Iran Nuclear Agreement

  • Iran
    Top Conflicts to Watch in 2020: An Armed Confrontation Between Iran and the United States
    This year, an armed confrontation between Iran and the United States or one of its allies over Iran's involvement in regional conflicts and support of militant proxy groups was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.
  • Iran
    Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Iran Policy
    In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, CFR President Richard N. Haass analyzed the pros and cons of the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani and offered recommendations for U.S. policy moving forward. Takeaways: The targeted killing of Soleimani took place within a context of longstanding suspicion and animosity between the United States and Iran over the past four decades since revolution in Iran ousted the Shah and brought about the Islamic Republic. The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (more formally, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) cut the amount of enriched uranium Iran could legally possess, reduced its ability to produce more, and introduced an intrusive set of inspections. The result was that the time Iran would need to build nuclear weapons and achieve a nuclear or near nuclear capability increased to something on the order of one year, a period sufficiently long for Western intelligence agencies to discover what was going on and for governments to respond. At the same time, there were problems with the JCPOA, including its limited duration and lack of constraints on delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles. The fact that the JCPOA did not constrain Iran’s regional activities should not be considered a flaw of the agreement, however. Arms control cannot be expected to accomplish everything, and if we insist that it do so, we run the risk it will accomplish nothing. Grand bargains seek the perfect at the expense of the possible. The U.S. sanctions subsequently imposed on Iran constituted a form of economic warfare. Iran was not in a position to respond in kind, and instead initiated a series of actions meant to make the United States and others pay a price for the sanctions and therefore conclude they needed to be removed. The United States never provided a diplomatic alternative to Iran when it imposed these sanctions. If there is evidence that Soleimani was involved in mounting an imminent attack on U.S. forces, it should be made public. If, however, it turns out that these criteria were not met, his killing will be widely viewed as an action of choice and not necessity, one leading to an open-ended conflict between the United States and Iran fought in many places with many tools and few red lines that either will observe. A preemptive attack (for example, attacking a missile about to launch or an airplane loaded with bombs about to take off) is treated in international law as a legitimate form of self-defense. However, a preventive attack (mounted against a gathering threat rather than an imminent one) is something very different. A world of regular preventive actions would be one in which conflict were far more prevalent. It is not in our interest to lower the norm against preventive attacks lest they become much more frequent. There is no doubt that Soleimani had the blood of Americans on his hands and was a force for instability in the region. But just because he was an evil person and killing him may have been legally justifiable does not make it wise. Among the negative consequences:                                                                                                                          The killing interrupted what were useful political dynamics in both Iran (where anti-regime protests had been increasing in size and frequency) and in Iraq (where anti-Iranian protests had been growing). U.S.-Iraq ties are severely strained. This could require U.S. troops to depart Iraq, which would create a vacuum Iran would be all too happy to fill. It could also lead to a revival of terrorism in Iraq. The United States has been forced to send more forces to the region. They are thus not available for deployment elsewhere, and the United States has fewer resources to contend with the immediate threats of North Korea and Venezuela and the longer-term challenges posed by China and Russia. Iran has already announced it plans to take steps at odds with the JCPOA, which would shrink the window it needs to build a nuclear weapon if it chooses to do so. This could present the United States and Israel with difficult and potentially costly choices. Looking ahead, the United States should work closely with its allies and the other signatories of the JCPOA to put together the outlines of a new and improved agreement – call it JCPOA 2.0 – and present Iran with a new deal. The United States should also act immediately to repair its relationship with Iraq. Iraq is among the region’s most important countries. It is an essential component of any containment of Iran. We do not want to open the door to increased Iranian influence. Nor do we want to see a reconstitution of a massive terrorist threat in the form of ISIS or anyone else based within Iraq’s borders. The threat of sanctions against Iraq ought to be removed. So, too, should the threat for U.S. forces to remain in the country absent Iraqi permission. The Trump administration needs to accept reality. Regime change in Iran is unlikely. Our objective should be to change Iran’s behavior, to negotiate an outcome in the nuclear and missile sphere acceptable to both countries, and through our actions to lead Iran to conclude that it will fail if it continues to try to destabilize the region. This all still remains possible.
  • Iran
    The Coming Nuclear Crisis With Iran
    Iran’s move to suspend cooperation with the 2015 nuclear deal threatens to further escalate already high tensions between Washington and Tehran.
  • Iran
    Soleimani’s Death: A Crippling Blow to the Iranian Regime
    The U.S. targeted killing of commander Qasem Soleimani marks a further weakening of Iran’s regime in its struggle against the United States and its ability to project influence in the Mideast.
  • South Africa
    Shedding Light on the Iran-South Africa Relationship
    Kitaneh Fitzpatrick is an intern for Middle Eastern history and geopolitics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. She is pursuing a master of arts in Near Eastern studies at New York University.  In November 2019, hundreds of Iranian intelligence reports were leaked that shed light on Tehran’s success in bolstering Iranian influence throughout the region. Syria and Iraq featured heavily in the reports and are usually the focus of international attention on Iran’s foreign influence. But the Islamic Republic’s reach extends far beyond the Middle East. Recently, Iran has turned its attention to Africa. Faced with crippling sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Iran has developed a close partnership with South Africa. South Africa has long been a cornerstone of Iran’s South-South strategy, which aims to strengthen ties with African and South American states. Strongly promoted by President Ahmadinejad, the South-South strategy intends to boost Iranian international credibility and promote trade. The Islamic Republic was one of the first countries to resume trade with South Africa following the end of apartheid, and the two countries have enjoyed strong relations ever since. Trade has been an integral element of this relationship, with Iranian officials estimating the value of Iranian Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa in 2018 at roughly $135 billion.  South Africa has proven to be an unlikely ally, calling the U.S. withdrawal from of the Iran Nuclear deal “regrettable” and publicly reaffirming its commitment to building an Iranian-South African relationship. South Africa has also advocated for Iranian interests at the UN, siding with Iran on critical issues at the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency. South Africa’s commitment to maintaining diplomatic ties with Iran in the sanctions era has allowed the two countries to engage in joint business-tech forums, scientific cooperation, and tourism. Operating within the framework of the South Africa-Iran Joint Commission of Cooperation established in 1995, Iranian and South African foreign ministers meet frequently to discuss enhancing cooperation.  South Africa has become an important defense partner. Tehran has sought to leverage its longstanding relationship with South Africa to support Iranian naval expansion outside of the Middle East, and has conducted limited out-of-area naval operations in South Africa, according to a recent U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report. Iran and South Africa have also signed basic military cooperation agreements, and Iran’s deputy minister of defense met with South Africa’s chief of defense force staff in Tehran this May to discuss “the development of defense cooperation [that would achieve] long term and strategic engagement.” While deepening defense ties with South Africa is important to projecting Iranian military might, Iran’s navy frequently faces maintenance issues and its deployed forces are largely symbolic. However, naval expansion to South Africa is still a powerful demonstration of Iranian political influence in spite of economic hardship and domestic unrest.  South Africa is part of Tehran’s effort to offset the cost of U.S. sanctions and increasing diplomatic isolation from the West. The relationship still has room to grow, but it and others will provide an essential lifeline to Iran and will undermine U.S. pressure.
  • Election 2020
    The President's Inbox: Should the United States Maintain Maximum Pressure on Iran?
    Each week between now and the Iowa caucuses, I’m talking with two experts with differing views on how the United States should handle a foreign policy challenge it faces. These special episodes are part of CFR’s Election 2020 activities, which are made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
  • Election 2020
    Should the United States Maintain Maximum Pressure on Iran?
    Podcast
    In this episode of our special Election 2020 series of The President’s Inbox, Robert Malley and Ray Takeyh join host James M. Lindsay to discuss U.S. policy toward Iran.
  • Iran
    Rouhani Punctures Hope for Iran-U.S. Thaw
    Iran’s president used his UN address to dispel notions about ramped-up diplomacy with the United States or fundamental changes to Iranian actions in the Persian Gulf.
  • Iran
    Iran’s Next Move, With Ray Takeyh
    Podcast
    Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle East studies at CFR, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss the rising tensions between Iran and the United States.
  • Iran
    Trump's Iran Policy Proves the Primacy of U.S. Power—but to What End?
    As Iran slowly untethers itself from the Iran nuclear deal’s central constraints on enriched uranium, signaling the deal’s potential collapse, President Trump is proving that U.S. unilateral power remains paramount on the global stage.  Trump’s policy to kill the 2015 deal has been prevailing against the objections of the remaining signatories, perhaps the most powerful global counter-coalition possible — China, Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the European Union. It has been prevailing despite that Iran had until very recently been abiding by the deal following the U.S. withdrawal last May. But without an endgame strategy on Iran that includes an exit ramp off the escalatory ladder of tensions and a solution to the nuclear problem, Trump’s victory will be a Pyrrhic one. Throughout the Cold War and after, it was dogma that the United States needed partners in order to make sanctions work. With Iran, Trump has shown that the U.S. alone remains a preeminent power that can implement an unprecedented “maximum pressure” campaign of primary and secondary sanctions.  U.S. unilateral sanctions, and the threats to retaliate against companies doing business with Iran, have effectively crippled the Iranian economy, isolating it from international financial markets, drying up foreign investment, cutting its oil exports to 1.1million barrels per day (bpd) and below, stifling its economy (which is projected to shrink by 6 percent in 2019) and causing its currency to lose 60 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar.  But Trump’s assertion of U.S. unilateral power, through the use of sanctions, is a disruptive power and not an end in itself. To date, U.S. efforts to strengthen the Iran nuclear deal have been counterproductive to enhancing U.S. security. By withdrawing from the deal, Trump has provoked an Iranian reaction that could lead to the deal’s collapse while providing no alternative constraints on the Iranian nuclear program. The Iran Deal had resulted in a rollback of the Iranian nuclear program that included the removal of 98 percent of its enriched uranium, decreasing its enrichment capabilities to very low levels of 3.67 percent — far below weapons grade — and subjecting its program to robust international inspections. As the deal unravels, the Iranian program will be able to continue unfettered, adding once again to the destabilizing challenges in the region, not reducing them.  Furthermore, as the president recently increased the sanction pressure — including tightening sanctions on Iran's oil exports, sanctioning Iran’s supreme leader and placing its elite military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), on the terrorist list—Iran has adopted a more aggressive response and tensions have escalated across the region. The U.S. and Iran came very close to open conflict as the confrontation spilled into the Persian Gulf. And the chances for conflict are only accelerating as tit-for-tat reactions continue to disrupt the shipping lanes in the gulf. U.S. sanctions also have enabled the IRGC and Iran’s conservatives to tighten their control over Iran's economy and politics. And U.S. rejection of the Iran deal has turned the Iranian public against negotiations with the West, particularly on its nuclear program, further constraining Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani’s; 72 percent do not think Iran should negotiate with the West because it is untrustworthy.  The challenge before Trump is whether he is willing and able to convert U.S. power into an endgame strategy that results not in war by design or miscalculation, not in Iran building nuclear weapons, but in his stated goals of a nuclear weapons-free Iran with a better nuclear deal and an Iran that, as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo put it, behaves like “a normal nation.” Meeting that challenge won’t be easy, especially for an administration that is short-staffed on the national security cabinet level on down, and a president who is dismissive of coordinated approaches to strategy and policy. Trump, nonetheless, did lay the groundwork for progress earlier recently when he offered to talk to the Iranians without pre-conditions. If this offer is more than just a hat tip to a U.S. domestic constituency, there needs to be a comprehensive strategy with clear goals, objectives and options. Time is of the essence as Iran moves away from the constraints on its nuclear program. To be successful, a strategy would need to include as incentives something very similar to what the president appears to be offering North Korea: broad-based sanctions relief and security guarantees reinforcing the president’s claim that he is not pursuing regime change in Iran.  Although the Iranian leadership has rejected the president’s offer, the Iranians should reconsider their response. The Iranian strategy is inappropriately focused on pressuring the other signatories to fulfill the trade and investment requirements of the Iran nuclear deal with threats of incremental violations every 60 days. This strategy does not fully recognize how the U.S. has checkmated the other signatories on this issue.   If the U.S. is going to go it alone on Iran, it must implement a strategy that leverages U.S. economic power into opportunities for a diplomatic solution that makes the U.S. more secure.
  • Iran
    Is Iran’s Nuclear Program Back for Good?
    The demise of the Iran nuclear deal does not make Tehran an immediate threat, but it opens the door to nuclear escalation.
  • Iran
    U.S.-Iran Tensions, Osaka’s G20 Summit, and More
    Podcast
    Tensions between Iran and the United States persist, Osaka holds this year’s Group of Twenty summit, and U.S. President Donald J. Trump travels to South Korea.
  • Iran
    Escalating U.S.-Iran Tensions: What’s Next?
    Neither Iran nor the United States likely wants war, but the possibility of a miscommunication is considerable, risking a dangerous escalation.
  • Iran Nuclear Agreement
    Tensions Flare With Iran, a Showdown Between Congress and the White House, and More
    Podcast
    Tensions between the United States and Iran flare, Hungary’s far-right prime minister visits the White House, and Congress and the Trump administration prepare for a showdown.
  • Iran
    Latest U.S. Pressure Has Iran Over a Barrel
    Iran appears increasingly boxed in by intensifying U.S. sanctions, the latest of which will effectively cut it off from its main oil customers.