Space

South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK) has successfully established its place in the international shipbuilding, electronics, and automobile industries. Yet despite major investments in space technology, the ROK is still waiting for a breakthrough in its efforts to launch a satellite into orbit. Its third attempt is currently scheduled to take place at the Naro Space Center on October 26, 2012. In the midst of double-digit increases in Chinese and Indian space budgets and the expansion of Japan's space program to include military activities, what is South Korea's strategy for Asia's emerging space competition? And how likely is it to accomplish its goals, given its late entry into this complex high-tech sector? After years of technological underdevelopment, the ROK created the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) in 1989, just as it was undergoing democratization and opening up to the outside world. Its initial strategy focused on using import substitution to establish a national capability for operating foreign-produced satellites, with the intention of eventually building its own communications and remote-sensing spacecraft. During this time, KARI benefited from cooperation with Britain, the United States, and other foreign satellite manufacturers. In conjunction with its satellite program, KARI also began experiments in sounding-rocket technology in the 1990s. By the late 1990s, however, these solid-fuel boosters had reached altitudes of nearly 180 kilometers, bumping into U.S.-imposed missile-range restrictions South Korea had agreed to in return for surface-to-surface missile technology in the 1970s. Washington feared that the ROK's military government might be tempted to use missiles for offensive purposes. As a result, KARI concentrated on building a network of communications and remote-sensing satellites using foreign technologies, while beginning to construct its own scientific satellites, which it launched on foreign boosters. However, the advance of North Korea's ballistic missile program and its attempted launch of a satellite from its Taepodong I missile in 1998 posed a clear military threat to South Korea. In the context of the North-South political rivalry, Pyongyang's space launch gambit also risked endangering Seoul's technological reputation. Frustrated by attempts to acquire booster technology outside the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), South Korea took steps to become a member. After entering the MTCR in 2001, Seoul sought to acquire liquid-fuel boosters for use in a devoted space-launch program. After failing to reach a deal with U.S. providers (due to high cost and non-MTCR-related U.S. export controls), KARI ended up entering an agreement with Russia in 2004 for the purchase of a large liquid-fuel Angara booster to serve as the first stage of its planned Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV) I. KARI would construct the solid-fuel second-stage booster and the satellite. As part of the space agreement, Russia agreed to assist in the development and construction of a space-launch facility on an island in South Jeolla province and to provide KARI with astronaut training and a flight to the International Space Station. After a mini-scandal involving the unauthorized removal of training manuals from Russia's Star City by the ROK's first-choice astronaut Ko San, the Russian Space Agency barred him from its program. This turn of events allowed his female alternate, Yi So-yeon, to claim the title of the first Korean citizen to venture into space. She traveled to the space station in April 2008, becoming a national hero, although critics derided the flight for its $20 million price tag and reliance on Russian technology. KARI's success in satellite component development and the construction of a state-of-the-art space control and remote-sensing center in Taejon provided evidence of South Korean progress toward its goal of becoming one of the world's top ten space powers by 2015. However, budgetary troubles beginning in 2008 and difficulties in mastering the complexities of satellite launch have recently plagued KARI. In 2009, KARI's first attempt to launch the KSLV I ended in disappointment, after a successful Russian first stage was followed by the failed release of the satellite shroud from the Korean-built second stage, causing the still-attached spacecraft to lose velocity, tumble, and burn up in the atmosphere. KARI's second launch attempt in June 2010 ended in an explosion about two minutes into the KSLV I's flight, causing finger pointing by both Russia and South Korea. Lacking other options, KARI eventually purchased another Angara booster for its third KSLV I attempt. South Korea is struggling in space against structural obstacles having to do with its late entry into space technology and exploration. Put simply, as a middle-sized power, Seoul has to invest a higher percent of its resources into space activity if it hopes to develop a sustainable niche position among Asia's larger and more established space powers, which are decades ahead of it. Japan achieved its first satellite launch in January 1970, China in April 1970, and India in July 1980. However, Seoul's peninsular rival North Korea faces even greater obstacles in its space efforts because of its sharply limited finances, much lower technological base, and UN sanctions on its technology-acquisition program. Pyongyang has failed in three attempts to orbit a satellite thus far and has no experience in operating satellites or with advanced satellite production. Another advantage Seoul enjoys compared to Pyongyang is its good relations with more developed space powers. Besides its space ties to Russia and the United States, KARI cooperates with members of the European Space Agency, Ukraine, India, and Japan. North Korea's sole contacts in space activity may be with Iran. Historically speaking, early failures in space-launch programs are part of the normal growing pains of such efforts. The United States suffered many problems in the latter half of 1957 and throughout 1958 as it struggled to catch up with the Soviet Union after the successful launch of Sputnik. KARI is likely to overcome its problems with the KSLV I. However, what can it realistically expect of its space program? With a budget that has declined in recent years and now sits at $262 million (compared to Japan's $3.8 billion and India's $1.34 billion), South Korea will need to devote considerably more resources to space activities if it hopes to catch up with its Asian neighbors. KARI's future plans include the development of a domestically produced, three-stage, liquid-fuel KSLV II booster by 2021 capable of launching payloads of up to 1.5 tons into low-Earth orbit (compared to the 100 kilograms of the KSLV I). The ROK aims to launch its first lunar probe by 2023, a feat already accomplished by Japan, China, and India in the past decade. Notably, KARI has abandoned efforts to maintain its astronaut program due to its high cost, suggesting a possible recognition of more limited aims. The ROK's space program is now focused on developing national technological independence in space activity, particularly for space launch and satellite production. These technologies are important for national security missions, such as space-based reconnaissance, but they are also necessary building blocks for providing commercial space services in the future. Thus, in the medium term, South Korea's space program will be more of an "investment" than a moneymaker. Fortunately, KARI can expand its reach into space by building more intensive cooperative links with its friends and allies, thus allowing it to cost-share in international missions and satellite constellations without having to own or construct all of the technology. As the United States pivots toward Asia, it has begun to reach out more actively to its allies to share military satellite costs and reduce vulnerabilities to its own space assets posed by China's emerging capabilities. The ROK could play a mutually beneficial role as part of a growing network of U.S.-allied space capabilities, joining Japan, Australia, and members of the European Space Agency in increasingly linked networks for communications, remote sensing, space situational awareness, and global positioning. India may eventually join these nations as well. While such an approach may be less glamorous than a go-it-alone strategy, it is also safer and more affordable for Seoul. Nevertheless, Seoul will face challenges in bringing itself up to the level of allied actors and in developing even a limited range of commercial products that will be viable in a competitive space marketplace. A successful flight of the KSLV I may convince the government that it should push ahead. There are high entry costs to space activity, but it will provide important contributions to national security and offer benefits that come with the associated prestige. In this regard, the ROK government may have already decided that increased investment in space capability is unavoidable.

The Obama administration has accurately described outer space as increasingly "congested, contested, and competitive." Eleven countries have space launch capability and over sixty countries own and operate approximately 1,100 active satellites that play an invisible but essential role in almost all facets of our daily lives. However, as nations increasingly rely more on space, orbital space debris resulting from human activities on earth is a rapidly growing threat to civil, military, and commercial satellites. No country or group of countries possesses the sovereign authority or responsibility for regulating space. Outer space is instead governed by a patchwork of informal industry standards, unofficial UN guidelines, and bilateral agreements to prevent or mitigate potential satellite collisions and interference from space debris. As the leading country in space—and one that depends greatly on its assured availability—the United States has a core national interest to prevent or minimize the inherent risks of space activities. The United States should work with other spacefaring nations to establish a nonlegally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities. Specifically, the Obama administration should start negotiations building upon, but ultimately replacing, the current draft of the Space Code of Conduct put forth by the European Union (EU). The Problem Presently, existing resources and technology track approximately 22,000 items in space bigger than a softball, including the upper stages of launch vehicles, disabled spacecraft, dead batteries, solid rocket motor waste, and refuse from human missions. In addition, there are hundreds of thousands of other fragments of space junk that measure between one and ten centimeters, and countless millions that are even smaller. Traveling at speeds up to 22,000 miles per hour, even flecks of paint could potentially damage manned or unmanned spacecraft. Although it took forty years to produce 10,000 pieces of softball-sized space debris, that amount doubled over the next ten years, largely due to accidents and willful neglect. Most of the debris is located at a high orbit, where it could pose a significant threat for decades. Proposals to remove this space debris would be hugely expensive, have numerous technical hurdles, and require unprecedented international collaboration. If this escalating growth of space debris is not halted, U.S. officials worry that space will become a needlessly high-risk environment. Space as a U.S. National Interest The United States relies more on space for military, intelligence, civilian, scientific, and environmental activities than any other country. Without assured access to space, the United States could not attack suspected terrorists with precision-guided munitions, conduct imagery analysis of suspected nuclear weapons programs, use broadband Internet connectivity for cell phones and financial transactions, measure changes in the sea levels or arctic ice sheets, or forecast the paths of hurricanes. Though its preeminent global role may be declining, the United States remains the leader among all spacefaring nations. The United States accounts for 75 percent of worldwide governmental space funding, and U.S. government or industry owns and operates roughly 40 percent of all the active spacecraft in orbit. To alleviate the threat posed by space debris, U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center (JSPOC) detects, tracks, and identifies space objects through an elaborate constellation of twenty-nine ground-based radars and optical sensors. In addition to protecting U.S. spacecraft, JSPOC extends this capability—at no cost to the international community—by warning countries and commercial space operators when their satellites are at risk from large space debris or other satellites. European Union Code of Conduct In 2008, the EU published a draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, which it revised in September 2010. The code calls on member states to establish "policies and procedures to minimize the possibility of accidents … or any form of harmful interference with other States' right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space." It is based on three principles: 1) freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes; 2) preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit; and 3) due consideration for the legitimate defense interests of states. The code is not legally binding, but is rather a voluntary agreement among states with no formal enforcement mechanisms. In February 2011, thirty-seven Republicans noted that they were "deeply concerned" about the code because inadequate Obama administration briefings led to the mistaken belief that it could constrain missile defenses or antisatellite weapons. These misimpressions have been and must continue to be sufficiently addressed with relevant congressional members and staff; according to Obama administration space officials, the code's provisions are consistent with all existing practices of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Pentagon, and State Department. They believe that the code would lend order and predictability to the space domain by promoting norms of responsible behavior, facilitating the dissemination of best practices, and increasing transparency. The United States and the EU have also engaged in four rounds of consultations about the code, after which the EU incorporated suggested U.S. language, such as on the right to self-defense in space. For two years, the Obama administration has debated whether to endorse the EU code, pending a Pentagon assessment as to whether it would have an operational impact on the military's uses of space; most officials believe that it would not, as its provisions concur with all Pentagon space plans and policies. Given that the EU code is in U.S. national interest, if the Pentagon confirms that it would not have any negative impact, President Barack Obama should endorse it as the first step toward negotiations on an international code of conduct for outer space activities. Furthermore, the majority of spacefaring countries, including Australia, Canada, and Japan, have already endorsed the EU code. Why an International Code of Conduct? An international code of conduct for outer space activities is required. Other spacefaring nations—such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China—have indicated that they might not sign the EU code because they were insufficiently consulted in its development and believe it could be a ploy to limit the future capacities of emerging powers in outer space. Since February 2008, China and Russia have repeatedly proposed an alternative legally binding treaty that would outlaw the weaponization of space; the United States and most other spacefaring nations correctly oppose the draft treaty on the grounds that it would be unverifiable and would not cover ground-based systems. Along current trend lines, the EU code will likely suffer the same fate as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was endorsed by 132 states, but not Brazil, China, or India, much less Iran and North Korea. The United States has a clear interest in defining the rules of the road for interstate behavior in space, and it must actively lead the development of an international code of conduct on outer space activities. The United States is uniquely suited to do so as the leading space power, which through JSPOC provides the only reliable and timely information regarding space debris to commercial space operators and spacefaring nations, including Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Endorsing the EU code is an important first step toward ensuring U.S. objectives and would serve as a promising foundation for a more widely accepted international code. U.S. leadership toward developing an international code is long overdue and must begin with in-depth negotiations with emerging spacefaring nations to assure the document reflects their own interests. In addition to the EU code provisions, the international code must require the timely notification of space launches, planned satellite orbital placements, scheduled space maneuvers, and a ban on the weaponization of space, which is an essential requirement for Russia and China. The U.S. military has no kinetic weapons in space, nor has it indicated any plans to pursue them in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the current architecture of the U.S. homeland and regional missile defense radars and interceptors would not be affected by the imposition of such an international code. Though not legally binding, an international code would be the most significant normative step that captures the interests of almost all spacefaring countries while shaping and promoting sustainable outer space conduct. Negotiations will require time and patience, as many states have understaffed space agencies. However, given that the threat from space debris is increasing exponentially and could lead to a domain that is no longer reliable or safe for human use, such discussions cannot start soon enough.