Indo-Pacific

Over the weekend the Halifax International Security Forum convened its tenth iteration, one that observed the hundredth anniversary of the 1918 armistice ending World War I, and took the occasion of the forum’s own anniversary to reflect on the deliberations of the past decade. One of the distinguishing features of the Halifax forum lies in its selection of participating countries: only democracies are invited. An all-democracy forum on security raises the visibility of values issues—in the forum’s own words, “a security conference of democratic states that seeks to strengthen democracy.” This year’s plenary deliberations included more attention to Asia and the Indo-Pacific region than in the past—and surfaced concerns about China, trade, the Belt and Road Initiative, technology, and surveillance. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command commander, Admiral Phil Davidson, provided a keynote that reinforced the speech Vice President Mike Pence had delivered away in Port Moresby just hours earlier at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit. Davidson, given his specific focus on Indo-Pacific security, offered more expansive detail about what the administration means when it refers to a “free and open” region: “free from coercion by other nations” as well as free “in terms of values and belief systems” “individual rights and liberties” including religious freedom and good governance “the shared values of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”  “all nations should enjoy unfettered access to the seas and airways upon which our nations and economies depend” “open investment environments, transparent agreements between nations, protection of intellectual property rights, fair and reciprocal trade” Davidson took care to echo Vice President Pence’s invitation to China to participate in a free and open Indo-Pacific, as long as Beijing “chooses to respect its neighbors’ sovereignty, embrace free, fair, and reciprocal trade, and uphold human rights and freedom.” The session titled “Asia Values: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific” featured speakers from all four of the “Quad” countries: Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. One panelist noted the divergent geographic definitions of the Indo-Pacific: a common map for India, Japan, and Australia—one that ends on the east coast of Africa—but a U.S. view that ends with India’s west coast, leaving out the huge expanse of the Indian Ocean. (More on the geographic gap, with maps, from my perspective here.) Any number of other countries could have been represented, but by framing the discussion through the prism of the Quad, the session got to topics such as the Quad’s own evolution of purpose. What began as a humanitarian coordination effort among the four countries with the December 26, 2004 tsunami had a brief life as a “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” meeting in 2007. But Australia later removed itself from that framework, and the four did not meet again until 2017. Since 2017, the Quad has met formally—at the assistant-secretary level—three times, the most recent of which took place in Singapore on November 15. These meetings, however, are no longer referred to as a “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” but by the more anodyne “U.S.-Australia-India-Japan Consultations” (or other variants according to the capital issuing the statement: Canberra, New Delhi, or Tokyo). As the Halifax discussion on the Indo-Pacific highlighted, the Quad framework has evolved to take up matters not solely in the military-security lane. The conversation usefully raised ideas for the four countries to pursue together, such as increased cooperation for “instruments to meet the infrastructure demand” (some is already underway, but the need is great), counterproliferation and counterterrorism cooperation, and continued work to build greater interoperability among all four countries in order to better respond to humanitarian emergencies. Reflecting on the powerful symbol of all four democracies, and what they could do together, I was struck by the divergence in the otherwise similar statements released by each country following the November 15 Quad meeting in Singapore. Australia, Japan, and the United States all made reference to “exchang[ing] views on regional developments including in Sri Lanka and Maldives.” India, however, just noted “recent developments in the regional situation.” Challenges to democracy in Sri Lanka and Maldives suggest exactly the type of regional developments that all four Quad members ought to be able to discuss freely and openly, and consider what support they might be able to offer.   As we look ahead to more consultations among the Quad, all of us interested in the potential of this framework should be thinking about what it means for four democracies to develop a common agenda for the region. At a time of technological change, and new realizations about the vulnerabilities of all of our democracies—the precise vulnerabilities of open societies—perhaps the Quad democracies should be looking ahead to over-the-horizon issues that will be central to strengthening not only our own democracies but also others in the region. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was published by Oxford University Press in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

One of Asia’s most important annual economic gatherings still does not include India, a flaw that undermines efforts to expand trade and innovation throughout the region.

For many Southeast Asian states, the Trump White House’s new strategy for the region, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, is a hard idea to sell—at least right now. The strategy vows to promote a rules-based security and economic order in Asia, while also encouraging closer cooperation among regional U.S. partners. But the concept has been questioned by even close U.S. partners like Singapore, which has not yet expressed clear support for the idea. Many Southeast Asian states fear looking like they are building a coalition against China. But others simply appear unready to sign up for an idea at a time when the White House has sent multiple worrying signals to Southeast Asia. The White House’s trade strategy, for instance, has at times targeted Southeast Asian states. In democracies like Indonesia and Malaysia, U.S. indifference to human rights alienates some local leaders. Overall, the administration’s erratic approach to policymaking has undermined Southeast Asians’ confidence in the United States’ president. Due to the White House’s nationalist tone and inconsistent approach to Southeast Asia, some Southeast Asian states have begun to accept China’s growing regional power. Still, some Southeast Asian states fear aspects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), worry about Beijing’s approach to the South China Sea, and resent Chinese influence in their domestic politics. Many Southeast Asian states remain uneasy with the idea of China becoming the region’s preeminent power. For the Trump administration to restore Southeast Asian states’ trust in the United States as an indispensable external actor, and to convince them to sign onto the Free and Open Indo-Pacific idea, it needs to show that tough policies are not just designed to favor the United States but also can benefit Southeast Asia. It can do so in Vietnam. For more on how it can do so, see my new Diplomat article, from which this blog is adapted.

The outcome of the election in the Maldives, which ousted the authoritarian President Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom, allows the country to focus on rebuilding its democratic institutions and its relationship with India.

Ahead of Sunday's election in the Maldives, read up on the issues facing the island nation, including democratic backsliding, corruption, and geopolitical competition between China and India.

The Donald J. Trump administration has pursued a foreign policy toward Southeast Asia that has simultaneously courted and alienated countries in the region. The White House has taken a tougher approach to regional security, including increasing freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea and developing a regional concept, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” which draws clearer lines against coercive behavior in regional waters and trade practices, especially by Beijing. The U.S. president also has spent extensive time in Southeast Asia, a contrast to some of his predecessors. On the other hand, the Trump administration has angered many Southeast Asian states by ramping up trade wars, which could impact some of the region’s most trade-dependent economies. The White House often has placed an emphasis on relations with Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, forsaking ties with Indonesia. To some extent, these decisions make sense. Vietnam and Singapore are close strategic partners that are generally aligned with U.S. concerns about China and have become increasingly worried about China’s regional assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea and regarding influencing other states’ political systems. The Philippines is a U.S. treaty ally, Trump seems to personally like Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, and the Philippines is the first country in Southeast Asia to embrace the idea of negotiating a bilateral free trade deal with the Trump administration, which jibes with the White House’s preference for bilateral trade liberalization rather than multilateral deals. But the Trump administration should, for the rest of its term, devote greater attention to U.S.-Indonesia relations, which have largely taken a backseat for this White House. For more on how the White House could bolster U.S.-Indonesia relations, see my new article for Pinter Politik, which draws upon my Council Special Report, Keeping the U.S.-Indonesia Relationship Moving Forward.

Australia's new India economic strategy shows how India's growing economic weight makes it an unavoidable economic partner, despite the challenges in navigating its market.

India, which still views U.S. foreign policy with some skepticism, is essential to the success of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy. What will New Delhi conclude from the recent U.S. diplomacy on display?

Earlier today Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi delivered the keynote address at the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue. Given India’s limited participation in recent years—a disappointment to many observers who had hoped for a more active Indian presence at Asia’s premier security forum—Modi’s speech was eagerly anticipated. As with his address in January at the World Economic Forum, Modi presented India as a champion of the liberal international order. (Unlike his address at Davos, however, Modi delivered this one in Singapore entirely in English rather than Hindi, which he does not frequently do.) Modi included a lot of material in this speech that would not surprise Indian listeners, as many elements of his address reaffirmed earlier policies, positions, or initiatives. To my ears, his speech amplified the central and ongoing themes of India’s role on the world stage: (1) India’s focus on its own long civilizational history of international engagement—and raising global awareness of that history; (2) India’s sense of itself as playing a linking role for the larger Indo-Pacific space; and (3) India’s commitment to principles, rule of law, and a theory of equality for nations as part of its general commitment to the liberal international order. On the first theme—the not-to-be-forgotten importance of India’s civilizational past—Modi invoked India’s maritime history, highlighting the Indus Valley civilization port of Lothal (in his home state of Gujarat) as “among the world’s oldest ports.” He cited Buddhism as a regional link for the Indo-Pacific: “The ancient wisdom of the region is our common heritage. Lord Buddha’s message of peace and compassion has connected us all.” Not surprisingly, he underscored the importance of the Indian Ocean to India, noting that 90 percent of India’s trade and energy passes through it. He specifically delineated the boundaries of the Indo-Pacific as seen through Indian eyes: as a space extending “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas.” In this geography—unlike the American geography that bookends the Indo-Pacific with India’s west coast and then the U.S. west coast—India sits right in the middle. Modi emphasized India’s “Act East” policy of stepped-up activity with the ASEAN region, and highlighted India’s work with the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and a series of regional organizations in which India participates: the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (the “Plus” includes countries outside of ASEAN), and ASEAN Regional Forum. In this presentation, Modi also noted India’s participation in organizations “bridging South and Southeast Asia”: the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation and the Mekong-Ganga Economic Corridor. (APEC, of course, did not figure as India has been denied membership for more than twenty years.) He highlighted strengthened bilateral ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, Russia, the United States, and China (“no other relationship…has as many layers”). Finally, in the geographic tour, he included India’s “growing partnership with Africa.” This tour of India’s participation in regional institutions, and its ties both throughout the Indo-Pacific and with the world’s major powers, points to how India sees itself as both a bridge across the region, and a point of connection—a node—for interaction in the Indo-Pacific.   On the question of principles, Modi specifically affirmed India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific as a “free, open, and inclusive” region, not “directed against any country,” with “Southeast Asia at its center,” and a space that requires a “common rules-based order” that respects “sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as equality of all nations.” He underscored the importance of freedom of navigation and connectivity—and decried protectionism, as he had in his Davos speech. (Of course, less than a month after the Davos speech, India raised tariffs on a range of goods such as toys and phones largely imported from China.) At least Modi is speaking about the need to stop protectionism. Over in Washington, DC, the Donald J. Trump administration has decided to revive it. For me, the big-picture takeaway from this speech lies in Modi’s apparent desire to position India as a champion of the liberal international order. Observers of the region and of Indo-Pacific geopolitics will be looking for more. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was just published by Oxford University Press in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

As the Donald J. Trump administration develops its Indo-Pacific strategy, some big questions remain unresolved about not only the initiatives it will undertake, but the basic geography as well. For example, the Indo-Pacific as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy defines it covers a geography quite different from that understood in India as the larger Indo-Pacific incorporating the entirety of the Indian Ocean. In order to realize the potential of this strategy, the Trump administration will need to reconcile differences over what constitutes this region, internally align the segmented U.S. bureaucracy to adequately address this expansive area, and determine what might be productive joint initiatives. For more on the challenges, and some of my recommendations on what can be done, see my new Council on Foreign Relations Expert Brief, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean.” My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was just published by Oxford University Press in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

The Donald J. Trump administration has released its National Security Strategy (NSS). Media attention and analysis of the document has rightly highlighted the prominence of Russia and China, identified as revisionist powers that “want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.” Observers have also remarked upon the incoherence of a strategy that claims a role for “competitive diplomacy” and “advancing American influence” while slashing the budget and the personnel of the State Department. And of course, the elephant in the room is whether the president actually believes what the strategy outlines. But one lesser-discussed area worth further attention is the more prominent place given to India and the Indo-Pacific region in U.S. national security. The NSS describes its components in four sections—following the four “pillars” of the strategy—that lead the document: “protect the American people,” “promote American prosperity,” “preserve peace through strength,” and “advance American influence.” Following these pillars, a final section charts out “the strategy in a regional context.” This format differs from those of previous NSS documents which tended to interweave specifical regional priorities within the outlines of strategic goals. But the biggest departure from previous NSS documents is the placement of the Indo-Pacific discussion—at the very top of the regions considered, above Europe and the Middle East. This is the first mention of the Indo-Pacific in any NSS, although the George W. Bush 2002 document referred to the Indian Ocean sea lanes. The Indo-Pacific framework seems driven by China’s greater assertiveness throughout the region, and the NSS characterizes the region in terms reminiscent of the Cold War: A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region. The region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States, represents the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. The U.S. interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific extends back to the earliest days of our republic. (46) This section, while covering the challenges of China’s militarization of the South China Sea, Belt and Road investments, and North Korea, presents U.S. “allies and partners” as the centerpiece of American strategy, leading with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The document welcomes “India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense partner” and it calls for more cooperation with the “Quad”—Japan, Australia, and India. It also pledges to “expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region” (47). How did previous NSS documents feature India? In the Barack Obama NSS of 2015, the president’s prefatory letter mentioned the rebalance to Asia and unlocking “the potential of our relationship with India” as among the “historic opportunities” before the United States. That strategy emphasized U.S. interests in strengthening “our strategic and economic partnership” and honed in quickly on the shared values of the United States and India as “the world’s largest democracies” (24). The Obama NSS of 2010 had a more optimistic view of the geopolitical possibilities for the United States with China and Russia, and grouped India in with both as one of the “key centers of influence” in the twenty-first century. That strategy emphasized the development of the U.S.-India strategic partnership: The United States and India are building a strategic partnership that is underpinned by our shared interests, our shared values as the world’s two largest democracies, and close connections among our people. India’s responsible advancement serves as a positive example for developing nations, and provides an opportunity for increased economic, scientific, environmental, and security partnership. Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation, and helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G-20, and will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world. (43–44) The George W. Bush administration placed a high priority on transforming ties with India, and indeed it was the Bush administration that spearheaded the civil nuclear agreement so critical to ending decades of estrangement between New Delhi and Washington. In its 2006 NSS, the Bush administration’s first mention of India noted that “relations between India and Pakistan have improved” (14). Later references to India focused on the country’s role as a global engine of growth (26), a partner in the Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (27), and highlighted that the United States had “set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path” (35). And the Bush administration’s 2002 NSS contained more references to India (sixteen) than any of the subsequent documents. While the first reference to India came in the context of “the need for India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes,” further attention to India as part of the 2002 strategy looked at India’s “potential to become one of the great democratic powers of the twenty-first century” and sought to “transform” this relationship (10). So in terms of regional focus, the Trump administration’s adoption of the larger Indo-Pacific framework and its elevation to the top of the regional strategic priorities boosts India’s place in terms of strategy. The bigger questions, of course, lie in the degree to which this NSS will guide the administration’s actual policy steps. And that’s where we can see through some visible holes. As many have noted, the Trump administration’s goal of expanding partnerships across Asia and emphasizing the norm of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” now lacks its most important and hard-fought initiative: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). India, of course, was not a TPP member. But there is now no larger Asian trade architecture in which the United States participates that might have, down the line, appeared attractive to India to advance its own trade interests and domestic economic reforms. And as I’ve written elsewhere, there is an Asian economic consultation, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, in which India’s absence is glaring—but no U.S. administration has taken up this gap and it has not been mentioned by the Trump administration. Secretaries Rex Tillerson and Jim Mattis have referred to the challenges posed by China’s infrastructure investments across Asia, but even as Tillerson has proposed partnership with India on transparent regional infrastructure financing, the Trump administration’s treasury secretary has not supported an expansion of World Bank lending. And despite the stated interest in expanding economic ties with India—and I readily admit the economic side of U.S.-India relations is prickly at the best of times—the Trump administration’s approach emphasizes a trade deficit with India of $26 billion. This amounts to a tiny fraction of the more than $300 billion trade deficit with China. Given that New Delhi also has concerns about India’s trade deficit with China, measuring progress with India in terms of the trade deficit rather than continued progress on market access, and a more positive vision for cooperation) seems like a strange point to stress. Which is all to say: the new NSS offers a new prominence for India as part of the American approach to a higher-profile Indo-Pacific region. But whether the Trump administration will be able to fill the crucial economic gaps in the India and Indo-Pacific strategy remains an open question. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Despite the swirl of anxiety in the U.S. media about President Donald J. Trump’s big Asia trip, one thing went right in Manila: continued progress with India. On Monday, Trump met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila. The meeting reportedly lasted forty-five minutes, and according to the White House readout covered the “free and open Indo-Pacific,” and resolved “that two of the world’s great democracies should also have the world’s greatest militaries,” in a nod to the rapidly strengthening U.S.-India defense partnership. They also discussed Indian oil imports from the United States (now more than ten million barrels), and the upcoming Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Hyderabad, India. (Ivanka Trump will lead the U.S. delegation, and the Hyderabad police are already relocating streetside beggars in a citywide drive.) The Indian Ministry of External Affairs provided a press briefing with further details. According to Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar (video via India Today’s Geeta Mohan), Trump and Modi also discussed North Korea, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the supply line India has developed to Afghanistan through the Chabahar port in Iran, since Pakistan blocks Indian overland access. The first wheat shipment through the Chabahar route arrived last week. What attracted the flurry of media attention, however, was not so much the Trump-Modi encounter but a lower-level meeting of officials from the United States, Australia, India, and Japan on Sunday—the “Quad.” This gathering at the assistant secretary level showcased a meeting of four great democracies committed to ensuring a “free and open” region, with “enhanced connectivity,” “respect for international law,” and “the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.” These quotes draw from the slightly different press statements each country released following the meeting (individual, not joint statements), but the general intent seems clear. Greater coordination among all four countries—two of them U.S. treaty allies (Japan and Australia), and one (India) a “strategic partner” of the other three—has the potential to be the most significant strategic response to China’s challenge of the rules-based international order. How the Trump administration works to realize the full potential of the Quad, and of a larger regional Indo-Pacific vision encompassing India and the Indian Ocean, will be the strategic question to watch. I’ve written recently about my concerns that the U.S. economic approach does not cohere with the strategic framework, for example the absence of a policy to incorporate India in economic groupings such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). I hope the Trump administration seizes this moment to recognize the strategic potential of supporting India’s economic growth by helping it achieve greater linkages across the entire region. The president is wise to bet on India, but a successful strategy toward New Delhi will depend on getting both the strategic and the economic vision right. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

President Donald J. Trump just delivered a speech in Da Nang, Vietnam, that outlined his administration’s strategy toward Asia—with a heavy emphasis on a “free and open Indo-Pacific region.” He should start by supporting Indian membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Asia’s third-largest economy—yes, it’s India—remains on the outside of this vital grouping despite a membership request dating back more than twenty years. India in APEC would help offset the now-overwhelming influence of the Chinese economy, while also embedding India in a forum that would nudge it toward further economic reform. It would also send a strong message to the region about increasing free and open trade at a time such a signal from the Trump administration is sorely needed. Finally, supporting India’s APEC bid would demonstrate a U.S. commitment to help strategic partner India gain the greater role it seeks in institutions of global governance. Trump’s speech in Da Nang built on pre-trip Asia messaging from his cabinet. In the weeks leading to the president’s trip, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson both used the phrase “free and open Indo-Pacific” in high-profile testimony and remarks, underscoring India’s geographic connection to the Asia-Pacific as a cornerstone of the Trump administration’s strategic thinking. How Washington will specifically help realize this idea, however, has not been fleshed out. Remedying India’s exclusion from the region’s largest economic grouping would be a natural step, especially since New Delhi has been snubbed on this front since the 2010 expiration of APEC’s moratorium on new members. The Barack Obama administration never got beyond vaguely “welcoming India’s interest in APEC membership.” It neither pledged explicit support for India’s entry to the grouping, nor expended any diplomatic capital to make this a reality. Those cool to the idea of India in APEC cite New Delhi’s notorious intransigence in trade negotiations. They worry that India would gum up the functioning of a successful organization. But APEC is not a binding negotiation forum; it works through dialogue and action plans to collectively advance “free and open trade and investment” in the region. The benefits of an APEC that includes India far outweigh the potential costs. With the Trump administration’s departure from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Washington’s economic leverage in Asia has receded just at the time China’s trade and investment links, symbolized by the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, have increased. By pulling India, the world’s seventh-largest economy, inside APEC, Washington could help the larger Indo-Pacific region balance its economic center of gravity better. At the same time, embedding India within a non-binding grouping committed to free and open trade will help India’s reformers with the external validation they need to explain why reform will unleash the Indian economy further. As important, with Asian allies and partners confused about where Washington stands on the question of free and open trade—having left the TPP, the Trump administration is fighting with Canada and Mexico on the North American Free Trade Agreement and with South Korea on the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement—a show of support for APEC as an institution by pushing for India’s entrance could reaffirm the American voice in favor of trade. APEC is an institution that helps set the global agenda, and Asia could use a sign that the United States supports free and open trade to prevent a cascade of protectionism. Finally, if the president went to bat for India at APEC, it would show that Washington understands the inequity of keeping India on the outside, especially with the country’s dramatic economic growth since APEC’s 1989 founding. Today, the Indian economy is larger than Group of Seven members Canada and Italy. For New Delhi to remain absent from Asia’s most important economic grouping even though the Indian economy now helps power global growth makes little sense institutionally and economically. At the same time, U.S. support would showcase American commitment to help India gain the more central global leadership role the country seeks. Of all the steps the president could take to make the “free and open Indo-Pacific” a more tangible reality, unqualified support for Indian membership in APEC would be the most obvious. Though the chance to support Indian APEC membership would have been most meaningful at the APEC summit itself, it’s still possible to align around this step in the coming months. Let’s hope they decide to take it up soon. Without economic ballast, the administration’s admirable strategic goal of making India a key stakeholder in a democratic and prosperous Asia will fall short. This piece originally appeared on Forbes.com. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

This morning Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson delivered a speech on India to frame his visit to the country next week. Tillerson has offered formal speeches infrequently, and has been less visible on the South Asian region than his predecessors. I’m glad the secretary will finally travel to New Delhi and has finally decided to speak about India. I just wish he had done so earlier. Tillerson ran through the expected list of U.S.-India accomplishments. He noted the increasing convergence of defense and strategic ties, commented on the need to constantly improve the business environment (an acknowledgement that India remains challenging), and then got to his theme: the United States and India should be partners to further a “free and open Indo-Pacific” because democratic India has been rising as a responsible power, upholding the rule of law and freedom of navigation, while China has not. He contrasted the two powers explicitly and repeatedly. Tillerson spent time on the emerging problem of what he called “predatory economics” and nontransparent infrastructure financing, urging that, “We need to collaborate with India to ensure that the Indo-Pacific is increasingly a place of peace, stability, and growing prosperity—so that it does not become a region of disorder, conflict, and predatory economics.” This clearly referred to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its financing for infrastructure projects that may or may not be economically viable, with unclear lending terms that may create unsustainable repayment obligations. Here, Tillerson appears to have been influenced by India’s public objections to the BRI for precisely these reasons. South Asia is in so many ways a test case of what Beijing’s ambitious Initiative will deliver for recipient countries. The results in this region have caused alarm: Sri Lanka, unable to pay back its loan for an unviable port in the city of Hambantota, recently agreed to a debt-for-equity swap giving a Chinese state-owned enterprise majority ownership in the venture formed to operate the port. Sri Lanka can’t make good on the $6 billion loan it reportedly owes China, and the new deal is the result. No one knows what kind of bill Islamabad will eventually see for the $60-plus billion in infrastructure development to create the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. India has been trying to raise this issue on the international stage with little success. Back in May, India refused to attend the Belt and Road Forum in China. As I wrote at the time, the Indian statement on the Belt and Road Forum was forthright in its concerns:  Citing India’s commitment to physical connectivity “in an equitable and balanced manner,” the statement itemizes a series of principles for infrastructure projects that sound like a World Bank investment monitoring report: •  “must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality” •  “must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities” •  “balanced ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards” •  “transparent assessment of project costs” •  “skill and technology transfer to help long term running and maintenance of the assets created by local communities” •  “must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity”   India obviously believes that Belt and Road projects do not meet the above criteria. Tillerson proposed that the United States and India, as democracies interested in a free and open Indo-Pacific, should partner to develop transparent financial mechanisms that would help build the connectivity needed to increase trade and economic prosperity. He referred to the Millennium Challenge Corporation as one model, noting the recent compact signed with Nepal. But he provided no further specific proposals to sketch out in greater detail how the United States and India should work together to provide alternative financing. He also did not address how the United States and India would together be able to provide an alternative to meet the extensive infrastructure financing needs in the Indo-Pacific region at a time when the Donald J. Trump administration seeks to shrink the State Department and USAID budgets. Multilaterally, last week Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin declined to support an effort to expand the World Bank capital base to increase development lending. That too, won’t help “expand transparent, high-standard regional lending mechanisms,” to use Tillerson’s words from this morning. I look forward to further articulation of the concept that the United States and India will further partner to uphold rule of law, freedom of navigation, transparent financing to increase prosperity, and responsible leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Perhaps we’ll hear more next week from Secretary Tillerson in New Delhi. My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India is Making Its Place in the World, will be out in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).