A Conversation With Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar of Nigeria

Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar of Nigeria discusses emerging issues in the sub-region and across the continent, including Nigeria's foreign policy initiative and challenges to economic and regional security amid ongoing geopolitical turmoil.

OBADARE: Morning, everyone. 

AUDIENCE MEMBERS: Good morning! 

OBADARE: Thanks for coming. My name is Ebenezer Obadare, and I’m the Douglas Dillon senior fellow for Africa studies here at the Council. Welcome to this morning’s Council on Foreign Relations meeting with Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar of Nigeria. 

We’re joined today by CFR members attending both in person in New York and over 120 participating virtually. I would like to remind the members that this meeting is on the record. Once again, thanks for coming. 

And, Yusuf, thanks for joining us. 

TUGGAR: Thank you for having me. Yeah. Very good morning to you all. 

OBADARE: So I’m going to be in conversation with the minister for the first thirty minutes of the hour we’re going to spend together today, then I’m going to—the last thirty minutes will be for questions and comments from you in the audience. 

So I’m going to range widely and encourage us to think about the current geopolitical moment and what your regional fit is. And you can broadly talk about the world before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the world after that. A lot has happened—the jostling for supremacy, the increased imprint of Russia, and the struggle for China to also enlarge its footprint. 

This specific moment comes with opportunities and challenges for African countries. And I’m wondering from a Nigerian standpoint what your own reflections are on that. 

TUGGAR: Thank you very much. Happy to be here. 

Well, you could go even beyond—before the invasion, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which Nigeria outrightly condemned. You can go back to the end of the Cold War, the shift, the change from a bipolar system to what some refer to as a unipolar moment—that’s debatable—and then multipolarity, which is what we have. And for countries like Nigeria, it becomes all the more complex to navigate such a precarious arrangement. But we’ve been consistent. Even during the Cold War, we were a non-aligned county. We maintain strategic autonomy as our outlook. We deal with all countries. We’re friendly towards all. And you can see that from the foundational experience of Nigeria. The fact that we are a large country surrounded by smaller neighbors that are also Francophone—we’re Anglophone—means that we’ve always been non-threatening in our outlook. And the fact that we’re also a very diverse country with different cultures, different religions—Nigeria has over 300 different languages even though, of course, English is the lingua franca at sea of shared language. So we continue to maintain that. This year alone, we’ve signed MOUs with the United States of America, with China, so you can see the approach that we have. 

Be that as it may, we operate, essentially, a U.S. system of government, a presidential system. We have elections every four years. We have three tiers of government. We have a bicameral legislature. There’s this principle of separation of powers, checks and balances. So it’s all of that.  

But, of course, if you go to the core of our constitution, also you will see that national interest comes first when we talk about our foreign policy objectives that are in the constitution. Then Africa, because it’s our immediate neighborhood. Then, of course, harmony and peace, engaging with other countries, abiding by our commitments to treaties and agreements with other countries. And then, you know, supporting a peaceful world order as well. These are—you know, they are five foreign policy objectives. So it’s ingrained. 

OBADARE: Yeah. So the elephant in the room right now, if you’re a student of West Africa or the Sahel, is the upcoming split of ECOWAS into two. And this is—ECOWAS is the Economic Community of West African States. It was founded in 1975, mostly under the auspices of Nigeria, then under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon. What I mean I think is that, more than any other country, Nigeria has a stake, Nigeria has an interest in what happens to ECOWAS.  

With Mali—(coughs)—excuse me—with Mali, and Niger, and Burkina Faso forming this association of Sahelian states, this breakaway group, how do you see Nigeria handling this? Do you think the break is permanent? Or do you think what these countries are doing is just a negotiating strategy? Are they trying to get attention? How does Nigeria go about trying to pacify these countries, and bringing them back to the table, and making sure that ECOWAS remains one strong economic and political unit?  

TUGGAR: Well, first of all, I disagree with the description that ECOWAS has split into two. Because, if you look at the ratio, ECOWAS consists of fifteen countries and then three say that they want to leave ECOWAS. And ECOWAS has statutes and protocols that even say that it takes a year for you to leave. And those countries are signatories to those protocols. So the fact that three countries out of the fifteen say they want to do that doesn’t mean that ECOWAS is split into two.  

And even so, if you look at the way the world is structured, or Africa, the fact that you have these regional economic communities that are working towards the creation of an African continental free trade area, that the whole world is supportive of because, you know, if we’re talking about free trade and engagement in a globalized world then it is in the interest of every country for there to be such a huge common market that Africa itself will benefit from. So three countries saying they’re doing their own thing doesn’t fit into that, nor does it fit into the African Union itself and its aspirations, the whole.  

So African Union doesn’t even recognize that break, let alone other countries. And then, OK, if you take it further, to the United Nations, if you’re speaking as three countries as opposed to speaking as fifteen countries, or fifty-five countries in the case of the African Union, then you can see there’s—no country is autarchic to begin with. So let’s get that right. Let’s also look at what Nigeria is doing in terms of, first and foremost, under ECOWAS, because Nigeria is the chair of—current chair of ECOWAS. So we’re using all possible diplomatic means to see that they remain in ECOWAS. But that does not take away from doing what is right in terms of the tenets of ECOWAS, the principles of democracy.  

So what we’re trying to do is we have, of course, shared democratic values with other countries. But we also have shared interests with Mali, with Burkina Faso, with Niger. At the moment, they are under serious threat from terrorist organizations. Only two days ago. I think it was—or was it three? I don’t know, because of the jetlag, I’m not sure if I’ve missed a day. (Laughter.) But, yeah, Mali was under attack only recently. So that terrorist threat is real.  

Africa has a youthful population. There were mistakes that were made, both within Africa and also with some of our friends and neighbors. The European Union, the EU Sahel strategy, failed, and it failed woefully. Nigeria has always led the way, along with partners outside of Africa when it comes to maintaining peace in the region, and stability. We succeeded in Somalia—sorry—in Sierra Leone. We succeeded in Liberia. You can see what we did in terms of restoring peace and stability. We led ECOMOG along with our partners.  

So these are the sort of things that are going on. We have a regional partnership for democracy where we’re trying to strengthen democratic institutions, not just in the countries that have undergone these unconstitutional changes of government, but other countries as a whole in the region.  

OBADARE: So I take your point about the smallness of those countries. If you’re—from a Nigerian standpoint in West Africa, everything else looks small. I get that. But—I’m not trying to litigate this, but I guess the point is, yes, you seem to be suggesting that if these countries do actually push through, and because they’ve activated the protocols, they are going to regret it. I get that. But if you are not worried about those countries themselves, aren’t you worried about what appears to be driving those countries—the influence of Russia, for instance? They don’t seem to be acting alone. 

TUGGAR: No. What I beg to differ with was splitting into two, because I was in my head imagining an amoeba and how it splits, and then it forms two equal parts. So the point I was making was that, you know, these are not two equal parts. (Laughter.) But, yeah, you’re right. We are very much concerned about West Africa turning into a theater of contestations by outside powers. We’re very much concerned about the presence of Russia, of even the Wagner Group. I don’t know if it’s still called Wagner now. It’s called the African Frontier Force. This is something we’ve taken up with Russia.  

It’s something we have also taken up with China, which is why recently when President Tinubu visited China, if you look at the joint statement that was issued by President Tinubu and Xi Jinping, we made it clear that there had to be clarity in terms of China’s commitment to the unity of ECOWAS, and it is stated in the joint statement, and also Nigeria’s leading role in the region, within ECOWAS as well. So this is something that we’re very much concerned about, yeah. 

OBADARE: So, still on the question of Russia, whether or not it’s seeking to undermine Nigeria directly, I think the long and short is that the effect of what it’s doing in the rest of Sahel is bound to affect Nigeria adversely. And I’m wondering whether you think—do you see Russia as a security threat to Nigeria? And do you think Nigeria should rethink its relations with Russia? 

TUGGAR: Well, you can never accuse Nigeria of ideological necrophilia. (Laughter.) We always checked to see, OK, what is happening, or what is the reality? So the fact that we get along with Russia doesn’t mean we’re not going to interrogate what Russia is doing in our neighborhood. And I was in Russia earlier this year. I interacted with Minister Lavrov. And we made these points clear to them. Even if we’re friends, it doesn’t mean that we would have these sort of combatants that would be brought into our neighborhood. And the unity of ECOWAS is something that we take very seriously. And we consider such interference to be very serious to the interests—inimical to the interests of Nigeria. And we were given assurances. So it’s not something that we’re taking for granted. And we’re monitoring and following it closely. 

OBADARE: Yeah, especially after the waving of Russian flags in the context of the anti-government protests. Did you notice that? 

TUGGAR: Yeah. We investigated that. And we could not find any clear evidence that Russia had a hand in it. You also have to bear in mind that there are, you know, groups that were looking to take advantage of the protests to foment—to wreak havoc within Nigeria, because you have this problem—and it’s not just in Nigeria; it exists even in the United States—where we’re beginning to lose touch with the art of democratic persuasion, of democratic engagement. Someone like, I think it was—it think it was Stanley Cavell that described it better. I don’t have eloquent the words to put it as he did. But it’s not—it shouldn’t—democratic is not about, you know, winner takes all. So you have those that lose out in elections, that try to use all possible means to undermine governments, to pull the entire system down. And that’s not what democracy is about. 

And as I told you at the beginning of our conversation, we have created a system that is not unlike the U.S. system. So, you know, we have—if you look at the way democracy evolved in the United States, when it—when America came into existence, there was much more—the art of conversation, of persuasion, of convincing the other side, and also of accommodating those who have lost out when their elections, when their—when their contestations, has been lost. Because look at what was going on with The Federalist Papers, the discussions, the debates, and where we are now. So Nigeria is not—is not immune to that as well. So this is what we attribute it to. But we could not find any concrete evidence that Russia was directly involved. 

OBADARE: Yeah. Yeah. So I’m also—I’m a dyed in the wool democrat, small-D, in the American context. And I—but I also know that sometimes you need to wield the big stick. And that coercion, the use of coercion, is not necessarily antithetical to diplomatic practice. And that seems to have occurred to the ECOWAS heads of state in the aftermath of the coups d’etat, especially the most recent one, Niger. So we’ve had this idea of having a standing ECOWAS force. And the idea seems to have gained some traction. I’m wondering if you could just speak briefly about what the idea is all about. And maybe also, for the sake of this audience, what kind of supports you think Nigeria and ECOWAS need from the United States and its Western allies to see the idea through? 

TUGGAR: Well, Nigeria has demonstrated that it’s a responsible leader in the region, and that it uses its strength, it uses—it harnesses the military capabilities of ECOWAS to restore peace, to restore democracy in countries when they have such challenges, when they have unconstitutional changes of government, or when they have a total breakdown of order. But the major challenge we’re having is in acquiring kinetic and non-kinetic equipment. Countries like the United States do not sell equipment to Nigeria. So we see what is happening with Ukraine. If you were to give us the $50-60 billion that Ukraine is getting, I think it would solve all the problems in—(laughter)—in the ECOWAS region, you know? We see Israel, we see Egypt; we’re not getting that. I don’t even know if—I am no longer sure if it has anything to do with the Leahy laws or if it goes beyond that. 

But there’s also, I think, the failure on our part to explain Nigeria to other countries, to the outside world, because I think the perception sometimes is that Nigeria is still a military—under a military government, not realizing that we’ve had, I believe, seven successive elections since 1999. We have elections every four years. We’ve had—the system has been tested time and again. We’ve had transitions from one individual to the other, from one party to the other. We’ve had a president die in office. His vice president took over. He won an election, he lost an election. 

So it’s clear that we need—we need a strong Nigeria. We need a militarily strong Nigeria. And it’s clear that Nigeria is responsible in wielding that military power. And it’s also clear that when others from outside the region try to do it, it fails and it fails woefully, which is why G5 Sahel failed, Operation Barkhane failed, and the multinational joint task force is succeeding in the Lake Chad region, led by Nigeria. So it—multinational task force is Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon. And clearly, you know, Boko Haram has been degraded to just small bands of—or groups that every so often attack and, you know, move within a very complex cross-border region with lots of islands because of Lake Chad and so forth. So it works. I’m not going to repeat what I said about Sierra Leone, about Liberia. That is the formula, and that is why we need a strong Nigeria. 

OBADARE: So you sort of spoke offhandedly earlier about $60 billion going to Ukraine and how that could be used for Nigeria and ECOWAS in combating their own security threat. I see that as part of there is a broader element of the conversation that I—has been going on, you know, among African diplomats, you know, security and intelligence experts, and, you know, in the universities generally about the place of Africa in the current global arrangement. And you and I were speaking about this just before we came in. I’m wondering if you could also, then, speak to that. What is this whole idea of having a reimagined global political architecture and financial architecture? What would that entail? And how do you see Nigeria and other African countries benefitting from that rearrangement? 

TUGGAR: So it’s clear that we need—we need to revamp the global governing bodies as well as the financial architecture because they were designed for the twentieth century. They are—they have become anachronistic, to an extent, and they’re not fit for our purposes in the twenty-first century. The configuration has changed, but they haven’t changed. If you look at the United Nations Security Council, the five countries that have the veto power, clearly there’s something to do there in terms of expanding it to reflect the realities, especially if we are—we all ascribe—we all—we’ve signed onto the same sort of democratic norms and values. Then democracy should start there. Nigeria is a country of 220 million people. It’s going to be 400 million by the year 2050. It’s going to be the third-largest country in the world. And Nigeria belongs in the U.N. Security Council. Nigeria also belongs in the G-20 because it’s the largest economy in Africa. So when decisions are being made, Nigeria needs to be on the table, so—with veto powers. So these are the sort of changes that we’re looking for, because if we don’t then you begin to see a weakening of those global bodies. You end up with stalemate. 

And then, also, the financial architecture itself. It’s not about handouts. It’s not about development aid. It’s about a globalized world. It’s about the linkages that exist that would allow for all to benefit, all to prosper. 

But you can’t do that if there is a seeming double standard, if you will. If you look at even the International Criminal Court, the impression, rightly or wrongly, in Africa is, you know, it’s just designed for errant African leaders and it doesn’t apply everywhere else. So these are the sort of perceived injustices that need to be addressed so that it’s—you know, the structures remain effective and efficacious, because—also, with the financial system look at Basel IV and what is being proposed there, you know, more stringent restrictions on funding. And if you look at what others are doing, if you look at the Belt and Road Initiative for instance, it makes sense to a lot of countries around the world because they have subscribed to this idea of a globalized world. And in a globalized world, you need the linkages. You need electricity. You need—you know, so the power lines, the rail lines, the roads, and so on and so forth. But you know, it should not be an either/or situation; it should be something that we should all subscribe to, because the United States, the West leads when it comes to, you know, such ideas of globalization and all of that. So nobody should be left out, and that’s why we need to rejig the system. 

OBADARE: Let me—let me bring us back home before we turn it over to the audience. So President Tinubu has come out with these, you know, four cornerstone principles of Nigerian foreign policy: democracy, development, demography, and diaspora. Can you just talk to us about what informed, you know, this idea? And then, how much progress can you point to, albeit over the last one year, also? 

TUGGAR: OK. So democracy, demography, development, diaspora. 

Democracy, I think I’ve spoken about it a bit earlier. It’s about engaging with other—Nigeria is a democratic country, so it engages with others that share the same values. But it also engages with others to make those global governing bodies or try and make them more democratic. And also, we are engaging based on shared interests as well, as I said. So Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, they may not be democratic, but you know, the threat by terrorists is real. So we’ve got that. 

Demography, the fact that we are going to be the third-largest country in the world. We are engaging to create jobs through partnering with others in terms of digital technology, in terms of opportunities that lie through the internet, through business process, I am also seeing through large language models these days, through internet—(inaudible)—and all of that to create jobs. And you can see that we’ve done quite a bit with India. We attracted as much as $14 billion of investment. It’s not going to be immediate; it’s going to be over a period of time. And a large part of it is also increasing what already exists if you look at, for instance, a petrochemical plant in southern Nigeria that is already producing fertilizer and petrochemicals and all of that. So they’re expanding that. 

Development cuts across, is also engaging with others to grow our economy through agriculture, through infrastructure, through manufacturing; also with the special economic zones that we have, with tax incentives, and so forth. 

And then diaspora, getting more out of our diaspora. If you look at the Philippines, I think Philippines has about 8 million people in the diaspora but—that contribute 13 percent to the GDP. We have 15 million, roughly, that are contributing, I think, about 5 or 6 percent. So there is much more to do there. But also, for us to improve the quality of services that we provide the diaspora through our 109 missions around the world. So we need to do that. But apart from that, we have certain models that we’re trying to improve on. 

We’ve got the Technical Aid Corps. Nigeria has been providing support to African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries since 1987 through a volunteer program. We copied you. You have the Peace Corps. So this is Nigeria’s version of the Peace Corps. It’s all paid for by Nigeria. Upon request, countries get doctors, they get university lecturers, they get engineers. So we want to use that as a model to lead the conversation between us and other partners when it comes to the issue of migration, which is a very sensitive issue. 

Migration has been weaponized in the world today, but it’s a reality. It’s part of globalization. I think it was Adam Smith that said that, you know, free markets also mean that people have to move around. There has to—labor has to be able to move around freely. 

So this is, essentially, the four Ds that we’re trying to do. 

OBADARE: Thank you. 

At this point I would like to invite you to join our conversation with questions. If you have a question, please state your name and affiliation. And a reminder that this meeting is on the record. 

Please. 

Q: Thank you. I am Alexandra Starr with International Crisis Group. 

You mentioned that the African Union has a very important role to play for the future of the—(off mic, technical difficulties)—role Nigeria can play in helping that organization reach its full potential. 

OBADARE: OK. So— 

TUGGAR: Do I— 

OBADARE: Let’s take one— 

TUGGAR: OK. I think I better write it down so I don’t— 

Q: It’s the jetlag, right? (Laughter.) 

TUGGAR: Thanks. 

Q: Minister, good to see you here. Anthony Richter, Open Society Foundations. Two quick ones. 

First, you spoke eloquently about Nigeria’s readiness to step up and its global role, your visit to Moscow, and it’s recorded that you had a good conversation with your new counterpart in Kyiv. How willing are you to travel to Kyiv to learn the situation firsthand from their perspective? 

And second, you negotiated successfully the return of 1,100 Benin Bronzes from Germany when you were ambassador there. Up the road one mile away at the Metropolitan Museum there are 160 more. (Laughter.) Can you make a—how willing are you to make a side trip with NCMM to take that on? (Laughter.) 

Q: Good morning, sir. Thank you so much for being with us today. My name is Chloe Demrovsky. I am an executive in residence at New York University Center for Global Affairs. 

We’re about to head into climate week here in New York, and so I’m curious to hear more about your perspective on Nigeria’s role in both mitigation and adaptation in defense of your people, which is a very important part of the energy transition. Thank you. 

OBADARE: Want to quickly respond to those and then— 

TUGGAR: Yes. 

So with regards to the African Union, Nigeria is actually the only country on the continent with a near-permanent seat in the Peace and Security Council. So we play a very significant role there. At the moment, we have a Nigerian as the commissioner for peace and security of the—of the African Union. 

So what we’ve been trying to do also is to secure funding for the standby force. And part of what—I’m sure you must have been following the discussions that were going on at the U.N., where, unfortunately, now the—I think the ratio in terms of contributions is the African Union is to contribute 30 percent and then the U.N. 70 percent, which places a higher burden on Africa. And we mustn’t forget the fact that the African countries, especially countries like Nigeria that are—that contribute more than others to the AU as well as, I believe, the U.N., you—it means more of a burden on us. So it’s even a triple whammy, not a double whammy; you know, we contribute what we do on our own and then what we contribute to the African Union, to the U.N., and then Africa as a whole still has to come up with 30 percent. 

You know, when we’re talking about serious conflict resolution—and we have the experience; we’ve done it successfully with the ECOMOG and the ECOWAS force. And we’re already doing a lot. We have Nigerian troops at the moment, as we speak, in Sierra Leone. We have Nigerian troops in Guinea-Bissau. There are calls for the presence of Nigeria in several other countries. So we’re really stretched out, and we still can’t get the equipment that is needed. Sometimes we get equipment sold to us but with strict conditions that say that we can’t use the software or—you know? So it’s like getting a car without the engine or, you know, certain switches have been taken out. So it’s a very serious problem for us. 

My good friend Mr. Richter talked about Ukraine. Absolutely I am—I would be more than happy to visit Ukraine. As I said, we are friends to all countries. We are friends with Ukraine. Didn’t I recently speak with the—with the foreign minister of Ukraine, I think, three days ago? So, you know, definitely. 

With regards to climate change, Nigeria has led the way with green bonds. We floated green bonds. We’ve got a climate change law that has been passed. We have a national office on climate change that is actually chaired by the president. And we’re feeling the effects because about a fortnight ago one of the largest cities in Nigeria, maybe half of the city was submerged in water, effects of climate change, because there was always discourse about a dam breaking, about, you know, trying to blame someone for it, but that wasn’t the case. It was just, you know, unusual amount of rainfall that—because Maiduguri is in a semiarid region and they weren’t used to that rainfall. And we saw what happened in the Czech Republic and, you know, Central Europe as a whole. So it effects all countries. So we are very, very committed to our nationally defined contribution and continue to work towards that. And the minister of the environment is on his way here to attend UNGA. 

So thank you. 

Q: Thank you, Minister. Thanks for your insight. Thanks for being here. My name is Martial Combari, Blaylock Van. I’m also a term member. I’m also from Burkina Faso, even though I’m often mistaken as Nigerian—which my wife, who’s Nigerian, think is my greatest honor. (Laughter.) 

My question is around foreign investment and foreign exchange. Nigeria has taken steps recently in order to liberalize foreign exchange, which has been encouraging to both investors and companies operating in the region. Can you talk about the progress that has been made so far and if there are any additional steps that you foresee coming in order to support that endeavor? Thank you. 

Q: Thank you, sir. My name is Camille Massey. I’m with Synergos. 

And my question is around development and transforming agriculture into an economic engine. Synergos Nigeria works quite a bit with women and youth in ways to use cassava and other—and other plants to cut down on carbon emissions, as well as working with smallholder farmers to provide opportunity and transform their agricultural work into business opportunities. And I’m curious, as you look at Nigeria’s leadership globally, how you might see the models that are being created in Nigeria being useful to others. Thank you. 

OBADARE: OK. Here, and then I’ll come to you next. 

Q: Thank you. I’m Ella Gudwin with VisionSpring. 

I have an offer and a question. You talked about digital technology. As Nigeria rises in its economic power, one of the simplest technologies is eyeglasses. There are seventy million Nigerians who do not have the eyeglasses they need to see clearly. We are extending the Jigi Bola initiative from Lagos nationally. And so my offer is to extend it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that you have a clear vision ministry as you lead the continent. (Laughter.)  

And my question is a track two diplomacy question, which is one of your most beautiful soft power tools, is Nollywood, your music and your art. What do you see as the role of Nigeria’s cultural heritage and influence? 

OBADARE: Thank you.  

Minister. 

TUGGAR: OK. Well, with the reforms—economic reforms, President Tinubu embarked on macroeconomic reforms off the bat. The day he was sworn in, he pronounced that he was removing the fuel subsidy, he was committed to it. We had multiple exchange rates for the naira, our local currency. He unified those exchange rates, made them more realistic. But part of the problem we had was you had these opaque crypto exchanges, like Binance, that took advantage and that provided an avenue for money laundering and for other, you know, sort of opaque activities also, that undermined—seriously undermined the value of the naira, when we—at a time when we’d started making significant gains, the currency was beginning to stabilize. 

And for us, this translates to real-life situations. It’s a matter of life and death for people that rely on medication for diabetes, for hypertension, when the value the naira shoots up and they can’t afford such. So, I mean, I don’t know the statistics but, you know, it means that people died because of the activities of such companies. Which is why, just like the U.S., we decided to bring Binance to book. And the executives, for instance. So these are some of the challenges that we’ve been having, but the president is committed. There are also efforts towards domesticating some of the consumptive activities within Nigeria that take up so much. 

If you look at what we’re trying to do now with Dangote and his refinery, Dangote built a 650,000-barrel-per-day refinery, which is one of the largest in the world. And since Nigeria is a crude oil producer, it’s been agreed and arranged that he will be buying crude oil from the Nigerian state, and paying with naira, for instance. So you have a lot of these activities going on. I forgot to mention when we talked about climate change that we have an Electricity Act. That Electricity Act for the first time allows for feed-in tariffs for those that are generating renewable energy and putting it back to the grid. And for the first time also, it allows for you to come and set up as a—to generate, to transmit, and distribute. Prior to this, it was under the purview of the government exclusively so you can do that. And the subnationals—the states can also do that. So it’s created a lot of opportunities. 

With regards to agriculture, we—like I said, agriculture is one of the three areas that we’re looking to drive growth significantly. What we’re doing is also making available fertilizer, improved seeds, and other requirements for smallholder farmers. Because the majority of Nigerian agriculture is subsistence. It relies on those individual farmers. So it’s to support them. And then we do have these startups that provide the opportunity for those outside Nigeria to invest. And, you know, they’re making significant—a significant impact. But we need it—we need to scale up on that. And this is—this is part of what the minister for digital economy and communications is doing, and also the minister for agriculture. And we have what we refer to as the Renewed Hope Infrastructure Fund, that is also looking to do a lot with regards to irrigation, with regards to dams.  

Then, of course, on the eyeglasses, thanks ever so much. I’m sure some of my colleagues here—(laughter)—would be the first to take up that offer. So definitely, we need that. And, yeah, you’re right. Because prior to the COVID pandemic, I think Nigeria’s media and entertainment sector was growing at about 12 percent. And they say Nollywood is the third-largest in the world. So that soft power is something that we’re taking advantage of fully. 

Anthony Richter talked about the Benin Bronzes that we negotiated the return of from Germany—1,320 Benin Bronzes. It shows you how committed we are to utilizing our cultural heritage for diplomacy, for also contributing the debates—the global debate of righting wrongs, and also looking at the ontology of museums and of the way we consume art itself. But it also dovetails into what we tried to do when we negotiate trade deals. Intellectual property is something that Nigeria takes very seriously, because we have a youthful population, very creative. And we feel that, moving forward in the future, our output is going to be enormous. And therefore, we have to take measures to protect that intellectual property, beginning now. Thank you. 

OBADARE: Thank you, sir. 

Q: Hi, there. Sarah Leah Whitson with two hats today, DAWN and member of the board of the Armenian Bar Association. 

I wanted to ask you two questions. One is whether Nigeria has decided how it’s going to vote on the U.N. General Assembly resolution to enforce the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Israel’s illegal occupation. I know the OIC has supported the decision, as well as the other pending case investigating genocide in Gaza. The United States has said they are not going to vote for the resolution. How will Nigeria vote? 

And I also wanted to follow up on the Binance matter. Recognizing that Binance well may be guilty of various crimes in Nigeria, we are very dismayed about the continued detention of an American citizen, Mr. Gambaryan, who was there on business at the invitation of the Nigerian government and has faced a number of charges, but it appears to be entirely related to his role as an official at Binance. How do you expect that case to turn out? I believe that the U.S. special envoy on hostage affairs is now reviewing his case as a case of hostage taking.  

OBADARE: Thank you.  

Q: Hello, Mr. Minister. Thank you for your remarks today. My name is Elise Labott. I am the Murrow press fellow here at the Council on Foreign Relations.  

I would love to follow up, you know, kind of connect all the dots of what you were saying today. You were talking about Nigeria’s leadership specifically in the security sector, but when I see some of the other things you’re talking about—whether it’s democracy and development—and I see some of the efforts by the continent to—for instance, on purchasing power on vaccines, or the health sector and development—I’m wondering if you see Nigeria taking a leadership in developing some of these other sectors for resilience of the continent, to exercise its leadership. And what sectors that might be.  

And if you could expand on the discussions about permanent members of the Security Council. I know you said that Nigeria should be a permanent member, but if you could just kind of let us in on some of the discussions that are taking place, and how you see that playing out. Thank you. 

OBADARE: Thank you. Just one more. 

Q: I’ll be quick. Hi. I’m Michelle Gavin. I’m a colleague of Ebenezer’s in the Africa Program here at the Council.  

I wanted to take you back to the security crisis in the Sahel. I was very interested in what you had to say about the failures, and they’re undeniable, of European and Western-led efforts to try and contain and ultimately degrade the capacity of these terrorist organizations. But there’s a ton of analysis that suggests there is no purely military solution to this problem, that the kind of root causes of this instability and the ability of these organizations to continue to gain territory is really about governance. So I’m wondering, when you suggest that the way forward is more African leadership, what does that mean for addressing these root causes issues? 

TUGGAR: OK. Thank you. Let me start with Ms. Whitson, I think, on the issue of the Israeli vote. Nigeria has been consistent. Nigeria recognizes the state of Palestine. And Nigeria condemns very strongly and unequivocally the violence that has been going on in Gaza. And, you know, I think that is a clear indication of which we are going to vote. I think we—you know, our consistency speaks for itself when it comes to that. And we feel that international law has no room for revenge. International law was actually created to do away with the idea of revenge. And it’s difficult to look at what is happening in Gaza and not look at it within the context of revenge. 

With regards to Binance, you see we have to, when we partner with each other, have some degree of respect and confidence for our systems. It’s the same. Binance was sanctioned here in the U.S. And according to—you know, based on U.S. laws. We also have our own laws. We have our own system. And we are prosecuting Binance and its officials based on our own system. And we have to also find a way when we engage with each other not to turn every situation into a sine qua non, to say that Nigeria has to deal with Mr. Gambaryan in a certain way, otherwise all bets are off. That is it. Everything that we’re doing with the United States will be called off. Because this doesn’t—it doesn’t contribute to the much-needed partnership that the United States and Nigeria require, on different fronts. So I think we need to get that right. 

With regards to vaccines, yeah, definitely we are playing an active role in that. As a matter of fact, during the COVID crisis, we did try to become one of the countries in Africa to domesticate the production of vaccines. What was it—was it—Center for Disease Control in Nigeria performed commendably. As a matter of fact, the individual that headed it ended up going to work for the World Health Organization based in Berlin. So we’re looking at vaccines for—even for malaria. There’s a lot of work being done in that space. I wish I could tell you more, but my colleague, the minister for health, is on his way. (Laughs.) And part of the reason why he’s coming is because of several initiatives that are going on in that space.  

With regards to the Sahel, there is no silver bullet. So it’s not just about military deterrence. It’s not about the use of force alone. But neither is it about diplomatic efforts and persuasion only. It’s a carrot and stick. I think it was Wilson that said tread softly but carry a big stick. That’s what you need to do. So on our part, we would—a stronger ECOWAS force, a stronger Nigeria, would provide that deterrence. We’ve seen it happen. There’s a country that had an election, was ready to hand over, and then the sitting leader said, oh no, that’s it. I’m not getting out of the presidential villa. It took Nigerian Air Force aircraft to fly over the presidential villa a couple of times for him to vacate, and the winner of the election took over. So you can see, you know, it’s not necessarily the use of force, but just, you know, the presence of that force sometimes that it deters. 

But at the same time also we have to do more with regards to—and this is when I say “we,” I’m talking about African countries as a whole—where we have been found wanting is in governance at the local level. And it becomes all the more complex when you’re running a democratic system. So when the constitution says state governments have some degree of autonomy and they’re the ones to supervise local council elections, then the president and the federal government can’t really do much. And the failure of governance at the local level provides opportunity for extremism, for extremist groups, for organized crime to thrive—particularly at border areas where even when local governments are working properly there is some deficiency of sovereignty, of weakness, as you move from the center to the border areas. 

So you—if you look at West Africa and Africa as a whole, you find that insurgency and extremism and organized crime tends to thrive more in complex border areas. So this is where we have to do something about governance at the local level. But that would probably require a constitutional amendment. And so you need some people that would think, like the late Mikhail Gorbachev, to undo the very structure that they rely on for power.  

So because state governments and governors have—the state governments have to vote in favor of a constitutional amendment in a country like Nigeria for it to go through, so to change the electoral system, make it more democratic, and allow for funds to go from the center to the local government. But what President Tinubu did, very cleverly, was to seize the initiative. He preempted them and took them to court, took them to the supreme court. And he won. So at least the funding part we’ve got right. So the next big hurdle now is to have routine elections that are meant to take place at the local government level every three years. And to allow for, you know, that competition that would allow the system to run more efficiently. 

OBADARE: Thank you, honorable Minister. And thank you for joining us this morning. Please note that the video and transcript of this session will be posted on CFR website. Thank you. (Applause.) 

(END) 

This is an uncorrected transcript.