Health

Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines

  • COVID-19
    The Coronavirus Outbreak Could Disrupt the U.S. Drug Supply
    U.S. health officials have warned that the coronavirus outbreak could lead to drug shortages. Just how much does the United States rely on pharmaceutical products from China and India?
  • Trade
    More Cures for More Patients: Overcoming Pharmaceutical Barriers
    Mr. Setser's testimony focuses on three points: 1. America currently has a large and growing trade deficit in pharmaceutical products. 2. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act created new incentives for the offshoring of pharmaceutical production and other high technology manufacturing jobs. As I will discuss later, the biggest sources of pharmaceutical imports are not countries known for low wages, but rather countries known for their high tolerance of transfer pricing games and generous tax treatment of multinational firms. 3. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act provided a large windfall to the shareholders of pharmaceutical firms who had shifted their profits and often production abroad to reduce their U.S. tax burden—but it hasn’t generated lower prices for American consumers or a significant increase in investment in pharmaceutical research and development. The work of the Ways and Means committee staff1 has illustrated that Americans pay by far the world’s highest prices for drugs. Yet today, Americans are getting far too little back from our biggest pharmaceutical companies.
  • Public Health Threats and Pandemics
    Prescription for Disaster
    Podcast
    Antibiotics have saved untold millions of lives, but bacteria are learning to outsmart them at alarming rates. Projections show that by 2050, ten million people could die each year from antibiotic-resistant bacteria.
  • China
    U.S. Dependence on Pharmaceutical Products From China
    Last month, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission held a hearing on the United States’ growing reliance on China's pharmaceutical products. The topic reminded me of a spirited discussion described in Bob Woodward’s book, Fear: Trump in the White House. In the discussion, Gary Cohn, then chief economic advisor to President Trump, argued against a trade war with China by invoking a Department of Commerce study that found that 97 percent of all antibiotics in the United States came from China. “If you’re the Chinese and you want to really just destroy us, just stop sending us antibiotics,” he said. Cohn’s words highlight a security concern associated with pharmaceuticals from China. As Rosemary Gibson noted in her testimony, centralization of the global supply chain of medicines in a single country makes it vulnerable to interruption, “whether by mistake or design.” If we are dependent on China for thousands of ingredients and raw materials to make our medicine, China could use this dependence as a weapon against us. While the Department of Defense only purchases a small quantity of finished pharmaceuticals from China, about 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) used to make drugs in the United States are said to come from China and other countries like India. For example, the chemical starting material used to make doxycycline, the recommended treatment for anthrax exposure, comes from China. When an influential Chinese economist earlier this year suggested that Beijing curb its exports of raw materials for vitamins and antibiotics as a countermeasure in the trade war with the United States, the worries surrounding our API dependence to China seemed to be vindicated. Concern about a disruption in the supply chain could explain why the tariffs on Chinese products proposed by the United States Trade Representative in May 2019, worth approximately $300 billion, excludes “pharmaceuticals, certain pharmaceutical inputs, and select medical goods.” While the potential exposure to raw material supply disruptions drives part of our fear, concern about the safety and efficacy of Chinese-made pharmaceuticals is another component. In the summer of 2018, one of China’s largest domestic vaccine makers sold at least 250,000 substandard doses of vaccine for diphtheria, tetanus, and whooping cough. It was the latest in a slew of scandals caused by poor quality drug products made in China over the last decade. In 2008, the contamination of a raw ingredient imported from China and used to make heparin, a blood-thinning drug, was associated with at least eighty-one deaths the United States. According to an investigative journalist, fraud and manipulation of quality data is still endemic in Chinese pharmaceutical firms. In order to address the growing security and safety concerns about Chinese-made pharmaceuticals, some suggest that the United States switch to India as an alternative API supplier. However, doing so would be no different from rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. It is true that many Indian pharmaceutical firms are leading API manufacturers but India depends on China for sourcing nearly three quarters of APIs in generic drug formulations. The disruption in the supply chain notwithstanding, switching to India for the supply of APIs would only make the drugs sold in the United States more expensive: APIs and chemical intermediates from China are 35 to 40 percent cheaper than Indian ones. Moreover, India has its own drug safety problems as well. In 2013, a generic drug maker in India pled guilty to drug safety charges, which included shipping batches of adulterated drugs, having incomplete testing records, and inadequate programs to assess drug quality. According to a former executive of the company, this was only a fraction of the safety issues the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) could identify in overseas plants. Moreover, we could have overestimated our dependence on Chinese-made pharmaceutical products. As of 2018, China claimed 13.4 percent of all import lines– defined as distinct regulated products within a shipment through customs–among countries that export drugs and biologics to the United States. Of these import lines for drugs and biologics, about 83 percent were finished drugs, and only 7.5 percent were APIs. We certainly underestimate the share of APIs from China given that Chinese-made APIs can come to the United States as part of the finished drug products from other countries like India. However, the lack of a reliable API registry makes it difficult to estimate the true market share of Chinese-made APIs. In addition, when highlighting our dependence on Chinese-made pharmaceuticals, we could overlook the other side of the coin: China needs finished drugs made in the United States. China is facing a crisis of non-communicable diseases, including cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and diabetes. It is estimated that between 2002 and 2016, new cancer cases in China increased by more than 55 percent, from 2.19 million to 3.8 million. A majority of Chinese cancer patients, however, lack access to the most effective drugs. Partly because of this, cancer survival rate in China is less than half of the United States. Under the performance-based legitimacy in contemporary China, the government must justify its rule by continuously delivering public goods and services, like better healthcare, to meet people’s wants. In an increasingly state-dominated political system, the link between performance and legitimacy becomes so tight that failure to deliver such goods could endanger the system itself. In the meantime, with the rapid improvement of material living standards, Chinese people are increasingly valuing things beyond basic earnings, such as good health. As President Xi Jinping stated in the 19th Party Congress, the “principal contradiction” in the society is “the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.” In fact, in 2018, the government cut the import value-added tax on cancer drugs from 17 percent to 3 percent and reduced import tariffs on all common drugs and cancer drugs to zero. Essentially, regime legitimacy requires the state to deliver the most effective drugs, which are often patented and provided exclusively by multinational pharmaceutical companies. In May 2019, China unveiled a list of imported U.S. medical products to impose punitive tariffs upon. The list includes commonly used drugs such as insulin, ibuprofen, as well as medical devices such as ultrasonic diagnostic apparatuses and endoscopes, which Chinese firms can manufacture themselves. Nevertheless, the list did not include anti-cancer drugs and other patented ones. The same legitimacy concern also led the Chinese government to introduce incentives to improve the quality of its pharmaceutical products. In 2016, China’s FDA introduced the Generic Consistency Evaluation (GCE), which required generic drugs approved for production prior to 2008 to pass the GCE in order to gain “equivalence” to branded drugs in terms of safety and efficacy. Failure to pass the GCE in a timely manner will lead to the revocation of registration licenses or ineligibility for government tendering. Since generic drugs approved before 2008 are prone to low quality problems, a significant number of drugs that have failed to pass GCE are expected to exit the public market. The measure will help weed out over half of the nation’s 2,900 or so small, and often low-quality, domestic drug makers. Since early this year, nearly 20 pharmaceutical firms have either exited the industry or been reorganized. So what does all this mean for a response from the United States? Before making any major decisions on this issue, it is important to collect as much information as possible for a full assessment of the risks we face. We should also nurture the development of alternative sources and capabilities to make critically essential drugs in the United States. At present, instead of looking at the issue from a national security perspective, the best approach is to work with China to ensure the safety and efficacy of their pharmaceutical products. As I argued in my testimony to the U.S.-China Commission, this involves expanding the FDA’s inspection activities in China, helping to beef up the regulatory capacities of China’s National Medical Products Administration in the drug development and review process, and making sure Chinese firms consistently follow the appropriate process for safeguarding quality in production. Lastly, the U.S.-China Social and Cultural Dialogue, the only high-level forum to discuss U.S.-China cooperation after 2017, should be reopened as an institutional venue to discuss these issues.
  • Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines
    Measles and the Threat of the Anti-vaccination Movement
    Measles cases have spiked as a growing number of anti-vaxxers, opting out of immunizations for their kids, threaten decades of progress toward eliminating the disease.
  • China
    Vaccine Safety and Political Legitimacy in China
    Six months ago, about two dozen Chinese parents protested outside the National Health Commission after one of the country’s largest vaccine makers was found to have sold hundreds of thousands of doses of substandard diphtheria-tetanus- pertussis (DPT) vaccines to health clinics in Shandong and other provinces. At that time, I commented, “In the absence of broader, systematic solutions, appalling scandals like this may continue to recur.” I did not, however, anticipate that the next vaccine scandal was going to come so soon — and turn violent.  Earlier this month, hundreds of aggrieved parents gathered outside the government office in Jinhu county of East China’s Jiangsu province, demanding explanations for why over one hundred and forty-five children were given expired polio vaccines. During the demonstrations, a video clip posted online appeared to show the county party boss being hustled and beaten by dozens of angry protestors.  Parents from Jinhu were angry for good reason. The rise of vaccine-related scandals and growing tensions between the state and society has raised questions that could have profound implications on Chinese governance: What are the root causes of regulatory oversight? How do vaccination scandals contribute to growing legitimacy concerns for the Chinese government? Why is the linkage between vaccine safety and political legitimacy dangerous to the government? How can the state recover from these issues and enhance its credibility to govern?  If you are interested in these questions, please read my Op-Ed article in New York Times here.
  • China
    Chinese Parents, Pharma Industry Worried Sick After Latest Vaccine Scandal
    In a society that cherishes health, longevity, and continuation of the family line, there is a lingering and growing fear that the existing system is broken.  
  • Infectious Diseases
    Ending Polio in Nigeria Once and for All
    Toyin Saraki is the founder and president of Africa’s premier maternal and children’s health charity, the Wellbeing Foundation Africa, and a long-standing advocate for universal immunization in her native Nigeria. Polio, a vicious disease that primarily affects children and leaves them severely disabled, reared its ugly head once again in Nigeria last year, two years since it was last detected in the region. Up to this point, global polio eradication efforts had managed to defeat polio in all but two countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its reemergence speaks volumes to Nigeria’s inability to continue to deliver the most basic health care, begging the question: why does universal immunization remain unfulfilled?  This Tuesday was World Polio Day, and it is worth reflecting on the mistakes made and the challenges ahead in tackling this disease. Eradication is finally within our grasp, and we would be remiss to let this opportunity slip through our hands. To understand polio’s reemergence, it is important to understand the landscape in which it occurred, my native Nigeria. In 2016, four new cases of polio were reported, three of which were in Borno state, at the heart of Nigeria’s conflict ridden northeast. The reappearance of polio in this region is no coincidence—Boko Haram has wrought immense destruction to the Lake Chad basin, destroying an estimated 75 percent of basic infrastructure in northeastern Nigeria. Vaccines typically require cool conditions in order to maintain their potency. In the hot, dry, and remote northeast, this is near impossible with the destruction of so much infrastructure and frequent power outages. As a result, swathes of Nigeria’s most vulnerable children have been denied access to this cheap and simple preventative measure.    Another hurdle to universal immunization is the inadequate monitoring systems that track which immunizations people have received and ensure that a patient’s vaccinations are up-to-date. Nigeria suffers a severe lack of personal health records, rendering health statistics a product of mere guess work. In the absence of effective recordkeeping, it is nearly impossible to hold people that need vaccines accountable. In this sense, polio’s return to Nigeria is merely a symptom of a much larger failure in Nigeria’s public health system. Personal health records would serve to ensure access and delivery of vaccines. They would also put everyone in the system, and create impetus for improvement in healthcare as a response to accurate monitoring of health outcomes.   In 1990, polio coverage in Nigeria was 55 percent. By 1999, it had plummeted to 19 percent. Although polio coverage rebounded and was almost universal at the time of last year’s outbreak—polio coverage reached 90 percent in high-risk states—this remains suboptimal, and alludes to a striking lack of government commitment to the cause.    One solution to the problems facing polio immunization, as well as that of other preventable diseases, is the implementation of universal primary healthcare. Primary healthcare forms the cornerstone of basic health provision and, when present, is typically the area of healthcare responsible for immunizing local populations. What’s more, in many remote regions in Nigeria, which have the lowest immunization levels nationally, primary health is commonly the only form of healthcare access. It must therefore be prioritized, to give all people access to basic healthcare provisions, including crucial vaccinations.   For universal primary healthcare to be implemented in Nigeria, more needs to be given towards Nigeria’s failing healthcare system. In 2001, all members of the African Union pledged 15 percent of national spending to healthcare in the Abuja Declaration. Ironically, Abuja has not met this commitment, only spending a third of the pledged 15 percent on health care.  Fortunately, since the new polio cases were reported in 2016, there has been a renewed immunization drive. The international community and Nigerian government is set to vaccinate as many as 30 million children against polio. This drive must be sustained, and there is no room for complacency.   Investment in health infrastructure and reliable electricity are vital for remote areas, followed by the implementation of universal primary healthcare and adequate record-keeping. Yet none of this will be possible in the absence of greater commitment to the cause.   We know how to prevent polio, but children in my native Nigeria continue to be denied access to this basic but necessary vaccination. The reemergence of polio is tragic, but we should use it as an impetus to address the shortcomings of Nigerian healthcare. Greater government commitment to the sector is critical to preventing future outbreaks of illnesses like polio, protecting Nigerians of today and of the future.   
  • Health
    Health and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Age of Miracles
    To continue the extraordinary progress of the past fifteen years, the next U.S. administration should further integrate global health, development, and pandemic preparedness into the U.S. national security architecture.
  • Nigeria
    Polio in Northern Nigeria
    The appearance of two cases of polio in northern Nigeria is an unmitigated tragedy. Anybody who has traveled in the region and seen firsthand the victims of paralysis caused by polio can but weep. And now there are two more. Victims often have no wheel-chairs and, as elsewhere, health care is rudimentary if it exists at all. The tragedy is only mitigated by the courage the victims show in carrying on, and in the support they receive from their families and communities. Martins Ifijeh surveys ongoing immunization efforts and also analyzes the re-emergence of the disease in a thoughtful article in ThisDay. He notes that the effectiveness of immunization is reduced when children are malnourished, and malnourishment is endemic among the very large population of the internally displaced. He also highlights the need for the vaccine to be stored at a low temperature, hard to do in a war zone. He also cites Boko Haram hostility to immunization, which it characterizes as a “western plot.” Further, even in areas where Boko Haram no longer controls territory, security for health workers has not necessarily been re-established. So, polio is yet another cost of Boko Haram.
  • Global
    CRISPR: Transformative and Troubling
    A new genetic technology has the potential to cure diseases and boost plant, insect, and human lives, but it also poses profound ethical questions.
  • Global
    Generic Drug Regulation and the Politics of Pharmaceutical Pricing
    Joshua Sharfstein of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Alex Tabarrok of George Mason University join CFR’s Thomas Bollyky to discuss the role that generic drug regulation might play in addressing off-patent pharmaceutical pricing concerns.
  • China
    Chinese Pharma: A Global Health Game Changer?
    China’s advancement in the pharmaceutical sector has major implications for global health but it remains constrained by governance and other factors, says CFR’s Yanzhong Huang.
  • Public Health Threats and Pandemics
    Ebola
    Laurie Garrett offers a masterful account of the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire, and argues these lessons learned must be applied to solve the Ebola crisis of 2014.
  • Drug Policy
    Designing a Global Coalition of Medicines Regulators
    Globalization has transformed the marketplace for medicines in recent decades, giving rise to new threats including the poor traceability of global supply chains, counterfeit and substandard medicines, and antibacterial resistance. Aware that public drug authorities must cooperate to meet the emerging challenges of modern medicines regulation, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been discussing with counterpart agencies abroad creating a "global coalition of regulators." Yet a coalition alone is not enough; the devil, as always, will be in the details. In pursuit of this goal, the FDA and partner medicines regulatory agencies should design a coalition with five distinct features: narrow scope, to promote realistic goals; flexibility, to adapt to future circumstances; selective membership, to maximize like­mindedness, particularly in the early stages; nongovernmental (NGO) participation, to leverage the capacities of both NGOs and for-profit corporations; and institutional partnerships, to orchestrate the activities of other regulatory organizations. Medicines Oversight Is Increasingly Complex in a Global Context Since the early 1990s, firms and products have proliferated in the global drug market, leading to stiffer competition and pressures to improve productivity. Drug companies have adapted by outsourcing a large share of services to other countries. Their reliance on tens of thousands of foreign subcontractors has resulted in an acutely segmented supply chain. Medicines may be processed, packaged, sold, and resold multiple times before reaching consumers. For regulators, it can be difficult to ensure the safety of drugs before they hit pharmacy shelves. As a result, the global supply is vulnerable to a host of threats that can have deadly consequences. In 2007 and 2008, fraudulent doses of heparin, imported from China, killed at least 149 Americans. Even when the effects are not fatal, adulterated therapies can intensify illness, introduce new health concerns, or lead to costly delays in recovery. Such cases of deadly or ineffective medicines will likely become more frequent in the absence of more effective global regulation. For national regulatory authorities, enforcing a safe and secure medicines sector is no longer a singularly domestic undertaking. The FDA, for instance, is supposed to regulate products destined for the U.S. market originating in roughly 300,000 manufacturing facilities located in over 150 countries. But neither the FDA nor any other national regulatory authority has the capacity to fulfill this remit on its own. According to a 2010 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, it would take the FDA eighteen years to inspect all registered manufacturing firms in China just once. This point underscores the fact that most foreign facilities have never received a single inspection from the FDA, and never will, if the status quo persists. Tackling these concerns requires strong multilateral cooperation among national regulatory agencies. To this end, a handful of international institutions and initiatives populate the regulatory space. These include the Pharmaceutical Inspection Cooperation Scheme (PIC/S), International Conference on Harmonization (ICH), and International Pharmaceutical Regulators Forum (IPRF). These schemes operate within specific, technical mandates and, since they perform their respective tasks well, should not be the focus of unnecessary reforms. At the same time, such specialized entities leave critical areas of regulation unattended. What has been missing from the institutional landscape is a high-level, strategic body capable of coordinating these and other existing regulatory approaches, closing the policy gaps among them, and proposing solutions to emerging challenges not currently addressed. Doing so would also empower a body to assume responsibility for new and pressing commitments, including harmonizing medicines standards, establishing coordinated monitoring systems, and building capacity in countries that need it most. How to Design a Global Coalition of Regulators As the world's premier national regulatory body for medicines (and food), the U.S. FDA is ideally positioned to facilitate a multilateral coalition composed of heads of medicines agencies. Yet the success of any such institution hinges on its initial design. Getting it right the first time is critical, since institutions are notoriously resistant to change. More than a few regulatory arrangements have been hobbled by design flaws. A case in point is the International Organization of Securities Commissions, a network of domestic securities authorities that has struggled to harmonize standards because its large membership (124 agencies) and consensus decision-making rules impede cooperation. To improve the odds of success, the FDA and its counterparts should incorporate five design features into a coalition of medicines regulators: Narrow scope. The global coalition should identify select issues it could reasonably address with the resources and expertise at its disposal, and where it can add value. When it comes to medical products, top priorities include: harmonizing standards; increasing monitoring capabilities in jurisdictions where the production of drugs is burgeoning, such as China and India; and helping to build capacity in countries with weaker regulatory authorities. Only after the coalition has begun to attain these objectives should it consider expanding its remit to other issues, such as tackling barriers to generic drug access or scaling up the FDA's Secure Supply Chain pilot program—a voluntary initiative that expedites the entry of imported drugs for firms meeting designated security criteria. Flexibility. The supply chain for medicines will evolve in unexpected ways, as will the policy preferences of national medicines agencies. Therefore, it is important to design a coalition that can adapt its mission, membership, and mandate to future circumstances. First, coalition members should pursue soft approaches rather than treaty-based solutions because they are easier to negotiate, even if rules become "harder," or more detailed, over time. Examples of soft law are principles, action plans, and recommendations, such as those published by the Financial Action Task Force. Second, if decisions cannot be reached by consensus, a majoritarian voting system would help overcome obstacles to action and improve responsiveness. Electing members to the governing board, adopting a strategic plan, or urgently responding to a public health crisis are different scenarios in which voting may prove useful. Third, building mechanisms for self-evaluation beyond annual reports, such as requiring the coalition to renew its mandate every five years, can encourage its members to revisit and revise institutional goals. Selective membership. Initially, the coalition should maintain a selective membership of approximately twenty jurisdictions representing willing and capable regulatory leaders. This modest size will allow members to more easily identify actionable goals while accelerating plans to meet them. Meanwhile, the coalition should consider its future target membership, in order to forecast preferences down the line. This means that even if the body is mainly composed of advanced market democracies, it should from the outset also include rising powers integral to the global medicines trade and its regulation. The cast of members should encompass the Group of Seven (G7), including the European Union; a handful of (non-G7) industrialized countries that have shown leadership in global regulation, including Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Singapore; and critical rising powers, namely Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Once established, the coalition should open its doors to any country committed to upholding high domestic health standards and assuming part of the global regulatory burden. Nongovernmental participation. Full membership in the coalition should be limited to national regulatory agencies, since they represent the public interest. Still, nonstate actors possess unique capacities in global regulation, which the coalition should leverage. For example, firms are best suited to monitor their own supply chains. Likewise, NGOs bring an independent voice to policy debates and can serve as effective watchdogs. The best option would be to institutionalize participation of industry actors and NGOs within the coalition, as observers or affiliate members. Regulators would retain ultimate authority, but the coalition would regularly draw on their input. Criteria for firms should include contributions to drug innovations and a strong commitment to pharmacovigilance—detection, analysis, and prevention of adverse drug effects. Criteria for NGOs should involve evidence-based philanthropic work and a record of consumer advocacy. Limiting firm and NGO involvement to five members apiece would allow leaders to hear diverse opinions without undermining public interest. An alternative option is to establish a parallel network, detached from the coalition, to set standards and undertake activities complementing the coalition's work. Institutional partnerships. Finally, the coalition should avoid the pitfall of assuming the entire regulatory burden itself. Rather than trying to replace regulatory bodies that are working well, the coalition should aim to steer, shape, or "orchestrate" their work. This can be done through formal or informal partnerships, whereby the coalition either coordinates its activities with organizations that implement programs or realizes common goals by lending financial and political support, such as through grants, office space, joint forums, or high-level endorsements. Such measures might eventually involve regional harmonization efforts (e.g., African Medicines Regulatory Harmonization program) or relevant private standard-setting bodies (e.g., Health Level Seven International, which focuses on electronic health information). Initially, however, coalition leaders should collaborate with organizations that share similar memberships, such as the Summit of Heads of Medicines Regulatory Agencies, a forum for exchanging information. This would minimize policy differences and provide a testing ground for future partnerships. Building consensus to launch a coalition should not present any major obstacles as the FDA and foreign counterpart agencies are already exploring plans to create a new global regulatory authority. Nonetheless, implementing these policy proposals will require political dexterity. The coalition must provide a clear path to membership for developing countries that initially remain outside the body. One option is to create tiers of membership linked to regulatory capacity, establishing criteria for graduation and mobilizing development assistance to help countries do so. Similarly, nonstate actors will expect a clear and fair set of criteria for their participation. Failing to meet these demands may reduce the strategic role of the coalition and diminish its legitimacy. Moreover, consumer groups may argue that collaboration with the private sector exposes policymakers to regulatory capture, as agencies place private interests above public interests. However, historical lessons from many sectors suggest that regulatory capture is more likely when regulators interact with firms on their own terms and within their own bureaucracies, without the transparency afforded by participation of peer agencies. These five recommendations are no panacea. Still, they should vastly improve the existing patchwork of disjointed institutions sprawled across the regulatory landscape. More important, they represent a critical first step toward a strategic and nimble network of medicines regulatory authorities, capable of harnessing the strengths of current efforts while also creating new rules to ensure the security of the global supply chain. A global coalition of regulators, buffered by these prescriptions, would enhance consumers' confidence in their medicines, reduce cases of counterfeit and substandard drugs entering the global supply chain, and potentially save taxpayers money by leveraging the resources of other countries and institutions. The stakes are high, given the growing risk to public health. But so, too, are the incentives and opportunities for cooperation, because all countries—and all people—rely on a supply of safe medicine.