Israel and Hamas Reach Cease-Fire, but Will the War End?

Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and Director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What are the prospects for this hostage deal effectively ending the Israel-Hamas war?

A cease-fire and hostage deal does not necessarily end the war. It is important to keep in mind that when Hamas launched its attacks on southern Israel on October 7, 2023, it was also launching a total war that included a broad international effort to de-legitimize the state of Israel. Even if a cease-fire were to end the hostilities in Gaza, as the draft agreement reportedly envisions, Hamas, affiliated groups, and other international actors like the Iranian regime would continue the war by other means.

In addition, the three-phased cease-fire agreement will likely be vulnerable to vigorous opposition on both sides. The first phase alone is six weeks, and only on the sixteenth day of that stage will negotiations begin over the terms of the second phase. This extended time frame provides opportunities for the agreement’s Israeli and Palestinian opponents to undermine it at critical moments.

This was the pattern during the 1990s, which featured the Oslo Accords peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Of course, the Oslo process was drawn out over the better part of a decade, but it is not hard to imagine similar dynamics emerging over this cease-fire. During the Oslo process, whenever there was perceived progress toward peace, opponents of compromise sowed discord through politics and violence, damaging the legitimacy of the talks to the point that they collapsed. In the current moment, the main spoilers could be Israeli settlers who want nothing less than the destruction of Hamas and the resettlement of Gaza, and Palestinian extremists who believe they are winning.

Finally, it is still possible that either side could renege on the deal. Indeed, this is one of the reasons Hamas has held onto the remaining 98 hostages. They are human bargaining chips. Once they are all returned to their families, Hamas has little reason to believe that Israel will not return to the battlefield to destroy them. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said as much for months. At the same time, Hamas has an incentive to keep fighting given how much damage the war in Gaza has done to Israel’s international image.

Will Israel keep a security presence in Gaza?

The Israeli government has been clear since late 2023 that it will retain overall security over the Gaza Strip in the future. Israel wants the freedom of action they enjoy in the West Bank to maintain pressure on Hamas in Gaza and prevent the group from having any chance of mounting an attack like the one on October 7, the most deadly in Israeli history.

Hamas has demanded during previous rounds of negotiations that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) leave the Gaza Strip entirely as part of any cease-fire. The group softened that demand after the Israelis killed Yahya Sinwar—Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip—in October 2024. The deal indicates that Israel would withdraw entirely from the Gaza Strip.

It would be unexpected if the Israeli government agrees to withdraw from this area. Israeli officials have argued over the last fifteen months of war that the problem in Gaza between 2005 and 2023 was the absence of Israel’s security services and their inability to conduct regular counterterror operations as the IDF and Shin Bet, the Israeli domestic security agency, do in the West Bank. 

What is left of Hamas forces and leadership in Gaza?

Hamas has proven to be resilient despite Israel’s killing of large numbers of its fighters and leaders (estimated to be seventeen thousand), in addition to many others wounded or captured. After fifteen months of fighting, it can still launch rockets into Israel, and there are daily reports that Israeli soldiers are killed in Gaza, a toll that now stands at more than eight hundred. The group is not as well organized or trained as it was at the beginning of the war, but Hamas is still able to recruit fighters at a rate that outstrips Israel’s ability to kill them. The risk for Israel of getting mired in a guerilla conflict with no clear exit is evident.

Contrary to expectations that Hamas’s grip on Gaza would diminish following Sinwar’s death, the group remains in charge in Gaza. One tangible sign of this is Hamas’s ability to replenish its ranks by promising aid and medical care for the families of new recruits. Because the Israeli government has refused to invest in a so-called “Day After” plan, beyond ruling out a role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, the United States and its partners in the region have been unable or unwilling to empower alternatives to Hamas.  

What does the deal mean for humanitarian relief for Palestinians in Gaza?

The cease-fire and hostage agreement will save lives and provide an opportunity for more humanitarian assistance to reach Gazans in need. The underlying logic of the cease-fire is to make it permanent. The negotiators hope that after the three phases are complete, relief will become routine and the reconstruction of Gaza can begin. In the first phase, displaced Palestinians are to be allowed to return to their homes while some six hundred trucks of humanitarian aid would enter Gaza each day. The ramp up of relief aid, of course, presupposes that supporters of the cease-fire can outmaneuver its opponents.

Is the U.S. role in the conflict likely to change with the incoming Trump administration?

It is hard to know. President-elect Donald Trump warned that there would be consequences if the hostages were not released by the time he returned to the Oval Office on January 20. It was not clear what he meant. The agreement after so many months of failure reflects a number of factors: Israel’s diminishing returns in Gaza, especially as Hamas has demonstrated an ability to recruit new fighters; Hamas being under significant military pressure and wanting to escape the war it began with as much of its organization intact; and the new U.S. administration, which has influence and goodwill with Israel and a tougher rhetorical (so far) approach to Hamas and Iran.

The United States is likely to remain committed to helping ensure Israeli security through weapons sales and intelligence sharing. It remains unclear whether U.S.-Israel cooperation will extend to a possible strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. During his first term, Trump only opted once to use military force against Iran when he ordered the assassination of Quds Forces commander Qassem Soleimani. His maximum pressure campaign seemed intended to compel the Iranian leadership into a negotiation for a revised or broader nuclear agreement. The region has changed much since Trump’s first term. The Iranians are weaker, but, as a result, they are plausibly more motivated to weaponize their nuclear program. This will encourage either a U.S.-Israeli effort to preclude this outcome or new negotiations. Either option is possible.

This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.