Oceans and Seas

The UN Pact on High Seas Biodiversity represents a long-overdue acknowledgment that the fate of the ocean will help determine our own. But success will require reconciling the divergent interests of multiple constituencies.

Test your knowledge of maritime policy and disputes, from the Arctic to the South China Sea.

Washington will need to identify and commit to specific goals in the Indo-Pacific if this geographic and strategic approach is to be successful.

With much of the world’s attention fixated on climate change, the Our Ocean conference is a great opportunity to address the health of the oceans and garner commitments to save it from the scourges of pollution, overfishing, and transnational crime. 

As the Donald J. Trump administration develops its Indo-Pacific strategy, some big questions remain unresolved about not only the initiatives it will undertake, but the basic geography as well. For example, the Indo-Pacific as the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy defines it covers a geography quite different from that understood in India as the larger Indo-Pacific incorporating the entirety of the Indian Ocean. In order to realize the potential of this strategy, the Trump administration will need to reconcile differences over what constitutes this region, internally align the segmented U.S. bureaucracy to adequately address this expansive area, and determine what might be productive joint initiatives. For more on the challenges, and some of my recommendations on what can be done, see my new Council on Foreign Relations Expert Brief, “The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Needs More Indian Ocean.” My book about India’s rise on the world stage, Our Time Has Come: How India Is Making Its Place in the World, was just published by Oxford University Press in January. Follow me on Twitter: @AyresAlyssa. Or like me on Facebook (fb.me/ayresalyssa) or Instagram (instagr.am/ayresalyssa).

Though the Paris Agreement included only one reference to oceans, the link between global warming and ocean health makes President Trump’s renunciation of the Paris agreement appear even more ignorant and indefensible.

This week the Chinese and Russian navies launched eight days of war games in the South China Sea. For Beijing, it’s a chance to brush off the July ruling by an international tribunal dismissing the merit of its claim to jurisdiction over those waters. For Moscow, it’s an opportunity to flex Russia’s global muscles and tweak U.S. pretensions to be the arbiter of Asia-Pacific security. Meanwhile, the Obama administration is hosting a very different ocean reunion in Washington. On September 15-16, Secretary of State John Kerry will welcome representatives from some sixty countries, as well as hundreds more from business, science, and civil society to the third Our Ocean conference. According to the agenda, the conferees will focus on how to: protect oceans from global warming, expand marine protected areas, support sustainable fisheries, and stem oceanic pollution. Just what are we to make of this odd juxtaposition? Realists might well conclude that the Obama administration had lost its mind, by allowing its chief diplomat to focus on a boutique environmental issue. Such an “old school” assessment is misguided, because defending U.S. national security is about much more than geopolitics. Yes, the risks of great power war, nuclear proliferation, and terrorism will remain with us for decades. But Americans also confront new perils, including “threats without a threatener” like climate change and pandemic disease. The dramatic deterioration of the world’s oceans—a catastrophe exacerbated by global warming—falls squarely into this basket. And it is no distant threat, but a clear and present danger. John Kerry thus deserves praise for elevating its prominence in U.S. foreign policy. The oceans, which cover 71 percent of our planet, are not just a nice place to windsurf. They help regulate the Earth’s climate, feed humanity, and sustain economic growth. Unfortunately, they are in deep crisis, thanks to global warming, unsustainable exploitation, and rampant pollution. Without a dramatic course correction, we stand to lose not only resources of immense value but also our main source of breathable air. This week’s conference seeks to turn the tide by adopting innovative, collaborative approaches to rescuing the marine environment. Four priorities stand out: Prevent climate change from killing the oceans: Humanity is just waking up to the sea’s indispensable role in buffering the planet from climate change. The oceans are an enormous carbon sink, absorbing a quarter of the world’s CO2 They also function as the planet’s lungs, producing half of all atmospheric oxygen—more than all rain forests combined. And they are a powerful heat sink, absorbing a thousand times more heat than the atmosphere. Unfortunately, providing these “ecosystem services” has come at a catastrophic cost. Rising carbon loads make seawater more acidic, threatening zooplankton and other microorganisms and undermining the marine food chain upon which a billion people depend for their primary source of protein. Warmer oceans, meanwhile, are killing off phytoplankton, bleaching coral reefs, and melting icecaps. Sea levels are rising faster than predicted, promising to inundate U.S. coastal communities. Many cities will need to be abandoned, among them Norfolk, VA, home to the world’s largest naval base. Finally, warmer waters are producing hurricanes and storms of unprecedented violence, posing greater threats not only to coastal residents but commercial shipping upon which 90 percent of global trade relies. Despite their acute vulnerability to global warming—and their historic role in mitigating it—the oceans remain a fringe issue in global climate discussions. (Indeed, the oceans got barely a mention in the historic Paris Agreement). Expect the conferees in Washington to sound the tocsin about our dying oceans—and the need to restore their health to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals endorsed at last year’s UN General Assembly. Expand marine protected areas: Kerry’s second priority is to persuade other countries to establish and extend marine protected areas (MPAs), or managed zones designed to protect marine ecosystems and maintain biodiversity by regulating fishing and other forms of exploitation. In 2010, parties to the Biodiversity Convention endorsed conserving 10 percent of their exclusive economic zones as MPAs. The United States has more than risen to this challenge, having preserved more than 30 percent of U.S. waters. Just last week, President Obama quadrupled the size of the Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument, established by George W. Bush, creating the world’s largest MPA, at more than two times the size of Texas. The good news is that protection works—and can even reverse past damage caused by humans. The bad news is that globally, only 3-4 percent of world’s oceans currently fall within MPAs. Enforcement is also a challenge: Too many small or poor countries lack the capacity, and sometimes the will, to ensure that citizens and foreign fishing fleets respect their regulations. This week’s Our Ocean conference should focus on how to improve maritime domain awareness among small island nations like Palau, which have declared massive MPAs. To complement these sovereign MPAs, the United States must keep pushing for prompt completion of a UN high seas biodiversity agreement. Despite initial reservations that such talks could go off track, the White House ultimately chose to engage other countries rather than marginalize itself. Negotiations began promisingly in March, and the second round concluded last week. The final two negotiating sessions will occur in 2017, whereupon a draft treaty will be presented to UN member states. End illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Globally, some 60 percent of global fish stocks are depleted or over-exploited, thanks to unsustainable practices. One of the biggest culprits is illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. As the name implies, this encompasses three separate offenses: (a) harvesting fish within another nation’s fishery (or one controlled by a regional fisheries management organization); (b) failing to report the catch to the relevant fisheries authority, or (c) fishing by improperly authorized vessels, often operating under “flags of non-compliance.” Beyond its ecological and economic costs, IUU fishing exacerbates maritime insecurity, since it is frequently linked to transnational organized crime. Fortunately, both international law and high technology provide tools to combat this scourge. A recent legal breakthrough was the entry into force in June 2016 of the Port State Measures Agreement, a treaty that prohibits illegal fish hauls from being unloaded in the ports of participating states. This week Secretary Kerry will press additional countries to ratify the convention. Building on the “Sea Scout” initiative Kerry unveiled at last year’s conference, which aims to identify IUU “hot spots,” the State Department has also invited technology firms to Washington to showcase new approaches to monitoring and combating illegal fishing worldwide. (A potential model for such efforts is Secure Our Oceans, a joint project by the Henry L. Stimson Center and the Pristine Seas program of the National Geographic Society). Stop rampant marine pollution. The scale at which humans are despoiling the oceans is mind-boggling. Each year, we dump more than eight million tons of plastic into the sea. Much of this flotsam is ground down into fine particles that find their way into the diets and flesh of living organisms. A huge percentage of this waste originates in emerging and developing countries, particularly in littoral Asia, that lack adequate systems for waste management in coastal zones, particularly at the municipal level. And then there is the effluent of the affluent. Thanks to lax regulations, too many rivers in the United States and other advanced market nations deliver a massive runoff of fertilizers and chemicals into the sea. Nutrient pollution from the Mississippi river, for example, has elevated nitrogen and phosphorous levels into the Gulf of Mexico, creating enormous dead zones. In 2015, the Group of Seven (G7) adopted an action plan committing its members to combat both land- and water-based sources of marine pollution. The Our Ocean summit offers an opportunity to expand this effort to big emerging economies like Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia. As always, the proof of good intentions will be in the implementation. Wisely, the State Department has included multiple participants from the private sector—including the fishing industry, plastics manufacturers, and retail companies—as well as scientists and nongovernmental advocacy groups. Since the days of Teddy Roosevelt, U.S. presidents have created national monuments late in their terms to burnish their legacies. Barack Obama—like George W. Bush before him—has taken this conservation commitment beyond the water’s edge. At this week’s Our Ocean conference, the United States can take things even further, by safeguarding high seas biodiversity and helping other nations become responsible stewards of their marine environment. The European Union has promised to host the next Our Ocean conference in 2017, with Indonesia on tap for 2018. But sustaining momentum on ocean issues will require firm leadership from the next U.S. president, who should know the stakes involved. Hillary Clinton, in response to a request from ocean advocates, recently released a letter outlining her ocean priorities, pledging to boost the “blue economy” while protecting the health of the marine environment. Donald Trump has yet to do the same.

Coauthored with Daniel Chardell, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the international tribunal at The Hague prepares to issue its much-anticipated ruling on the legality of China’s claims to nearly the entire South China Sea, Beijing and Washington have already begun lobbing rhetorical shots across the bow. “We do not make trouble but we have no fear of trouble,” warned a senior People’s Liberation Army official at the Shangri-La Dialogue earlier this month, in reference to U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS). U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, for his part, cautioned China against “erecting a great wall of self-isolation” as it continues to construct, expand, and militarize artificial islands in the disputed waters over the objections of its Southeast Asian neighbors. Clashes in the South China Sea have captured the world’s attention for good reason. Whether through miscommunication, accidental escalation, or outright provocation, these disputes could spark a devastating regional conflict. Yet U.S.-China regional competition extends well beyond the South China Sea, permeating everything from trade and investment to the politics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s premier intergovernmental organization. To acquire a more nuanced understanding of Southeast Asian views of U.S.-China regional competition, the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations joined with the Australia-based Lowy Institute for International Policy in convening a workshop in Singapore. Here are four major takeaways. 1. Disputes in the South China Sea present a quandary for Southeast Asian countries, as they seek to shape Chinese behavior while maintaining ASEAN solidarity and centrality. ASEAN has long been predicated on cohesion and solidarity among its ten member states. The grouping operates by consensus and advances the principle of “centrality,” according to which ASEAN, not external powers, should play the primary convening role in regional diplomacy. For decades, these principles have enabled ASEAN members to preserve their autonomy while reaping the benefits of relations with great powers. South China Sea disputes have exposed rifts within ASEAN, threatening to upset this delicate balance. ASEAN’s failure to adopt a robust, unified position against China’s aggressive behavior has infuriated the Philippines and Vietnam, the most vocal of the group’s five claimants to the disputed waters. Meanwhile, China’s large-scale reclamation in the Spratly Islands and fishing activities in the maritime jurisdiction of Malaysia and Indonesia have made it increasingly difficult for Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to ignore Chinese assertiveness. And yet Cambodia and Laos continue to lean toward China, precluding the adoption of a tougher collective stance. Singapore, which has long sought to play a bridging role among China, Southeast Asian claimants, and the United States, remains reluctant to assume an overly critical stance vis-à-vis Beijing. Divisions within ASEAN have only invited further incursions by China in the South China Sea—and countermoves by the United States—threatening ASEAN centrality. Concerned that leaving Chinese claims unchallenged will set a troubling precedent, Washington has undertaken several FONOPS and doubled down on its security commitments to the Philippines, which filed the case against China in Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 2013. If the arbitral tribunal rules that China’s so-called “nine-dash line” has no basis in international law, Beijing could react defiantly, accelerating its land reclamation and declaring an air defense identification zone over the South China Sea (as it did over the East China Sea in 2013). Such moves could increase the likelihood of a clash between China and the Philippines, raising the specter of a broader regional conflagration involving the United States. 2. The reputational cost of not approving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would be extremely high for the United States, since many Southeast Asian policymakers regard the trade deal as a symbol of U.S. commitment to the region. A pillar of the U.S. rebalance to Asia is the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an ambitious free-trade agreement encompassing twelve major economies along the Pacific Rim, including ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. Although the ultimate economic benefits of the agreement for Southeast Asia are uncertain, the TPP has become symbolic of Washington’s commitment to the region. Given how much political capital Southeast Asian participants have invested in the agreement’s success, its rejection by Congress will carry high reputational costs to the United States, reinforcing the widespread perception that its commitment to Southeast Asia is waning. Beijing is well-positioned economically to profit from this scenario. Beyond championing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—a trade agreement encompassing all ten ASEAN members plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—Chinese President Xi Jinping has personally spearheaded the One Belt, One Road initiative, which aims to channel hundreds of billions of dollars into infrastructure projects spanning Eurasia. President Xi has also overseen the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new regional development bank that many regard as a rival to the U.S.-dominated World Bank and the Japan-dominated Asian Development Bank. 3. Southeast Asian borders are porous, and Southeast Asian states’ capacity to police the illicit flow of goods and people—including terrorists—across them presents governance and security challenges. Assistance from Washington and Beijing could help close these gaps. Many of Southeast Asia’s security challenges are transnational, thanks to the region’s intricate network of land and maritime borders. A number of governments struggle to manage the cross-border flow of terrorists, migrants, illicit goods, and victims of human trafficking. The regional terrorist threat has grown acute recently due to the advent of the self-declared Islamic State, its sophisticated propaganda, and its aggressive use of social media for recruitment. Hundreds of fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian nations have traveled to the Middle East to join the Islamic State and other jihadist groups. The January 2016 terrorist attacks in Jakarta, though modest in scope, evince the desire of Islamic State affiliates to launch attacks in the region itself. There is an obvious opportunity for ASEAN, the United States, and China to cooperate on counterterrorism, since the Islamic State and its ilk provides them with a common enemy. When providing capacity-building assistance, however, the United States and China must not unwittingly exacerbate weak local governance. Worse still, the threat of Islamic State terrorism has already compelled some Southeast Asian governments to further entrench draconian counterterrorism laws, which are counterproductive for human rights and governance. 4. Rather than choose between the United States and China, ASEAN members should wield their collective influence to constrain the U.S.-China rivalry through regional rules and institutions, and to channel competition toward productive ends. ASEAN should not only maintain its “strategic autonomy” amid U.S.-China competition, but also leverage its centrality in efforts to steer Washington and Beijing away from confrontation. To realize these objectives, ASEAN needs bold ideas and reinvigorated leadership. ASEAN might start by rethinking its commitment to “egalitarian multilateralism”—the notion that all members are on equal footing—since the absence of decisive leadership within the group will only invite China or the United States to fill the power vacuum. In practice as opposed to rhetoric, ASEAN has always been hierarchical, as might be expected given the yawning economic gap between its most developed (Singapore and Brunei) and least developed (Laos and Myanmar) members. For ASEAN, the imminent ruling of the arbitral tribunal is a double-edged sword. It could offer an opportunity for the group to demonstrate unity in the face of great power competition. Or, if its members fail to adopt a common position on the court’s ruling, its fissures could deepen. How ASEAN responds to the ruling, and whether it proves capable of navigating a potentially defiant Chinese response, could determine the course of regional peace and security for years to come. To learn more, read the full report: “Southeast Asian Perspectives on U.S.-China Competition”

China and India increasingly vie for strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean, while also cooperating on some transnational security issues.  

Coauthored with Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations This year, the global environmental outlook is sunnier than last Earth Day. To be sure, Earth faces dire threats, as global warming, desertification, and deforestation continue unabated. The world has hit record temperatures each of the last eleven months. Ninety-three percent of the Great Barrier Reef’s coral is now bleached. Biodiverse jungles in Indonesia are being burned to make way for palm oil plantations. And half of the world’s population will live in water stressed areas by 2025. And yet the news is not all negative. Over the past year, the world has collectively taken significant steps to fight these alarming trends, suggesting that we are not wholly incapable of caring for our planet. Three accomplishments in particular provide welcome glimmers of hope. The Paris Agreement The most prominent example of humanity’s collective will to tackle environmental challenges was the breakthrough Paris Agreement reached in December at the twenty-first meeting of the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Delegates pledged to limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, buttressed by countries’ individual Intended Nationally Determined Contributions. They also established a new five-year review cycle and committed to ratchet up their ambitions for emissions reductions in each period. They further expanded financing mechanisms to facilitate sustainable development and compensate vulnerable states for loss and damage, while extending to 2025 their previous $100 billion pledge for climate finance from developed states. Overall, the Paris Agreement provides a promising platform on which to accelerate climate action in the future—provided that domestic politics do not derail countries’ commitments to meeting their pledges. The Sustainable Development Goals Environmental conservation featured prominently in six of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted at the United Nations on September 25, 2015. This marked a welcome change from the previous Millennium Development Goals, which gave short shrift to the global environment—and the invaluable “ecosystem services” that a healthy and resilient planet provide to the world economy. In adopting SDGs 13-15, countries committed themselves to conserve the terrestrial environment (including by fighting deforestation, combating desertification, and preserving endangered species); to sustainably manage marine ecosystems (including though better coastal zone management and more sustainable fisheries); and to combat climate change. Goals 6, 7, and 11, meanwhile, commit parties to sustainably manage water resources, promote clean energy, and make the transition to sustainable cities and communities. To be sure, the SDGs are highly ambitious and their implementation will require follow-through by UN member states. Still, they send an unprecedented and promising signal by placing environmental considerations at the heart of the global development agenda. Restarting negotiations on a high seas biodiversity agreement Becalmed for years, UN negotiations have finally started on a treaty to protect marine life on the high seas—the vast expanses of water more than 200 miles from shore that constitute approximately 64 percent of the ocean and cover 50 percent of the Earth’s surface. A preparatory committee, which will meet from April 2016-April 2017, will aim to develop a foundation for a treaty text. The intended High Seas Biodiversity Convention will fill a huge gap in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which addresses only marine areas within countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which extend just 200 miles. Prospects for this ambitious treaty improved markedly when Obama administration, which had been on the fence, announced last year that it would enter multilateral negotiations. As the rapporteur report from a December 2014 CFR workshop noted, U.S. participation will be extremely important for the success of a high seas biodiversity treaty, given its naval dominance, economic interests, and leading role in advancing conservation. Moreover, joining the negotiations from the beginning will allow the United States to shape the treaty text (including potentially problematic clauses related to resource sharing). Another reason for optimism: when it comes to treaty ratification, conventions to preserve marine resources are among the few to escape notorious gridlock in Washington. Although the Senate has approved U.S. ratification of only five multilateral treaties during President Obama’s tenure, four of these protect ocean wildlife and combat illegal fishing. Taken together, the Paris Agreement, the SDGs, and the negotiations for a High Seas Biodiversity Convention are hopeful indicators. They suggest that the world’s leaders, and their constituents, are waking to the realization that there is no Planet B. But driving this agenda home will require vigorous leadership from the United States, including from President Obama during his last months in office, and from whoever succeeds him next January. One of the United States’ greatest strengths is its ability to actively engage in and to drive the agenda in nearly every multilateral body on Earth, and to bring unmatched resources and issue-specific technical and scientific knowledge to bear on global problems, not least environmental ones. During President Obama’s remaining tenure in office, the administration should draw upon this unparalleled U.S. capacity and work to enhance coordination and partnership among various environmentally-focused bodies. Such an approach is far from glamorous. But improving institutional capacity to tackle the greatest collective challenge we face is necessary to save the planet in the long term. The president has done the country and the world a great service by placing environmental sustainability at the heart of U.S. national security, foreign policy, and development assistance. Here’s hoping that the next occupant of the Oval Office builds on this legacy so that the planet has a better chance of surviving its race against time.

In telling the Group of Seven (G7) yesterday to butt out of its controversial maritime claims in East Asia, China has doubled down on an historic strategic blunder. Beijing’s belligerence in the South China Sea is especially imprudent. By refusing to compromise on its outrageous sovereignty claims, the government of Xi Jinping discredits its “peaceful rise” rhetoric and complicates efforts by member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to “triangulate” between China and the United States. Continued Chinese muscle-flexing will only undermine support for president Xi Jinping’s signature One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative and push regional fence-sitters into the U.S. embrace. The most promising outcome for all concerned would be a face-saving climb-down by China. Under this scenario, Beijing would promote détente rather than confrontation—without explicitly abandoning its jurisdictional claims. These are the main takeaways from a week’s worth of discussions with officials, policy analysts, and academics in China, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Over the past two decades, Southeast Asian nations have sought to avoid permanently choosing sides between China and the United States to preserve national autonomy while reaping economic benefits. As veteran Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan noted in a recent speech, ASEAN countries have learned how to “balance, hedge and band-wagon” as the situation requires, to remain independent actors rather than passive objects of great power competition. The results have been phenomenal, permitting ASEAN’s emergence as an economically dynamic and largely peaceful bloc of more than 600 million inhabitants. But continued success rests on a fragile balance between two distinct orders: an economic one increasingly dominated by China, and a security one underpinned by the forward presence of the U.S. military, including formal alliances with two countries (the Philippines and Thailand) and growing defense ties with others (including Singapore and Vietnam). The Obama administration’s “rebalance” to Asia, welcomed by most ASEAN member states after U.S. distractions in the Middle East and Afghanistan, was intended to provide additional reassurance in the face of China’s inexorable rise. This dual order has allowed Southeast Asians to have their cake and eat it too. They can enjoy both growing economic linkages with China without worrying about their security. This freedom not to choose has underpinned both the “ASEAN way”—a consensus-based diplomatic tradition among the bloc’s members—as well as the concept of “ASEAN centrality”—which holds that ASEAN should remain the fulcrum of regional integration. Suddenly, ASEAN nations are being pressed to choose—in ways that threaten the cohesion of the bloc itself. At a commercial level, ASEAN nations confront two rival—albeit overlapping—schemes for trade liberalization: the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Chinese-favored Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The TPP, which has attracted twelve countries (Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, the United States, and ASEAN members Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), is conceived as a high-standard deal that will address difficult, behind-the-border trade barriers, including regulations related to intellectual property rights and environmental and labor protections. RCEP, by contrast, is a lower-ambition arrangement being negotiated by sixteen countries, including all ten members of ASEAN plus China, India, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Experts disagree over whether these two trade schemes are compatible—much less whether they will ultimately facilitate a broader Asia-Pacific free trade zone. Of particular concern for ASEAN are asymmetries in membership, raising the prospect of fragmentation of the Southeast Asian bloc. Beyond these competing trade visions, Xi Jinping’s government has launched an ambitious OBOR scheme with two strands—a modern “Silk Road” intended to integrate the Chinese economy with those of Central and South Asia (and eventually Europe), and a “Maritime Silk Road” to do the same for Southeast Asia. The OBOR project is designed to fill a yawning gap in regional infrastructure needs—estimated at a whopping $8 trillion (with a “T”) through 2020—by modernizing road, rail, air, seaport, and communications facilities. It was to help finance such plans that Beijing spearheaded the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, or AIIB, last year. As it experiences economic slowdown, China also views OBOR as a way to export its own excess capacity, as well as labor. China’s bullying actions in Southeast Asia place these grand plans in jeopardy. Across the region—from Myanmar to Indonesia to Vietnam—governments worry about the geopolitical implications of their growing economic dependence on China. They suspect that OBOR will entail a political, not merely economic, quid pro quo. The sometimes ham-handed actions of Chinese diplomats have not helped. (In several countries, including Malaysia, visiting Chinese officials have met separately with Chinese diaspora communities, stoking anxieties that China is pursuing an irredentist, or at least hegemonic, agenda.) After years of crouching and hiding, China now seems intent on treating its neighbors as tributary states, with President Xi as suzerain. Little wonder that states in the region are cozying up to the United States and looking urgently for signals of its staying power. In the wake of the triumphant Sunnylands summit in February, where President Obama reaffirmed the notion of ASEAN centrality, nations increasingly regard the United States as their partner of choice. This brings us back to the most obvious regional flashpoint, the South China Sea. Despite repeated assurances that it seeks a peaceful resolution to this maritime dispute, China brooks no challenge to its historically dubious “nine-dash line.” This asserts Chinese jurisdiction over some ninety percent of that sea—where five other nations (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) have advanced their own, albeit more modest, claims. Although Beijing has pledged to negotiate a binding “code of conduct” with other claimants, it has never taken such talks seriously. Rather, it has adopted a breakneck strategy of island-building to create “facts on the sea,” including air bases and port facilities, enforcing its will through a growing detachment of armed coast guard vessels. It has also asserted—contrary to the terms of (and its obligations under) the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—that the naval vessels of all countries, including the United States, must obtain prior permission before peacefully transiting what it considers to be its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Expect matters to heat up this spring. Seeking a legal ruling where diplomacy has failed, the Philippines has taken China to court. The venue is the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, established under UNCLOS—to which both China and the Philippines are party. Having ruled in October that it has jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal is expected to render its final decision by June. Observers anticipate that it will rule in the Philippines’ favor on most counts—including potentially on the most explosive matter, by declaring that China’s nine-dash line lacks any legal basis. Taking preemptive action, Beijing has already declared that it will neither accept nor comply with the tribunal’s ruling. Nevertheless, a judgment against China would deal it a huge diplomatic blow. It would also create domestic headaches for Xi. Having cultivated hyper-nationalism among its citizens and netizens when it serves its purpose, the government risks being propelled into precipitate action by an inflamed Chinese public. Such an incendiary climate will make it hard for cooler heads to prevail. The aftermath of the ruling will be a moment of great danger for China, ASEAN, and the United States. The Xi government may well lash out with more aggressive actions to assert its sovereignty claims, including potentially declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the entire area contained within the nine-dash line. ASEAN nations, meanwhile, will struggle to maintain solidarity. Claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, will press for a united, hard line, even as Chinese allies Cambodia and Laos will press for accommodation. Steering between these camps will require deft diplomacy, particularly by Singapore—often ASEAN’s unofficial leader—and Indonesia, the bloc’s most populous nation. Finally, an escalating war of words in capitals—and of actions on the high seas—will test the mettle of the United States, as it seeks to defend maritime rights through freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), while restraining reckless impulses on the part of its allies and friends in the region that could draw it into a military confrontation with China. In view of this looming danger, the time is ripe for discreet bilateral discussions between Washington and Beijing on the imminent tribunal ruling and steps that both governments can take to limit its fallout, both international and (particularly in China’s case) domestic. The goal should not be some “G-2” condominium—something that ASEAN States would understandably reject. Rather, the objective should be some face-saving formula whereby China can make clear its displeasure with the ruling, while announcing that it would accept a multilateral moratorium on further island reclamation. Without relinquishing its sovereignty claims, Beijing would essentially recognize that these jurisdictional matters cannot be resolved in the near or perhaps even medium term without potentially catastrophic military confrontation. In the meantime, China would declare itself open to joint development of mineral resources with other regional states, as well as practical steps to preserve other marine resources, including fishing grounds, on which all parties depend. For its part, the United States could agree to ramp down the tempo of its FONOPs and overflight exercises, without renouncing the principles of maritime law, as established under UNCLOS (the vast majority of which the United States recognizes as customary international law). Finally, ASEAN claimant nations, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines, would need to signal restraint in advancing their own jurisdictional claims, particularly in regard to occupying and fortifying island features. They should also work closely with China, as well as the United States, on procedures to prevent the escalation of “unplanned encounters at sea,” as Singapore has recommended. The envisioned scenario, to be sure, will require multiple moving parts to come together, and in the right sequence. And it will entail a politically difficult climb-down for China. But it will also help the Chinese government escape from the blind alley into which its imprudent policies have led.

Coauthored with Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the Paris climate meeting rapidly approaches, the preparatory discussions have been remarkably silent on the crucial links between global warming and the health of the world’s oceans. This is a missed opportunity to galvanize global political will behind significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Last week, the U.S.-based Consortium for Ocean Leadership and the European Marine Board released an Oceans Climate Nexus Consensus Statement, drawing attention to how integral the oceans are to the earth’s climate system—and to the survival of life on our planet. The statement calls on parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to deliver a strong agreement at Paris that includes ambitious mitigation targets that will limit further damage to the ocean and its ecosystems. It also calls on funders to fund oceans research, so that scientists can better comprehend the magnitude of climate change and propose ways to mitigate and adapt. Though the oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, we still understand very little about how they work. But we do know that they are fundamental to the climate system, serving as our planetary life support system. As humanity has continued to spew out greenhouse gasses, the oceans have been working overtime to buffer us from the consequences. Since the start of the industrial revolution, the oceans have absorbed 25 percent of human emissions of carbon dioxide, while producing half of the world’s oxygen—more than all of the world’s rainforests combined. But all the extra CO2 uptake comes at a cost. The increased acidity of the oceans is already making it hard for microorganisms, crustaceans, and mollusks to build skeletons and shells. Unless current trends are reversed, complex marine food webs could collapse entirely. But the oceans aren’t just getting more acidic. They are also warming disastrously. A close look at the world’s oceans shows that we’re only seeing the tip of the iceberg when we focus on the atmospheric and terrestrial impacts of rising temperatures. That’s because most of the heat generated by the greenhouse effect is being absorbed by the ocean. The good news is that the world’s oceans are not just a carbon sink, but a heat sink as well: they hold one thousand times more heat than the atmosphere. The bad news is that while the atmosphere loses heat very quickly, once the oceans heat up, they won’t cool back for decades—even centuries—even with dramatic declines in emissions. And we don’t know when they’ll reach their carrying capacity. Data from Church et al. (2011), graphic designed by Skeptical Science http://www.skepticalscience.com/graphics.php?g=46 The warming of the world’s oceans has potentially catastrophic implications for marine biodiversity. If it continues, it could render entire regions of extreme heat, such as the Persian Gulf, devoid of marine life. Combined with rising ocean acidification, warming will disrupt marine ecosystems. Humans will quickly feel these effects: oceans are a critical food source for much of the world and of course, rising sea levels already threaten low-lying and island states. More warm water in the tropics also means a larger hurricane generation zone, which could threaten these states, as well as global trade (nearly 90 percent of global trade takes places involves shipping). And as the ocean heats up, it will alter rainfall patterns: 86 percent of global evaporation and 78 percent of global precipitation occur over the ocean. Still, there is a slowly growing recognition that we can’t tackle climate change if we ignore the role of the oceans. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had a chapter devoted to oceans (previous reports only mentioned it in passing). Secretary of State John Kerry has made the oceans a foreign policy priority, elevating the issue both in the United States and internationally. At the second Our Ocean summit, hosted by Chile last month, attendees announced over eighty new initiatives to protect the world’s oceans. The United States is also currently developing its first integrated marine plans for its coastal zones, to be released in 2016. In additional to the Oceans-Climate Nexus Consensus Statement, a group of forty-two organizations will host the annual World Oceans Day on December 4 at the UNFCCC conference in Paris to highlight the connection between global warming and marine health and propose solutions. The coalition calls on UN member states to conserve and sustainably manage coastal ecosystems (including mangroves, seagrass beds, and salt marshes), both to mitigate climate change—by providing natural carbon sinks—and to  adapt to its consequences—by creating natural defenses against rising seas, storms, and flooding. Despite these efforts, the oceans remain a fringe issue when it comes to global efforts to tackle climate change. Existing initiatives—and funding—are woefully inadequate to tackle to scope of the challenge. A quick scan of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) that countries have prepared for Paris reveals virtually no mention of oceans—much less an integrated global plan to protect them. Oceans must feature more prominently in any agreement that comes out of Paris. The links between oceans and climate change only underscore how essential it is to cut carbon emissions to ensure the sustainability of the planet. Greater investment in ocean research can also improve forecasting, reducing the uncertain effects of climate change, and potentially saving many lives. At Paris, states and other stakeholders should scale up efforts and funding to study the relationship between oceans and climate change.  And although it is too late to alter INDCs before Paris, they should be revised in five years (as recently suggested by France and China), to include ocean-centered climate mitigation efforts.  For too long, oceans health and climate change have been treated as distinct issues. Paris provides an opportunity to fix that, and in doing so, take a big step toward fixing our planet.

Last night I had the honor to participate in a great New York event—the announcement of the winners of the Wendy Schmidt Ocean Health XPrize, presented by Foreign Affairs LIVE. Two years ago, the XPrize Foundation announced that they would offer $2 million to any private team that could do something many had considered impossible: create a device to reliably measure the acidity of the deep ocean, while surviving pressures equivalent to hundreds of atmospheres. The big winner was Sunburst Sensors, a tiny company  based in Missoula, Montana, which came in first place for both accuracy and affordability. Of the many catastrophic consequences of climate change, ocean acidification may be the worst. The oceans, which cover 71 percent of the Earth’s surface, produce fifty percent of the oxygen we breathe. They are also the planet’s biggest carbon sink—absorbing 50 percent of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. Unfortunately, absorbing all that carbon is dramatically altering the ocean’s pH balance. Since the industrial revolution began, average acidity of the upper ocean has jumped 30 percent. The ocean is now more acidic than it has been for fifty million years. Unless CO2 emissions decline, ocean acidity could surge another 100 percent by the end of the century. This slow-motion disaster threatens the survival of ocean life. Acidification is already stressing shellfish, corals, and plankton whose shells or skeletons are made of calcium carbonate. If these small creatures disappear, ocean food webs will collapse. Simultaneously, the sea temperatures are rising, as the ocean stores 90 percent of the energy from the warming Earth. Over the past century, the mean ocean surface temperature has increased 0.7 degrees Celsius. By 2100, it will rise another 3 degrees. Meanwhile, several hundred “dead zones”—areas with insufficient oxygen to support marine life—have emerged throughout the world. This triple whammy —ocean acidification, warming, and deoxygenation—is placing unprecedented stress on species. Microbes, plankton, corals, mollusks, fish, and marine mammals are struggling to adapt to new ocean biochemistry, ecosystems, food webs, currents, and circulation. Unless humanity reverses course, the predicted “Sixth Extinction” will unfold not only on land, but in the sea. The first step in mitigating and hopefully reversing these trends is better scientific understanding about the health (and sickness) of the ocean. Fortunately, U.S. and international policymakers are getting the message. In June 2014, national governments, scientists, and nongovernmental organizations gathered in Washington for an “Our Ocean” Summit hosted by Secretary of State John Kerry. They endorsed the creation of a Global Oceans Acidification Observing Network. When fully developed, this would be a global network of sensors capable of monitoring pH levels along coasts and in the deep ocean, permitting scientists around the world to generate vast data about trends and variations in acidity and their impact on local species and ecosystems. Ultimately, such a network could function like an oceanic “Fitbit,” taking the pulse of this living system and providing early warning of emerging problems. The limiting factor in realizing this dream has been technology. Here is where the XPrize comes in. The XPrize Foundation, the brainchild of entrepreneur Peter Diamandis, operates on a simple premise: namely, that in a world of rapid technological change, things once considered impossible are no longer so. The only thing missing is an incentive to correct for market failure—plus some healthy competition. The Ocean Health XPrize is only the latest in a long line of contests. They include the Google Lunar XPRIZE, which promises $30 million for the first team to land a private robot on the Moon, and the Quallcom Tricorder XPRIZE, which offers $10 million for the first health diagnostic tool of the sort that Dr. McCoy carried around on Star Trek. To find out more about the entrants in the 2015 Ocean Health XPrize competition, check out this video of last night’s event. It includes comments from the prize’s benefactor, the philaphropist Wendy Schmidt, as well as a conversation on the health of the global oceans moderated by Paul Bunje of XPrize, featuring Sherri Goodman (CEO of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership), Ghislaine Maxwell (founder of the TerraMar Project), Richard Spinrad (chief scientist at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA), and yours truly. Follow me on Twitter: @StewartMPatrick

Coauthored with Alexandra Kerr, assistant director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Extreme fluctuations in the global environment are becoming more apparent and quantifiable, forcing nations to accept that climate change is no longer a theory, but a threat. Mitigating its worst effects is no longer a choice, but a lifeline. Over the past two weeks, delegates from 196 countries have sought to lay a foundation for a comprehensive agreement to alleviate climate change’s worst effects, which unless mitigated will imperil the world’s oceans. Gathering under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the negotiators have tried to hammer out the details of a monumental emissions control and reduction treaty. If all goes well, the world will adopt the treaty next year at the 2015 UNFCCC conference in Paris. The past fortnight offers a glimmer of hope that humankind, confronting impending climate-related disasters, may finally be ready to mend its ways. Perhaps, as Samuel Butler observed, we will see that, “seamen, in a storm, turn pious converts, and reform.” In particular, climate change is already beginning to harm marine ecosystems—threatening the health of the entire planet. Oceans comprise fully 70 percent of our planet—and provide some of the most vital mechanisms for mitigating climate change. Yet, the oceans are dying a slow death, thanks to massive poisoning by anthropogenic CO2 emissions, largely from land-based sources As Earth’s largest carbon sink, the oceans remove some 30-40 percent of anthropogenic (caused by human activity) carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere. But as emissions continue to rise, the oceans are being forced to absorb ever-larger quantities of CO2, generating devastating acidification. The UNFCCC enshrines as one of its objectives the promotion of sustainable management and protection of the oceans, as well as coastal and marine ecosystems (Article 4, paragraph 1(d)). Reviving the health of the world’s oceans will require a breakthrough agreement in Paris, as well as a strong “oceans” pillar in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Reversing or slowing climate change is in the national interest of every country. Over the past year, multiple reports have warned that predicted temperature increases, rising sea levels, and changing weather patterns will have dire economic and security implications. Last week, the UN Secretary-General’s report, The Road to Dignity by 2030, underscored that sustainable development depends on arresting climate change. Among other things, it calls for all future infrastructure development must ensure “planet-friendly” development moving forward. The existential, borderless nature of the climate change challenge means that no single state or even select group of states can tackle climate change alone. It will require global collaboration with coordinated domestic efforts, and it will depend on real commitments from developing, not just developed countries states. Thus, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris agreement should apply to all countries, not just developed states. It will also be grounded in bottom-up, realistic goals, attuned to each country’s varying capacities. And it will include monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to ensure tangible progress—and mid-course corrections when countries get off track. Real progress in Paris is essential to saving the world’s oceans, which have borne the brunt of climate change. This May, the scientific report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warned that without significant curbs on greenhouse gas emissions, sea levels could rise between by up to 38.2 inches and global average temperature by 8.1°F by the end of the century. In October, the Convention on Biological Diversity’s fourth Global Outlook report cautioned that rising global temperatures will lead to increased ocean acidification, elevated sea levels, changes in precipitation patterns, and substantial loss of Arctic sea ice. Without a change in course, the outlook is bleak. But somewhat remarkably, 2014 has also seen oceans governance rise in prominence on the international agenda, despite the press of international crises from Ukraine to Syria. In June, building on President Obama’s National Ocean Policy, Secretary of State John Kerry hosted the “Our Ocean” conference, convening delegates from eighty countries to discuss innovative ways to counter acidification, end marine pollution, and ensure sustainable fisheries. This followed a “World Oceans Summit”in February, hosted by the Economist magazine, which enlisted private sector leaders in improving oceans governance through sustainable business practices. These recent developments—and other multilateral initiatives—are documented in CFR’s new Global Governance Monitor: Oceans, relaunched last week. This comprehensive multimedia guide uses technology to track and analyze the major successes and failures in oceans governance. One of the underlying themes of the Monitor is that the fate of the planet rests in large part with the health of the world’s oceans. As the famed oceanographer Sylvia Earle reminds us, “No blue, no green.” With competing priorities, the recent international spotlight on oceans governance could fade quickly. So what should policymakers focus on in 2015? The most important objective remains a meaningful, binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that UNFCCC parties will sign in Paris. This agreement must include concrete commitments from the world’s major emerging economies countries, including not only China but also India, Brazil, Indonesia, and others. Beyond this ambitious goal, there is much more to be done to save the world’s oceans from their current deterioration. Drawing from the recommendations of the Oceans Global Governance Monitor and from the final report of the Global Ocean Commission (GOC), the following three steps would be a start: Improve sustainable fishing practices, both on the High Seas and in countries’ exclusive economic zones (EEZs): Nearly half of global fish stocks have been fully exploited and roughly one-third have been overexploited due to unsustainable fishing practices and widespread illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. To this end the Global Ocean Commission has three suggestions: First, eliminate harmful fishing subsidies. Second, enact domestic policies that will reduce IUU fishing by preventing illegal catches from reaching the legal market—thereby reducing incentives for this illicit [over] fishing. Third, focus on providing more support to existing regional fisheries management organizations (RMFOs). Extend Marine Protected Areas: Currently, marine protected areas only cover around 2.8 percent of the oceans globally. Increasing the number and size of reserves around the world will give the ocean and the creatures and flora a place to recover from the harmful effects of human activity. The Global Ocean Commission goes as far as to suggest that governments should agree to designate the High Seas as a “regeneration zone,” prohibiting all industrial fishing practices out with EEZs and RFMO areas.  Toughen restrictions on plastics: Our reliance on plastic has increased exponentially in the past century, with a report released Wednesday suggesting that the oceans may contain around 5.25 trillion pieces of plastic, or 269,000 tons. Domestic policy should be implemented that enforces new, stronger restrictions on plastics production and disposal. Additionally, the Global Ocean Commission suggests that countries should restrict the production of single-use plastics, much like California did earlier this year when it passed a ban on single-use plastic bags in grocery stores. These reforms, if agreed and implemented by UN member states, would help to restore threatened species, preserve marine biodiversity, and reduce the flood of pollution that now fouls once pristine seas. Important goals, all. But unless humanity finally takes the dramatic steps needed to stem the massive flow of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, both the blue and the green will fade to black.