Humanitarian Crises

In recent months, considerable ink and pixels have been spilled chronicling the growing humanitarian crisis in western Myanmar, and castigating the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the Myanmar security forces for their scorched earth policy toward Rakhine State in the west. But less has been written about possible actions that Naypyidaw, and outside actors, can take. In my new piece for Aspenia, I outline some potential immediate steps that could help stem the crisis. The piece can be read here.

Learn more about modern human trafficking—and how it affects women and girls—through six publications from the Women and Foreign Policy program.

To address a migration emergency that shows no signs of abating, states should look beyond building refugee camps and offer economic opportunities to those displaced, says expert Alexander Betts.

A poll conducted by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) shows that only about 15 percent of Americans are aware of the famines in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Known as the “four famines,” these disasters put more than twenty million people at risk. When Americans are informed about the crises, however, 73 percent say that it must be a major global concern. According to David Miliband, the CEO of the IRC and a former British foreign secretary, millennials, those born between 1981 and 1997, recognize the severity of the crisis more than any other group. The IRC finding is yet more evidence of the need to educate Americans on the four famines. A campaign by the recently-formed Global Emergency Response Coalition—comprising eight of the largest foreign assistance and humanitarian organizations in America—seeks to do just that. Together, these organizations hope to more effectively raise awareness and money. (George Clooney is supporting the effort.) It boasts a host of corporate funders, including the PepsiCo Foundation and BlackRock, which have each promised $1 million in matching donations, as well as Google and Twitter. Similar efforts have had some success in the past. The Bring Back Our Girls campaign in response to the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in 2014, and the Lost Boys of Sudan campaign in response to boys displaced and orphaned by the Second Sudanese Civil War, were largely successful in their efforts to educate the international public on these disasters. It is to be hoped that this one will be as well.  

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), a highly respected, independent non-governmental organization that works with refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), has released its annual list of the world’s ten most neglected displacement crises. Six of the ten are in Africa. The top five, all in Africa, are: the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, South Sudan, and Nigeria. The others, in order of magnitude, are Yemen, Palestine, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Somalia. The NRC list is based on: Demonstrated lack of political will for a resolution, both among domestic combatants and the international community; lack of media attention; and, lack of economic support for UN humanitarian appeals. According to NRC Secretary General Jan Egeland, “The international community has not only forgotten these crises, but has never really shown sufficient willingness to contribute to a solution.” How true. For example, the CAR has largely dropped out of Western consciousness, even though one in five CAR residents are displaced from their homes and only 35 percent have access to clean drinking water. Despite this need, international donors only covered 38 percent of the UN appeal for humanitarian assistance. It should come as no surprise that the CAR ranked dead last in the UN Human Development Index for the third year in a row. In Nigeria, despite receiving the highest media coverage per IDP, only half of humanitarian appeals for assistance have been met in 2016. The list goes on. The NRC report would seem to be a call to action on the part of the wealthy and democratic West. Yet the reaction is muted. Why so little attention from the United States, especially when it comes to crises in Africa? Part of the answer involves the longstanding U.S. involvement in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the fact that anything relating to terrorism receives an inordinate amount of media attention. Another part is compassion fatigue: to many Americans humanitarian crises in Africa seem to be never ending, offering few reasons to believe things will or can get better. Finally, the current administration is inward looking, promising to cut U.S. foreign aid and support for international institutions. There is not much room for Africa in “America First.”

Caroline O’Leary is an intern in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. April was Sexual Assault Awareness Month, which brought a deserved spotlight to the 5,551 cases of human sex trafficking reported nationally in 2016. Across the globe, however, a parallel crisis gets far less attention: violent conflict—which creates weakened legal infrastructure and increases economic instability—has left tens of millions vulnerable to sex trafficking. The sexual abuse and trafficking of refugees is a little-acknowledged facet of the refugee crisis in Europe and the Middle East. However, it is a very real part of life for many forced to flee their homes because of violence from Syria and Iraq. The total number of people forcibly displaced by conflict reached 65.3 million by the end of 2015. These refugees face a dire economic situation; for instance, 90 percent of Syrian refugees are living below their host country’s national poverty line. As former Secretary of State John Kerry once noted, “Wherever we find poverty and lack of opportunity…we find not just vulnerability to trafficking, but zones of impunity where traffickers can prey on their victims.” Migration to Europe for work is considered a perilous necessity for many unable to support themselves or their families. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), at least 1,883 migrants have died so far in 2017—70 percent while attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea. The conditions in which migrants travel can not only be deadly, but also open venues through which they can become ensnared in sex trafficking rings. In some circumstances, migrants voluntarily make the decision to take on sex work—which smugglers promise will be lucrative and not require foreign language skills or documentation—as a means of surviving financially. However, upon agreeing to this work, many are abused and treated as sex slaves as well as taken further from home, where they often fall deeper into poverty. Others are unaware of their coercion into the trade until it is too late. Smugglers promise safe passage into Europe in return for payments that run on average from $3,400 to $6,800, according to a 2015 Interpol report. However, smugglers frequently use physical and sexual abuse to demand more money from their victims than initially agreed upon. The IOM notes that this exchange often leads to sex trafficking, where victims are “repeatedly raped or forced to prostitute themselves in near slavery condition” in order to pay back their “debts.” Despairingly, refugee sex trafficking victims often then find themselves unable to report abuse due to their legal status, for fear that alerting authorities may result in their own arrest rather than that of their abuser. Child refugees are decidedly vulnerable as well. They currently account for more than half of the refugee population, and often find themselves parent-less and destitute. At least ten thousand unaccompanied minor refugees have been reported missing after reaching Europe, and many of them are believed to have fallen victim to trafficking and sexual exploitation. Europol has also found crossover between the gangs that help smuggle refugees into the European Union and those exploiting them for sex and slavery. Since this illegal trade takes place largely underground, it is difficult to craft responsive policy. However, a humanitarian crisis of this proportion demands attention and deserves the response of policymakers. To combat sex trafficking and abuse among refugees, the United States should: Increase contributions to refugee resettlement programs to provide alternative work options and asylum in refugees’ new home countries. While potentially highly impactful, this would be difficult to implement due given the current political climate in the United States. The massive scope of the population in need of resettlement is also a significant challenge. Continue to encourage international reflection periods similar to what the European Union has. Such periods provide a reprieve from deportation to allow identified sex victims to seek emergency health and aid services while being legally classified as victims of crime, thereby mitigating any concerns victims may have regarding reporting their abuse. Strengthen legal systems for victimized refugees in order to empower them to get in contact with law enforcement authorities, should they wish to. The benefits of doing so contribute not only to individual refugee empowerment, but also the long-term goal of bringing down sex trafficking rings. Sex trafficking is just one symptom of an enormous refugee crisis—the largest since World War II. To respond to such an issue will take years of cohesive anti-sex-trafficking strategy on the parts of governments around the world—particularly around areas of conflict. Implementing policies that streamline the legal aid and rehabilitation of victims, however, is an achievable way to humanize refugees in a time of uncertainty and fear.

This is a guest post by Rishav Shah, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Rishav is a graduate of McGill University, where he double majored in International Development Studies and African Studies. On March 29, U.S. President Donald J. Trump moved to authorize an escalation of U.S. military action in Somalia. The authorization effectively approves the Pentagon’s March 12 request for expanded targeting authority in the East African state. Central to this order is a dramatic departure from former President Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) regarding counterterrorism strikes away from conventional war zones (Yemen and Somalia). This represents a far more kinetic approach to al-Shabaab while the U.S. administration cuts aid and development assistance. Liberalizing counterterrorism airstrikes while slashing funding for humanitarian assistance through cuts to USAID, the State Department, and U.N initiatives, is indicative of the current administration opting for a short term foreign policy solution rather than any consideration for longer term peace and stability in Somalia. Under Obama’s PPG, such operational procedures required high-level interagency vetting and consultation in Washington over proposed strikes with particular emphasis on the safety of civilians. It is important to note that President Trump and his administration were under no obligation to preserve the escalation standards of the former administration. Each president is entitled to formulate their own pathways to military action. Under the new administration’s guidelines, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is able to apply less restrictive battlefield rules to Somalia. Broadly this allows for two potential consequences: that commanders may strike individuals solely on the perceived status that these individuals may be al-Shabaab fighters (rather than on the basis of the fact that they pose a specific threat to Americans) and subsequently, that some civilian bystander deaths would be permitted if deemed necessary and proportionate. Any assessment of this new directive must be framed around a larger conversation of about an insurgency and a newly formed Somali government overcoming a drought which is now an internationally recognized humanitarian crisis. Somalia’s government has declared the drought a national disaster with the UN reporting that a quarter of a million people have been displaced. Widespread drought in the Horn of Africa, resulting in mass food insecurity and a spike in internally displaced peoples (IDPs) is now exacerbating a refugee crisis which regional partners are struggling to contain. In the face of a dire humanitarian crisis, the Trump administration’s proposed “Skinny Budget’ has placed USAID programs at risk of debilitating cuts. These budget cuts are expected to rein in emergency aid operations across the board—including urgent drought and famine relief in Somalia. The drought and al-Shabaab insurgency have culminated in the creation of 1,106,751 IDPs and upwards of 600,000 refugees regionally. The absence and the inability of the state to meet the needs to a rapidly growing number of Somalis in search of food, water and safety, coupled with a stuttering response from global leaders has left al-Shabaab with a window of opportunity in terms of territorial seizure, and recruitment by way of resource monopolization. The situation on the ground is that civilians are scouring landscapes for food and water. More often than not, these landscapes are also active war zones occupied by al-Shabaab combatants and the counterinsurgency. This environment makes it very difficult to gauge differences between combatants and civilians in the midst of military action- increasing the risk of mistaking civilians as militants. While  intensified military action will likely reduce the mobility and capacity of al-Shabaab, there is concern that any increase in civilian casualties could undermine the federal government. Furthermore, the prospect of retaliatory attacks from the insurgency would also place a vulnerable civilian population at further risk. Essential to any analysis on military American military presence in Somalia is accounting for the prospect of surging numbers of IDPs and refugees. Exacerbating such circumstances will be of particular concern to U.S. allies in the region—notably Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia—all of whom are struggling to uphold human rights standards regarding the refugee crises, and are deeply troubled by the militant threat of al-Shabaab. Ultimately, implications of this policy could be counter-intuitive when considering the prospective growth, peace, and stability of an already deeply fragile state, and an increasingly strained region.

Peter Lundberg, United Nations (UN) Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Nigeria, stated on April 25 that the aid organizations working in northeast Nigeria will run out of cash by June if pledges made by the international donors at a February  conference in Oslo are not paid. The UN Office for the Coordinaton for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 4.7 million people in Nigeria are in need of food for survival, many of whom are victims of Boko Haram. It also projects that some seven million people are in need of multiple forms of humanitarian assistance. The UN estimates that 43,800 are already experiencing famine. Currently the World Food Programme (WFP) is providing rations to 1.3 million people a month, according to Lundberg. Separate from Lundberg’s comments, the WFP said that its funds would run out within weeks, according to Reuters. At Oslo, international donors pledged $457 million toward the $1.5 billion the UN estimates it needs to address the humanitarian disaster in the Lake Chad Basin. However, Lundgren reports that in Nigeria aid agencies have received only 19 percent of the money asked for, in Cameroon agencies have received 23 percent, in Chad 4 percent, and in Niger 47 percent. Due to the size of its population, Nigeria has by far the greatest number of people facing potential starvation. During the conference, donors pledged only about a third of the money the UN estimates is required to meet the Lake Chad humanitarian disaster, while the United States pledged no new money at all. With respect to pledges, slow payment is an old song, often reflecting national bureaucratic and other requirements. The UN number of 4.7 million in Nigeria needing rations to survive is higher than the more frequently cited estimate of 2.5 million (a figure in reference to those internally displaced by Boko Haram). However, given the destruction of northeast Nigeria, and the depths of its poverty even in the best of times, such statistics seem credible. The UN notes that it is unable to reach some 700,000 because of ongoing Boko Haram activities. It remains to be seen when or if the American public will be galvanized by the famine, and whether it will demand greater proactivity from its federal government with regards to the crises.

This post originally appeared on the Council on Foreign Relations The Internationalist Blog and is written by Kate Almquist Knopf, director of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and Payton Knopf, former coordinator of the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan. On Tuesday, the UN Security Council will convene to discuss the ongoing civil war in South Sudan. The meeting, chaired by Nikki Haley, the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, in her capacity as president of the council in April, comes at an inflection point for the world’s newest nation and for the global institutions, the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) in particular, that are mandated to manage international crises of this magnitude and preserve the state system. Absent a fundamental change in the current humanitarian and security trends in the next eight months, nearly half of South Sudan’s population will have died of starvation or fled the country by the war’s fourth anniversary in December. Such a rapid depopulation of a sovereign state is nearly unprecedented; Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and Rwanda in the throes of genocide are the closest analogues for such a tragic record. Debates aside as to whether a full-scale genocide has yet begun in South Sudan, the level of trauma and psychological distress endured by South Sudanese citizens is on par with these cases. In a study conducted by the South Sudan Law Society using the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, 41 percent of South Sudanese exhibited symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder, rates comparable to those of post–genocide Rwanda and post–genocide Cambodia. That was two years ago. The magnitude of the war’s human cost has since continued to escalate and now dwarfs that of nearly every other global conflict, with the exception of Syria. In just three years, South Sudan has become the fastest growing refugee crisis in the world; the largest refugee crisis in Africa, and the third largest globally, after Afghanistan and Syria; and the largest cross-border exodus in Africa since the Rwandan genocide. Over 1.7 million South Sudanese have fled the country since 2013, and nearly 1.9 million are displaced internally. Of those that remain, at least one hundred thousand people are dying in a man-made famine, and a further one million people are on the precipice. Fortunately, the United Nations and the African Union have the necessary legal authorities to salvage the sovereignty of one their own member states by establishing an international administration, with an executive mandate, in South Sudan to run the country for a finite period of time, as described in a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Council Special Report, Ending South Sudan’s Civil War, published by the Center for Preventive Action. Given the extreme degree of South Sudan’s state failure, such an administration is the only remaining path to protect the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, restore its legitimacy, and empower its citizens. Though seemingly radical, international administrations have been previously employed to guide Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, and other countries out of conflict, without a greater financial investment from the United States and others than is currently being spent on the humanitarian operation and UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. Although each of these cases differ from one another and from South Sudan, the challenges to establishing a transitional administration can be managed through a combination of politics and force. Article 4(h) of the AU Consultative Act permits “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity,” a clause capturing the AU principle of “non-indifference” arising from the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide. The AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, in fact concluded in 2014 that the killings in Juba in December 2013, which sparked the civil war, and subsequent acts, constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity. Numerous other independent, international investigations have since presented similar findings, most notably the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, which reported in March that “the targeting of civilians on the basis of their ethnic identity is unacceptable and amounts to ethnic cleansing.” Although, as Paul Williams has noted, invocation of Article 4(h) might appear to be a direct challenge to the authority granted to the UN Security Council by the UN Charter, Article 4(h) has never been invoked, and it is likely that the African Union would not proceed with any such intervention without prior (or at least concurrent) authorization by the Security Council. Action by the Security Council and by the African Union to legally mandate the administrative and peacekeeping components of an international transitional administration in South Sudan could, however, be complementary rather than conflicting. The Security Council has long-since determined that the war in South Sudan constitutes a threat to international peace and security and has exercised Chapter VII of the UN Charter on multiple occasions in the last three years to authorize and sustain a sanctions regime as well as a peacekeeping mission. Equally noteworthy is that the application of Article 4(h) in concert with a Security Council resolution would not require anything akin to the NATO operation for Libya authorized in 2011. Instead, the Security Council and the African Union—with leadership from key member states, including the United States—could orchestrate the establishment of a transitional administration through diplomacy, following the request of a configuration of South Sudanese religious, civil society, traditional, and political leaders, who retain more legitimacy across the population than the regime in the capital. The state’s sovereignty need no longer be held hostage—and squandered—by a morally bankrupt elite that continues to commit widespread atrocities against its own people and bears primary responsibility for the humanitarian and security crisis while exercising none of the responsibilities of a sovereign government, including preservation of the country’s territorial integrity. When, as political scientists David Lake and Christopher Fariss have shown, the state exercises only “limited or abused sovereignty,” international trusteeship—used sparingly—can break a vicious circle in which narrow, extractive coalitions and competition for state control have led to a “vortex that pulls states down.” Lake and Fariss also conclude that in these instances, the objective is not capacity-building but limiting violence and shepherding a transition to a new, more legitimate governing order by leveling the playing field among belligerents. The effectiveness of trusteeship is, however, contingent on two factors. First, the trustee must have few, if any, interests beyond stability in the failed state. Second, the interests of the trustee and the average citizen must overlap. It is hard to find a more clear-cut case of a predatory elite abusing a state’s sovereignty than that of South Sudan. However, formal UN trusteeship is neither applicable to UN member states, according to the UN Charter, nor necessary in this case. The Security Council and African Union have the legal authorities to authorize the components of a transitional administration, with an executive mandate, in South Sudan, and the conditions outlined by Lake and Fariss are present for such an administration with such a mandate to succeed. The Security Council meeting on Tuesday presents an opportunity for Haley, who has already stressed the link between human rights abuses and insecurity in the council, to demonstrate U.S. resolve in confronting the crisis in South Sudan. The success of the proposal in the CFR Council Special Report will depend on getting the politics right both at the United Nations and the African Union of course. But both institutions must act quickly to end the war and salvage South Sudan’s sovereignty before there is nothing and no one left in the country to save.

If the war Obama and the Pentagon struggled to avoid is now upon us, it's likely to make a bad situation worse.