleven and kidnapped four in Shiroro, Niger. January 25: Two Boko Haram suicide bombers killed themselves and three others in Gwoza, Borno.  January 25: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at twenty) ISWA militants in Mobbar, Borno. January 25: Four herdsmen were killed in Nsukka, Enugu.  January 26: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Bali, Taraba.  January 26: Gunmen kidnapped three in Abaji, FCT. January 26: Herdsmen killed seventeen in Bokkos, Plateau.  January 27: Boko Haram killed six Chadian soldiers on Tetewa Island in Lake Chad.  January 28: Herdsmen killed one farmer and one policeman in Ovia North East, Edo.  January 28: Boko Haram killed three in Konduga, Borno.  January 29: Boko Haram killed five in Blangoua, Chad.  January 29: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Ankpa, Kogi.  January 30: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and three boys in Maiduguri, Borno.  January 30: Bandits killed two farmers in Wukari, Taraba.  January 30: Twenty-one Boko Haram militants, three soldiers, and one civilian were killed during an attack in Lake Chad. 

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 18 to 24, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1580150322071'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, January 17: Thirteen soldiers and four Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Bama, Borno.) January 18: Bandits kidnapped thirty-two people in Shiroro, Niger.  January 18: Bandits kidnapped five in Bukkuyum, Zamfara.  January 18: One soldier and four Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack on an aid facility in Ngala, Borno.  January 18: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Igalamela-Odolu, Kogi.  January 18: Boko Haram killed four soldiers and kidnapped "scores" (estimated at forty) in Bama, Borno. January 19: A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself and nine others in Kaiga-Kindjiria, Chad. January 19: Vandals tampered with a pipeline, leading to an explosion that killed five in Alimosho, Lagos. January 21: Gunmen killed four in Keana, Nassarawa. January 21: Police killed one during a Shiite protest in Abuja, FCT. January 21: 8 soldiers and "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants were killed during a battle in Kaga, Borno.  January 21: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped fourteen in Batsari, Katsina.  January 22: "Several" (estimated at ten) were killed during a clash between Boko Haram and ISWA militants in Abadam, Borno.  January 23: Boko Haram killed ten loggers in Dikwa, Borno.  January 23: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Ughelli North, Delta.   

Over the last couple of weeks, Boko Haram has increased attacks on the road from Maiduguri to Kano, the only remaining safe highway of the six major roads that connect Maiduguri with the rest of the state and country, according to Nigeria media. A major report on the increasing isolation of Maiduguri closely follows Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines supplying the city with electricity. Destroyed bridges and frequent attacks on travelers have cut off not only Maiduguri residents, but many other residents of Borno state from accessing or travelling to Borno’s neighboring states. In response, the Nigerian army has evacuated many villages along the highway, causing hardship and anger among the residents and friction between the governor of Borno state and the army.  Borno state and its capital, Maiduguri, have been ground zero for Boko Haram. Mohammed Yussuf founded the movement in Maiduguri, the police murdered him there in 2009, and Boko Haram emerged there in 2011 as a deadly terrorist movement. By 2015, Boko Haram controlled a territory as large as Belgium in Borno and adjacent Yobe and Adamawa states. The Nigerian army, assisted by Chadian forces and South African mercenaries, pushed Boko Haram back. But, there has been a Boko Haram resurgence. Though it is unclear the extent to which either Boko Haram faction actually governs territory, it is now able to operate in three states, especially Borno, and in some places it even provides a modicum of governance. It has seemingly pushed the security services back into fortified super camps, particularly Maiduguri. Local resident fear that Boko Haram will, with the closing of the Maiduguri-Kano highway, completely cut off Maiduguri and Borno state from the rest of Nigeria. The faction that is most active appears to be the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), though Abubakar Shekau’s faction has also been active. Nominally, Borno has a population of more than four million, and Maiduguri has a population of more than two million. However, because of the flow of internally displaced persons, it is hard to know how many people are now living there. Traditionally the state has been a center of trade, agriculture, and fishing. Borno was a center of the cattle industry, and a transit point for fish caught in Lake Chad. These activities are all dependent on the roads. The security services have so far been able to repel frequent Boko Haram attempts to destroy the bridge along the Kano-Maiduguri highway. If that bridge is destroyed, or attacks on travelers renders the road inaccessible, as a practical matter the only way to get to Maiduguri will be by air. Maiduguri has an international airport which remains open, and the city remains the headquarters of the Nigerian army operating against Boko Haram. It remains to be seen whether the isolation of Borno is part of a larger Boko Haram strategy and whether is presages a return to occupying and governing territory. 

On January 20, the electric company serving Maiduguri, capital of Borno state, publicly stated that Boko Haram attacks on transmission lines and infrastructure had cut electricity service to the city on January 17, removing Maiduguri from the national grid. The electric company had promised to restore power soon.  Maiduguri nominally has a population of about two million, but it is likely now much greater because of the influx of persons displaced by fighting between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram factions. In addition to being the capital of Borno state, the city is the residence of the Shehu of Borno, one of Nigeria’s most important Islamic traditional rulers. The city is on the main Hajj pilgrimage route stretching from Senegal on the Atlantic coast to Mecca. There is a modern university, an international airport, and it is on the national railway network, now being restored by Chinese companies. The city is a major trading center, especially for cattle. However, the poverty of the city’s residents is legendary in the region, where Maiduguri is sometimes called “the beggar maker.”  The city’s population is mostly Muslim in religion and Kanuri in ethnicity, and it has long been a center of radical Islamic thinking. There is a small Christian minority, mostly made up of ethnicities from elsewhere in Nigeria. Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Harm in Maiduguri, and he was killed there by the police in 2009. Since its resurgence starting in 2011, Boko Haram has come close on occasion to occupying the city. More frequently, it has dominated certain neighborhoods, with Boko Haram’s black flag flying over certain buildings. However, the Nigerian army now has its northern command headquarters there. Many international relief agencies also have offices in Maiduguri. Even in the best of times (which these are not), many or most residents of Maiduguri would have little or no access to electricity. The well-to-do would have their own electric generators. So, it is difficult to know what the impact actually is of the detachment of Maiduguri from the national grid for most residents. That said, however, Boko Haram would appear to have scored some sort of victory. Boko Haram has split into factions, of which the two best known are one that has been led by Abubakar Shekau since the resumption of hostilities in 2011, and one called the Islamic State in West African (ISWA), associated with the Islamic State. Relations among the factions are murky; at times they cooperate, at other times they fight each other. Nigerian media is carrying reports of a recent gun battle between the two factions that left “several” fighters dead. At present, it is not known which faction carried out the attack on Maiduguri’s electricity infrastructure.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 11 to 17, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker, featured below.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1579619989117'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   January 11: Boko Haram killed four and kidnapped four in Alom, Chad.  January 11: The MNJTF and Nigerian Air Force killed four ISWA (Boko Haram) commanders along with "several" other Boko Haram militants (estimated total of fifteen) in Kukawa, Borno.  January 12: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Owan West, Edo.  January 13: Kidnappers abducted two teachers in Owan West, Edo.  January 13: Kidnappers abducted two in Ola-Oluwa, Osun.  January 14: Gunmen killed thirty and kidnapped one hundred in Kaduna, Kaduna.  January 14: Gunmen kidnapped two health workers in Zurmi, Zamfara.  January 14: Bandits killed twenty-nine in Gummi, Zamfara.  January 15: Bandits killed fourteen in Gummi, Zamfara.  January 17: Kidnappers killed one and abducted twenty-two in Shiroro, Niger.  January 17: Gunmen killed two in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.   

This year, a mass-casualty terrorist attack on the United States or a treaty ally directed or inspired by a foreign terrorist organization was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from January 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker, featured below.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1578933098309'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   December 2019–January 2020: The Nigerian army killed one hundred bandits in Zamfara. January 4: Four Nigerian soldiers and six Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Konduga, Borno.  January 4: Gunmen killed four and kidnapped ten in Wukari, Taraba. January 5: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) ISWA (Boko Haram) militants in Kukawa, Borno.  January 5: Bandits killed one and kidnapped forty in Kurfi, Katsina. January 5: Bandits kidnapped thirty in Batsari, Katsina.  January 6: Kidnappers abducted seven in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni, Rivers. January 6: A bomb planted by Boko Haram killed thirty-two in Ngala, Borno.  January 6: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Kaga, Borno.  January 6: Boko Haram killed three Nigerian soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  January 7: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Jibia, Katsina.  January 7: Boko Haram killed twenty soldiers and three civilians in Monguno, Borno.  January 8: Nigerian troops killed "many" (estimated at ten) bandits in Jibia, Katsina.  January 8: Bandits abducted four seminarians in Ikara, Kaduna.  January 8: Bandits killed four and kidnapped twenty-one in Paikoro, Niger. January 9: Sectarian violence led to thirteen deaths in Mangu, Plateau.  January 10: Four Air Force officers and "several" (estimated at five) bandits were killed during a gunfight in Birnin-Gwari, Kaduna. January 10: Boko Haram killed three and kidnapped seven in Konduga, Borno.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528827552157'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528476877380'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1550185218651'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1127px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);  

Members of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a faction of Boko Haram, recently executed eleven hostages on camera. The video, released to a Nigerian Journalist on December 26, alleged that all the hostages executed were Christians, and that their murders were in retaliation for the killing of Abubakar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, by U.S. forces in October. The Islamic State-affiliated faction of Boko Haram has long posed a dilemma for policymakers. Is ISWA indeed an arm of the Islamic State (IS)? If so, does that mean it is therefore part of international jihadi terrorism and therefore has its sights set on Western targets? Or, despite its name, is it fundamentally a local insurrection against the secular Nigerian state? ISWA is certainly affiliated with IS. But what does that affiliation actually mean? They appear to share the same theological basis and much of the same rhetoric. IS leader Abubakar al-Baghdadi either orchestrated or approved an ISWA leadership change. But, evidence of strategic or tactical cooperation is limited. IS in Iraq and Syria sought to destroy Western secularism and was an avowed enemy of the United States. But ISWA in Nigeria has attacked no American installations, which, however, are few in the organization’s area of operation. It is implacably hostile to the secular Nigeria state, which it characterizes as evil.  ISWA has killed Christian hostages before. Most recently, it claimed to have murdered four aid workers it had kidnapped. In 2019 it murdered two midwives it had also kidnapped. It continues to hold captive an unknown number of hostages, estimated to be in the dozens and mostly aid workers and others somehow associated with the Nigerian government. In March 2018, it released the 104 schoolgirls it had kidnapped at Dapchi the month prior (five were apparently killed in the abduction), but it kept in its custody the lone Christian, Leah Sharibu. A number of things made this episode of particular significance. The eleven executions are the most numerous to date at one time. Further, ISWA videotaped the executions, made reference to the religion of the hostages, released the video the day after Christmas, and made it clear that their deaths were revenge for the U.S. killing of al-Baghdadi. By linking the murders to revenge for the killing of al-Baghdadi, ISWA is involving the United States, while publicity of the gruesome murders may have also been intended to further alienate Nigeria’s Christians and Muslims. In a Twitter thread, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly and unequivocally denounced the murders: “We should under no circumstances let the terrorists divide us by turning Christians against Muslims, because these barbaric killers don’t represent Islam and millions of other law-abiding Muslims around the world.”  Thus far, U.S. media reaction has been restrained. U.S.-based advocacy groups for Christians in West Africa have also been quiet, likely because of the Christmas holidays. But, even if the ISWA murders of Christians becomes a political issue in the United States in the coming days, U.S. capacity in the region, always small, is likely to become even smaller. A 2019 troop deployment review has signaled a U.S. draw-down of military and intelligence assets in West Africa. Should a consensus emerge that ISWA is, indeed, a part of IS, the U.S. capacity to shape events in northern Nigeria is likely to remain limited.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from December 28, 2019,  to January 3, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker, featured below.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1578323688608'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   December 28: Communal violence led to seven deaths in Etsako East, Edo.  December 29: Boko Haram killed one and kidnapped two in Biu, Borno.  December 29: Kidnappers killed four in Kuje, FCT.  December 29: Bandits killed one and abducted three in Jibia, Katsina.  December 31: Vigilantes killed four kidnappers in Kotonkarfe, Kogi.  December 31: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Damboa, Borno.  December 31: Gunmen kidnapped three in Ekiti, Kwara.   January 1: Gunmen kidnapped five people as well as a Taraba chief in Gassol, Taraba.  January 1: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  January 2: Nigerian troops killed four Boko Haram militants in Michika, Adamawa.  January 3: Herdsmen killed twenty-three in Kotonkarfe, Kogi.  January 3: Boko Haram killed three in Chibok, Borno.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528827552157'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1528476877380'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1027px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1550185218651'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='900px';vizElement.style.height='1127px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);