Where the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks Are Headed

Ray Takeyh is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.    

What do we make of this weekend’s nuclear talks in Oman? Are there prospects for further diplomacy on denuclearization?

The indirect talks between the United States and Iran in Oman have achieved their foremost objective: more diplomacy. After U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in 2018, the two countries’ relations grew even colder. This weekend’s meeting was the first face-to-face meeting since the U.S. withdrew seven years ago.       

Leaders agreed the talks were “constructive” and decided to hold another round on April 19. This next round will also be held in Oman and will again be indirect, with the Omani foreign minister shuttling between the U.S. and Iranian delegations.

Did either side indicate any new areas of compromise or hurdles?

The Iranian position remains that the talks should focus on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief, with Iran repeatedly stating that its nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes. The Islamic Republic views the meetings as a means of giving confidence-building measures that its program is not for military purposes in exchange for lifting sanctions.

The U.S. position appears to have more wiggle room than Iran’s. Before his departure to Oman, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff stressed, “I think our position begins with dismantlement of your program. That is our position today. That doesn’t mean, by the way, that at the margins we’re not going to find other ways to find compromise between our two countries.” Trump has said that he only wants assurances that Iran does not produce nuclear weapons. Thus, issues such as Iran’s support for regional proxies and its missile program could be off the table.

Do U.S. threats to use military force against Iran’s nuclear program work in encouraging Iranian diplomacy?      

Iran is considered by both the United States and Israel to be in a weakened position because of the ongoing fighting in the Middle East during the past year, which has decapitated Hezbollah and Hamas—Tehran’s regional proxies. Then in October 2024, Israel conducted its largest-ever attack on Iran directly, targeting its air defenses and missile production facilities and rendering them vulnerable without air defenses around its main nuclear sites.

Iran also suffers from persistent economic decline, partly due to sanctions. Trump has sent mixed messages on his willingness to negotiate; he has promised “maximum pressure” sanctions, and in the days leading up to this past weekend’s meeting, imposed new sanctions on entities that the United States said were supporting Iran’s nuclear program.

Thus far, these factors do not seem to have significantly swayed Tehran’s negotiating position. To date, Iran has given the Trump administration the same thing that it gave Joe Biden’s team: indirect talks focused on the nuclear issue and sanctions relief.

Can the P5+1 countries get involved again in a process to safeguard a nuclear agreement?

The P5+1 (the five UN Security Council members, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, along with Germany) have been involved in nuclear negotiations in the past, but the latest discussions so far have not stated a timeline to bring them in. 

The Kremlin has stated that it stands ready to help facilitate resolutions, and China, Iran, and Russia met separately in the week leading up to the first U.S.-Iran meeting. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are closely watching the talks unfolding between Washington and Tehran, with the French foreign minister saying that they will “be vigilant” to ensure that any negotiations “comply with our security interests.” 

The talks have begun on a bilateral basis—and they are likely to stay in this format. It should be noted, however, that the negotiations leading to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal were also essentially the product of U.S.-Iran talks that were then affirmed by the P5+1 group.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.