Sinwar’s Death Does Not Mean Breakthrough in Israel-Hamas War

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What does Sinwar’s death mean for the Israel-Hamas war?

The Israelis have done a lot of damage to Hamas, killing more than half of their estimated twenty-thousand-plus fighters in arms at the start of the war last October, and the killing of Yahya Sinwar is a major blow. It would seem an opportune moment for the Israelis to declare victory and go home, ceding the Gaza Strip to the stewardship of a combination of the United Nations, Europeans, and Arab states for reconstruction and redevelopment. That is the hope, at least of many outside actors, including U.S. and UN officials and other cease-fire advocates.

However, it is important to understand that while Hamas is on the ropes, the history of the conflict suggests that Sinwar’s killing will possibly not change all that much. After all, the Israelis have killed Hamas leaders before with no appreciable effect on their overall security. Throughout the last year, Yahya Sinwar proved that he and Hamas were formidable adversaries of the more powerful Israel Defense Forces, masterfully drawing the Israeli military into a difficult urban fight that killed a large number of Israeli soldiers and was destined to damage Israel’s international standing. It is possible that after Sinwar’s death, Hamas’s violence will wane for some time, but it seems unlikely that the organization will completely collapse. Even if it did, armed cadres of the group will likely continue to fight. Over the medium to long term, a new group could emerge to carry on the resistance.

Is there any Hamas military figure that could replace him?

Sinwar was an uncompromising nationalist and Islamist who sought Israel’s destruction. He was known to clash with Hamas leadership outside of Gaza, which some analysts and commentators allege have been more willing to strike interim deals with Israel (though they never really have). He is not irreplaceable, however. The problem for Hamas is that their roster has grown thin since last year’s October 7 attack. The Israelis have killed some of the most well-known Hamas leaders since then, including political leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Saleh al-Arouri, military figure Marwan Issa, and apparently military leader Mohamed Deif, who is believed to have been killed in an Israeli air strike last July, though Hamas never confirmed his demise.

Khaled Meshaal, the one-time leader of the Hamas political office who is currently in Doha, is a possible successor as leader of the organization outside of the Gaza Strip. There is also Moussa Abu Marzouk, a founder of Hamas and once-permanent resident of the United States, who also now resides in Doha. Khalil Hayya was a deputy to Sinwar before he left the Gaza Strip for cease-fire talks in Qatar this summer. Lebanon-based Osama Hamdan who once served in the Hamas office in Tehran and as the head of the organization’s International Relations Department is another contender.  Some media in the United States and Israel are also reporting that Sinwar's brother, Mohamed, is a candidate to take over leadership of Hamas. It is unclear if any of these figures, with the exception of Meshaal, have the kind of support within Hamas necessary to lead the group.

What does this mean for the issue of hostages, prisoner swaps, and any moves toward a cease-fire?

U.S. President Joe Biden’s statement about Sinwar’s killing suggests that there is now an opportunity to end the war, which would presumably mean the return of hostages, estimated at more than one hundred. Needless to say, Hamas’s ability to demand the release of large numbers of Palestinian prisoners has diminished dramatically. Indeed, Israelis have floated the idea of granting amnesty to anyone in Gaza who releases a hostage. They clearly believe that Hamas is so broken without Sinwar and others, it cannot negotiate, and that its grip on the Gazan population is so weak that the Israelis can go straight to the Palestinian population.

It is hard to imagine a formal cease-fire now. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and especially his rightwing partners in his governing coalition have maintained that Hamas needs to be defeated and that military pressure—as opposed to a negotiated deal, which many Israelis support—is the best way to bring hostages home. Given this, a more realistic expectation is that members of the government will continue to advocate that Israel press its military advantage in Gaza. That is setting up Israel for a re-occupation of Gaza, which some of the prime minister’s partners no doubt support.

Left out, of course, are the roughly two million Palestinians of Gaza who have suffered enormously. A cease-fire would benefit them the most, but Israeli political dynamics are such that the Israelis could choose to continue the fight despite holding such a dominant position.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.