Islamic State

  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: July 18–24
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 18 to 24, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1595859679446'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 18: A bomb explosion killed six children in Malumfashi, Katsina.  July 18: Kidnappers killed two vigilantes in Gassol, Taraba.  July 18: Kidnappers abducted six in Chikun, Kaduna.  July 18: Twenty-three Nigerian soldiers and seventeen bandits were killed during a clash in Jibia, Katsina.  July 18: Boko Haram killed three in Chibok, Borno.  July 19: Suspected herdsmen killed twenty-one civilians and one police inspector in Kaura, Kaduna.  July 19: A joint task force killed four kidnappers in Lokoja, Kogi.  July 20: Suspected Fulani militia killed eleven in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.  July 20: Bandits kidnapped sixteen in Rafi, Niger state.  July 20: A military airstrike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  July 21: Sectarian violence led to three deaths in Kauru, Kaduna.  July 21: Bandits killed three in Batsari, Katsina. July 22: Kidnappers killed one police officer and kidnapped four in Akamkpa, Cross River. July 22: Boko Haram killed five kidnapped aid workers in Borno. July 22: Kidnappers abducted seventeen in Safana, Katsina.  July 23: Military airstrikes killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  July 23: Kidnappers abducted five in Jada, Adamawa. July 23: Fulani militia killed seven in Kajuru, Kaduna.  July 24: Bandits killed ten in Jema'a and Kaura LGAs in Kaduna.   
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: July 11–17
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 11 to 17, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1595259109595'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   Last week: July 10: Gunmen killed nine in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna. July 10: Boko Haram killed twenty Nigerian soldiers in Kukawa, Borno. July 10: Boko Haram killed fifteen Nigerian soldiers in Ngala, Borno.  July 10: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Maru, Zamfara.    This week: July 11: Gunmen killed three in Dutsinma, Katsina. July 11: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  July 12: Gunmen killed one in Zangon Kataf, Kaduna.  July 12: Gunmen killed two and kidnapped kidnapped twenty in Chikun, Kaduna.  July 13: Kidnappers abducted five in Gassol, Taraba.  July 13: Boko Haram killed eight Nigerian soldiers in Konduga, Borno.  July 13: Boko Haram killed four Nigerian soldiers in Kaga, Borno.  July 13: Boko Haram killed "several" (estimated at ten) civilians in Maiduguri, Borno.  July 14: Nigerian troops killed six bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara.  July 14: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Danmusa, Katsina.  July 15: The Nigerian Air Force killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  July 15: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.  July 17: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Kolofata, Cameroon. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: July 4–10
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from July 4 to 10, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1594669586832'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   July 4: Gunmen killed three and abducted five in Kurfi LGA and abducted three others in Matazu LGA in Katsina.  July 6: Herders killed two in Logo, Benue.  July 6: Bandits killed fifteen civilians and Nigerian troops killed forty-six bandits in Batsari, Katsina.  July 6: A Boko Haram IED killed one Nigerian soldier in Kaga, Borno.  July 7: Thirty-seven Nigerian soldiers and seventeen Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Damboa, Borno.  July 7: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.  July 8: Gunmen killed two farmers and kidnapped ten others in Toto, Nasarawa.  July 8: Kidnappers killed two police officers in Oredo, Edo.  July 9: Kidnappers abducted eight in Abaji, FCT.  July 9: The Nigerian Air Force killed twenty bandits in Talata-Mafara, Zamfara.  July 9: Gunmen killed two naval officers in Lokoja, Kogi.  July 9: Gunmen killed nine in Kauru, Kaduna. July 10: Gunmen killed eleven in Kauru, Kaduna.  July 10: Herdsmen killed seven civilians and Nigerian troops killed two herdsmen in Logo, Benue.  July 10: Gunmen kidnapped three in Ekiti East, Ekiti. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigerian Army Statements Bely Facts on the Ground in Northeast
    Nigerian army spokesmen have announced a series of successes against Boko Haram and that terrorism had been significantly weakened in the Lake Chad Basin. But such announcements lack credibility.    According to the Nigeria Security Tracker, the last two years have been deadlier than any other period for Nigerian soldiers since the Boko Haram insurgency began in 2011. On Tuesday, Boko Haram killed thirty-seven soldiers in a deadly ambush, though military spokesmen claimed only two soldiers were killed. Soon after, videos circulated showing ostensible survivors cursing the Army and Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai. Last Month, Boko Haram released a video showing the execution of a Nigerian soldier and a policeman. Another video showed five kidnap victims pleading for their freedom, and a third extended fraternal greetings to Boko Haram fighters in the nearby states of Zamfara and Niger. The media in the northeast is restricted and military spokesmen lack credibility. They often undercount casualties and inflate the number of terrorists killed. The government in Abuja frequently states that victory is at hand. Hence, accurate information is hard to come by. The reality appears to be that the Nigerian army is able to secure Maiduguri and the larger towns. It has consolidated its forces into fortified bases in these population centers in part to reduce military casualties. It can even clear episodically certain rural districts. But it is not able to retain the territory it clears nor the territory around cities and towns. In this way, insurgents have at times effectively cut off ground travel to these cities and towns from the rest of the country. Buratai appears to recognize this reality. In an interview with Nigerian media, he commented that Boko Haram was hard to defeat because its operatives were blended into the population. He suggested that defeat of the jihadi insurrection could require many years. But, the frequent disconnect between official statements and the reality on the ground continues to undermine confidence in the military.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 27–July 3
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 27 to July 3, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1594048906650'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 27: Ten Nigerian soldiers and twenty Boko Haram militants were killed in a clash in Damboa, Borno.  June 27: The Nigerian Air Force killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  June 28: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Oju, Benue.  June 29: Communal violence led to ten deaths in Misau, Bauchi.  June 29: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Wukari and Donga LGAs in Taraba.  June 30: Kidnappers abducted four aid workers and one security worker in Borno (LGA unknown).  June 30: Communal violence led to two deaths and five abductions in Afikpo South, Ebonyi.  July 1: Bandits kidnapped thirty and killed two vigilantes in Nasarawa, Nasarawa. July 2: The Nigerian Air Force killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  July 2: Nigerian troops killed two robbers in Jos North, Plateau.   July 2: Three Nigerian soldiers, two civilians, and seven Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Mobbar, Borno.  July 2: Bandits killed two in Batsari, Katsina.  July 2: Communal violence led to four deaths in Donga, Taraba.  July 3: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 20–26
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 20 to June 26, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1593456837823'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 20: Gunmen killed twenty-three in Maru, Zamfara.  June 20: Kidnappers killed four and one kidnapper was killed by police in Kwali, FCT. June 20: Boko Haram killed six in Gubio, Borno.  June 20: Communal violence led to six deaths in Guri, Jigawa.  June 21: Boko Haram killed five in Magumeri, Borno.  June 22: Bandits killed three and kidnapped one in Dandume, Katsina.  June 23: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in airstrikes in Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  June 23: Communal violence led to two deaths in Konshisha, Benue.  June 24: Bandits killed four in Shiroro, Niger state.  June 25: Gunmen killed one police officer and five civilians in Danmusa, Katsina.  June 25: Gunmen killed two in Barkin Ladi, Plateau.  June 25: Nigerian soldiers killed two gunmen in Guma, Benue.  June 25: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  June 25: Bandits killed two in Koton Karfe, Kogi.  June 26: Kidnappers abducted nine people in Akoko South-East, Ondo.  June 26: Bandits killed twelve in Tsafe, Zamfara. June 26: Bandits killed three in Danmusa, Katsina. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 13–19
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 13 to June 19, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.     var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1592835901619'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 13: Twenty soldiers and forty-one ISWA militants were killed during a clash in Monguno, Borno.  June 13: ISWA killed forty civilians in Nganzai, Borno.   June 13: ISWA killed thirty-one civilians in Gubio, Borno.  June 14: Communal violence led to ten deaths in Agatu, Benue.  June 14: Sectarian violence led to two deaths in Bokkos, Plateau.  June 14: Nigerian troops killed fourteen Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  June 14: Militia killed three and kidnapped six in Wukari, Taraba.  June 15: Bandits kidnapped ten and killed two in Shiroro, Niger state.  June 15: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in Faskari, Katsina.  June 15: Bandits kidnapped twenty-five in Maru, Zamfara.  June 16: Nigerian troops killed two herdsmen in Guma, Benue.  June 16: Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) operatives killed seven police officers in Ughelli, Delta.  June 17: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.  June 17: Nigerian troops killed "some" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in a separate incident in Bama, Borno.  June 19: Bandits killed seven in Batsari, Katsina.  June 19: Nigerian troops killed three kidnappers in Quan'an Pan, Plateau. 
  • Nigeria
    ISWA’s Recent Attacks Could Signal a New, Deadlier Approach in Nigeria
    Bulama Bukarti is a sub-Saharan Africa analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in London, and a PhD candidate at SOAS, University of London. On June 9, a Boko Haram faction called a religious gathering in a village in Gubio, Borno state. It would become the group’s deadliest attack on civilians this year. Claiming to be on a preaching tour, armed militants entered the village of Foduma Koloram and asked residents to give up their arms and any other weapons. According to reports, once those villagers that had dane guns and bows and arrows surrendered them, the militants started shooting at close range and used vehicles to ram those attempting to flee. The group killed eighty-one people over a period of six hours, left many others injured, and abducted seven. They stole hundreds of cattle and set the village ablaze as they left. This was followed by news of twin attacks on the June 13 that “appalled” the United Nations. After killing thirty-eight in an assault on Goni Usmanti village, jihadis attacked Monguno with heavy weaponry and rocket launchers. A base for many international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), the attack on Manguno led to a clash with government forces in which twenty soldiers died while protecting aid workers. The Gubio and Monguno assaults were claimed by Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), the faction of Boko Haram affiliated to the Islamic State. ISWA’s attack on Gubio, and presumably Goni Usmanti (which they did not expressly claim), represents a stark change in stance by the group. In a policy position long at odds with the Islamic State’s global stance, ISWA had not—until now, at least—attacked Muslim civilians, though they made exceptions for those who work for the Nigerian government or INGOs. This was also a key factor in the group’s split from the parent faction of Boko Haram in 2016. Since then, ISWA has distinguished itself by primarily targeting military, government, and INGO targets, while avoiding when possible killing Muslim civilians. This effort has been supported by a “winning hearts and minds” approach, with service provision in the areas they control. While the Monguno attack, with INGO and military targets, fits within ISWA’s bill, the ones in Gubio and Goni Usmanti, where the majority of fatalities were Muslim civilians, do not. While ISWA labelled its victims as vigilantes working with government forces, they were mostly unarmed cattle herders and residents, some of whom hold light weapons for self-defense in an utterly restive area. This signals a change in the group’s modus operandi of focusing attacks on state targets and Christians, but not Muslim civilians. It is not yet clear what is responsible for this change, but there are three possible explanations. The first is in reports that the attack was retaliation against villagers who pushed back against extortion by ISWA. The Gubio attack was against a herding village that had reportedly killed ISWA tax collectors. In pursuit of its proto-state objectives, ISWA has some territorial control in Borno and Yobe states and does tax residents. Reuters reported two years ago that ISWA provides safe grazing for about 2,500 naira ($7) a cow and 1,500 naira ($4) for smaller animals, presumably per annum. It also runs slaughterhouses, taking a cut for each animal. With cattle and other forms of livestock a key part of the economy in northeastern Nigeria, there are strong incentives for this behavior. The second explanation is the change in ISWA’s leadership in February 2020, following a successful coup within the group. Infighting in ISWA led to the execution of three of the group’s most senior leaders and their replacement with hard-line commanders who favor a more brutal approach. The revolt was triggered by an attempt to further “soften” the group’s approach to attacks. I concluded when this news first broke that this development may lead to a “further hardening of ISWAP’s policy of attacks.” This recent shift in who is a permissible target would be in line with this change in leadership and could signal an escalation in ISWA’s use of brutality against civilians, particularly noncompliant ones. The third is that these attacks might be a show of force to undermine government messaging on recent battlefield successes. Following an attack that led to the death of at least forty-seven soldiers last March, the Nigerian army announced a major offensive on both factions of Boko Haram. In April, Chad claimed to have killed 1,000 ISWA fighters in a counteroffensive that was the largest Chadian military action on record. Last week, the Nigerian army reported to have added a further 1,400 fighters to this toll. While government reports on the number of fighters killed in counter-offensives may be inflated or include misattributed civilian deaths, on-the-ground reports corroborate claims that recent efforts against the group have struck a heavy blow. With estimates from late 2019 putting ISWA’s fighting force at between 3,500 and 5,000, the loss of up to 2,400 fighters would be significant. These recent incidents could be the beginning of a new chapter in ISWA’s violence. If the faction sustains its attacks on civilians, unarmed Nigerians will become the target of both factions of Boko Haram. That ISWA has more fighters, reach, and sophistication means that the group could prove far deadlier than the original parent faction, Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah Liddawati wa Jihad (JAS). This could make a war that has killed an estimated 38,000 people and displaced millions even bloodier.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: June 6–12
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 6 to June 12, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.    var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1592235794410'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   June 6: Troops killed two bandits in Tsafe, Zamfara.  June 6: Sectarian violence led to four deaths in Bali LGA and two deaths in Donga LGA, Taraba.  June 6: Herdsmen killed twelve civilians and Nigerian troops killed five of the herdsmen in Guma, Benue.   June 6: ISWA fighters killed six Nigerian soldiers in Konduga, Borno.   June 6: Nigerian troops killed "scores" (estimated at forty) of bandits in Zurmi, Zamfara.  June 6: Communal violence led to four deaths in Onicha, Ebonyi.  June 7: A Nigerian military airstrike killed "several" (estimated at ten) bandits in the Kwayanbana Forest in Zamfara.   June 7: Boko Haram killed five and kidnapped nine in Konduga, Borno.  June 8: Nigerian troops killed an "unspecified" (estimated at ten) number of Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  June 9: Boko Haram killed eighty-one and kidnapped six in Gubio, Borno.  June 9: Bandits killed fifty-seven in Faskari, Katsina.  June 9: Communal violence led to twenty-three deaths in Lamurde, Adamawa.  June 10: Nigerian troops killed "several" (estimated at ten) Boko Haram militants in Gwoza, Borno.  June 10: Boko Haram killed four in Damboa, Borno.  June 11: Boko Haram released a video of them killing one Nigerian soldier and one Nigerian police officer.  June 12: Bandits killed eight and kidnapped nine in Faskari, Katsina. 
  • Nigeria
    Bandit and Jihadi Attacks Span Northern Nigeria
    On June 10, an estimated one hundred fifty bandits killed fifteen-seven people across six villages in Katsina state. Thirty-three of the victims were from the village of Kadisau and, according to a resident, they rustled two hundred head of cattle and looted every shop there in an operation that lasted some five hours. A similar but deadlier operation occurred on June 9 in Borno state. The locations of the attacks in Borno and Katsina are around 450 miles apart. The two assaults were only a day apart and of similar magnitude. They are examples of different aspects of insecurity in northern Nigeria. In the case of Borno, some victims believed the attack was a reprisal against local vigilante groups, and seemed to know the attackers. In the Katsina episode, reporting makes no reference to the existence of vigilante groups, and locals have referred to the attacks as “bandits.” In both areas, banditry and cattle rustling are common. Large-scale banditry is on the rise throughout Nigeria, particularly in the northwest. In Niger and in other parts of West Africa, the line between "jihadis" and criminal networks can be very thin. Indeed, jihadi groups have financed their operations by kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, and human and narcotics trafficking, among other criminal activities. That might be the case in Borno. Within the past week, military spokesmen have claimed success in operations against “bandits” and “jihadis.” According to media, the government has also engaged in talks with certain groups, but without apparent success. In any event, the bottom line is that security everywhere in Nigeria, particularly across the north, appears to be rapidly deteriorating, resulting popular discontent. Youth activists in Katsina, in response to the spate of attacks across the state, cancelled a Democracy Day celebration for June 12 and will replaced it with an online protest. They and others publicly implored the government to do something about the attacks. Some Nigerians complain that the federal government is paying too much attention to COVID-19 and not enough to banditry, which, they say, is killing many more people than the disease.
  • Nigeria
    Massacre in Northern Nigeria Involves Cattle Rustling, Jihadis, and Vigilantes
    According to Nigerian and international media, at least eighty-one people were killed in communities in Gubio local government area (LGA). One of the villages mentioned is Felo. This number was revised upwards from sixty-nine initially reported following the governor of Borno state’s visit to the area. Seven others, including the village head, were reportedly abducted. The town of Gubio is about fifty miles north of the Borno state capital of Maiduguri. The media also reports that between four hundred and twelve hundred cattle were stolen, a significant number. Though the attackers destroyed the village of Felo, media does not report the deaths of women or girls. Reporting of this episode across Nigerian and international media is sometimes unclear. Though no group has claimed responsibility, some in the media are saying that the attacks was the work of the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a Boko Haram faction with links to the Islamic State. The killings appear to have been especially brutal; some victims were run down by the attackers' vehicles. Many of the victims were tending cattle in open areas and so were particularly vulnerable, and bodies were found scattered over a large area. The media is drawing the implication that the attackers deliberately hunted down at least some of their victims, perhaps in reprisal, implying that they knew them. Villagers suspected that the attack was a reprisal for two “Boko Haram” members that vigilantes had killed in the past two months. According to locals interviewed, Boko Haram had been extorting them, and villagers had begun to resist, which has started to result in violent conflict. Villagers in Gubio LGA earn their livelihood through cattle rearing and they had been plagued by cattle rustling. In response, they organized a local vigilante group to protect their cattle that may have been augmented by the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). The CJTF emerged in 2013 during the Boko Haram insurgency, effectively as a vigilante group or community militia. It has since become a more official part of the government-led effort to counter Boko Haram and is a loose umbrella organization of thousands of vigilantes. Vigilante bands are found elsewhere in Nigeria and have varying relationships with the federal government's security services—some are even paid by them, though most are not. The exact relationship between the CJTF and the local vigilantes is unclear. It is plausible that, as some in the media reported, the atrocity was carried out by ISWA in revenge against the local vigilantes or the CJTF for informing on them to the security services or killing their members, even if cattle were also taken. That’s what some villagers report. The possibility also remains that the operation was purely or primarily criminal without ties to a jihadi faction. Cattle rustling is a problem in many parts of Nigeria. It is not uncommon for some local communities to assume responsibility for their own security, organizing vigilante groups that often have only tenuous connections to the regular security services.
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 30–June 5
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 30 to June 5, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1591635772470'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   (Last week, May 26: Nigerian troops killed seventy-five Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno.) May 30: Bandits killed three in Faskari, Katsina.  May 30: Gunmen abducted five in Shiroro, Niger state.  May 30: Boko Haram killed two in Askira/Uba, Borno.  May 30: Nigerian troops killed four bandits in Tsafe, Zamfara.  May 30: Gunmen killed three and kidnapped two in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.  May 31: A Boko Haram suicide bomber killed herself but no others in Konduga, Borno.  May 31: Bandits killed eighteen in Faskari, Katsina.  May 31: Herdsmen killed three in Akinyele, Oyo.  May 31: Herdsmen killed thirteen in Obi, Benue.  June 1: Boko Haram killed four in Konduga LGA and four in Damboa LGA, Borno.  June 1: Gunmen killed one and kidnapped three in Shiroro, Niger state.  June 1: Nigerian troops killed one Boko Haram militant in Madagali, Adamawa.  June 2: Boko Haram kidnapped one soldier and three aid workers in Guzamala, Borno.  June 2: Nine Boko Haram militants and one soldier were killed during a clash in Kukawa, Borno.  June 3: Nigerian troops killed two bandits in Chikun, Kaduna.  June 3: Gunmen killed nine in Kajuru, Kaduna.  June 3: Bandits killed six in Talata-Mafara LGA and fifteen in Maru LGA, Zamfara.  June 3: Nigerian troops killed six Boko Haram militants in Konduga, Borno.  June 4: Bandits killed two in Kurfi, Katsina. June 4: Bank robbers killed eight police officers and one civilian in Yagba East, Kogi.  June 4: Gunmen kidnapped six in Chikun, Kaduna. June 4: Sectarian violence led to five deaths in Guma, Benue.  June 5: Sectarian violence led to six deaths in Kwande, Benue.  June 5: Sectarian violence led to eleven deaths in Bali, Taraba. June 5: Nigerian troops killed seventy bandits in Chikun, Kaduna. June 5: Nigerian troops killed three bandits in Tsafe, Zamfara. 
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 23–29
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 23 to 29, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1591025961002'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 23: Communal violence resulted in one death in Afikpo, Ebonyi.  May 23: Four cultists were killed in Ifako/Ijaye, Lagos.  May 24: Nigerian troops killed twelve Boko Haram militants in Ngala, Borno.  May 26: Nigerian troops killed thirty bandits around Birnin-Magaji/Kiyaw, Zamfara.  May 26: Five Boko Haram militants and two Cameroonian soldiers were killed during a clash in Soueram, Cameroon.  May 27: Communal violence resulted in one death in Awka North, Anambra.  May 27: Bandits killed seventy-four in Sabon Birni, Sokoto.   May 28: Bandits killed thirteen in Faskari LGA and two in Sabuwa LGA in Katsina.  May 28: Gunmen killed five in Bassa, Plateau.  May 29: Kidnappers abducted four in Ika North East, Delta.  May 29: Communal violence resulted in three deaths in Awka North, Anambra.  
  • Nigeria
    Nigeria Security Tracker Weekly Update: May 16–22
    Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from May 16 to 22, 2020. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents are included in the Nigeria Security Tracker.   var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1590503351929'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.width='750px';vizElement.style.height='790px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   May 16: Gunmen kidnapped three people from Ado and Makurdi LGAs in Benue. May 17: Boko Haram killed twenty in Nganzai, Borno.   May 17: Nigerian troops killed twenty Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno.  May 17: Gunmen abducted a naval officer and two others in Akoko South-East, Ondo.  May 17: Bandits killed five in Shiroro, Niger state.  May 18: Twelve Nigerien soldiers and seven Boko Haram militants were killed during an attack in Diffa, Niger.  May 18: Nigerian troops killed seven Boko Haram militants in Bursari, Yobe.  May 18: Bandits killed eight in Wukari, Taraba.  May 18: Two Nigerian soldiers and three Boko Haram militants were killed during a clash in Gujba, Yobe.  May 19: Communal violence led to fifteen deaths in Biase, Cross River.  May 19: Bandits killed ten in Tsafe, Zamfara.  May 20: Communal violence led to twp deaths in Ishielu, Ebonyi.  May 21: Police officers killed eight kidnappers in Bali, Taraba.   May 22: Police killed two bandits in Sabon Birni, Sokoto. May 22: Gunmen killed twenty in Kajuru, Katsina.  May 20–22: Nigerian troops killed 135 bandits in Jiba and Dan Musa LGAs in Katsina and Birnin Magaji and Zurmi LGAs in Zamfara. 
  • Mozambique
    Preventing the Next Boko Haram in Northern Mozambique
    James Blake is an advisor, analyst, and journalist who focuses on conflict, humanitarian crises, and refugee issues. He is a member of the International Crisis Group's ambassadorial council.  As the world’s attention is fixed on the global COVID-19 pandemic, a brewing conflict in northern Mozambique is threatening to plunge the region into chaos. The conflict, which broke out in Cabo Delgado province in the fall of 2017, has since resulted in more than 1,000 deaths and forced 100,000 people to flee their homes. The details remain murky—not least because the government has banned researchers and journalists from covering it—but it is becoming clear that the so-called Islamic State is trying to capitalize on the insurgency. Along with the rising death toll, growing humanitarian needs, and brutal human rights abuses, there is concern among analysts that the conflict could spread into neighboring countries across southern and eastern Africa, not unlike the spread of jihadi violence in the Sahel.   Northern Mozambique has long suffered from high levels of illiteracy, poverty, child malnutrition, and alleged government discrimination. The region is primarily Muslim and features multiple languages, while the rest of the country is predominantly Christian. Cabo Delgado province in particular has long practiced Sufism, a mystical form of Islam. In recent years, new forms of Islam have been introduced to the region. In 2008, heavily influenced ideologically by Islamists in East Africa, a sect called Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamo (ASWJ) (“adherents of the prophetic tradition”) formed. Its primary sponsors were followers of Sheikh Rogo, who was sanctioned by the United States and UN in 2012 for providing support to al-Shabab. According to an ITCT report [PDF], following Rogo’s death, several of his followers moved to northern Mozambique.  Three mosques in Mocimboa da Praia, a district in Cabo Delgado province, adopted Rogo’s interpretation of Islam, which advocates for the formation of an Islamic State. Although the authorities have subsequently shut them down, many who studied at these three mosques as children eventually joined militias and recruited others to join their cause. Some who became members of ASWJ had been given money [PDF], which was likely the result of illicit economic activity, to attend madrassas in places such as Saudi Arabia and Sudan.  The majority of ASWJ are from the Kimwani tribe, which has suffered particular economic and social marginalization. In approximately mid-2015, the group adopted the name al-Shabab (“youth”), like the Somali-based insurgency, though it is also still called ASWJ. According to a local study [PDF], friends and marriages of members, and also the promise of monthly wages, helped ASWJ grow further.  The first registered attack took place two years later in Mocimboa da Praia in October 2017, when militants attacked a police station. ASWJ gradually increased its presence in the region and attacks continued sporadically through 2018. During this time and beyond, Human Rights Watch has documented the group beheading victims, burning entire villages to the ground, attacking schools, ports, and mosques, and raiding food supplies. By mid-August 2018, the World Food Programme started to distribute aid to the thousands of people who fled their homes and now live in IDP camps.  By summer 2019, the so-called Islamic State had announced that the group was part of its franchise, an affiliate of its Central Africa Province. It remains unclear exactly how much control IS has over the group. There are some indications of a connection; for instance, during some attacks the group has carried the black flag of Islamic State. Further, Jasmine Opperman, a security analyst, suggested the idea of temporarily occupying and looting towns, but not holding them, fits IS tactics. Recent journalistic reports suggest the group is recruiting and gaining weapons across the porous borders with neighboring countries, such as Tanzania and Congo. For its part, the Mozambique military lacks the necessary equipment and the language skills to implement a robust counter-insurgency strategy, though the African Union has offered to provide training and equipment. The number of attacks has risen significantly over the first quarter of this year. On March 23, ASWJ briefly took control of a transport hub close to one of Africa’s most significant gas projects. The fear among the business community, which includes large multinational organizations such as Total and ExxonMobil, is that the group will soon look to disrupt the gas projects and target foreign nationals for kidnapping. The government’s response has won few plaudits. Human rights agencies have accused them of detaining people without trial and arresting journalists for reporting on the conflict. In response to the growing atrocities, the government enlisted the shadowy Wagner Group, a Russian private security company with links to the Kremlin. It is currently operating in the Central African Republic and other war-torn countries Already, there are rising humanitarian needs and too little humanitarian support. The number of displaced persons has risen from 1,000 in March 2019, to more than 115,000 a year later. More than two million people are already in need of humanitarian support [PDF], according to ECHO. Such support should aim to address growing needs, boosting outcomes such as lowering malnutrition rates, and providing programs that result in more opportunities for education, and clamping down on government corruption. Northern Mozambique requires urgent international assistance to stem growing violence, armed attacks, and the likelihood of a more coordinated and lethal insurgency that is likely to outlast the coronavirus pandemic.