Humanitarian Crises

Cyclone Idai devastated parts of Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe this month and dissipated last week. Recovery in the affected countries is starting, but there is still a long way to go. The death toll continues to mount. As of March 24, according to media, it at least 446 in Mozambique, 259 in Zimbabwe, and 56 in Malawi. Local authorities caution that it is likely to go much higher. According to Mozambique Environment Minister Celso Correia, progress is being made to restore basic services in Beira, a major port city that bore the brunt of the storm. Electricity has been restored to water treatment facilities, the port, and to the vital rail lines, as well as some parts of the city. The main road that connects Beira to the rest of the country is expected to open early this week, facilitating the arrival of food and medicine to the city and to its environs. Beira’s population is more than half a million. Its port and rail line connects interior Mozambique and landlocked Zimbabwe and Malawi to the sea. Restoration of the railway is essential for the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to those landlocked countries. The minister’s chief concern now appears to be disease: “We’ll have cholera for sure,” he said, and malaria is “unavoidable,” given the flooding and standing water. The authorities have established a cholera center in Beira, though as yet there are no reported cases. There is also likely to be an outbreak of typhoid, and because of the damage to transportation links and disruption of markets, a food shortage. The deputy director of the UN’s humanitarian operation, Sebastian Rhodes Stampa, reports that two large field hospitals and a water purification system are expected soon. Drones are also being used as part of an extensive effort to access humanitarian needs in central Mozambique. But UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres cautioned that “far greater international support is needed.” The region is the breadbasket of Mozambique; according to the World Food Program, this puts each affected country at risk of food insecurity in some cases on par with that faced in Yemen, Syria, and South Sudan.  

In March, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi experienced severe flooding from Cyclone Idai. Around the same time, parts of Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska experienced devastating flooding along parts of the Missouri River system caused by heavy snowmelt and rain.  Commentators are highlighting the role that climate change played in the “bomb cyclone” in the Midwest. Scientists can link climate change to the general increase in heavy participation over time, but it is much more difficult to identify it with a single event. Some have predicted that above-average flooding will continue. To account for the scale of the destruction—some estimate over $1.3 billion in Nebraska alone—others pointed to the flood control infrastructure, which is not sufficient to contain the greatly increased rainfall of the past few years. Levees, popular flood control constructions in the United States, cannot completely reduce the risk of flooding, yet they encourage construction in floodplains, as do, among other things, federally-subsidized flood insurance and poor regulation.  With respect to Cyclone Idai, commentators point to the fact that, while there has not been an increase in the number of cyclones in the Indian Ocean in the past seventy years, the storms that do occur are more intense. Cyclone Idai is understood to be the worst cyclone on record in the region. There is virtually no flood control infrastructure in place in the African countries affected. Nigeria, for another example, frequently suffers from devastating floods as rivers overflow due to heavy seasonal rains, and has faced criticism for poor responses.   In both the American Midwest and in southeastern Africa, the flooding has led to enormous property damage, displacement of people, and loss of life. But the differences between a catastrophe in a developed country and one of the world’s poorest regions is striking. Around six hundred are reported dead due to Cyclone Idai. Some estimate that the death toll could rise dramatically, absent a major international relief effort. Thousands of those displaced are crammed into inadequate shelters with poor sanitation, increasing the likelihood of disease, and humanitarian workers are planning for the consequences of massive disruption of food chains. In the American Midwest, national media is reporting at least three deaths as of March 21. Tragic though the flooding is, there are in place disaster relief structures and provision for relief and reconstruction, mostly funded by the U.S. federal government. Nobody anticipates food shortages, and though the region affected includes rich agricultural land, nobody anticipates that there will be a major impact from the flooding on the American food supply.  There will be an international relief effort in southern Africa. USAID is already involved and the U.S. embassy in Maputo is asking the U.S. Department of Defense to mobilize a military team to support rescue efforts. Already there is a U.S. Air Force aircraft on the ground at the Maputo airport. No doubt there will be significant relief efforts from other countries. However, the question is whether international efforts will be enough and whether they will be sustained long enough. Flooding is a fact of life and climate change will make it worse. While any one country’s impact on reducing climate change, save for a handful of large polluters, will be minimal, the proper regulation of floodplains, sufficient infrastructure, and advance warning systems will help save many lives.

Elizabeth Munn is the Spring 2019 volunteer intern with the Africa program at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. She is a student at George Mason University, studying global affairs and African studies. On February 20, the UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan issued its third report. Despite the peace deal signed six months ago in September, it documented an increase in cases of rape and sexual violence over the past year, concluding that the crimes had “become quite normalized” in South Sudan. Driving much of this is oil.  According to the report, the state-owned oil company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet), has demonstrated a “total lack of transparency and independent oversight” in its diversion of oil revenues into the hands of government elites. The structure of the company is deliberately designed to allow for autocratic control: it is run by a managing director who is accountable to a board of directors whose members are appointed by the president. To the board, the government has appointed loyalists, particularly individuals from the National Security Services (NSS), which has been accused [PDF] of human rights abuses. This process has allowed Nilepet‘s oil revenue to be diverted to the security services, who in turn purchase weapons and other military equipment. In fact, a majority of Nilepet’s revenues in 2015 were used to fund over two hundred thousand soldiers stationed in conflict areas near oil fields. Further, Nilepet received a letter from government elites asking for $1.5 million for military expenses in 2016. South Sudan produces around ninety million barrels of oil a year and the vast majority of the revenue finds its way back to political and economic elites, while, according to 2016 data from the World Bank, the poverty rate stands at 82 percent. With oil income accounting for about 98 percent of the government’s budget, the parties in conflict have targeted oil-producing states and facilities in efforts to gain money and power. The struggle has entirely neglected the needs of the average citizen. A report by Global Witness documented how some South Sudanese must resort to the black market to obtain fuel, where prices can reach 300 South Sudanese pounds ($2.30) just to fill a one-liter plastic bottle, equivalent to almost $9 a gallon. Although Nilepet is under the complete control of the government, it is considered a private company, meaning it is not subject to the same oversight as a government agency. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan advocated for increased accountability and transparency in oil companies, such as Nilepet, to overcome deeply-rooted corruption in oil-rich nations. This likely requires international support against corrupt practices.  The U.S. Commerce Department has designated foreign and domestic oil entities operating in South Sudan as threats to U.S. national security because of their role in the conflict. These other state-owned companies, which dominate oil production in South Sudan alongside Nilepet, are the Chinese National Petroleum Company, Petronas of Malaysia, and the Indian Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Unlike those of China, Malaysia, and India, many other international companies have abandoned oil production in South Sudan altogether.  South Sudan is home to one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. International efforts, such as those of the U.S. Department of Commerce, are needed to call attention to the severity of the issue and push South Sudan to implement accountability and transparency in the oil industry and among the security services.   

Why the world’s swelling refugee population has shrinking options.

There is extensive media attention given to migration from North Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean. These stories are accompanied by regular reports on the rescue of migrants from sinking boats, issues concerning their reception in Europe, and their impact on European politics. The BBC usefully has called attention to the likely larger and more deadly flow of migrants across the Sahara. The report is primarily based on anecdotes obtained from on-the-ground reporting. Statistics are thin, but the BBC’s conclusions are credible. The BBC cites data from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which are probably the best available. According to IOM, in 2015 there were 6,000 traffickers in the Agadez region of Niger who transported some 340,000 migrants across the Sahara to Libya. The migrants were eventually bound for Europe. They came from all over West Africa to Agadez, long a center of the cross Sahara trade. In one of the poorest parts of the world, the profits from trafficking were huge; the BBC quotes one trafficker as saying that he earned as much as $6,000 per week. In 2015, according to the BBC, the Nigerien government, banned trafficking of people across the Sahara under pressure from European countries. The BBC ascribes some of the drop in migration to the law. Perhaps. But it is not clear what capacity the Nigerien government actually has to enforce such a law. The BBC provides anecdotes from wily traffickers who find new and different ways across the Sahara, though such routes are often far from water sources and presumably result in higher mortality rates. The BBC also notes that stories about the dangers of migration and the harsh conditions in holding centers in Libya and even in Europe are trickling back to villages all over West Africa, convincing would-be migrants to stay put. Niger is a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which permits the free movement of people across borders; the trafficking was therefore probably legal, at least until the Nigerien border with Libya, which is not a member of ECOWAS and could therefore presumably have blocked the trafficking.  That country, however, is wracked by civil war. Migration across the Sahara is also far more dangerous than across the Mediterranean. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative in Niger, Alessandra Morelli, estimates that for every migrant death in the Mediterranean, there are at least two in the Sahara.  Trade across the Sahara is an old song. Estimates are that the slave trade across the Sahara lasted longer than the Atlantic slave trade and involved nearly as many victims. But, trafficking from West Africa to Europe is still poorly understood, and it is not clear the exact numbers of migrants and traffickers involved, nor what is primarily driving such migration. For whatever reasons, the numbers appear to have indeed dropped.   

This year, a deepening of the economic crisis and growing political instability in Venezuela was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

This year, a worsening of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen was included as a top tier priority in the Center for Preventive Action’s annual Preventive Priorities Survey.

In an article recently published in Foreign Affairs, Joshua Busby and Nina von Uexkull identify the countries that are most at risk from climate-related instability and humanitarian crises.

Cameroon is spiraling downward, with fighting between rebels in the Anglophone regions (the Northwest and Southwest regions) and President Paul Biya’s security forces intensifying. At a briefing before the UN Security Council (UNSC) on December 13, the U.S. deputy permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Jonathan Cohen, urged the Biya government and the Anglophone rebels to begin talks. In a separate speech before the UNSC, the British deputy representative to the UN, Ambassador Jonathan Allen, announced a $3.1 million contribution from his government to the UN’s appeal for humanitarian relief in the Anglophone regions, representing 20 percent of the total appeal. The director of UN humanitarian operations, Reena Ghelani, said that Cameroon is “one of the fastest growing displacement crises in Africa.” She noted that internally displaced Cameroonians, who number almost half a million, lack adequate food, shelter, and water, and that there are at least thirty thousand Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria. In addition to rebels, most of whom are separatists apparently seeking to establish an Anglophone republic called Ambazonia, Cameroon also faces murderous operations carried out by the radical, jihadist Boko Haram in its predominately Muslim north. Obviously, dialogue that might stop the killing in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions is devoutly to be hoped for. The rebels are splintered into many separate groups, some of which are mutually antagonistic in addition to being hostile to the government in Yaounde. Biya’s regime, notoriously repressive, has a record of many broken promises with respect to the Anglophone regions.  Biya, around eighty-five years of age, recently won deeply-flawed elections in October, but already there is speculation about how the country will transition when he can no longer serve as chief of state. Under all these circumstances it is hard to see how a dialogue between the Biya regime and the rebels can begin anytime soon. Similarly, Boko Haram in neighboring Nigeria and in Cameroon shows little interest in dialogue with “secular” governments. In the short term, at least, the outlook for Cameroon is grim.  

Dan Sullivan is the senior advocate for human rights at Refugees International. South Sudan is facing one of the largest displacement crises in the world. A recent peace agreement is stoking hopes for returns of displaced people to their homes. But with ongoing instability and a lack of sufficient planning, returns remain a dangerous prospect.  Nearly 4.5 million South Sudanese have been forcibly displaced since civil war broke out in December 2013. That equates to roughly 40 percent of the pre-war population displaced either within the country or as refugees to surrounding countries. So it is understandable that when a new Revitalized Peace Agreement was signed in September 2018, international actors were eager to start finding ways for those displaced to return to their homes. There is just one glaring problem: it is not yet safe for large-scale returns to take place. A recent Refugees International (RI) report, Displaced Nation: The Dangerous Implications of Rushed Returns in South Sudan, looked at the prospects of returns by focusing on the internally displaced persons (IDPs) most likely to be the first to face pressure to return. These include the nearly two hundred thousand IDPs living in or adjacent to UN peacekeeping bases, in what are known as protection of civilian sites (PoCs). RI interviewed IDPs in Juba and Wau, as well as UN and humanitarian officials.  We found that IDPs in the PoCs were experiencing difficult and crowded conditions and most had a desire to return to their homes. However, most also felt it was not safe to do so. In particular, IDPs who had fled ethnically motivated atrocities feared that they would be targeted by armed actors upon return. RI was also struck by the lack of planning and concerted efforts to inform IDPs about return options and to ensure a continuation of protection and life-saving aid services in potential areas of returns.  The reality of the ongoing insecurity was underscored recently during a horrific ten-day period starting in late November in which some 125 women were sexually assaulted on their way to a food distribution site not far from the largest PoC site in Bentiu. Adding to the challenge of returns are high-levels of food insecurity (nearly 60 percent of the population has faced acute food insecurity this year) and continuing cases of aid manipulation. RI found instances in which aid had been diverted away from civilians and into the hands of armed actors. We also saw evidence that the government had used instability in some areas as an excuse to restrict aid to populations in need.  Humanitarians are making a great effort to avoid the diversion of aid. However, they need additional support from both donors and the UN leadership in speaking with a unified voice to the government of South Sudan against such manipulation. This can and must be done in a way that ensures sustained levels of aid, without which the country would almost certainly be facing famine. Finally, international aid efforts must be careful not to reinforce ethnic dislocation that has taken place as a result of the fighting and severe human rights violations, which may amount to crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. The ability of the peace agreement to bring real security remains a work in progress, especially as several key areas of disagreement remain unresolved. But even if the peace muddles forward, safe and voluntary returns will only be possible with serious planning that includes a real effort to inform potential returnees and to assure sustained protection and life-saving aid.  How the first returns from PoCs play out will be closely watched and will have far reaching consequences for the millions more displaced throughout the region.  

The European Commission announced that that migrant and refugee arrivals in Europe via the Mediterranean Sea number 134,004 as of December 5, 2018, down from 179,536 during the same period in 2017. The year that saw the highest number of arrivals, 1,015,078, was 2015. While Italy experienced the biggest drop, arrivals actually increased in Spain and Greece. Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Pakistan have remained the largest countries of origin since 2014; since then, almost one million Syrians have sought asylum in the Europe Sub-Saharan Africans make up an large portion of those living outside their country of origin globally, and remain a significant and growing part of the migrant and refugee flow, especially those arriving in Italy and Spain. In Italy, in numerical order, the largest countries of origin were Tunisia, Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. In Spain, it was Guinea, Morocco, Mali, and Ivory Coast. Spain retains two enclaves on the North African coast, Ceuta and Melilla, and many Africans go there to seek refugee asylum, sometimes storming border walls. The prominence of Nigeria as an origin for migrants and refugees probably owes much to the fact that the country is by far most populous in Africa, comprising roughly one-sixth of the continent’s people. The other African countries of migrant and refugee origin—Eritrea, Sudan, Mali, Ivory Coast—are involved in internal conflict or are just emerging from it. Even though by Western standards migrants and refugees are desperately poor, they still need some money to afford to make it to Europe. The poorest of the poor, such as the internally displaced in northeast Nigeria, lack the resources to even try.

Developments in conflicts across the world that you might have missed this week.

The United States can do more to support negotiation efforts in Yemen and help the parties find a workable, sustainable solution to the conflict.