International Relations

How did world leaders do in managing global challenges in 2018? Experts from twenty-eight think tanks around the world grade international cooperation a middling C.

Washington continues to claim Ankara as “strategic partner.” Let’s stop pretending it is.

In 2018, CFR once again hosted high-level discussions of global affairs, from U.S. election security to the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry to the artificial intelligence race.

When Andrew Brunson, the North Carolinian pastor, was released from Turkish custody in October, President Donald J. Trump tweeted that he was looking forward to “good, perhaps great, relations between the United States & Turkey.” The administration then subsequently lifted sanctions it had imposed on Turkey’s ministers of interior and justice over Brunson’s detention. The Turks responded by lifting sanctions Ankara had imposed on then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions and—not understanding what his portfolio entails—the Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke. The change in tone between the two governments is a welcome development, but it does not change the alternate directions the two countries are moving. Put simply, the United States and Turkey do not share interests, priorities, or common values.  The divergence between these two NATO allies reflects the changes in international politics since the end of the Cold War nearly a generation ago. Absent the common threat posed by the Soviet Union, there is no strategic rationale for the U.S.-Turkey partnership.  The sooner American policymakers understand this fact, the greater likelihood that the Washington can pursue a more realistic approach to Ankara, which means working together when possible, working around Turkey when necessary, and publicly opposing the Turks where they seek to undermine American policies and interests. Ankara wants to be a regional power in its own right and as a result, opposes the U.S.-led regional political order that helps to advance American power and interests in Turkey’s neighborhood. Turkey’s foreign policy is complicated, but Ankara’s desire to be a leader in its region and beyond has compelled the Turkish leadership to improve ties with Russia, cooperate with Iran to evade UN sanctions, and oppose the United States in Syria.  It also happens to be good politics for President Erdogan to oppose the United States given the reservoir of anti-Americanism among Turks. Although it is clear that Turkey and the United States differ in important areas, American officials have sought to narrow the divide between the governments through intensive diplomacy.  These efforts have produced few tangible results.  Consequently, it is time for the United States to try a different approach. This includes: 1.    Recognizing that the strategic relationship is a relic of the past. Going forward U.S. officials should ask for and expect less from their Turkish counterparts. This includes expectations concerning Turkey’s involvement in the fight against the Islamic State as well as Turkey’s cooperation in adhering to recent U.S. sanctions on Iran. 2.     Developing alternatives to Incirlik Air Base without abandoning it. While Incirlik was important to the fight against the Islamic State and may be important in future crises, the base has also become useful to Turkey’s leaders in domestic politics. Turkish officials have threatened to rescind permission for the anti-ISIS coalition’s use of the facility over the U.S. relationship with the YPG—a warning that plays well with nationalists. Options in Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and possibly Jordan or Iraq would insulate the United States from periodic Turkish threats to revoke American access to the base. 3.     Continuing the relationship with the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). It is true that the YPG is linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been waging a terrorist campaign against Turkey for three decades, and it is also true that the YPG and its affiliated political party do not represent all Syrian Kurds.  Still, the YPG has been critical in the fight against the self-declared Islamic State in Syria, especially in contrast to the Turks, who have been ambivalent in their involvement. 4.      U.S. officials should take a strong public stand on Turkish policies that undermine U.S. policy. Private diplomacy and persuasion behind closed doors has little, if any, effect on the policies that Ankara pursues at home and abroad. Toward that end, the United States should end its cooperation with Turkey on the F-35 program, preventing Turkey from accessing the newest high-tech jet in the American military inventory. The Turkish government simply cannot purchase advanced weapons from Russia, undermine American efforts and threaten U.S. forces in Syria, aid Iran, arrest American citizens, detain Turkish employees of the U.S. embassy, and carry out repressive rule of its own citizens that violates the principles of Ankara’s NATO membership and expect to enjoy the benefits of America’s most advanced military aircraft. Turkey is and will continue to be a member of NATO, but it is not the partner it used to be. In the future, U.S. policy should be based on the fact that while Turkey is not an enemy of the United States, it is also not a friend. Washington can work with Ankara where it remains possible, work around the Turks where it is necessary, and work against them where it has to. I explore this argument in greater detail in a new Council Special Report, Neither Friend nor Foe: The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations. 

This article first appeared here on ForeignPolicy.com on September 13, 2018. Almost two decades ago, I went to dinner at a restaurant called Peking in the Zamalek neighborhood of Cairo to celebrate the Chinese New Year. During what I vaguely remember being a raucous dinner, the crowd at the restaurant was asked to hush because a special guest had arrived. It was China’s ambassador to Egypt, who took the floor with a young Chinese woman—his translator—who effortlessly turned Mandarin into flawless classical Arabic. My dinner companions, a mix of American grad students, Egyptians, and Egyptian-Americans, were blown away at the translator’s skills. After all, few Americans could accomplish a similar feat. We then resumed celebrating the Year of the Rabbit. Looking back, the young Chinese woman’s beautiful Arabic symbolized Beijing’s long term investment in building China’s regional role. The country’s leaders at the time understood that at some point they would want a greater voice in the region. Back in the late 1990s, this idea seemed plausible, but well over the horizon. When China came up in conversation, Egyptian officials would often declare, “China is not a replacement for the United States.” Then they would wait two long beats and with add with a smirk, “Yet.” Have we now arrived at that moment? On July 10, China’s President Xi Jinping opened the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab Cooperation Forum with a lengthy and rousing speech about collaboration, cooperation, and “win-win” solutions for Beijing and the Arab world. A few weeks later he flew to Abu Dhabi for a three day state visit to the United Arab Emirates, the first by a Chinese leaders in almost three decades, and signed a raft of mostly economic agreements. The conference and Xi’s trip come at a time when there is a lot of interest in the Middle East and beyond in President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative—an amorphous plan to put China at the center of global governance and in the process reverse the flow of goods, services, and ideas that have made the West paramount over the last few centuries. If you are an economic determinist, the Chinese have indeed become players in the Middle East. But broaden the scope of analysis and Chinese’s grand plans haven’t moved much beyond the beautiful-Arabic stage. No doubt China’s economic state-craft is real and has the potential to be profoundly consequential for the Middle East. In his July speech before about 300 attendees —including at least one Arab head of state and a handful of Middle Eastern foreign ministers—in Beijing, Xi committed $20 billion worth of loans to the region, an additional almost 90 million in aid to Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon for reconstruction and care for displaced people, and another billion dollars to the Arab world toward building “social stability.” This comes on top of major Chinese investment in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, where about 60 percent of China’s exports are re-exported to Africa, the Middle East, and  Europe. China has also targeted non-Arab Turkey and Saudi Arabia as central pieces to the Belt and Road that will provide access to the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, respectively. There has been some backlash to the Chinese in Southeast Asia and Africa about a ‘new colonialism,’ but less so in the Arab world and certainly not among officials there. In the early and mid-2000s, Egyptian diplomats would get misty eyed when talking about China. This wasn’t surprising. The Chinese Communist Party had solved a riddle that had proven beyond the apparatchiks of Egypt’s National Democratic Party—how to generate long term economic growth without upending social cohesion and maintaining the power of the party. More recently, a senior official from a Gulf country noted that Washington’s political polarization made it an unreliable and even risky partner in the Arab world’s quest for economic development and declared, “If you sat where we sit, you too would base your economic future on partnership with China.” The Chinese can bring a lot of resources to bear for what they call “win-win” cooperation in the Middle East. The new ports, airports, logistics “hubs,” and economic zones that are being planned or are under construction stand to benefit these countries (unless they are saddled with huge debt like a number of Beijing’s client states in Africa) while China gets to enjoy the benefits of new infrastructure and the copious energy resources of the region that will facilitate its continued development. Yet to infer, as a fair of amount of reporting and analysis suggests, that China’s financial investment in the Middle East means that Beijing will become a geo-strategic player in the region may be getting out ahead of even the Chinese. Of course, there is historical precedent for this evolution: The British occupation of Egypt came about in part to collect Khedive Ismail’s debts to European banks. Still, the Chinese seem more interested in opportunistic mercantilism than becoming a problem solver and provider of regional security. A close look at Xi’s July speech or China’s 2016 policy statement on the Middle East reveals a detailed discussion of economic statecraft, but the barest minimum of boilerplate on politics, diplomacy, and security in the region. Reflecting these official statements, the Chinese foray into these areas has been tepid, at best.  They’ve declared their support for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; have resisted American efforts to cut off Iran’s oil exports, which, given how much energy Beijing imports from Tehran, is to be expected; and declared their opposition to extremism and terrorism. There is a certain logic that given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, it will have to get involved in the security and politics of the region. All that said, what have the Chinese actually done?  They hosted relatively low-level delegations of Palestinians and Israelis in Beijing in 2017, reiterating their support for a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state—a starting point that is doomed to fail. Beijing set up a naval base in Djibouti—strategically located at Bab el Mandeb where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden—and their warships have made port calls in parts of the Middle East.  Maybe these activities presage a more active role in the future, but at the moment, it isn’t even clear that the Chinese have the military resources for a sustained presence in the region.  Beijing’s answer to fighting extremism seems to be rounding up ethnic Uighurs into re-education camps, an issue on which Middle Eastern governments have remained silent. No one in the Middle East expects the Chinese to be a provider of security, that is what the United States does and the Chinese are all too happy to benefit from it.  As Washington has demonstrated less appetite to get involved militarily in the region, Middle Eastern countries have looked to Moscow or taken it upon themselves to secure their interest in Syria and Yemen. Contrary to the often breathless commentary about China as a rising power in the Arab world, Beijing’s minimalist approach to the dramas and traumas of the Middle East in favor of economics issues is shrewd in terms of China’s broader ambitions. A day after the United States launched 59 cruise missiles at Syria, while Presidents Trump and Xi were enjoying chocolate cake at Mar a Largo, I called a friend in Beijing to get a sense of the Chinese reaction. He laughed and told me that no one in the Chinese capital was impressed with the American display of 1980s-era technology. “Besides,” he said, “anything that keeps the United States bogged down in the crises of the Middle East is good for China. It’s less resources Washington can spend on the South China Sea.” That makes sense—and it’s time the rest of the world realizes it.

Sungtae (Jacky) Park is a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. The history of Korea’s relations with China and Japan going back to ancient times shows that Koreans have always had a complicated, yet pragmatic relationship with their neighbors, and recent South Korean public opinion polls on China and Japan, too, have been fluctuating depending on circumstances. Current social and geopolitical trends also seem to forecast improvement in Japan-South Korea relations and deterioration in China-South Korea relations. Miscalculating South Korea’s geopolitical orientation could lead to lesser support on the part of Americans for the U.S.-South Korea alliance, less solidarity on the part of Japanese with their South Korean quasi-allies, and further emboldening on the part of Chinese in the attempt to pry South Korea away from the United States. As the Korean Peninsula has historically been the center of geopolitical competition in Northeast Asia, a nuanced understanding of Seoul’s position and perception toward Beijing and Tokyo would help all relevant parties contribute to long-term strategic stability in the region. Read more on The National Interest.