Global Board of Advisors Lunch With Members: What Does the World Think of the United States in 2024?

At the midpoint of CFR’s Global Board of Advisors’ annual two-day summit, we invite you to a seated lunch with members of CFR’s Global Board. The lunch will be followed by a discussion featuring a panel of Global Board members from various regions. The panel will explore external perceptions of current affairs in the United States, with a particular focus on the upcoming 2024 presidential election.

MURRAY: Hello and welcome to our panel session on what the world thinks of the U.S. in 2024, in our election year. That’s quite a big, big topic. The Biden administration has been described as being everywhere, doing everything, all at once, dealing with all the major challenges—the wars, the tensions with China, climate, rapid technology advances. But we have an excellent panel today, who are all members of the CFR Global Advisory Board, under the leadership of David Rubenstein and Michael Froman, our president. They are representing different areas of the world, major regions—the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa. So our discussion is really going to provide us an excellent 360 perspective on how the world is viewing the U.S., which is extremely important for the next administration in terms of how the U.S. should lead, how the U.S. should engage. We really need to listen to how the U.S. is being perceived around the world.  

So let me introduce our distinguished panel. 

We have on our far end here Henadi Al-Saleh, who is the chairperson of Agility, a global leader in supply chains, infrastructure, innovation, has 54,000 employees in six continents. Henadi is also CEO of Agility Global, which is a business owner and operator, long-term investor, which has a footprint in seven continents. 

We have the Honorable Julie Bishop, who was the former foreign minister of Australia from 2013 to 2018, and is currently the chancellor of the Australian National University. And I believe you were the first woman in both those positions. 

And we have André Esteves, who is the chairman, senior partner, and controlling shareholder of BTG Pactual, which is a global financial firm and the largest investment bank in Latin America. 

And we have Gbenga Oyebode, who is the cofounder of Aluko & Oyebode, which is one of the largest integrated law firms in Nigeria. Gbenga is also part of the U.S.-Nigerian and International Bar Association. So he’s an international lawyer, very distinguished. 

So let’s get started. We have a lot to talk about and a lot to cover. And I’d first like to turn to our business leaders to talk to us about how they’re seeing the major economic trends, the major trends that are happening in 2024, and how you’re perceiving the impact of the U.S. election. Are you preparing for a global economy where the U.S., under the different—whomever wins of the two candidates goes in a different direction? Or some analysts are saying the U.S. has really set its course—tariffs, more protectionist, more industrial policy—and it’s really a matter of degrees. And just give us your views on where you see the global economy and how you’re preparing for the election results. 

And why don’t we start with Henadi? 

AL-SALEH: That’d be great. So, from our perspective, you know, we take a step back and we look at the broader trends that have been taking place over the past eight years. And largely, we don’t see a major difference taking place. We see the U.S. taking a step back from globalization, increasing tariffs, focus on industrialization. So from our perspective as a supply chain logistics company providing solutions for our customers and ensuring that they are served, we are focused on ensuring that they are resilient and they are faced—are able to face all of these issues seamlessly. We need to make sure that their supply chain is visible. It’s resilient.  

So from our perspective, as a supply chain company, what we do is we invest in technology. We double down on technology irrespective of who comes into presidency, because at the end of the day whether ports are closing, whether it’s the crisis in the Red Sea, or any other issue, we need to make sure at the end of the day the consumers get their items. So that investment in technology requires focusing on IOP, giving visibility, ensuring at the end of the day the end consumer doesn’t get hurt. 

MURRAY: André, what do you seeing in the—how are you planning? 

ESTEVES: Well, being based in Brazil, and when I look U.S. and the big trends—more protectionism, higher deficit, more regulation, more taxes, it sounds familiar for me in Brazil. (Laughter.) And what worries me in reality here is the discussion about the deficit—U.S. deficit—or, better saying, the lack of discussion about deficit in the electoral campaign. U.S. is with highest nominal deficit for times—time of peace. And I don’t see that in the U.S. political spectrum a serious discussion, or even a superficial discussion about that. One side continues to think about spending as there is no tomorrow. The other is cutting taxes, there is no tomorrow. But there is a tomorrow. And a tomorrow that you need to manage. A huge debt and a huge deficit. And even if you are the owner of the printer, there is a limit to print.  

When we discuss the role of dollar globally, we always think about geopolitical measures, movements, deals, agreements. But it’s important the strength of the dollar and the stability of the dollar. The dollar arrived there not only—not mostly because of geopolitical reasons, but because of economic reasons. And when you look today what is happening, you have less buyers of U.S. Treasurys, right? The last ten years, the key buyers of U.S. Treasurys was China. It’s not a big fan of Treasurys at this stage, right? The Fed, that is not leveraging. It’s deleveraging—on the opposite direction. And the U.S. banks that already traumatized with the hikes of interest rates. So none of them will be there. And I’m afraid of the global cost of capital, or cost of opportunity, will be higher than what we think, given the size of U.S. deficit and the lack of discussion about that.  

MURRAY: So Hanadi sees us—sees the global—the election really not impacting the direction, in terms of where technology is going and the importance of that. André, you’re concerned about the lack of attention to the major issue of the national debt in the election, and what impact that will have. Gbenga, how are you viewing this election and the outcome, in terms of where you see the U.S. role in the global economy, and your business interests? 

OYEBODE: Honestly, I’d like to see a situation where the U.S. election was important for Africa. But I tend to see situations where whatever happens at U.S. elections are mostly pretty domestic in terms of the impact. You know, I would say to you, for instance, that the last U.S. president that visited Nigeria was George W. So we haven’t had a U.S. president visit Nigeria in sixteen years. So that sends a signal. That’s a message, whether it was intended or not. And so those are the sort of concerns that I would have with how do you engage with the continent that’s going to be two and a half billion people very soon? How do you engage with a country like Nigeria, that’s going to be 400 million people in twenty years, if today you’re not engaging?  

You know, I could look also back sixteen years and say, actually, if you said to me, who was the U.S. president that most affected the continent? Again, it was George W, with PEPFAR. And since then, there hasn’t really been very much that I could say to you that was—that got our attention. Power Africa really didn’t get off the starting blocks. And, of course, we remember Bill Clinton with AGOA. So, you know, the elections are important. I’m a global citizen, so I know what the consequences could be. But when I look at my continent, my country, I tend not to see very much that will change either way. 

MURRAY: So, Julie, Australia is a major U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific. It’s a(n) important democratic partner. How are Australians looking at this election? Are they concerned in terms of one candidate or the other? 

BISHOP: I think it’s a truism in Australian politics that it doesn’t really matter who the American people elect for the White House in Washington or whom the Australian people elect for the lodge in Canberra, because the alliance between Australia and the United States is so strong and so deep and so longstanding—our military alliance dating back to 1917 and the formal alliance from 1951. That relationship will transcend the personalities in political office. It will transcend any difference in U.S. domestic policies. And when it comes to foreign policy, the differences are somewhat nuanced.  

Probably one that will concern us is how the different candidates will manage the power competition with China, because that impacts directly on Australia. The United States is our—by far the largest foreign direct investor, by a—you know, a mile, and also our major strategic security intelligence defense partner. China is by far our largest two-way trading partner. So how the different administrations will manage the China relationship is very important to us. 

Different personalities in Washington and Canberra have made changes at the edges. So when there are—when there’s a U.S. president and an Australian prime minister who are kind of aligned, either in their politics or in their personalities, you do see some benefits. I’m thinking of George W. Bush and John Howard. They are, like, joined at the hip, and Australia was one of the most willing of the coalition of the willing when it came to Afghanistan and Iraq. And then we ended up with the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 1995. And I’d love to see another U.S.—oh, not 1995—2005. I’d love to see another U.S. free trade agreement of that stature.  

But then we were in for a shock when President Trump slapped tariffs on Australian steel. And there’s a rather infamous phone call between President Trump and Prime Minister Turnbull. Having said all of that, I think what Australians are concerned about is what the U.S. will look like. Will it be more protectionist? More make America great again? More America first, America only? Or will it be what our part of the world wants, that is the U.S. as the indispensable power that has global reach, global influence, and is a beacon for freedom and democracy?  

And we’re also concerned about what must be teetering on unsustainable debt and deficit. What’s the debt? Something like $35 trillion? That starts to concern countries like ours, that are so intertwined with the U.S. economy and the global economy, because neither candidate seems to have a plan or even talks about the debt and the deficit and what one’s going to do about it. And I think that is a matter of concern.  

And the other point about Nigeria, if I can speak on behalf of the islands of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, you know, 90 percent of the relationship is turning up. And when the U.S. doesn’t turn up, it plays out really badly because there is a competitor or rival who will turn up. And if you have an option, you end up taking an option that might not have been your preferred. 

MURRAY: So I think what’s clear is that in this election year there’s very little attention being paid to some of the key issues that are really affecting the world. And I like to take that a little bit deeper and actually ask all the panelists to identify the key—three key trends you see happening globally, either geopolitical or geoeconomic, that are the major trends. What do you see as the major trends? And how would you define the U.S. role and where it should be going with regard to those three major trends? You know, whether it’s the wars, the climate, I’ll leave that to you to determine. But what do you see as the three major trends, and what should be the U.S. role? 

AL-SALEH: Well, for our region, I’ll pick up where actually you left off. And that’s partnering with other partners other than the U.S. in order to achieve whatever mandate you have. So when I think about the region, there are two drivers to keep an eye on. One is the changing energy landscape and the other is economic mandates that the countries have to undertake in order to achieve job creation and also to increase the private sector contribution to GDP.  

So we talk about the changing energy landscape. Today, China buys 75 percent of the oil and gas from the region. The other fact is, since 2015 the U.S. and the six largest European economies used to consume close to 30 percent of exports from the region. But now, actually last year, it’s only around 8 percent. So you see a changing trend as to who the partner is. When it comes to the economic diversification mandate to the region, they all have 2030 vision plans that requires the private sector to contribute a certain percentage to GDP. But the fundamental aspect of it is to create jobs for local content. If you look at Saudi Arabia, has to create close to four and a half million jobs, UAE, a million and a half jobs. And look at the different countries, they all have, you know, certain targets.  

And the question is, you know, who is going to support them and partner them in order to stimulate the economy and create these jobs? And who is filling that gap? So today China has allocated close to half a trillion dollars already in various projects, when it comes to factories, developing bridges, manufacturing. And it has three times that amount in the pipeline. Secondly, when you look at foreign direct investments, you know China and Asian countries, back in around five, six years ago, had invested $4 billion. Today, it’s close to $27 billion, as compared to the U.S. when it was $4 billion and now it’s only—almost double to $7 billion. So the major trend is diversifications away from the U.S. and looking at alternative partners, mainly China, and the implications that has going forward. 

MURRAY: That’s really interesting. André. 

ESTEVES: Well, I do see clearly a world led by two big powers, U.S. and China. But I also see a multipolar world, where you have midsized powers that somehow independent and could be a source of stabilization. You have countries like India, or Turkey, or Brazil, or Saudi that can play a role and be neutral. It means that you are matched with—attached to the common sense. Sometimes the best position is X. Sometimes the best position is Y. And I think I don’t think this is a negative thing. 

Going to a more Latin American approach, I think what caught my attention is the distance of U.S. to the region. Even with all the cultural feed, the same time zone, if you look at this decade China became the key trading partner to basically all the Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico. Also became the key FDI provider for the region. There’s nothing wrong with that, honestly, but the distance of U.S. caught my attention, because if you go twenty years behind it was Europe, this partner. It was not even U.S. in the ’90s or 2000. So I think U.S. is caught by many issues globally from distant zones, and maybe it’s not paying attention on the natural extension with the same continent, the same time zone, a lot of cultural feed. And we talk about immigration without talking about that.  

Also, to conclude on the climate challenge, I also do see U.S., even with recent efforts—Secretary Kerry made important advances on that. But I also do see U.S. could do much more in terms of leading the transformation, and I don’t see that. In the region where we are the key food provider or provider of food security to the world, and we have the giant Amazon forest to take care, I think the partnerships could be much more intense, much more effective. So that would be my assessment. 

MURRAY: Gbenga, what do you see as the major trends happening and what the U.S. role should be? It’s particularly important for the economy— 

OYEBODE: Look, I think very similar—the Global South is dealing today with the challenges that revolve around investment. But what you tend to see is that China is the biggest investor. As you travel across Africa, almost every country you go has a major infrastructure project that’s been funded by the Chinese. And there’s continued support. If you land in Rwanda, beautiful foreign ministry building, they tell you it’s a gift of the Chinese government. Same thing in Ethiopia. But my sense is that the Chinese filled a vacuum, a vacuum that’s there because the rest of the world retreated.  

And so if I—if I say, look, who’s the biggest—where does Nigeria’s crude oil go to the most? It goes to India. Who’s our biggest—all our imports come from China. Twenty years ago it was a U.S. and Europe. That just shows you how things have changed. And so really, in terms of the issues that affect us, I think we—across the continent, climate obviously is a big problem, one that all of us need to focus on. You know, there has been too much of a U.S. focus on dealing with building military bases. I’m not saying terrorism is not a big issue, but I think that support—investment changes the paradigm, actually, on a continent, that’s not significantly in need of aid, but more investment. I think that’s the way to go. 

And I think sometimes we underestimate the influence of the American political system, and the sort of wrong message—wrong messages it sends to nascent democracies. Messages that sometimes will translate to, you know, it doesn’t matter how you get there, but winning is the ultimate objective. And for us in Nigeria, for instance, where we have a U.S.-style constitution, it’s important that we learn and take signal of what’s happening through the election cycle in the U.S. So I think it’s important that we focus U.S. attention, and not necessarily because we think there should be a competition between China and the U.S. or the rest of the world. But I think it’s important that, when you look at—the only real big U.S. investors left in a country like Nigeria are oil and gas majors, who essentially prospect and ship. You know, there’s no real development. Nothing that’s left on the continent for the future. And I think some—those are some of the concerns that we have.  

MURRAY: So, Julie, the messaging here is that the U.S. is not paying attention. Starting with President Obama, we—as a nation, we’re shifting to the Asia-Pacific. Have you seen that attention? What are the trends that you’re seeing? 

BISHOP: Well, I was going to join with my fellow panelists in talking about the great-power competition or rivalry between the United States and China. And it is playing out quite deliberately in our region. And it’s how countries such as ours, where we have such a strong alliance with the United States and strong economic financial relationship, and yet an overwhelmingly powerful trading relationship with China. And just one word of warning, when Australia and China at a political level disagreed over Australia’s view of the world, if I can put it that way, the economic coercion, the punishment meted out by China to Australia was astounding. And the rest of the world must have watched with some concern.  

In other words, it wasn’t about trade. It wasn’t about the quality of goods. It was nothing like that. It was about political positions that Australia had taken that offended China. And their response was swift, and profound, and deep. And many sectors of the economy really felt the pain. But what it did was make these sectors look for markets elsewhere. They had put all their eggs in one basket, because it’s easy to sell to China. They buy in huge quantities and they pay very good prices. But there are some sectors of the economy, particularly in agriculture and others, education, where we had to look for other markets. And it was a very good lesson. The new government has calmed the waters, and we’re back to our old ways selling everything to China. Some people never learn. (Laughter.)  

And the second—the second trend, I think, is obviously technology and the advancements in technology. And I’m no expert, but people say that the greatest disruptions are yet to come. And I think, just looking at the way AI and technology has transformed the way wars are waged, in terms of the use of drones and how AI is transforming the way we live, and work, and study. Obviously, the U.S. has a powerful role to play in being at the cutting edge of the positive uses of technology.  

And then the third, I would say, is in the climate change space. But I want to put it this way. In the short term, it’s the policy responses to climate change that are having a bigger impact than the extreme weather events themselves. And we’re seeing it throughout our region in terms of cost of living, cost of energy. And so the policy responses, the tariffs on electric vehicles out of China, all these policy responses are having a huge impact on cost of living. And in the short term, I think that’s going to have a pretty significant impact on the global economy. 

MURRAY: Gbenga, I’d like to pick up the technology issue with you in terms of Nigeria. This is an area where obviously the U.S. leads. And this is an area where many analysts are saying that if Africa as a continent doesn’t catch the wave of AI, Gen AI, and the rapid technology advances, it may never catch up. What do you think the U.S. role, the private sector, should be in terms of helping Nigeria deal with this challenge? 

OYEBODE: Well, I’m not—I’m not sure that the role is about helping. I think the role is about collaboration. I think it’s about engagement. It’s about sharing ideas. It’s about understanding that the future is there for all of us. Look, the reality of our technology in today’s world, thirty years ago, you know, technology was something that the Western world thought was its sole preserve. In today’s world. AI is something that we all use today already, on our cell phones. So that fallacy that says that, you know, we will have to beg for it or pay for it in a way that is unreasonable, I sense that it’s no longer the truth.  

The other side of it also is that, you know, we’re back in a bipolar world. You know, as much as it is that it is convenient, I don’t see any major U.S. cellphone operator on the African continent. I don’t see any major U.S. equipment supplier in the telecoms industry on the continent. They’re mostly Chinese. I mean, the reality is that the world has changed. And so I stress that what we do need to be talking about is how do we collaborate on developing technology, particularly on a continent where the average age is under twenty, where significantly youth bulge, where as much as we—the emigration from the continent to—particularly to Canada, to Europe, to Australia is increasing. So I would stress that, particularly around AI, it’s time for us to sit around the table and have a conversation on technology and developments that could make the future. 

MURRAY: André, I’d like to come back to you. Brazil is a founding partner in the BRICS. And you’re very positive about multipolarity. But in 2019, U.N. Secretary-General Guterres actually warned about a divide, that there was a fracture—there would be a fracture with the two major economies leading different blocs. And changing the international economic order, the political order, has been an agenda item for the BRICS for years. How are you—are you seeing that warning as actually coming to fruition? Or do you have a little bit more positive spin in terms of two different economies, two different major currencies, two different trading rules? 

ESTEVES: And there are different cultures also, right? Different societies. We should remember the origin of the BRICS. It was a brand created by an economist in an investment bank in Wall Street. (Laughter.) It was not under a Chinese Politburo or discussion. And it was here in New York. And a brand about economic development. At that time, a common denominator about the growth in the next decades, which was roughly right in a certain way. And I don’t see BRICS as a Chinese thing. And that is the nature of India, Brazil, and if you go to the extent of the BRICS of South Africa, Turkey, or Saudi, is to be kind of independent. Of course, in Latin America you have a clear cultural alignment with the U.S., friendship. It’s a very seamless society. And at this stage, we are doing more business with China.  

But as it was said here before, they will change, right? Brazil in 2024 will export more to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea than to Spain, France, and Italy, which was unthinkable twenty years ago. But that’s a reality. And it’s not the reality to link it to U.S. or China. This was just the normal development. And if the BRICS somehow became—not the governance body, but it’s much more of a commercial discussion than geopolitical discussion. I don’t see Brazil and India using BRICS on a geopolitical—from a geopolitical perspective. And, honestly, neither China, I would say. But a more plural economic world, especially regarding trading and investment. I don’t see these as negative. But I don’t see BRICS as the new United Nations, right? (Laughter.) It’s just a collection of similar countries that, again, I conclude, saying it was created here in Wall Street, New York.  

MURRAY: I have one more question for Henadi on the youth bulge, but I just want to warn everyone that we’ll be turning to the audience, both physical and virtual, for your questions. So, Henadi, if you could address the youth population. You are—the Middle East is a very young demographic. What are their perceptions of the U.S.? And how do you see that going forward and in terms of impacting relations with the U.S.?  

AL-SALEH: So just a little bit about the demographics of the Middle East, and specifically the GCC. So if you look at Saudi Arabia, close to 75 percent of the population is below the age of forty. In the UAE, around 50 percent of the population is between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five. You look at Kuwait, around 60 percent of the population is below the age of thirty. So the demographic—the youth is quite predominant. Hence, the requirement to create jobs and the economic development that’s required to support that.  

When I think about their impression—so I’ll talk about two buckets of their impressions. So over the past few years, what you see is in the past, the youth used to be educated in the U.S.—top talent educated in the U.S. Since 2015, you see close to—almost a 70 percent decline in enrollment in universities in the U.S. And that’s on the back of, you know, longer visa processing, higher expenses, and also sort of security issues or concerns that they’ve brought up. At the same time, you look at TikTok and the emergence of TikTok as a social platform. It has some of the highest penetration rates in the region. You have retail platforms like Shein or Temu, who are widely popular. Look at Shein, 20 percent—almost 20 percent of their global sales comes from the Gulf. So you see one bucket right there, sort of an emerging—different emerging perspective when it comes to the youth. 

When it comes to actual opinions, I will rely on two sort of surveys that were taken. Back in 2022, the Washington Institute conducted a survey. And they asked a few Arab countries what did they think of U.S. as a partner—whether they think of the U.S. as a partner. And overwhelmingly, the opinion was, we cannot rely on the U.S. as a partner, and therefore we need to look at alternatives. And alternatives, citing whether it’s China or Russia’s as alternative. And more recently, this year in January, there was another poll that was conducted from around sixteen Arab countries, including the GCC, about U.S.’s role in the current war in the Middle East. And close to 87 percent of the population cited that the U.S.’s role was negative. So with emerging alternatives and the current situation, I say there is a shift when it comes to the opinion of the U.S. in the region. 

MURRAY: That’s really fascinating, given the role that U.S. culture has played since World War II as a bridging element globally.  

AL-SALEH: Absolutely. 

MURRAY: So I’d like to open this up. Just a reminder both to our physical and virtual audience, this is on the record. There is media in the room. And please identify yourself by name and affiliation. And so I’ll open it to the room first. Let’s go to the back there. 

Q: Jeff Laurenti, with New Jersey’s Capital City Redevelopment Corporation. 

This has been a fascinating discussion at a very high-altitude level—economic policy in the future, and all that. And only in Ms. Al-Saleh’s last intervention was there even a hint of the kind of political issues that seem to excite or animate public opinion. So in thinking of what the American public has seen as important politically in international affairs, we have Israel and the immediate Arab environs, a major war. War between Russia and Ukraine. And then many levels down, other more narrowly focused concerns.  

What are the concerns at the political level that publics in your respective regions see as at stake in which direction the American public goes on November 5? And how much does public opinion vary depending on who is the American president, what that president’s—his or her image is in terms of willingness to support cooperation with the U.S.? One remembers the Europeans became very distant during the second Bush administration, and it was much more difficult for the U.S. to harness them. What do you see in terms of willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on the political issues that arise regularly? 

MURRAY: I’m going to let you volunteer. (Laughter.) So, André, go ahead. 

ESTEVES: I think what worries people, I would say, not only in Latin America, my region, but with Europe or Australia—and my colleagues here will say—I think is an isolated—self-isolated U.S. Since the power and the strength of the U.S. economy, continental countries generally have low trade-to-GDP ratios. It’s normal. It happens to U.S., Russia, Brazil, India. But an isolated U.S., I think, is the big fear coming from the election. A U.S. focus on protectionism. It’s isolated from the rest of the world, from a trade point of view, from a cultural point of view, from an investment point of view. That’s, I think, what is, I would say, is the scary development from the political landscape that we could see. 

BISHOP: I think I referred to this in my first answer, but Australia is one of the strongest allies of the United States, no question. And actually, that reminds me. When China pushes back against Australia for AUKUS, the alliance with the U.S. and U.K., and the Quad, the strategic relationship with India, Japan, the U.S., and Australia—when China pushes back, I’m going to say it’s just like BRICS. Just a benign group of people, probably a name dreamt up by a Wall Street banker. (Laughter.) That’s all. So that’s a good line. (Laughter.) 

But Australia is, likewise—and the region is, likewise, concerned about any withdrawal of the U.S. from its role as a global influence. Nations in our region want to see more of the U.S., not less. They want to see more U.S. private sector investment, not more debt trap diplomacy. They want to see more of the United States in terms of its investments, its presence, its values. That’s what they’re looking for. They don’t want to live in a world where only China calls the shots. And the president that is able to focus on the U.S.’ global role will be very welcomed in Australia. 

MURRAY: Gbenga. 

OYEBODE: Look, I think—I mean, let me use Sudan as an example, and the war in Sudan. The very fact that everybody here is focused only on Ukraine and Gaza sends a signal. And the signal is more people have died in Sudan than have died in both conflicts. And I think if we could focus attention on some of those things—the world shouldn’t be about, you know, don’t do this with the Chinese, we’ll do it for you. I mean, which is essentially the sort of decision making that’s been made today. And I think that the—you know, again, Sudan is just such a great example of how nobody talks about that conflict.  

And if you look through the whole of central Africa, from the Horn all the way, you know, to Guinea, to Gambia, particularly in the Sahel, what you will see is—you know, where has ISIS resurged—there’s been an ISIS resurgence? It’s in the Sahel. And so there’s been significant, you know, conflicts that I think that if we could focus attention on. You know, and it’s not a one-way street, by the way. I mean, even the governments in those areas need to understand it’s not—it’s not Russia against the U.S. and France. It’s about resolving conflicts on the ground and reducing the pain. But critically, I think climate pays, you know, is—you know, we tend not to talk of how, you know, the climate issue is pushing populations downward in the Sahara. And that in itself is a cause of a lot of the conflicts that we see.  

MURRAY: Yes, Bob. 

Q: Thanks. Bob Hormats. 

I’d like to follow this conversation up. I think the word you used about isolationism is correct. And I would just simply make one point that’s geopolitical and one that’s domestic. And that is, we’re having more and more difficulties playing the global trade leadership role that we played for several decades, really since World War II, and in maintaining alliances. And one of the reasons is that the American people, or large swaths of American people, are, in fact, isolationist. We tend to think that the period after World War II was the norm, where we were a global leader and Americans supported our global leadership. If you look at the environment today, not just the far-right, you know, the MAGAs who were sort of crazily negative about trade and about alliances, but you get some of that on the left too.  

So my question really would be, from country—people who know our country, and know this issue, and are concerned about this isolationism and the impact, what kinds of advice would you have from your own experience with us, and with the world, in developing as we move forward a global system where you can convince the American people that we should, and it’s in our interest, to take a leadership role in global trade and in global alliances, which we’ve done quite successfully and with enormous support, starting in the late 1940s? And now that seems to be dissipating. And what do we argue at home to make people understand the historical significance of this past role, and the future benefits of not pulling back from it, and allowing the world just to go into a free-for-all with no American leadership, or minimal American leadership? 

ESTEVES: I have a clear answer for that. I think my advice, which is not necessarily easy to follow, should be: Keep your values, right? The dollar became the global reserve currency not because U.S. forced that, but about—because of the success of U.S. And it happened naturally. And part of the success is a functional democracy, a hundred years of political consensus. You have the political cycles a little bit more to the left a little bit to the right, but if you look a hundred years of U.S. politics, didn’t change very much, right? Bob Rubin, CEO of Goldman, Sachs, was secretary of treasury of Bill Clinton, a Democrat. And it was a great partnership, and good for U.S., and, as a consequence, good for the world.  

So I would keep the openness, the entrepreneurial spirit, the political consensus, and the functional democracy. Not easy, maybe, my advice. But it’s clear. Just keep your values. (Laughter.) 

BISHOP: Just following up on that, I think it’s going to take very powerful political advocacy and narratives. The story of how the U.S. built the international legal system, the rule of law post-World War II, is the most amazing story of resilience, and courage, and foresight. And the U.S. was the instigator, the defender, the guarantor, of the international rules-based system, that collection of institutions, and networks, and alliances, and protocols embodied by all the Bretton Woods and the United Nations and everything. That story is brilliant. And that is when the United States showed extraordinary leadership. The Marshall Plan, I could go on. That’s a story that every American should be proud to own.  

There’s also a story about open, free market economies, and about strong, free liberal democracies and democratic institutions, embodied in the United States. And what’s frustrating for the rest of the world, if I might speak on behalf of the rest of the world as Australians often do—(laughter)—if I may, what is—what is so frustrating is that we see America turning inwards. We see both sides in the Clinton-Trump election, way back then, turning away from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a brilliant opportunity for the United States to build stronger trade and strategic relationships. That when there’s a vacuum, it’s filled. And the United States is leaving a vacuum. And nature abhors a vacuum and will fill it. So I think it’s going to take very courageous political advocacy, leadership, because you have a fabulous narrative to share with the American people.  

MURRAY: Henadi. 

Al-SALEH: I mean, if COVID taught us anything, it’s that this entire world is dependent on each other. We’re all interconnected in some way, one way or another. What you say resonates very strongly. I mean, the U.S. took leadership when it comes to global trade, global economy in the past you know, several decades. It reduced infant mortality, brought hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. I mean, that is the experience of the world when it looks at the U.S. leading, taking, as you know, a leadership role within the global economy. The rule of law, the criticality and importance of it. And now you see the U.S. taking more of an inward, world system slightly fractured. It has a huge impact on all these statistics and the way the world perceives, not just where they stand today but what does it mean for them going forward? 

MURRAY: I think we have a question online.  

OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Fred Hochberg. 

Q: Thank you for this excellent conversation. 

I’m going to be—I’m going to cheat and give two questions, because there are so many things—(inaudible). One—and they’re related. A lot of this seems to focus on the polarization in our country in terms of issues around the debt, issues around China, issues around U.S.’s—our role in the world. That’s a challenge for our country. We’ve been struggling for a long, long time. So can you speak to that? And related, or somewhat related, we often see the alliance now of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea as a real threat to the world. I haven’t really heard a lot about that so far. So maybe you could—someone could comment on that as well. Thank you. 

BISHOP: When I was foreign minister of Australia, I was continually lectured on a regular basis—(laughter)—by my counterparts from China, Russia, Iran, about how the United States was unreliable. Whenever you want them, they won’t turn up, was the message. About the double standards of the United States. That they will support some despots when it’s in their interest but will attack others when it’s not. About the U.S.’s double standards over the South China Sea, being the, the global enforcer of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea by transiting, you know, the only—the only Navy in the world that can transit all international waters yet refusing to ratify that very convention. When the U.S. pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, the Iranian foreign minister gleefully went around UNGA leaders’ week telling us that this is typical of the U.S., they’re on the Security Council, that deal was endorsed by the Security Council, the U.S. walks away from it.  

So sometimes the U.S. plays into the hands of its rivals and its competitors. (Laughs.) But my rebuttal always was that that’s not the America I know. That’s not the United States ally that we have. They’re dependable, they’re reliable, and they’re no more hypocritical or embracing of double standards than anyone else, let’s face it. But overall, a country that embraces freedom and democracy and openness and a market economy is preferable to a closed authoritarian autocracy, or whatever other model you come up with. The trouble is, there’s now an alternate narrative to the U.S. liberal democracy narrative. And that is that it’s OK to be a repressive, authoritarian political model, as long as you are trading openly and investing in other countries under whatever terms, and turning a blind eye to corruption, and turning a blind eye to the debt-for-equity swaps, and the like. As long as you can get the money, it doesn’t matter about the values attached to it.  

And that’s where I really think the U.S. and allies are letting the side down, because there are a lot of countries in the Global South who are looking for alternate political and economic models. And suddenly the one that we all promoted during the Cold War on our side—what we all promoted is now not being promoted. It’s being overtaken by other models that appear to be an easier, more sustainable way, when we all know it’s not. History tells us it’s not. Fred’s gone quiet. (Laughter.) 

Q: Thank you for this excellent discussion. Elise Labott. I’m the Edward R. Murrow press fellow here at the Council.  

And, I mean, I think, Minister Bishop, you just put the finest point on it. But I just want to understand if I’m hearing you all correctly, because to pull all these threads together I’m hearing about, you know, keeping our values, there’s a vacuum here, and debt trap diplomacy, and all of these alternative models. At what point do countries kind of know that they’re doing this devil’s bargain with China, and don’t really care? I mean, shouldn’t these nations be taking—I under—I totally agree with everything you all said about the U.S. retreat inwards and isolationism. But at what point do these countries have to take responsibility? And it sounds like they know that they’re making this devil’s bargain, and make it anyway? So how do we—are you saying that, you know, they have no choice because the U.S. is not providing that leadership? 

BISHOP: OK, let me take Pacific Islands, my part of the world, the Pacific Islands. Think back to World War II, were unequivocally backing the U.S. They were part of the fight against the common enemy at the time. And the U.S. occupied the Pacific Islands. And they got immense support. And I think of Solomon Islands. Absolutely, totally, 100 percent in the U.S. orbit, until it felt that the U.S. was ignoring it, that it wasn’t investing, that there was no private sector investment. And the U.S. substitutes that with aid. Not one Pacific Island nation ever asked me, as Australia’s foreign minister, for more aid. They want investment. They want jobs for their kids. Youth unemployment is huge in the Pacific. They want investment to build a sustainable economy. They don’t want aid.  

So when the United States—of course, it’s necessary after, you know, extreme weather events and the like. But that’s not the form of investment they want in their countries. And they’re getting no conditions, no strings, no questions asked investment from China that— 

Q: There are strings. 

BISHOP: Well, the string is called a debt-for-equity swap. So if you want to know a country that might be rethinking that, think Sri Lanka. They might think that it wasn’t such a good idea. Australia and the U.S. are deeply concerned about Papua New Guinea, because the investments in ports, and airports, and communications, this can be—this can be dual use in a heartbeat. So it means that countries who value their alliances have to be there and be investing and supporting these nations, who are looking for inspiration for political models and economic models. But if the U.S. and Australia and others aren’t there, they will feel that they have no option but to accept a lesser outcome, but nevertheless. So, a great big white Chinese lions building is in the middle of Samoa as their—it’s just aesthetically confronting. But they’ve got a brand-new parliament house. It’s just very white with lots of lion on it. (Laughter.) 

MURRAY: And I think if I could interpret the comments of other panelists, the issue here is that we’re dealing with nations that want to develop, that want to—they’re emerging economies. And so in terms of it being a swap with the devil, it’s actually seen as a chance to move forward, be part of the global economy. 

BISHOP: I think they’re also hedging, let’s face it. They’re hedging a bit. So they’re leveraging. 

ESTEVES: I would separate—(inaudible). And, of course, there are smaller nations that are dependent of a very specific investment. Sometimes it’s a dam. Sometimes it’s specific aid. Sometimes it’s a tunnel, a bridge, or whatever, that China governance can provide faster and easier than a market economy. But I would say that this is an exception or a less relevant situation. I think we should look at the more mainstream situation where countries are diversifying their partners. And it’s not bad. It’s good. It’s good for global balance. And we just need to use our governing bodies, keep the values, as you repeated. But I like the idea that we do more business with Malaysia, Indonesia, or Korea. Not more of, but the same level than Europe, which is a traditional partner with much more cultural connection.  

And I think this is healthier. It’s not bad. It’s good. We should not look as different partnerships, a more multipolar world, as something negative. It’s negative when we are promoting bad people, when we are promoting the lack of rule of law, when you have a potential crypto system that can be an alternative to all of the money laundering controls that we created in the last twenty years. So that’s, I think, what should be scared. But doing business with more people in a more diversified way, it will be good for global productivity. I don’t see this as a bad thing. 

MURRAY: So we’re actually reaching the end of our time here. And I do want to end with a flash round with our panelists. If you had thirty seconds after the election is determined in the U.S. with the new president-elect, what’s your one major piece of advice to the new president in terms of the U.S. role and its importance in your region? 

Gbenga. 

OYEBODE: Look, I think, really, it’s a message around engagement. I live in a city that’s twenty-two million people. It’s going to be forty million in twenty years, a country that’s going to be 400 million people. Population is growing at 3 percent flat year on year. You know, you can’t avoid or ignore the populations on the continent. And I think it’s time for the U.S. to understand that it’s not China or the U.S. It’s about all of us developing the continent, particularly a very young continent where 60 percent of the population is under twenty. 

MURRAY: André. 

ESTEVES: Oh, in thirty seconds? U.S. is a fifty-fifty society at this stage. So my advice, whoever wins should be a very humble victory. (Laughter.) That would be my suggestion. The behavior—my advice would be humbleness, in respect to the American society. (Laughter.) 

MURRAY: Julie. 

BISHOP: I’d like to see a U.S. president who is a champion of open global trade and the benefits of globalization, because we have all benefited from it under the U.S. as guarantor of the international rules-based order since World War II. 

MURRAY: Henadi. 

AL-SALEH: I don’t think you could have said it better, actually. But I’d add to that is when it comes to our region specifically, it’s, you know, the economic mandate these countries have has to be undertaken in order to secure the livelihood of all the youth in the area. In order to for them to achieve that, it has to be done under peaceful times. So I think my thirty seconds would be to end the conflict and for it to be perceived as a just end to the conflict in the region. 

MURRAY: So I think the major takeaways are the U.S. election debate is not covering the global issues and the importance of the U.S. around the world very well. Major concern, from all of our leaders on stage, our distinguished leaders, is U.S. isolationism. And I think the major message is private-public collaboration. That this is not something for the U.S. government to solely do. It really is up to the private sector to be investing globally, and in regions around the world, and helping to not only profit their companies, but help these emerging economies—  

BISHOP: Imagine if the rest of the world had a vote, and the U.S. didn’t. (Laughter.) 

MURRAY: So on that note, please join me in thanking our distinguished panelists. (Applause.) 

(END) 

This is an uncorrected transcript.