Health

Health Policy and Initiatives

  • Global
    A Conversation with Peter Piot
    Podcast
    Peter Piot and Michel Sidibé discuss Piot's new book, No Time to Lose: A Life in Pursuit of Deadly Viruses, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, and the state of the AIDS epidemic in the world today.
  • Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines
    Ensuring the Safety and Integrity of the World’s Drug, Vaccine, and Medicines Supply
    The world is facing two immediate health crises concerning drugs and vaccines: affordable and reliable access to life-sparing medicines and the safety and reliability of those medicines. Regulation and distribution systems to ensure access and protect public safety, where they exist, are outdated. And over the past decade all aspects of raw materials extraction, ingredients synthesis, formulation, packaging, and distribution have globalized to such an extent that nearly every pill, injection, and salve contains elements derived from multiple countries. The supply chain of production is compromised: hundreds of thousands of people are dying annually from false, poisonous, or substandard medicines. Unless this issue is addressed, millions more lives and the credibility of medicines and vaccines will be lost. The Groups of Eight (G8) and Twenty (G20) countries should take the lead, as a matter of urgency, in promoting cooperation among national safety regulators, tougher legal frameworks, and regional networks of surveillance and prosecution. The Problem The entire chain of medicines and vaccine production, from raw chemical extraction to the sales of packages in pharmacies and hospitals, has become so globally complex that no single country-based regulatory system can guarantee its population's safety. The pace of change is breathtaking. Domestic U.S. drug producers, for example, now import 80 percent of their active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) from foreign manufacturers, compared to nearly 100 percent domestic production fifteen years ago. Those ingredients are primarily made or processed by some ten thousand companies located in India and China, where regulatory lapses have often proven serious, even fatal. A vast network of brokers creates an opaque barrier between APIs and excipient (inert ingredients) manufacturers and the next links in the production chain. The medicines chain is no longer transparent or readily traceable. Consumer demand for medicines is simultaneously increasing, as a result of innovative financing and distribution schemes in poor countries, Internet distribution, and worldwide demographic shifts toward older populations. With rising demand and medicine shortages comes unscrupulous behavior. Across the globe, pharmacies and hospitals are discovering that more of their products each year contain no API, have substandard or weak API formulations, are contaminated, or have been deliberately counterfeited by criminals to imitate legitimate medicines. This is a crisis for the rich, emerging, and poor worlds alike. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that counterfeiting, substandard formulation, contamination, fakery, and active ingredient substitution constitute a $431 billion market; 83.4 percent of that, or $359 billion, had direct public health impact, representing a 300 percent increase over such clinically dangerous sales in 2000. A 2009 International Policy Network study reckoned that seven hundred thousand people are killed annually due to use of substandard treatments for tuberculosis (TB) and malaria alone. As WHO TB control director Mario Raviglione concluded, "Without better regulation of the drugs, we are running the risk of anarchy." "Buyer beware" is not an appropriate warning, as patients and physicians cannot typically discern the authenticity and safety of the treatments they use. Worse, unregulated market forces favor substandard and criminal production as the highest profits are garnered from products that contain little or no costly active ingredients and nonhygienic excipients. In a largely unregulated global market in which errors or deliberate misformulations typically are marketed without notice or penalty to the manufacturers and distributors, the danger for patients and consumers is real and universal. The Solution In order to remedy the drug safety crisis without significantly reducing access to vital medicines, the G8 and G20 nations should take the following six steps. Use the MediCrime Convention as a starting framework for worldwide coordination The MediCrime Convention, launched in 2011, is a noteworthy binding international instrument among European nations. Ratification procedures are now under way and include agreeing to mutual transparency in regulation and enforcement activities, identifying jurisdictional boundaries, and committing to sanctions and penalties for violators of public health. The convention unfortunately uses the word "counterfeit" in lieu of terms agreed upon by the WHO, and thus implies emphasis on patent protection and pharmaceutical branding. Nevertheless, its country agreements for transparency, shared product testing, prosecutions, and investigations can serve as the basis for other regional frameworks. Identifying cross-national legal frameworks for collaboration between regulatory authorities should be a matter of urgency for G8/G20 leaders, as criminality and substandard manufacturing thrive in the absence of such multinational regulation. Ultimately, multinational agreements should have financial instruments built into them, generating funds for strengthening regulatory systems worldwide, particularly in poorly resourced countries. Create regional centers of excellence for regulation The WHO estimates that less than 17 percent of its member states have well-developed drug regulation and a third have little to no capacity to execute those regulations. Some 20 percent of nations have little to no legal provisions or capacity for regulation of the safety and reliability of medicines; combined, 50 percent are clearly incapable of ensuring the health of their public in terms of drug and vaccine safety. Pooling resources and skills on a regional basis can help solve the capacity side of this equation. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Regulatory Harmonization Steering Committee is endeavoring to reach collaborative accord in Asia. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) is building laboratory centers to service the region for drug and API safety analysis. It is seeking to harmonize regulatory and enforcement law across the region to allow transparency in surveillance and enforcement data, shared investigation power, and cross-border tracking of fraudulent or contaminated drugs. In March 2012, the East African Community (EAC) Medicines Registration Harmonization program was launched with political and financial support from UN agencies, the Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), private foundations, and bilateral donors. The G8/20 leaders should back these efforts and aggressively encourage transparent exchange among its regulators and creation of financial instruments, potentially derived from stiff penalties imposed on violators, that can be used to bolster legal, inspection, and enforcement capacities. Encourage an alliance of regulators G8/G20 countries should commit to strong coordination, transparent information, and collaboration in the innovation of drug and vaccine safety, criminal interception, laboratory testing, and public health measures. In an effort to lift all boats, the regulatory agencies within the G20 should actively collaborate and assist less well-resourced nations in building both legal frameworks and capacities to test, track, and trace vaccines and medicines in order to guarantee the health of the global public. At the outset, the G8 should take steps to promote far more transparent and aggressive collaboration among its drug safety regulators and to identify weak links in the chain of safety regulation and inspection within the larger G20 community. Create a common numbering system for all pharmaceuticals Countries currently use a hodgepodge of numbering systems, rendering tracking and authentication of products and medicines from one country to another nearly impossible. Numbering should identify the product, its site and identity of manufacture, and the date of its original production. A universal numbering system adopted immediately by the G8 nations and encouraged worldwide could ease and simplify tracking of medicines, just as zip codes have improved global postal delivery. Encourage foreign assistance providers to feature drug safety capacity building In the absence of new money dedicated to the pursuit of global drug safety, existing resources may be far better directed. Donor states that currently manufacture or support the distribution of large amounts of pharmaceuticals and vaccines to poorer countries should feature training and support for drug authentication and safety as financed components of such drug delivery. Similarly, appropriate technology for rapid identification of substandard and fraudulent drugs should be provisioned not only by donor governments, but also by their funded nongovernmental partners. Encourage private sector players to ensure the reliability of online retailers Over the past three years, Interpol has executed criminal sweeps that have identified and removed thousands of websites engaged in illegal distribution of medicines. One website host company, GoDaddy.com, has removed eighty thousand such websites in just two years, which is estimated to represent about 2 percent of total illegal Web medicines operations. Relevant companies, such as Google and Microsoft as well as GoDaddy, are working to form a consortium that can quickly identify and remove online retailers engaged in dangerous medicines distribution. The relevant commerce agencies within the G20 should identify and encourage similar private sector interventions that can keep legitimate medicines distributors online while swiftly identifying and removing their criminal imitators. Conclusion Given the global scale of this rapidly escalating drug safety and reliability crisis, some analysts insist solutions must await creation of a multibillion dollar international regulatory authority and/or a world treaty agreement. Such grandly scaled interventions may be realistic one day, but the present political atmosphere favors neither treaties, generally, nor creation of expensive new multilateral entities. Potentially millions of lives will be lost in the meantime unless the far more immediate and actionable steps recommended here are taken. The integrity of the global drug and vaccine supply must be decoupled from patent protection and aggressively tackled through transparent collaborative relations between existing national safety regulators and rapid capacity building where regulation is weak or nonexistent.
  • Health Policy and Initiatives
    Universal Health Coverage: The Future of Healthcare Reform?
    Play
    YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, and this is our final meeting of the new Universal Health Coverage Roundtable Series. The meeting will discuss the council's new report, "The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage." I said this report is officially released by the council, but the most important part and the most innovative part of the work actually was done by Dalberg, actually, led by Daniel Altman, Vicky Hausman and their teams. So we – privileged to have three speakers for today's discussion: Laurie Garrett, Daniel Altman and Alex Preker. All three of our speakers' full bios, are included in your handouts, so I'm not going to repeat them, save to say that Daniel is director of thought leadership at Dalberg Global Development Advisors; and Laurie is senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and the only writer ever to have been awarded all three of the big Ps of journalism, the Peabody, the Polk and the Pulitzer, and she's also called by WHO Director General Margaret Chan as the foremost voice of global health. The third one – (chuckles) – just – not included in the handouts, but I heard what she say. The – Alex Preker – Alex is the head of Health Industry and Investment Policy at the World Bank Group. So for time's sake, we're going to begin with brief remarks from Laurie, followed by remarks from Daniel. And after Laurie and Daniel's remarks, Alex will comment as a respondent to the report, and then we're going to open up the floor to questions and discussion. So without further ado, Laurie. LAURIE GARRETT: Well, it's great to see you all here. Good afternoon and enjoy your lunch. And I'm sure there's more food if you feel, you know, necessary to dive out during my remarks to put another layer on your plate. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. If you've not previously been here, this is our Washington office. Headquarters, however, are in New York. In – among the global health team, one of our team members is based here in Washington, Tom Bollyky – there you are – and the rest of us are in the New York office. For quite some time, this phrase, UHC, universal health coverage, has been tossed about. And it seemed for years that whoever was using the term had a unique definition for it so that it was very hard to get your hands around what are we talking about when we say we want universal health coverage. If you were a Western European, you probably thought it meant you want a single-payer system run by this national government universally available to everybody in your country. If you were an American, you may very well have thought, well, that's something that's going to go to the Supreme Court. (Scattered laughter.) And if you were in most of the middle- and poor-income countries of the world, you thought, what a nice idea; not ever going to really be a reality for us. So at much prodding from the Rockefeller Foundation, to whom we're very grateful for the push to make this series of meetings and ultimate report happen, and Ariel Pablos-Mendez, who many of you probably know, who's now serving in USAID running global health programs, we tried to take this apart and deconstruct this whole concept of universal health coverage to find what's the bottom line that's a(n) actual workable target, realizing that there is a couple of trends that play into how you analyze this picture. The first is this very substantial, dramatic increase in the size, scope and funding of global health that occurred between roughly 2000 and 2008 and is now going downhill post-financial crisis. Most of this surge was very much initiative-based, and so it was about very specific targeted health efforts. But the further we got down that path, whether it was distributing antiretrovirals or dealing with tuberculosis prevention or bed nets for malaria, whatever it might be, the more all the participants came to recognize that if you didn't have a health system in place and you didn't have systems of health financing that removed the probability, the near certainty of bankruptcy for poor households that were afflicted with a key provider having a major illness, a traffic accident or anything that would debilitate them or kill them – if you didn't get to that core, then everything else would fall apart, and you were basically setting up a giant charity construct that would be endlessly dependent. And similarly, there has been a large body of literature going back for quite some time arguing back and forth about what is the role of the consumer or patient in their own health, and if all health is free, does it change the relationship between the provider and the consumer or patient and the commitment that the individual has to their own health protection – preventive care, diet, exercise, all of the above. Well, there are obviously three big problems when you talk about providing health. The first is that we have a fantastic deficit of skilled health care workers globally. And this can be defined in every single category, whether you're looking at dentists, lab technicians, pharmacists, surgeons, registered nurses, health administrators, hospital administrators; in every single category we have a deficit of personnel. And the deficit is, of course, most acute in the poorest countries in the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on a per capita basis. So that's your first challenge. The second is that the delivery systems themselves are largely very weak – in some cases quite chaotic – with difficult relations between the private providing systems, or chaos, and the public providing systems, or chaos. In many countries, the relationship between the private sector of health, which is often the number one provider – or the majority of all health care is administered privately – the relationship between that private sector and the public sector is very testy, even competitive and angry, and a spirit of cooperation is not present. And in large part, it's because one sector requires a hundred percent out-of-pocket payments on the part of the health consumer while the other sector is largely publicly or fully publicly supported. And this creates some obvious tensions for the individual as well. If you think you're going to get better care in the private sector but it'll bankrupt your family, what do you do? And then the – from the individual point of view, this question of bankruptcy is quite serious. The institute – the International Labor Organization did its own survey a few years ago looking at this question of the bankrupting impact of illness in the absence of health coverage. And their data points were quite startling. And what they were able to show was that in many societies – and I think, at this point, it is true of the United States – a major catastrophic illness can be the primary source of bankruptcy for personal and family bankruptcy. And we have not resolved this, clearly, in the U.S. Well, I'm going to let Daniel speak to the particulars of what's uniquely discovered in this report, but the one tip-off I want to give you is – couple of things: First, when we – we thought when you look at the question of universal health coverage, it's best to focus on it as a financing question, whether it's personal economics, family economics, village economics, country economics. Coverage is about payment. And it's best to push aside as somebody else's issue to deal with whether coverage actually gets you anything. In other words, it is wholly possible for you to have some system whereby your pay – your health is paid for – you have a voucher, you have insurance, you're in a national plan, whatever it may be – but there's no health care workers when you get to that clinic, or the clinic is in shambles when you get there. So there three pieces to you to – to actually providing health care to everybody, but the one piece we're looking at is the economic financing piece. And finally, I just couldn't help but notice that when the Dalberg group completed their analysis, they reached a key conclusion that turns out to coincide with the primary debate now inside the United States Supreme Court. It is a question of whether it is both feasible and desirable to try and build health coverage without resting it heavily on risk pooling, and that means some sort of mandate that both the well and the sick are in the same pool sharing the same burden, and that it is probably the only way to financially make it affordable for a community, a society, a country, a whole people. And with that, I'll be happy to pass off from there. Yanzhong. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Actually, before the – Dan gets started, I'm – I forgot that we have some housekeeping rules to announce. This meeting is on-the-record, so you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. But please turn off your cellphones. And with that, Daniel. DANIEL ALTMAN: Thank you, Laurie and Yanzhong. It's been a pleasure to work with both of you as we prepared this report. I should also thank the Rockefeller Foundation for its generous support of this work at CFR. It's a particular pleasure for me to be here presenting to you as a member of CFR. And I'd like to start by just speaking broadly about the potential benefits that we might see from universal health coverage. There are a lot of different ways where we might find benefit in the universal health coverage program, regardless of what the exact financing structure might be. And I'm going to separate them into three. I'm going to talk a little bit about the macro-level efficiencies that you might obtain, then what improvements you might get in health outcomes, and finally, about benefits for households. At the macro level – these are some of the benefits that get most attention, especially in this country, when we talk about universal coverage. One is – the simplest, perhaps, is if you get everybody under a single roof or the biggest roof possible, you could save a lot in administrative costs. And I remember back in '94 when I started to look at this issue, it was estimated that you could make savings of perhaps tens of billions of dollars by having a program like Medicare that covered people throughout their lives. That used to be a lot of money once upon a time. But more importantly, I think there's an idea that if you have a universal birth-to-death health care system which has a large coverage pool, you're getting a lot of efficiencies in how care is delivered. You're correcting a lot of incentive problems that currently jack up prices and costs within the system – for example, between the various parts of a hospital and its practices and the practices that it contracts with and their billing systems and their technicians. There are a lot of incentive and holdup problems that economists have and can identify in that system. It also helps us to coordinate care in a way that reduces waste. If the hospital and the rehabilitation center, the home health aides and the general practitioners are all connected, then we have less likelihood of wasted or ineffectual treatments. It allows us to negotiate lower prices, as some countries have already done. With drug manufacturers, for example, France has negotiated, as an entire country health system, to get lower prices. And finally, it can allow us to – and I will use the word ration high-cost care. When you are trying to provide health coverage for a large population, you find that you want to give the coverage where you get the most bang for the buck, and this is something that the United Kingdom has probably been a pioneering country in doing. So there are a lot of ways where you might be able to capture efficiencies and lower the cost to an entire economy of giving decent health care to its people. Now, just as important are what you're getting for that money, or what – the health outcomes that you're getting for that money that you pay. And it's worth talking about where those benefits could arise. It's not the focus of this report, for reasons that I'll explain later, but I think it deserves mention. First of all, you would expect that more people would get some kind of care if there is universal coverage, and you would also expect that more people will reserve – will receive some formal medical care, what we consider advanced, technologically enabled medical care, as opposed to traditional medicine, which can be ineffective or even counterproductive. As one of my colleagues over at the Intel-Grameen social enterprise said, they're getting care now, they're just getting it from the quacks. And so to the extent that you can shift that towards formal medicine, that might have benefit. Also, because of the coordination of care that I mentioned earlier, you tend to have fewer errors, people getting the wrong treatment, that could actually harm them, as well as being inefficient. But we also find that you're treating patients earlier. What happens in this country, for example, quite often is people wait until something is really bad and then they show up at the emergency room if they can't afford to pay for care through normal channels or if they don't have insurance. We could avoid something like that if we had universal coverage. Finally, perhaps most importantly, there's much more incentive for preventive care. If you're paying the health costs of somebody throughout their life, you want to start early with preventive care so that those costs will be reduced over the course of their life. And these – all of these factors could help to lead to better health outcomes. Now, in addition to the macro-efficiencies and health outcomes, we can see some possibilities for gains within the household. One which is quite important, that Laurie was alluding to earlier, is the affordability of care. It's not the case that the poor people consume a smaller percentage of their income in health care. They consume about the same percentage of their income in health care. But because their incomes are much lower, they get a lot less care. The cost – the prices of care are not proportionately lower. So to the extent that we can mitigate that, it could be a good thing. And it's especially important if you're worried about public health, because if people anywhere in your society aren't getting treated for diseases, you have problems of contagion that could arise, especially in countries that have problems with epidemics on an unfortunately somewhat regular basis. But even more, beyond the affordability of care, just going to a doctor or getting some sort of basic treatment, there is the potential benefit of risk pooling. And this is the genius of insurance, as any economist will tell you, that you're able to pool risk with a large group so that at no time do you have to make some extraordinary outlay in order to cover your costs. This is extremely important, especially when the out-of-pocket cost of health care is high, which it is in many of the developing countries that we may talk about today. And the final benefit, I think, that could accrue to households and is worth noting is in human capacity. An adverse health event in the household, especially of poor households, can have a lot of negative effects, not just on the person who has the health event, who might not be able to work, might not be able to be productive, but they might not be able to take care of their children, their children might therefore suffer some effects of this. There's a whole cascade of effects that can arise. And so if you were able to somewhat – to somehow mitigate those health disasters and, in fact, as I said, disconnect them from financial disasters as well, through risk pooling, you might see knock-on effects in human capacity. And that's something that researchers really (have/haven't ?) investigated. So these last benefits, these household benefits, are the ones we're going to focus on today, and there are a couple reasons for that. One is that the macro-efficiencies that we've spoken about have not necessarily been the biggest focus for a lot of developing countries that have delved into universal health coverage, because they haven't had much of a health system to begin with, and thus, you know, it's not as though you're moving from one very sophisticated system to another and seeing what efficiencies you might capture. You're sort of building a system from scratch, in many cases, and you're building UHC at the same time as you're building the health system itself. And another reason why we're focusing on the household benefits is because those health outcomes are often very difficult to determine in the early years of a UHC program. And since we are in the early years in many developing countries, the evidence is scarce, though not non-existent. If some of you would like to follow up with the work of Gideon (sp) and Diaz (sp) that's cited in the paper, you can see quite a few studies that are trying to gauge the early effects, often looking at things like infant mortality, which you can gauge today rather than looking 20 years later to see how healthy somebody is. And there have been pluses and minuses. In some cases you find improvements in health outcomes; in some cases you find almost no effect. But it may be early days to gauge that. So for all of those reasons, we chose to focus, especially in a short paper like this, on these household benefits, which should be almost immediately perceptible. If you're trying to reduce the financial burden of adverse health events in households, that should be something that we can see right away. And in fact we can. So that's what I'll be outlining the evidence on for you. What I think is a useful bottom line here is to think about how we might create a virtuous cycle of less financial burden on households, better health, more investment in health, and then less financial burden and more investment in health going forward. You know, health is such a fundamental aspect of development, the best development economists in the world seem only to agree about health as the one sine qua non, the one thing you need to get off the ground. Even the evidence on education, which also seems so fundamental, is much more mixed. But if you can get reasonable health status for people in a poor country, they have a much better shot of turning it into a rich country. And so we want to use the tools that we have – and UHC is one of them – to perhaps set in motion this virtuous cycle of better health investment and then better health for future generations. Well, let's talk about a few of the issues that come up when you start to consider a UHC system and how to capture some of these household benefits. One is the affordability of the program itself for households. How easy is it for them to actually opt in to the system and to use the services that might be provided to them? One issue that comes up constantly is that of user fees. And there are a lot of different ways to gauge user fees. It could be a copayment for a physician's visit; it could be some sort of deductible; it could be a percentage of costs. User fees have almost always been found to discourage people's use of care. And if the idea of universal health coverage is to increase the access of care, you have to make sure that it's within the ability and willingness of people to pay. One tool that you can use to assure that to some degree is a cap on annual spending. You can say, OK, well, we have user fees, but only up to $50 a year, and after that everything's paid for. So these are sort of two variables that you can already tweak, or two dials that you could tweak as you're designing your UHC system. But I think just as important as these variables are the ones that are related to risk pooling. We've seen a lot of different systems grow up around the world. Some of them were spoken about, in the first roundtable in this series, by Bill Schaue (ph), where you have different pools set up for different populations. You might see one health insurance pool for government employees and then another one set up for the private sector, or you might see one for the military and then another one for private sector. You might see them set up on village-level basis, so that each little village or cluster of villages has its own mutual insurance. We have sometimes seen the separation between people who are in formal and informal employment, so that you have some sort of employer-sponsored or -provided health insurance for those in formal employment, and then for informal employment there's a whole other system that's set up by the government. This kind of segregation often takes you into trouble because, as Laurie pointed out, if you want to really achieve the genius of risk pooling, you need to have a big enough pool. You need to have people with different health status. And the more that you separate them by variables that may be related to their health status, such as whether they have a steady government job or they have formal employment, the less benefit you're likely to get out of risk pooling at the household level. Another issue that comes up sometimes is enrollment. Some of these programs are mandatory. Some of them are voluntary. With the mandatory ones, sometimes even though everybody's supposed to get coverage, they have a registration process which is extremely difficult and onerous. And sometimes you have people who don't even have an official national identification number or card and it's very hard for them to actually sign up for the insurance which is their right. For the voluntary programs, we run into potential problems of adverse selection. Who are the people who are going to sign up for health insurance? You can bet that the first ones there are the ones who think they might be getting sick soon. This is something we're well familiar with in the U.S. And we've seen it happen. We've seen death spirals of insurance plans that occur as a result. So these are all issues that need to be taken into account, not just to ensure the success of the program, but to ensure that these benefits that we talked about percolate down to the household level. So in the paper, we have a few examples of some programs that are already in existence. We've drawn a little bit on the UHC Forward database from the joint learning program, which is referenced here. But I think what I'd like to talk about more is whether it works, whether we actually see evidence that these benefits can be accrued and what's associated with the accrual of those benefits. Well, for affordability, definitely yes. When we have UHC programs that don't have overly onerous user fees, we definitely see access to care improving. And along with that, not surprisingly, we see utilization of care rising as well. But that can sometimes be a bit of a double-edged sword, and sometimes it occurs, to the surprise of the government organizing the program or whatever the entity is that organizes it, because of moral hazard. You lower the price of care; people get more care; they might even be a little less careful about getting sick because the consequences are not so great. This happened in Taiwan in the '90s. They got a lot more utilization than they were expecting. They had to fiddle some budgets and see how they could adjust for the future. Another issue, though, with affordability is that the out-of-pocket cost doesn't always fall even when you set up a UHC program. And you might ask, well how could that possibly be? Well, we've run into some cases, for example in the Philippines, where the private providers that are reimbursed by the government see that the government is passing on only a small percentage of those costs to the consumer and they say, well, you can jack up the prices, basically charging the consumer the same as what they used to pay, but we're getting a bigger reimbursement from the government because the consumer only pays a small share of that. So some of these systems can be open to gaming, and that's something to look out for as well. But overall the evidence is quite strong that the affordability is improved, the access to care is improved, and so is utilization. In terms of evidence for the benefits of risk pooling, we certainly see big drops in catastrophic spending, and that is, as I said, probably the biggest benefit that we can expect and the most desirous one at the household level. And we see those in different regions all around the world. Several examples are cited in here. On human capacity, which was the third of these household benefits that I mentioned, we are starting to see some results. As you might expect, since it's somewhat indirect, it could take a little more time, and the scientific methods that you might use to gauge that are a little more difficult because there are a lot of things that could go into human capacity. So trying to figure out what's the delta that you get from this kind of program could be difficult. You need a randomized controlled trial or some other perhaps quasi-experimental design. Doing a rigorous paper is not the easiest thing, but we've seen a little bit. We've seen some benefits to worker productivity, as you might expect. And I think, by the way, some of the best proof that insurance coverage can improve worker productivity is the fact that you've seen some large employers in poor countries, like Pakistan for example, setting up basically HMOs for their workers and paying the bulk of the cost because they know that they'll recoup that in terms of reduced absenteeism and higher productivity. And we've mentioned a couple of those in the report. Also, in terms of human capacity, though, we are starting to see these effects on the next generation, that children's school enrollment, for example, in some of the Chinese rural health insurance demonstrations seems to go up, which could be because it's – they're not required to stay at home and take care of their parents when they're ill – something as simple as that. And these are the kinds of things that I hope that more economists like myself will look into because I think that they make a powerful case for the humanitarian aspects of universal health coverage. So I'll just end by giving you a little bit of a prospectus for the future. Obviously there are many reasons to consider a UHC program. As I said, there are many different models; it's not all about single payer, as Laurie said. But there are many potential benefits that you could capture. There's not rigorous evidence supporting all of them yet, but that's partly because we're in the early stages when it comes to the developing world and UHC. But I think that the household benefits that have been documented so far make a strong case. And when you see what the political leaders who have ushered in UHC and their countries have spoken about, it is indeed these household benefits that they say we cannot have our people burdened not just be health events, but by the catastrophic costs that come – can come with them if we hope to grow into the future. And some of the most far-sighted leaders have recognized this, and I hope that more will in the future. Thank you. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Daniel. Actually when I was listening to your report, received this message from the Kaiser Family Foundation about recent poll data on the American attitudes toward the Affordable Health Care Act that said there was a perfect divide on the Americans' attitudes toward the act. Indeed they found that more than 50 percent of all Americans still believe that the Supreme Court should rule it's unconstitutional, the individual mandate requiring nearly everyone obtaining health insurance. So – (chuckles) – despite that the – all those – the benefits that Daniel alluded to, the – it seems that Americans still haven't realized that. (Laughs.) MR. ALTMAN: Well, I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but this may be unconstitutional. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea. (Laughter.) MR. HUANG: So, OK. Alex? ALEXANDER S. PREKER: Well, thanks very much for having invited me here, Laurie and others from the – from New York, and I – it's – I'm delighted as a preliminary to my – to be here in this office. It's – congratulations to the council for having set up this new office here. So it's really nice. We'll have to come and have some of our meetings in the World Bank here. MS. GARRETT: Yeah, that long walk two blocks away. DR. PREKER: Exactly. So we – I'll forego the reimbursement on the taxi this time. MS. GARRETT: (Laughs.) DR. PREKER: So this is an immensely important topic, and it's interesting because Rob Hecht, who's here from Results for Development – he and I were working together in 1993 when the bank was doing its world health report on "Investing in Health," and one of the interesting things at that time was that we came up with some statistics that showed that although 90 percent of the disease burden in the world is in developing countries, only 10 percent of the financing is there. So there was this very big disparity between where the needs are and where the money is at the global level. Interestingly enough, if one looks at the data now, you know, which is almost 20 years later, it's not like that. It's 60-40, which demonstrates the change that has happened in the last 20 years in terms of distribution of financing globally. So you now have the BRIC countries – if you take the BRIC – and Goldman Sachs had coined this idea – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with "S" in the – in brackets – South Africa (was ?) sort of – was supposed to be part of that – and then, once they got through that, they added "N-11," the next 11, which includes countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. But what's interesting is how have those countries now performed in terms of – in terms of this agenda? Because one could say that, well, it's the BRIC N-11 that really would have the largest capacity. So let's look at whether or not those countries have actually been able, during that 20 years, while this shift in funding has actually taken place – you know, has there been a change in the way that the population might have access to that – that financing? So if we just look at the table now in – on page 10 for a second – and I think Daniel kind of highlighted this – but I just want to draw out a couple of observations on this table. So it's on Page 10. So it's interesting that when one looks at places like Kenya, where the size of the pool is 7 (percent), and then out of pocket is 51 (percent). And then you go down the list – Mali is the same, 3 (percent), 52 (percent); India a bit further down, 9 (percent) and 50 (percent). So the observation is that, you know, countries that really have poor coverage or poor pools end up spending a lot of money out of pocket. And of course the troubling part is then, when you now go further along and you see a place like (Turkish ?) Republic, which is 97 percent coverage – well, it's still got 40 percent out of pocket. And if you go down further on the list there – Philippines, 80 percent coverage, but 52 (percent) – (5)4 percent out of pocket. And then you go down to the bottom, which is where we would like to see it, Colombia and Thailand where 88 percent and 72 percent for Thailand; Colombia, 88 (percent). And there you have 8 (percent) and 16 (percent). So I think this where we now – need to now be thinking a little bit. How is it that at least two countries have succeeded in reaching the coverage level and then, at the same time, doing something about that out-of-pocket exposure that they – that the population has to health expenditure? And then other countries that, you know, one would say would – you know, they're part of the BRIC – you know, India is there; I don't see many of the other BRICS in there. Chile is not – no, China is not there. MS. GARRETT (?): Brazil is. DR. PREKER: Yeah, Brazil is there. So Brazil is there as well. And these countries are actually not doing well in the distribution of the – of the funding and clearly have not succeeded in putting in place a mechanism that dealt with that out-of-pocket side of the expenditure. So that raises a couple of issues, which I think is really the crux of the matter is that, you know, there's an ideological debate about scaling up and then there's the pragmatic debate about what you do about it. And I think this, in some ways, is also the thing that U.S. is facing right now. You've got the – you've got the ideological debate, but then you have a pragmatic debate. You know, what are the solutions and how do you actually achieve it? And that now – one of the pragmatic solutions is being challenged of course in the Supreme Court. But, you know, this was one of many options. It was not the only one, but it was one of many. And now that's being put to a test to see how consistent that is with other principles in society, and that's precisely what we find in many developing countries. So I worked a little bit in Ghana in the early – well, 2003 to 2007. And we helped the Ghanaian government at that time put in place a scale-up program for health insurance, essentially what – at the time that we started working with the government, they had – they had inherited a British-style health system, which was basically free care, universal coverage. So going back about 45 years, that's the kind of system that they had inherited. So on the – on the surface of it, you would say, well, that's great; you know, they – I mean, they came from a background where they had full coverage, and everybody had entitlement to services. Well, within 10 years after the colonial powers left, that system collapsed because the system didn't have enough money, and so what happened was that although you had a rule that said everybody has access to care, that rule eroded in practice, and people ended up spending money out of pocket because there wasn't enough money in the system. And then the government even came in with – initially, it was an informal kind of payment, but then the government eventually came in with a rule that said, well, if you are going to come to a public clinic, you have to pay something because, you know, our clinics are going bankrupt, so the Bamako type of thing that, you know, why shouldn't we be getting part of the money in the public sector, because we know you're paying the money anyways out of pocket, so why shouldn't the government benefit, and so we can finance part of our health service with that money out of pocket? And so they brought in a rule that – which was called in Ghana a kind of a nice term – it's called "cash and carry." You know, you come in with your cash, and you carry away the services. So they brought in that kind of a system. And that worked OK for a while. It did help a lot, studies that were done that showed that – like in Bamako, it showed the institutions that were collecting and were allowed to retain those fees that they did collect out of pocket ended up being better staffed and ended up having at least drugs so that when people went there, they actually got treated, whereas the clinics that didn't have that, although in principle, there was free care, basically, people were getting nothing. So they got free care, but they got free care to nothing. And I think this is what we are seeing in some of these places here. When you look at the – when you look at some of these statistics – (inaudible) – public, when 98 – 97 percent is free care, but clearly, they're getting nothing, because they are paying 40 percent out of pocket. So, you know, they are not getting what they want, so they are – they are choosing to finance. OK, so Ghana then decided, OK, we're going to abolish the "cash and carry," and instead of that, if people are willing to pay, why don't we, instead of having people pay at the point of service, why don't we just put that money in a pool, and the – I mean, clearly, the population is willing to pay, so that's good, so let's now take advantage of the fact that the population is willing to pay, we'll put that money into a pool, and we'll make that into an insurance program so that that way, everybody contributes a little bit, because you know, the evidence is there that they are willing to pay, but instead of paying when you get sick, people will pay ahead of time, and we create a health insurance system. So that's essentially what they did. They created a health insurance system, and then they said, well, but you know, many people can't afford to make that small contribution, so we're going to subsidize the people who can't afford to pay the premium. And what ended up happening then, of course, is that they put in place the system, and coverage went up very quickly to 70 percent. And then the thing unraveled because what was happening was all sorts of administrative things: The system wasn't able to clear the bills; they weren't able to handle the claims; they weren't able to register poor people, so even though poor people had access to the services, actually, poor people weren't getting registered, not unlike in the U.S., where you have the Medicaid patients – often there's a – you find – (inaudible) – statistic shows that many Medicaid patients actually don't register. It's either too complicated, or they don't register, or they may be illegal workers or whatever. There's a lot of reasons, but they don't get into the system. And so we found the same thing, that, you know, even though you have the system in place, the people who really should benefit, the rules are there, but they don't come in. And so I think once again we are seeing this here in this table, and which you are highlighting in this report, that the rules by themselves aren't enough unless you couple them with some pragmatic institutions. You know, and part of it is the human resources that you were mentioning. But there are a couple other very important things. And you know, drugs and equipment are two very important elements of a – of the health system that we often forget. And when you look at the expenditure in a health service, often the big expenditure item is actually drugs plus human resources. So in many – in many emerging economies, you can have as high as 50 percent, even 60 percent of the whole health expenditure is actually on pharmaceuticals. So once again, it means that a single thing can't solve the problem. You really have to have – it has to be an – universal coverage can't go by itself. It can't just be the front end where you're collecting the money, and then you say everybody is covered. It has to go along with institutional reforms. I think the report nicely highlights some of those institutional things that you think are important in this. And then I just want to end on one note is that those institutions, we often think kind of in concrete terms that those institutions are things like buildings and, you know, bodies – buildings and bodies and drugs and the equipment. But I'm now beginning to work in a part of the bank which looks at how better to work with the private sector. I work in the IFC part of the bank. And I work in a part of the IFC which is called the investment climate department, where we are looking at investment policies toward the private sector and whether or not those investment policies actually encourage the private sector to, one, be functional, and second of all, to have some sort of a social benefit. And it's really interest, a report that we have just come out of, following a survey that we did in the Africa region, which shows that many governments put in place programs that intend to mobilize resources and energy from the private sector. In fact, I think the statistic was somewhere close to 80 percent actually have rules about that. And only 6 percent actually implement them. So one of the big challenges, I think also in the insurance side, which we find in many countries and which once again you are highlighting in this report, is that the capacity to implement really has to be there, and it goes beyond the brick-mortar, the bodies and the – and the drugs. And it includes some of the rules and regulations and how those rules and regulations are enforced, but also the culture of the population that's using those services and whether or not those populations end up behaving in a way that's consistent with the new system that's in place. And with that, I'll just highlight a small final example that once again comes from Ghana, where you had a mother that came to a clinic with a child and was somebody that came from a background where she could have belonged to – you know, she could have belonged to the insurance scheme, or she could have been subsidized through the subsidies program. And once she got to the clinic, she didn't have coverage. And so the clinic said, well, I mean, the rules we have is that you have to have coverage, and if you don't, we can't give you care. And so she was turned down. And this of course became a very big scandal. It became a – you know, it became a political fiasco for two reasons. One, it was a political fiasco because, you know, why should a mother with a young child be refused care? You know, so that – you know, there was a moral aspect on the treatment part. But it was also a fiasco because it was a PR fiasco because of course if she had gotten the care, you now destroy the whole health insurance system because every other mother with a child would say, well, when we get sick, we can just walk in and we're going to get care, so why should we bother paying? So it opens up the floodgates with moral hazard and noncompliance. And I think that really demonstrates the very difficult position that governments and countries are in that are trying to do scale-up, that when you are trying to put in place things that will work, you will be forced – you – to confront that moral dilemma when the child and the mother comes to the clinic and where you have to make a judgment call. And unfortunately, of course, what often happens is that the individuals or the health care providers that are at that point of conflict, in the front line, end up making the wrong judgment calls at that point. And that of course is the big challenge that we face in many of these reforms that we're doing. So I think this is a tremendously timely report. Congratulations on some of the insights that you have in it. And we look forward to teaming up with you and taking this agenda forward, Laurie and others. So – MR. HUANG: Thank you, Alex. And to the story that you shared with us on Ghana actually until very recently happened every day in China, I believe. (Chuckles.) The – so as a presider, I have the privilege to ask the first question. This question will be about the relationship between the universal health coverage and equality. I think it is addressed in the report, although I probably didn't – in the talk, didn't allude to – but the – my question is that universal health coverage, by definition, means fairer, more efficient financing that pools risk and encourages prepayment to share health care cost equitably across the population. But the report seems to also indicate that there is no strong evidence supporting that spread of universal health coverage necessarily reduces inequality of health care access. So my question is: In what situation would universal health coverage lead to persistence, if not exacerbation, of inequality? MR. ALTMAN: Well – MR. HUANG: Daniel? MR. ALTMAN: Yeah, in answering your question, Yanzhong, I'll draw on a conversation with Julio Frenk last year. He's the former minister of health in Mexico and now dean of the School of Public Health at Harvard. And we were talking about what would improve health outcomes in developing countries, and we discussed the extension of care on a broader basis. And he said it's not going to make a fundamental difference to the lives of a lot of the poorest people until the bigger issues of inequality are addressed; that it – there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in the sense that inequality can breed poor health outcomes for people at the bottom, which can then worsen their outcomes in the labor force and thus worsen inequality in the long term. But I don't think I would start looking to universal health coverage to be a major reducer of inequality until some of the more fundamental drivers of inequality were addressed. It may have some effect on the margin, but there are such enormous other drivers at work right now – for example, just the opening of markets through globalization seems to decrease inequality between countries but increase it within countries, in many cases. You know, with that kind of wave percolating through your economy, it might be difficult to pick up the effect of UHC. But I would never underestimate the abilities of a skilled empirical economist in a randomized controlled trial. MS. GARRETT: (Off mic.) MR. HUANG: OK, I wonder – to both Laurie and Alex, can you respond? MS. GARRETT: Well, I – I'd like to take Alex's bottom line, the woman in Ghana going with her child for care and being turned away. There's a number of ways that scenario could have played out, and I've personally seen it play out in every one of these ways. One is – goes to the inequality question. I remember very well doing a series of following women who had babies in sub-Saharan African countries with high fevers. And it was fevers where it's a matter of life and death to seek appropriate care within – you have maybe a 24-, 48-hour window or the baby dies. In most cases, it was either – it was measles or malaria. And what I saw was, these women typically lived in the rural areas, but their husbands or the fathers of these children were typically in the cities, where they had a second family and lived a completely separate life. The women could not and would not violate relations with their husbands to go straight to the nearest clinic. They would go to the city, find the husband – with the ailing baby – get his permission and then go to the clinic. So no universal health coverage access is going to save that baby's life if the inequity in the gender relations in those marriages and across whole societies is an impediment to getting the appropriate care when you need it. But also with this example of the mother and ailing child, she may very well have had coverage and then gotten to a clinic that had no M.D. in the entire clinic, had no equipment, had no skilled personnel, or had – as we've all seen, if we've traveled widely in poor countries, had an alleged doctor, alleged medical staff, alleged equipment, and no electricity, no running water and no appropriate hygiene, so that seeking care could actually be a life-threatening event. So if all pieces are not in place, you obviously don't get to nirvana and you don't get to equity. And then I guess the final piece of the equity question is something that we all see around the world, the difference between rural and urban, and one key piece of that is not just that health provision is very concentrated in urban areas but also that your ability to access it will depend on your personal finances because you still have to pay for transport. So even if once you get to the clinic, the care is covered, you had to get there, and that becomes the other rate-limiting step that is class-biased. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. Can I just add one sentence onto that, which is, a lot of people say, isn't it easier for poor people to go to the hospital than rich people, because the value of rich people's time is so much higher – you know, they – if you have a hundred-dollar-an-hour job versus a minimum wage job? No, you're looking at it backwards. The problem is that that that minimum wage means a lot more to that person than a couple of hundred-dollar-an-hour hours to a wealthy person, and it's much harder for them to take that time away in going to the clinic, even if all the pieces of the puzzle, as Laurie said, are there. MR. HUANG: OK. Alex? MR. PREKER: OK, so on the universal – and equality, there's a troublesome dimension to that, and that is that in higher-income countries, it makes a lot of sense. If – you know, I'm Canadian. In Canada, everybody has access to care, and that means poor people and rich people have access to care, and Canadians are rich enough so we can afford to give away care to both rich and poor people. But the problem is, if you're living in Mali or in other very low-income countries, and you've got a hundred dollars, and you've got a hundred people, and you give $1 to each one of the hundred people, both the people who are rich and the people who are poor, then everybody's getting $1. But if you took the hundred dollars and you gave the hundred dollars to only the 20 people who are really poor, each one of those 20 people would be getting $5, and the other people would be getting – maybe spending other money, but they have the money to spend out of pocket, and therefore you'd actually be more successful in having equity by not extending universally and spreading the finances thinly across the whole population. So I think this is where we have the tension, I think, at low-income countries between the ideology of what we think is universalist and therefore, you know, it's good for the poor, and the reality of the economics; that when you actually do that and you execute it, you're actually taking money away from the poor whenever you have a program which is universal. MR. HUANG: Very interesting. So we have about 35 minutes. So I want to open the floor up to questions. Please identify yourself and your affiliation before responding. Please also flip your tent card to indicate that you have a question, and we also allow one-finger rule at – if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So I'm going to start with Jeanette. Q: Thank you. MR. HUANG: Oh, by the way, Jeanette is the new managing director of the Rockefeller Foundation in charge of health. Q: Thank you. Very interesting for me, because in fact it's a discourse that I am not familiar with. In fact people that are from developing countries, in general, when we talked about universal health coverage, we basically talked about access to care, not necessarily about the financial impact. So it has been very important for me to sort of listen to the discussion. I understand that there is an issue there; that basically the implicit assumption is that if you increase coverage, financial coverage, you will increase access and then you will improve health outcomes. I would challenge that, though, and I think that we need to discuss, probably in a different forum, about that implicit assumption. Now I'd like to make a comment – a couple of comments. The first one is the comment on universal health coverage and equity. In fact the issue there is in whatever dimension you are talking, if it is the financial dimension or the access dimension, in the road towards achieving 100 percent – let's say from 10 (percent) to 100 (percent) – not all the groups of the population benefit the same. So in fact when you begin to implement this – basically, in the road to universal, you create more inequities, unless you focus on beginning with the worst-off, which is what UNICEF in fact is doing in its newest strategy. They are basically making the case. And if you do the costing and the economic exercises, you realize that it's much more cost-effective to do it in that way. And then the other comment – and then I just want to use Table 10 as an example, because here there are some examples. There's one example that I know very well, which is the example of Chile, because in fact I'm Chilean. And you are saying here – the tables say here that we implemented the universal health coverage in 1979. I would say that in fact we destroyed universal health coverage in 1979, because until then we had basically a system that had one pool that provided access to everyone. The depth of the package, though – of course the system regulated through waiting lists, and in 1979 what happened is that the pools were divided into two, one private – I mean, several private, 15 in fact – and one public. And why I'm putting this example – not because I'm from Chile; I'm putting this example because it depends on your definition. I mean, if you think about the former Soviet Union countries, according to the definition of universal health coverage, they did have universal health coverage, and from one day to the other, they didn't have it. And what we are having now, it's basically the rebuilding of the universal health coverage using different instruments. And you can argue that in fact, it was a theoretical universal health coverage because people didn't get covered. In fact, they did; the issue was that they didn't get access to services. So what I'm trying to say is that the discussion, I think it's a bit more broader because it has to do with some historical process of reforms that I think Alex said in his intervention. And it's very interesting to continue this conversation. MR. HUANG: Jeanette, you mention the Soviet case. This actually remind me of China. Actually, China recent – just a couple of days ago, announced it has achieved universal health coverage. (Chuckles.) So covering 100 – 1.4 – nearly 1.4 billion people, well, that is truly an achievement, right? (Chuckles.) Laurie. MS. GARRETT: I think you raise some very important points, and they actually were all points that we debated and grappled with through this entire process – you know, trying to find a way to focus in and not end up producing another 1,000-page document that nobody reads. Well, hopefully somebody reads this. (Chuckles.) But, first of all, yes, different countries have tried to roll out universal health coverage in different ways. And many have, in fact, done exactly what you said: target the neediest first and work your way backwards. But as Daniel pointed out, many countries, this being one of them, has rolled out universal health coverage in ways that do not reflect needs, but rather specific groupings – military or – in our country, really tying access to coverage – not care, but coverage – to site of employment so that it became part of labor negotiations beginning in the early part of the 20th century. And companies that had organized labor tended to have good health insurance coverage, and those that didn't lacked it. So different countries have rolled out their systems in various ways. And I think often, the one that gets the most praise is what Julio Frenk rolled out in Mexico. But I think it's also instructive – and we have some citations to follow up if there is interest – I think it's also instructive to see the struggle that Brazil is having right now, because Brazil did, in fact, roll out very aggressively for the poorest population tier and created great tension within the middle class in Brazil that they're still struggling to cope with and to figure out what is justice and equity with some payment and some nonpayment in a system as complicated and massive as the nation of Brazil. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. It's – I agree very strongly that these are important issues to take into account, and I think that everything you said makes sense in theory. In practice, when you deal with the logistical and political implications of rolling out a system like this, it seems like, from experience around the world, it's easier to roll out a system to everyone and then start layering on the services rather than to start with a lot of services for a small group and then start layering on other populations for partly the same reasons that Laurie was referring to. But I would also point out that if you just start out providing care to the poorest, you're losing a lot of the potential benefit of risk pooling because you're targeting a population that's the sickest in society. MR. HUANG: Alex, you have a – MS. GARRETT: Add anything to – MR. PREKER: No. MR. HUANG: OK. Irena (ph)? Q: Thank you so much for such a great panel, first of all. I have a question related to a presentation, two months ago, of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the World Bank. And in his speech, he spoke about achievements in Georgia. And one of the achievements was hospitals all around the country. He calls these hospital like five-star hotels. And these hospitals are available for everyone. And in this context, I would like to ask this distinguished panel and especially Alex how it was made by coverage, how you see this model, because Georgia is not a rich country; probably it's a(n) emerging economy; maybe we can call it from poor-to middle-income country. And do you think this kind of model could work for other countries like this kind – this type of countries? And the other question is about equality, because even President Saakashvili stressed that all people, rural people, poorer people could come to this hospital. They are – have modern equipment. But anyway, they are not equal. I'm – but he said, for example, once in their life they could be – could have appropriate service – and how it's related to question of equality. And following – so Canada is famous for its health coverage. Why other countries, for example, United States, cannot follow this example in health coverage? MS. GARRETT: I'll take the latter, you take the former. (Laughter.) MR. PREKER: OK. Yes, then I don't have to defend the Canadian system. (Laughter.) Well, I think Georgia is quite typical of what happened in the – you know, the states that were part of the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the – of the former Soviet Union. I've been to Georgia several times, and – so I know exactly what you're talking about. The problem was that very shortly after the transition, the bank – the government in Georgia basically went bankrupt. It had a compression of economic growth, of – I think it was, like, 70 percent. It was one of the most hard-hit of the Eastern European countries in terms of – in terms of collapse of the economy. And so essentially the government was bankrupt, which meant that they had a very large stock of facilities, hospitals and also doctors that were on the payroll, because everybody was a civil servant on the payroll, or at least a government employee, and no money. And so people were not – basically, the salary bill stopped, people would no longer get paid, and there was no drugs in the hospital. I remember the last time I visited, which was I guess now close to 10 years ago, but at that time, you know, I had to walk up seven stairs because, you know, there was no light, there was no electricity. It was – basically, the service had collapsed. So in a context like that, you know, if you have one functioning hospital that actually is functioning, I mean, there is a need for tertiary care in Georgia like there's – anybody – anywhere else in the world. I mean, this is a country – it has a lot of chronic disease and a lot of acute disease that need to be dealt with. And, you know, you can die in the street or you can die in the hospital. But the issue, I think, that Georgia faces with this kind of a situation was – it's the same as we face in many other parts of the world – is if that hospital, now is functioning, was reserved and could be used only for the acute care that it was built for and not be giving primary care and stuff that could be given in clinics, then you might end up having something that actually works. But the problem is, because the rest of the health services collapsed, if you have one institution that has been made functional and you have the rest of the service that's collapsed, even in Georgia, this is never going to work, because you can't have 6 million or whatever it is that your population is – you can't have 6 million people coming to one place and getting care for primary care. It just – it's just not going to work. This institution will collapse unless, you know, it's – unless that institution sits on top of a – the pyramid of a large health service. So I think this is a – and it's a difficult dilemma many countries face, is because you like to have one place which provides decent care, but you're not going to – 6 million people are not going to be able to get care from that one place. MS. GARRETT: When I – 14 years ago, I traveled the – all over Georgia looking at their health system. And I think that the Georgia example is actually an interesting one that – for you to have raised because the advantage that Georgia today has is that the vast majority of the society truly rejected the Soviet model of health, and what they were left with was something so horrible – I mean, some of the worst atrocities I've ever seen in health care delivery, I saw back then in Georgia – you know, physicians with no gloves performing surgery, not able to scrub beforehand because there was no soap. So there – in a sense, they have an advantage now in that the – there was very little support for keeping what had existed and great possibility of coming in with a clean slate and trying to do the right thing. And similarly, Canada built its health system long ago on a clean slate. The United States has built incrementally hundreds of different health systems so thoroughly fragmented, each with its own interest groups dependent on its continued existence, that trying to create a single or even a workable financing mechanism is impossible in America. The best we can hope for is to make these fragmentary pieces work together a little bit better, be a bit better regulated so that they can't price gouge various elements of funding, and create better equity and pooling for the largest elements of the system. And that's what the health reform act tried to do. But, as you can see, there are many interests that seek – see that they will lose if that is fully implemented and therefore are very actively fighting against it. MR. HUANG: That's exactly what Debbie Fuentes (ph) said: just 90 percent politics, 10 percent technical-institutional details. (Laughs.) Let's see whether we have any questions from the participants – from the teleconference participants. Anybody? MS. GARRETT: On the phone. MR. HUANG: On the phone? OK – (laughs) – nobody. So Ben (ph). Q: Bart Szewczyk (ph), Wilmer Hale and G.W. law school. Thank you very much for all of your presentations. I wanted to ask, is there any empirical evidence between the degree of universal health coverage and long-term economic growth? I guess those studies would be probably difficult to do, but is there any evidence one way or the other? MR. ALTMAN: Short answer is no. If you're referring to sort of cross-sectional-type of analysis, that would be very difficult because the universal health coverage systems are so different that to throw in a single dummy variable for them would not give you a very good regression. So not putting it into technical terms, I think that would be very tough to do, to look at countries in comparison to each other and see whether there was an effect on growth. If you looked within one country, you'd have a better shot of finding an outcome. And there have been some studies even in the United States looking at Medicare. It's not completely universal, but it's universal for part of the population. And the idea was to take the burden of caring for the older generation away from people who could be otherwise productive in the workforce, in addition to all the other benefits that it might have. And you know, I think that there's some evidence to support positive effects, but spotty and not necessarily so generalizable across contexts that I would want to take it from one country and apply it to another. MR. HUANG: Comments? DR. PREKER: Yeah, I mean, there's been – recently, there's been the commission of growth – health and growth. So if you want to look at what they did, you – it's worthwhile just Googling that. I mean, there's basically two problems. One is that we haven't agreed on what universal coverage is, and so it's hard to do regressions against something you haven't defined yet. And so it's not an easy thing to draw the correlation. But there's a reverse correlation, and that is that countries that tend to go through rapid growth tend to become more inequitable during the growth phase (till you get ?) industrialization process. And during that inequity period, you tend to have health care becoming less equitable, like you saw in Georgia and other countries in Eastern Europe. So one has to be careful about the cause and effect there. But certainly if one looks at the world where you have rapid growth and economic growth, like China, those places – those places have become much more inequitable in health care. I don't think it's the health care that led to the growth, because you would then say, well, inequitable health care leads to growth. No, I think that's not the way it is. But I think you can expect to see inequity in health care appear when you have rapid population growth in some areas and where part of the population ends up having purchasing power, which means that they can buy care that the general population can't afford. MS. GARRETT: Can I follow up? Alex, I want to ask you about something. The – one of the things we've seen in the most rapidly expanding economies in the late 20th or early 21st centuries. If you look at China, if you look at post-Soviet Russia, you look at – less so at Brazil, and certainly in India, you see that as these economies explode, the public sector salaries for those that are not engaged in highly corruption-prone sectors do not keep pace with growth in the private sector. So there's the envy-of-your-neighbor problem, and that seems to compel, in a way, an increase in corruption in direct health provision so that – for example, I saw myself in China, a doctor will say to a patient, here's what – here's the free syringe; I can now give you an injection with it; it's been used before. (Laughter.) Here's the one that's still in its packaging, but that'll cost you $50. Do you want me to inject you with this one or this one? And that $50 is going to the doctor. So is there a way to have this economic growth without also enhancing not only the lack of equity, but also corruption within the health sector? DR. PREKER: All right, I don't have the answer to that. I mean, we know empirically that countries that go through a very rapid growth period, you have social consequences. And so it's one of the things that is there. And you know, when you (saw ?) – the definition of emerging markets by Goldman Sachs is it's growth in the double digits with large populations and where you have population dynamics that's moving towards aging. So that's the – you know, that's the definition of an emerging economy, and I think in most of the emerging economy, you've had – you've had problems in the health side. So they go through a phase and then, you know – then eventually, when you have a sufficient middle class that ends up with political power, then that middle class starts demanding social services that are reasonable for the middle class. And that's what you're basically seeing now in both China and India. You have the growth phase, and now you have a middle class that's beginning to say, we're not happy with this anymore; we're – you know, we want change. And so (there's ?) this change happening in both China and in India. MR. ALTMAN: (But ?) that creates an additional causality problem because it's the income growth that's leading to the health coverage, not vice versa. (Laughter.) DR. PREKER (?): Yeah. MR. HUANG: OK. Jesse? Q: Thanks. All right, Jesse Bump, Georgetown University. I just wanted to point out there's a tension between what we in the global health community think about as universal health coverage, which tends to be focused on equity and focused on the poorest and largely I think that comes from the mindset that that's the missing piece in existing health systems. But, as we move into the sub-Saharan and other areas where there really aren't very many systems themselves, I wanted to point out that in the health systems I've studied, none of them have come from the poor. They're all built around a paying customer at the beginning. And as Daniel said, this amounts to a rationing question, and rationing means it's an ethical issue that then has to get solved at the implementation stage around the history, politics, and economics of a particular population. Thanks. MR. HUANG: Comments? MS. GARRETT: Absolutely. MR. HUANG: (Laughs.) OK, fully agree. Robert? Q: Is that working? OK. Robert Hecht from Results for Development. This looks like a great report, and I'll read it – read it carefully. It seems to me if you look at what's going on around the world and try to understand the trends in health systems, health financing, access to care that Jeanette was talking about, financial protection, both of those dimensions, there – there's a lot of common language around universal coverage and there is some commonalities. But in my own observation, I think there are a lot of submovements within geographies and things are happening at different speeds and different ways, and I wonder if you've been thinking about that and would – will be bringing it out in some of your future work. In my casual look at things, it seems like there are lot of what I would call second-generation changes in health financing arrangements and coverage in some of the middle-income regions: Latin America, which already has a long history going back to the '60s, '70s, '80s; Eastern Europe – some of the Eastern European countries that made dramatic moves in the '90s and are now – they're burnishing their systems and making some gradual changes; Korea, which has recently merged many of its risk pools into a single one; Turkey – there are – there are – there are some trends going on that I would call second-generation type ones. In the OECD countries, we see this as – it's a – it's a – it's a never-ending process, so there are third- and fourth- – very interesting things going on in the Netherlands and in the U.K., and the NHS is constantly being reconfigured and reformulated. So the notion that there's not a single ending point but there's a constant evolution and that individual countries and groups of countries are moving at different speeds, I think, is worth reflecting on. In my own opinion, Africa is really at a stage of early experimentation and nothing more than that. There's a lot of hype right now, but – and there are some interesting things going on in places like Ghana and Rwanda and smaller-scale things in Nigeria and Kenya and places like that. But it's early experimentation, I would say. I think that the part of the world which is most exciting right now is East Asia and maybe India added because there, with rapid economic growth, all the political and economic underpinnings are there for quantum changes within these systems, and that's what we're seeing in China right now. India is thinking very – in very big terms, and it feels – is feeling its oats or whatever you call it, and wants to make some dramatic moves, is watching what China's doing. And places like Vietnam and Indonesia and so on you see, again, attempts to really complete somewhat fragmented systems. So trying to get a little more nuanced, maybe, would be – would be just an interesting suggestion for you to think about when you consider what's going on across these different geographies. The question I had, maybe for Laurie – because I know the council, when it does important work like this, often – it has a special – a special strength or comparative advantage in answering the question, well, what does this mean for the U.S. and for U.S. policy? And I didn't see anything in there, and I just wondered: Is that the next move? What does this mean for Raj? What does this mean for the CDC? What does this mean for Obama? What does this mean for the global programs that the U.S. supports and has a major say in, like the World Bank and the Global Fund and so on? It seems a little silent on the question of so what for U.S. – Council on Foreign Relations – (laughter) – for U.S. foreign policy? So I wondered if you could comment on that. MS. GARRETT: OK. MR. HUANG: The U.S. is the outlier. (Chuckles.) MS. GARRETT: Well, I mean, as usual, Bob Hecht comes in with the key question and also fascinating observation about regional shifts. I was surprised you left out Singapore, because many people think one of the most exciting sort of new health systems is Singapore and – financing model. Q: Medical savings accounts? MS. GARRETT: Well – Q: I don't think – I don't think so. I think that's – MS. GARRETT: OK. I'm just saying. Q: – that's the past, not the future, but – MS. GARRETT: I'm just saying. As far as the U.S. goes, we had many ways to try and tackle the UHC question. Probably most awkward one was, as Americans, to try and talk about health coverage. If there's one thing truly wrong in the United States, it's our tremendous inequity of affordable access to health care. And so I don't – we didn't feel particularly comfortable with being in the role that the United States should be telling the rest of the world, you know, how to finance health, but also that the Global Health Initiative's whole component with the sort of brass tacks of what it imagines to be health coverage and systems work is still very, very infant stage. Ariel Pablos-Mendez didn't even get in there until about a year ago – not even a year. Is it? How many – it's – 10 months ago? Q: August. MS. GARRETT: August. So – and then I think the other piece that added yet another layer of awkward to the question of what do we recommend about U.S. foreign policy is that we're all realistically on the edge of our seats what's going to be left of the U.S. support for its own account 150 budget by the time the FY '13 fight is over. And it's pretty hard to go out on a limb and say, and so then we should all do this huge program around universal health coverage or something if in fact we're going to be fighting to just keep very basic aspects of U.S. global health programming funded after, you know, October 1st or after – whenever we stop being – borrowing money to keep the lights on in Washington and actually pass a budget, which probably not be until late January 2013 or even February 2013. MR. HUANG: Daniel. MR. ALTMAN: I would just say, very quickly, if you can't give money, you can still give advice – (laughter) – and I think in this paper – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) Really? MR. ALTMAN: – in this paper, we're trying to highlight some of the issues that are worth considering if you're a country that's thinking about a UHC program. And we don't take a position on what U.S. policy should be, but if I had to take a guess, that – U.S. policy would at least look at some of these very same issues. I wish we had much more space to write about the regional shifts that you're discussing and some of these other issues, but as Laurie said earlier, we decided that the best thing we could do here was take a very focused look at one chunk of the problem where we seeing some early and immediate results and try and push the dialogue in that direction. MR. HUANG: Alex, you want to comment? MR. PREKER: No, that's fine. MR. HUANG: Oh. MS. GARRETT: I think Robert – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) OK. Robert, yes. Q: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. I just had another comment and I just wanted to first say that I think this discussion has been really useful, and I just want to thank all of you for putting in the time and putting together the reports and bringing this group of people together. And I think some of the questions that have been raised here, particularly around, you know, does UHC work, the kind of – one of the more fundamental questions – I just wanted to call everyone's attention to the fact that in September the Lancet British medical journal is putting together a special series on universal health coverage, and it will be launched then, and I think a few of the papers in that series will begin to answer some of the questions that have been raised here. But as those papers are currently in the review process, I don't want to say too much more, but I just wanted to raise the flag and put that on everyone's radar, that that will be coming up in a few months. So stay tuned for that. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Robert. I guess there's no questions from – but – so I'm going to ask if there's – OK. I'm going to ask the final question, again using my presider's privilege. It's about this relationship between universal health coverage and costs of care. Because obviously the report – it was on Page 13 – made it very clear that even the evidence collected to date makes a strong case for UHC as a way to cut costs, I'm curious: What kind of costs are we talking about here? Because if you look at the countries, economies such as Taiwan and China, there seems to be no indication that the spread of the UHC program would – leads to the reduction of the total health spending, because you could have the case, like in China, right, spread of UHC – actually the drop of the share of out-of-pocket spending or actually now the share is – has – is going to – drop below 30 percent, which is actually really low. But in the meantime, you found that the total health spending continued to dramatically increase. So that – if the salary level or income level can't catch up with the increase of total health spending, you would still end up paying in the – more out-of-pocket share , OK – no, not total out-of- – total out-of-pocket spending, I mean, in the – in terms of the actual – the dollar amount. MR. ALTMAN: Right. So I think there are two responses that go back to things that we have alluded to. One is, if you're looking for these macroefficiencies to be captured where your country all of a sudden is spending less on health care or getting more bang for its buck in health care, it may take time. It doesn't necessarily happen right at the very beginning of the UHC program, especially since a lot of these efficiencies, we think, are going to come from preventive care, which may take decades to pay off, in some cases. The second answer – and as – and I alluded to it in the case of Taiwan – is that utilization often goes up because the price has gone down, so your total costs end up being similar or even more. And sometimes it can go up much more quickly than you might expect. And then it's the question of whether there's moral hazard and whether you need to have some level of user fees just to keep it in check. You know, we talked about the woman and her baby being turned away from a health clinic, potentially. You know, in the United Kingdom, which has a very well-known national health insurance system, though obviously not a perfect one, nobody gets turned away. They don't even ask you for any form of identification. They don't, however, give the best quality of health care that's available in the country. And that has some – that goes some way to controlling the moral hazard. Those other high levels of health care are available. You have to pay for them a hundred percent out of pocket or get a corollary insurance plan to the public health insurance you already have. But it allows that other option. Now, that also introduces all sorts of new questions about equity and distribution of resources in the health sector that I'm sure Professor Bump (sp) and others would want to discuss with us. But I think that to your basic question about the overall macro level of health costs, there are those two basic responses. MR. HUANG: Any other comments? MR. PREKER: Well, just a quick economic response. Health care is a luxury good, and the observation we've had is that growth in health care is faster than GDP growth, which means that countries, as they get richer, are willing to – populations are willing to spend more. And that increases. So, you know, U.S. is most likely going to spend over 20 percent shortly. And there's no way of really stopping that. So the cost containment, which tends to be more in the public side – so when you put the lid on the expenditure in the public side, then it's natural people are going to spend out of pocket because if they can't get it on the public side, they're going to spend it personally because you've got a lot of – law of economics, and you've got to get the number up there somehow. So if it doesn't come from the public, it's going to come from the private. MS. GARRETT: Well, and this in a way goes to Robert Hecht's point because we – you know, in terms of the regional variations in trends because, you know, the truth is if there's no capping of any kind, no personal limit on spending, most people will demand the absolute nirvana of health: I want to live to be 110; I want to die in my sleep having had no aches and pains before I die. I mean, who doesn't have that fantasy? But for a system to be built with that as the, you know, gold standard to be achieved universally for all citizenry and payment to somehow be available to achieve such a standard is entirely unrealistic and will bankrupt the society very quickly. Well, I think we see now is all across Europe, where there's a great deal of experimentation going on, part of it is a realization that, A, the expectation level is too high in the population, so that not only is utilization extraordinary, but it's utilization for two weeks in a spa, you know, but also that the population is aging, so that the very expensive needs level is rising, that it's above expectations.   And I think it's realistic to look ahead and say, look, first of all, everybody's definition of what UHC is is going to be different. Each society is going to have its own cultural perspective, and that in many cases is going to reflect how the culture feels about health, how important is health in your culture, which kind of reminds me of a famous set of studies done by the Columbia Mailman School of Public Health back 10 years ago in the early days – 15 years ago – early days of the HIV pandemic, asking the question, why was it that uptake of HIV-related services and testing and even condom use was so poor in Harlem compared to down in Chelsea. So you had two specific communities on the island of Manhattan, both at very high risk for HIV, absolutely diametrically opposite utilization rates for services, regardless of payment. And the answer was simply that in the Chelsea neighborhood, which was overwhelmingly white and where most of the individuals at risk were gay men, it was a community that thought health was at the top of its agenda. It was the number one issue in their lives, and therefore they really fought for every single service they could get, whereas in Harlem, most of the people surveyed said, well, let's see, health, any aspect of health, even my pregnancy and having a safe baby, is down here compared to not getting shot, paying the rent, finding money for food tomorrow, getting my welfare check cashed, et cetera, so that by the time you got to, do I have hypertension, or am I at risk for HIV, it was 15 seconds of your 24-hour agenda. And I think that's yet another whole issue that plays into the regional variations and social variations and class variations in uptake and use of health services. We're just looking at a teeny little piece. And we hope that this has been helpful. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Obviously, this issue is much more complicated than we have expected – (chuckles) – that as the – this – the remarks of our speakers have indicated. So that concludes our universal health coverage round-table series. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our three speakers, Daniel, Laurie and Alex, for their contribution to this round-table meeting. And also, I'd like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation, especially Robert, for his crucial role in making that round-table series possible. And I'd also like to thank our research associates, and particularly Zoe Liberman – you have all received emails from her – and for her assistance in making that possible, and also for – (inaudible) – for her assistance this afternoon. And last but not least, I'd like to thank you all who participate in today's meetings for making such a lively and enjoyable discussion. And thank you. Enjoy rest of the day. (Applause.) -------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, and this is our final meeting of the new Universal Health Coverage Roundtable Series. The meeting will discuss the council's new report, "The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage." I said this report is officially released by the council, but the most important part and the most innovative part of the work actually was done by Dalberg, actually, led by Daniel Altman, Vicky Hausman and their teams. So we – privileged to have three speakers for today's discussion: Laurie Garrett, Daniel Altman and Alex Preker. All three of our speakers' full bios, are included in your handouts, so I'm not going to repeat them, save to say that Daniel is director of thought leadership at Dalberg Global Development Advisors; and Laurie is senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and the only writer ever to have been awarded all three of the big Ps of journalism, the Peabody, the Polk and the Pulitzer, and she's also called by WHO Director General Margaret Chan as the foremost voice of global health. The third one – (chuckles) – just – not included in the handouts, but I heard what she say. The – Alex Preker – Alex is the head of Health Industry and Investment Policy at the World Bank Group. So for time's sake, we're going to begin with brief remarks from Laurie, followed by remarks from Daniel. And after Laurie and Daniel's remarks, Alex will comment as a respondent to the report, and then we're going to open up the floor to questions and discussion. So without further ado, Laurie. LAURIE GARRETT: Well, it's great to see you all here. Good afternoon and enjoy your lunch. And I'm sure there's more food if you feel, you know, necessary to dive out during my remarks to put another layer on your plate. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. If you've not previously been here, this is our Washington office. Headquarters, however, are in New York. In – among the global health team, one of our team members is based here in Washington, Tom Bollyky – there you are – and the rest of us are in the New York office. For quite some time, this phrase, UHC, universal health coverage, has been tossed about. And it seemed for years that whoever was using the term had a unique definition for it so that it was very hard to get your hands around what are we talking about when we say we want universal health coverage. If you were a Western European, you probably thought it meant you want a single-payer system run by this national government universally available to everybody in your country. If you were an American, you may very well have thought, well, that's something that's going to go to the Supreme Court. (Scattered laughter.) And if you were in most of the middle- and poor-income countries of the world, you thought, what a nice idea; not ever going to really be a reality for us. So at much prodding from the Rockefeller Foundation, to whom we're very grateful for the push to make this series of meetings and ultimate report happen, and Ariel Pablos-Mendez, who many of you probably know, who's now serving in USAID running global health programs, we tried to take this apart and deconstruct this whole concept of universal health coverage to find what's the bottom line that's a(n) actual workable target, realizing that there is a couple of trends that play into how you analyze this picture. The first is this very substantial, dramatic increase in the size, scope and funding of global health that occurred between roughly 2000 and 2008 and is now going downhill post-financial crisis. Most of this surge was very much initiative-based, and so it was about very specific targeted health efforts. But the further we got down that path, whether it was distributing antiretrovirals or dealing with tuberculosis prevention or bed nets for malaria, whatever it might be, the more all the participants came to recognize that if you didn't have a health system in place and you didn't have systems of health financing that removed the probability, the near certainty of bankruptcy for poor households that were afflicted with a key provider having a major illness, a traffic accident or anything that would debilitate them or kill them – if you didn't get to that core, then everything else would fall apart, and you were basically setting up a giant charity construct that would be endlessly dependent. And similarly, there has been a large body of literature going back for quite some time arguing back and forth about what is the role of the consumer or patient in their own health, and if all health is free, does it change the relationship between the provider and the consumer or patient and the commitment that the individual has to their own health protection – preventive care, diet, exercise, all of the above. Well, there are obviously three big problems when you talk about providing health. The first is that we have a fantastic deficit of skilled health care workers globally. And this can be defined in every single category, whether you're looking at dentists, lab technicians, pharmacists, surgeons, registered nurses, health administrators, hospital administrators; in every single category we have a deficit of personnel. And the deficit is, of course, most acute in the poorest countries in the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on a per capita basis. So that's your first challenge. The second is that the delivery systems themselves are largely very weak – in some cases quite chaotic – with difficult relations between the private providing systems, or chaos, and the public providing systems, or chaos. In many countries, the relationship between the private sector of health, which is often the number one provider – or the majority of all health care is administered privately – the relationship between that private sector and the public sector is very testy, even competitive and angry, and a spirit of cooperation is not present. And in large part, it's because one sector requires a hundred percent out-of-pocket payments on the part of the health consumer while the other sector is largely publicly or fully publicly supported. And this creates some obvious tensions for the individual as well. If you think you're going to get better care in the private sector but it'll bankrupt your family, what do you do? And then the – from the individual point of view, this question of bankruptcy is quite serious. The institute – the International Labor Organization did its own survey a few years ago looking at this question of the bankrupting impact of illness in the absence of health coverage. And their data points were quite startling. And what they were able to show was that in many societies – and I think, at this point, it is true of the United States – a major catastrophic illness can be the primary source of bankruptcy for personal and family bankruptcy. And we have not resolved this, clearly, in the U.S. Well, I'm going to let Daniel speak to the particulars of what's uniquely discovered in this report, but the one tip-off I want to give you is – couple of things: First, when we – we thought when you look at the question of universal health coverage, it's best to focus on it as a financing question, whether it's personal economics, family economics, village economics, country economics. Coverage is about payment. And it's best to push aside as somebody else's issue to deal with whether coverage actually gets you anything. In other words, it is wholly possible for you to have some system whereby your pay – your health is paid for – you have a voucher, you have insurance, you're in a national plan, whatever it may be – but there's no health care workers when you get to that clinic, or the clinic is in shambles when you get there. So there three pieces to you to – to actually providing health care to everybody, but the one piece we're looking at is the economic financing piece. And finally, I just couldn't help but notice that when the Dalberg group completed their analysis, they reached a key conclusion that turns out to coincide with the primary debate now inside the United States Supreme Court. It is a question of whether it is both feasible and desirable to try and build health coverage without resting it heavily on risk pooling, and that means some sort of mandate that both the well and the sick are in the same pool sharing the same burden, and that it is probably the only way to financially make it affordable for a community, a society, a country, a whole people. And with that, I'll be happy to pass off from there. Yanzhong. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Actually, before the – Dan gets started, I'm – I forgot that we have some housekeeping rules to announce. This meeting is on-the-record, so you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. But please turn off your cellphones. And with that, Daniel. DANIEL ALTMAN: Thank you, Laurie and Yanzhong. It's been a pleasure to work with both of you as we prepared this report. I should also thank the Rockefeller Foundation for its generous support of this work at CFR. It's a particular pleasure for me to be here presenting to you as a member of CFR. And I'd like to start by just speaking broadly about the potential benefits that we might see from universal health coverage. There are a lot of different ways where we might find benefit in the universal health coverage program, regardless of what the exact financing structure might be. And I'm going to separate them into three. I'm going to talk a little bit about the macro-level efficiencies that you might obtain, then what improvements you might get in health outcomes, and finally, about benefits for households. At the macro level – these are some of the benefits that get most attention, especially in this country, when we talk about universal coverage. One is – the simplest, perhaps, is if you get everybody under a single roof or the biggest roof possible, you could save a lot in administrative costs. And I remember back in '94 when I started to look at this issue, it was estimated that you could make savings of perhaps tens of billions of dollars by having a program like Medicare that covered people throughout their lives. That used to be a lot of money once upon a time. But more importantly, I think there's an idea that if you have a universal birth-to-death health care system which has a large coverage pool, you're getting a lot of efficiencies in how care is delivered. You're correcting a lot of incentive problems that currently jack up prices and costs within the system – for example, between the various parts of a hospital and its practices and the practices that it contracts with and their billing systems and their technicians. There are a lot of incentive and holdup problems that economists have and can identify in that system. It also helps us to coordinate care in a way that reduces waste. If the hospital and the rehabilitation center, the home health aides and the general practitioners are all connected, then we have less likelihood of wasted or ineffectual treatments. It allows us to negotiate lower prices, as some countries have already done. With drug manufacturers, for example, France has negotiated, as an entire country health system, to get lower prices. And finally, it can allow us to – and I will use the word ration high-cost care. When you are trying to provide health coverage for a large population, you find that you want to give the coverage where you get the most bang for the buck, and this is something that the United Kingdom has probably been a pioneering country in doing. So there are a lot of ways where you might be able to capture efficiencies and lower the cost to an entire economy of giving decent health care to its people. Now, just as important are what you're getting for that money, or what – the health outcomes that you're getting for that money that you pay. And it's worth talking about where those benefits could arise. It's not the focus of this report, for reasons that I'll explain later, but I think it deserves mention. First of all, you would expect that more people would get some kind of care if there is universal coverage, and you would also expect that more people will reserve – will receive some formal medical care, what we consider advanced, technologically enabled medical care, as opposed to traditional medicine, which can be ineffective or even counterproductive. As one of my colleagues over at the Intel-Grameen social enterprise said, they're getting care now, they're just getting it from the quacks. And so to the extent that you can shift that towards formal medicine, that might have benefit. Also, because of the coordination of care that I mentioned earlier, you tend to have fewer errors, people getting the wrong treatment, that could actually harm them, as well as being inefficient. But we also find that you're treating patients earlier. What happens in this country, for example, quite often is people wait until something is really bad and then they show up at the emergency room if they can't afford to pay for care through normal channels or if they don't have insurance. We could avoid something like that if we had universal coverage. Finally, perhaps most importantly, there's much more incentive for preventive care. If you're paying the health costs of somebody throughout their life, you want to start early with preventive care so that those costs will be reduced over the course of their life. And these – all of these factors could help to lead to better health outcomes. Now, in addition to the macro-efficiencies and health outcomes, we can see some possibilities for gains within the household. One which is quite important, that Laurie was alluding to earlier, is the affordability of care. It's not the case that the poor people consume a smaller percentage of their income in health care. They consume about the same percentage of their income in health care. But because their incomes are much lower, they get a lot less care. The cost – the prices of care are not proportionately lower. So to the extent that we can mitigate that, it could be a good thing. And it's especially important if you're worried about public health, because if people anywhere in your society aren't getting treated for diseases, you have problems of contagion that could arise, especially in countries that have problems with epidemics on an unfortunately somewhat regular basis. But even more, beyond the affordability of care, just going to a doctor or getting some sort of basic treatment, there is the potential benefit of risk pooling. And this is the genius of insurance, as any economist will tell you, that you're able to pool risk with a large group so that at no time do you have to make some extraordinary outlay in order to cover your costs. This is extremely important, especially when the out-of-pocket cost of health care is high, which it is in many of the developing countries that we may talk about today. And the final benefit, I think, that could accrue to households and is worth noting is in human capacity. An adverse health event in the household, especially of poor households, can have a lot of negative effects, not just on the person who has the health event, who might not be able to work, might not be able to be productive, but they might not be able to take care of their children, their children might therefore suffer some effects of this. There's a whole cascade of effects that can arise. And so if you were able to somewhat – to somehow mitigate those health disasters and, in fact, as I said, disconnect them from financial disasters as well, through risk pooling, you might see knock-on effects in human capacity. And that's something that researchers really (have/haven't ?) investigated. So these last benefits, these household benefits, are the ones we're going to focus on today, and there are a couple reasons for that. One is that the macro-efficiencies that we've spoken about have not necessarily been the biggest focus for a lot of developing countries that have delved into universal health coverage, because they haven't had much of a health system to begin with, and thus, you know, it's not as though you're moving from one very sophisticated system to another and seeing what efficiencies you might capture. You're sort of building a system from scratch, in many cases, and you're building UHC at the same time as you're building the health system itself. And another reason why we're focusing on the household benefits is because those health outcomes are often very difficult to determine in the early years of a UHC program. And since we are in the early years in many developing countries, the evidence is scarce, though not non-existent. If some of you would like to follow up with the work of Gideon (sp) and Diaz (sp) that's cited in the paper, you can see quite a few studies that are trying to gauge the early effects, often looking at things like infant mortality, which you can gauge today rather than looking 20 years later to see how healthy somebody is. And there have been pluses and minuses. In some cases you find improvements in health outcomes; in some cases you find almost no effect. But it may be early days to gauge that. So for all of those reasons, we chose to focus, especially in a short paper like this, on these household benefits, which should be almost immediately perceptible. If you're trying to reduce the financial burden of adverse health events in households, that should be something that we can see right away. And in fact we can. So that's what I'll be outlining the evidence on for you. What I think is a useful bottom line here is to think about how we might create a virtuous cycle of less financial burden on households, better health, more investment in health, and then less financial burden and more investment in health going forward. You know, health is such a fundamental aspect of development, the best development economists in the world seem only to agree about health as the one sine qua non, the one thing you need to get off the ground. Even the evidence on education, which also seems so fundamental, is much more mixed. But if you can get reasonable health status for people in a poor country, they have a much better shot of turning it into a rich country. And so we want to use the tools that we have – and UHC is one of them – to perhaps set in motion this virtuous cycle of better health investment and then better health for future generations. Well, let's talk about a few of the issues that come up when you start to consider a UHC system and how to capture some of these household benefits. One is the affordability of the program itself for households. How easy is it for them to actually opt in to the system and to use the services that might be provided to them? One issue that comes up constantly is that of user fees. And there are a lot of different ways to gauge user fees. It could be a copayment for a physician's visit; it could be some sort of deductible; it could be a percentage of costs. User fees have almost always been found to discourage people's use of care. And if the idea of universal health coverage is to increase the access of care, you have to make sure that it's within the ability and willingness of people to pay. One tool that you can use to assure that to some degree is a cap on annual spending. You can say, OK, well, we have user fees, but only up to $50 a year, and after that everything's paid for. So these are sort of two variables that you can already tweak, or two dials that you could tweak as you're designing your UHC system. But I think just as important as these variables are the ones that are related to risk pooling. We've seen a lot of different systems grow up around the world. Some of them were spoken about, in the first roundtable in this series, by Bill Schaue (ph), where you have different pools set up for different populations. You might see one health insurance pool for government employees and then another one set up for the private sector, or you might see one for the military and then another one for private sector. You might see them set up on village-level basis, so that each little village or cluster of villages has its own mutual insurance. We have sometimes seen the separation between people who are in formal and informal employment, so that you have some sort of employer-sponsored or -provided health insurance for those in formal employment, and then for informal employment there's a whole other system that's set up by the government. This kind of segregation often takes you into trouble because, as Laurie pointed out, if you want to really achieve the genius of risk pooling, you need to have a big enough pool. You need to have people with different health status. And the more that you separate them by variables that may be related to their health status, such as whether they have a steady government job or they have formal employment, the less benefit you're likely to get out of risk pooling at the household level. Another issue that comes up sometimes is enrollment. Some of these programs are mandatory. Some of them are voluntary. With the mandatory ones, sometimes even though everybody's supposed to get coverage, they have a registration process which is extremely difficult and onerous. And sometimes you have people who don't even have an official national identification number or card and it's very hard for them to actually sign up for the insurance which is their right. For the voluntary programs, we run into potential problems of adverse selection. Who are the people who are going to sign up for health insurance? You can bet that the first ones there are the ones who think they might be getting sick soon. This is something we're well familiar with in the U.S. And we've seen it happen. We've seen death spirals of insurance plans that occur as a result. So these are all issues that need to be taken into account, not just to ensure the success of the program, but to ensure that these benefits that we talked about percolate down to the household level. So in the paper, we have a few examples of some programs that are already in existence. We've drawn a little bit on the UHC Forward database from the joint learning program, which is referenced here. But I think what I'd like to talk about more is whether it works, whether we actually see evidence that these benefits can be accrued and what's associated with the accrual of those benefits. Well, for affordability, definitely yes. When we have UHC programs that don't have overly onerous user fees, we definitely see access to care improving. And along with that, not surprisingly, we see utilization of care rising as well. But that can sometimes be a bit of a double-edged sword, and sometimes it occurs, to the surprise of the government organizing the program or whatever the entity is that organizes it, because of moral hazard. You lower the price of care; people get more care; they might even be a little less careful about getting sick because the consequences are not so great. This happened in Taiwan in the '90s. They got a lot more utilization than they were expecting. They had to fiddle some budgets and see how they could adjust for the future. Another issue, though, with affordability is that the out-of-pocket cost doesn't always fall even when you set up a UHC program. And you might ask, well how could that possibly be? Well, we've run into some cases, for example in the Philippines, where the private providers that are reimbursed by the government see that the government is passing on only a small percentage of those costs to the consumer and they say, well, you can jack up the prices, basically charging the consumer the same as what they used to pay, but we're getting a bigger reimbursement from the government because the consumer only pays a small share of that. So some of these systems can be open to gaming, and that's something to look out for as well. But overall the evidence is quite strong that the affordability is improved, the access to care is improved, and so is utilization. In terms of evidence for the benefits of risk pooling, we certainly see big drops in catastrophic spending, and that is, as I said, probably the biggest benefit that we can expect and the most desirous one at the household level. And we see those in different regions all around the world. Several examples are cited in here. On human capacity, which was the third of these household benefits that I mentioned, we are starting to see some results. As you might expect, since it's somewhat indirect, it could take a little more time, and the scientific methods that you might use to gauge that are a little more difficult because there are a lot of things that could go into human capacity. So trying to figure out what's the delta that you get from this kind of program could be difficult. You need a randomized controlled trial or some other perhaps quasi-experimental design. Doing a rigorous paper is not the easiest thing, but we've seen a little bit. We've seen some benefits to worker productivity, as you might expect. And I think, by the way, some of the best proof that insurance coverage can improve worker productivity is the fact that you've seen some large employers in poor countries, like Pakistan for example, setting up basically HMOs for their workers and paying the bulk of the cost because they know that they'll recoup that in terms of reduced absenteeism and higher productivity. And we've mentioned a couple of those in the report. Also, in terms of human capacity, though, we are starting to see these effects on the next generation, that children's school enrollment, for example, in some of the Chinese rural health insurance demonstrations seems to go up, which could be because it's – they're not required to stay at home and take care of their parents when they're ill – something as simple as that. And these are the kinds of things that I hope that more economists like myself will look into because I think that they make a powerful case for the humanitarian aspects of universal health coverage. So I'll just end by giving you a little bit of a prospectus for the future. Obviously there are many reasons to consider a UHC program. As I said, there are many different models; it's not all about single payer, as Laurie said. But there are many potential benefits that you could capture. There's not rigorous evidence supporting all of them yet, but that's partly because we're in the early stages when it comes to the developing world and UHC. But I think that the household benefits that have been documented so far make a strong case. And when you see what the political leaders who have ushered in UHC and their countries have spoken about, it is indeed these household benefits that they say we cannot have our people burdened not just be health events, but by the catastrophic costs that come – can come with them if we hope to grow into the future. And some of the most far-sighted leaders have recognized this, and I hope that more will in the future. Thank you. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Daniel. Actually when I was listening to your report, received this message from the Kaiser Family Foundation about recent poll data on the American attitudes toward the Affordable Health Care Act that said there was a perfect divide on the Americans' attitudes toward the act. Indeed they found that more than 50 percent of all Americans still believe that the Supreme Court should rule it's unconstitutional, the individual mandate requiring nearly everyone obtaining health insurance. So – (chuckles) – despite that the – all those – the benefits that Daniel alluded to, the – it seems that Americans still haven't realized that. (Laughs.) MR. ALTMAN: Well, I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but this may be unconstitutional. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea. (Laughter.) MR. HUANG: So, OK. Alex? ALEXANDER S. PREKER: Well, thanks very much for having invited me here, Laurie and others from the – from New York, and I – it's – I'm delighted as a preliminary to my – to be here in this office. It's – congratulations to the council for having set up this new office here. So it's really nice. We'll have to come and have some of our meetings in the World Bank here. MS. GARRETT: Yeah, that long walk two blocks away. DR. PREKER: Exactly. So we – I'll forego the reimbursement on the taxi this time. MS. GARRETT: (Laughs.) DR. PREKER: So this is an immensely important topic, and it's interesting because Rob Hecht, who's here from Results for Development – he and I were working together in 1993 when the bank was doing its world health report on "Investing in Health," and one of the interesting things at that time was that we came up with some statistics that showed that although 90 percent of the disease burden in the world is in developing countries, only 10 percent of the financing is there. So there was this very big disparity between where the needs are and where the money is at the global level. Interestingly enough, if one looks at the data now, you know, which is almost 20 years later, it's not like that. It's 60-40, which demonstrates the change that has happened in the last 20 years in terms of distribution of financing globally. So you now have the BRIC countries – if you take the BRIC – and Goldman Sachs had coined this idea – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with "S" in the – in brackets – South Africa (was ?) sort of – was supposed to be part of that – and then, once they got through that, they added "N-11," the next 11, which includes countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. But what's interesting is how have those countries now performed in terms of – in terms of this agenda? Because one could say that, well, it's the BRIC N-11 that really would have the largest capacity. So let's look at whether or not those countries have actually been able, during that 20 years, while this shift in funding has actually taken place – you know, has there been a change in the way that the population might have access to that – that financing? So if we just look at the table now in – on page 10 for a second – and I think Daniel kind of highlighted this – but I just want to draw out a couple of observations on this table. So it's on Page 10. So it's interesting that when one looks at places like Kenya, where the size of the pool is 7 (percent), and then out of pocket is 51 (percent). And then you go down the list – Mali is the same, 3 (percent), 52 (percent); India a bit further down, 9 (percent) and 50 (percent). So the observation is that, you know, countries that really have poor coverage or poor pools end up spending a lot of money out of pocket. And of course the troubling part is then, when you now go further along and you see a place like (Turkish ?) Republic, which is 97 percent coverage – well, it's still got 40 percent out of pocket. And if you go down further on the list there – Philippines, 80 percent coverage, but 52 (percent) – (5)4 percent out of pocket. And then you go down to the bottom, which is where we would like to see it, Colombia and Thailand where 88 percent and 72 percent for Thailand; Colombia, 88 (percent). And there you have 8 (percent) and 16 (percent). So I think this where we now – need to now be thinking a little bit. How is it that at least two countries have succeeded in reaching the coverage level and then, at the same time, doing something about that out-of-pocket exposure that they – that the population has to health expenditure? And then other countries that, you know, one would say would – you know, they're part of the BRIC – you know, India is there; I don't see many of the other BRICS in there. Chile is not – no, China is not there. MS. GARRETT (?): Brazil is. DR. PREKER: Yeah, Brazil is there. So Brazil is there as well. And these countries are actually not doing well in the distribution of the – of the funding and clearly have not succeeded in putting in place a mechanism that dealt with that out-of-pocket side of the expenditure. So that raises a couple of issues, which I think is really the crux of the matter is that, you know, there's an ideological debate about scaling up and then there's the pragmatic debate about what you do about it. And I think this, in some ways, is also the thing that U.S. is facing right now. You've got the – you've got the ideological debate, but then you have a pragmatic debate. You know, what are the solutions and how do you actually achieve it? And that now – one of the pragmatic solutions is being challenged of course in the Supreme Court. But, you know, this was one of many options. It was not the only one, but it was one of many. And now that's being put to a test to see how consistent that is with other principles in society, and that's precisely what we find in many developing countries. So I worked a little bit in Ghana in the early – well, 2003 to 2007. And we helped the Ghanaian government at that time put in place a scale-up program for health insurance, essentially what – at the time that we started working with the government, they had – they had inherited a British-style health system, which was basically free care, universal coverage. So going back about 45 years, that's the kind of system that they had inherited. So on the – on the surface of it, you would say, well, that's great; you know, they – I mean, they came from a background where they had full coverage, and everybody had entitlement to services. Well, within 10 years after the colonial powers left, that system collapsed because the system didn't have enough money, and so what happened was that although you had a rule that said everybody has access to care, that rule eroded in practice, and people ended up spending money out of pocket because there wasn't enough money in the system. And then the government even came in with – initially, it was an informal kind of payment, but then the government eventually came in with a rule that said, well, if you are going to come to a public clinic, you have to pay something because, you know, our clinics are going bankrupt, so the Bamako type of thing that, you know, why shouldn't we be getting part of the money in the public sector, because we know you're paying the money anyways out of pocket, so why shouldn't the government benefit, and so we can finance part of our health service with that money out of pocket? And so they brought in a rule that – which was called in Ghana a kind of a nice term – it's called "cash and carry." You know, you come in with your cash, and you carry away the services. So they brought in that kind of a system. And that worked OK for a while. It did help a lot, studies that were done that showed that – like in Bamako, it showed the institutions that were collecting and were allowed to retain those fees that they did collect out of pocket ended up being better staffed and ended up having at least drugs so that when people went there, they actually got treated, whereas the clinics that didn't have that, although in principle, there was free care, basically, people were getting nothing. So they got free care, but they got free care to nothing. And I think this is what we are seeing in some of these places here. When you look at the – when you look at some of these statistics – (inaudible) – public, when 98 – 97 percent is free care, but clearly, they're getting nothing, because they are paying 40 percent out of pocket. So, you know, they are not getting what they want, so they are – they are choosing to finance. OK, so Ghana then decided, OK, we're going to abolish the "cash and carry," and instead of that, if people are willing to pay, why don't we, instead of having people pay at the point of service, why don't we just put that money in a pool, and the – I mean, clearly, the population is willing to pay, so that's good, so let's now take advantage of the fact that the population is willing to pay, we'll put that money into a pool, and we'll make that into an insurance program so that that way, everybody contributes a little bit, because you know, the evidence is there that they are willing to pay, but instead of paying when you get sick, people will pay ahead of time, and we create a health insurance system. So that's essentially what they did. They created a health insurance system, and then they said, well, but you know, many people can't afford to make that small contribution, so we're going to subsidize the people who can't afford to pay the premium. And what ended up happening then, of course, is that they put in place the system, and coverage went up very quickly to 70 percent. And then the thing unraveled because what was happening was all sorts of administrative things: The system wasn't able to clear the bills; they weren't able to handle the claims; they weren't able to register poor people, so even though poor people had access to the services, actually, poor people weren't getting registered, not unlike in the U.S., where you have the Medicaid patients – often there's a – you find – (inaudible) – statistic shows that many Medicaid patients actually don't register. It's either too complicated, or they don't register, or they may be illegal workers or whatever. There's a lot of reasons, but they don't get into the system. And so we found the same thing, that, you know, even though you have the system in place, the people who really should benefit, the rules are there, but they don't come in. And so I think once again we are seeing this here in this table, and which you are highlighting in this report, that the rules by themselves aren't enough unless you couple them with some pragmatic institutions. You know, and part of it is the human resources that you were mentioning. But there are a couple other very important things. And you know, drugs and equipment are two very important elements of a – of the health system that we often forget. And when you look at the expenditure in a health service, often the big expenditure item is actually drugs plus human resources. So in many – in many emerging economies, you can have as high as 50 percent, even 60 percent of the whole health expenditure is actually on pharmaceuticals. So once again, it means that a single thing can't solve the problem. You really have to have – it has to be an – universal coverage can't go by itself. It can't just be the front end where you're collecting the money, and then you say everybody is covered. It has to go along with institutional reforms. I think the report nicely highlights some of those institutional things that you think are important in this. And then I just want to end on one note is that those institutions, we often think kind of in concrete terms that those institutions are things like buildings and, you know, bodies – buildings and bodies and drugs and the equipment. But I'm now beginning to work in a part of the bank which looks at how better to work with the private sector. I work in the IFC part of the bank. And I work in a part of the IFC which is called the investment climate department, where we are looking at investment policies toward the private sector and whether or not those investment policies actually encourage the private sector to, one, be functional, and second of all, to have some sort of a social benefit. And it's really interest, a report that we have just come out of, following a survey that we did in the Africa region, which shows that many governments put in place programs that intend to mobilize resources and energy from the private sector. In fact, I think the statistic was somewhere close to 80 percent actually have rules about that. And only 6 percent actually implement them. So one of the big challenges, I think also in the insurance side, which we find in many countries and which once again you are highlighting in this report, is that the capacity to implement really has to be there, and it goes beyond the brick-mortar, the bodies and the – and the drugs. And it includes some of the rules and regulations and how those rules and regulations are enforced, but also the culture of the population that's using those services and whether or not those populations end up behaving in a way that's consistent with the new system that's in place. And with that, I'll just highlight a small final example that once again comes from Ghana, where you had a mother that came to a clinic with a child and was somebody that came from a background where she could have belonged to – you know, she could have belonged to the insurance scheme, or she could have been subsidized through the subsidies program. And once she got to the clinic, she didn't have coverage. And so the clinic said, well, I mean, the rules we have is that you have to have coverage, and if you don't, we can't give you care. And so she was turned down. And this of course became a very big scandal. It became a – you know, it became a political fiasco for two reasons. One, it was a political fiasco because, you know, why should a mother with a young child be refused care? You know, so that – you know, there was a moral aspect on the treatment part. But it was also a fiasco because it was a PR fiasco because of course if she had gotten the care, you now destroy the whole health insurance system because every other mother with a child would say, well, when we get sick, we can just walk in and we're going to get care, so why should we bother paying? So it opens up the floodgates with moral hazard and noncompliance. And I think that really demonstrates the very difficult position that governments and countries are in that are trying to do scale-up, that when you are trying to put in place things that will work, you will be forced – you – to confront that moral dilemma when the child and the mother comes to the clinic and where you have to make a judgment call. And unfortunately, of course, what often happens is that the individuals or the health care providers that are at that point of conflict, in the front line, end up making the wrong judgment calls at that point. And that of course is the big challenge that we face in many of these reforms that we're doing. So I think this is a tremendously timely report. Congratulations on some of the insights that you have in it. And we look forward to teaming up with you and taking this agenda forward, Laurie and others. So – MR. HUANG: Thank you, Alex. And to the story that you shared with us on Ghana actually until very recently happened every day in China, I believe. (Chuckles.) The – so as a presider, I have the privilege to ask the first question. This question will be about the relationship between the universal health coverage and equality. I think it is addressed in the report, although I probably didn't – in the talk, didn't allude to – but the – my question is that universal health coverage, by definition, means fairer, more efficient financing that pools risk and encourages prepayment to share health care cost equitably across the population. But the report seems to also indicate that there is no strong evidence supporting that spread of universal health coverage necessarily reduces inequality of health care access. So my question is: In what situation would universal health coverage lead to persistence, if not exacerbation, of inequality? MR. ALTMAN: Well – MR. HUANG: Daniel? MR. ALTMAN: Yeah, in answering your question, Yanzhong, I'll draw on a conversation with Julio Frenk last year. He's the former minister of health in Mexico and now dean of the School of Public Health at Harvard. And we were talking about what would improve health outcomes in developing countries, and we discussed the extension of care on a broader basis. And he said it's not going to make a fundamental difference to the lives of a lot of the poorest people until the bigger issues of inequality are addressed; that it – there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in the sense that inequality can breed poor health outcomes for people at the bottom, which can then worsen their outcomes in the labor force and thus worsen inequality in the long term. But I don't think I would start looking to universal health coverage to be a major reducer of inequality until some of the more fundamental drivers of inequality were addressed. It may have some effect on the margin, but there are such enormous other drivers at work right now – for example, just the opening of markets through globalization seems to decrease inequality between countries but increase it within countries, in many cases. You know, with that kind of wave percolating through your economy, it might be difficult to pick up the effect of UHC. But I would never underestimate the abilities of a skilled empirical economist in a randomized controlled trial. MS. GARRETT: (Off mic.) MR. HUANG: OK, I wonder – to both Laurie and Alex, can you respond? MS. GARRETT: Well, I – I'd like to take Alex's bottom line, the woman in Ghana going with her child for care and being turned away. There's a number of ways that scenario could have played out, and I've personally seen it play out in every one of these ways. One is – goes to the inequality question. I remember very well doing a series of following women who had babies in sub-Saharan African countries with high fevers. And it was fevers where it's a matter of life and death to seek appropriate care within – you have maybe a 24-, 48-hour window or the baby dies. In most cases, it was either – it was measles or malaria. And what I saw was, these women typically lived in the rural areas, but their husbands or the fathers of these children were typically in the cities, where they had a second family and lived a completely separate life. The women could not and would not violate relations with their husbands to go straight to the nearest clinic. They would go to the city, find the husband – with the ailing baby – get his permission and then go to the clinic. So no universal health coverage access is going to save that baby's life if the inequity in the gender relations in those marriages and across whole societies is an impediment to getting the appropriate care when you need it. But also with this example of the mother and ailing child, she may very well have had coverage and then gotten to a clinic that had no M.D. in the entire clinic, had no equipment, had no skilled personnel, or had – as we've all seen, if we've traveled widely in poor countries, had an alleged doctor, alleged medical staff, alleged equipment, and no electricity, no running water and no appropriate hygiene, so that seeking care could actually be a life-threatening event. So if all pieces are not in place, you obviously don't get to nirvana and you don't get to equity. And then I guess the final piece of the equity question is something that we all see around the world, the difference between rural and urban, and one key piece of that is not just that health provision is very concentrated in urban areas but also that your ability to access it will depend on your personal finances because you still have to pay for transport. So even if once you get to the clinic, the care is covered, you had to get there, and that becomes the other rate-limiting step that is class-biased. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. Can I just add one sentence onto that, which is, a lot of people say, isn't it easier for poor people to go to the hospital than rich people, because the value of rich people's time is so much higher – you know, they – if you have a hundred-dollar-an-hour job versus a minimum wage job? No, you're looking at it backwards. The problem is that that that minimum wage means a lot more to that person than a couple of hundred-dollar-an-hour hours to a wealthy person, and it's much harder for them to take that time away in going to the clinic, even if all the pieces of the puzzle, as Laurie said, are there. MR. HUANG: OK. Alex? MR. PREKER: OK, so on the universal – and equality, there's a troublesome dimension to that, and that is that in higher-income countries, it makes a lot of sense. If – you know, I'm Canadian. In Canada, everybody has access to care, and that means poor people and rich people have access to care, and Canadians are rich enough so we can afford to give away care to both rich and poor people. But the problem is, if you're living in Mali or in other very low-income countries, and you've got a hundred dollars, and you've got a hundred people, and you give $1 to each one of the hundred people, both the people who are rich and the people who are poor, then everybody's getting $1. But if you took the hundred dollars and you gave the hundred dollars to only the 20 people who are really poor, each one of those 20 people would be getting $5, and the other people would be getting – maybe spending other money, but they have the money to spend out of pocket, and therefore you'd actually be more successful in having equity by not extending universally and spreading the finances thinly across the whole population. So I think this is where we have the tension, I think, at low-income countries between the ideology of what we think is universalist and therefore, you know, it's good for the poor, and the reality of the economics; that when you actually do that and you execute it, you're actually taking money away from the poor whenever you have a program which is universal. MR. HUANG: Very interesting. So we have about 35 minutes. So I want to open the floor up to questions. Please identify yourself and your affiliation before responding. Please also flip your tent card to indicate that you have a question, and we also allow one-finger rule at – if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So I'm going to start with Jeanette. Q: Thank you. MR. HUANG: Oh, by the way, Jeanette is the new managing director of the Rockefeller Foundation in charge of health. Q: Thank you. Very interesting for me, because in fact it's a discourse that I am not familiar with. In fact people that are from developing countries, in general, when we talked about universal health coverage, we basically talked about access to care, not necessarily about the financial impact. So it has been very important for me to sort of listen to the discussion. I understand that there is an issue there; that basically the implicit assumption is that if you increase coverage, financial coverage, you will increase access and then you will improve health outcomes. I would challenge that, though, and I think that we need to discuss, probably in a different forum, about that implicit assumption. Now I'd like to make a comment – a couple of comments. The first one is the comment on universal health coverage and equity. In fact the issue there is in whatever dimension you are talking, if it is the financial dimension or the access dimension, in the road towards achieving 100 percent – let's say from 10 (percent) to 100 (percent) – not all the groups of the population benefit the same. So in fact when you begin to implement this – basically, in the road to universal, you create more inequities, unless you focus on beginning with the worst-off, which is what UNICEF in fact is doing in its newest strategy. They are basically making the case. And if you do the costing and the economic exercises, you realize that it's much more cost-effective to do it in that way. And then the other comment – and then I just want to use Table 10 as an example, because here there are some examples. There's one example that I know very well, which is the example of Chile, because in fact I'm Chilean. And you are saying here – the tables say here that we implemented the universal health coverage in 1979. I would say that in fact we destroyed universal health coverage in 1979, because until then we had basically a system that had one pool that provided access to everyone. The depth of the package, though – of course the system regulated through waiting lists, and in 1979 what happened is that the pools were divided into two, one private – I mean, several private, 15 in fact – and one public. And why I'm putting this example – not because I'm from Chile; I'm putting this example because it depends on your definition. I mean, if you think about the former Soviet Union countries, according to the definition of universal health coverage, they did have universal health coverage, and from one day to the other, they didn't have it. And what we are having now, it's basically the rebuilding of the universal health coverage using different instruments. And you can argue that in fact, it was a theoretical universal health coverage because people didn't get covered. In fact, they did; the issue was that they didn't get access to services. So what I'm trying to say is that the discussion, I think it's a bit more broader because it has to do with some historical process of reforms that I think Alex said in his intervention. And it's very interesting to continue this conversation. MR. HUANG: Jeanette, you mention the Soviet case. This actually remind me of China. Actually, China recent – just a couple of days ago, announced it has achieved universal health coverage. (Chuckles.) So covering 100 – 1.4 – nearly 1.4 billion people, well, that is truly an achievement, right? (Chuckles.) Laurie. MS. GARRETT: I think you raise some very important points, and they actually were all points that we debated and grappled with through this entire process – you know, trying to find a way to focus in and not end up producing another 1,000-page document that nobody reads. Well, hopefully somebody reads this. (Chuckles.) But, first of all, yes, different countries have tried to roll out universal health coverage in different ways. And many have, in fact, done exactly what you said: target the neediest first and work your way backwards. But as Daniel pointed out, many countries, this being one of them, has rolled out universal health coverage in ways that do not reflect needs, but rather specific groupings – military or – in our country, really tying access to coverage – not care, but coverage – to site of employment so that it became part of labor negotiations beginning in the early part of the 20th century. And companies that had organized labor tended to have good health insurance coverage, and those that didn't lacked it. So different countries have rolled out their systems in various ways. And I think often, the one that gets the most praise is what Julio Frenk rolled out in Mexico. But I think it's also instructive – and we have some citations to follow up if there is interest – I think it's also instructive to see the struggle that Brazil is having right now, because Brazil did, in fact, roll out very aggressively for the poorest population tier and created great tension within the middle class in Brazil that they're still struggling to cope with and to figure out what is justice and equity with some payment and some nonpayment in a system as complicated and massive as the nation of Brazil. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. It's – I agree very strongly that these are important issues to take into account, and I think that everything you said makes sense in theory. In practice, when you deal with the logistical and political implications of rolling out a system like this, it seems like, from experience around the world, it's easier to roll out a system to everyone and then start layering on the services rather than to start with a lot of services for a small group and then start layering on other populations for partly the same reasons that Laurie was referring to. But I would also point out that if you just start out providing care to the poorest, you're losing a lot of the potential benefit of risk pooling because you're targeting a population that's the sickest in society. MR. HUANG: Alex, you have a – MS. GARRETT: Add anything to – MR. PREKER: No. MR. HUANG: OK. Irena (ph)? Q: Thank you so much for such a great panel, first of all. I have a question related to a presentation, two months ago, of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the World Bank. And in his speech, he spoke about achievements in Georgia. And one of the achievements was hospitals all around the country. He calls these hospital like five-star hotels. And these hospitals are available for everyone. And in this context, I would like to ask this distinguished panel and especially Alex how it was made by coverage, how you see this model, because Georgia is not a rich country; probably it's a(n) emerging economy; maybe we can call it from poor-to middle-income country. And do you think this kind of model could work for other countries like this kind – this type of countries? And the other question is about equality, because even President Saakashvili stressed that all people, rural people, poorer people could come to this hospital. They are – have modern equipment. But anyway, they are not equal. I'm – but he said, for example, once in their life they could be – could have appropriate service – and how it's related to question of equality. And following – so Canada is famous for its health coverage. Why other countries, for example, United States, cannot follow this example in health coverage? MS. GARRETT: I'll take the latter, you take the former. (Laughter.) MR. PREKER: OK. Yes, then I don't have to defend the Canadian system. (Laughter.) Well, I think Georgia is quite typical of what happened in the – you know, the states that were part of the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the – of the former Soviet Union. I've been to Georgia several times, and – so I know exactly what you're talking about. The problem was that very shortly after the transition, the bank – the government in Georgia basically went bankrupt. It had a compression of economic growth, of – I think it was, like, 70 percent. It was one of the most hard-hit of the Eastern European countries in terms of – in terms of collapse of the economy. And so essentially the government was bankrupt, which meant that they had a very large stock of facilities, hospitals and also doctors that were on the payroll, because everybody was a civil servant on the payroll, or at least a government employee, and no money. And so people were not – basically, the salary bill stopped, people would no longer get paid, and there was no drugs in the hospital. I remember the last time I visited, which was I guess now close to 10 years ago, but at that time, you know, I had to walk up seven stairs because, you know, there was no light, there was no electricity. It was – basically, the service had collapsed. So in a context like that, you know, if you have one functioning hospital that actually is functioning, I mean, there is a need for tertiary care in Georgia like there's – anybody – anywhere else in the world. I mean, this is a country – it has a lot of chronic disease and a lot of acute disease that need to be dealt with. And, you know, you can die in the street or you can die in the hospital. But the issue, I think, that Georgia faces with this kind of a situation was – it's the same as we face in many other parts of the world – is if that hospital, now is functioning, was reserved and could be used only for the acute care that it was built for and not be giving primary care and stuff that could be given in clinics, then you might end up having something that actually works. But the problem is, because the rest of the health services collapsed, if you have one institution that has been made functional and you have the rest of the service that's collapsed, even in Georgia, this is never going to work, because you can't have 6 million or whatever it is that your population is – you can't have 6 million people coming to one place and getting care for primary care. It just – it's just not going to work. This institution will collapse unless, you know, it's – unless that institution sits on top of a – the pyramid of a large health service. So I think this is a – and it's a difficult dilemma many countries face, is because you like to have one place which provides decent care, but you're not going to – 6 million people are not going to be able to get care from that one place. MS. GARRETT: When I – 14 years ago, I traveled the – all over Georgia looking at their health system. And I think that the Georgia example is actually an interesting one that – for you to have raised because the advantage that Georgia today has is that the vast majority of the society truly rejected the Soviet model of health, and what they were left with was something so horrible – I mean, some of the worst atrocities I've ever seen in health care delivery, I saw back then in Georgia – you know, physicians with no gloves performing surgery, not able to scrub beforehand because there was no soap. So there – in a sense, they have an advantage now in that the – there was very little support for keeping what had existed and great possibility of coming in with a clean slate and trying to do the right thing. And similarly, Canada built its health system long ago on a clean slate. The United States has built incrementally hundreds of different health systems so thoroughly fragmented, each with its own interest groups dependent on its continued existence, that trying to create a single or even a workable financing mechanism is impossible in America. The best we can hope for is to make these fragmentary pieces work together a little bit better, be a bit better regulated so that they can't price gouge various elements of funding, and create better equity and pooling for the largest elements of the system. And that's what the health reform act tried to do. But, as you can see, there are many interests that seek – see that they will lose if that is fully implemented and therefore are very actively fighting against it. MR. HUANG: That's exactly what Debbie Fuentes (ph) said: just 90 percent politics, 10 percent technical-institutional details. (Laughs.) Let's see whether we have any questions from the participants – from the teleconference participants. Anybody? MS. GARRETT: On the phone. MR. HUANG: On the phone? OK – (laughs) – nobody. So Ben (ph). Q: Bart Szewczyk (ph), Wilmer Hale and G.W. law school. Thank you very much for all of your presentations. I wanted to ask, is there any empirical evidence between the degree of universal health coverage and long-term economic growth? I guess those studies would be probably difficult to do, but is there any evidence one way or the other? MR. ALTMAN: Short answer is no. If you're referring to sort of cross-sectional-type of analysis, that would be very difficult because the universal health coverage systems are so different that to throw in a single dummy variable for them would not give you a very good regression. So not putting it into technical terms, I think that would be very tough to do, to look at countries in comparison to each other and see whether there was an effect on growth. If you looked within one country, you'd have a better shot of finding an outcome. And there have been some studies even in the United States looking at Medicare. It's not completely universal, but it's universal for part of the population. And the idea was to take the burden of caring for the older generation away from people who could be otherwise productive in the workforce, in addition to all the other benefits that it might have. And you know, I think that there's some evidence to support positive effects, but spotty and not necessarily so generalizable across contexts that I would want to take it from one country and apply it to another. MR. HUANG: Comments? DR. PREKER: Yeah, I mean, there's been – recently, there's been the commission of growth – health and growth. So if you want to look at what they did, you – it's worthwhile just Googling that. I mean, there's basically two problems. One is that we haven't agreed on what universal coverage is, and so it's hard to do regressions against something you haven't defined yet. And so it's not an easy thing to draw the correlation. But there's a reverse correlation, and that is that countries that tend to go through rapid growth tend to become more inequitable during the growth phase (till you get ?) industrialization process. And during that inequity period, you tend to have health care becoming less equitable, like you saw in Georgia and other countries in Eastern Europe. So one has to be careful about the cause and effect there. But certainly if one looks at the world where you have rapid growth and economic growth, like China, those places – those places have become much more inequitable in health care. I don't think it's the health care that led to the growth, because you would then say, well, inequitable health care leads to growth. No, I think that's not the way it is. But I think you can expect to see inequity in health care appear when you have rapid population growth in some areas and where part of the population ends up having purchasing power, which means that they can buy care that the general population can't afford. MS. GARRETT: Can I follow up? Alex, I want to ask you about something. The – one of the things we've seen in the most rapidly expanding economies in the late 20th or early 21st centuries. If you look at China, if you look at post-Soviet Russia, you look at – less so at Brazil, and certainly in India, you see that as these economies explode, the public sector salaries for those that are not engaged in highly corruption-prone sectors do not keep pace with growth in the private sector. So there's the envy-of-your-neighbor problem, and that seems to compel, in a way, an increase in corruption in direct health provision so that – for example, I saw myself in China, a doctor will say to a patient, here's what – here's the free syringe; I can now give you an injection with it; it's been used before. (Laughter.) Here's the one that's still in its packaging, but that'll cost you $50. Do you want me to inject you with this one or this one? And that $50 is going to the doctor. So is there a way to have this economic growth without also enhancing not only the lack of equity, but also corruption within the health sector? DR. PREKER: All right, I don't have the answer to that. I mean, we know empirically that countries that go through a very rapid growth period, you have social consequences. And so it's one of the things that is there. And you know, when you (saw ?) – the definition of emerging markets by Goldman Sachs is it's growth in the double digits with large populations and where you have population dynamics that's moving towards aging. So that's the – you know, that's the definition of an emerging economy, and I think in most of the emerging economy, you've had – you've had problems in the health side. So they go through a phase and then, you know – then eventually, when you have a sufficient middle class that ends up with political power, then that middle class starts demanding social services that are reasonable for the middle class. And that's what you're basically seeing now in both China and India. You have the growth phase, and now you have a middle class that's beginning to say, we're not happy with this anymore; we're – you know, we want change. And so (there's ?) this change happening in both China and in India. MR. ALTMAN: (But ?) that creates an additional causality problem because it's the income growth that's leading to the health coverage, not vice versa. (Laughter.) DR. PREKER (?): Yeah. MR. HUANG: OK. Jesse? Q: Thanks. All right, Jesse Bump, Georgetown University. I just wanted to point out there's a tension between what we in the global health community think about as universal health coverage, which tends to be focused on equity and focused on the poorest and largely I think that comes from the mindset that that's the missing piece in existing health systems. But, as we move into the sub-Saharan and other areas where there really aren't very many systems themselves, I wanted to point out that in the health systems I've studied, none of them have come from the poor. They're all built around a paying customer at the beginning. And as Daniel said, this amounts to a rationing question, and rationing means it's an ethical issue that then has to get solved at the implementation stage around the history, politics, and economics of a particular population. Thanks. MR. HUANG: Comments? MS. GARRETT: Absolutely. MR. HUANG: (Laughs.) OK, fully agree. Robert? Q: Is that working? OK. Robert Hecht from Results for Development. This looks like a great report, and I'll read it – read it carefully. It seems to me if you look at what's going on around the world and try to understand the trends in health systems, health financing, access to care that Jeanette was talking about, financial protection, both of those dimensions, there – there's a lot of common language around universal coverage and there is some commonalities. But in my own observation, I think there are a lot of submovements within geographies and things are happening at different speeds and different ways, and I wonder if you've been thinking about that and would – will be bringing it out in some of your future work. In my casual look at things, it seems like there are lot of what I would call second-generation changes in health financing arrangements and coverage in some of the middle-income regions: Latin America, which already has a long history going back to the '60s, '70s, '80s; Eastern Europe – some of the Eastern European countries that made dramatic moves in the '90s and are now – they're burnishing their systems and making some gradual changes; Korea, which has recently merged many of its risk pools into a single one; Turkey – there are – there are – there are some trends going on that I would call second-generation type ones. In the OECD countries, we see this as – it's a – it's a – it's a never-ending process, so there are third- and fourth- – very interesting things going on in the Netherlands and in the U.K., and the NHS is constantly being reconfigured and reformulated. So the notion that there's not a single ending point but there's a constant evolution and that individual countries and groups of countries are moving at different speeds, I think, is worth reflecting on. In my own opinion, Africa is really at a stage of early experimentation and nothing more than that. There's a lot of hype right now, but – and there are some interesting things going on in places like Ghana and Rwanda and smaller-scale things in Nigeria and Kenya and places like that. But it's early experimentation, I would say. I think that the part of the world which is most exciting right now is East Asia and maybe India added because there, with rapid economic growth, all the political and economic underpinnings are there for quantum changes within these systems, and that's what we're seeing in China right now. India is thinking very – in very big terms, and it feels – is feeling its oats or whatever you call it, and wants to make some dramatic moves, is watching what China's doing. And places like Vietnam and Indonesia and so on you see, again, attempts to really complete somewhat fragmented systems. So trying to get a little more nuanced, maybe, would be – would be just an interesting suggestion for you to think about when you consider what's going on across these different geographies. The question I had, maybe for Laurie – because I know the council, when it does important work like this, often – it has a special – a special strength or comparative advantage in answering the question, well, what does this mean for the U.S. and for U.S. policy? And I didn't see anything in there, and I just wondered: Is that the next move? What does this mean for Raj? What does this mean for the CDC? What does this mean for Obama? What does this mean for the global programs that the U.S. supports and has a major say in, like the World Bank and the Global Fund and so on? It seems a little silent on the question of so what for U.S. – Council on Foreign Relations – (laughter) – for U.S. foreign policy? So I wondered if you could comment on that. MS. GARRETT: OK. MR. HUANG: The U.S. is the outlier. (Chuckles.) MS. GARRETT: Well, I mean, as usual, Bob Hecht comes in with the key question and also fascinating observation about regional shifts. I was surprised you left out Singapore, because many people think one of the most exciting sort of new health systems is Singapore and – financing model. Q: Medical savings accounts? MS. GARRETT: Well – Q: I don't think – I don't think so. I think that's – MS. GARRETT: OK. I'm just saying. Q: – that's the past, not the future, but – MS. GARRETT: I'm just saying. As far as the U.S. goes, we had many ways to try and tackle the UHC question. Probably most awkward one was, as Americans, to try and talk about health coverage. If there's one thing truly wrong in the United States, it's our tremendous inequity of affordable access to health care. And so I don't – we didn't feel particularly comfortable with being in the role that the United States should be telling the rest of the world, you know, how to finance health, but also that the Global Health Initiative's whole component with the sort of brass tacks of what it imagines to be health coverage and systems work is still very, very infant stage. Ariel Pablos-Mendez didn't even get in there until about a year ago – not even a year. Is it? How many – it's – 10 months ago? Q: August. MS. GARRETT: August. So – and then I think the other piece that added yet another layer of awkward to the question of what do we recommend about U.S. foreign policy is that we're all realistically on the edge of our seats what's going to be left of the U.S. support for its own account 150 budget by the time the FY '13 fight is over. And it's pretty hard to go out on a limb and say, and so then we should all do this huge program around universal health coverage or something if in fact we're going to be fighting to just keep very basic aspects of U.S. global health programming funded after, you know, October 1st or after – whenever we stop being – borrowing money to keep the lights on in Washington and actually pass a budget, which probably not be until late January 2013 or even February 2013. MR. HUANG: Daniel. MR. ALTMAN: I would just say, very quickly, if you can't give money, you can still give advice – (laughter) – and I think in this paper – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) Really? MR. ALTMAN: – in this paper, we're trying to highlight some of the issues that are worth considering if you're a country that's thinking about a UHC program. And we don't take a position on what U.S. policy should be, but if I had to take a guess, that – U.S. policy would at least look at some of these very same issues. I wish we had much more space to write about the regional shifts that you're discussing and some of these other issues, but as Laurie said earlier, we decided that the best thing we could do here was take a very focused look at one chunk of the problem where we seeing some early and immediate results and try and push the dialogue in that direction. MR. HUANG: Alex, you want to comment? MR. PREKER: No, that's fine. MR. HUANG: Oh. MS. GARRETT: I think Robert – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) OK. Robert, yes. Q: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. I just had another comment and I just wanted to first say that I think this discussion has been really useful, and I just want to thank all of you for putting in the time and putting together the reports and bringing this group of people together. And I think some of the questions that have been raised here, particularly around, you know, does UHC work, the kind of – one of the more fundamental questions – I just wanted to call everyone's attention to the fact that in September the Lancet British medical journal is putting together a special series on universal health coverage, and it will be launched then, and I think a few of the papers in that series will begin to answer some of the questions that have been raised here. But as those papers are currently in the review process, I don't want to say too much more, but I just wanted to raise the flag and put that on everyone's radar, that that will be coming up in a few months. So stay tuned for that. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Robert. I guess there's no questions from – but – so I'm going to ask if there's – OK. I'm going to ask the final question, again using my presider's privilege. It's about this relationship between universal health coverage and costs of care. Because obviously the report – it was on Page 13 – made it very clear that even the evidence collected to date makes a strong case for UHC as a way to cut costs, I'm curious: What kind of costs are we talking about here? Because if you look at the countries, economies such as Taiwan and China, there seems to be no indication that the spread of the UHC program would – leads to the reduction of the total health spending, because you could have the case, like in China, right, spread of UHC – actually the drop of the share of out-of-pocket spending or actually now the share is – has – is going to – drop below 30 percent, which is actually really low. But in the meantime, you found that the total health spending continued to dramatically increase. So that – if the salary level or income level can't catch up with the increase of total health spending, you would still end up paying in the – more out-of-pocket share , OK – no, not total out-of- – total out-of-pocket spending, I mean, in the – in terms of the actual – the dollar amount. MR. ALTMAN: Right. So I think there are two responses that go back to things that we have alluded to. One is, if you're looking for these macroefficiencies to be captured where your country all of a sudden is spending less on health care or getting more bang for its buck in health care, it may take time. It doesn't necessarily happen right at the very beginning of the UHC program, especially since a lot of these efficiencies, we think, are going to come from preventive care, which may take decades to pay off, in some cases. The second answer – and as – and I alluded to it in the case of Taiwan – is that utilization often goes up because the price has gone down, so your total costs end up being similar or even more. And sometimes it can go up much more quickly than you might expect. And then it's the question of whether there's moral hazard and whether you need to have some level of user fees just to keep it in check. You know, we talked about the woman and her baby being turned away from a health clinic, potentially. You know, in the United Kingdom, which has a very well-known national health insurance system, though obviously not a perfect one, nobody gets turned away. They don't even ask you for any form of identification. They don't, however, give the best quality of health care that's available in the country. And that has some – that goes some way to controlling the moral hazard. Those other high levels of health care are available. You have to pay for them a hundred percent out of pocket or get a corollary insurance plan to the public health insurance you already have. But it allows that other option. Now, that also introduces all sorts of new questions about equity and distribution of resources in the health sector that I'm sure Professor Bump (sp) and others would want to discuss with us. But I think that to your basic question about the overall macro level of health costs, there are those two basic responses. MR. HUANG: Any other comments? MR. PREKER: Well, just a quick economic response. Health care is a luxury good, and the observation we've had is that growth in health care is faster than GDP growth, which means that countries, as they get richer, are willing to – populations are willing to spend more. And that increases. So, you know, U.S. is most likely going to spend over 20 percent shortly. And there's no way of really stopping that. So the cost containment, which tends to be more in the public side – so when you put the lid on the expenditure in the public side, then it's natural people are going to spend out of pocket because if they can't get it on the public side, they're going to spend it personally because you've got a lot of – law of economics, and you've got to get the number up there somehow. So if it doesn't come from the public, it's going to come from the private. MS. GARRETT: Well, and this in a way goes to Robert Hecht's point because we – you know, in terms of the regional variations in trends because, you know, the truth is if there's no capping of any kind, no personal limit on spending, most people will demand the absolute nirvana of health: I want to live to be 110; I want to die in my sleep having had no aches and pains before I die. I mean, who doesn't have that fantasy? But for a system to be built with that as the, you know, gold standard to be achieved universally for all citizenry and payment to somehow be available to achieve such a standard is entirely unrealistic and will bankrupt the society very quickly. Well, I think we see now is all across Europe, where there's a great deal of experimentation going on, part of it is a realization that, A, the expectation level is too high in the population, so that not only is utilization extraordinary, but it's utilization for two weeks in a spa, you know, but also that the population is aging, so that the very expensive needs level is rising, that it's above expectations.   And I think it's realistic to look ahead and say, look, first of all, everybody's definition of what UHC is is going to be different. Each society is going to have its own cultural perspective, and that in many cases is going to reflect how the culture feels about health, how important is health in your culture, which kind of reminds me of a famous set of studies done by the Columbia Mailman School of Public Health back 10 years ago in the early days – 15 years ago – early days of the HIV pandemic, asking the question, why was it that uptake of HIV-related services and testing and even condom use was so poor in Harlem compared to down in Chelsea. So you had two specific communities on the island of Manhattan, both at very high risk for HIV, absolutely diametrically opposite utilization rates for services, regardless of payment. And the answer was simply that in the Chelsea neighborhood, which was overwhelmingly white and where most of the individuals at risk were gay men, it was a community that thought health was at the top of its agenda. It was the number one issue in their lives, and therefore they really fought for every single service they could get, whereas in Harlem, most of the people surveyed said, well, let's see, health, any aspect of health, even my pregnancy and having a safe baby, is down here compared to not getting shot, paying the rent, finding money for food tomorrow, getting my welfare check cashed, et cetera, so that by the time you got to, do I have hypertension, or am I at risk for HIV, it was 15 seconds of your 24-hour agenda. And I think that's yet another whole issue that plays into the regional variations and social variations and class variations in uptake and use of health services. We're just looking at a teeny little piece. And we hope that this has been helpful. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Obviously, this issue is much more complicated than we have expected – (chuckles) – that as the – this – the remarks of our speakers have indicated. So that concludes our universal health coverage round-table series. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our three speakers, Daniel, Laurie and Alex, for their contribution to this round-table meeting. And also, I'd like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation, especially Robert, for his crucial role in making that round-table series possible. And I'd also like to thank our research associates, and particularly Zoe Liberman – you have all received emails from her – and for her assistance in making that possible, and also for – (inaudible) – for her assistance this afternoon. And last but not least, I'd like to thank you all who participate in today's meetings for making such a lively and enjoyable discussion. And thank you. Enjoy rest of the day. (Applause.) -------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, and this is our final meeting of the new Universal Health Coverage Roundtable Series. The meeting will discuss the council's new report, "The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage." I said this report is officially released by the council, but the most important part and the most innovative part of the work actually was done by Dalberg, actually, led by Daniel Altman, Vicky Hausman and their teams. So we – privileged to have three speakers for today's discussion: Laurie Garrett, Daniel Altman and Alex Preker. All three of our speakers' full bios, are included in your handouts, so I'm not going to repeat them, save to say that Daniel is director of thought leadership at Dalberg Global Development Advisors; and Laurie is senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and the only writer ever to have been awarded all three of the big Ps of journalism, the Peabody, the Polk and the Pulitzer, and she's also called by WHO Director General Margaret Chan as the foremost voice of global health. The third one – (chuckles) – just – not included in the handouts, but I heard what she say. The – Alex Preker – Alex is the head of Health Industry and Investment Policy at the World Bank Group. So for time's sake, we're going to begin with brief remarks from Laurie, followed by remarks from Daniel. And after Laurie and Daniel's remarks, Alex will comment as a respondent to the report, and then we're going to open up the floor to questions and discussion. So without further ado, Laurie. LAURIE GARRETT: Well, it's great to see you all here. Good afternoon and enjoy your lunch. And I'm sure there's more food if you feel, you know, necessary to dive out during my remarks to put another layer on your plate. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. If you've not previously been here, this is our Washington office. Headquarters, however, are in New York. In – among the global health team, one of our team members is based here in Washington, Tom Bollyky – there you are – and the rest of us are in the New York office. For quite some time, this phrase, UHC, universal health coverage, has been tossed about. And it seemed for years that whoever was using the term had a unique definition for it so that it was very hard to get your hands around what are we talking about when we say we want universal health coverage. If you were a Western European, you probably thought it meant you want a single-payer system run by this national government universally available to everybody in your country. If you were an American, you may very well have thought, well, that's something that's going to go to the Supreme Court. (Scattered laughter.) And if you were in most of the middle- and poor-income countries of the world, you thought, what a nice idea; not ever going to really be a reality for us. So at much prodding from the Rockefeller Foundation, to whom we're very grateful for the push to make this series of meetings and ultimate report happen, and Ariel Pablos-Mendez, who many of you probably know, who's now serving in USAID running global health programs, we tried to take this apart and deconstruct this whole concept of universal health coverage to find what's the bottom line that's a(n) actual workable target, realizing that there is a couple of trends that play into how you analyze this picture. The first is this very substantial, dramatic increase in the size, scope and funding of global health that occurred between roughly 2000 and 2008 and is now going downhill post-financial crisis. Most of this surge was very much initiative-based, and so it was about very specific targeted health efforts. But the further we got down that path, whether it was distributing antiretrovirals or dealing with tuberculosis prevention or bed nets for malaria, whatever it might be, the more all the participants came to recognize that if you didn't have a health system in place and you didn't have systems of health financing that removed the probability, the near certainty of bankruptcy for poor households that were afflicted with a key provider having a major illness, a traffic accident or anything that would debilitate them or kill them – if you didn't get to that core, then everything else would fall apart, and you were basically setting up a giant charity construct that would be endlessly dependent. And similarly, there has been a large body of literature going back for quite some time arguing back and forth about what is the role of the consumer or patient in their own health, and if all health is free, does it change the relationship between the provider and the consumer or patient and the commitment that the individual has to their own health protection – preventive care, diet, exercise, all of the above. Well, there are obviously three big problems when you talk about providing health. The first is that we have a fantastic deficit of skilled health care workers globally. And this can be defined in every single category, whether you're looking at dentists, lab technicians, pharmacists, surgeons, registered nurses, health administrators, hospital administrators; in every single category we have a deficit of personnel. And the deficit is, of course, most acute in the poorest countries in the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on a per capita basis. So that's your first challenge. The second is that the delivery systems themselves are largely very weak – in some cases quite chaotic – with difficult relations between the private providing systems, or chaos, and the public providing systems, or chaos. In many countries, the relationship between the private sector of health, which is often the number one provider – or the majority of all health care is administered privately – the relationship between that private sector and the public sector is very testy, even competitive and angry, and a spirit of cooperation is not present. And in large part, it's because one sector requires a hundred percent out-of-pocket payments on the part of the health consumer while the other sector is largely publicly or fully publicly supported. And this creates some obvious tensions for the individual as well. If you think you're going to get better care in the private sector but it'll bankrupt your family, what do you do? And then the – from the individual point of view, this question of bankruptcy is quite serious. The institute – the International Labor Organization did its own survey a few years ago looking at this question of the bankrupting impact of illness in the absence of health coverage. And their data points were quite startling. And what they were able to show was that in many societies – and I think, at this point, it is true of the United States – a major catastrophic illness can be the primary source of bankruptcy for personal and family bankruptcy. And we have not resolved this, clearly, in the U.S. Well, I'm going to let Daniel speak to the particulars of what's uniquely discovered in this report, but the one tip-off I want to give you is – couple of things: First, when we – we thought when you look at the question of universal health coverage, it's best to focus on it as a financing question, whether it's personal economics, family economics, village economics, country economics. Coverage is about payment. And it's best to push aside as somebody else's issue to deal with whether coverage actually gets you anything. In other words, it is wholly possible for you to have some system whereby your pay – your health is paid for – you have a voucher, you have insurance, you're in a national plan, whatever it may be – but there's no health care workers when you get to that clinic, or the clinic is in shambles when you get there. So there three pieces to you to – to actually providing health care to everybody, but the one piece we're looking at is the economic financing piece. And finally, I just couldn't help but notice that when the Dalberg group completed their analysis, they reached a key conclusion that turns out to coincide with the primary debate now inside the United States Supreme Court. It is a question of whether it is both feasible and desirable to try and build health coverage without resting it heavily on risk pooling, and that means some sort of mandate that both the well and the sick are in the same pool sharing the same burden, and that it is probably the only way to financially make it affordable for a community, a society, a country, a whole people. And with that, I'll be happy to pass off from there. Yanzhong. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Actually, before the – Dan gets started, I'm – I forgot that we have some housekeeping rules to announce. This meeting is on-the-record, so you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. But please turn off your cellphones. And with that, Daniel. DANIEL ALTMAN: Thank you, Laurie and Yanzhong. It's been a pleasure to work with both of you as we prepared this report. I should also thank the Rockefeller Foundation for its generous support of this work at CFR. It's a particular pleasure for me to be here presenting to you as a member of CFR. And I'd like to start by just speaking broadly about the potential benefits that we might see from universal health coverage. There are a lot of different ways where we might find benefit in the universal health coverage program, regardless of what the exact financing structure might be. And I'm going to separate them into three. I'm going to talk a little bit about the macro-level efficiencies that you might obtain, then what improvements you might get in health outcomes, and finally, about benefits for households. At the macro level – these are some of the benefits that get most attention, especially in this country, when we talk about universal coverage. One is – the simplest, perhaps, is if you get everybody under a single roof or the biggest roof possible, you could save a lot in administrative costs. And I remember back in '94 when I started to look at this issue, it was estimated that you could make savings of perhaps tens of billions of dollars by having a program like Medicare that covered people throughout their lives. That used to be a lot of money once upon a time. But more importantly, I think there's an idea that if you have a universal birth-to-death health care system which has a large coverage pool, you're getting a lot of efficiencies in how care is delivered. You're correcting a lot of incentive problems that currently jack up prices and costs within the system – for example, between the various parts of a hospital and its practices and the practices that it contracts with and their billing systems and their technicians. There are a lot of incentive and holdup problems that economists have and can identify in that system. It also helps us to coordinate care in a way that reduces waste. If the hospital and the rehabilitation center, the home health aides and the general practitioners are all connected, then we have less likelihood of wasted or ineffectual treatments. It allows us to negotiate lower prices, as some countries have already done. With drug manufacturers, for example, France has negotiated, as an entire country health system, to get lower prices. And finally, it can allow us to – and I will use the word ration high-cost care. When you are trying to provide health coverage for a large population, you find that you want to give the coverage where you get the most bang for the buck, and this is something that the United Kingdom has probably been a pioneering country in doing. So there are a lot of ways where you might be able to capture efficiencies and lower the cost to an entire economy of giving decent health care to its people. Now, just as important are what you're getting for that money, or what – the health outcomes that you're getting for that money that you pay. And it's worth talking about where those benefits could arise. It's not the focus of this report, for reasons that I'll explain later, but I think it deserves mention. First of all, you would expect that more people would get some kind of care if there is universal coverage, and you would also expect that more people will reserve – will receive some formal medical care, what we consider advanced, technologically enabled medical care, as opposed to traditional medicine, which can be ineffective or even counterproductive. As one of my colleagues over at the Intel-Grameen social enterprise said, they're getting care now, they're just getting it from the quacks. And so to the extent that you can shift that towards formal medicine, that might have benefit. Also, because of the coordination of care that I mentioned earlier, you tend to have fewer errors, people getting the wrong treatment, that could actually harm them, as well as being inefficient. But we also find that you're treating patients earlier. What happens in this country, for example, quite often is people wait until something is really bad and then they show up at the emergency room if they can't afford to pay for care through normal channels or if they don't have insurance. We could avoid something like that if we had universal coverage. Finally, perhaps most importantly, there's much more incentive for preventive care. If you're paying the health costs of somebody throughout their life, you want to start early with preventive care so that those costs will be reduced over the course of their life. And these – all of these factors could help to lead to better health outcomes. Now, in addition to the macro-efficiencies and health outcomes, we can see some possibilities for gains within the household. One which is quite important, that Laurie was alluding to earlier, is the affordability of care. It's not the case that the poor people consume a smaller percentage of their income in health care. They consume about the same percentage of their income in health care. But because their incomes are much lower, they get a lot less care. The cost – the prices of care are not proportionately lower. So to the extent that we can mitigate that, it could be a good thing. And it's especially important if you're worried about public health, because if people anywhere in your society aren't getting treated for diseases, you have problems of contagion that could arise, especially in countries that have problems with epidemics on an unfortunately somewhat regular basis. But even more, beyond the affordability of care, just going to a doctor or getting some sort of basic treatment, there is the potential benefit of risk pooling. And this is the genius of insurance, as any economist will tell you, that you're able to pool risk with a large group so that at no time do you have to make some extraordinary outlay in order to cover your costs. This is extremely important, especially when the out-of-pocket cost of health care is high, which it is in many of the developing countries that we may talk about today. And the final benefit, I think, that could accrue to households and is worth noting is in human capacity. An adverse health event in the household, especially of poor households, can have a lot of negative effects, not just on the person who has the health event, who might not be able to work, might not be able to be productive, but they might not be able to take care of their children, their children might therefore suffer some effects of this. There's a whole cascade of effects that can arise. And so if you were able to somewhat – to somehow mitigate those health disasters and, in fact, as I said, disconnect them from financial disasters as well, through risk pooling, you might see knock-on effects in human capacity. And that's something that researchers really (have/haven't ?) investigated. So these last benefits, these household benefits, are the ones we're going to focus on today, and there are a couple reasons for that. One is that the macro-efficiencies that we've spoken about have not necessarily been the biggest focus for a lot of developing countries that have delved into universal health coverage, because they haven't had much of a health system to begin with, and thus, you know, it's not as though you're moving from one very sophisticated system to another and seeing what efficiencies you might capture. You're sort of building a system from scratch, in many cases, and you're building UHC at the same time as you're building the health system itself. And another reason why we're focusing on the household benefits is because those health outcomes are often very difficult to determine in the early years of a UHC program. And since we are in the early years in many developing countries, the evidence is scarce, though not non-existent. If some of you would like to follow up with the work of Gideon (sp) and Diaz (sp) that's cited in the paper, you can see quite a few studies that are trying to gauge the early effects, often looking at things like infant mortality, which you can gauge today rather than looking 20 years later to see how healthy somebody is. And there have been pluses and minuses. In some cases you find improvements in health outcomes; in some cases you find almost no effect. But it may be early days to gauge that. So for all of those reasons, we chose to focus, especially in a short paper like this, on these household benefits, which should be almost immediately perceptible. If you're trying to reduce the financial burden of adverse health events in households, that should be something that we can see right away. And in fact we can. So that's what I'll be outlining the evidence on for you. What I think is a useful bottom line here is to think about how we might create a virtuous cycle of less financial burden on households, better health, more investment in health, and then less financial burden and more investment in health going forward. You know, health is such a fundamental aspect of development, the best development economists in the world seem only to agree about health as the one sine qua non, the one thing you need to get off the ground. Even the evidence on education, which also seems so fundamental, is much more mixed. But if you can get reasonable health status for people in a poor country, they have a much better shot of turning it into a rich country. And so we want to use the tools that we have – and UHC is one of them – to perhaps set in motion this virtuous cycle of better health investment and then better health for future generations. Well, let's talk about a few of the issues that come up when you start to consider a UHC system and how to capture some of these household benefits. One is the affordability of the program itself for households. How easy is it for them to actually opt in to the system and to use the services that might be provided to them? One issue that comes up constantly is that of user fees. And there are a lot of different ways to gauge user fees. It could be a copayment for a physician's visit; it could be some sort of deductible; it could be a percentage of costs. User fees have almost always been found to discourage people's use of care. And if the idea of universal health coverage is to increase the access of care, you have to make sure that it's within the ability and willingness of people to pay. One tool that you can use to assure that to some degree is a cap on annual spending. You can say, OK, well, we have user fees, but only up to $50 a year, and after that everything's paid for. So these are sort of two variables that you can already tweak, or two dials that you could tweak as you're designing your UHC system. But I think just as important as these variables are the ones that are related to risk pooling. We've seen a lot of different systems grow up around the world. Some of them were spoken about, in the first roundtable in this series, by Bill Schaue (ph), where you have different pools set up for different populations. You might see one health insurance pool for government employees and then another one set up for the private sector, or you might see one for the military and then another one for private sector. You might see them set up on village-level basis, so that each little village or cluster of villages has its own mutual insurance. We have sometimes seen the separation between people who are in formal and informal employment, so that you have some sort of employer-sponsored or -provided health insurance for those in formal employment, and then for informal employment there's a whole other system that's set up by the government. This kind of segregation often takes you into trouble because, as Laurie pointed out, if you want to really achieve the genius of risk pooling, you need to have a big enough pool. You need to have people with different health status. And the more that you separate them by variables that may be related to their health status, such as whether they have a steady government job or they have formal employment, the less benefit you're likely to get out of risk pooling at the household level. Another issue that comes up sometimes is enrollment. Some of these programs are mandatory. Some of them are voluntary. With the mandatory ones, sometimes even though everybody's supposed to get coverage, they have a registration process which is extremely difficult and onerous. And sometimes you have people who don't even have an official national identification number or card and it's very hard for them to actually sign up for the insurance which is their right. For the voluntary programs, we run into potential problems of adverse selection. Who are the people who are going to sign up for health insurance? You can bet that the first ones there are the ones who think they might be getting sick soon. This is something we're well familiar with in the U.S. And we've seen it happen. We've seen death spirals of insurance plans that occur as a result. So these are all issues that need to be taken into account, not just to ensure the success of the program, but to ensure that these benefits that we talked about percolate down to the household level. So in the paper, we have a few examples of some programs that are already in existence. We've drawn a little bit on the UHC Forward database from the joint learning program, which is referenced here. But I think what I'd like to talk about more is whether it works, whether we actually see evidence that these benefits can be accrued and what's associated with the accrual of those benefits. Well, for affordability, definitely yes. When we have UHC programs that don't have overly onerous user fees, we definitely see access to care improving. And along with that, not surprisingly, we see utilization of care rising as well. But that can sometimes be a bit of a double-edged sword, and sometimes it occurs, to the surprise of the government organizing the program or whatever the entity is that organizes it, because of moral hazard. You lower the price of care; people get more care; they might even be a little less careful about getting sick because the consequences are not so great. This happened in Taiwan in the '90s. They got a lot more utilization than they were expecting. They had to fiddle some budgets and see how they could adjust for the future. Another issue, though, with affordability is that the out-of-pocket cost doesn't always fall even when you set up a UHC program. And you might ask, well how could that possibly be? Well, we've run into some cases, for example in the Philippines, where the private providers that are reimbursed by the government see that the government is passing on only a small percentage of those costs to the consumer and they say, well, you can jack up the prices, basically charging the consumer the same as what they used to pay, but we're getting a bigger reimbursement from the government because the consumer only pays a small share of that. So some of these systems can be open to gaming, and that's something to look out for as well. But overall the evidence is quite strong that the affordability is improved, the access to care is improved, and so is utilization. In terms of evidence for the benefits of risk pooling, we certainly see big drops in catastrophic spending, and that is, as I said, probably the biggest benefit that we can expect and the most desirous one at the household level. And we see those in different regions all around the world. Several examples are cited in here. On human capacity, which was the third of these household benefits that I mentioned, we are starting to see some results. As you might expect, since it's somewhat indirect, it could take a little more time, and the scientific methods that you might use to gauge that are a little more difficult because there are a lot of things that could go into human capacity. So trying to figure out what's the delta that you get from this kind of program could be difficult. You need a randomized controlled trial or some other perhaps quasi-experimental design. Doing a rigorous paper is not the easiest thing, but we've seen a little bit. We've seen some benefits to worker productivity, as you might expect. And I think, by the way, some of the best proof that insurance coverage can improve worker productivity is the fact that you've seen some large employers in poor countries, like Pakistan for example, setting up basically HMOs for their workers and paying the bulk of the cost because they know that they'll recoup that in terms of reduced absenteeism and higher productivity. And we've mentioned a couple of those in the report. Also, in terms of human capacity, though, we are starting to see these effects on the next generation, that children's school enrollment, for example, in some of the Chinese rural health insurance demonstrations seems to go up, which could be because it's – they're not required to stay at home and take care of their parents when they're ill – something as simple as that. And these are the kinds of things that I hope that more economists like myself will look into because I think that they make a powerful case for the humanitarian aspects of universal health coverage. So I'll just end by giving you a little bit of a prospectus for the future. Obviously there are many reasons to consider a UHC program. As I said, there are many different models; it's not all about single payer, as Laurie said. But there are many potential benefits that you could capture. There's not rigorous evidence supporting all of them yet, but that's partly because we're in the early stages when it comes to the developing world and UHC. But I think that the household benefits that have been documented so far make a strong case. And when you see what the political leaders who have ushered in UHC and their countries have spoken about, it is indeed these household benefits that they say we cannot have our people burdened not just be health events, but by the catastrophic costs that come – can come with them if we hope to grow into the future. And some of the most far-sighted leaders have recognized this, and I hope that more will in the future. Thank you. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Daniel. Actually when I was listening to your report, received this message from the Kaiser Family Foundation about recent poll data on the American attitudes toward the Affordable Health Care Act that said there was a perfect divide on the Americans' attitudes toward the act. Indeed they found that more than 50 percent of all Americans still believe that the Supreme Court should rule it's unconstitutional, the individual mandate requiring nearly everyone obtaining health insurance. So – (chuckles) – despite that the – all those – the benefits that Daniel alluded to, the – it seems that Americans still haven't realized that. (Laughs.) MR. ALTMAN: Well, I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but this may be unconstitutional. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea. (Laughter.) MR. HUANG: So, OK. Alex? ALEXANDER S. PREKER: Well, thanks very much for having invited me here, Laurie and others from the – from New York, and I – it's – I'm delighted as a preliminary to my – to be here in this office. It's – congratulations to the council for having set up this new office here. So it's really nice. We'll have to come and have some of our meetings in the World Bank here. MS. GARRETT: Yeah, that long walk two blocks away. DR. PREKER: Exactly. So we – I'll forego the reimbursement on the taxi this time. MS. GARRETT: (Laughs.) DR. PREKER: So this is an immensely important topic, and it's interesting because Rob Hecht, who's here from Results for Development – he and I were working together in 1993 when the bank was doing its world health report on "Investing in Health," and one of the interesting things at that time was that we came up with some statistics that showed that although 90 percent of the disease burden in the world is in developing countries, only 10 percent of the financing is there. So there was this very big disparity between where the needs are and where the money is at the global level. Interestingly enough, if one looks at the data now, you know, which is almost 20 years later, it's not like that. It's 60-40, which demonstrates the change that has happened in the last 20 years in terms of distribution of financing globally. So you now have the BRIC countries – if you take the BRIC – and Goldman Sachs had coined this idea – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with "S" in the – in brackets – South Africa (was ?) sort of – was supposed to be part of that – and then, once they got through that, they added "N-11," the next 11, which includes countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. But what's interesting is how have those countries now performed in terms of – in terms of this agenda? Because one could say that, well, it's the BRIC N-11 that really would have the largest capacity. So let's look at whether or not those countries have actually been able, during that 20 years, while this shift in funding has actually taken place – you know, has there been a change in the way that the population might have access to that – that financing? So if we just look at the table now in – on page 10 for a second – and I think Daniel kind of highlighted this – but I just want to draw out a couple of observations on this table. So it's on Page 10. So it's interesting that when one looks at places like Kenya, where the size of the pool is 7 (percent), and then out of pocket is 51 (percent). And then you go down the list – Mali is the same, 3 (percent), 52 (percent); India a bit further down, 9 (percent) and 50 (percent). So the observation is that, you know, countries that really have poor coverage or poor pools end up spending a lot of money out of pocket. And of course the troubling part is then, when you now go further along and you see a place like (Turkish ?) Republic, which is 97 percent coverage – well, it's still got 40 percent out of pocket. And if you go down further on the list there – Philippines, 80 percent coverage, but 52 (percent) – (5)4 percent out of pocket. And then you go down to the bottom, which is where we would like to see it, Colombia and Thailand where 88 percent and 72 percent for Thailand; Colombia, 88 (percent). And there you have 8 (percent) and 16 (percent). So I think this where we now – need to now be thinking a little bit. How is it that at least two countries have succeeded in reaching the coverage level and then, at the same time, doing something about that out-of-pocket exposure that they – that the population has to health expenditure? And then other countries that, you know, one would say would – you know, they're part of the BRIC – you know, India is there; I don't see many of the other BRICS in there. Chile is not – no, China is not there. MS. GARRETT (?): Brazil is. DR. PREKER: Yeah, Brazil is there. So Brazil is there as well. And these countries are actually not doing well in the distribution of the – of the funding and clearly have not succeeded in putting in place a mechanism that dealt with that out-of-pocket side of the expenditure. So that raises a couple of issues, which I think is really the crux of the matter is that, you know, there's an ideological debate about scaling up and then there's the pragmatic debate about what you do about it. And I think this, in some ways, is also the thing that U.S. is facing right now. You've got the – you've got the ideological debate, but then you have a pragmatic debate. You know, what are the solutions and how do you actually achieve it? And that now – one of the pragmatic solutions is being challenged of course in the Supreme Court. But, you know, this was one of many options. It was not the only one, but it was one of many. And now that's being put to a test to see how consistent that is with other principles in society, and that's precisely what we find in many developing countries. So I worked a little bit in Ghana in the early – well, 2003 to 2007. And we helped the Ghanaian government at that time put in place a scale-up program for health insurance, essentially what – at the time that we started working with the government, they had – they had inherited a British-style health system, which was basically free care, universal coverage. So going back about 45 years, that's the kind of system that they had inherited. So on the – on the surface of it, you would say, well, that's great; you know, they – I mean, they came from a background where they had full coverage, and everybody had entitlement to services. Well, within 10 years after the colonial powers left, that system collapsed because the system didn't have enough money, and so what happened was that although you had a rule that said everybody has access to care, that rule eroded in practice, and people ended up spending money out of pocket because there wasn't enough money in the system. And then the government even came in with – initially, it was an informal kind of payment, but then the government eventually came in with a rule that said, well, if you are going to come to a public clinic, you have to pay something because, you know, our clinics are going bankrupt, so the Bamako type of thing that, you know, why shouldn't we be getting part of the money in the public sector, because we know you're paying the money anyways out of pocket, so why shouldn't the government benefit, and so we can finance part of our health service with that money out of pocket? And so they brought in a rule that – which was called in Ghana a kind of a nice term – it's called "cash and carry." You know, you come in with your cash, and you carry away the services. So they brought in that kind of a system. And that worked OK for a while. It did help a lot, studies that were done that showed that – like in Bamako, it showed the institutions that were collecting and were allowed to retain those fees that they did collect out of pocket ended up being better staffed and ended up having at least drugs so that when people went there, they actually got treated, whereas the clinics that didn't have that, although in principle, there was free care, basically, people were getting nothing. So they got free care, but they got free care to nothing. And I think this is what we are seeing in some of these places here. When you look at the – when you look at some of these statistics – (inaudible) – public, when 98 – 97 percent is free care, but clearly, they're getting nothing, because they are paying 40 percent out of pocket. So, you know, they are not getting what they want, so they are – they are choosing to finance. OK, so Ghana then decided, OK, we're going to abolish the "cash and carry," and instead of that, if people are willing to pay, why don't we, instead of having people pay at the point of service, why don't we just put that money in a pool, and the – I mean, clearly, the population is willing to pay, so that's good, so let's now take advantage of the fact that the population is willing to pay, we'll put that money into a pool, and we'll make that into an insurance program so that that way, everybody contributes a little bit, because you know, the evidence is there that they are willing to pay, but instead of paying when you get sick, people will pay ahead of time, and we create a health insurance system. So that's essentially what they did. They created a health insurance system, and then they said, well, but you know, many people can't afford to make that small contribution, so we're going to subsidize the people who can't afford to pay the premium. And what ended up happening then, of course, is that they put in place the system, and coverage went up very quickly to 70 percent. And then the thing unraveled because what was happening was all sorts of administrative things: The system wasn't able to clear the bills; they weren't able to handle the claims; they weren't able to register poor people, so even though poor people had access to the services, actually, poor people weren't getting registered, not unlike in the U.S., where you have the Medicaid patients – often there's a – you find – (inaudible) – statistic shows that many Medicaid patients actually don't register. It's either too complicated, or they don't register, or they may be illegal workers or whatever. There's a lot of reasons, but they don't get into the system. And so we found the same thing, that, you know, even though you have the system in place, the people who really should benefit, the rules are there, but they don't come in. And so I think once again we are seeing this here in this table, and which you are highlighting in this report, that the rules by themselves aren't enough unless you couple them with some pragmatic institutions. You know, and part of it is the human resources that you were mentioning. But there are a couple other very important things. And you know, drugs and equipment are two very important elements of a – of the health system that we often forget. And when you look at the expenditure in a health service, often the big expenditure item is actually drugs plus human resources. So in many – in many emerging economies, you can have as high as 50 percent, even 60 percent of the whole health expenditure is actually on pharmaceuticals. So once again, it means that a single thing can't solve the problem. You really have to have – it has to be an – universal coverage can't go by itself. It can't just be the front end where you're collecting the money, and then you say everybody is covered. It has to go along with institutional reforms. I think the report nicely highlights some of those institutional things that you think are important in this. And then I just want to end on one note is that those institutions, we often think kind of in concrete terms that those institutions are things like buildings and, you know, bodies – buildings and bodies and drugs and the equipment. But I'm now beginning to work in a part of the bank which looks at how better to work with the private sector. I work in the IFC part of the bank. And I work in a part of the IFC which is called the investment climate department, where we are looking at investment policies toward the private sector and whether or not those investment policies actually encourage the private sector to, one, be functional, and second of all, to have some sort of a social benefit. And it's really interest, a report that we have just come out of, following a survey that we did in the Africa region, which shows that many governments put in place programs that intend to mobilize resources and energy from the private sector. In fact, I think the statistic was somewhere close to 80 percent actually have rules about that. And only 6 percent actually implement them. So one of the big challenges, I think also in the insurance side, which we find in many countries and which once again you are highlighting in this report, is that the capacity to implement really has to be there, and it goes beyond the brick-mortar, the bodies and the – and the drugs. And it includes some of the rules and regulations and how those rules and regulations are enforced, but also the culture of the population that's using those services and whether or not those populations end up behaving in a way that's consistent with the new system that's in place. And with that, I'll just highlight a small final example that once again comes from Ghana, where you had a mother that came to a clinic with a child and was somebody that came from a background where she could have belonged to – you know, she could have belonged to the insurance scheme, or she could have been subsidized through the subsidies program. And once she got to the clinic, she didn't have coverage. And so the clinic said, well, I mean, the rules we have is that you have to have coverage, and if you don't, we can't give you care. And so she was turned down. And this of course became a very big scandal. It became a – you know, it became a political fiasco for two reasons. One, it was a political fiasco because, you know, why should a mother with a young child be refused care? You know, so that – you know, there was a moral aspect on the treatment part. But it was also a fiasco because it was a PR fiasco because of course if she had gotten the care, you now destroy the whole health insurance system because every other mother with a child would say, well, when we get sick, we can just walk in and we're going to get care, so why should we bother paying? So it opens up the floodgates with moral hazard and noncompliance. And I think that really demonstrates the very difficult position that governments and countries are in that are trying to do scale-up, that when you are trying to put in place things that will work, you will be forced – you – to confront that moral dilemma when the child and the mother comes to the clinic and where you have to make a judgment call. And unfortunately, of course, what often happens is that the individuals or the health care providers that are at that point of conflict, in the front line, end up making the wrong judgment calls at that point. And that of course is the big challenge that we face in many of these reforms that we're doing. So I think this is a tremendously timely report. Congratulations on some of the insights that you have in it. And we look forward to teaming up with you and taking this agenda forward, Laurie and others. So – MR. HUANG: Thank you, Alex. And to the story that you shared with us on Ghana actually until very recently happened every day in China, I believe. (Chuckles.) The – so as a presider, I have the privilege to ask the first question. This question will be about the relationship between the universal health coverage and equality. I think it is addressed in the report, although I probably didn't – in the talk, didn't allude to – but the – my question is that universal health coverage, by definition, means fairer, more efficient financing that pools risk and encourages prepayment to share health care cost equitably across the population. But the report seems to also indicate that there is no strong evidence supporting that spread of universal health coverage necessarily reduces inequality of health care access. So my question is: In what situation would universal health coverage lead to persistence, if not exacerbation, of inequality? MR. ALTMAN: Well – MR. HUANG: Daniel? MR. ALTMAN: Yeah, in answering your question, Yanzhong, I'll draw on a conversation with Julio Frenk last year. He's the former minister of health in Mexico and now dean of the School of Public Health at Harvard. And we were talking about what would improve health outcomes in developing countries, and we discussed the extension of care on a broader basis. And he said it's not going to make a fundamental difference to the lives of a lot of the poorest people until the bigger issues of inequality are addressed; that it – there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in the sense that inequality can breed poor health outcomes for people at the bottom, which can then worsen their outcomes in the labor force and thus worsen inequality in the long term. But I don't think I would start looking to universal health coverage to be a major reducer of inequality until some of the more fundamental drivers of inequality were addressed. It may have some effect on the margin, but there are such enormous other drivers at work right now – for example, just the opening of markets through globalization seems to decrease inequality between countries but increase it within countries, in many cases. You know, with that kind of wave percolating through your economy, it might be difficult to pick up the effect of UHC. But I would never underestimate the abilities of a skilled empirical economist in a randomized controlled trial. MS. GARRETT: (Off mic.) MR. HUANG: OK, I wonder – to both Laurie and Alex, can you respond? MS. GARRETT: Well, I – I'd like to take Alex's bottom line, the woman in Ghana going with her child for care and being turned away. There's a number of ways that scenario could have played out, and I've personally seen it play out in every one of these ways. One is – goes to the inequality question. I remember very well doing a series of following women who had babies in sub-Saharan African countries with high fevers. And it was fevers where it's a matter of life and death to seek appropriate care within – you have maybe a 24-, 48-hour window or the baby dies. In most cases, it was either – it was measles or malaria. And what I saw was, these women typically lived in the rural areas, but their husbands or the fathers of these children were typically in the cities, where they had a second family and lived a completely separate life. The women could not and would not violate relations with their husbands to go straight to the nearest clinic. They would go to the city, find the husband – with the ailing baby – get his permission and then go to the clinic. So no universal health coverage access is going to save that baby's life if the inequity in the gender relations in those marriages and across whole societies is an impediment to getting the appropriate care when you need it. But also with this example of the mother and ailing child, she may very well have had coverage and then gotten to a clinic that had no M.D. in the entire clinic, had no equipment, had no skilled personnel, or had – as we've all seen, if we've traveled widely in poor countries, had an alleged doctor, alleged medical staff, alleged equipment, and no electricity, no running water and no appropriate hygiene, so that seeking care could actually be a life-threatening event. So if all pieces are not in place, you obviously don't get to nirvana and you don't get to equity. And then I guess the final piece of the equity question is something that we all see around the world, the difference between rural and urban, and one key piece of that is not just that health provision is very concentrated in urban areas but also that your ability to access it will depend on your personal finances because you still have to pay for transport. So even if once you get to the clinic, the care is covered, you had to get there, and that becomes the other rate-limiting step that is class-biased. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. Can I just add one sentence onto that, which is, a lot of people say, isn't it easier for poor people to go to the hospital than rich people, because the value of rich people's time is so much higher – you know, they – if you have a hundred-dollar-an-hour job versus a minimum wage job? No, you're looking at it backwards. The problem is that that that minimum wage means a lot more to that person than a couple of hundred-dollar-an-hour hours to a wealthy person, and it's much harder for them to take that time away in going to the clinic, even if all the pieces of the puzzle, as Laurie said, are there. MR. HUANG: OK. Alex? MR. PREKER: OK, so on the universal – and equality, there's a troublesome dimension to that, and that is that in higher-income countries, it makes a lot of sense. If – you know, I'm Canadian. In Canada, everybody has access to care, and that means poor people and rich people have access to care, and Canadians are rich enough so we can afford to give away care to both rich and poor people. But the problem is, if you're living in Mali or in other very low-income countries, and you've got a hundred dollars, and you've got a hundred people, and you give $1 to each one of the hundred people, both the people who are rich and the people who are poor, then everybody's getting $1. But if you took the hundred dollars and you gave the hundred dollars to only the 20 people who are really poor, each one of those 20 people would be getting $5, and the other people would be getting – maybe spending other money, but they have the money to spend out of pocket, and therefore you'd actually be more successful in having equity by not extending universally and spreading the finances thinly across the whole population. So I think this is where we have the tension, I think, at low-income countries between the ideology of what we think is universalist and therefore, you know, it's good for the poor, and the reality of the economics; that when you actually do that and you execute it, you're actually taking money away from the poor whenever you have a program which is universal. MR. HUANG: Very interesting. So we have about 35 minutes. So I want to open the floor up to questions. Please identify yourself and your affiliation before responding. Please also flip your tent card to indicate that you have a question, and we also allow one-finger rule at – if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So I'm going to start with Jeanette. Q: Thank you. MR. HUANG: Oh, by the way, Jeanette is the new managing director of the Rockefeller Foundation in charge of health. Q: Thank you. Very interesting for me, because in fact it's a discourse that I am not familiar with. In fact people that are from developing countries, in general, when we talked about universal health coverage, we basically talked about access to care, not necessarily about the financial impact. So it has been very important for me to sort of listen to the discussion. I understand that there is an issue there; that basically the implicit assumption is that if you increase coverage, financial coverage, you will increase access and then you will improve health outcomes. I would challenge that, though, and I think that we need to discuss, probably in a different forum, about that implicit assumption. Now I'd like to make a comment – a couple of comments. The first one is the comment on universal health coverage and equity. In fact the issue there is in whatever dimension you are talking, if it is the financial dimension or the access dimension, in the road towards achieving 100 percent – let's say from 10 (percent) to 100 (percent) – not all the groups of the population benefit the same. So in fact when you begin to implement this – basically, in the road to universal, you create more inequities, unless you focus on beginning with the worst-off, which is what UNICEF in fact is doing in its newest strategy. They are basically making the case. And if you do the costing and the economic exercises, you realize that it's much more cost-effective to do it in that way. And then the other comment – and then I just want to use Table 10 as an example, because here there are some examples. There's one example that I know very well, which is the example of Chile, because in fact I'm Chilean. And you are saying here – the tables say here that we implemented the universal health coverage in 1979. I would say that in fact we destroyed universal health coverage in 1979, because until then we had basically a system that had one pool that provided access to everyone. The depth of the package, though – of course the system regulated through waiting lists, and in 1979 what happened is that the pools were divided into two, one private – I mean, several private, 15 in fact – and one public. And why I'm putting this example – not because I'm from Chile; I'm putting this example because it depends on your definition. I mean, if you think about the former Soviet Union countries, according to the definition of universal health coverage, they did have universal health coverage, and from one day to the other, they didn't have it. And what we are having now, it's basically the rebuilding of the universal health coverage using different instruments. And you can argue that in fact, it was a theoretical universal health coverage because people didn't get covered. In fact, they did; the issue was that they didn't get access to services. So what I'm trying to say is that the discussion, I think it's a bit more broader because it has to do with some historical process of reforms that I think Alex said in his intervention. And it's very interesting to continue this conversation. MR. HUANG: Jeanette, you mention the Soviet case. This actually remind me of China. Actually, China recent – just a couple of days ago, announced it has achieved universal health coverage. (Chuckles.) So covering 100 – 1.4 – nearly 1.4 billion people, well, that is truly an achievement, right? (Chuckles.) Laurie. MS. GARRETT: I think you raise some very important points, and they actually were all points that we debated and grappled with through this entire process – you know, trying to find a way to focus in and not end up producing another 1,000-page document that nobody reads. Well, hopefully somebody reads this. (Chuckles.) But, first of all, yes, different countries have tried to roll out universal health coverage in different ways. And many have, in fact, done exactly what you said: target the neediest first and work your way backwards. But as Daniel pointed out, many countries, this being one of them, has rolled out universal health coverage in ways that do not reflect needs, but rather specific groupings – military or – in our country, really tying access to coverage – not care, but coverage – to site of employment so that it became part of labor negotiations beginning in the early part of the 20th century. And companies that had organized labor tended to have good health insurance coverage, and those that didn't lacked it. So different countries have rolled out their systems in various ways. And I think often, the one that gets the most praise is what Julio Frenk rolled out in Mexico. But I think it's also instructive – and we have some citations to follow up if there is interest – I think it's also instructive to see the struggle that Brazil is having right now, because Brazil did, in fact, roll out very aggressively for the poorest population tier and created great tension within the middle class in Brazil that they're still struggling to cope with and to figure out what is justice and equity with some payment and some nonpayment in a system as complicated and massive as the nation of Brazil. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. It's – I agree very strongly that these are important issues to take into account, and I think that everything you said makes sense in theory. In practice, when you deal with the logistical and political implications of rolling out a system like this, it seems like, from experience around the world, it's easier to roll out a system to everyone and then start layering on the services rather than to start with a lot of services for a small group and then start layering on other populations for partly the same reasons that Laurie was referring to. But I would also point out that if you just start out providing care to the poorest, you're losing a lot of the potential benefit of risk pooling because you're targeting a population that's the sickest in society. MR. HUANG: Alex, you have a – MS. GARRETT: Add anything to – MR. PREKER: No. MR. HUANG: OK. Irena (ph)? Q: Thank you so much for such a great panel, first of all. I have a question related to a presentation, two months ago, of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the World Bank. And in his speech, he spoke about achievements in Georgia. And one of the achievements was hospitals all around the country. He calls these hospital like five-star hotels. And these hospitals are available for everyone. And in this context, I would like to ask this distinguished panel and especially Alex how it was made by coverage, how you see this model, because Georgia is not a rich country; probably it's a(n) emerging economy; maybe we can call it from poor-to middle-income country. And do you think this kind of model could work for other countries like this kind – this type of countries? And the other question is about equality, because even President Saakashvili stressed that all people, rural people, poorer people could come to this hospital. They are – have modern equipment. But anyway, they are not equal. I'm – but he said, for example, once in their life they could be – could have appropriate service – and how it's related to question of equality. And following – so Canada is famous for its health coverage. Why other countries, for example, United States, cannot follow this example in health coverage? MS. GARRETT: I'll take the latter, you take the former. (Laughter.) MR. PREKER: OK. Yes, then I don't have to defend the Canadian system. (Laughter.) Well, I think Georgia is quite typical of what happened in the – you know, the states that were part of the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the – of the former Soviet Union. I've been to Georgia several times, and – so I know exactly what you're talking about. The problem was that very shortly after the transition, the bank – the government in Georgia basically went bankrupt. It had a compression of economic growth, of – I think it was, like, 70 percent. It was one of the most hard-hit of the Eastern European countries in terms of – in terms of collapse of the economy. And so essentially the government was bankrupt, which meant that they had a very large stock of facilities, hospitals and also doctors that were on the payroll, because everybody was a civil servant on the payroll, or at least a government employee, and no money. And so people were not – basically, the salary bill stopped, people would no longer get paid, and there was no drugs in the hospital. I remember the last time I visited, which was I guess now close to 10 years ago, but at that time, you know, I had to walk up seven stairs because, you know, there was no light, there was no electricity. It was – basically, the service had collapsed. So in a context like that, you know, if you have one functioning hospital that actually is functioning, I mean, there is a need for tertiary care in Georgia like there's – anybody – anywhere else in the world. I mean, this is a country – it has a lot of chronic disease and a lot of acute disease that need to be dealt with. And, you know, you can die in the street or you can die in the hospital. But the issue, I think, that Georgia faces with this kind of a situation was – it's the same as we face in many other parts of the world – is if that hospital, now is functioning, was reserved and could be used only for the acute care that it was built for and not be giving primary care and stuff that could be given in clinics, then you might end up having something that actually works. But the problem is, because the rest of the health services collapsed, if you have one institution that has been made functional and you have the rest of the service that's collapsed, even in Georgia, this is never going to work, because you can't have 6 million or whatever it is that your population is – you can't have 6 million people coming to one place and getting care for primary care. It just – it's just not going to work. This institution will collapse unless, you know, it's – unless that institution sits on top of a – the pyramid of a large health service. So I think this is a – and it's a difficult dilemma many countries face, is because you like to have one place which provides decent care, but you're not going to – 6 million people are not going to be able to get care from that one place. MS. GARRETT: When I – 14 years ago, I traveled the – all over Georgia looking at their health system. And I think that the Georgia example is actually an interesting one that – for you to have raised because the advantage that Georgia today has is that the vast majority of the society truly rejected the Soviet model of health, and what they were left with was something so horrible – I mean, some of the worst atrocities I've ever seen in health care delivery, I saw back then in Georgia – you know, physicians with no gloves performing surgery, not able to scrub beforehand because there was no soap. So there – in a sense, they have an advantage now in that the – there was very little support for keeping what had existed and great possibility of coming in with a clean slate and trying to do the right thing. And similarly, Canada built its health system long ago on a clean slate. The United States has built incrementally hundreds of different health systems so thoroughly fragmented, each with its own interest groups dependent on its continued existence, that trying to create a single or even a workable financing mechanism is impossible in America. The best we can hope for is to make these fragmentary pieces work together a little bit better, be a bit better regulated so that they can't price gouge various elements of funding, and create better equity and pooling for the largest elements of the system. And that's what the health reform act tried to do. But, as you can see, there are many interests that seek – see that they will lose if that is fully implemented and therefore are very actively fighting against it. MR. HUANG: That's exactly what Debbie Fuentes (ph) said: just 90 percent politics, 10 percent technical-institutional details. (Laughs.) Let's see whether we have any questions from the participants – from the teleconference participants. Anybody? MS. GARRETT: On the phone. MR. HUANG: On the phone? OK – (laughs) – nobody. So Ben (ph). Q: Bart Szewczyk (ph), Wilmer Hale and G.W. law school. Thank you very much for all of your presentations. I wanted to ask, is there any empirical evidence between the degree of universal health coverage and long-term economic growth? I guess those studies would be probably difficult to do, but is there any evidence one way or the other? MR. ALTMAN: Short answer is no. If you're referring to sort of cross-sectional-type of analysis, that would be very difficult because the universal health coverage systems are so different that to throw in a single dummy variable for them would not give you a very good regression. So not putting it into technical terms, I think that would be very tough to do, to look at countries in comparison to each other and see whether there was an effect on growth. If you looked within one country, you'd have a better shot of finding an outcome. And there have been some studies even in the United States looking at Medicare. It's not completely universal, but it's universal for part of the population. And the idea was to take the burden of caring for the older generation away from people who could be otherwise productive in the workforce, in addition to all the other benefits that it might have. And you know, I think that there's some evidence to support positive effects, but spotty and not necessarily so generalizable across contexts that I would want to take it from one country and apply it to another. MR. HUANG: Comments? DR. PREKER: Yeah, I mean, there's been – recently, there's been the commission of growth – health and growth. So if you want to look at what they did, you – it's worthwhile just Googling that. I mean, there's basically two problems. One is that we haven't agreed on what universal coverage is, and so it's hard to do regressions against something you haven't defined yet. And so it's not an easy thing to draw the correlation. But there's a reverse correlation, and that is that countries that tend to go through rapid growth tend to become more inequitable during the growth phase (till you get ?) industrialization process. And during that inequity period, you tend to have health care becoming less equitable, like you saw in Georgia and other countries in Eastern Europe. So one has to be careful about the cause and effect there. But certainly if one looks at the world where you have rapid growth and economic growth, like China, those places – those places have become much more inequitable in health care. I don't think it's the health care that led to the growth, because you would then say, well, inequitable health care leads to growth. No, I think that's not the way it is. But I think you can expect to see inequity in health care appear when you have rapid population growth in some areas and where part of the population ends up having purchasing power, which means that they can buy care that the general population can't afford. MS. GARRETT: Can I follow up? Alex, I want to ask you about something. The – one of the things we've seen in the most rapidly expanding economies in the late 20th or early 21st centuries. If you look at China, if you look at post-Soviet Russia, you look at – less so at Brazil, and certainly in India, you see that as these economies explode, the public sector salaries for those that are not engaged in highly corruption-prone sectors do not keep pace with growth in the private sector. So there's the envy-of-your-neighbor problem, and that seems to compel, in a way, an increase in corruption in direct health provision so that – for example, I saw myself in China, a doctor will say to a patient, here's what – here's the free syringe; I can now give you an injection with it; it's been used before. (Laughter.) Here's the one that's still in its packaging, but that'll cost you $50. Do you want me to inject you with this one or this one? And that $50 is going to the doctor. So is there a way to have this economic growth without also enhancing not only the lack of equity, but also corruption within the health sector? DR. PREKER: All right, I don't have the answer to that. I mean, we know empirically that countries that go through a very rapid growth period, you have social consequences. And so it's one of the things that is there. And you know, when you (saw ?) – the definition of emerging markets by Goldman Sachs is it's growth in the double digits with large populations and where you have population dynamics that's moving towards aging. So that's the – you know, that's the definition of an emerging economy, and I think in most of the emerging economy, you've had – you've had problems in the health side. So they go through a phase and then, you know – then eventually, when you have a sufficient middle class that ends up with political power, then that middle class starts demanding social services that are reasonable for the middle class. And that's what you're basically seeing now in both China and India. You have the growth phase, and now you have a middle class that's beginning to say, we're not happy with this anymore; we're – you know, we want change. And so (there's ?) this change happening in both China and in India. MR. ALTMAN: (But ?) that creates an additional causality problem because it's the income growth that's leading to the health coverage, not vice versa. (Laughter.) DR. PREKER (?): Yeah. MR. HUANG: OK. Jesse? Q: Thanks. All right, Jesse Bump, Georgetown University. I just wanted to point out there's a tension between what we in the global health community think about as universal health coverage, which tends to be focused on equity and focused on the poorest and largely I think that comes from the mindset that that's the missing piece in existing health systems. But, as we move into the sub-Saharan and other areas where there really aren't very many systems themselves, I wanted to point out that in the health systems I've studied, none of them have come from the poor. They're all built around a paying customer at the beginning. And as Daniel said, this amounts to a rationing question, and rationing means it's an ethical issue that then has to get solved at the implementation stage around the history, politics, and economics of a particular population. Thanks. MR. HUANG: Comments? MS. GARRETT: Absolutely. MR. HUANG: (Laughs.) OK, fully agree. Robert? Q: Is that working? OK. Robert Hecht from Results for Development. This looks like a great report, and I'll read it – read it carefully. It seems to me if you look at what's going on around the world and try to understand the trends in health systems, health financing, access to care that Jeanette was talking about, financial protection, both of those dimensions, there – there's a lot of common language around universal coverage and there is some commonalities. But in my own observation, I think there are a lot of submovements within geographies and things are happening at different speeds and different ways, and I wonder if you've been thinking about that and would – will be bringing it out in some of your future work. In my casual look at things, it seems like there are lot of what I would call second-generation changes in health financing arrangements and coverage in some of the middle-income regions: Latin America, which already has a long history going back to the '60s, '70s, '80s; Eastern Europe – some of the Eastern European countries that made dramatic moves in the '90s and are now – they're burnishing their systems and making some gradual changes; Korea, which has recently merged many of its risk pools into a single one; Turkey – there are – there are – there are some trends going on that I would call second-generation type ones. In the OECD countries, we see this as – it's a – it's a – it's a never-ending process, so there are third- and fourth- – very interesting things going on in the Netherlands and in the U.K., and the NHS is constantly being reconfigured and reformulated. So the notion that there's not a single ending point but there's a constant evolution and that individual countries and groups of countries are moving at different speeds, I think, is worth reflecting on. In my own opinion, Africa is really at a stage of early experimentation and nothing more than that. There's a lot of hype right now, but – and there are some interesting things going on in places like Ghana and Rwanda and smaller-scale things in Nigeria and Kenya and places like that. But it's early experimentation, I would say. I think that the part of the world which is most exciting right now is East Asia and maybe India added because there, with rapid economic growth, all the political and economic underpinnings are there for quantum changes within these systems, and that's what we're seeing in China right now. India is thinking very – in very big terms, and it feels – is feeling its oats or whatever you call it, and wants to make some dramatic moves, is watching what China's doing. And places like Vietnam and Indonesia and so on you see, again, attempts to really complete somewhat fragmented systems. So trying to get a little more nuanced, maybe, would be – would be just an interesting suggestion for you to think about when you consider what's going on across these different geographies. The question I had, maybe for Laurie – because I know the council, when it does important work like this, often – it has a special – a special strength or comparative advantage in answering the question, well, what does this mean for the U.S. and for U.S. policy? And I didn't see anything in there, and I just wondered: Is that the next move? What does this mean for Raj? What does this mean for the CDC? What does this mean for Obama? What does this mean for the global programs that the U.S. supports and has a major say in, like the World Bank and the Global Fund and so on? It seems a little silent on the question of so what for U.S. – Council on Foreign Relations – (laughter) – for U.S. foreign policy? So I wondered if you could comment on that. MS. GARRETT: OK. MR. HUANG: The U.S. is the outlier. (Chuckles.) MS. GARRETT: Well, I mean, as usual, Bob Hecht comes in with the key question and also fascinating observation about regional shifts. I was surprised you left out Singapore, because many people think one of the most exciting sort of new health systems is Singapore and – financing model. Q: Medical savings accounts? MS. GARRETT: Well – Q: I don't think – I don't think so. I think that's – MS. GARRETT: OK. I'm just saying. Q: – that's the past, not the future, but – MS. GARRETT: I'm just saying. As far as the U.S. goes, we had many ways to try and tackle the UHC question. Probably most awkward one was, as Americans, to try and talk about health coverage. If there's one thing truly wrong in the United States, it's our tremendous inequity of affordable access to health care. And so I don't – we didn't feel particularly comfortable with being in the role that the United States should be telling the rest of the world, you know, how to finance health, but also that the Global Health Initiative's whole component with the sort of brass tacks of what it imagines to be health coverage and systems work is still very, very infant stage. Ariel Pablos-Mendez didn't even get in there until about a year ago – not even a year. Is it? How many – it's – 10 months ago? Q: August. MS. GARRETT: August. So – and then I think the other piece that added yet another layer of awkward to the question of what do we recommend about U.S. foreign policy is that we're all realistically on the edge of our seats what's going to be left of the U.S. support for its own account 150 budget by the time the FY '13 fight is over. And it's pretty hard to go out on a limb and say, and so then we should all do this huge program around universal health coverage or something if in fact we're going to be fighting to just keep very basic aspects of U.S. global health programming funded after, you know, October 1st or after – whenever we stop being – borrowing money to keep the lights on in Washington and actually pass a budget, which probably not be until late January 2013 or even February 2013. MR. HUANG: Daniel. MR. ALTMAN: I would just say, very quickly, if you can't give money, you can still give advice – (laughter) – and I think in this paper – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) Really? MR. ALTMAN: – in this paper, we're trying to highlight some of the issues that are worth considering if you're a country that's thinking about a UHC program. And we don't take a position on what U.S. policy should be, but if I had to take a guess, that – U.S. policy would at least look at some of these very same issues. I wish we had much more space to write about the regional shifts that you're discussing and some of these other issues, but as Laurie said earlier, we decided that the best thing we could do here was take a very focused look at one chunk of the problem where we seeing some early and immediate results and try and push the dialogue in that direction. MR. HUANG: Alex, you want to comment? MR. PREKER: No, that's fine. MR. HUANG: Oh. MS. GARRETT: I think Robert – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) OK. Robert, yes. Q: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. I just had another comment and I just wanted to first say that I think this discussion has been really useful, and I just want to thank all of you for putting in the time and putting together the reports and bringing this group of people together. And I think some of the questions that have been raised here, particularly around, you know, does UHC work, the kind of – one of the more fundamental questions – I just wanted to call everyone's attention to the fact that in September the Lancet British medical journal is putting together a special series on universal health coverage, and it will be launched then, and I think a few of the papers in that series will begin to answer some of the questions that have been raised here. But as those papers are currently in the review process, I don't want to say too much more, but I just wanted to raise the flag and put that on everyone's radar, that that will be coming up in a few months. So stay tuned for that. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Robert. I guess there's no questions from – but – so I'm going to ask if there's – OK. I'm going to ask the final question, again using my presider's privilege. It's about this relationship between universal health coverage and costs of care. Because obviously the report – it was on Page 13 – made it very clear that even the evidence collected to date makes a strong case for UHC as a way to cut costs, I'm curious: What kind of costs are we talking about here? Because if you look at the countries, economies such as Taiwan and China, there seems to be no indication that the spread of the UHC program would – leads to the reduction of the total health spending, because you could have the case, like in China, right, spread of UHC – actually the drop of the share of out-of-pocket spending or actually now the share is – has – is going to – drop below 30 percent, which is actually really low. But in the meantime, you found that the total health spending continued to dramatically increase. So that – if the salary level or income level can't catch up with the increase of total health spending, you would still end up paying in the – more out-of-pocket share , OK – no, not total out-of- – total out-of-pocket spending, I mean, in the – in terms of the actual – the dollar amount. MR. ALTMAN: Right. So I think there are two responses that go back to things that we have alluded to. One is, if you're looking for these macroefficiencies to be captured where your country all of a sudden is spending less on health care or getting more bang for its buck in health care, it may take time. It doesn't necessarily happen right at the very beginning of the UHC program, especially since a lot of these efficiencies, we think, are going to come from preventive care, which may take decades to pay off, in some cases. The second answer – and as – and I alluded to it in the case of Taiwan – is that utilization often goes up because the price has gone down, so your total costs end up being similar or even more. And sometimes it can go up much more quickly than you might expect. And then it's the question of whether there's moral hazard and whether you need to have some level of user fees just to keep it in check. You know, we talked about the woman and her baby being turned away from a health clinic, potentially. You know, in the United Kingdom, which has a very well-known national health insurance system, though obviously not a perfect one, nobody gets turned away. They don't even ask you for any form of identification. They don't, however, give the best quality of health care that's available in the country. And that has some – that goes some way to controlling the moral hazard. Those other high levels of health care are available. You have to pay for them a hundred percent out of pocket or get a corollary insurance plan to the public health insurance you already have. But it allows that other option. Now, that also introduces all sorts of new questions about equity and distribution of resources in the health sector that I'm sure Professor Bump (sp) and others would want to discuss with us. But I think that to your basic question about the overall macro level of health costs, there are those two basic responses. MR. HUANG: Any other comments? MR. PREKER: Well, just a quick economic response. Health care is a luxury good, and the observation we've had is that growth in health care is faster than GDP growth, which means that countries, as they get richer, are willing to – populations are willing to spend more. And that increases. So, you know, U.S. is most likely going to spend over 20 percent shortly. And there's no way of really stopping that. So the cost containment, which tends to be more in the public side – so when you put the lid on the expenditure in the public side, then it's natural people are going to spend out of pocket because if they can't get it on the public side, they're going to spend it personally because you've got a lot of – law of economics, and you've got to get the number up there somehow. So if it doesn't come from the public, it's going to come from the private. MS. GARRETT: Well, and this in a way goes to Robert Hecht's point because we – you know, in terms of the regional variations in trends because, you know, the truth is if there's no capping of any kind, no personal limit on spending, most people will demand the absolute nirvana of health: I want to live to be 110; I want to die in my sleep having had no aches and pains before I die. I mean, who doesn't have that fantasy? But for a system to be built with that as the, you know, gold standard to be achieved universally for all citizenry and payment to somehow be available to achieve such a standard is entirely unrealistic and will bankrupt the society very quickly. Well, I think we see now is all across Europe, where there's a great deal of experimentation going on, part of it is a realization that, A, the expectation level is too high in the population, so that not only is utilization extraordinary, but it's utilization for two weeks in a spa, you know, but also that the population is aging, so that the very expensive needs level is rising, that it's above expectations.   And I think it's realistic to look ahead and say, look, first of all, everybody's definition of what UHC is is going to be different. Each society is going to have its own cultural perspective, and that in many cases is going to reflect how the culture feels about health, how important is health in your culture, which kind of reminds me of a famous set of studies done by the Columbia Mailman School of Public Health back 10 years ago in the early days – 15 years ago – early days of the HIV pandemic, asking the question, why was it that uptake of HIV-related services and testing and even condom use was so poor in Harlem compared to down in Chelsea. So you had two specific communities on the island of Manhattan, both at very high risk for HIV, absolutely diametrically opposite utilization rates for services, regardless of payment. And the answer was simply that in the Chelsea neighborhood, which was overwhelmingly white and where most of the individuals at risk were gay men, it was a community that thought health was at the top of its agenda. It was the number one issue in their lives, and therefore they really fought for every single service they could get, whereas in Harlem, most of the people surveyed said, well, let's see, health, any aspect of health, even my pregnancy and having a safe baby, is down here compared to not getting shot, paying the rent, finding money for food tomorrow, getting my welfare check cashed, et cetera, so that by the time you got to, do I have hypertension, or am I at risk for HIV, it was 15 seconds of your 24-hour agenda. And I think that's yet another whole issue that plays into the regional variations and social variations and class variations in uptake and use of health services. We're just looking at a teeny little piece. And we hope that this has been helpful. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Obviously, this issue is much more complicated than we have expected – (chuckles) – that as the – this – the remarks of our speakers have indicated. So that concludes our universal health coverage round-table series. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our three speakers, Daniel, Laurie and Alex, for their contribution to this round-table meeting. And also, I'd like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation, especially Robert, for his crucial role in making that round-table series possible. And I'd also like to thank our research associates, and particularly Zoe Liberman – you have all received emails from her – and for her assistance in making that possible, and also for – (inaudible) – for her assistance this afternoon. And last but not least, I'd like to thank you all who participate in today's meetings for making such a lively and enjoyable discussion. And thank you. Enjoy rest of the day. (Applause.) -------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations, and this is our final meeting of the new Universal Health Coverage Roundtable Series. The meeting will discuss the council's new report, "The New Global Health Agenda: Universal Health Coverage." I said this report is officially released by the council, but the most important part and the most innovative part of the work actually was done by Dalberg, actually, led by Daniel Altman, Vicky Hausman and their teams. So we – privileged to have three speakers for today's discussion: Laurie Garrett, Daniel Altman and Alex Preker. All three of our speakers' full bios, are included in your handouts, so I'm not going to repeat them, save to say that Daniel is director of thought leadership at Dalberg Global Development Advisors; and Laurie is senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations and the only writer ever to have been awarded all three of the big Ps of journalism, the Peabody, the Polk and the Pulitzer, and she's also called by WHO Director General Margaret Chan as the foremost voice of global health. The third one – (chuckles) – just – not included in the handouts, but I heard what she say. The – Alex Preker – Alex is the head of Health Industry and Investment Policy at the World Bank Group. So for time's sake, we're going to begin with brief remarks from Laurie, followed by remarks from Daniel. And after Laurie and Daniel's remarks, Alex will comment as a respondent to the report, and then we're going to open up the floor to questions and discussion. So without further ado, Laurie. LAURIE GARRETT: Well, it's great to see you all here. Good afternoon and enjoy your lunch. And I'm sure there's more food if you feel, you know, necessary to dive out during my remarks to put another layer on your plate. And welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. If you've not previously been here, this is our Washington office. Headquarters, however, are in New York. In – among the global health team, one of our team members is based here in Washington, Tom Bollyky – there you are – and the rest of us are in the New York office. For quite some time, this phrase, UHC, universal health coverage, has been tossed about. And it seemed for years that whoever was using the term had a unique definition for it so that it was very hard to get your hands around what are we talking about when we say we want universal health coverage. If you were a Western European, you probably thought it meant you want a single-payer system run by this national government universally available to everybody in your country. If you were an American, you may very well have thought, well, that's something that's going to go to the Supreme Court. (Scattered laughter.) And if you were in most of the middle- and poor-income countries of the world, you thought, what a nice idea; not ever going to really be a reality for us. So at much prodding from the Rockefeller Foundation, to whom we're very grateful for the push to make this series of meetings and ultimate report happen, and Ariel Pablos-Mendez, who many of you probably know, who's now serving in USAID running global health programs, we tried to take this apart and deconstruct this whole concept of universal health coverage to find what's the bottom line that's a(n) actual workable target, realizing that there is a couple of trends that play into how you analyze this picture. The first is this very substantial, dramatic increase in the size, scope and funding of global health that occurred between roughly 2000 and 2008 and is now going downhill post-financial crisis. Most of this surge was very much initiative-based, and so it was about very specific targeted health efforts. But the further we got down that path, whether it was distributing antiretrovirals or dealing with tuberculosis prevention or bed nets for malaria, whatever it might be, the more all the participants came to recognize that if you didn't have a health system in place and you didn't have systems of health financing that removed the probability, the near certainty of bankruptcy for poor households that were afflicted with a key provider having a major illness, a traffic accident or anything that would debilitate them or kill them – if you didn't get to that core, then everything else would fall apart, and you were basically setting up a giant charity construct that would be endlessly dependent. And similarly, there has been a large body of literature going back for quite some time arguing back and forth about what is the role of the consumer or patient in their own health, and if all health is free, does it change the relationship between the provider and the consumer or patient and the commitment that the individual has to their own health protection – preventive care, diet, exercise, all of the above. Well, there are obviously three big problems when you talk about providing health. The first is that we have a fantastic deficit of skilled health care workers globally. And this can be defined in every single category, whether you're looking at dentists, lab technicians, pharmacists, surgeons, registered nurses, health administrators, hospital administrators; in every single category we have a deficit of personnel. And the deficit is, of course, most acute in the poorest countries in the world, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on a per capita basis. So that's your first challenge. The second is that the delivery systems themselves are largely very weak – in some cases quite chaotic – with difficult relations between the private providing systems, or chaos, and the public providing systems, or chaos. In many countries, the relationship between the private sector of health, which is often the number one provider – or the majority of all health care is administered privately – the relationship between that private sector and the public sector is very testy, even competitive and angry, and a spirit of cooperation is not present. And in large part, it's because one sector requires a hundred percent out-of-pocket payments on the part of the health consumer while the other sector is largely publicly or fully publicly supported. And this creates some obvious tensions for the individual as well. If you think you're going to get better care in the private sector but it'll bankrupt your family, what do you do? And then the – from the individual point of view, this question of bankruptcy is quite serious. The institute – the International Labor Organization did its own survey a few years ago looking at this question of the bankrupting impact of illness in the absence of health coverage. And their data points were quite startling. And what they were able to show was that in many societies – and I think, at this point, it is true of the United States – a major catastrophic illness can be the primary source of bankruptcy for personal and family bankruptcy. And we have not resolved this, clearly, in the U.S. Well, I'm going to let Daniel speak to the particulars of what's uniquely discovered in this report, but the one tip-off I want to give you is – couple of things: First, when we – we thought when you look at the question of universal health coverage, it's best to focus on it as a financing question, whether it's personal economics, family economics, village economics, country economics. Coverage is about payment. And it's best to push aside as somebody else's issue to deal with whether coverage actually gets you anything. In other words, it is wholly possible for you to have some system whereby your pay – your health is paid for – you have a voucher, you have insurance, you're in a national plan, whatever it may be – but there's no health care workers when you get to that clinic, or the clinic is in shambles when you get there. So there three pieces to you to – to actually providing health care to everybody, but the one piece we're looking at is the economic financing piece. And finally, I just couldn't help but notice that when the Dalberg group completed their analysis, they reached a key conclusion that turns out to coincide with the primary debate now inside the United States Supreme Court. It is a question of whether it is both feasible and desirable to try and build health coverage without resting it heavily on risk pooling, and that means some sort of mandate that both the well and the sick are in the same pool sharing the same burden, and that it is probably the only way to financially make it affordable for a community, a society, a country, a whole people. And with that, I'll be happy to pass off from there. Yanzhong. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Actually, before the – Dan gets started, I'm – I forgot that we have some housekeeping rules to announce. This meeting is on-the-record, so you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. But please turn off your cellphones. And with that, Daniel. DANIEL ALTMAN: Thank you, Laurie and Yanzhong. It's been a pleasure to work with both of you as we prepared this report. I should also thank the Rockefeller Foundation for its generous support of this work at CFR. It's a particular pleasure for me to be here presenting to you as a member of CFR. And I'd like to start by just speaking broadly about the potential benefits that we might see from universal health coverage. There are a lot of different ways where we might find benefit in the universal health coverage program, regardless of what the exact financing structure might be. And I'm going to separate them into three. I'm going to talk a little bit about the macro-level efficiencies that you might obtain, then what improvements you might get in health outcomes, and finally, about benefits for households. At the macro level – these are some of the benefits that get most attention, especially in this country, when we talk about universal coverage. One is – the simplest, perhaps, is if you get everybody under a single roof or the biggest roof possible, you could save a lot in administrative costs. And I remember back in '94 when I started to look at this issue, it was estimated that you could make savings of perhaps tens of billions of dollars by having a program like Medicare that covered people throughout their lives. That used to be a lot of money once upon a time. But more importantly, I think there's an idea that if you have a universal birth-to-death health care system which has a large coverage pool, you're getting a lot of efficiencies in how care is delivered. You're correcting a lot of incentive problems that currently jack up prices and costs within the system – for example, between the various parts of a hospital and its practices and the practices that it contracts with and their billing systems and their technicians. There are a lot of incentive and holdup problems that economists have and can identify in that system. It also helps us to coordinate care in a way that reduces waste. If the hospital and the rehabilitation center, the home health aides and the general practitioners are all connected, then we have less likelihood of wasted or ineffectual treatments. It allows us to negotiate lower prices, as some countries have already done. With drug manufacturers, for example, France has negotiated, as an entire country health system, to get lower prices. And finally, it can allow us to – and I will use the word ration high-cost care. When you are trying to provide health coverage for a large population, you find that you want to give the coverage where you get the most bang for the buck, and this is something that the United Kingdom has probably been a pioneering country in doing. So there are a lot of ways where you might be able to capture efficiencies and lower the cost to an entire economy of giving decent health care to its people. Now, just as important are what you're getting for that money, or what – the health outcomes that you're getting for that money that you pay. And it's worth talking about where those benefits could arise. It's not the focus of this report, for reasons that I'll explain later, but I think it deserves mention. First of all, you would expect that more people would get some kind of care if there is universal coverage, and you would also expect that more people will reserve – will receive some formal medical care, what we consider advanced, technologically enabled medical care, as opposed to traditional medicine, which can be ineffective or even counterproductive. As one of my colleagues over at the Intel-Grameen social enterprise said, they're getting care now, they're just getting it from the quacks. And so to the extent that you can shift that towards formal medicine, that might have benefit. Also, because of the coordination of care that I mentioned earlier, you tend to have fewer errors, people getting the wrong treatment, that could actually harm them, as well as being inefficient. But we also find that you're treating patients earlier. What happens in this country, for example, quite often is people wait until something is really bad and then they show up at the emergency room if they can't afford to pay for care through normal channels or if they don't have insurance. We could avoid something like that if we had universal coverage. Finally, perhaps most importantly, there's much more incentive for preventive care. If you're paying the health costs of somebody throughout their life, you want to start early with preventive care so that those costs will be reduced over the course of their life. And these – all of these factors could help to lead to better health outcomes. Now, in addition to the macro-efficiencies and health outcomes, we can see some possibilities for gains within the household. One which is quite important, that Laurie was alluding to earlier, is the affordability of care. It's not the case that the poor people consume a smaller percentage of their income in health care. They consume about the same percentage of their income in health care. But because their incomes are much lower, they get a lot less care. The cost – the prices of care are not proportionately lower. So to the extent that we can mitigate that, it could be a good thing. And it's especially important if you're worried about public health, because if people anywhere in your society aren't getting treated for diseases, you have problems of contagion that could arise, especially in countries that have problems with epidemics on an unfortunately somewhat regular basis. But even more, beyond the affordability of care, just going to a doctor or getting some sort of basic treatment, there is the potential benefit of risk pooling. And this is the genius of insurance, as any economist will tell you, that you're able to pool risk with a large group so that at no time do you have to make some extraordinary outlay in order to cover your costs. This is extremely important, especially when the out-of-pocket cost of health care is high, which it is in many of the developing countries that we may talk about today. And the final benefit, I think, that could accrue to households and is worth noting is in human capacity. An adverse health event in the household, especially of poor households, can have a lot of negative effects, not just on the person who has the health event, who might not be able to work, might not be able to be productive, but they might not be able to take care of their children, their children might therefore suffer some effects of this. There's a whole cascade of effects that can arise. And so if you were able to somewhat – to somehow mitigate those health disasters and, in fact, as I said, disconnect them from financial disasters as well, through risk pooling, you might see knock-on effects in human capacity. And that's something that researchers really (have/haven't ?) investigated. So these last benefits, these household benefits, are the ones we're going to focus on today, and there are a couple reasons for that. One is that the macro-efficiencies that we've spoken about have not necessarily been the biggest focus for a lot of developing countries that have delved into universal health coverage, because they haven't had much of a health system to begin with, and thus, you know, it's not as though you're moving from one very sophisticated system to another and seeing what efficiencies you might capture. You're sort of building a system from scratch, in many cases, and you're building UHC at the same time as you're building the health system itself. And another reason why we're focusing on the household benefits is because those health outcomes are often very difficult to determine in the early years of a UHC program. And since we are in the early years in many developing countries, the evidence is scarce, though not non-existent. If some of you would like to follow up with the work of Gideon (sp) and Diaz (sp) that's cited in the paper, you can see quite a few studies that are trying to gauge the early effects, often looking at things like infant mortality, which you can gauge today rather than looking 20 years later to see how healthy somebody is. And there have been pluses and minuses. In some cases you find improvements in health outcomes; in some cases you find almost no effect. But it may be early days to gauge that. So for all of those reasons, we chose to focus, especially in a short paper like this, on these household benefits, which should be almost immediately perceptible. If you're trying to reduce the financial burden of adverse health events in households, that should be something that we can see right away. And in fact we can. So that's what I'll be outlining the evidence on for you. What I think is a useful bottom line here is to think about how we might create a virtuous cycle of less financial burden on households, better health, more investment in health, and then less financial burden and more investment in health going forward. You know, health is such a fundamental aspect of development, the best development economists in the world seem only to agree about health as the one sine qua non, the one thing you need to get off the ground. Even the evidence on education, which also seems so fundamental, is much more mixed. But if you can get reasonable health status for people in a poor country, they have a much better shot of turning it into a rich country. And so we want to use the tools that we have – and UHC is one of them – to perhaps set in motion this virtuous cycle of better health investment and then better health for future generations. Well, let's talk about a few of the issues that come up when you start to consider a UHC system and how to capture some of these household benefits. One is the affordability of the program itself for households. How easy is it for them to actually opt in to the system and to use the services that might be provided to them? One issue that comes up constantly is that of user fees. And there are a lot of different ways to gauge user fees. It could be a copayment for a physician's visit; it could be some sort of deductible; it could be a percentage of costs. User fees have almost always been found to discourage people's use of care. And if the idea of universal health coverage is to increase the access of care, you have to make sure that it's within the ability and willingness of people to pay. One tool that you can use to assure that to some degree is a cap on annual spending. You can say, OK, well, we have user fees, but only up to $50 a year, and after that everything's paid for. So these are sort of two variables that you can already tweak, or two dials that you could tweak as you're designing your UHC system. But I think just as important as these variables are the ones that are related to risk pooling. We've seen a lot of different systems grow up around the world. Some of them were spoken about, in the first roundtable in this series, by Bill Schaue (ph), where you have different pools set up for different populations. You might see one health insurance pool for government employees and then another one set up for the private sector, or you might see one for the military and then another one for private sector. You might see them set up on village-level basis, so that each little village or cluster of villages has its own mutual insurance. We have sometimes seen the separation between people who are in formal and informal employment, so that you have some sort of employer-sponsored or -provided health insurance for those in formal employment, and then for informal employment there's a whole other system that's set up by the government. This kind of segregation often takes you into trouble because, as Laurie pointed out, if you want to really achieve the genius of risk pooling, you need to have a big enough pool. You need to have people with different health status. And the more that you separate them by variables that may be related to their health status, such as whether they have a steady government job or they have formal employment, the less benefit you're likely to get out of risk pooling at the household level. Another issue that comes up sometimes is enrollment. Some of these programs are mandatory. Some of them are voluntary. With the mandatory ones, sometimes even though everybody's supposed to get coverage, they have a registration process which is extremely difficult and onerous. And sometimes you have people who don't even have an official national identification number or card and it's very hard for them to actually sign up for the insurance which is their right. For the voluntary programs, we run into potential problems of adverse selection. Who are the people who are going to sign up for health insurance? You can bet that the first ones there are the ones who think they might be getting sick soon. This is something we're well familiar with in the U.S. And we've seen it happen. We've seen death spirals of insurance plans that occur as a result. So these are all issues that need to be taken into account, not just to ensure the success of the program, but to ensure that these benefits that we talked about percolate down to the household level. So in the paper, we have a few examples of some programs that are already in existence. We've drawn a little bit on the UHC Forward database from the joint learning program, which is referenced here. But I think what I'd like to talk about more is whether it works, whether we actually see evidence that these benefits can be accrued and what's associated with the accrual of those benefits. Well, for affordability, definitely yes. When we have UHC programs that don't have overly onerous user fees, we definitely see access to care improving. And along with that, not surprisingly, we see utilization of care rising as well. But that can sometimes be a bit of a double-edged sword, and sometimes it occurs, to the surprise of the government organizing the program or whatever the entity is that organizes it, because of moral hazard. You lower the price of care; people get more care; they might even be a little less careful about getting sick because the consequences are not so great. This happened in Taiwan in the '90s. They got a lot more utilization than they were expecting. They had to fiddle some budgets and see how they could adjust for the future. Another issue, though, with affordability is that the out-of-pocket cost doesn't always fall even when you set up a UHC program. And you might ask, well how could that possibly be? Well, we've run into some cases, for example in the Philippines, where the private providers that are reimbursed by the government see that the government is passing on only a small percentage of those costs to the consumer and they say, well, you can jack up the prices, basically charging the consumer the same as what they used to pay, but we're getting a bigger reimbursement from the government because the consumer only pays a small share of that. So some of these systems can be open to gaming, and that's something to look out for as well. But overall the evidence is quite strong that the affordability is improved, the access to care is improved, and so is utilization. In terms of evidence for the benefits of risk pooling, we certainly see big drops in catastrophic spending, and that is, as I said, probably the biggest benefit that we can expect and the most desirous one at the household level. And we see those in different regions all around the world. Several examples are cited in here. On human capacity, which was the third of these household benefits that I mentioned, we are starting to see some results. As you might expect, since it's somewhat indirect, it could take a little more time, and the scientific methods that you might use to gauge that are a little more difficult because there are a lot of things that could go into human capacity. So trying to figure out what's the delta that you get from this kind of program could be difficult. You need a randomized controlled trial or some other perhaps quasi-experimental design. Doing a rigorous paper is not the easiest thing, but we've seen a little bit. We've seen some benefits to worker productivity, as you might expect. And I think, by the way, some of the best proof that insurance coverage can improve worker productivity is the fact that you've seen some large employers in poor countries, like Pakistan for example, setting up basically HMOs for their workers and paying the bulk of the cost because they know that they'll recoup that in terms of reduced absenteeism and higher productivity. And we've mentioned a couple of those in the report. Also, in terms of human capacity, though, we are starting to see these effects on the next generation, that children's school enrollment, for example, in some of the Chinese rural health insurance demonstrations seems to go up, which could be because it's – they're not required to stay at home and take care of their parents when they're ill – something as simple as that. And these are the kinds of things that I hope that more economists like myself will look into because I think that they make a powerful case for the humanitarian aspects of universal health coverage. So I'll just end by giving you a little bit of a prospectus for the future. Obviously there are many reasons to consider a UHC program. As I said, there are many different models; it's not all about single payer, as Laurie said. But there are many potential benefits that you could capture. There's not rigorous evidence supporting all of them yet, but that's partly because we're in the early stages when it comes to the developing world and UHC. But I think that the household benefits that have been documented so far make a strong case. And when you see what the political leaders who have ushered in UHC and their countries have spoken about, it is indeed these household benefits that they say we cannot have our people burdened not just be health events, but by the catastrophic costs that come – can come with them if we hope to grow into the future. And some of the most far-sighted leaders have recognized this, and I hope that more will in the future. Thank you. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Daniel. Actually when I was listening to your report, received this message from the Kaiser Family Foundation about recent poll data on the American attitudes toward the Affordable Health Care Act that said there was a perfect divide on the Americans' attitudes toward the act. Indeed they found that more than 50 percent of all Americans still believe that the Supreme Court should rule it's unconstitutional, the individual mandate requiring nearly everyone obtaining health insurance. So – (chuckles) – despite that the – all those – the benefits that Daniel alluded to, the – it seems that Americans still haven't realized that. (Laughs.) MR. ALTMAN: Well, I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but this may be unconstitutional. That doesn't mean it's a bad idea. (Laughter.) MR. HUANG: So, OK. Alex? ALEXANDER S. PREKER: Well, thanks very much for having invited me here, Laurie and others from the – from New York, and I – it's – I'm delighted as a preliminary to my – to be here in this office. It's – congratulations to the council for having set up this new office here. So it's really nice. We'll have to come and have some of our meetings in the World Bank here. MS. GARRETT: Yeah, that long walk two blocks away. DR. PREKER: Exactly. So we – I'll forego the reimbursement on the taxi this time. MS. GARRETT: (Laughs.) DR. PREKER: So this is an immensely important topic, and it's interesting because Rob Hecht, who's here from Results for Development – he and I were working together in 1993 when the bank was doing its world health report on "Investing in Health," and one of the interesting things at that time was that we came up with some statistics that showed that although 90 percent of the disease burden in the world is in developing countries, only 10 percent of the financing is there. So there was this very big disparity between where the needs are and where the money is at the global level. Interestingly enough, if one looks at the data now, you know, which is almost 20 years later, it's not like that. It's 60-40, which demonstrates the change that has happened in the last 20 years in terms of distribution of financing globally. So you now have the BRIC countries – if you take the BRIC – and Goldman Sachs had coined this idea – Brazil, Russia, India and China – with "S" in the – in brackets – South Africa (was ?) sort of – was supposed to be part of that – and then, once they got through that, they added "N-11," the next 11, which includes countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. But what's interesting is how have those countries now performed in terms of – in terms of this agenda? Because one could say that, well, it's the BRIC N-11 that really would have the largest capacity. So let's look at whether or not those countries have actually been able, during that 20 years, while this shift in funding has actually taken place – you know, has there been a change in the way that the population might have access to that – that financing? So if we just look at the table now in – on page 10 for a second – and I think Daniel kind of highlighted this – but I just want to draw out a couple of observations on this table. So it's on Page 10. So it's interesting that when one looks at places like Kenya, where the size of the pool is 7 (percent), and then out of pocket is 51 (percent). And then you go down the list – Mali is the same, 3 (percent), 52 (percent); India a bit further down, 9 (percent) and 50 (percent). So the observation is that, you know, countries that really have poor coverage or poor pools end up spending a lot of money out of pocket. And of course the troubling part is then, when you now go further along and you see a place like (Turkish ?) Republic, which is 97 percent coverage – well, it's still got 40 percent out of pocket. And if you go down further on the list there – Philippines, 80 percent coverage, but 52 (percent) – (5)4 percent out of pocket. And then you go down to the bottom, which is where we would like to see it, Colombia and Thailand where 88 percent and 72 percent for Thailand; Colombia, 88 (percent). And there you have 8 (percent) and 16 (percent). So I think this where we now – need to now be thinking a little bit. How is it that at least two countries have succeeded in reaching the coverage level and then, at the same time, doing something about that out-of-pocket exposure that they – that the population has to health expenditure? And then other countries that, you know, one would say would – you know, they're part of the BRIC – you know, India is there; I don't see many of the other BRICS in there. Chile is not – no, China is not there. MS. GARRETT (?): Brazil is. DR. PREKER: Yeah, Brazil is there. So Brazil is there as well. And these countries are actually not doing well in the distribution of the – of the funding and clearly have not succeeded in putting in place a mechanism that dealt with that out-of-pocket side of the expenditure. So that raises a couple of issues, which I think is really the crux of the matter is that, you know, there's an ideological debate about scaling up and then there's the pragmatic debate about what you do about it. And I think this, in some ways, is also the thing that U.S. is facing right now. You've got the – you've got the ideological debate, but then you have a pragmatic debate. You know, what are the solutions and how do you actually achieve it? And that now – one of the pragmatic solutions is being challenged of course in the Supreme Court. But, you know, this was one of many options. It was not the only one, but it was one of many. And now that's being put to a test to see how consistent that is with other principles in society, and that's precisely what we find in many developing countries. So I worked a little bit in Ghana in the early – well, 2003 to 2007. And we helped the Ghanaian government at that time put in place a scale-up program for health insurance, essentially what – at the time that we started working with the government, they had – they had inherited a British-style health system, which was basically free care, universal coverage. So going back about 45 years, that's the kind of system that they had inherited. So on the – on the surface of it, you would say, well, that's great; you know, they – I mean, they came from a background where they had full coverage, and everybody had entitlement to services. Well, within 10 years after the colonial powers left, that system collapsed because the system didn't have enough money, and so what happened was that although you had a rule that said everybody has access to care, that rule eroded in practice, and people ended up spending money out of pocket because there wasn't enough money in the system. And then the government even came in with – initially, it was an informal kind of payment, but then the government eventually came in with a rule that said, well, if you are going to come to a public clinic, you have to pay something because, you know, our clinics are going bankrupt, so the Bamako type of thing that, you know, why shouldn't we be getting part of the money in the public sector, because we know you're paying the money anyways out of pocket, so why shouldn't the government benefit, and so we can finance part of our health service with that money out of pocket? And so they brought in a rule that – which was called in Ghana a kind of a nice term – it's called "cash and carry." You know, you come in with your cash, and you carry away the services. So they brought in that kind of a system. And that worked OK for a while. It did help a lot, studies that were done that showed that – like in Bamako, it showed the institutions that were collecting and were allowed to retain those fees that they did collect out of pocket ended up being better staffed and ended up having at least drugs so that when people went there, they actually got treated, whereas the clinics that didn't have that, although in principle, there was free care, basically, people were getting nothing. So they got free care, but they got free care to nothing. And I think this is what we are seeing in some of these places here. When you look at the – when you look at some of these statistics – (inaudible) – public, when 98 – 97 percent is free care, but clearly, they're getting nothing, because they are paying 40 percent out of pocket. So, you know, they are not getting what they want, so they are – they are choosing to finance. OK, so Ghana then decided, OK, we're going to abolish the "cash and carry," and instead of that, if people are willing to pay, why don't we, instead of having people pay at the point of service, why don't we just put that money in a pool, and the – I mean, clearly, the population is willing to pay, so that's good, so let's now take advantage of the fact that the population is willing to pay, we'll put that money into a pool, and we'll make that into an insurance program so that that way, everybody contributes a little bit, because you know, the evidence is there that they are willing to pay, but instead of paying when you get sick, people will pay ahead of time, and we create a health insurance system. So that's essentially what they did. They created a health insurance system, and then they said, well, but you know, many people can't afford to make that small contribution, so we're going to subsidize the people who can't afford to pay the premium. And what ended up happening then, of course, is that they put in place the system, and coverage went up very quickly to 70 percent. And then the thing unraveled because what was happening was all sorts of administrative things: The system wasn't able to clear the bills; they weren't able to handle the claims; they weren't able to register poor people, so even though poor people had access to the services, actually, poor people weren't getting registered, not unlike in the U.S., where you have the Medicaid patients – often there's a – you find – (inaudible) – statistic shows that many Medicaid patients actually don't register. It's either too complicated, or they don't register, or they may be illegal workers or whatever. There's a lot of reasons, but they don't get into the system. And so we found the same thing, that, you know, even though you have the system in place, the people who really should benefit, the rules are there, but they don't come in. And so I think once again we are seeing this here in this table, and which you are highlighting in this report, that the rules by themselves aren't enough unless you couple them with some pragmatic institutions. You know, and part of it is the human resources that you were mentioning. But there are a couple other very important things. And you know, drugs and equipment are two very important elements of a – of the health system that we often forget. And when you look at the expenditure in a health service, often the big expenditure item is actually drugs plus human resources. So in many – in many emerging economies, you can have as high as 50 percent, even 60 percent of the whole health expenditure is actually on pharmaceuticals. So once again, it means that a single thing can't solve the problem. You really have to have – it has to be an – universal coverage can't go by itself. It can't just be the front end where you're collecting the money, and then you say everybody is covered. It has to go along with institutional reforms. I think the report nicely highlights some of those institutional things that you think are important in this. And then I just want to end on one note is that those institutions, we often think kind of in concrete terms that those institutions are things like buildings and, you know, bodies – buildings and bodies and drugs and the equipment. But I'm now beginning to work in a part of the bank which looks at how better to work with the private sector. I work in the IFC part of the bank. And I work in a part of the IFC which is called the investment climate department, where we are looking at investment policies toward the private sector and whether or not those investment policies actually encourage the private sector to, one, be functional, and second of all, to have some sort of a social benefit. And it's really interest, a report that we have just come out of, following a survey that we did in the Africa region, which shows that many governments put in place programs that intend to mobilize resources and energy from the private sector. In fact, I think the statistic was somewhere close to 80 percent actually have rules about that. And only 6 percent actually implement them. So one of the big challenges, I think also in the insurance side, which we find in many countries and which once again you are highlighting in this report, is that the capacity to implement really has to be there, and it goes beyond the brick-mortar, the bodies and the – and the drugs. And it includes some of the rules and regulations and how those rules and regulations are enforced, but also the culture of the population that's using those services and whether or not those populations end up behaving in a way that's consistent with the new system that's in place. And with that, I'll just highlight a small final example that once again comes from Ghana, where you had a mother that came to a clinic with a child and was somebody that came from a background where she could have belonged to – you know, she could have belonged to the insurance scheme, or she could have been subsidized through the subsidies program. And once she got to the clinic, she didn't have coverage. And so the clinic said, well, I mean, the rules we have is that you have to have coverage, and if you don't, we can't give you care. And so she was turned down. And this of course became a very big scandal. It became a – you know, it became a political fiasco for two reasons. One, it was a political fiasco because, you know, why should a mother with a young child be refused care? You know, so that – you know, there was a moral aspect on the treatment part. But it was also a fiasco because it was a PR fiasco because of course if she had gotten the care, you now destroy the whole health insurance system because every other mother with a child would say, well, when we get sick, we can just walk in and we're going to get care, so why should we bother paying? So it opens up the floodgates with moral hazard and noncompliance. And I think that really demonstrates the very difficult position that governments and countries are in that are trying to do scale-up, that when you are trying to put in place things that will work, you will be forced – you – to confront that moral dilemma when the child and the mother comes to the clinic and where you have to make a judgment call. And unfortunately, of course, what often happens is that the individuals or the health care providers that are at that point of conflict, in the front line, end up making the wrong judgment calls at that point. And that of course is the big challenge that we face in many of these reforms that we're doing. So I think this is a tremendously timely report. Congratulations on some of the insights that you have in it. And we look forward to teaming up with you and taking this agenda forward, Laurie and others. So – MR. HUANG: Thank you, Alex. And to the story that you shared with us on Ghana actually until very recently happened every day in China, I believe. (Chuckles.) The – so as a presider, I have the privilege to ask the first question. This question will be about the relationship between the universal health coverage and equality. I think it is addressed in the report, although I probably didn't – in the talk, didn't allude to – but the – my question is that universal health coverage, by definition, means fairer, more efficient financing that pools risk and encourages prepayment to share health care cost equitably across the population. But the report seems to also indicate that there is no strong evidence supporting that spread of universal health coverage necessarily reduces inequality of health care access. So my question is: In what situation would universal health coverage lead to persistence, if not exacerbation, of inequality? MR. ALTMAN: Well – MR. HUANG: Daniel? MR. ALTMAN: Yeah, in answering your question, Yanzhong, I'll draw on a conversation with Julio Frenk last year. He's the former minister of health in Mexico and now dean of the School of Public Health at Harvard. And we were talking about what would improve health outcomes in developing countries, and we discussed the extension of care on a broader basis. And he said it's not going to make a fundamental difference to the lives of a lot of the poorest people until the bigger issues of inequality are addressed; that it – there is a chicken-and-egg problem here in the sense that inequality can breed poor health outcomes for people at the bottom, which can then worsen their outcomes in the labor force and thus worsen inequality in the long term. But I don't think I would start looking to universal health coverage to be a major reducer of inequality until some of the more fundamental drivers of inequality were addressed. It may have some effect on the margin, but there are such enormous other drivers at work right now – for example, just the opening of markets through globalization seems to decrease inequality between countries but increase it within countries, in many cases. You know, with that kind of wave percolating through your economy, it might be difficult to pick up the effect of UHC. But I would never underestimate the abilities of a skilled empirical economist in a randomized controlled trial. MS. GARRETT: (Off mic.) MR. HUANG: OK, I wonder – to both Laurie and Alex, can you respond? MS. GARRETT: Well, I – I'd like to take Alex's bottom line, the woman in Ghana going with her child for care and being turned away. There's a number of ways that scenario could have played out, and I've personally seen it play out in every one of these ways. One is – goes to the inequality question. I remember very well doing a series of following women who had babies in sub-Saharan African countries with high fevers. And it was fevers where it's a matter of life and death to seek appropriate care within – you have maybe a 24-, 48-hour window or the baby dies. In most cases, it was either – it was measles or malaria. And what I saw was, these women typically lived in the rural areas, but their husbands or the fathers of these children were typically in the cities, where they had a second family and lived a completely separate life. The women could not and would not violate relations with their husbands to go straight to the nearest clinic. They would go to the city, find the husband – with the ailing baby – get his permission and then go to the clinic. So no universal health coverage access is going to save that baby's life if the inequity in the gender relations in those marriages and across whole societies is an impediment to getting the appropriate care when you need it. But also with this example of the mother and ailing child, she may very well have had coverage and then gotten to a clinic that had no M.D. in the entire clinic, had no equipment, had no skilled personnel, or had – as we've all seen, if we've traveled widely in poor countries, had an alleged doctor, alleged medical staff, alleged equipment, and no electricity, no running water and no appropriate hygiene, so that seeking care could actually be a life-threatening event. So if all pieces are not in place, you obviously don't get to nirvana and you don't get to equity. And then I guess the final piece of the equity question is something that we all see around the world, the difference between rural and urban, and one key piece of that is not just that health provision is very concentrated in urban areas but also that your ability to access it will depend on your personal finances because you still have to pay for transport. So even if once you get to the clinic, the care is covered, you had to get there, and that becomes the other rate-limiting step that is class-biased. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. Can I just add one sentence onto that, which is, a lot of people say, isn't it easier for poor people to go to the hospital than rich people, because the value of rich people's time is so much higher – you know, they – if you have a hundred-dollar-an-hour job versus a minimum wage job? No, you're looking at it backwards. The problem is that that that minimum wage means a lot more to that person than a couple of hundred-dollar-an-hour hours to a wealthy person, and it's much harder for them to take that time away in going to the clinic, even if all the pieces of the puzzle, as Laurie said, are there. MR. HUANG: OK. Alex? MR. PREKER: OK, so on the universal – and equality, there's a troublesome dimension to that, and that is that in higher-income countries, it makes a lot of sense. If – you know, I'm Canadian. In Canada, everybody has access to care, and that means poor people and rich people have access to care, and Canadians are rich enough so we can afford to give away care to both rich and poor people. But the problem is, if you're living in Mali or in other very low-income countries, and you've got a hundred dollars, and you've got a hundred people, and you give $1 to each one of the hundred people, both the people who are rich and the people who are poor, then everybody's getting $1. But if you took the hundred dollars and you gave the hundred dollars to only the 20 people who are really poor, each one of those 20 people would be getting $5, and the other people would be getting – maybe spending other money, but they have the money to spend out of pocket, and therefore you'd actually be more successful in having equity by not extending universally and spreading the finances thinly across the whole population. So I think this is where we have the tension, I think, at low-income countries between the ideology of what we think is universalist and therefore, you know, it's good for the poor, and the reality of the economics; that when you actually do that and you execute it, you're actually taking money away from the poor whenever you have a program which is universal. MR. HUANG: Very interesting. So we have about 35 minutes. So I want to open the floor up to questions. Please identify yourself and your affiliation before responding. Please also flip your tent card to indicate that you have a question, and we also allow one-finger rule at – if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So I'm going to start with Jeanette. Q: Thank you. MR. HUANG: Oh, by the way, Jeanette is the new managing director of the Rockefeller Foundation in charge of health. Q: Thank you. Very interesting for me, because in fact it's a discourse that I am not familiar with. In fact people that are from developing countries, in general, when we talked about universal health coverage, we basically talked about access to care, not necessarily about the financial impact. So it has been very important for me to sort of listen to the discussion. I understand that there is an issue there; that basically the implicit assumption is that if you increase coverage, financial coverage, you will increase access and then you will improve health outcomes. I would challenge that, though, and I think that we need to discuss, probably in a different forum, about that implicit assumption. Now I'd like to make a comment – a couple of comments. The first one is the comment on universal health coverage and equity. In fact the issue there is in whatever dimension you are talking, if it is the financial dimension or the access dimension, in the road towards achieving 100 percent – let's say from 10 (percent) to 100 (percent) – not all the groups of the population benefit the same. So in fact when you begin to implement this – basically, in the road to universal, you create more inequities, unless you focus on beginning with the worst-off, which is what UNICEF in fact is doing in its newest strategy. They are basically making the case. And if you do the costing and the economic exercises, you realize that it's much more cost-effective to do it in that way. And then the other comment – and then I just want to use Table 10 as an example, because here there are some examples. There's one example that I know very well, which is the example of Chile, because in fact I'm Chilean. And you are saying here – the tables say here that we implemented the universal health coverage in 1979. I would say that in fact we destroyed universal health coverage in 1979, because until then we had basically a system that had one pool that provided access to everyone. The depth of the package, though – of course the system regulated through waiting lists, and in 1979 what happened is that the pools were divided into two, one private – I mean, several private, 15 in fact – and one public. And why I'm putting this example – not because I'm from Chile; I'm putting this example because it depends on your definition. I mean, if you think about the former Soviet Union countries, according to the definition of universal health coverage, they did have universal health coverage, and from one day to the other, they didn't have it. And what we are having now, it's basically the rebuilding of the universal health coverage using different instruments. And you can argue that in fact, it was a theoretical universal health coverage because people didn't get covered. In fact, they did; the issue was that they didn't get access to services. So what I'm trying to say is that the discussion, I think it's a bit more broader because it has to do with some historical process of reforms that I think Alex said in his intervention. And it's very interesting to continue this conversation. MR. HUANG: Jeanette, you mention the Soviet case. This actually remind me of China. Actually, China recent – just a couple of days ago, announced it has achieved universal health coverage. (Chuckles.) So covering 100 – 1.4 – nearly 1.4 billion people, well, that is truly an achievement, right? (Chuckles.) Laurie. MS. GARRETT: I think you raise some very important points, and they actually were all points that we debated and grappled with through this entire process – you know, trying to find a way to focus in and not end up producing another 1,000-page document that nobody reads. Well, hopefully somebody reads this. (Chuckles.) But, first of all, yes, different countries have tried to roll out universal health coverage in different ways. And many have, in fact, done exactly what you said: target the neediest first and work your way backwards. But as Daniel pointed out, many countries, this being one of them, has rolled out universal health coverage in ways that do not reflect needs, but rather specific groupings – military or – in our country, really tying access to coverage – not care, but coverage – to site of employment so that it became part of labor negotiations beginning in the early part of the 20th century. And companies that had organized labor tended to have good health insurance coverage, and those that didn't lacked it. So different countries have rolled out their systems in various ways. And I think often, the one that gets the most praise is what Julio Frenk rolled out in Mexico. But I think it's also instructive – and we have some citations to follow up if there is interest – I think it's also instructive to see the struggle that Brazil is having right now, because Brazil did, in fact, roll out very aggressively for the poorest population tier and created great tension within the middle class in Brazil that they're still struggling to cope with and to figure out what is justice and equity with some payment and some nonpayment in a system as complicated and massive as the nation of Brazil. MR. ALTMAN: Yeah. It's – I agree very strongly that these are important issues to take into account, and I think that everything you said makes sense in theory. In practice, when you deal with the logistical and political implications of rolling out a system like this, it seems like, from experience around the world, it's easier to roll out a system to everyone and then start layering on the services rather than to start with a lot of services for a small group and then start layering on other populations for partly the same reasons that Laurie was referring to. But I would also point out that if you just start out providing care to the poorest, you're losing a lot of the potential benefit of risk pooling because you're targeting a population that's the sickest in society. MR. HUANG: Alex, you have a – MS. GARRETT: Add anything to – MR. PREKER: No. MR. HUANG: OK. Irena (ph)? Q: Thank you so much for such a great panel, first of all. I have a question related to a presentation, two months ago, of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili at the World Bank. And in his speech, he spoke about achievements in Georgia. And one of the achievements was hospitals all around the country. He calls these hospital like five-star hotels. And these hospitals are available for everyone. And in this context, I would like to ask this distinguished panel and especially Alex how it was made by coverage, how you see this model, because Georgia is not a rich country; probably it's a(n) emerging economy; maybe we can call it from poor-to middle-income country. And do you think this kind of model could work for other countries like this kind – this type of countries? And the other question is about equality, because even President Saakashvili stressed that all people, rural people, poorer people could come to this hospital. They are – have modern equipment. But anyway, they are not equal. I'm – but he said, for example, once in their life they could be – could have appropriate service – and how it's related to question of equality. And following – so Canada is famous for its health coverage. Why other countries, for example, United States, cannot follow this example in health coverage? MS. GARRETT: I'll take the latter, you take the former. (Laughter.) MR. PREKER: OK. Yes, then I don't have to defend the Canadian system. (Laughter.) Well, I think Georgia is quite typical of what happened in the – you know, the states that were part of the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the – of the former Soviet Union. I've been to Georgia several times, and – so I know exactly what you're talking about. The problem was that very shortly after the transition, the bank – the government in Georgia basically went bankrupt. It had a compression of economic growth, of – I think it was, like, 70 percent. It was one of the most hard-hit of the Eastern European countries in terms of – in terms of collapse of the economy. And so essentially the government was bankrupt, which meant that they had a very large stock of facilities, hospitals and also doctors that were on the payroll, because everybody was a civil servant on the payroll, or at least a government employee, and no money. And so people were not – basically, the salary bill stopped, people would no longer get paid, and there was no drugs in the hospital. I remember the last time I visited, which was I guess now close to 10 years ago, but at that time, you know, I had to walk up seven stairs because, you know, there was no light, there was no electricity. It was – basically, the service had collapsed. So in a context like that, you know, if you have one functioning hospital that actually is functioning, I mean, there is a need for tertiary care in Georgia like there's – anybody – anywhere else in the world. I mean, this is a country – it has a lot of chronic disease and a lot of acute disease that need to be dealt with. And, you know, you can die in the street or you can die in the hospital. But the issue, I think, that Georgia faces with this kind of a situation was – it's the same as we face in many other parts of the world – is if that hospital, now is functioning, was reserved and could be used only for the acute care that it was built for and not be giving primary care and stuff that could be given in clinics, then you might end up having something that actually works. But the problem is, because the rest of the health services collapsed, if you have one institution that has been made functional and you have the rest of the service that's collapsed, even in Georgia, this is never going to work, because you can't have 6 million or whatever it is that your population is – you can't have 6 million people coming to one place and getting care for primary care. It just – it's just not going to work. This institution will collapse unless, you know, it's – unless that institution sits on top of a – the pyramid of a large health service. So I think this is a – and it's a difficult dilemma many countries face, is because you like to have one place which provides decent care, but you're not going to – 6 million people are not going to be able to get care from that one place. MS. GARRETT: When I – 14 years ago, I traveled the – all over Georgia looking at their health system. And I think that the Georgia example is actually an interesting one that – for you to have raised because the advantage that Georgia today has is that the vast majority of the society truly rejected the Soviet model of health, and what they were left with was something so horrible – I mean, some of the worst atrocities I've ever seen in health care delivery, I saw back then in Georgia – you know, physicians with no gloves performing surgery, not able to scrub beforehand because there was no soap. So there – in a sense, they have an advantage now in that the – there was very little support for keeping what had existed and great possibility of coming in with a clean slate and trying to do the right thing. And similarly, Canada built its health system long ago on a clean slate. The United States has built incrementally hundreds of different health systems so thoroughly fragmented, each with its own interest groups dependent on its continued existence, that trying to create a single or even a workable financing mechanism is impossible in America. The best we can hope for is to make these fragmentary pieces work together a little bit better, be a bit better regulated so that they can't price gouge various elements of funding, and create better equity and pooling for the largest elements of the system. And that's what the health reform act tried to do. But, as you can see, there are many interests that seek – see that they will lose if that is fully implemented and therefore are very actively fighting against it. MR. HUANG: That's exactly what Debbie Fuentes (ph) said: just 90 percent politics, 10 percent technical-institutional details. (Laughs.) Let's see whether we have any questions from the participants – from the teleconference participants. Anybody? MS. GARRETT: On the phone. MR. HUANG: On the phone? OK – (laughs) – nobody. So Ben (ph). Q: Bart Szewczyk (ph), Wilmer Hale and G.W. law school. Thank you very much for all of your presentations. I wanted to ask, is there any empirical evidence between the degree of universal health coverage and long-term economic growth? I guess those studies would be probably difficult to do, but is there any evidence one way or the other? MR. ALTMAN: Short answer is no. If you're referring to sort of cross-sectional-type of analysis, that would be very difficult because the universal health coverage systems are so different that to throw in a single dummy variable for them would not give you a very good regression. So not putting it into technical terms, I think that would be very tough to do, to look at countries in comparison to each other and see whether there was an effect on growth. If you looked within one country, you'd have a better shot of finding an outcome. And there have been some studies even in the United States looking at Medicare. It's not completely universal, but it's universal for part of the population. And the idea was to take the burden of caring for the older generation away from people who could be otherwise productive in the workforce, in addition to all the other benefits that it might have. And you know, I think that there's some evidence to support positive effects, but spotty and not necessarily so generalizable across contexts that I would want to take it from one country and apply it to another. MR. HUANG: Comments? DR. PREKER: Yeah, I mean, there's been – recently, there's been the commission of growth – health and growth. So if you want to look at what they did, you – it's worthwhile just Googling that. I mean, there's basically two problems. One is that we haven't agreed on what universal coverage is, and so it's hard to do regressions against something you haven't defined yet. And so it's not an easy thing to draw the correlation. But there's a reverse correlation, and that is that countries that tend to go through rapid growth tend to become more inequitable during the growth phase (till you get ?) industrialization process. And during that inequity period, you tend to have health care becoming less equitable, like you saw in Georgia and other countries in Eastern Europe. So one has to be careful about the cause and effect there. But certainly if one looks at the world where you have rapid growth and economic growth, like China, those places – those places have become much more inequitable in health care. I don't think it's the health care that led to the growth, because you would then say, well, inequitable health care leads to growth. No, I think that's not the way it is. But I think you can expect to see inequity in health care appear when you have rapid population growth in some areas and where part of the population ends up having purchasing power, which means that they can buy care that the general population can't afford. MS. GARRETT: Can I follow up? Alex, I want to ask you about something. The – one of the things we've seen in the most rapidly expanding economies in the late 20th or early 21st centuries. If you look at China, if you look at post-Soviet Russia, you look at – less so at Brazil, and certainly in India, you see that as these economies explode, the public sector salaries for those that are not engaged in highly corruption-prone sectors do not keep pace with growth in the private sector. So there's the envy-of-your-neighbor problem, and that seems to compel, in a way, an increase in corruption in direct health provision so that – for example, I saw myself in China, a doctor will say to a patient, here's what – here's the free syringe; I can now give you an injection with it; it's been used before. (Laughter.) Here's the one that's still in its packaging, but that'll cost you $50. Do you want me to inject you with this one or this one? And that $50 is going to the doctor. So is there a way to have this economic growth without also enhancing not only the lack of equity, but also corruption within the health sector? DR. PREKER: All right, I don't have the answer to that. I mean, we know empirically that countries that go through a very rapid growth period, you have social consequences. And so it's one of the things that is there. And you know, when you (saw ?) – the definition of emerging markets by Goldman Sachs is it's growth in the double digits with large populations and where you have population dynamics that's moving towards aging. So that's the – you know, that's the definition of an emerging economy, and I think in most of the emerging economy, you've had – you've had problems in the health side. So they go through a phase and then, you know – then eventually, when you have a sufficient middle class that ends up with political power, then that middle class starts demanding social services that are reasonable for the middle class. And that's what you're basically seeing now in both China and India. You have the growth phase, and now you have a middle class that's beginning to say, we're not happy with this anymore; we're – you know, we want change. And so (there's ?) this change happening in both China and in India. MR. ALTMAN: (But ?) that creates an additional causality problem because it's the income growth that's leading to the health coverage, not vice versa. (Laughter.) DR. PREKER (?): Yeah. MR. HUANG: OK. Jesse? Q: Thanks. All right, Jesse Bump, Georgetown University. I just wanted to point out there's a tension between what we in the global health community think about as universal health coverage, which tends to be focused on equity and focused on the poorest and largely I think that comes from the mindset that that's the missing piece in existing health systems. But, as we move into the sub-Saharan and other areas where there really aren't very many systems themselves, I wanted to point out that in the health systems I've studied, none of them have come from the poor. They're all built around a paying customer at the beginning. And as Daniel said, this amounts to a rationing question, and rationing means it's an ethical issue that then has to get solved at the implementation stage around the history, politics, and economics of a particular population. Thanks. MR. HUANG: Comments? MS. GARRETT: Absolutely. MR. HUANG: (Laughs.) OK, fully agree. Robert? Q: Is that working? OK. Robert Hecht from Results for Development. This looks like a great report, and I'll read it – read it carefully. It seems to me if you look at what's going on around the world and try to understand the trends in health systems, health financing, access to care that Jeanette was talking about, financial protection, both of those dimensions, there – there's a lot of common language around universal coverage and there is some commonalities. But in my own observation, I think there are a lot of submovements within geographies and things are happening at different speeds and different ways, and I wonder if you've been thinking about that and would – will be bringing it out in some of your future work. In my casual look at things, it seems like there are lot of what I would call second-generation changes in health financing arrangements and coverage in some of the middle-income regions: Latin America, which already has a long history going back to the '60s, '70s, '80s; Eastern Europe – some of the Eastern European countries that made dramatic moves in the '90s and are now – they're burnishing their systems and making some gradual changes; Korea, which has recently merged many of its risk pools into a single one; Turkey – there are – there are – there are some trends going on that I would call second-generation type ones. In the OECD countries, we see this as – it's a – it's a – it's a never-ending process, so there are third- and fourth- – very interesting things going on in the Netherlands and in the U.K., and the NHS is constantly being reconfigured and reformulated. So the notion that there's not a single ending point but there's a constant evolution and that individual countries and groups of countries are moving at different speeds, I think, is worth reflecting on. In my own opinion, Africa is really at a stage of early experimentation and nothing more than that. There's a lot of hype right now, but – and there are some interesting things going on in places like Ghana and Rwanda and smaller-scale things in Nigeria and Kenya and places like that. But it's early experimentation, I would say. I think that the part of the world which is most exciting right now is East Asia and maybe India added because there, with rapid economic growth, all the political and economic underpinnings are there for quantum changes within these systems, and that's what we're seeing in China right now. India is thinking very – in very big terms, and it feels – is feeling its oats or whatever you call it, and wants to make some dramatic moves, is watching what China's doing. And places like Vietnam and Indonesia and so on you see, again, attempts to really complete somewhat fragmented systems. So trying to get a little more nuanced, maybe, would be – would be just an interesting suggestion for you to think about when you consider what's going on across these different geographies. The question I had, maybe for Laurie – because I know the council, when it does important work like this, often – it has a special – a special strength or comparative advantage in answering the question, well, what does this mean for the U.S. and for U.S. policy? And I didn't see anything in there, and I just wondered: Is that the next move? What does this mean for Raj? What does this mean for the CDC? What does this mean for Obama? What does this mean for the global programs that the U.S. supports and has a major say in, like the World Bank and the Global Fund and so on? It seems a little silent on the question of so what for U.S. – Council on Foreign Relations – (laughter) – for U.S. foreign policy? So I wondered if you could comment on that. MS. GARRETT: OK. MR. HUANG: The U.S. is the outlier. (Chuckles.) MS. GARRETT: Well, I mean, as usual, Bob Hecht comes in with the key question and also fascinating observation about regional shifts. I was surprised you left out Singapore, because many people think one of the most exciting sort of new health systems is Singapore and – financing model. Q: Medical savings accounts? MS. GARRETT: Well – Q: I don't think – I don't think so. I think that's – MS. GARRETT: OK. I'm just saying. Q: – that's the past, not the future, but – MS. GARRETT: I'm just saying. As far as the U.S. goes, we had many ways to try and tackle the UHC question. Probably most awkward one was, as Americans, to try and talk about health coverage. If there's one thing truly wrong in the United States, it's our tremendous inequity of affordable access to health care. And so I don't – we didn't feel particularly comfortable with being in the role that the United States should be telling the rest of the world, you know, how to finance health, but also that the Global Health Initiative's whole component with the sort of brass tacks of what it imagines to be health coverage and systems work is still very, very infant stage. Ariel Pablos-Mendez didn't even get in there until about a year ago – not even a year. Is it? How many – it's – 10 months ago? Q: August. MS. GARRETT: August. So – and then I think the other piece that added yet another layer of awkward to the question of what do we recommend about U.S. foreign policy is that we're all realistically on the edge of our seats what's going to be left of the U.S. support for its own account 150 budget by the time the FY '13 fight is over. And it's pretty hard to go out on a limb and say, and so then we should all do this huge program around universal health coverage or something if in fact we're going to be fighting to just keep very basic aspects of U.S. global health programming funded after, you know, October 1st or after – whenever we stop being – borrowing money to keep the lights on in Washington and actually pass a budget, which probably not be until late January 2013 or even February 2013. MR. HUANG: Daniel. MR. ALTMAN: I would just say, very quickly, if you can't give money, you can still give advice – (laughter) – and I think in this paper – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) Really? MR. ALTMAN: – in this paper, we're trying to highlight some of the issues that are worth considering if you're a country that's thinking about a UHC program. And we don't take a position on what U.S. policy should be, but if I had to take a guess, that – U.S. policy would at least look at some of these very same issues. I wish we had much more space to write about the regional shifts that you're discussing and some of these other issues, but as Laurie said earlier, we decided that the best thing we could do here was take a very focused look at one chunk of the problem where we seeing some early and immediate results and try and push the dialogue in that direction. MR. HUANG: Alex, you want to comment? MR. PREKER: No, that's fine. MR. HUANG: Oh. MS. GARRETT: I think Robert – MR. HUANG: (Chuckling.) OK. Robert, yes. Q: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you. I just had another comment and I just wanted to first say that I think this discussion has been really useful, and I just want to thank all of you for putting in the time and putting together the reports and bringing this group of people together. And I think some of the questions that have been raised here, particularly around, you know, does UHC work, the kind of – one of the more fundamental questions – I just wanted to call everyone's attention to the fact that in September the Lancet British medical journal is putting together a special series on universal health coverage, and it will be launched then, and I think a few of the papers in that series will begin to answer some of the questions that have been raised here. But as those papers are currently in the review process, I don't want to say too much more, but I just wanted to raise the flag and put that on everyone's radar, that that will be coming up in a few months. So stay tuned for that. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Robert. I guess there's no questions from – but – so I'm going to ask if there's – OK. I'm going to ask the final question, again using my presider's privilege. It's about this relationship between universal health coverage and costs of care. Because obviously the report – it was on Page 13 – made it very clear that even the evidence collected to date makes a strong case for UHC as a way to cut costs, I'm curious: What kind of costs are we talking about here? Because if you look at the countries, economies such as Taiwan and China, there seems to be no indication that the spread of the UHC program would – leads to the reduction of the total health spending, because you could have the case, like in China, right, spread of UHC – actually the drop of the share of out-of-pocket spending or actually now the share is – has – is going to – drop below 30 percent, which is actually really low. But in the meantime, you found that the total health spending continued to dramatically increase. So that – if the salary level or income level can't catch up with the increase of total health spending, you would still end up paying in the – more out-of-pocket share , OK – no, not total out-of- – total out-of-pocket spending, I mean, in the – in terms of the actual – the dollar amount. MR. ALTMAN: Right. So I think there are two responses that go back to things that we have alluded to. One is, if you're looking for these macroefficiencies to be captured where your country all of a sudden is spending less on health care or getting more bang for its buck in health care, it may take time. It doesn't necessarily happen right at the very beginning of the UHC program, especially since a lot of these efficiencies, we think, are going to come from preventive care, which may take decades to pay off, in some cases. The second answer – and as – and I alluded to it in the case of Taiwan – is that utilization often goes up because the price has gone down, so your total costs end up being similar or even more. And sometimes it can go up much more quickly than you might expect. And then it's the question of whether there's moral hazard and whether you need to have some level of user fees just to keep it in check. You know, we talked about the woman and her baby being turned away from a health clinic, potentially. You know, in the United Kingdom, which has a very well-known national health insurance system, though obviously not a perfect one, nobody gets turned away. They don't even ask you for any form of identification. They don't, however, give the best quality of health care that's available in the country. And that has some – that goes some way to controlling the moral hazard. Those other high levels of health care are available. You have to pay for them a hundred percent out of pocket or get a corollary insurance plan to the public health insurance you already have. But it allows that other option. Now, that also introduces all sorts of new questions about equity and distribution of resources in the health sector that I'm sure Professor Bump (sp) and others would want to discuss with us. But I think that to your basic question about the overall macro level of health costs, there are those two basic responses. MR. HUANG: Any other comments? MR. PREKER: Well, just a quick economic response. Health care is a luxury good, and the observation we've had is that growth in health care is faster than GDP growth, which means that countries, as they get richer, are willing to – populations are willing to spend more. And that increases. So, you know, U.S. is most likely going to spend over 20 percent shortly. And there's no way of really stopping that. So the cost containment, which tends to be more in the public side – so when you put the lid on the expenditure in the public side, then it's natural people are going to spend out of pocket because if they can't get it on the public side, they're going to spend it personally because you've got a lot of – law of economics, and you've got to get the number up there somehow. So if it doesn't come from the public, it's going to come from the private. MS. GARRETT: Well, and this in a way goes to Robert Hecht's point because we – you know, in terms of the regional variations in trends because, you know, the truth is if there's no capping of any kind, no personal limit on spending, most people will demand the absolute nirvana of health: I want to live to be 110; I want to die in my sleep having had no aches and pains before I die. I mean, who doesn't have that fantasy? But for a system to be built with that as the, you know, gold standard to be achieved universally for all citizenry and payment to somehow be available to achieve such a standard is entirely unrealistic and will bankrupt the society very quickly. Well, I think we see now is all across Europe, where there's a great deal of experimentation going on, part of it is a realization that, A, the expectation level is too high in the population, so that not only is utilization extraordinary, but it's utilization for two weeks in a spa, you know, but also that the population is aging, so that the very expensive needs level is rising, that it's above expectations.   And I think it's realistic to look ahead and say, look, first of all, everybody's definition of what UHC is is going to be different. Each society is going to have its own cultural perspective, and that in many cases is going to reflect how the culture feels about health, how important is health in your culture, which kind of reminds me of a famous set of studies done by the Columbia Mailman School of Public Health back 10 years ago in the early days – 15 years ago – early days of the HIV pandemic, asking the question, why was it that uptake of HIV-related services and testing and even condom use was so poor in Harlem compared to down in Chelsea. So you had two specific communities on the island of Manhattan, both at very high risk for HIV, absolutely diametrically opposite utilization rates for services, regardless of payment. And the answer was simply that in the Chelsea neighborhood, which was overwhelmingly white and where most of the individuals at risk were gay men, it was a community that thought health was at the top of its agenda. It was the number one issue in their lives, and therefore they really fought for every single service they could get, whereas in Harlem, most of the people surveyed said, well, let's see, health, any aspect of health, even my pregnancy and having a safe baby, is down here compared to not getting shot, paying the rent, finding money for food tomorrow, getting my welfare check cashed, et cetera, so that by the time you got to, do I have hypertension, or am I at risk for HIV, it was 15 seconds of your 24-hour agenda. And I think that's yet another whole issue that plays into the regional variations and social variations and class variations in uptake and use of health services. We're just looking at a teeny little piece. And we hope that this has been helpful. MR. HUANG: Thank you, Laurie. Obviously, this issue is much more complicated than we have expected – (chuckles) – that as the – this – the remarks of our speakers have indicated. So that concludes our universal health coverage round-table series. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our three speakers, Daniel, Laurie and Alex, for their contribution to this round-table meeting. And also, I'd like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation, especially Robert, for his crucial role in making that round-table series possible. And I'd also like to thank our research associates, and particularly Zoe Liberman – you have all received emails from her – and for her assistance in making that possible, and also for – (inaudible) – for her assistance this afternoon. And last but not least, I'd like to thank you all who participate in today's meetings for making such a lively and enjoyable discussion. And thank you. Enjoy rest of the day. (Applause.) -------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. 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  • Health Policy and Initiatives
    The Global Fund at Ten Years: Reflecting on Its Impact and Looking Forward to Challenges Ahead
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    YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang. It's pronounced as Hwawng (ph), not Hwang (ph). (Chuckles.) We had that experience last week. I was in Boston. You know, I was on a standby list. You know, they were calling Hwang (ph), Hwang (ph), and I -- who? -- (laughter). So -- I'm a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is our fourth meeting of the new Emerging Powers in Global Health Governance Roundtable Series. And on April 9th, our third roundtable meeting, in New York, had Chris Elias speaking about the role of Gates Foundation in global health. Today we focus on another major player in global health, the Global Fund, which is the world's largest player -- funder of AIDS, TB and malaria projects, and also maybe, arguably, the most viable multilateral providing funding for global health. And this meeting will examine the Global Fund's contribution to global health over the past decade and its ongoing efforts to transform the organization into a more effective and accountable one. We are privileged to have Debrework Zewdie, deputy general manager and head of strategy, investment and impact division of the Global Fund. As a former World Banker with a doctorate degree in immunology, Debrework has dedicated the past 28 years to mitigating the impact of infectious diseases in her diverse capacities as a scientist, strategist, manager, policymaker, program implementer, advocate and activist. Have I missed anything? (Laughter.) So we'll begin with brief remarks from Debrework, and after her remarks we will open the floor up to questions and discussions. And just as housekeeping rules, this meeting is on the record. That means you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. And also don't forget to turn off your cell phones. OK, so I'm going to start with Debrework. You have 15 minutes. DEBREWORK ZEWDIE: Thank you, Huang. I hope I said it properly. HUANG: Yes. That's perfect. ZEWDIE: And good afternoon. First of all, thank you for inviting me, and thank you to all of you for coming. Most of you are my friends who I haven't seen in the last 2 1/2 years when I've been housekeeping in Geneva. I have been asked to focus on three things. The first one is the fund's contribution to global health. I'm going to spend a very short time on it. The second one, it says current crisis. If at the end of this meeting I did not convince you that the Global Fund is not in crisis, then we would -- our time will not be worth it. And then the third one will be our efforts to strengthen the Global Fund. That's where I want to spend most of my time. As most of you know -- and I'm not going to repeat most of the things which you will be able to read, and spend our time more on the transformation -- is that it is a fund which to date has approved over $23 billion in AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and building health systems. We have programs in about 150 countries, and we have to date disbursed more than $15 billion, and 80 percent of it just in the last five years. So that it gives you a perspective. More than half, about 60 percent, of our funding goes to sub-Saharan Africa, where the disease burden is disproportionate. We have a number of statistics which -- and you will be able to read from our website -- are putting over over 3 million people on antiretrovirals, and we are the major funders of DOTS for TB and MDR-TB. In malaria we have distributed bed nets and drugs. I think the only thing I want to mention about results is the Global Fund has contributed -- and I use that for -- that word very carefully -- contributed to the decline in new infections in many of the countries in HIV and also the decrease in under-5 mortality in malaria. So that's the results. Is the Global Fund in crisis? Is it not. 2011 was a very difficult year. You know -- you have seen what happened to the fund. What we are doing now is to use this event that we had in 2011 as an opportunity to change the fund, which has been working very well, to make it even better, to make it more accountable, to make it more innovative and to make it more effective and efficient. For those of you who know, when the Global Fund was established, we were supposed to be simple, efficient and effective. We are nothing like those things now. So there are a number of fundamentals that we are transforming, and our focus is three areas. One is strengthening our foundation, and the second one is implementing the 2011-2016 strategy, and the third and probably one of the most important ones is securing enough resources so that we continue to do what we do. How are we going to do this? We have defined distinct work areas. The first one -- we call it organizing to deliver. The second one is the quality and timelines in proposal development and grant processing, and the third one is simplification of in-country implementation of grants and risk management. What do I mean by organizing to deliver? Under the leadership of the new general manager, who -- whose detail is to come and reform the Global Fund, we have established a new organizational structure. And we have rebalanced the staff and the resources that the Global Fund has. Essentially what we have done is to make sure that the institution is a grants-making institution. That's the core business. Sometime in early 2011, we had an expert group to look into the workings of the Global Fund, and they came up with a figure of about 50-50 split on the resources and staff that we have in grant management versus other functions. In about 60 days we have changed that to 75 to 25. How did we do that? First of all, we expanded what we used to call country programs and it's now called grant management. And we focused it into -- we have what we call high-impact regions. So we have two for Africa, one for Asia, seven countries each. These are countries, whether you -- whether use -- HIV, malaria or TB -- where you -- we call high-impact countries. What this does is, our efforts will be focused in these areas hopefully to move the needle in public health in all these three epidemics. At the same time, what was hurting smaller countries was -- for example, if you have Nigeria and DRC on your portfolio, forget about the rest of the countries. That is consuming in and of itself. So by creating a different department for the rest of Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, those countries will have much more focus and involvement in what we do. So today a fund portfolio manager in a high-impact country, for example, would be dealing with one country, whereas earlier a fund portfolio manager -- it's not unusual to have five, seven countries under the same portfolio. So that's what we are doing. The second and equally important is, for those of you who knew the Global Fund, we had a department called Strategy, Policy and Evaluation. We have changed it into Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation Department. And a hundred percent of these people are working on grant management. These are the people who will implement -- which takes me to the next point, which is implementing the strategy -- and what we are working towards is what we call strategic investment for impact. So these are the people whose job it is to make sure that every single penny in the Global Fund is invested properly. We have moved the monitoring and -- the monitoring function from this unit to grant management because they -- those are the people who should be working with the country team, whereas we have kept evaluation because we are going to focus more on impact evaluation. So all these two -- these are the two biggest departments in the Global Fund and they'll be focused on grant management. Simplification of in-country monitoring of grants and risk, we have -- the general manager has put two projects in place. Because he's a banker, he gives this -- it different names and every time we say this is not a public health vocabulary changer. One, he calls it, manufacturing of grants. And I was shocked a bit when he first said it, but actually it makes sense because if you have a system of bringing out this, the fundamentals of a glass, right, then you can change it into a whiskey glass, a wine glass, et cetera. So that's essentially what it is. The second one -- he calls it unclogging the pipes. We have existing programs in place which we need to make sure that they move as they're supposed to move. The third one is the quality and the timeliness in proposal development and grant processing. As most of you remember, the 2011-2016 strategy was endorsed in Accra. We also canceled Round 11 for reasons which maybe we will go into when we discuss. That was replaced by what we call a transitional funding mechanism. This is to help countries who would have got the resources from Round 11 to keep them going until we go to the next and most important phase, which is what we call the two-step process. Before I go away from the transitional funding mechanism, the proposals have come in by the 31st of March. Twenty-five percent of them came from Africa. The initial upper limit for all these 61 grants is about a little bit more than $600 million and we will be able to fund that. The second one, which many of you pay attention to, is what we call grant renewal or Phase 2. We have about $8 billion worth of Phase 2. To just give you an example on May 2, we will have a meeting to determine about 15 renewals worth about $700 million. The change in Phase 2 is, instead of internally doing it by ourselves, we have opened it up to our partners so that they have a say in helping us do strategic investment because the renewal -- the Phase 2 grant renewal is a good window to straighten up our processes when we go to our two-step process. The last point which I want to mention -- and I have been told 15 minutes -- is we have also established what we call disease committees. Again, in the general manager's analogy, he says if you are at war, at least once a month you want to talk to your allies and say, where is this going? So we will establish an HIV/AIDS committee, malaria committee, TB committee. It is not going to discuss about which is the best proposal, but it is, where is the gap? So that's where we're going, and I'll be happy to respond to any questions so that we can -- I can elaborate on some of these things. Thank you. HUANG: Thank, Debrework. You just used 10 minutes. (Chuckles.) So if you want to say more, you can. But -- (laugh) -- ZEWDIE: I thought I heard the bell or something. HUANG: OK, so I'm going to use my privilege as a presider to ask the first question -- ZEWDIE: OK. HUANG: -- if I may. Let's rewind the travails of 2011. ZEWDIE: (All right ?). HUANG: In January, AP covered the story that these -- about the (probable ?) corruption and misuse of the fund money for African countries. The Global Fund did investigation and found -- and made actions to recover much of the misappropriated funds. But instead of praising the fund for its initiative and attempts to correct (holes ?) in this process, well, the fund's reputation was tarnished -- ZEWDIE: Right. HUANG: -- and some of European donors actually suspended their funding. So this is interesting because it's often presumed that the transparency promotes accountability and international institutions promoting greater transparency will result in higher levels of public and donor support of these institutions. But, in the case of the Global Fund, this seems to be the opposite, right? Greater transparency actually lowers levels of donor confidence and potentially challenges the legitimacy of the organization. So this incident, you know, in my opinion, might send a signal to many similar organizations/institutions that if they admitted that corruption or fraud has happened somewhere within the vertical donor process, funders will withdraw, right? So organizations are afraid to say that they make mistakes and thus make the same mistakes over and over again. So the end result is that these organizations may become even less accountable. So I'm curious, what's your comment on this what I would call accountability dilemma? ZEWDIE: When I thought I had used up 15 minutes, what I left off was something which I will start with. The donors are coming back. As you know, the European Commission had its own investigation. The Germans were leading in the investigation, and then the board put in place what they called the high-level panel. The -- without going into what happened at the beginning, what's happening now is when we also showed turning around -- as I told you, we had moved 75 percent of our resources to grant management. And there are a number of steps that we have taken to tighten the systems and, more importantly, to work better with the Office of the Inspector General. We don't have a problem with the principle, the independence, or having an office of an inspector general. It is good for us. It's good for our grants. But it had to work in a seamless manner, which is what we are doing now, as a result of which Germany was the first country to come back. Japan -- as you well know, they had their own problem with the tsunami, but they came and paid not only for the previous year, but for the current year as well. Last week the general manager addressed the U.K. Parliament, and the United Kingdom has committed its resources and consistently up to the next three years. Spain, that has a challenge, is coming back and paying as well. So they have come -- they have recognized -- you don't blame someone for misunderstanding or misperceiving something. I think if when you see the evidence you turn it around, that's also a good thing. So it is -- that was one of my concluding remarks, which I wanted to do -- including the U.S., who is the largest donor that we have. Today they have much more confidence in what we are doing and much more support, which is much more (strengthened ?). So that's what the current situation is. And this is what I meant when, at the beginning, I said the Global Fund is not in crisis. What are the lessons what from happened in January? The lessons are the following: One, I think the world is looking very carefully how development resources are being used, and that's what happened with the Global Fund. Probably we are the first ones to be subjected to this. Well, if you are inside, if you are a staff member like I was, it's a traumatizing experience, especially because we were not hiding anything. All those information was on our website. But from where I sit today, it provided a fantastic opportunity for us to change the Global Fund around. I don't know any other transformation that has happened in 60 days where we moved the staff from doing something else to focusing on grants. The litmus test is going to be in couple of months, and at a minimum a year, countries saying the Global Fund is simple, they listen to us, we can work with them, it makes a difference. If all this has helped us to move in that direction, I think it's not bad. But when it hits you, it is -- it's not a good experience to go through. HUANG: So I might be a little bit too pessimistic -- (chuckles) -- on this. So we're going to open up the floor for questions and discussions. The -- please -- well, I saw that -- (chuckles) -- Sherry (sp) already have the -- flipped her (tin card ?). So please flip your (tin card ?) to indicate that you have a question. And we also allow the one-finger rule, if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So Sherry (sp). QUESTIONER: OK. Thanks. Leave it to the reporter to be the first to raise their hand. (Chuckles.) Thank you for coming and giving us this update. I was just curious if you could talk a bit about the impact of the cancellation of the round on the ground. And for example, at the most extreme, are people going without their medicines? ZEWDIE: OK. No, they're not. This is -- the way the Global Fund works is countries come in with at least a five-year proposal. So in December when we consult round 11, most of the countries were in their second or third year of program. But they were thinking ahead, and they were requesting money for the subsequent years. Even before we consult round 11, there is a modality within the World Bank structure that we don't cut funding from countries. There is what we call a continuity of service, which gives the countries enough time, especially to make sure that antiretroviral treatment for people does not get -- (inaudible). Did -- what happened to programs because of round 11? To my knowledge, there is none of the countries had run short of money and were just left to -- high and dry. That was exactly why we came up with a very short way of -- the Transitional Funding Mechanism was put in place exactly to protect those kinds of countries. It's a two-year window, so all of them have come -- mainly, these proposals are either for antiretroviral treatment or for PMTCT or for the replenishment of bed nets for malaria. So this funding will take these countries to 2014, when we would start with what we call now the two-step iterative process. The -- part of the significant change in the new strategy is currently, countries spend a lot of money in producing a proposal, and the chance of success is 40 percent, 50 percent, and especially for HIV/AIDS, much less. The two-step process will help countries before investing a whole lot of resources to see if the proposal is viable or not. That's only -- only after knowing that will they come into the second process. So we expect almost a 99 percent approval process for these countries. So we have made sure that the countries had money, came in with the Transitional Funding Mechanism, which will take them to the two-step iterative process. So none of the programs, to my knowledge, whether it's malaria, HIV/AIDS or TB or health systems, have suffered because we cancelled round 11. HUANG: But what about those countries that made ineligible for the funding, countries -- I know Chinese government announced that that would continue fund-supported programs, but what about those countries like Mexico and Indonesia? Are they going to -- the government going to foot their bills? ZEWDIE: So one of the things which everybody realized is remember at the beginning of the fund, proposals come in. If they are viable, they are funded. And then when we looked into our data, we found out that resources were going not necessarily only to the poorest countries. So that is when this dilemma of what do we do with countries who have the capacity and the resources to take care of the problem. And it's not a complete cut-out. It is a phased process where the country will promise to come and pick up the programs and go. So we have a wonderful relationship with China. Yes, it could have been handled better in December. But we have rebound where they will be carrying out the programs. It's the same thing with -- for Mexico and Indonesia. HUANG: Good to hear that. OK, I think Victoria. QUESTIONER: Victoria Fan from the Center for Global Development. Debrework, it's such a pleasure to hear this, and very encouraging overall. I'm very -- particularly interested in the Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation group or division, whatever it's called now. This is -- there's many uses of impact evaluation. One might be for learning lessons in general for specific disease interventions. But another might be potentially to link it to performance-based financing. Is that currently what you're -- I mean, I'm curious to learn more about how you might envision impact evaluation being incorporated. ZEWDIE: The unit is new, the Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation unit. That doesn't mean the work has not been done earlier on. We tried, but we tried in a -- in a more or less ad hoc manner. That's what we are trying to correct. We are also using partners and expertise appropriately. For example, we have what we call the TERG, the Technical Evaluation and -- Reference Group. These are eminent people from different parts of the world. We haven't used them effectively. So instead of them coming and advising us on what to do, we are allowing them to help us develop how we will be doing impact evaluation in a -- in a meaningful way. Performance-based funding is something which the -- it's one of the cornerstones of the Global Fund. Absolutely, it will be tied with strategic investment and impact. We are trying to staff that department. We do not have all the skills, and I look to all of you to help us identify these people very quickly so that we can translate this into action. HUANG: Thank you, Debrework. Lisa. QUESTIONER: Thanks very much, and welcome, Debrework. My name is Lisa Carty. I'm from the UNAIDS office here in Washington. So actually a two-part question: I was wondering if you could elaborate a little more on the country-level impacts of the reform process because as I understand it, that was a very important goal was to make operations at country level smoother and more transparent and address some of the issues involving principal recipients -- (inaudible) -- recipients. And the second -- I'd just be interested in your opinion and thoughts going forward -- is your having traveled recently in Africa and looked a little bit at some of these questions -- you know, I think the reality is now that 10 years into the Global Fund's life cycle, programs are very deeply integrated in so many countries. You know, and early on in the Global Fund, there were places that were clearly Global Fund-funded entities. And now, you know, almost any site you go to will have U.S. money, Global Fund money, host country money. So, you know, the reality is that if the Global Fund sneezes, everyone else is going to sort of catch that cold. And you know, I'm wondering, as you're taking this forward, how you're thinking about what the coordination and collaboration mechanisms are going to be, both at country level and globally, because this next year sounds very critical. So what's the vision for try to make sure that everybody moves forward in the same general direction? ZEWDIE: Thank you. On the first one, one of the departments in the Strategic Investment and Impact division is strategic investment and partnerships. What that means is, for example, the HIV/AIDS person's job, which is to be running around attending meetings and helping, in a piecemeal way, the fund portfolio managers. They have two distinct jobs: one, the technical expertise should come from our partners. That was how the Global Fund was established in the first place. So we are translating that into action. So this person's job is not going and giving advice to the fund portfolio manager, but globally connect with the partner and institutions and make that connection at global level. The fund portfolio managers will be the entry point at country level for partnership. So we are coming at it from two different directions. And now because of the reorganization, they have time to pay attention to partnerships, to make sure that they don't go to a capital city, talk to the LFN (ph), come back. They have a dialogue; they create a relationship, and at global level, the institutions would monitor it. Integration -- that's exactly what the Global Fund is supposed to do. And when we do strategic investment in the two-step iterative process, we are going to look at it in a holistic manner: Who is there; what is -- what are they doing; what is the gap? And then we come in and fill the gap and have an integrated way of working together. So it's not -- fortunately, the Global Fund has never waved its flag. But it became a common thing to do for countries. That's what happened. I remember in the early days, they were not even supposed to put "Global Fund" on the cars. But you see them everywhere now. That is what we are trying to consolidate and give more -- (inaudible) -- we will allow our partners to impregnate us -- so opening the doors, making sure that integration happens and technical assistance happens from the technical units and not internally driven. That's how we could move 75 percent of the staff to move into grant management and not to do -- (inaudible) -- or WHO, which we have done in the last couple of years. HUANG: OK, we have -- it looks like we have many questions here. Yasmin (sp). QUESTIONER: Sir, my thanks to the council for hosting this timely discussion. And Debrework, thank you for your comment. My question actually follows nicely from Lisa's, which is about partnership. So you said that the world is watching closely how dollars are being spent in global health. Well, the world is also watching closely how the global health key donors play together. And I'd be really interested from a -- (inaudible) -- country perspective, from a strategic perspective: What is this relationship and standing of the Global Fund in relation to particularly the USG and the giant donors? And how much of the strategic development early in the year -- how much has this impacted on the scrutiny to the Global Fund? And what does this mean for the field of global health in terms of partnerships? ZEWDIE: OK, the good thing is I have somebody here from the USG who knows it much better than me, John (sp). The relationship between the Global Fund and the USG has been very strong from the beginning, almost to a point of sacrificing a lot of things from PEPFAR to support the Global Fund. That's the kind of relationship we have. Are we doing that in all 150 countries? No, it depends on individuals; it depends on the relationship, which is what we are trying to correct now. So that's one answer. The second one -- the USG is also trendsetter. So the resources that we get from the U.S. government is the resource that everybody is looking at. It is also a challenge for the rest of the world. That's why the funding and the support we get from the USG is almost the livelihood of the Global Fund, which encourages the other countries to come in and support us. We are starting with PEPFAR now in two countries to pilot a better way of working together, and we have chosen Nigeria as one of the examples. So it's not going to be just a good talk that I give or Gabrielle (sp) or Mark (sp) gives. It is something which we are going to start on the ground and see what works, what doesn't work, so that we move further. But John -- HUANG: John, do you have any quick follow-up remarks? (Chuckles.) QUESTIONER: Well, I'd -- I just -- I guess I'd say a couple things. I'm John Monahan from -- special adviser for global health partnerships at State. And two -- I -- two things I -- I'm sorry; I'll try to be quick -- but the first point is I just have to thank Gabrielle (sp), Debrework and their team. I mean, what -- get what -- as you know, the U.S. government's commitment to the Global Fund has been strong and consistent throughout this period of time of incredible change. We're very excited by the kinds of changes that Debrework outlined, the possibility of the fund executing these transformations and becoming the more strategic investor that she talked about is incredibly powerful. And so thank you for the report. This is very helpful. In terms of the partnership, we see it as an -- as an enormous opportunity -- and Lisa's (sp) is exactly right -- in country, you know, the integration on -- in -- on the ground happens everywhere. The interdependence between PEPFAR and the Global Fund we see what I think's an opportunity here is the kinds of reforms Debrework's talking about and the approach that Gabrielle (sp) and the team have taken allows us both to be better partners. It's both -- the Global Fund, I think, is in a very different position in terms of how it's organized, and I also think that it's a challenge to us to -- Ambassador Goosby's been leading this initiative -- to increase our efficiency and the effectiveness of the bilateral programs and the opportunity here to work in a really integrated way, country by country, is enormous here. So thank you for your presentation. But we see this as a -- as a huge opportunity. HUANG: I was told that the Global Fund was the most efficient organization because with 600 staff, you manage, like, $30 billion of money. Is that still the case? ZEWDIE: We are actually decreasing the number of staff. So, by making that shift from the control and administrative purposes to grant management, what we have done is to increase the efficiency on the core business of the Global Fund (and ?) shrinking the other nice things you can have if you have a lot of time and money. So the number of the Global Fund staff will decrease. The quality and the type of staff that we are going to put in, for example, for strategic investment, will change. And we have also promised the board that we are going to do the transformation with the budget that we have been given. So that's where we are maximizing both the resources and also the efficiency. HUANG: Wonderful. Chris (sp)? OK. QUESTIONER: Thanks for the presentation, Debrework, and thanks for organizing this. It's always a pleasure. Actually I want to pick up on Lisa's question a little bit of -- you -- Debrework, you raised a -- that simplification, simplifying things was an important goal, and I was wondering if you can elaborate a bit more. From the country perspective -- the recipient country respective (sic), how exactly is the new Global Fund going to be simpler for them to engage with and to meet the requirements? ZEWDIE: I'm going to show you something, which is what I'm looking for, to make that point. We have -- can you see this? This is 120-page -- 1,200 pages of documentation for one grant, OK? That's horrendous. Frankly, countries work with us because they need the money and they have a huge epidemic. It's not because we're simpler. Every decision that has been taken by the board and the secretariat made sense when the decision was made. But, cumulatively, when you look at them, they -- it doesn't serve any purpose, neither for the secretariat nor for the countries. So what we are trying to do now is to look into the whole life cycle from beginning to end and cut all this unnecessary back and forth. Of course, when we start the two-stage iterative process, this would -- this would shorten by itself. But now the requests that goes back and forth between the countries and ourselves from grant signing to disbursement is horrendous. So that is what we are working on now. So the first thing was to settle staff. Transforming a 600 -- over a 600-staff organization in 60 days is -- you can imagine how we were working. Now by the end of the month everybody would have settled, all the departments and all the staff. Immediately, we embark on this unclogging the pipe and manufacturing the grant (banking ?) system. That's when we cut all these unnecessary things that have been added. So simplification would be the first thing that we'd -- we would be focusing on. QUESTIONER: Do you have a timeline where -- you had 60 days to accomplish the first task; have you set a timeline of we have 120 days to accomplish the second (one ?)? ZEWDIE: Yes, we do, and we also have milestones in between. When we go to the board in May, there are certain things that we have promised the board which we will deliver on. And then by the next board, these processes would have already kicked in. And what we expect from the second board is countries saying yes, it is simple now. HUANG: Sally. QUESTIONER: Thanks very much. I'm Sally Cole with PSI. And Debrework, thank you for coming and for your coherent explanation. The mandate of Gabriel Jaramillo and his team, as I understand, has really been looking intensively at the secretariat and its functions and -- at the country level. What about the board and the IG? I mean, is somebody looking at them as institutions? Are they going to be left where they are? And if so, how will they interact with the reborn secretariat? ZEWDIE: John, you have to realize Sally is an old friend, but I never, ever told her to ask this question. (Laughter.) The board -- the board has been transforming itself as the secretariat has been transforming itself. The high-level panel report is something which we all followed to change this fund. As a result already, there is a tremendous change between the Office of the Inspector General and the secretariat. We have -- we call Monday bureaucracy day. All meetings happen only on Monday in the Global Fund. We start with a management executive committee meeting where the inspector general is invited too. This is when we talk about where is the budget, how do we function, et cetera. Then subsequently, we have another committee which looks into the grant. So every executive committee member would know what's happening in our malaria grant in Ghana, for example, because the country team comes and presents. And the inspector general is also a member of that. The third one is the disease committees, which I mentioned. So that is one way of improving for the Office of the Inspector General. And he comes with his staff to understand what we are doing and also for us to -- for him to tell us how to do this without touching on his independence. The -- I'm going to let John tell you, because John is a board member, on what the board is doing. QUESTIONER: I'll -- just briefly, I do -- I have to emphasize how critical the change has been in terms of the relationship between the secretariat and the inspector general from where we sit. The inspector general's function is absolutely critical to the fund and to the transparency and to making sure that we know that resources are going where they're supposed to. But this kind of really effective coordination is fabulous. So it's a very positive step. In terms of the board -- and the board is on a two-part -- two-stage reform process -- it -- based in part on the recommendation of the high-level panel and in part on work that the board leadership had already undertaken, it restructured what had become a proliferation of multiple working groups and committees to three standing committees: a finance committee, a strategy and investment committee and an audit and ethics committee that, for the first time, will actually include non-board members on the committee -- in fact, a majority of non-board members, including -- chaired by an independent committee member to provide oversight to the inspector general as well as sort of the boarder audit and ethics issues. The board is also trying to have a mechanism where -- historically, the committees have -- (inaudible) -- independent. They have a coordinating mechanism so that the leadership can -- we can make sure that issues are managed in a more effective and sort of efficient way. I mean, the fund -- among its issues is that governance really had not been managed, I think, systematically, I think would be a fair description. The critical thing here is to execute, much like what the secretariat's doing now. The board needs to actually make the committees work. The committees have met for the first time within the last two to three months. We are -- and I'm actually quite optimistic that we've moved -- we've streamlined. Now, obviously the next step is there are still major issues remaining in governance. How do we make sure that implementing country voices are as effectively at the table as possible? How do we make sure that the board interacts with the kinds of structural changes that Debrework's described. Both of those are critical. But we're on the right path, in my view, at least. HUANG: Debrework said Monday is a bureaucratic day. I'm glad that this meeting is scheduled on Wednesday -- (laughter) -- so you have time. ZEWDIE: Anyway, I'm not allowed to travel -- the executive management team is not allowed to travel on Monday. HUANG: OK. Next we're going to have three -- actually the next three questions were all from -- they're all from Robert. We have -- actually, we have four Roberts in this room, at least. (Laughter.) First Robert? QUESTIONER: Is that me? HUANG: Yeah, that's you. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) -- Robert 1 or Robert 2? HUANG: We have kind of identity crisis here. QUESTIONER: Help me out a little bit. I'm Robert -- QUESTIONER: Whatever you say -- (off mic). (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: I don't know if this is working. I'm Robert Hecht from the Results for Development Institute. Debrework, thank you. The changes you describe are very impressive. They're ambitious, they're exciting, and they sound very positive. So congratulations on that. We all have seen organizations that went through a difficult period, especially around financial management or lack of top-notch management, I even think at our own shared institution at the World Bank in the past around the trust funds, the donor trust funds, where there was some question about proper use of funds. Often the reaction is to come down very hard with lots of financial controls, and those are understandable, but they can also have negative -- unintended negative effects, especially for the staff. You talked about changing the staff and improving the staff, but being able to work in an organization where you're allowed to be creative, where you can be entrepreneurial, where it's fun to go to work, where people are not looking over your shoulder all the time is also important. And you also talk about making sure that the staff can focus on impact, value for money, getting them most public health benefit and development benefit. How are you and Gabriel thinking about a possible trade-off there, or how you avoid the trade-off so that you correct the financial issues, which have come out very prominently and obviously need to be high on the agenda, and at the same time create an organization that is fun, creative, entrepreneurial and focusing on development impact and health impact and not only on making sure that every euro and dollar is accounted for? ZEWDIE: Thank you, Robert. The last point, in the morale of the staff at the Global Fund, was during that time when the AP story broke, because fund portfolio managers had to think twice before they signed on a disbursement. They were terrified. So that actually crippled us more than anything else, which was internally known to us. So the change now is that -- essentially the empowerment of staff so that they could take action, because we have put -- so if you take six months ago, fund portfolio manager, who is responsible for about four, five countries and there is somebody above him or her, there was a chain that they had to go through because everybody was afraid to commit. What we are doing, especially in the 21 high-impact countries, is there's no chain. There is the fund portfolio manager and there is the regional director directly reporting to the division head, because we want them to pay close attention to this. That's number one. Number two, we have strengthened what we call a country team. So it's not a fund portfolio manager who is going to take a decision, it is the finance person, the fund portfolio manager, the monitoring and evaluation person, (legal ?), who sit together and who decide on something. So we have taken away the fear factor. There is also a change from the side of the inspector general. There is more interaction, there is more discussion about them playing the role of almost quality control, which was not -- it was not supposed to be a punishing instrument. So that's one of it. The other big one is we need to -- Gabriel calls it the soft skills. It is attracting the best staff, mentoring them and also incentivizing performance. So there are all these milestones that these people have to fulfill. And what management is doing is to arm them with all the instruments that they need so that they could indeed perform. So we had -- this is that -- the biggest task. Once we have settled them, we are going to have coaching -- a very simple but rigorous way of performance evaluation, which is more like the private sector and not like the U.N. system. So we are putting all these things in place, but the problem is we are moving in a very fast speed because we don't have time to put these things in place. So that is already changing. You see a lot of change and a lot of hope in the staff as we move forward in this. HUANG: OK, we still have lots of questions. So I'm going to collect those questions, actually, in two, maybe -- hopefully three rounds. In the first round, we collected two -- three questions from Robert (sp), Robert and Jen. QUESTIONER: This Robert (sp). Thank you. We are sort of here to -- reflecting on the success of the -- of the fund after 10 years. And I think there's been unquestioned success of the fund and PEPFAR and the Gates Foundation and other funders as well as other bilateral funding for drugs. I was recently in Uganda and Malawi and even in the rural areas of those countries and visiting a number of health centers and hospitals. And I was always struck, because I always asked the question, about the availability of drugs. And everyone said, you know, oh, no, we don't have any problems with drugs, which was, to me, a spectacular result -- (inaudible) -- based on just a few years ago, when that would not have been true. We have all benefited, then, from these very coordinated efforts -- and even if they were not coordinated, they were certainly cooperative -- to have this kind of result in many countries that for many years had drug shortages. However, what I did observe and continue to read about -- and when I do travel in these countries, there are two headwinds that we're yet to tamp down. And I was wondering what lessons you discern from your experience at the World Bank and now at the Global Fund in what we do about the clear, continuous crisis in health worker shortages and the breakdown in technical training for health workers that we do have. And even when our intentions are pretty positive, where we supply equipment, and then when the equipment breaks, we have no funding to fix it, no one trained to fix it. I saw a number of broken-down cars, trucks, ambulances. That's one headwind. The second headwind is the paradox of success, of having drugs available. What we have seen in some countries -- I got the country report in Uganda, where we are seeing a tick-up of infection in populations where we didn't expect it. And that was marriage-age people, people in their 40s, where we didn't see it before. And someone described that as the paradox of success: People now know that there are drugs available, so the prevention side has suffered a lot. So maybe from your experiences in these two wonderful institutions, you can sort of give us some hope about what we do about these two headwinds. HUANG: Robert. QUESTIONER: Hey, I'm Robert Marten with the Rockefeller Foundation. Thank you again for the talk. My question builds on some of the other points that were raised. And it's -- you know, when you look back at the last 10 years, I think again, the Global Fund has been tremendously successful. But you've also seen over these -- the past 10 years a bit of a shift from the more vertical approach to the horizontal. And so I know this question has surfaced many times before, but I just would love to hear your thoughts and where the internal discussion is on this, particularly in this moment of opportunity that you have in terms of broadening the fund's remit beyond HIV, TB and malaria and how those discussions are faring, and then also in terms of the implications for global governance of or for health, however you want to put it. That's a -- maybe a broader second question, but the first question would be particularly important. HUANG: Jen. QUESTIONER: Jen Kates from the Kaiser Family Foundation. Hello. Good to see you. Two quick things that build on some of what we heard. One is on prevention, and that relates to the UNAIDS new investment framework and just thinking about where prevention is going and how an institution like the Global Fund can -- which is responding to country-driven proposals, but how you're looking at that and figuring out how to be proactive and not just reactive and be on the cutting edge of these changes. But then another question is around the public messaging around the fund, because having you here is great, and I think a lot of the things you shared we've only heard about, you know, on a listserv or some information, and changing the public discourse and dialogues in Washington and probably other capitals is needed. And I heard something that you said today, and I heard it the other day too, which seems to me big news, which is that the transitional funding mechanism can meet the demand. And that was something that wasn't clear recently, and it seems like big news, and I wonder if you have any plans to get that out there in some fashion. ZEWDIE: OK. Robert, thank you. The Global Fund -- and I would tie it with the vertical versus horizontal question as well -- is in a very awkward position where its board, rightly, makes sure that we stick to our mandate, whatever that means. So that is where, for example, health worker -- health workforce crisis is a crisis which affects our programs. I'll give you a very simple example, and this is how development irritates some of us. This was a Phase 2 panel there, from Chad, and the group, the country team, has come in and was presenting to the Phase 2 panel, and they said this cannot be an A grant, it is a B grant, because Chad does not have a good data collection system. And we had it as a conditions precedent for the last two years. So what do you do? You cut the funding on something which should have been there a long time ago. Everybody was supposed to build the data system of Chad, even before the Global Fund was born. So we keep every year saying, this doesn't work, that doesn't work. We don't do anything collectively to help these countries to come out of this. So the work -- the health workforce crisis is exactly the same thing. We all talk about it. I don't think there is a concerted effort to bring this thing out, so that all our programs will work well. I will be lying to you if I say the Global Fund has a special program to do this. We don't. But it affects our programs; you are right. The second one, the success of treatment versus prevention, I want to tie the prevention questions together. I think about a year, a year and a half ago, there was talk about the Global Fund is only focusing on treatment. That's not true. The funding which goes to prevention and treatment us almost equal. Now the question comes into the strategic funding of prevention., What is it in prevention that we're funding? Yes, there will be resurgence as people become more and more comfortable with treatment. Then you can't even detect the virus in their blood. The hope I see is, as you said, the new investment framework, which we are going to follow. Take circumcision, for example. We knew circumcision works or worked six, seven years ago. But the only time it has taken effect is when PEPFAR and UNAIDS said, we are going to put X amount of money to do it. So we need those kinds of champions. I was in Sydney talking on the microbicide conference. It's exactly the same things. It takes an -- institutions and people to champion and push this thing forward, unfortunately, because evidence alone is not going to do it. We are all worried about these countries, like Uganda, who are successful but we need -- because it is going to cost us even more -- to have a concerted effort to making sure that treatment is indeed used as prevention and not a cause to feeding the pipeline with new infections. The -- again, the board, unless they change their mind, as we look into the future, when our 2011-2016 strategy was being developed, there was huge debate in allowing the fund -- whether to stay within its mandate now or to even go a little bit into reproductive health. The final conclusion was, you stay within your mandate. But you know already -- for example, 40 percent of our funding is going to saving lives of mothers and children. So that is what the thinking is at the board level. I don't see it moving in any other way now. However, there is a global discussion now as to what is going to happen to it. Do we still go this way? So that may change the Global Fund as well. I have -- I have answered the first part of your question, I hope, Jen. We don't do a good job when communicating. We have now recruited -- if I was Gabriel, I would say a fantastic person -- (laughter) -- called Seth Fasan (ph). He is very well-known. He has been in crisis communications management. One of the first things he's going to do is to initiate a newspaper. So every week we will send out news to -- if you compare this community with the implementing countries, we are even worse. They have no clue what we are doing because we don't communicate with them. And that's when we knew we lost the war when the AP story hit us. If a few ministers of health from implementing countries stood up and said, the Global Fund is saving lives in my country, that would have changed the trajectory. We haven't cultivated them. So that's the focus now, to cultivate implementing countries, but more importantly, to share our news as quickly as possible, without having any excuse. The reason why the full funding of the Transitional Funding Mechanism was not disclosed was because of the way we work. We had to disclose to our board yesterday -- I think you got the email yesterday. But you are right. We are not doing a good job. We have to -- we know we have not done a good job, so we will improve. HUANG: OK. So -- I'm sorry, actually, we are running out of time, even though -- (chuckles) -- we haven't run out of the questions. It is the council's rule that we start in time and end in time. (Laughter.) For those who are unable to have found the time to ask questions, I apologize. Maybe you could ask Debrework after the meeting. But I'd like to thank Debrework for this very informative and encouraging update. (Applause.) And my best wishes to the reorganization and transformation efforts of the fund. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our -- (inaudible) -- the -- Jerouz (ph) and in particular Zoe (sp) for their support -- assistance in making this round-table series possible. And also I would like thank the -- Stuart Patrick (ph), Faroh (ph) -- is Faroh (ph) here? Just -- and the IIGG program and the Robina Foundation for their generous support of this round-table series, and last but not least, you the participants of this meeting, for your -- the questions and insights, for making this such a lively discussion. I appreciate it. Thank you. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. YANZHONG HUANG: Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations. I'm Yanzhong Huang. It's pronounced as Hwawng (ph), not Hwang (ph). (Chuckles.) We had that experience last week. I was in Boston. You know, I was on a standby list. You know, they were calling Hwang (ph), Hwang (ph), and I -- who? -- (laughter). So -- I'm a senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is our fourth meeting of the new Emerging Powers in Global Health Governance Roundtable Series. And on April 9th, our third roundtable meeting, in New York, had Chris Elias speaking about the role of Gates Foundation in global health. Today we focus on another major player in global health, the Global Fund, which is the world's largest player -- funder of AIDS, TB and malaria projects, and also maybe, arguably, the most viable multilateral providing funding for global health. And this meeting will examine the Global Fund's contribution to global health over the past decade and its ongoing efforts to transform the organization into a more effective and accountable one. We are privileged to have Debrework Zewdie, deputy general manager and head of strategy, investment and impact division of the Global Fund. As a former World Banker with a doctorate degree in immunology, Debrework has dedicated the past 28 years to mitigating the impact of infectious diseases in her diverse capacities as a scientist, strategist, manager, policymaker, program implementer, advocate and activist. Have I missed anything? (Laughter.) So we'll begin with brief remarks from Debrework, and after her remarks we will open the floor up to questions and discussions. And just as housekeeping rules, this meeting is on the record. That means you can feel free to use and quote today's discussion. And also don't forget to turn off your cell phones. OK, so I'm going to start with Debrework. You have 15 minutes. DEBREWORK ZEWDIE: Thank you, Huang. I hope I said it properly. HUANG: Yes. That's perfect. ZEWDIE: And good afternoon. First of all, thank you for inviting me, and thank you to all of you for coming. Most of you are my friends who I haven't seen in the last 2 1/2 years when I've been housekeeping in Geneva. I have been asked to focus on three things. The first one is the fund's contribution to global health. I'm going to spend a very short time on it. The second one, it says current crisis. If at the end of this meeting I did not convince you that the Global Fund is not in crisis, then we would -- our time will not be worth it. And then the third one will be our efforts to strengthen the Global Fund. That's where I want to spend most of my time. As most of you know -- and I'm not going to repeat most of the things which you will be able to read, and spend our time more on the transformation -- is that it is a fund which to date has approved over $23 billion in AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and building health systems. We have programs in about 150 countries, and we have to date disbursed more than $15 billion, and 80 percent of it just in the last five years. So that it gives you a perspective. More than half, about 60 percent, of our funding goes to sub-Saharan Africa, where the disease burden is disproportionate. We have a number of statistics which -- and you will be able to read from our website -- are putting over over 3 million people on antiretrovirals, and we are the major funders of DOTS for TB and MDR-TB. In malaria we have distributed bed nets and drugs. I think the only thing I want to mention about results is the Global Fund has contributed -- and I use that for -- that word very carefully -- contributed to the decline in new infections in many of the countries in HIV and also the decrease in under-5 mortality in malaria. So that's the results. Is the Global Fund in crisis? Is it not. 2011 was a very difficult year. You know -- you have seen what happened to the fund. What we are doing now is to use this event that we had in 2011 as an opportunity to change the fund, which has been working very well, to make it even better, to make it more accountable, to make it more innovative and to make it more effective and efficient. For those of you who know, when the Global Fund was established, we were supposed to be simple, efficient and effective. We are nothing like those things now. So there are a number of fundamentals that we are transforming, and our focus is three areas. One is strengthening our foundation, and the second one is implementing the 2011-2016 strategy, and the third and probably one of the most important ones is securing enough resources so that we continue to do what we do. How are we going to do this? We have defined distinct work areas. The first one -- we call it organizing to deliver. The second one is the quality and timelines in proposal development and grant processing, and the third one is simplification of in-country implementation of grants and risk management. What do I mean by organizing to deliver? Under the leadership of the new general manager, who -- whose detail is to come and reform the Global Fund, we have established a new organizational structure. And we have rebalanced the staff and the resources that the Global Fund has. Essentially what we have done is to make sure that the institution is a grants-making institution. That's the core business. Sometime in early 2011, we had an expert group to look into the workings of the Global Fund, and they came up with a figure of about 50-50 split on the resources and staff that we have in grant management versus other functions. In about 60 days we have changed that to 75 to 25. How did we do that? First of all, we expanded what we used to call country programs and it's now called grant management. And we focused it into -- we have what we call high-impact regions. So we have two for Africa, one for Asia, seven countries each. These are countries, whether you -- whether use -- HIV, malaria or TB -- where you -- we call high-impact countries. What this does is, our efforts will be focused in these areas hopefully to move the needle in public health in all these three epidemics. At the same time, what was hurting smaller countries was -- for example, if you have Nigeria and DRC on your portfolio, forget about the rest of the countries. That is consuming in and of itself. So by creating a different department for the rest of Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America, those countries will have much more focus and involvement in what we do. So today a fund portfolio manager in a high-impact country, for example, would be dealing with one country, whereas earlier a fund portfolio manager -- it's not unusual to have five, seven countries under the same portfolio. So that's what we are doing. The second and equally important is, for those of you who knew the Global Fund, we had a department called Strategy, Policy and Evaluation. We have changed it into Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation Department. And a hundred percent of these people are working on grant management. These are the people who will implement -- which takes me to the next point, which is implementing the strategy -- and what we are working towards is what we call strategic investment for impact. So these are the people whose job it is to make sure that every single penny in the Global Fund is invested properly. We have moved the monitoring and -- the monitoring function from this unit to grant management because they -- those are the people who should be working with the country team, whereas we have kept evaluation because we are going to focus more on impact evaluation. So all these two -- these are the two biggest departments in the Global Fund and they'll be focused on grant management. Simplification of in-country monitoring of grants and risk, we have -- the general manager has put two projects in place. Because he's a banker, he gives this -- it different names and every time we say this is not a public health vocabulary changer. One, he calls it, manufacturing of grants. And I was shocked a bit when he first said it, but actually it makes sense because if you have a system of bringing out this, the fundamentals of a glass, right, then you can change it into a whiskey glass, a wine glass, et cetera. So that's essentially what it is. The second one -- he calls it unclogging the pipes. We have existing programs in place which we need to make sure that they move as they're supposed to move. The third one is the quality and the timeliness in proposal development and grant processing. As most of you remember, the 2011-2016 strategy was endorsed in Accra. We also canceled Round 11 for reasons which maybe we will go into when we discuss. That was replaced by what we call a transitional funding mechanism. This is to help countries who would have got the resources from Round 11 to keep them going until we go to the next and most important phase, which is what we call the two-step process. Before I go away from the transitional funding mechanism, the proposals have come in by the 31st of March. Twenty-five percent of them came from Africa. The initial upper limit for all these 61 grants is about a little bit more than $600 million and we will be able to fund that. The second one, which many of you pay attention to, is what we call grant renewal or Phase 2. We have about $8 billion worth of Phase 2. To just give you an example on May 2, we will have a meeting to determine about 15 renewals worth about $700 million. The change in Phase 2 is, instead of internally doing it by ourselves, we have opened it up to our partners so that they have a say in helping us do strategic investment because the renewal -- the Phase 2 grant renewal is a good window to straighten up our processes when we go to our two-step process. The last point which I want to mention -- and I have been told 15 minutes -- is we have also established what we call disease committees. Again, in the general manager's analogy, he says if you are at war, at least once a month you want to talk to your allies and say, where is this going? So we will establish an HIV/AIDS committee, malaria committee, TB committee. It is not going to discuss about which is the best proposal, but it is, where is the gap? So that's where we're going, and I'll be happy to respond to any questions so that we can -- I can elaborate on some of these things. Thank you. HUANG: Thank, Debrework. You just used 10 minutes. (Chuckles.) So if you want to say more, you can. But -- (laugh) -- ZEWDIE: I thought I heard the bell or something. HUANG: OK, so I'm going to use my privilege as a presider to ask the first question -- ZEWDIE: OK. HUANG: -- if I may. Let's rewind the travails of 2011. ZEWDIE: (All right ?). HUANG: In January, AP covered the story that these -- about the (probable ?) corruption and misuse of the fund money for African countries. The Global Fund did investigation and found -- and made actions to recover much of the misappropriated funds. But instead of praising the fund for its initiative and attempts to correct (holes ?) in this process, well, the fund's reputation was tarnished -- ZEWDIE: Right. HUANG: -- and some of European donors actually suspended their funding. So this is interesting because it's often presumed that the transparency promotes accountability and international institutions promoting greater transparency will result in higher levels of public and donor support of these institutions. But, in the case of the Global Fund, this seems to be the opposite, right? Greater transparency actually lowers levels of donor confidence and potentially challenges the legitimacy of the organization. So this incident, you know, in my opinion, might send a signal to many similar organizations/institutions that if they admitted that corruption or fraud has happened somewhere within the vertical donor process, funders will withdraw, right? So organizations are afraid to say that they make mistakes and thus make the same mistakes over and over again. So the end result is that these organizations may become even less accountable. So I'm curious, what's your comment on this what I would call accountability dilemma? ZEWDIE: When I thought I had used up 15 minutes, what I left off was something which I will start with. The donors are coming back. As you know, the European Commission had its own investigation. The Germans were leading in the investigation, and then the board put in place what they called the high-level panel. The -- without going into what happened at the beginning, what's happening now is when we also showed turning around -- as I told you, we had moved 75 percent of our resources to grant management. And there are a number of steps that we have taken to tighten the systems and, more importantly, to work better with the Office of the Inspector General. We don't have a problem with the principle, the independence, or having an office of an inspector general. It is good for us. It's good for our grants. But it had to work in a seamless manner, which is what we are doing now, as a result of which Germany was the first country to come back. Japan -- as you well know, they had their own problem with the tsunami, but they came and paid not only for the previous year, but for the current year as well. Last week the general manager addressed the U.K. Parliament, and the United Kingdom has committed its resources and consistently up to the next three years. Spain, that has a challenge, is coming back and paying as well. So they have come -- they have recognized -- you don't blame someone for misunderstanding or misperceiving something. I think if when you see the evidence you turn it around, that's also a good thing. So it is -- that was one of my concluding remarks, which I wanted to do -- including the U.S., who is the largest donor that we have. Today they have much more confidence in what we are doing and much more support, which is much more (strengthened ?). So that's what the current situation is. And this is what I meant when, at the beginning, I said the Global Fund is not in crisis. What are the lessons what from happened in January? The lessons are the following: One, I think the world is looking very carefully how development resources are being used, and that's what happened with the Global Fund. Probably we are the first ones to be subjected to this. Well, if you are inside, if you are a staff member like I was, it's a traumatizing experience, especially because we were not hiding anything. All those information was on our website. But from where I sit today, it provided a fantastic opportunity for us to change the Global Fund around. I don't know any other transformation that has happened in 60 days where we moved the staff from doing something else to focusing on grants. The litmus test is going to be in couple of months, and at a minimum a year, countries saying the Global Fund is simple, they listen to us, we can work with them, it makes a difference. If all this has helped us to move in that direction, I think it's not bad. But when it hits you, it is -- it's not a good experience to go through. HUANG: So I might be a little bit too pessimistic -- (chuckles) -- on this. So we're going to open up the floor for questions and discussions. The -- please -- well, I saw that -- (chuckles) -- Sherry (sp) already have the -- flipped her (tin card ?). So please flip your (tin card ?) to indicate that you have a question. And we also allow the one-finger rule, if you have any quick follow-up remarks. So Sherry (sp). QUESTIONER: OK. Thanks. Leave it to the reporter to be the first to raise their hand. (Chuckles.) Thank you for coming and giving us this update. I was just curious if you could talk a bit about the impact of the cancellation of the round on the ground. And for example, at the most extreme, are people going without their medicines? ZEWDIE: OK. No, they're not. This is -- the way the Global Fund works is countries come in with at least a five-year proposal. So in December when we consult round 11, most of the countries were in their second or third year of program. But they were thinking ahead, and they were requesting money for the subsequent years. Even before we consult round 11, there is a modality within the World Bank structure that we don't cut funding from countries. There is what we call a continuity of service, which gives the countries enough time, especially to make sure that antiretroviral treatment for people does not get -- (inaudible). Did -- what happened to programs because of round 11? To my knowledge, there is none of the countries had run short of money and were just left to -- high and dry. That was exactly why we came up with a very short way of -- the Transitional Funding Mechanism was put in place exactly to protect those kinds of countries. It's a two-year window, so all of them have come -- mainly, these proposals are either for antiretroviral treatment or for PMTCT or for the replenishment of bed nets for malaria. So this funding will take these countries to 2014, when we would start with what we call now the two-step iterative process. The -- part of the significant change in the new strategy is currently, countries spend a lot of money in producing a proposal, and the chance of success is 40 percent, 50 percent, and especially for HIV/AIDS, much less. The two-step process will help countries before investing a whole lot of resources to see if the proposal is viable or not. That's only -- only after knowing that will they come into the second process. So we expect almost a 99 percent approval process for these countries. So we have made sure that the countries had money, came in with the Transitional Funding Mechanism, which will take them to the two-step iterative process. So none of the programs, to my knowledge, whether it's malaria, HIV/AIDS or TB or health systems, have suffered because we cancelled round 11. HUANG: But what about those countries that made ineligible for the funding, countries -- I know Chinese government announced that that would continue fund-supported programs, but what about those countries like Mexico and Indonesia? Are they going to -- the government going to foot their bills? ZEWDIE: So one of the things which everybody realized is remember at the beginning of the fund, proposals come in. If they are viable, they are funded. And then when we looked into our data, we found out that resources were going not necessarily only to the poorest countries. So that is when this dilemma of what do we do with countries who have the capacity and the resources to take care of the problem. And it's not a complete cut-out. It is a phased process where the country will promise to come and pick up the programs and go. So we have a wonderful relationship with China. Yes, it could have been handled better in December. But we have rebound where they will be carrying out the programs. It's the same thing with -- for Mexico and Indonesia. HUANG: Good to hear that. OK, I think Victoria. QUESTIONER: Victoria Fan from the Center for Global Development. Debrework, it's such a pleasure to hear this, and very encouraging overall. I'm very -- particularly interested in the Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation group or division, whatever it's called now. This is -- there's many uses of impact evaluation. One might be for learning lessons in general for specific disease interventions. But another might be potentially to link it to performance-based financing. Is that currently what you're -- I mean, I'm curious to learn more about how you might envision impact evaluation being incorporated. ZEWDIE: The unit is new, the Strategic Investment and Impact Evaluation unit. That doesn't mean the work has not been done earlier on. We tried, but we tried in a -- in a more or less ad hoc manner. That's what we are trying to correct. We are also using partners and expertise appropriately. For example, we have what we call the TERG, the Technical Evaluation and -- Reference Group. These are eminent people from different parts of the world. We haven't used them effectively. So instead of them coming and advising us on what to do, we are allowing them to help us develop how we will be doing impact evaluation in a -- in a meaningful way. Performance-based funding is something which the -- it's one of the cornerstones of the Global Fund. Absolutely, it will be tied with strategic investment and impact. We are trying to staff that department. We do not have all the skills, and I look to all of you to help us identify these people very quickly so that we can translate this into action. HUANG: Thank you, Debrework. Lisa. QUESTIONER: Thanks very much, and welcome, Debrework. My name is Lisa Carty. I'm from the UNAIDS office here in Washington. So actually a two-part question: I was wondering if you could elaborate a little more on the country-level impacts of the reform process because as I understand it, that was a very important goal was to make operations at country level smoother and more transparent and address some of the issues involving principal recipients -- (inaudible) -- recipients. And the second -- I'd just be interested in your opinion and thoughts going forward -- is your having traveled recently in Africa and looked a little bit at some of these questions -- you know, I think the reality is now that 10 years into the Global Fund's life cycle, programs are very deeply integrated in so many countries. You know, and early on in the Global Fund, there were places that were clearly Global Fund-funded entities. And now, you know, almost any site you go to will have U.S. money, Global Fund money, host country money. So, you know, the reality is that if the Global Fund sneezes, everyone else is going to sort of catch that cold. And you know, I'm wondering, as you're taking this forward, how you're thinking about what the coordination and collaboration mechanisms are going to be, both at country level and globally, because this next year sounds very critical. So what's the vision for try to make sure that everybody moves forward in the same general direction? ZEWDIE: Thank you. On the first one, one of the departments in the Strategic Investment and Impact division is strategic investment and partnerships. What that means is, for example, the HIV/AIDS person's job, which is to be running around attending meetings and helping, in a piecemeal way, the fund portfolio managers. They have two distinct jobs: one, the technical expertise should come from our partners. That was how the Global Fund was established in the first place. So we are translating that into action. So this person's job is not going and giving advice to the fund portfolio manager, but globally connect with the partner and institutions and make that connection at global level. The fund portfolio managers will be the entry point at country level for partnership. So we are coming at it from two different directions. And now because of the reorganization, they have time to pay attention to partnerships, to make sure that they don't go to a capital city, talk to the LFN (ph), come back. They have a dialogue; they create a relationship, and at global level, the institutions would monitor it. Integration -- that's exactly what the Global Fund is supposed to do. And when we do strategic investment in the two-step iterative process, we are going to look at it in a holistic manner: Who is there; what is -- what are they doing; what is the gap? And then we come in and fill the gap and have an integrated way of working together. So it's not -- fortunately, the Global Fund has never waved its flag. But it became a common thing to do for countries. That's what happened. I remember in the early days, they were not even supposed to put "Global Fund" on the cars. But you see them everywhere now. That is what we are trying to consolidate and give more -- (inaudible) -- we will allow our partners to impregnate us -- so opening the doors, making sure that integration happens and technical assistance happens from the technical units and not internally driven. That's how we could move 75 percent of the staff to move into grant management and not to do -- (inaudible) -- or WHO, which we have done in the last couple of years. HUANG: OK, we have -- it looks like we have many questions here. Yasmin (sp). QUESTIONER: Sir, my thanks to the council for hosting this timely discussion. And Debrework, thank you for your comment. My question actually follows nicely from Lisa's, which is about partnership. So you said that the world is watching closely how dollars are being spent in global health. Well, the world is also watching closely how the global health key donors play together. And I'd be really interested from a -- (inaudible) -- country perspective, from a strategic perspective: What is this relationship and standing of the Global Fund in relation to particularly the USG and the giant donors? And how much of the strategic development early in the year -- how much has this impacted on the scrutiny to the Global Fund? And what does this mean for the field of global health in terms of partnerships? ZEWDIE: OK, the good thing is I have somebody here from the USG who knows it much better than me, John (sp). The relationship between the Global Fund and the USG has been very strong from the beginning, almost to a point of sacrificing a lot of things from PEPFAR to support the Global Fund. That's the kind of relationship we have. Are we doing that in all 150 countries? No, it depends on individuals; it depends on the relationship, which is what we are trying to correct now. So that's one answer. The second one -- the USG is also trendsetter. So the resources that we get from the U.S. government is the resource that everybody is looking at. It is also a challenge for the rest of the world. That's why the funding and the support we get from the USG is almost the livelihood of the Global Fund, which encourages the other countries to come in and support us. We are starting with PEPFAR now in two countries to pilot a better way of working together, and we have chosen Nigeria as one of the examples. So it's not going to be just a good talk that I give or Gabrielle (sp) or Mark (sp) gives. It is something which we are going to start on the ground and see what works, what doesn't work, so that we move further. But John -- HUANG: John, do you have any quick follow-up remarks? (Chuckles.) QUESTIONER: Well, I'd -- I just -- I guess I'd say a couple things. I'm John Monahan from -- special adviser for global health partnerships at State. And two -- I -- two things I -- I'm sorry; I'll try to be quick -- but the first point is I just have to thank Gabrielle (sp), Debrework and their team. I mean, what -- get what -- as you know, the U.S. government's commitment to the Global Fund has been strong and consistent throughout this period of time of incredible change. We're very excited by the kinds of changes that Debrework outlined, the possibility of the fund executing these transformations and becoming the more strategic investor that she talked about is incredibly powerful. And so thank you for the report. This is very helpful. In terms of the partnership, we see it as an -- as an enormous opportunity -- and Lisa's (sp) is exactly right -- in country, you know, the integration on -- in -- on the ground happens everywhere. The interdependence between PEPFAR and the Global Fund we see what I think's an opportunity here is the kinds of reforms Debrework's talking about and the approach that Gabrielle (sp) and the team have taken allows us both to be better partners. It's both -- the Global Fund, I think, is in a very different position in terms of how it's organized, and I also think that it's a challenge to us to -- Ambassador Goosby's been leading this initiative -- to increase our efficiency and the effectiveness of the bilateral programs and the opportunity here to work in a really integrated way, country by country, is enormous here. So thank you for your presentation. But we see this as a -- as a huge opportunity. HUANG: I was told that the Global Fund was the most efficient organization because with 600 staff, you manage, like, $30 billion of money. Is that still the case? ZEWDIE: We are actually decreasing the number of staff. So, by making that shift from the control and administrative purposes to grant management, what we have done is to increase the efficiency on the core business of the Global Fund (and ?) shrinking the other nice things you can have if you have a lot of time and money. So the number of the Global Fund staff will decrease. The quality and the type of staff that we are going to put in, for example, for strategic investment, will change. And we have also promised the board that we are going to do the transformation with the budget that we have been given. So that's where we are maximizing both the resources and also the efficiency. HUANG: Wonderful. Chris (sp)? OK. QUESTIONER: Thanks for the presentation, Debrework, and thanks for organizing this. It's always a pleasure. Actually I want to pick up on Lisa's question a little bit of -- you -- Debrework, you raised a -- that simplification, simplifying things was an important goal, and I was wondering if you can elaborate a bit more. From the country perspective -- the recipient country respective (sic), how exactly is the new Global Fund going to be simpler for them to engage with and to meet the requirements? ZEWDIE: I'm going to show you something, which is what I'm looking for, to make that point. We have -- can you see this? This is 120-page -- 1,200 pages of documentation for one grant, OK? That's horrendous. Frankly, countries work with us because they need the money and they have a huge epidemic. It's not because we're simpler. Every decision that has been taken by the board and the secretariat made sense when the decision was made. But, cumulatively, when you look at them, they -- it doesn't serve any purpose, neither for the secretariat nor for the countries. So what we are trying to do now is to look into the whole life cycle from beginning to end and cut all this unnecessary back and forth. Of course, when we start the two-stage iterative process, this would -- this would shorten by itself. But now the requests that goes back and forth between the countries and ourselves from grant signing to disbursement is horrendous. So that is what we are working on now. So the first thing was to settle staff. Transforming a 600 -- over a 600-staff organization in 60 days is -- you can imagine how we were working. Now by the end of the month everybody would have settled, all the departments and all the staff. Immediately, we embark on this unclogging the pipe and manufacturing the grant (banking ?) system. That's when we cut all these unnecessary things that have been added. So simplification would be the first thing that we'd -- we would be focusing on. QUESTIONER: Do you have a timeline where -- you had 60 days to accomplish the first task; have you set a timeline of we have 120 days to accomplish the second (one ?)? ZEWDIE: Yes, we do, and we also have milestones in between. When we go to the board in May, there are certain things that we have promised the board which we will deliver on. And then by the next board, these processes would have already kicked in. And what we expect from the second board is countries saying yes, it is simple now. HUANG: Sally. QUESTIONER: Thanks very much. I'm Sally Cole with PSI. And Debrework, thank you for coming and for your coherent explanation. The mandate of Gabriel Jaramillo and his team, as I understand, has really been looking intensively at the secretariat and its functions and -- at the country level. What about the board and the IG? I mean, is somebody looking at them as institutions? Are they going to be left where they are? And if so, how will they interact with the reborn secretariat? ZEWDIE: John, you have to realize Sally is an old friend, but I never, ever told her to ask this question. (Laughter.) The board -- the board has been transforming itself as the secretariat has been transforming itself. The high-level panel report is something which we all followed to change this fund. As a result already, there is a tremendous change between the Office of the Inspector General and the secretariat. We have -- we call Monday bureaucracy day. All meetings happen only on Monday in the Global Fund. We start with a management executive committee meeting where the inspector general is invited too. This is when we talk about where is the budget, how do we function, et cetera. Then subsequently, we have another committee which looks into the grant. So every executive committee member would know what's happening in our malaria grant in Ghana, for example, because the country team comes and presents. And the inspector general is also a member of that. The third one is the disease committees, which I mentioned. So that is one way of improving for the Office of the Inspector General. And he comes with his staff to understand what we are doing and also for us to -- for him to tell us how to do this without touching on his independence. The -- I'm going to let John tell you, because John is a board member, on what the board is doing. QUESTIONER: I'll -- just briefly, I do -- I have to emphasize how critical the change has been in terms of the relationship between the secretariat and the inspector general from where we sit. The inspector general's function is absolutely critical to the fund and to the transparency and to making sure that we know that resources are going where they're supposed to. But this kind of really effective coordination is fabulous. So it's a very positive step. In terms of the board -- and the board is on a two-part -- two-stage reform process -- it -- based in part on the recommendation of the high-level panel and in part on work that the board leadership had already undertaken, it restructured what had become a proliferation of multiple working groups and committees to three standing committees: a finance committee, a strategy and investment committee and an audit and ethics committee that, for the first time, will actually include non-board members on the committee -- in fact, a majority of non-board members, including -- chaired by an independent committee member to provide oversight to the inspector general as well as sort of the boarder audit and ethics issues. The board is also trying to have a mechanism where -- historically, the committees have -- (inaudible) -- independent. They have a coordinating mechanism so that the leadership can -- we can make sure that issues are managed in a more effective and sort of efficient way. I mean, the fund -- among its issues is that governance really had not been managed, I think, systematically, I think would be a fair description. The critical thing here is to execute, much like what the secretariat's doing now. The board needs to actually make the committees work. The committees have met for the first time within the last two to three months. We are -- and I'm actually quite optimistic that we've moved -- we've streamlined. Now, obviously the next step is there are still major issues remaining in governance. How do we make sure that implementing country voices are as effectively at the table as possible? How do we make sure that the board interacts with the kinds of structural changes that Debrework's described. Both of those are critical. But we're on the right path, in my view, at least. HUANG: Debrework said Monday is a bureaucratic day. I'm glad that this meeting is scheduled on Wednesday -- (laughter) -- so you have time. ZEWDIE: Anyway, I'm not allowed to travel -- the executive management team is not allowed to travel on Monday. HUANG: OK. Next we're going to have three -- actually the next three questions were all from -- they're all from Robert. We have -- actually, we have four Roberts in this room, at least. (Laughter.) First Robert? QUESTIONER: Is that me? HUANG: Yeah, that's you. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: (Inaudible) -- Robert 1 or Robert 2? HUANG: We have kind of identity crisis here. QUESTIONER: Help me out a little bit. I'm Robert -- QUESTIONER: Whatever you say -- (off mic). (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: I don't know if this is working. I'm Robert Hecht from the Results for Development Institute. Debrework, thank you. The changes you describe are very impressive. They're ambitious, they're exciting, and they sound very positive. So congratulations on that. We all have seen organizations that went through a difficult period, especially around financial management or lack of top-notch management, I even think at our own shared institution at the World Bank in the past around the trust funds, the donor trust funds, where there was some question about proper use of funds. Often the reaction is to come down very hard with lots of financial controls, and those are understandable, but they can also have negative -- unintended negative effects, especially for the staff. You talked about changing the staff and improving the staff, but being able to work in an organization where you're allowed to be creative, where you can be entrepreneurial, where it's fun to go to work, where people are not looking over your shoulder all the time is also important. And you also talk about making sure that the staff can focus on impact, value for money, getting them most public health benefit and development benefit. How are you and Gabriel thinking about a possible trade-off there, or how you avoid the trade-off so that you correct the financial issues, which have come out very prominently and obviously need to be high on the agenda, and at the same time create an organization that is fun, creative, entrepreneurial and focusing on development impact and health impact and not only on making sure that every euro and dollar is accounted for? ZEWDIE: Thank you, Robert. The last point, in the morale of the staff at the Global Fund, was during that time when the AP story broke, because fund portfolio managers had to think twice before they signed on a disbursement. They were terrified. So that actually crippled us more than anything else, which was internally known to us. So the change now is that -- essentially the empowerment of staff so that they could take action, because we have put -- so if you take six months ago, fund portfolio manager, who is responsible for about four, five countries and there is somebody above him or her, there was a chain that they had to go through because everybody was afraid to commit. What we are doing, especially in the 21 high-impact countries, is there's no chain. There is the fund portfolio manager and there is the regional director directly reporting to the division head, because we want them to pay close attention to this. That's number one. Number two, we have strengthened what we call a country team. So it's not a fund portfolio manager who is going to take a decision, it is the finance person, the fund portfolio manager, the monitoring and evaluation person, (legal ?), who sit together and who decide on something. So we have taken away the fear factor. There is also a change from the side of the inspector general. There is more interaction, there is more discussion about them playing the role of almost quality control, which was not -- it was not supposed to be a punishing instrument. So that's one of it. The other big one is we need to -- Gabriel calls it the soft skills. It is attracting the best staff, mentoring them and also incentivizing performance. So there are all these milestones that these people have to fulfill. And what management is doing is to arm them with all the instruments that they need so that they could indeed perform. So we had -- this is that -- the biggest task. Once we have settled them, we are going to have coaching -- a very simple but rigorous way of performance evaluation, which is more like the private sector and not like the U.N. system. So we are putting all these things in place, but the problem is we are moving in a very fast speed because we don't have time to put these things in place. So that is already changing. You see a lot of change and a lot of hope in the staff as we move forward in this. HUANG: OK, we still have lots of questions. So I'm going to collect those questions, actually, in two, maybe -- hopefully three rounds. In the first round, we collected two -- three questions from Robert (sp), Robert and Jen. QUESTIONER: This Robert (sp). Thank you. We are sort of here to -- reflecting on the success of the -- of the fund after 10 years. And I think there's been unquestioned success of the fund and PEPFAR and the Gates Foundation and other funders as well as other bilateral funding for drugs. I was recently in Uganda and Malawi and even in the rural areas of those countries and visiting a number of health centers and hospitals. And I was always struck, because I always asked the question, about the availability of drugs. And everyone said, you know, oh, no, we don't have any problems with drugs, which was, to me, a spectacular result -- (inaudible) -- based on just a few years ago, when that would not have been true. We have all benefited, then, from these very coordinated efforts -- and even if they were not coordinated, they were certainly cooperative -- to have this kind of result in many countries that for many years had drug shortages. However, what I did observe and continue to read about -- and when I do travel in these countries, there are two headwinds that we're yet to tamp down. And I was wondering what lessons you discern from your experience at the World Bank and now at the Global Fund in what we do about the clear, continuous crisis in health worker shortages and the breakdown in technical training for health workers that we do have. And even when our intentions are pretty positive, where we supply equipment, and then when the equipment breaks, we have no funding to fix it, no one trained to fix it. I saw a number of broken-down cars, trucks, ambulances. That's one headwind. The second headwind is the paradox of success, of having drugs available. What we have seen in some countries -- I got the country report in Uganda, where we are seeing a tick-up of infection in populations where we didn't expect it. And that was marriage-age people, people in their 40s, where we didn't see it before. And someone described that as the paradox of success: People now know that there are drugs available, so the prevention side has suffered a lot. So maybe from your experiences in these two wonderful institutions, you can sort of give us some hope about what we do about these two headwinds. HUANG: Robert. QUESTIONER: Hey, I'm Robert Marten with the Rockefeller Foundation. Thank you again for the talk. My question builds on some of the other points that were raised. And it's -- you know, when you look back at the last 10 years, I think again, the Global Fund has been tremendously successful. But you've also seen over these -- the past 10 years a bit of a shift from the more vertical approach to the horizontal. And so I know this question has surfaced many times before, but I just would love to hear your thoughts and where the internal discussion is on this, particularly in this moment of opportunity that you have in terms of broadening the fund's remit beyond HIV, TB and malaria and how those discussions are faring, and then also in terms of the implications for global governance of or for health, however you want to put it. That's a -- maybe a broader second question, but the first question would be particularly important. HUANG: Jen. QUESTIONER: Jen Kates from the Kaiser Family Foundation. Hello. Good to see you. Two quick things that build on some of what we heard. One is on prevention, and that relates to the UNAIDS new investment framework and just thinking about where prevention is going and how an institution like the Global Fund can -- which is responding to country-driven proposals, but how you're looking at that and figuring out how to be proactive and not just reactive and be on the cutting edge of these changes. But then another question is around the public messaging around the fund, because having you here is great, and I think a lot of the things you shared we've only heard about, you know, on a listserv or some information, and changing the public discourse and dialogues in Washington and probably other capitals is needed. And I heard something that you said today, and I heard it the other day too, which seems to me big news, which is that the transitional funding mechanism can meet the demand. And that was something that wasn't clear recently, and it seems like big news, and I wonder if you have any plans to get that out there in some fashion. ZEWDIE: OK. Robert, thank you. The Global Fund -- and I would tie it with the vertical versus horizontal question as well -- is in a very awkward position where its board, rightly, makes sure that we stick to our mandate, whatever that means. So that is where, for example, health worker -- health workforce crisis is a crisis which affects our programs. I'll give you a very simple example, and this is how development irritates some of us. This was a Phase 2 panel there, from Chad, and the group, the country team, has come in and was presenting to the Phase 2 panel, and they said this cannot be an A grant, it is a B grant, because Chad does not have a good data collection system. And we had it as a conditions precedent for the last two years. So what do you do? You cut the funding on something which should have been there a long time ago. Everybody was supposed to build the data system of Chad, even before the Global Fund was born. So we keep every year saying, this doesn't work, that doesn't work. We don't do anything collectively to help these countries to come out of this. So the work -- the health workforce crisis is exactly the same thing. We all talk about it. I don't think there is a concerted effort to bring this thing out, so that all our programs will work well. I will be lying to you if I say the Global Fund has a special program to do this. We don't. But it affects our programs; you are right. The second one, the success of treatment versus prevention, I want to tie the prevention questions together. I think about a year, a year and a half ago, there was talk about the Global Fund is only focusing on treatment. That's not true. The funding which goes to prevention and treatment us almost equal. Now the question comes into the strategic funding of prevention., What is it in prevention that we're funding? Yes, there will be resurgence as people become more and more comfortable with treatment. Then you can't even detect the virus in their blood. The hope I see is, as you said, the new investment framework, which we are going to follow. Take circumcision, for example. We knew circumcision works or worked six, seven years ago. But the only time it has taken effect is when PEPFAR and UNAIDS said, we are going to put X amount of money to do it. So we need those kinds of champions. I was in Sydney talking on the microbicide conference. It's exactly the same things. It takes an -- institutions and people to champion and push this thing forward, unfortunately, because evidence alone is not going to do it. We are all worried about these countries, like Uganda, who are successful but we need -- because it is going to cost us even more -- to have a concerted effort to making sure that treatment is indeed used as prevention and not a cause to feeding the pipeline with new infections. The -- again, the board, unless they change their mind, as we look into the future, when our 2011-2016 strategy was being developed, there was huge debate in allowing the fund -- whether to stay within its mandate now or to even go a little bit into reproductive health. The final conclusion was, you stay within your mandate. But you know already -- for example, 40 percent of our funding is going to saving lives of mothers and children. So that is what the thinking is at the board level. I don't see it moving in any other way now. However, there is a global discussion now as to what is going to happen to it. Do we still go this way? So that may change the Global Fund as well. I have -- I have answered the first part of your question, I hope, Jen. We don't do a good job when communicating. We have now recruited -- if I was Gabriel, I would say a fantastic person -- (laughter) -- called Seth Fasan (ph). He is very well-known. He has been in crisis communications management. One of the first things he's going to do is to initiate a newspaper. So every week we will send out news to -- if you compare this community with the implementing countries, we are even worse. They have no clue what we are doing because we don't communicate with them. And that's when we knew we lost the war when the AP story hit us. If a few ministers of health from implementing countries stood up and said, the Global Fund is saving lives in my country, that would have changed the trajectory. We haven't cultivated them. So that's the focus now, to cultivate implementing countries, but more importantly, to share our news as quickly as possible, without having any excuse. The reason why the full funding of the Transitional Funding Mechanism was not disclosed was because of the way we work. We had to disclose to our board yesterday -- I think you got the email yesterday. But you are right. We are not doing a good job. We have to -- we know we have not done a good job, so we will improve. HUANG: OK. So -- I'm sorry, actually, we are running out of time, even though -- (chuckles) -- we haven't run out of the questions. It is the council's rule that we start in time and end in time. (Laughter.) For those who are unable to have found the time to ask questions, I apologize. Maybe you could ask Debrework after the meeting. But I'd like to thank Debrework for this very informative and encouraging update. (Applause.) And my best wishes to the reorganization and transformation efforts of the fund. I'd like to take this opportunity to thank our -- (inaudible) -- the -- Jerouz (ph) and in particular Zoe (sp) for their support -- assistance in making this round-table series possible. And also I would like thank the -- Stuart Patrick (ph), Faroh (ph) -- is Faroh (ph) here? Just -- and the IIGG program and the Robina Foundation for their generous support of this round-table series, and last but not least, you the participants of this meeting, for your -- the questions and insights, for making this such a lively discussion. I appreciate it. Thank you. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2012, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
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  • Trade
    Forging a New Trade Policy on Tobacco
    Tobacco is reemerging as a polarizing issue in U.S. trade policy. New trade agreement negotiations, the first launched by the Obama administration, and an upcoming UN summit on noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are forcing the White House to choose between the tobacco debate's partisans. The United States need not exclude tobacco from its eight-country trade talks, known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), or harm U.S. economic interests in order to promote tobacco control. U.S. negotiators should pursue a four-part strategy in the TPP that reduces tobacco agricultural subsidies; promotes coordinated, stringent tobacco product regulation; includes an explicit health exception for tobacco control measures; and excludes Vietnam, a lower-income country involved in the TPP talks, from tobacco tariff reductions. There is strong U.S. precedent for each element of this strategy. If implemented, this strategy will achieve the long elusive appropriate balance between U.S. mandates on trade and its obligations to promote global health and standing abroad. A Brief, Recent History of U.S. Trade Policy on Tobacco Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. trade policy on tobacco was controversial. The United States used bilateral trade measures to pry open emerging Asian economies to imported cigarettes. The entry of multinational tobacco companies sharply increased tobacco use in these countries, which were unprepared for intensive tobacco marketing, particularly to women and youth. A public outcry followed. In 1997, Congress attached an amendment to its appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, known as the Doggett Amendment, which barred personnel from those agencies from promoting tobacco abroad. President William J. Clinton extended that prohibition to all U.S. executive branch agencies with a 2001 executive order. Both the Doggett Amendment and 2001 executive order remain in force. In the intervening decade, U.S. trade policy on tobacco has receded as a public issue, but remained largely unchanged. While the United States cracks down on tobacco products at home, it continues to help expand their markets abroad. Nearly every trade and investment agreement that the United States has negotiated over the last decade reduces tobacco tariffs and improves the protection of tobacco-related investments overseas. Tobacco companies are aggressively exploiting trade and investment agreements to expand their market in low- and middle-income countries. Lower tariffs reduce the price of imported cigarettes in countries without good taxation systems to compensate. Multinational tobacco companies use dispute resolution provisions in trade and investment agreements to block tobacco marketing and labeling regulations far more modest than those in the United States. Young women, who have historically smoked less than men in most parts of the developing world, are a major target of industry marketing campaigns. Girls now smoke at the same rate as boys in more than 60 percent of countries surveyed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. TPP and Tobacco The Obama administration launched its TPP negotiations in late 2009. These talks involve eight other trading partners, including one lower-income country—Vietnam. The TPP members have set a goal of reaching the outlines of an agreement by the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) Leaders' meeting in Honolulu in November. The battle lines on tobacco are drawn. Last month, Representative Linda Sanchez (D-CA) circulated a letter among her House colleagues demanding that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) exclude tobacco entirely from the TPP trade talks. Philip Morris asked U.S. trade officials to use these TPP talks to eliminate tobacco tariffs and block the use of large health warning labels on cigarette packs. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other international business groups have supported the tobacco industry, calling on USTR to oppose a new plain cigarette-packaging requirement in Australia, another TPP country. It is unclear how U.S. officials will proceed, but the stakes are high. With the poor U.S. economy and the 2012 presidential election looming, the Obama administration is looking to the TPP talks to improve its trade credentials and standing among the business community. With the global health community focused on the UN summit and the global epidemic of NCDs, the United States will be subject to heightened scrutiny for its decisions on tobacco, a leading risk factor for cancers, cardiovascular disease, chronic respiratory illnesses, and nearly all NCDs. The position that the White House adopts on tobacco will set the precedent for future U.S. trade agreements. A decision to exclude tobacco entirely will incite active TPP opposition from the tobacco industry and perhaps some international business groups. U.S. trade officials are obliged by law to stimulate U.S. economic growth and maintain and enlarge foreign markets for U.S. agricultural and manufacturing products. Tobacco is a legal product and the United States is its largest exporter. A decision to seek tobacco tariff reductions and block effective cigarette labeling will undermine U.S. credibility on global health in the UN NCD summit in September. Tobacco is different from alcohol, fast food, and other leading risk factors for NCDs. As former WHO director-general Gro Harlem Brundtland famously said, tobacco is the only consumer product that, when used as directed, kills. There are 1.2 billion smokers worldwide, roughly one-third of the world's adult population. Seven hundred million children—approximately 40 percent of all children—are exposed to second-hand tobacco smoke at home. How can the United States promote further trade in tobacco products when they already cause more deaths annually than HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis combined? The Way Forward The United States need not exclude tobacco from the TPP talks to promote tobacco control. U.S. negotiators should adopt the following four-part strategy to balance U.S. trade interests with tobacco control priorities. 1. Reduce Subsidies. U.S. negotiators should seek reduced agricultural subsidies for tobacco, which would level the playing field for U.S. tobacco producers and help diminish foreign production. The United States phased out its own tobacco quota and price support programs in 2004 with a $9.6 billion buyout to producers. 2. Harmonize Regulations. The United States, which now has strict tobacco labeling and content restrictions, should use the TPP Agreement as a vehicle to coordinate with TPP partners on adopting the same high standards. Common standards and labeling requirements promote trade and effective tobacco regulation and reduce the likelihood of smuggling and trade disputes. 3. Make health exceptions for tobacco control explicit. The United States should seek to explicitly identify tobacco control measures as among the general exceptions to the TPP Agreement. This exception would limit the ability of tobacco companies to abuse TPP dispute resolution to block effective advertising and labeling measures. 4. Exclude Vietnam from tobacco tariff reductions. Entry of multinational tobacco companies and marketing tactics into Vietnam would be disastrous. Vietnam has joined the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, but is still implementing its requirements. Cigarette taxes in Vietnam are much lower than the WHO recommends. Its labeling requirements do not yet apply to imported products. A state-owned tobacco company dominates local sales, so there is little incentive for advertising. Forty-six percent of Vietnamese men smoke, but less than two percent of Vietnamese women. There is ample U.S. precedent for each of these actions. Trade talks routinely seek lower agricultural subsidies. U.S. trade agreements are designed to promote regulatory harmonization. U.S. trade agreements frequently include exceptions for essential security, taxation, environmental measures to safeguard plant and human health, and conservation measures. The United States has excluded agricultural commodities from tariff reductions in past free trade agreements (FTAs) due to political sensitivities. U.S. FTAs with Australia, South Korea, and Jordan exclude sugar, rice, and tobacco, respectively. The United States has also adopted differential trade policies toward developing countries for public health reasons. The United States has, for instance, long excluded developing countries from its trade efforts on pharmaceutical pricing. This strategy also does not require policymakers to choose between U.S. jobs and global health. The United States currently exports significant volumes of high-quality tobacco leaf and premium cigarettes to Japan, Europe, and affluent Middle Eastern countries, but almost nothing to cost-sensitive developing-country markets like Vietnam. If U.S. tobacco companies have legitimate complaints of discriminatory treatment, the United States can still seek redress in WTO dispute resolution. Conclusion The Obama administration has a tremendous opportunity to adopt a new approach on tobacco that better balances U.S. mandates on trade with its obligations to promote global health and U.S. standing abroad. In recent years, Washington has shown leadership and courage in protecting its citizens from the perils of tobacco. It's past time that the United States adopt policies that support its trading partners' efforts to do the same.
  • Health Policy and Initiatives
    AIDS at 30: Getting Policy and Funding Right
    On the heels of the 30th anniversary since AIDS was recognized, the UN General Assembly will meet to discuss the next course of HIV/AIDS funding. CFR Senior Fellow for Global Health Laurie Garrett traces the initial failures to contain the spread of AIDS, and calls on international policymakers to adequately fund the combat of the deadly disease.
  • Global
    HIV’s Tenuous Funding Road
    With the UN meeting on AIDS funding this week, CFR’s Laurie Garrett says the slow response to the AIDS epidemic was the single biggest failure in public health and argues the need to double funding for new treatments to stop the spread of the disease.
  • Global
    The AIDS Pandemic at 30 Years: Can it be Stopped?
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    SETH BERKLEY: So good evening, everybody. My name is Seth Berkley. I'm the president and CEO of the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and I'd like to welcome you to this meeting. First of all, the next meeting is going to be the World Economic Update, which is going to happen tomorrow morning. For all of you who come to a lot of meetings here, the usual request: Please turn off your communication devices. Don't just put them on vibrate; turn them off, to avoid interference with the sound system. And I'd like to remind all of you that this particular session is going to be on the record. You all know that -- the statistics about AIDS as a disease. More than 33 million people are infected today, living with it, and nearly 30 million people have died. There's 7,100 new infections a day. Now we've had an extraordinary revolution in treatment, where we now have more drugs to treat HIV than all other viruses put together. And we've had enormous progress on getting treatment out to people who need it. Today there's about 6.6 million people on treatment. But there's also 9 million people who need treatment who aren't getting it. And for every three people put on treatment, there's five new infections. Now it's been a pretty extraordinary and unprecedented response to AIDS, and we're going to talk about that today, because we have a fabulous panel. But to put that into perceptive, there's going to be in the next few days, from the 8th to 10th of June, a high-level meeting of the U.N. General Assembly on HIV/AIDS. And this particular meeting is going to mark the 30th anniversary of the original reports of HIV in a cluster of gay men in Los Angeles. It also is 10 years since the landmark meeting that was hosted by the -- by the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS, the first time the General Assembly had taken a health issue like this forward. Since that time, a lot of things have happened. We've had HIV/AIDS as the specific target of the MDGs, and we've also had a -- an unbelievable political commitment, starting out in the Labour government of the U.K. and then at the Gleneagles G-8 summit, where they adopted a goal of universal access by 2010, which we did not make. So today we're going to talk about AIDS at 30 and is this an epidemic that we can stop. And to talk about it, we've got this fabulous panel. To my left is Michelle Bachelet, who's the first undersecretary general and executive director of U.N. Women, which was established on July 2nd, 2010. Former to that, she served as president of Chile, from 2006 to '10, and had the amazing ability to serve both as a minister of defense and a minister of health of that country. To her left is Paul De Lay, who's replacing my good friend Michel Sidibe, and he's picked a(n) excellent substitute. Paul joined UNAIDS in February 2003. He was appointed the deputy executive director of the program in 2009. And prior to that, he worked at the Global Program on AIDS at WHO, and the chief of HIV/AIDS at USAID. He's a very experienced physician. And next to him, at the end, is Robert Orr, who's the assistant secretary-general for planning and policy coordination in the executive office of the secretary-general since 2004. He runs the secretary-general's policy committee, and he's the principal policy adviser to the secretary-general on climate change, food security, global health, counterterrorism, and U.N. reform. Quite a big set of tasks there. So I'm going to start with a series of questions, and then obviously we'll open it to the members. UNAIDS has adopted a very bold platform. They've said zero HIV infections, zero HIV discrimination and zero AIDS death. And in the last two years, we've seen tremendous in breakthroughs in biomedical prevention. We've seen proof of concept of a vaccine. We've seen successful clinical trials of a microbicide. We've seen that if you give anti-retroviral drugs for prevention, you can block transmission to men who have sex with men. And most recently, data to show that if you treat discordant couples, you can block transmission. So very exciting new science coming. We also know that over the last few years, we've begun to see rates of HIV drop in a number of countries, and we've got more people on anti-retrovirals than ever before. But we also know that donor governments have become less willing and less able to sustain the levels of existing funding for anti-retroviral therapy and for prevention research. So we could be on the threshold of ending the pandemic, or we could lose the ground we've gained. So can we keep the momentum going and stop the pandemic? So let me start with you, Paul. PAUL DE LAY: Seth, thank you. And again, I am grateful to be here, and I do want to extend the apologies of our executive director, Michel Sidibe. He was planning to come, but at the last minute was -- had to meet with the secretary-general to prepare for the high-level meeting. We're negotiating a declaration, which is a critical document that we may talk a little bit about before. The successes -- and I think we can call them successes -- that Seth has referred to that have occurred over the last 10 years certainly started from a period of time of extreme skepticism. In 2000, no one thought we could put people on complicated anti-retroviral drugs. No one thought we would get the resources from donors. No one thought that we would be able to effectively change risk behaviors and overcome the stigma and discrimination that's particularly associated with this epidemic, unlike most of the other infectious disease epidemics of the world. And we've proved them wrong. Now, of course, we have naysayers who are saying, well, we can't sustain people on treatment, or the decreases in prevention are not fast enough. We have a 25 percent decline in incident infections since 2001. Well, all of this results from a lot of work, a lot of passion, a lot of community engagement, and money. We are now at about $16 billion U.S. being spent in middle and low-income countries. We never thought we'd get to that level. It's probably not enough. But it was at least enough to be able to broaden from what we were calling "boutique programs" back in the '90s that only served hundreds of thousands of people, to programs that truly served millions of people, both on the treatment side and on the prevention side. And the successes -- and I will close now -- that we've seen thus far have primarily been what we used to call the old ABCs: abstinence, be faithful to your partner, and use condoms. We are just now on the verge of seeing the effects of male circumcision and the increasing number of people who are being treated and are therefore less infectious. So the last 10 years really was a proof of concept that risk behaviors could be changed. And I think that's a positive story, as positive and as powerful as the dramatic increases in treatment. Unfortunately, it's not going to be enough. And if we continue the current trend at this rate, we are looking at an epidemic that will last another 30 to 40 years. BERKLEY: Thank you, Paul. Bob, the U.N., on this particular issue, has done a really enormously fabulous job. They've created a special program and brought the different U.N. agencies together -- UNAIDS -- and they've also created a funding mechanism. Kofi Annan pushed very hard for that, the Global Fund, which has raised unprecedented amounts of money for HIV and obviously also for malaria and TB. All of this has said that, you know, AIDS is exceptional. Is there still room for AIDS exceptionalism? And how do you see the future for this effort within the U.N. system, given the priorities that are with us today? ROBERT ORR: Thank you, Seth, and to the council for the invitation. I'm really struck at what a difference a decade makes. If you think back just one decade ago, when we were talking about this -- and in the context of, Seth, your question about the U.N. -- this was still taboo. It was still an area where, institutionally, you couldn't really talk about it. But as we are tonight -- literally, the planes are landing at JFK one after the other with heads of state on board -- you couldn't even raise this in polite company with heads of state one decade ago. Diplomatically, this was a dead letter. In this one decade, not just the scientific advances that Seth mentioned -- and I think that the institutional advance had been that the U.N. became the locus of activity, in many ways, to fill this huge vacuum of leadership. It was not easy. It was not pretty in the early days. But I think -- I remember the initial efforts, when Richard Holbrooke, for whom I worked at the time, tried to drag this into the Security Council -- the visceral reaction that this was wrong. You couldn't do that. This was distorting what the U.N. was. There was an institutional reaction, there was a cultural reaction, there was a political reaction all wrapped into one. But what's happened in the decade since was that the U.N., I think, both because of some political leadership -- I would credit Kofi Annan and Richard Holbrooke, among others -- but for creating a space within the organization to address this. And then a lot of the pioneers in the area just constantly opening that space in the U.N., and I think the Global Fund -- the fact that Kofi Annan was successful at getting the Global Fund off the ground, but then it had to leave the U.N. -- (chuckles) -- to survive and thrive, I think is -- it shows some of the limits too, the institutional limits. But I really wanted to pick up your AIDS exceptionalism issue, Seth, because I think here's another area where we really are on the verge of a breakthrough. For a while, it took AIDS exceptionalism to give this issue the attention it deserved. But we've long since outgrown AIDS exceptionalism. For our success on AIDS, we need to break down the barrier of exceptionalism. And for success on a range of other health issues, we need to break that down. So right now maybe the most exciting, dynamic advancement in the space is the global strategy on women's and children's health. And the big question -- the big question two years ago was, do we have room for a strategy on women's and children's health and the fight against HIV/AIDS. You know, for those of you -- I think just about everyone in this room recognizes that's a crazy question. But that was the question. Do we have enough funding to do women's and children's health and HIV/AIDS? How could you see these two things as somehow competing with each other, when the overlap is so dramatic -- but also the model of how you -- how we've had some success against HIV/AIDS; bringing in multistakeholder communities, scaling up, going up the cultural issues and the political issues, as well as the technical and the health issues. So I think we can not only say that AIDS exceptionalism is no longer needed, it really is something that we are going to get much further by integrating our HIV/AIDS interventions in a broader set. And just coming from Nigeria and Ethiopia, and in the last week with the secretary-general where we saw, at the village level, things happening on women's and children's health, and HIV/AIDS kind of seamlessly meshed into those programs -- that's where we want to be. We just need to get it out there further and farther. BERKLEY: Thank you, Bob. And for President Bachelet, women have steadily borne more of the brunt of the epidemic worldwide. And yet, culturally they often can't control their own sexual situation, their sexual relationships. You know, what can be done to empower women and reduce their risk of infection particularly? And I personally want to congratulate you on your new role at U.N. Women, and I suspect that many of the members don't know fully what U.N. Women is, so you might just want to take a minute to say something about the new agency -- if I can call it an agency -- and how that is going to play a role around HIV. MICHELLE BACHELET: Well, thank you Mr. Berkley. I'm happy to be here again in the council today in my new capacity as the executive director of U.N. Women. But also because I'm here is because I -- last year Michel Sibide asked me to be an advocate, as a former epidemiologist, of the national commission of HIV/AIDS for my country. The foreign minister, as the head of delegation of the UNGASS meeting 10 years ago, where all what you have been saying, I lived it there -- where just putting in a declaration, a final statement, people who are sex workers or men who have sex with men, was really a very complicated situation to do at the general assembly. So of course, I have to say I've seen and I agree with what I've heard -- but on the other hand, I have to say, or we improve women's capacities, we empower women, or we're not going to be able to be completely successful because in Africa, of course, and not only in Africa, also in the Pacific area, and still in some parts of the Caribbean, the HIV epidemic still has the face of a woman. And women in many of those places are first -- they'll have, as you mentioned, all the capacity of putting the conditions in a sexual intercourse, in a relation, but also not only with intimate partners, but also in many places where rape is used a -- or as a means of war, in the case of conflict or post-conflict countries, where you can end the conflict, but rape doesn't end, unfortunately. Maintains as a way of, I would say, of a relation between power between men and women. On the other hand, we see women who do not have access to -- attention to IRV (ph), to health care. And also women, in my experience in HIV/AIDS commission, but I have spoken to my friends in the UNAIDS and many other places, usually they are the ones who -- how can I say -- they sacrifice for the rest. If there are few treatments they would prefer that her husband or her children receive the treatment and they are always there. They never go to the health site for care, attention or so on. So why I mention all this? It's not anecdotic (ph). It's concrete of the difficulties that we find in fighting with HIV/AIDS and not looking at the specificities of women. So what do we need to do? First of all, we need to empower women as agents of change. We need much more women leaders in terms of women living with HIV/AIDS, or women ensuring that there is sort of a mainstreaming in the health quality that can ensure that women really are receiving the treatment, the care, or the information so they can prevent and avoid getting an HIV infection. I have to say that one of the things that I was taking with Michel Sibide, and of course with Dr. Babatunde from UNFPA is how we deal with the issue that a woman is a mother, but not only a mother. And because if you see many -- I have some data here, that in 2009 53 percent of pregnant women living with (HIV?) received the antiretrovirals to prevent mother-to-child transmission in low- and middle-income countries. And they -- (inaudible) -- up from 15 percent. I mean, from 15 percent, 2005, to 53 in 2009. It looks like a great improvement. But only 26 percent of pregnancy women receive HIV testing and counseling. So we're not -- first of all we do not know exactly how many women are living with HIV/AIDS. And then they receive the treatment -- but in some places because of a lack of funding, because of the perspective of women as mother, trying to avoid vertical transmission, when the children is -- the child is about three months old, they cut the treatment. And then, the children can avoid the transmission, but what about breastfeeding? What about the women who then could die afterwards because spontaneously the infection -- and can die of AIDS. So we have to continue working empowering women. Second, we need to ensure that women have access to prevention, treatment and care services. So we need to ensure particular earmarked fundings for women's access to all of this, because otherwise they won't be prioritized. And so there is an incredible, I would say, correlation between violence against women and HIV and AIDS. So we have to fight very strongly against violence against women. And I'm talking from domestic violence that can be linked to gender based violence, to of course conflict and post-conflict countries. If we don't work on that, I think, all our successes in terms of all kinds of medical treatment and so on will not be enough because many of the women who are victims of violence and then they are raped, they can get infected by their partners. We all know that women are less -- how could I say -- they transmit less their HIVs. They are the ones who carry it to men, then men to women. So, we really -- I'm really convinced, and not because now I'm the head of the -- of U.N. Women, I'm always been convinced of this, because I'm a medical doctor and I study these things. So just to end saying that if we do not focus on women on this next step, we will be having this trend. I mean, this trend maybe will not go as fast as we should in terms of trying to prevent and to improve the quality of life of people living with HIV/AIDS. Two words about UN Women -- new agency, new entity of the United Nations. After five years in negotiations, they acknowledge that even though all the efforts done on the U.N. system for women, for gender equality and women's empowerment, all the indicators linked to women's issues and women's life were the ones who progressed the slower. And if we only go into the -- into the Millennium Development Goals, we see that empowerment of women, maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS and so on -- of course, poverty has the face of a woman and is still very high. So there was this political decision that women should have their relevance, if I may say, as apart from other kinds of global (challenge?) like climate change, poverty, and so on. So this new entity is working for the women and girls of the world, will be producing the coordination synergies within the U.N. system, is probably the first child of the reform of the United Nations because it's -- what looks after is to produce synergies, coordination, and not duplicate efforts, and have five main priorities as leading agency, because there are many other areas where women are important, but were not the leading ones. And HIV/AIDS, of course, our friends here are the leading ones, but it's economical and political empowerment that's -- (inaudible) -- first two priorities -- understanding that if women cannot have autonomy, economic autonomy, we'll never have equal rights, and that we need -- for example, when we're talking about HIV -- the women's voices to be heard so we really can give the relevance and the importance to women's issues. Otherwise, usually, they're not in the DNA of the decision-makers -- very difficult, that they really consider special measures for women. Third, ending violence against women, that's a third priority. And fourth, it's women in the heart of peace and security agenda for 1325, as you all know, and not only as usually be seen, and probably what we have advanced more, is looking at how we can prevent violent -- again, the violence against women in conflict and post-conflict countries, but what we have been, I would say -- I mean, when I say "we," I say the whole world, the community, the international community. Very slow, if in the other part of 1325 that last year celebrated 10 years, it is looking at women and incentive and encouraging women's involvement in the peace building and peacemaking process. This will mean women at the peace talks, women at the peace agreement. This has been very slow, very slow, and we're going to work very strong on that. How? Through national capacity building, in national action planning, but also budgeting, because only planning without money is only music and is not important, and of course, statistic that can show us an indicators and follow-up of indicators that can show us, you are really progressing or not. Education, health, and so on, migration, domestic workers -- all of those areas, we will be working on that and many others as you can imagine, but we will be building partnership with the rest of our colleagues on the U.N., because we want to work to do that, not duplicate what they have been doing so long. Oh, and last -- sorry. Really, I shut up immediately. (Laughter.) But it's so linked to this issue, because I was 10 years ago in the UNGASS in the -- (inaudible) -- delegation in my country. But still now, in -- (inaudible) -- to include an article about sexual education was a fight. I mean, today, in -- 50 years ago in -- (inaudible) -- it was talked about sexual and reproductive rights. But today, nobody's also talking about that. Family planning is a revolutionary word; that was in the '60s. And I don't -- I'm not crazy. I'm mentioning this because one of the issues -- (inaudible) -- on how we really can combat and work in a better with HIV/AIDS is how we ensure -- and with maternal mortality, with early forced marriage, with pregnancy, it's through really have sexual reproductive services linked to HIV and AIDS services. Otherwise, we're having a lot of problems in many places facing how we can ensure, really, health care and health attention to women and girls and boys and men. Thank you. BERKLEY: OK. Thank you very much, both for your comments on women, and then a brief view of U.N. Women. For either Bob or Paul, this week is the high-level meeting. We're going to see people -- 40 heads of state, civil society representatives, activists are going to convene at the United Nations to see where we go from here. Are we going to be able to end the pandemic? And we understand that there is some areas of disagreement that are going on now. Maybe you can highlight what you think are some of the main issues of disagreement, what coalitions are driving these debates, and how you see those playing out. For some, there is some concern that we're, in fact, moving backwards on some of the major concerns towards stigma and other issues that President Bachelet has just talked about. DE LAY: The declaration of commitment that was endorsed by 182 member states in 2001, which was the U.N. General Assembly Special Session, the UNGASS -- which sounds like a Pepto-Bismol type of medicine, but -- (laughter) -- was at the time -- and I'm not sure we appreciated it as much as we do now -- an incredibly courageous document. It dealt with an epidemic that, quite honestly, nobody wanted to deal with. This isn't TB, this isn't malaria, this is an epidemic that gets into the roots of behaviors, sexual and drug-using behaviors, that we don't like to acknowledge. And it was seen as critical that we have a powerful document that really addressed the profound human rights issues, and specifically access to services. I know of no other infectious disease, epidemic, where people are deliberately excluded from services. It's never happened with bednets or ORS or immunizations. But in AIDS, it happens every single day. So this was a powerful document. But the document ended, literally, December 31st, 2010. So we now need something that reaffirms that, strengthens it, adds to it, adds the parts that were not well-covered and takes us into the next decade. And what are the issues we're seeing? And this is where, I think, Seth's comment that we're moving backwards, it's -- why are we talking about human rights? Why are we talking about engaging the most vulnerable and most affected communities? Why are we talking about harm reduction as an intervention that successfully can reduce HIV transmission among drug users? Why are we talking about sex? And what AIDS did bring, following the comments of President Bachelet, what AIDS brought to the table as far as gender was very specifically the sexual nature of gender, and violence. And that was a major leap forward. I mean, family planning and all never really grappled with sex. Fortunately, we had the technologies that we didn't need to deal with sex. So what we're hoping for is a document that's going to move us forward. And we do have risks because of the environment we're in. And hopefully tonight we'll have a document and be able to move forward for the next three, four days, to try to figure out what that then means, as far as how do we operationalize it. BERKLEY: So maybe I can also ask you, Bob, to comment on this. And you've made it a very important part of your tenure to -- about measuring accountability. And so here's the situation: We're going to have a new declaration. Does it matter? And what has to happen to turn this into reality? ORR: Great question. We have to look at what business model is going to work in the next decade. If we just talked about the past decade, and where we've made progress and where we haven't -- if there's one area that is absolutely required for the new business model to work, it is accountability at all levels: accountability for results, accountability for money. Fighting AIDS has been a pretty expensive deal, and this is where these kinds of unnecessary conflicts have been created between women's health and children's health and malaria and HIV. So we do need to be able to account for every dollar, yen, euro -- you name it -- spent. But the accountability is much more fundamental than that. And so in the women's and children's health strategy, we built into the agreement a plan for an agreed accountability mechanism, which we've not been able to get in broader MBGs (ph). What this can enable is a discussion -- ongoing discussion -- among all the players, for what they're putting in and what they're getting out. This will be required to keep the momentum up. People hate the term "donor fatigue," but right now, some donors are pretty flat on their back. Trying to keep the money coming out of the -- you know, the blood out of the stone -- that's not how we're going to win this. We have to get leaner, smarter, faster. But we also need to be able to keep the political support that we've seen. So the accountability mechanisms should not be sector specific. If you don't need a HIV/AIDS accountability mechanism, a malaria mechanism, a dollar mechanism -- you actually need all the information on the table about what you're putting in and what you're getting out, the cost-effectiveness of those interventions. And what's interesting, by giving this back a human face -- women and children, the most obviously universal experience of everyone; everyone has a mother, and everyone's been a child -- by giving this back a human face, we actually have a chance to make accountability not a bean-counting exercise, but actually a humanizing exercise for this. How many lives did we save this year? Was that the best investment we could make to get those lives? This is a hard, tough prioritization questions that have always been out there. But rather than pitting one community, the malaria community, against the HIV/AIDS community, if we can kind of bring this together so that we're actually trying to save lives and save money to be able to save even more lives, I think we have a shot at this. But the last point I would make about the business model -- and I'm glad the issue of stigma has come up multiple times -- there are some things that don't cost a lot of money, but are the hardest things: the cultural attitudes, the inability for politicians to see their way beyond, you know, certain issues, and this will cost me too much. What we found, though, is tipping points on stigma issues can be swift. When the secretary-general came in, I don't think anyone thought -- they were thinking, oh, post-Kofi Annan, we're in trouble. Kofi Annan knew AIDS. He cared about AIDS. He cared about Africa. Uh-oh, here comes an Asian secretary-general. I think, to everyone's surprise, this East Asian secretary-general has taken it up as his cause, and he's probably made as much or more progress on stigma issues than anyone else could have. He went straight at his own home country, in Korea, and said, I can't believe you have visa restrictions. This is an embarrassment. It was front-page news across every paper in Korea: Secretary-general berates Korea for its policies on visa restrictions. He did the same in the United States. He did the same in China. This is generally not a politically winning formula: Go after your big supporters and benefactors. But it tips the discussion in those countries, in certain segments of the population that didn't want to talk about it. So if there's a cost-effective intervention that I could say, universally, we all need to adopt: Go after the stigma issues because that's where you can make the biggest difference for the least amount of money. BERKLEY: That's a good use of the bully pulpit, and let's hope he doesn't have to use it later on this week if I'm -- regret -- (inaudible). ORR: (Laughs.) Me and my big mouth, we make them. We have a few of those moments this week. BERKLEY: So at this time, I'd like to invite the members to join the conversation. There are microphones available. Please wait for the microphone, and speak directly into it. We're going to ask you to stand up, introduce yourself, your name and your affiliation, and to try to keep these to questions and relatively briefly so there's enough time for others to speak. So the floor is open, please. QUESTIONER: Thank you very much for the excellent presentation. I'm Natalie Hahn. I worked with the U.N. for many years, mostly UNICEF in Africa. Can we move the discussion to the field level? Which country in Africa has made the most progress? Who's funding it? Why has it been successful? What head of state? What members of parliament? What women's group? Is the private sector in Africa coming in? Position of the Obama administration? Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation? Where do you see the trends, also on the funding of the programs? But -- I'm interested in declarations, but I'm more interested in some field examples of what has worked, and why. BERKLEY: So let me ask for a little bit of a lightning rod -- round, where each one of you can just take a bit of this and take a crack at it. BACHELET: Well, maybe Paul will speak more widely, but I will mention one great example is Botswana. Botswana president decided to improve that country's economic growth and development, and it had a problem. One of the areas he wanted to develop is tourism. And it didn't work because the trend of -- I mean, probably by many other reasons, but one of the reasons, they had to decide, it was that the trend of HIV/AIDS were going higher and higher and higher and higher. So they -- well, this is not -- I mean, so he, as the president of the republic, decided -- and put a big priority to -- the struggle against HIV/AIDS. And this is not that one day, he woke up and liked it. I mean, this was a struggle of women's organizations, private sector -- I mean, it was like -- because I've been asking myself: How do we produce shift on those official-making people? And it has to be, though, the task of a lot of people who come together, or to struggle for many years, and then, in this case, the president of the republic -- they said that this is something we have to do. So he increased tremendously the budget for prevention, for treatment -- and really, it dropped dramatically, the trend of HIV/AIDS. So that's a great example. BERKLEY: Paul, you want to give a quick example? DE LAY: South Africa. The -- it's gone from possibly being one of the worst responders to one of the best. They're putting, now, ($)1.5 billion U.S. of their own money annually into the response. They have close to 1.2 million people on treatment. That's almost three times how many people are being treated on this country. They're investing in mother-to-child transmission. They're producing their own AIDS drugs. So they're transferring technology from India and from China. So they're taking all the right actions. And it is a -- I think, an incredible reversal from what we saw under President Mbeki. BERKLEY: Do you want to -- ORR: I would love to. Thank you, first, for the question. I love it -- it takes a UNICEF person to bring us back to where it matters, on the ground. I'd like to give -- those I think are great historical kind of cases. I want to give you a hot-off-the-press what it looks like. We were just in Nigeria 10 days ago. This is one of the countries that's had one of the biggest problems on a whole range of health issues. And for all the money, the oil wealth, never been able to translate it into health outcomes anywhere commensurate with that wealth. The president, at the time temporary president, Jonathan, came to New York last September and at our Every Woman, Every Child event said he wanted to dedicate a fixed percentage of his oil revenue to addressing women's and children's health issues. Everyone said, yeah right, I'm sure that's going to happen. The day before we arrived in Abuja, less than two weeks ago, the assembly passed a health bill that earmarks 2 percent of the general revenue fund of Nigeria, which is basically all the oil money, for primary health care. The revolution that that could make -- now I say "could" because that's a lot of money, but it has to get from here to there. But then we met with all the governors, the governors who control a huge amount of that budget and how it's spent and where it's spent -- and these governors were competing with each other for who was going to get more bang for their buck. And the transparency levels are going up. Civil society is very much enmeshed at every level with this. We met not just with the president, but his entire cabinet -- entire cabinet -- across all the different agencies, all the different ministries. And civil society stoking this from below. And then had dinner with the business community which was piling into this now much more organized space. This is what you need -- you need all these stakeholders. It won't come from one piece or the other. But success can build on itself. And I think a country like Nigeria, which I don't think anyone would accuse of having been an example over the last decade in this area -- watch this space, because I think we have a success in the making if we can translate these major commitments from all sectors of Nigerian society and the international community, if we can get the huge burdens in Nigeria with this kind of resource flow and this kind of organization. And here the U.N. is a major part of the story. UNICEF, WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, UNFPA, U.N. Women -- working together virtually seamlessly on the ground. And for those who know what it looks like on the ground, to say virtually seamlessly, that's a heck of a lot of progress. So the U.N. can provide an organizing pole to work in a coherent manner with the government on these. So it's really an exciting story in the making here. BACHELET: I just want to make one comment, that I hope that Nigeria is taking into consideration the population trend that is really going very high. And that's already linked to the need to have real, clear family planning strategies because Nigeria has two problems. Its population is increasing dramatically and then on the other hand it's considered a middle-income country. So usually -- never meets the requirements to get federal aid. And if you look at average, probably has less poor as an average, but probably if you look at absolute numbers it has much more poor people than in many other places. And that's one of the problems we're feeling today in the world, that middle-income countries have more poor than less developed countries in terms of huge calculations. So just to mention that I hope that in that strategy they do consider that. Otherwise it will be very difficult to tackle it. BERKLEY: I was just going to say that, you know, it's interesting none of the people here mentioned Uganda, which was always seen as the kind of miracle case. And what's very interesting is Uganda, of course, President Museveni took on HIV because he sent some of his military leaders to Cuba who tested them, and that's when he realized how severe the epidemic was. What's interesting is the infection rates dropped very quickly there, partially because of the early spread and the openness. But now they're seeing recidivism in young people, because people aren't seeing the deaths around them. And they're also realizing the limits to being able to get treatment to everybody who needs it. They're beginning to see resistance. So you know, there's the positive side of what's happening, but also the limitations are being felt. Laurie? QUESTIONER: Thank you. And thank you all for being here today. Laurie Garrett from the Council on Foreign Relations. The major impact of the world financial crisis on global health funding appears not to have been an actual marked decline in the size of the overall amount of money available, but a skewing of it in terms of what the key donor is. So at this point at least for the -- by the end of 2010, well over 50 percent of all public sector giving came from a single source: Washington D.C. And well over 60 percent of all private giving came from one source: Seattle, Washington. So the two Washingtons are calling the shots. You're the bureaucracy that's implementing, thanks to the largesse of the two Washingtons. Now we have a very different Congress in the United States, we're hitting a real budget crunch, the FY '12 budget promises to be a bloody war -- (chuckles) -- in Washington. How can we make this next step, one way or the other but hopefully in a positive direction, if one of the two Washingtons radically decreases its contribution? DE LAY: Great formulation. And thank you, Laurie, for I think being the inspiration for this session today. The two Washingtons, I've not thought of it that way, but are on everyone's mind because I think everyone knows the two Washingtons in the best case scenario can't do this alone. And the chances for the two Washingtons to not be able to deliver what they're even delivering today is very real. I think this multistakeholder model that has been developed in the HIV/AIDS community in the fight against AIDS, but also now we're using very aggressively in the broader women's and children's health -- people bidding each other up; watching the corporate community kind of bid each other up, in a positive sense. Competitors looking at each other and saying, you know, actually if we do this together, we could totally cover the need for a given drug. And if we do this together, neither one of us is going to lose anything. So let's do it. The use of the bully pulpit, not just from traditional donor capitals but from actually countries that came to the table in last September, like Nigeria, that -- when you put that new 2 percent that goes on top of the Nigerian oil revenue, that is more than any kind of funding round we would get from all of the traditional donors trying to inch up a little bit. But what was maybe most interesting, I think, for many people -- realizing that a lot of the civil society organizations, both the global ones coming in with figures, their own fundraised money in the hundreds and $200 little old ladies sending their checks in was adding up to billions. This is very exciting because it mobilizes a lot more people than the traditional model does. So you actually not only get the money. You get the involvement and the political support of people that have sent their $100 check in to CARE or in to, you know, Save the Children or World Vision, but then they're also much better political consumers for their own government. So I think here, if we pull these stakeholders together, they keep each other honest, but they also bid each other up. And so right now, the potential for an upward spiral in this area to resist the pressure of the natural downward spiral on national budgets -- I think this is the race we're in right now. BERKLEY: Paul. Quickly. DE LAY: I don't -- I think whether you're Republican or a Democrat or anything in between, I think what the U.S. wants to see are three things. They want to see domestic expenditures going up in countries to really justify the international contribution. They want to see other donors, other bilateral donors, take more of their share of the responsibility. And the EU, in spite of the economic crisis, is attempting to do that. And that really is a role that the U.N. does play as far as trying to leverage the immense size of the U.S. contribution. And then the third thing is they want to make sure that their money is well spent. And it gets back to -- I know it sounds boring -- the accountability issue. But if the accountability issue is women saved in childbirth, infants saved from being infected; men and women, parents' lives being prolonged, and you can show that, then the U.S., I'm convinced, will remain a substantial donor. BERKLEY: So let me just say, it's interesting that the private sector is taking a very different view of the world now. It's not ROW. They realize that the growth in the future is going to be in many of these countries. And so there's a new look at that. And hopefully with that is going to be a changed relationship with how one deals with price tiering and new activities. Recently -- you know, today, there were announcements from a number of companies on vaccine pricing, you know, dramatic drops in vaccine pricing. So we hope to see more of that as well, which will help the sustainability of these efforts. Please, the gentleman over here. Please wait for the microphone. QUESTIONER: I'm Allen Hyman from Columbia-Presbyterian. Circumcision was mentioned as one of the few interventions that could prevent the spread of AIDS. And I find it ironic -- perhaps you do as well -- that -- you mentioned 30 years ago, it was in San Francisco that the first cluster was described. And this fall, the prohibition against circumcision is going to be on the ballot. Does the AIDS community have a position on circumcision, and what is it? MR. : I'm for it, but -- (laughter) -- DE LAY: From the evidence base, it's one of the few prevention/interventions that we know has measurable, significant protective effect. It's a 60 percent protective effect. It's better than a lot of the other things we have. So I think the AIDS community -- I don't want to speak for every single one -- supports it as -- particularly in hyper-endemic countries. It's going to be critical to reach that tipping point, where we can't get delayed sexual debut or condom use or reduction of multiple concurrent partnerships to achieve high enough levels. BACHELET: Just for the record, I'm against female genital mutilation. So for men, I'm for it, but not for women. (Laughter.) BERKLEY: Agreed. Please. QUESTIONER: Thanks, everybody. I'm Ann Starrs from Family Care International. And I wanted to pick up on the -- a couple of the comments that have been made. I think we are -- we'll be seeing later this week the launch of the global plan for the elimination of new HIV infections among children by 2015 and keeping their mothers alive, which I think will be a great thing and is an important initiative for bringing together the HIV and the MCH and the reproductive health communities. But I think -- the question I'd like to ask is, how do you see the future of this effort politically and strategically in terms of strengthening these linkages, particularly, you know, at these high levels but also very much at the ground where services are provided or made available and the importance of meeting women's and children's needs comprehensively, that sort of one-stop-shop approach? How do you do that while still taking into account the fact that there are marginalized populations -- men who have sex with men, commercial sex workers who are women but are not sort of -- you know, picking up on your comment, Bob, just sort of the human face -- this is -- these are a human face of HIV/AIDS as well, but it's not a human face that people want to see plastered on posters very often. So how -- while we're moving forward with this integration agenda, how do we make sure that those marginalized populations also continue to get the care and the services that they need? ORR: I'd love to take a whack at that. Thank you, Ann. I think the -- we -- there is attention there of we have to do both. You have to go after the populations that are the hard to reach and the underloved populations, call them, the ones that aren't going to make the posters, because that's where you could make a huge difference. At the same time, I think the success that we're seeing on the Women's and Children's Health Strategy is in part because that integrated roll-out of services -- everybody can see what they want to see. Those who really want to save babies can save babies, and they can see it and touch it. Those who think that, you know, women have been underserved for far too long and we're finally getting a women-centric roll-out of health services, they can have that. So I think the global strategy, the reason we're getting the kind of support we are is because we did not force that false choice. We heard all the debate between the health system strengtheners and the high-value interventioners and said wait a minute, folks, we're not arguing against each other, are we? So we meshed it together knowing that that defers the real challenge to the ground, to where it has to happen. But it's in that context that we're actually seeing both happening. You can build up the systems, the 34,000 trained, skilled health workers in Ethiopia that we saw that they want to quadruple over the next, I think, year or two years. That kind of scale is going to get a whole range of services out to mostly women and children. And that will have a great effect and a great face but that does not in any way mean that we can afford to neglect the populations that won't make a poster. QUESTIONER: Thanks. I'm Asia Russell. I work with Health GAP, and I want to pick up on a point that Bob Orr was making about stigma, and a point that Seth was making actually about Uganda, because 10 years ago, a key issue brought to the heart of the UNGASS declaration was the link between providing access to quality treatments and creating a flood of people who wanted to get tested, to know their status and to stop taking risks or to get themselves out of risky situations -- a really intimate link between being motivated to seek prevention, to find out one's status and then to extend one's life. And at the heart of that is actually stigma, because treatment access has a tremendous effect in reducing stigma at the level of a community. And I think a terrifying moment happened in Uganda last year when treatment interruptions were a reality in some of the most well-served, well-penetrated communities in Kampala and a kind of a precipice that implementers and people with HIV were looking out over in the entire country. And this is a country where 46 percent of new infections are between serial discordant cohabiting couples and where incidence is rising tremendously; 2007 -- (word inaudible) -- data show 120,000 new infections every year. So what are we -- what are we doing? And I think the reality is, 10 years after the UNGASS declaration, the value proposition about treatment has changed. And I think it's really important for the U.S. and the U.N. family to fully embrace this reality. UNAIDS just released data in the -- (inaudible) -- that's showing that if you scale up universal access, you avert 7 million new -- 7 million deaths and 12 million new infections. And now we have data showing us that if people have access to treatment and safe sex, they're 96 percent less likely to transmit -- including those 46 percent of new infections in Uganda that are between serial discordant couples. And those data are lost in translation, whether we're in D.C., in the other Washington or, you know, across the street at the U.N. And I think I want to hear from our panelists what you all plan to do between now and the FY '12 budget -- which Laurie (sp) is reminding us is going to be -- is going to be a scary one -- and not just over the week as we negotiate every single word. We're in an environment right now which we should be extremely enthusiastic to find ourselves in. But unfortunately, it seems like we're prepared to divorce ourselves from what the data are showing us. So please share a little bit about how the administration will be making the case on the Hill to fight for those -- not just maintenance, but the increases that are needed to reach 15 million people by 2015, and then what will the U.N. be doing to make the investment case? Thanks. BERKLEY: Anybody want to take a crack at that? MR. : (Inaudible) -- I'll be -- I'll be brief. You know, you've made some excellent points. And I think that certainly the tipping point to truly reach zero new infections, the vision that UNAIDS with partners has put before the world, will only happen if we go beyond what we've been doing now as far as with prevention, interventions. Risk behaviors can only be reduced to a level that's, while significant, is not going to be absolute. And I think the data shows that treatment does have a profound impact on transmission. We also have to go beyond that; the use of antiretroviral drugs in specific populations who are uninfected to protect themselves also needs to be entertained in some situations. The data's solid. And whether data is what sways political thinking and ministers of finance, always, I think, is open to debate. But I don't think we've ever had really for any disease, particularly a sexually transmitted disease, this strong of proof that use of antiretrovirals, particularly in infected people, has an incredible prevention benefit that goes beyond saving that person's life. BERKLEY: Can I -- can I just challenge you a little bit on some of the data? Because we know that, you know, the PrEP studies in women did not show an effect. And the particular finding that we were talking about, the 96 percent, was between stable, discordant couples. But the population attributable fraction of transmissions of that is quite low. Most of the transmission occurs very early in infection when people have high viral titers, and therefore one would have to have a different strategy. So how does that all play out in terms of what we're doing? MR. : Well, I think what that points to is certainly we need more information, but it means we have to be very careful about targeting the use of treatment as prevention, to make sure that we do get the benefits and that we don't do any harm. And we still need the studies that show that earlier and earlier treatment, while it sure looks like it saves peoples' live, doesn't cause any long-term adverse effects. So I think we just need more data. And ultimately we're going to have to target these programs. They aren't going to be massive general population type of intervention, particular for PrEP. BERKLEY: So we're out of time. I was hoping to do a lightning round to ask questions on, you know, whether you believe that we have the tools in hand. Certainly, as many know in this audience, I believe we need better technologies for prevention. And that's something that we have to do particularly for women as a priority going forward. But I want to thank all of the presenters. (Applause.) And I know that they'll be happy to answer questions in the reception outside. (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. SETH BERKLEY: So good evening, everybody. My name is Seth Berkley. I'm the president and CEO of the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative, and I'd like to welcome you to this meeting. First of all, the next meeting is going to be the World Economic Update, which is going to happen tomorrow morning. For all of you who come to a lot of meetings here, the usual request: Please turn off your communication devices. Don't just put them on vibrate; turn them off, to avoid interference with the sound system. And I'd like to remind all of you that this particular session is going to be on the record. You all know that -- the statistics about AIDS as a disease. More than 33 million people are infected today, living with it, and nearly 30 million people have died. There's 7,100 new infections a day. Now we've had an extraordinary revolution in treatment, where we now have more drugs to treat HIV than all other viruses put together. And we've had enormous progress on getting treatment out to people who need it. Today there's about 6.6 million people on treatment. But there's also 9 million people who need treatment who aren't getting it. And for every three people put on treatment, there's five new infections. Now it's been a pretty extraordinary and unprecedented response to AIDS, and we're going to talk about that today, because we have a fabulous panel. But to put that into perceptive, there's going to be in the next few days, from the 8th to 10th of June, a high-level meeting of the U.N. General Assembly on HIV/AIDS. And this particular meeting is going to mark the 30th anniversary of the original reports of HIV in a cluster of gay men in Los Angeles. It also is 10 years since the landmark meeting that was hosted by the -- by the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS, the first time the General Assembly had taken a health issue like this forward. Since that time, a lot of things have happened. We've had HIV/AIDS as the specific target of the MDGs, and we've also had a -- an unbelievable political commitment, starting out in the Labour government of the U.K. and then at the Gleneagles G-8 summit, where they adopted a goal of universal access by 2010, which we did not make. So today we're going to talk about AIDS at 30 and is this an epidemic that we can stop. And to talk about it, we've got this fabulous panel. To my left is Michelle Bachelet, who's the first undersecretary general and executive director of U.N. Women, which was established on July 2nd, 2010. Former to that, she served as president of Chile, from 2006 to '10, and had the amazing ability to serve both as a minister of defense and a minister of health of that country. To her left is Paul De Lay, who's replacing my good friend Michel Sidibe, and he's picked a(n) excellent substitute. Paul joined UNAIDS in February 2003. He was appointed the deputy executive director of the program in 2009. And prior to that, he worked at the Global Program on AIDS at WHO, and the chief of HIV/AIDS at USAID. He's a very experienced physician. And next to him, at the end, is Robert Orr, who's the assistant secretary-general for planning and policy coordination in the executive office of the secretary-general since 2004. He runs the secretary-general's policy committee, and he's the principal policy adviser to the secretary-general on climate change, food security, global health, counterterrorism, and U.N. reform. Quite a big set of tasks there. So I'm going to start with a series of questions, and then obviously we'll open it to the members. UNAIDS has adopted a very bold platform. They've said zero HIV infections, zero HIV discrimination and zero AIDS death. And in the last two years, we've seen tremendous in breakthroughs in biomedical prevention. We've seen proof of concept of a vaccine. We've seen successful clinical trials of a microbicide. We've seen that if you give anti-retroviral drugs for prevention, you can block transmission to men who have sex with men. And most recently, data to show that if you treat discordant couples, you can block transmission. So very exciting new science coming. We also know that over the last few years, we've begun to see rates of HIV drop in a number of countries, and we've got more people on anti-retrovirals than ever before. But we also know that donor governments have become less willing and less able to sustain the levels of existing funding for anti-retroviral therapy and for prevention research. So we could be on the threshold of ending the pandemic, or we could lose the ground we've gained. So can we keep the momentum going and stop the pandemic? So let me start with you, Paul. PAUL DE LAY: Seth, thank you. And again, I am grateful to be here, and I do want to extend the apologies of our executive director, Michel Sidibe. He was planning to come, but at the last minute was -- had to meet with the secretary-general to prepare for the high-level meeting. We're negotiating a declaration, which is a critical document that we may talk a little bit about before. The successes -- and I think we can call them successes -- that Seth has referred to that have occurred over the last 10 years certainly started from a period of time of extreme skepticism. In 2000, no one thought we could put people on complicated anti-retroviral drugs. No one thought we would get the resources from donors. No one thought that we would be able to effectively change risk behaviors and overcome the stigma and discrimination that's particularly associated with this epidemic, unlike most of the other infectious disease epidemics of the world. And we've proved them wrong. Now, of course, we have naysayers who are saying, well, we can't sustain people on treatment, or the decreases in prevention are not fast enough. We have a 25 percent decline in incident infections since 2001. Well, all of this results from a lot of work, a lot of passion, a lot of community engagement, and money. We are now at about $16 billion U.S. being spent in middle and low-income countries. We never thought we'd get to that level. It's probably not enough. But it was at least enough to be able to broaden from what we were calling "boutique programs" back in the '90s that only served hundreds of thousands of people, to programs that truly served millions of people, both on the treatment side and on the prevention side. And the successes -- and I will close now -- that we've seen thus far have primarily been what we used to call the old ABCs: abstinence, be faithful to your partner, and use condoms. We are just now on the verge of seeing the effects of male circumcision and the increasing number of people who are being treated and are therefore less infectious. So the last 10 years really was a proof of concept that risk behaviors could be changed. And I think that's a positive story, as positive and as powerful as the dramatic increases in treatment. Unfortunately, it's not going to be enough. And if we continue the current trend at this rate, we are looking at an epidemic that will last another 30 to 40 years. BERKLEY: Thank you, Paul. Bob, the U.N., on this particular issue, has done a really enormously fabulous job. They've created a special program and brought the different U.N. agencies together -- UNAIDS -- and they've also created a funding mechanism. Kofi Annan pushed very hard for that, the Global Fund, which has raised unprecedented amounts of money for HIV and obviously also for malaria and TB. All of this has said that, you know, AIDS is exceptional. Is there still room for AIDS exceptionalism? And how do you see the future for this effort within the U.N. system, given the priorities that are with us today? ROBERT ORR: Thank you, Seth, and to the council for the invitation. I'm really struck at what a difference a decade makes. If you think back just one decade ago, when we were talking about this -- and in the context of, Seth, your question about the U.N. -- this was still taboo. It was still an area where, institutionally, you couldn't really talk about it. But as we are tonight -- literally, the planes are landing at JFK one after the other with heads of state on board -- you couldn't even raise this in polite company with heads of state one decade ago. Diplomatically, this was a dead letter. In this one decade, not just the scientific advances that Seth mentioned -- and I think that the institutional advance had been that the U.N. became the locus of activity, in many ways, to fill this huge vacuum of leadership. It was not easy. It was not pretty in the early days. But I think -- I remember the initial efforts, when Richard Holbrooke, for whom I worked at the time, tried to drag this into the Security Council -- the visceral reaction that this was wrong. You couldn't do that. This was distorting what the U.N. was. There was an institutional reaction, there was a cultural reaction, there was a political reaction all wrapped into one. But what's happened in the decade since was that the U.N., I think, both because of some political leadership -- I would credit Kofi Annan and Richard Holbrooke, among others -- but for creating a space within the organization to address this. And then a lot of the pioneers in the area just constantly opening that space in the U.N., and I think the Global Fund -- the fact that Kofi Annan was successful at getting the Global Fund off the ground, but then it had to leave the U.N. -- (chuckles) -- to survive and thrive, I think is -- it shows some of the limits too, the institutional limits. But I really wanted to pick up your AIDS exceptionalism issue, Seth, because I think here's another area where we really are on the verge of a breakthrough. For a while, it took AIDS exceptionalism to give this issue the attention it deserved. But we've long since outgrown AIDS exceptionalism. For our success on AIDS, we need to break down the barrier of exceptionalism. And for success on a range of other health issues, we need to break that down. So right now maybe the most exciting, dynamic advancement in the space is the global strategy on women's and children's health. And the big question -- the big question two years ago was, do we have room for a strategy on women's and children's health and the fight against HIV/AIDS. You know, for those of you -- I think just about everyone in this room recognizes that's a crazy question. But that was the question. Do we have enough funding to do women's and children's health and HIV/AIDS? How could you see these two things as somehow competing with each other, when the overlap is so dramatic -- but also the model of how you -- how we've had some success against HIV/AIDS; bringing in multistakeholder communities, scaling up, going up the cultural issues and the political issues, as well as the technical and the health issues. So I think we can not only say that AIDS exceptionalism is no longer needed, it really is something that we are going to get much further by integrating our HIV/AIDS interventions in a broader set. And just coming from Nigeria and Ethiopia, and in the last week with the secretary-general where we saw, at the village level, things happening on women's and children's health, and HIV/AIDS kind of seamlessly meshed into those programs -- that's where we want to be. We just need to get it out there further and farther. BERKLEY: Thank you, Bob. And for President Bachelet, women have steadily borne more of the brunt of the epidemic worldwide. And yet, culturally they often can't control their own sexual situation, their sexual relationships. You know, what can be done to empower women and reduce their risk of infection particularly? And I personally want to congratulate you on your new role at U.N. Women, and I suspect that many of the members don't know fully what U.N. Women is, so you might just want to take a minute to say something about the new agency -- if I can call it an agency -- and how that is going to play a role around HIV. MICHELLE BACHELET: Well, thank you Mr. Berkley. I'm happy to be here again in the council today in my new capacity as the executive director of U.N. Women. But also because I'm here is because I -- last year Michel Sibide asked me to be an advocate, as a former epidemiologist, of the national commission of HIV/AIDS for my country. The foreign minister, as the head of delegation of the UNGASS meeting 10 years ago, where all what you have been saying, I lived it there -- where just putting in a declaration, a final statement, people who are sex workers or men who have sex with men, was really a very complicated situation to do at the general assembly. So of course, I have to say I've seen and I agree with what I've heard -- but on the other hand, I have to say, or we improve women's capacities, we empower women, or we're not going to be able to be completely successful because in Africa, of course, and not only in Africa, also in the Pacific area, and still in some parts of the Caribbean, the HIV epidemic still has the face of a woman. And women in many of those places are first -- they'll have, as you mentioned, all the capacity of putting the conditions in a sexual intercourse, in a relation, but also not only with intimate partners, but also in many places where rape is used a -- or as a means of war, in the case of conflict or post-conflict countries, where you can end the conflict, but rape doesn't end, unfortunately. Maintains as a way of, I would say, of a relation between power between men and women. On the other hand, we see women who do not have access to -- attention to IRV (ph), to health care. And also women, in my experience in HIV/AIDS commission, but I have spoken to my friends in the UNAIDS and many other places, usually they are the ones who -- how can I say -- they sacrifice for the rest. If there are few treatments they would prefer that her husband or her children receive the treatment and they are always there. They never go to the health site for care, attention or so on. So why I mention all this? It's not anecdotic (ph). It's concrete of the difficulties that we find in fighting with HIV/AIDS and not looking at the specificities of women. So what do we need to do? First of all, we need to empower women as agents of change. We need much more women leaders in terms of women living with HIV/AIDS, or women ensuring that there is sort of a mainstreaming in the health quality that can ensure that women really are receiving the treatment, the care, or the information so they can prevent and avoid getting an HIV infection. I have to say that one of the things that I was taking with Michel Sibide, and of course with Dr. Babatunde from UNFPA is how we deal with the issue that a woman is a mother, but not only a mother. And because if you see many -- I have some data here, that in 2009 53 percent of pregnant women living with (HIV?) received the antiretrovirals to prevent mother-to-child transmission in low- and middle-income countries. And they -- (inaudible) -- up from 15 percent. I mean, from 15 percent, 2005, to 53 in 2009. It looks like a great improvement. But only 26 percent of pregnancy women receive HIV testing and counseling. So we're not -- first of all we do not know exactly how many women are living with HIV/AIDS. And then they receive the treatment -- but in some places because of a lack of funding, because of the perspective of women as mother, trying to avoid vertical transmission, when the children is -- the child is about three months old, they cut the treatment. And then, the children can avoid the transmission, but what about breastfeeding? What about the women who then could die afterwards because spontaneously the infection -- and can die of AIDS. So we have to continue working empowering women. Second, we need to ensure that women have access to prevention, treatment and care services. So we need to ensure particular earmarked fundings for women's access to all of this, because otherwise they won't be prioritized. And so there is an incredible, I would say, correlation between violence against women and HIV and AIDS. So we have to fight very strongly against violence against women. And I'm talking from domestic violence that can be linked to gender based violence, to of course conflict and post-conflict countries. If we don't work on that, I think, all our successes in terms of all kinds of medical treatment and so on will not be enough because many of the women who are victims of violence and then they are raped, they can get infected by their partners. We all know that women are less -- how could I say -- they transmit less their HIVs. They are the ones who carry it to men, then men to women. So, we really -- I'm really convinced, and not because now I'm the head of the -- of U.N. Women, I'm always been convinced of this, because I'm a medical doctor and I study these things. So just to end saying that if we do not focus on women on this next step, we will be having this trend. I mean, this trend maybe will not go as fast as we should in terms of trying to prevent and to improve the quality of life of people living with HIV/AIDS. Two words about UN Women -- new agency, new entity of the United Nations. After five years in negotiations, they acknowledge that even though all the efforts done on the U.N. system for women, for gender equality and women's empowerment, all the indicators linked to women's issues and women's life were the ones who progressed the slower. And if we only go into the -- into the Millennium Development Goals, we see that empowerment of women, maternal mortality, HIV/AIDS and so on -- of course, poverty has the face of a woman and is still very high. So there was this political decision that women should have their relevance, if I may say, as apart from other kinds of global (challenge?) like climate change, poverty, and so on. So this new entity is working for the women and girls of the world, will be producing the coordination synergies within the U.N. system, is probably the first child of the reform of the United Nations because it's -- what looks after is to produce synergies, coordination, and not duplicate efforts, and have five main priorities as leading agency, because there are many other areas where women are important, but were not the leading ones. And HIV/AIDS, of course, our friends here are the leading ones, but it's economical and political empowerment that's -- (inaudible) -- first two priorities -- understanding that if women cannot have autonomy, economic autonomy, we'll never have equal rights, and that we need -- for example, when we're talking about HIV -- the women's voices to be heard so we really can give the relevance and the importance to women's issues. Otherwise, usually, they're not in the DNA of the decision-makers -- very difficult, that they really consider special measures for women. Third, ending violence against women, that's a third priority. And fourth, it's women in the heart of peace and security agenda for 1325, as you all know, and not only as usually be seen, and probably what we have advanced more, is looking at how we can prevent violent -- again, the violence against women in conflict and post-conflict countries, but what we have been, I would say -- I mean, when I say "we," I say the whole world, the community, the international community. Very slow, if in the other part of 1325 that last year celebrated 10 years, it is looking at women and incentive and encouraging women's involvement in the peace building and peacemaking process. This will mean women at the peace talks, women at the peace agreement. This has been very slow, very slow, and we're going to work very strong on that. How? Through national capacity building, in national action planning, but also budgeting, because only planning without money is only music and is not important, and of course, statistic that can show us an indicators and follow-up of indicators that can show us, you are really progressing or not. Education, health, and so on, migration, domestic workers -- all of those areas, we will be working on that and many others as you can imagine, but we will be building partnership with the rest of our colleagues on the U.N., because we want to work to do that, not duplicate what they have been doing so long. Oh, and last -- sorry. Really, I shut up immediately. (Laughter.) But it's so linked to this issue, because I was 10 years ago in the UNGASS in the -- (inaudible) -- delegation in my country. But still now, in -- (inaudible) -- to include an article about sexual education was a fight. I mean, today, in -- 50 years ago in -- (inaudible) -- it was talked about sexual and reproductive rights. But today, nobody's also talking about that. Family planning is a revolutionary word; that was in the '60s. And I don't -- I'm not crazy. I'm mentioning this because one of the issues -- (inaudible) -- on how we really can combat and work in a better with HIV/AIDS is how we ensure -- and with maternal mortality, with early forced marriage, with pregnancy, it's through really have sexual reproductive services linked to HIV and AIDS services. Otherwise, we're having a lot of problems in many places facing how we can ensure, really, health care and health attention to women and girls and boys and men. Thank you. BERKLEY: OK. Thank you very much, both for your comments on women, and then a brief view of U.N. Women. For either Bob or Paul, this week is the high-level meeting. We're going to see people -- 40 heads of state, civil society representatives, activists are going to convene at the United Nations to see where we go from here. Are we going to be able to end the pandemic? And we understand that there is some areas of disagreement that are going on now. Maybe you can highlight what you think are some of the main issues of disagreement, what coalitions are driving these debates, and how you see those playing out. For some, there is some concern that we're, in fact, moving backwards on some of the major concerns towards stigma and other issues that President Bachelet has just talked about. DE LAY: The declaration of commitment that was endorsed by 182 member states in 2001, which was the U.N. General Assembly Special Session, the UNGASS -- which sounds like a Pepto-Bismol type of medicine, but -- (laughter) -- was at the time -- and I'm not sure we appreciated it as much as we do now -- an incredibly courageous document. It dealt with an epidemic that, quite honestly, nobody wanted to deal with. This isn't TB, this isn't malaria, this is an epidemic that gets into the roots of behaviors, sexual and drug-using behaviors, that we don't like to acknowledge. And it was seen as critical that we have a powerful document that really addressed the profound human rights issues, and specifically access to services. I know of no other infectious disease, epidemic, where people are deliberately excluded from services. It's never happened with bednets or ORS or immunizations. But in AIDS, it happens every single day. So this was a powerful document. But the document ended, literally, December 31st, 2010. So we now need something that reaffirms that, strengthens it, adds to it, adds the parts that were not well-covered and takes us into the next decade. And what are the issues we're seeing? And this is where, I think, Seth's comment that we're moving backwards, it's -- why are we talking about human rights? Why are we talking about engaging the most vulnerable and most affected communities? Why are we talking about harm reduction as an intervention that successfully can reduce HIV transmission among drug users? Why are we talking about sex? And what AIDS did bring, following the comments of President Bachelet, what AIDS brought to the table as far as gender was very specifically the sexual nature of gender, and violence. And that was a major leap forward. I mean, family planning and all never really grappled with sex. Fortunately, we had the technologies that we didn't need to deal with sex. So what we're hoping for is a document that's going to move us forward. And we do have risks because of the environment we're in. And hopefully tonight we'll have a document and be able to move forward for the next three, four days, to try to figure out what that then means, as far as how do we operationalize it. BERKLEY: So maybe I can also ask you, Bob, to comment on this. And you've made it a very important part of your tenure to -- about measuring accountability. And so here's the situation: We're going to have a new declaration. Does it matter? And what has to happen to turn this into reality? ORR: Great question. We have to look at what business model is going to work in the next decade. If we just talked about the past decade, and where we've made progress and where we haven't -- if there's one area that is absolutely required for the new business model to work, it is accountability at all levels: accountability for results, accountability for money. Fighting AIDS has been a pretty expensive deal, and this is where these kinds of unnecessary conflicts have been created between women's health and children's health and malaria and HIV. So we do need to be able to account for every dollar, yen, euro -- you name it -- spent. But the accountability is much more fundamental than that. And so in the women's and children's health strategy, we built into the agreement a plan for an agreed accountability mechanism, which we've not been able to get in broader MBGs (ph). What this can enable is a discussion -- ongoing discussion -- among all the players, for what they're putting in and what they're getting out. This will be required to keep the momentum up. People hate the term "donor fatigue," but right now, some donors are pretty flat on their back. Trying to keep the money coming out of the -- you know, the blood out of the stone -- that's not how we're going to win this. We have to get leaner, smarter, faster. But we also need to be able to keep the political support that we've seen. So the accountability mechanisms should not be sector specific. If you don't need a HIV/AIDS accountability mechanism, a malaria mechanism, a dollar mechanism -- you actually need all the information on the table about what you're putting in and what you're getting out, the cost-effectiveness of those interventions. And what's interesting, by giving this back a human face -- women and children, the most obviously universal experience of everyone; everyone has a mother, and everyone's been a child -- by giving this back a human face, we actually have a chance to make accountability not a bean-counting exercise, but actually a humanizing exercise for this. How many lives did we save this year? Was that the best investment we could make to get those lives? This is a hard, tough prioritization questions that have always been out there. But rather than pitting one community, the malaria community, against the HIV/AIDS community, if we can kind of bring this together so that we're actually trying to save lives and save money to be able to save even more lives, I think we have a shot at this. But the last point I would make about the business model -- and I'm glad the issue of stigma has come up multiple times -- there are some things that don't cost a lot of money, but are the hardest things: the cultural attitudes, the inability for politicians to see their way beyond, you know, certain issues, and this will cost me too much. What we found, though, is tipping points on stigma issues can be swift. When the secretary-general came in, I don't think anyone thought -- they were thinking, oh, post-Kofi Annan, we're in trouble. Kofi Annan knew AIDS. He cared about AIDS. He cared about Africa. Uh-oh, here comes an Asian secretary-general. I think, to everyone's surprise, this East Asian secretary-general has taken it up as his cause, and he's probably made as much or more progress on stigma issues than anyone else could have. He went straight at his own home country, in Korea, and said, I can't believe you have visa restrictions. This is an embarrassment. It was front-page news across every paper in Korea: Secretary-general berates Korea for its policies on visa restrictions. He did the same in the United States. He did the same in China. This is generally not a politically winning formula: Go after your big supporters and benefactors. But it tips the discussion in those countries, in certain segments of the population that didn't want to talk about it. So if there's a cost-effective intervention that I could say, universally, we all need to adopt: Go after the stigma issues because that's where you can make the biggest difference for the least amount of money. BERKLEY: That's a good use of the bully pulpit, and let's hope he doesn't have to use it later on this week if I'm -- regret -- (inaudible). ORR: (Laughs.) Me and my big mouth, we make them. We have a few of those moments this week. BERKLEY: So at this time, I'd like to invite the members to join the conversation. There are microphones available. Please wait for the microphone, and speak directly into it. We're going to ask you to stand up, introduce yourself, your name and your affiliation, and to try to keep these to questions and relatively briefly so there's enough time for others to speak. So the floor is open, please. QUESTIONER: Thank you very much for the excellent presentation. I'm Natalie Hahn. I worked with the U.N. for many years, mostly UNICEF in Africa. Can we move the discussion to the field level? Which country in Africa has made the most progress? Who's funding it? Why has it been successful? What head of state? What members of parliament? What women's group? Is the private sector in Africa coming in? Position of the Obama administration? Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation? Where do you see the trends, also on the funding of the programs? But -- I'm interested in declarations, but I'm more interested in some field examples of what has worked, and why. BERKLEY: So let me ask for a little bit of a lightning rod -- round, where each one of you can just take a bit of this and take a crack at it. BACHELET: Well, maybe Paul will speak more widely, but I will mention one great example is Botswana. Botswana president decided to improve that country's economic growth and development, and it had a problem. One of the areas he wanted to develop is tourism. And it didn't work because the trend of -- I mean, probably by many other reasons, but one of the reasons, they had to decide, it was that the trend of HIV/AIDS were going higher and higher and higher and higher. So they -- well, this is not -- I mean, so he, as the president of the republic, decided -- and put a big priority to -- the struggle against HIV/AIDS. And this is not that one day, he woke up and liked it. I mean, this was a struggle of women's organizations, private sector -- I mean, it was like -- because I've been asking myself: How do we produce shift on those official-making people? And it has to be, though, the task of a lot of people who come together, or to struggle for many years, and then, in this case, the president of the republic -- they said that this is something we have to do. So he increased tremendously the budget for prevention, for treatment -- and really, it dropped dramatically, the trend of HIV/AIDS. So that's a great example. BERKLEY: Paul, you want to give a quick example? DE LAY: South Africa. The -- it's gone from possibly being one of the worst responders to one of the best. They're putting, now, ($)1.5 billion U.S. of their own money annually into the response. They have close to 1.2 million people on treatment. That's almost three times how many people are being treated on this country. They're investing in mother-to-child transmission. They're producing their own AIDS drugs. So they're transferring technology from India and from China. So they're taking all the right actions. And it is a -- I think, an incredible reversal from what we saw under President Mbeki. BERKLEY: Do you want to -- ORR: I would love to. Thank you, first, for the question. I love it -- it takes a UNICEF person to bring us back to where it matters, on the ground. I'd like to give -- those I think are great historical kind of cases. I want to give you a hot-off-the-press what it looks like. We were just in Nigeria 10 days ago. This is one of the countries that's had one of the biggest problems on a whole range of health issues. And for all the money, the oil wealth, never been able to translate it into health outcomes anywhere commensurate with that wealth. The president, at the time temporary president, Jonathan, came to New York last September and at our Every Woman, Every Child event said he wanted to dedicate a fixed percentage of his oil revenue to addressing women's and children's health issues. Everyone said, yeah right, I'm sure that's going to happen. The day before we arrived in Abuja, less than two weeks ago, the assembly passed a health bill that earmarks 2 percent of the general revenue fund of Nigeria, which is basically all the oil money, for primary health care. The revolution that that could make -- now I say "could" because that's a lot of money, but it has to get from here to there. But then we met with all the governors, the governors who control a huge amount of that budget and how it's spent and where it's spent -- and these governors were competing with each other for who was going to get more bang for their buck. And the transparency levels are going up. Civil society is very much enmeshed at every level with this. We met not just with the president, but his entire cabinet -- entire cabinet -- across all the different agencies, all the different ministries. And civil society stoking this from below. And then had dinner with the business community which was piling into this now much more organized space. This is what you need -- you need all these stakeholders. It won't come from one piece or the other. But success can build on itself. And I think a country like Nigeria, which I don't think anyone would accuse of having been an example over the last decade in this area -- watch this space, because I think we have a success in the making if we can translate these major commitments from all sectors of Nigerian society and the international community, if we can get the huge burdens in Nigeria with this kind of resource flow and this kind of organization. And here the U.N. is a major part of the story. UNICEF, WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, UNFPA, U.N. Women -- working together virtually seamlessly on the ground. And for those who know what it looks like on the ground, to say virtually seamlessly, that's a heck of a lot of progress. So the U.N. can provide an organizing pole to work in a coherent manner with the government on these. So it's really an exciting story in the making here. BACHELET: I just want to make one comment, that I hope that Nigeria is taking into consideration the population trend that is really going very high. And that's already linked to the need to have real, clear family planning strategies because Nigeria has two problems. Its population is increasing dramatically and then on the other hand it's considered a middle-income country. So usually -- never meets the requirements to get federal aid. And if you look at average, probably has less poor as an average, but probably if you look at absolute numbers it has much more poor people than in many other places. And that's one of the problems we're feeling today in the world, that middle-income countries have more poor than less developed countries in terms of huge calculations. So just to mention that I hope that in that strategy they do consider that. Otherwise it will be very difficult to tackle it. BERKLEY: I was just going to say that, you know, it's interesting none of the people here mentioned Uganda, which was always seen as the kind of miracle case. And what's very interesting is Uganda, of course, President Museveni took on HIV because he sent some of his military leaders to Cuba who tested them, and that's when he realized how severe the epidemic was. What's interesting is the infection rates dropped very quickly there, partially because of the early spread and the openness. But now they're seeing recidivism in young people, because people aren't seeing the deaths around them. And they're also realizing the limits to being able to get treatment to everybody who needs it. They're beginning to see resistance. So you know, there's the positive side of what's happening, but also the limitations are being felt. Laurie? QUESTIONER: Thank you. And thank you all for being here today. Laurie Garrett from the Council on Foreign Relations. The major impact of the world financial crisis on global health funding appears not to have been an actual marked decline in the size of the overall amount of money available, but a skewing of it in terms of what the key donor is. So at this point at least for the -- by the end of 2010, well over 50 percent of all public sector giving came from a single source: Washington D.C. And well over 60 percent of all private giving came from one source: Seattle, Washington. So the two Washingtons are calling the shots. You're the bureaucracy that's implementing, thanks to the largesse of the two Washingtons. Now we have a very different Congress in the United States, we're hitting a real budget crunch, the FY '12 budget promises to be a bloody war -- (chuckles) -- in Washington. How can we make this next step, one way or the other but hopefully in a positive direction, if one of the two Washingtons radically decreases its contribution? DE LAY: Great formulation. And thank you, Laurie, for I think being the inspiration for this session today. The two Washingtons, I've not thought of it that way, but are on everyone's mind because I think everyone knows the two Washingtons in the best case scenario can't do this alone. And the chances for the two Washingtons to not be able to deliver what they're even delivering today is very real. I think this multistakeholder model that has been developed in the HIV/AIDS community in the fight against AIDS, but also now we're using very aggressively in the broader women's and children's health -- people bidding each other up; watching the corporate community kind of bid each other up, in a positive sense. Competitors looking at each other and saying, you know, actually if we do this together, we could totally cover the need for a given drug. And if we do this together, neither one of us is going to lose anything. So let's do it. The use of the bully pulpit, not just from traditional donor capitals but from actually countries that came to the table in last September, like Nigeria, that -- when you put that new 2 percent that goes on top of the Nigerian oil revenue, that is more than any kind of funding round we would get from all of the traditional donors trying to inch up a little bit. But what was maybe most interesting, I think, for many people -- realizing that a lot of the civil society organizations, both the global ones coming in with figures, their own fundraised money in the hundreds and $200 little old ladies sending their checks in was adding up to billions. This is very exciting because it mobilizes a lot more people than the traditional model does. So you actually not only get the money. You get the involvement and the political support of people that have sent their $100 check in to CARE or in to, you know, Save the Children or World Vision, but then they're also much better political consumers for their own government. So I think here, if we pull these stakeholders together, they keep each other honest, but they also bid each other up. And so right now, the potential for an upward spiral in this area to resist the pressure of the natural downward spiral on national budgets -- I think this is the race we're in right now. BERKLEY: Paul. Quickly. DE LAY: I don't -- I think whether you're Republican or a Democrat or anything in between, I think what the U.S. wants to see are three things. They want to see domestic expenditures going up in countries to really justify the international contribution. They want to see other donors, other bilateral donors, take more of their share of the responsibility. And the EU, in spite of the economic crisis, is attempting to do that. And that really is a role that the U.N. does play as far as trying to leverage the immense size of the U.S. contribution. And then the third thing is they want to make sure that their money is well spent. And it gets back to -- I know it sounds boring -- the accountability issue. But if the accountability issue is women saved in childbirth, infants saved from being infected; men and women, parents' lives being prolonged, and you can show that, then the U.S., I'm convinced, will remain a substantial donor. BERKLEY: So let me just say, it's interesting that the private sector is taking a very different view of the world now. It's not ROW. They realize that the growth in the future is going to be in many of these countries. And so there's a new look at that. And hopefully with that is going to be a changed relationship with how one deals with price tiering and new activities. Recently -- you know, today, there were announcements from a number of companies on vaccine pricing, you know, dramatic drops in vaccine pricing. So we hope to see more of that as well, which will help the sustainability of these efforts. Please, the gentleman over here. Please wait for the microphone. QUESTIONER: I'm Allen Hyman from Columbia-Presbyterian. Circumcision was mentioned as one of the few interventions that could prevent the spread of AIDS. And I find it ironic -- perhaps you do as well -- that -- you mentioned 30 years ago, it was in San Francisco that the first cluster was described. And this fall, the prohibition against circumcision is going to be on the ballot. Does the AIDS community have a position on circumcision, and what is it? MR. : I'm for it, but -- (laughter) -- DE LAY: From the evidence base, it's one of the few prevention/interventions that we know has measurable, significant protective effect. It's a 60 percent protective effect. It's better than a lot of the other things we have. So I think the AIDS community -- I don't want to speak for every single one -- supports it as -- particularly in hyper-endemic countries. It's going to be critical to reach that tipping point, where we can't get delayed sexual debut or condom use or reduction of multiple concurrent partnerships to achieve high enough levels. BACHELET: Just for the record, I'm against female genital mutilation. So for men, I'm for it, but not for women. (Laughter.) BERKLEY: Agreed. Please. QUESTIONER: Thanks, everybody. I'm Ann Starrs from Family Care International. And I wanted to pick up on the -- a couple of the comments that have been made. I think we are -- we'll be seeing later this week the launch of the global plan for the elimination of new HIV infections among children by 2015 and keeping their mothers alive, which I think will be a great thing and is an important initiative for bringing together the HIV and the MCH and the reproductive health communities. But I think -- the question I'd like to ask is, how do you see the future of this effort politically and strategically in terms of strengthening these linkages, particularly, you know, at these high levels but also very much at the ground where services are provided or made available and the importance of meeting women's and children's needs comprehensively, that sort of one-stop-shop approach? How do you do that while still taking into account the fact that there are marginalized populations -- men who have sex with men, commercial sex workers who are women but are not sort of -- you know, picking up on your comment, Bob, just sort of the human face -- this is -- these are a human face of HIV/AIDS as well, but it's not a human face that people want to see plastered on posters very often. So how -- while we're moving forward with this integration agenda, how do we make sure that those marginalized populations also continue to get the care and the services that they need? ORR: I'd love to take a whack at that. Thank you, Ann. I think the -- we -- there is attention there of we have to do both. You have to go after the populations that are the hard to reach and the underloved populations, call them, the ones that aren't going to make the posters, because that's where you could make a huge difference. At the same time, I think the success that we're seeing on the Women's and Children's Health Strategy is in part because that integrated roll-out of services -- everybody can see what they want to see. Those who really want to save babies can save babies, and they can see it and touch it. Those who think that, you know, women have been underserved for far too long and we're finally getting a women-centric roll-out of health services, they can have that. So I think the global strategy, the reason we're getting the kind of support we are is because we did not force that false choice. We heard all the debate between the health system strengtheners and the high-value interventioners and said wait a minute, folks, we're not arguing against each other, are we? So we meshed it together knowing that that defers the real challenge to the ground, to where it has to happen. But it's in that context that we're actually seeing both happening. You can build up the systems, the 34,000 trained, skilled health workers in Ethiopia that we saw that they want to quadruple over the next, I think, year or two years. That kind of scale is going to get a whole range of services out to mostly women and children. And that will have a great effect and a great face but that does not in any way mean that we can afford to neglect the populations that won't make a poster. QUESTIONER: Thanks. I'm Asia Russell. I work with Health GAP, and I want to pick up on a point that Bob Orr was making about stigma, and a point that Seth was making actually about Uganda, because 10 years ago, a key issue brought to the heart of the UNGASS declaration was the link between providing access to quality treatments and creating a flood of people who wanted to get tested, to know their status and to stop taking risks or to get themselves out of risky situations -- a really intimate link between being motivated to seek prevention, to find out one's status and then to extend one's life. And at the heart of that is actually stigma, because treatment access has a tremendous effect in reducing stigma at the level of a community. And I think a terrifying moment happened in Uganda last year when treatment interruptions were a reality in some of the most well-served, well-penetrated communities in Kampala and a kind of a precipice that implementers and people with HIV were looking out over in the entire country. And this is a country where 46 percent of new infections are between serial discordant cohabiting couples and where incidence is rising tremendously; 2007 -- (word inaudible) -- data show 120,000 new infections every year. So what are we -- what are we doing? And I think the reality is, 10 years after the UNGASS declaration, the value proposition about treatment has changed. And I think it's really important for the U.S. and the U.N. family to fully embrace this reality. UNAIDS just released data in the -- (inaudible) -- that's showing that if you scale up universal access, you avert 7 million new -- 7 million deaths and 12 million new infections. And now we have data showing us that if people have access to treatment and safe sex, they're 96 percent less likely to transmit -- including those 46 percent of new infections in Uganda that are between serial discordant couples. And those data are lost in translation, whether we're in D.C., in the other Washington or, you know, across the street at the U.N. And I think I want to hear from our panelists what you all plan to do between now and the FY '12 budget -- which Laurie (sp) is reminding us is going to be -- is going to be a scary one -- and not just over the week as we negotiate every single word. We're in an environment right now which we should be extremely enthusiastic to find ourselves in. But unfortunately, it seems like we're prepared to divorce ourselves from what the data are showing us. So please share a little bit about how the administration will be making the case on the Hill to fight for those -- not just maintenance, but the increases that are needed to reach 15 million people by 2015, and then what will the U.N. be doing to make the investment case? Thanks. BERKLEY: Anybody want to take a crack at that? MR. : (Inaudible) -- I'll be -- I'll be brief. You know, you've made some excellent points. And I think that certainly the tipping point to truly reach zero new infections, the vision that UNAIDS with partners has put before the world, will only happen if we go beyond what we've been doing now as far as with prevention, interventions. Risk behaviors can only be reduced to a level that's, while significant, is not going to be absolute. And I think the data shows that treatment does have a profound impact on transmission. We also have to go beyond that; the use of antiretroviral drugs in specific populations who are uninfected to protect themselves also needs to be entertained in some situations. The data's solid. And whether data is what sways political thinking and ministers of finance, always, I think, is open to debate. But I don't think we've ever had really for any disease, particularly a sexually transmitted disease, this strong of proof that use of antiretrovirals, particularly in infected people, has an incredible prevention benefit that goes beyond saving that person's life. BERKLEY: Can I -- can I just challenge you a little bit on some of the data? Because we know that, you know, the PrEP studies in women did not show an effect. And the particular finding that we were talking about, the 96 percent, was between stable, discordant couples. But the population attributable fraction of transmissions of that is quite low. Most of the transmission occurs very early in infection when people have high viral titers, and therefore one would have to have a different strategy. So how does that all play out in terms of what we're doing? MR. : Well, I think what that points to is certainly we need more information, but it means we have to be very careful about targeting the use of treatment as prevention, to make sure that we do get the benefits and that we don't do any harm. And we still need the studies that show that earlier and earlier treatment, while it sure looks like it saves peoples' live, doesn't cause any long-term adverse effects. So I think we just need more data. And ultimately we're going to have to target these programs. They aren't going to be massive general population type of intervention, particular for PrEP. BERKLEY: So we're out of time. I was hoping to do a lightning round to ask questions on, you know, whether you believe that we have the tools in hand. Certainly, as many know in this audience, I believe we need better technologies for prevention. And that's something that we have to do particularly for women as a priority going forward. But I want to thank all of the presenters. (Applause.) And I know that they'll be happy to answer questions in the reception outside. (C) COPYRIGHT 2011, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR E-MAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.