European Union

  • Brexit
    What's at Stake in the UK Elections?
    As the United Kingdom recovers from a string of terror attacks, the country’s parliamentary elections could determine the course of its Brexit negotiations, trade and economic policy, internal borders, and foreign relations.
  • France
    After Macron Win, Political Challenges Await
    Political newcomer Emmanuel Macron won a decisive victory in France's presidential elections, but the new president will face major challenges to forming a governing coalition.
  • European Union
    Reprieve or Reform in Europe?
    MILAN – The first round of the French election turned out much as expected: the centrist Emmanuel Macron finished first, with 24% of the vote, rather narrowly beating the right-wing National Front’s Marine Le Pen, who won 21.3%. Barring a political accident of the type that befell the former frontrunner, conservative François Fillon, Macron will almost certainly win the second-round runoff against Le Pen on May 7. The European Union seems safe – for now. With the pro-EU Macron seemingly headed toward the Élysée Palace – the establishment candidates on the right and the left who lost in the first round have already endorsed him – the immediate threat to the EU and the eurozone seems to have subsided. But this is no time for complacency. Unless Europe addresses flaws in growth patterns and pursues urgent reforms, the longer-term risks to its survival will almost certainly continue to mount. And, as has often been noted, the French election, like other key votes over the past year, represents a rejection of establishment political parties: the Republicans’ Fillon came in third, with about 20% of the vote, and the Socialist Party’s Benoît Hamon finished fifth, with less than 6.5%. Meanwhile, the left-wing Euroskeptic Jean-Luc Mélenchon won 19.5%, putting the total share of voters who chose candidates of non-traditional parties – Le Pen, Macron, and Mélenchon – at nearly 65%. Unlike last year’s votes for Brexit in the United Kingdom and Donald Trump in the United States, which were driven by middle-class, middle-aged voters, in France, the young led the way in rejecting the establishment. Among 18-34-year-olds, Mélenchon – who has so far declined to endorse Macron for the second round – received roughly 27% of the vote. Le Pen was the second most popular candidate among young voters, especially the less educated. This trend is not exclusive to France. In Italy, the anti-establishment, Euroskeptic Five Star Movement has surpassed the center-left Democratic Party in recent polls, with the young comprising a significant share of that support. Likewise, in last December’s Italian referendum, younger voters formed a substantial share of the vote against the constitutional reforms – essentially a vote against then-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who had staked his political survival on their adoption. Of course, even in the face of weak and declining economic performance, there may be an upper limit to the support that populist parties can muster – a level that falls short of a governing mandate. But the fact that parties and candidates that reject the status quo are gaining ground, particularly among young people, reflects profound political polarization, which generates governance challenges that could impede reform. Yet reform is precisely what is needed to address these trends, which reflect fundamental problems with today’s prevailing growth patterns. In France, Italy, and Spain, growth is too slow, unemployment is high, and youth unemployment is even higher. In France, the youth-unemployment rate is in the neighborhood of 24%, and trending downward only slowly. Youth unemployment in Italy stands at 35%, and exceeds 40% in Spain. These are countries with substantial social-security systems. But those systems protect labor-market incumbents much more than new entrants. And the reforms that have been implemented, in order to ease entry into work, are not sufficient in the context of weak overall growth. Without deeper reform, the demographic arithmetic suggests that the disenfranchised and anti-establishment share of the population may grow (unless today’s young people change their stripes as they age). The question is whether this trend will lead to a genuine disruption of the status quo or merely to political polarization that weakens government effectiveness. The solution to European economies’ woes seems clear: a set of reforms that encourages more vigorous and much more inclusive growth patterns. After all, while globalization and technology lead to job displacement, sufficient growth can ensure that overall employment is sustained. To that end, reforms are needed at both the national and EU levels. While each EU country has its own specific features, some common reform imperatives stand out. In particular, all countries need to reduce structural rigidity, which deters investment and hampers growth. To boost flexibility, social-security systems have to be largely disconnected from specific jobs, companies, and sectors, and rebuilt around individuals and families, income, and human capital. The remainder of the domestic reform agenda is complex, but its goal is simple: enhance private-sector investment. Under this heading are items like regulatory reform, anti-corruption measures, and public-sector investment, especially in education and research. At the European level, the most important recent development is the weakening of the euro relative to most major currencies, especially the US dollar, since mid-2014. This has caused the eurozone to run a substantial surplus and helped to restore some competitiveness in the tradable sectors in France, Spain, and Italy. In all three countries, tourism is an important sector for employment and the balance of payments, and expenditures have been rising when measured in euros. Of course, the weaker euro has fueled large surpluses in Germany and northern Europe, where unit labor costs are lower, relative to productivity. In the longer term, convergence of unit labor costs is needed. But that will take time, especially in a low-inflation environment. In the meantime, the weak euro may help to spur growth. EU-level action is also needed on immigration, which has emerged as a major economic and political issue. Faced with inflows of huge numbers of refugees from the Middle East and Africa – inflows that exceed many countries’ absorptive capacity – the EU may need to modify the free movement of people for a period of time. After Germany, France is the most important country in the eurozone. If a Macron victory is treated as an opportunity to pursue aggressive reforms targeted at boosting growth and employment, the French election may amount to an important turning point for Europe. If, however, it is treated as a validation of the status quo, it will produce only a short reprieve for a besieged EU. This article originally appeared on project-syndicate.org. 
  • United Kingdom
    Brexit: Now for the Hard Part
    The weekend’s European Union (EU) Summit provided little love for UK prime minister Theresa May. Leaders approved a tough opening position in the upcoming Brexit negotiations, and warned against “completely unreal” expectations of a swift and favorable deal. EU negotiators will seek early agreement on the terms of exit (including citizen’s rights and the financial exit payments) before moving forward on a long-term trade agreement, while the British government seeks agreement on all three tracks together—“divorce”, transitional terms, and the long-term deal—by March 2019. Hard talk at the start of the negotiation should not be a surprise, but in some respects this past week does reflect a turning point. In my May monthly, I review the state of the negotiations and argue that the hard part of Brexit begins now. In particular: While the UK economy has held up impressively well to date, the longer-term economic costs of Brexit are becoming more apparent. The primary cost of Brexit was never to be measured by short-term dislocation, but rather through the long-term reduction in investment and reduced efficiency that comes from lost access to Europe’s common market and a less prosperous economic future. Economists estimate that the loss in UK gross domestic product from Brexit ranges from 1.5 percent to 9.5 percent, attributable to increased barriers to trade and migration and to the financial services sector shrinking as a result of limits to cross-border activity. The new relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the rest of the world, will take years to work out. An extended transition to an uncertain future will further stress UK and EU economies. The election cycle—most important, the ongoing French elections and German elections in the fall—makes it impossible for leaders to make tough decisions on the future of Europe. After those elections, and allowing some time for preparation, negotiators will have roughly nine months beginning early in 2018 to make the critical decisions on the path forward, in order for the exit agreement to be confirmed and implemented by the March 2019 deadline imposed by the Lisbon Treaty. The disconnect between political and economic timelines remains a significant, and underappreciated, cost of Brexit. Long-term investment decisions take time, as does the relocation of jobs and production to the continent, and the regulatory approval process adds to the challenge. All this suggests that, although investors have been patient and there has not been substantial movement of jobs to the continent so far, the pressure to make long-term decisions will intensify in the coming years, leading to investment and job shifts that could, in turn, affect the politics of Brexit. The challenge of launching a fundamental renegotiation of Britain’s economic and political relationship with Europe—a process that could take a decade—is straining political consensus in the United Kingdom and on the continent. Brexit will produce a Britain that is poorer and less of an economic and financial power than if it had remained in the European Union. At the same time, the Brexit vote adds to the populist and inward-looking centrifugal forces pulling at Europe. A chaotic Brexit remains a serious risk.
  • Turkey
    No, Erdogan Was Not an Authoritarian All Along
    A combination of European Union mishandling and domestic developments propelled Turkey to where it is now.
  • European Union
    France After the Election: What Next for Economic Policy in Europe?
    French election results show Emmanuel Macron in first place with 23.9 percent of the vote and Marine Le Pen in second with 21.4 percent, setting the stage for a run-off election on May 7. Early polls show a comfortable edge for Macron, the pro-E.U. former economy minister who ran on a campaign of ambitious economic reform including labor market deregulation and lower corporate taxes (though there will be questions about where supporters of Jean-Luc Mélenchon will land, or whether they will vote at all). While the result was expected, markets had become quite jittery in recent days and, unsurprisingly, rallied as results came in. The euro this morning is 2 percent stronger, reaching a five-month high at 1.09 to the dollar, and gold as well as other safe-haven investments have sold off. Investors are clearly relieved with the result that put Macron into the second round. But political risk is likely to remain an endemic feature in European and global markets, and European policymakers face a full calendar of challenges over the course of the year without a compelling vision about how to address the populist pressures sweeping the region. What comes next? Of the electoral challenges facing Europe this year, the French Presidential elections were the focus of markets given the importance of the French economy and Marine Le Pen’s call for France to leave the euro. Even if she were to prevail in the runoff, polls suggest a referendum on “Frexit” would fail and that her party would fall well short in mid-June parliamentary elections of the super majority necessary for constitutional changes. Still, a Le Pen victory would have caused economic tremors throughout Europe and called the future of the euro into question. From this perspective, Macron’s strong showing, against the backdrop of EU flags at rallies and in line with the polls, is an important stabilizing result. Now, market attention will now focus on this fall’s German elections, as well as possible early elections in Italy and Greece. In these latter two cases, politics will be affected by the resolution of economic problems—banks in Italy and debt in Greece—that could tell us a lot about Europe’s capacity to come together and solve EU-wide problems in the current environment. At this week’s meetings of the IMF and World Bank, we heard contrasting visions of the future course of economic policy in Europe. I repeatedly heard from European economic policymakers—though I am not sure whether this is hope or real belief—that these elections open a window for greater economic reform and more integration. The idea, as I understand it, is that, should pro-European leaders be elected in France and Germany, the stage would be set later this year for a new compact between the two largest countries in the Eurozone to re-energize the process of monetary and financial union, and address aggressively other challenges facing Europe including security, migration and Brexit. The converse argument, which I find far more compelling, sees a European economy that will continue to be constrained by strong populist and nationalistic pressures. Those pressures, as many have written, have their origin in a long period of poor economic performance reflected in low growth, high unemployment, and unaddressed dislocations from technology and integration. My concern in this context is not only the rise of rejectionist candidates in elections, but also that populism increasingly constrains mainstream politicians, a challenge compounded by the Brexit vote and the difficult negotiations that lie ahead. Polls now show that security and immigration have become the disruptors providing the fuel for the recent rise in discontent with mainstream policies, policymakers and institutions. From this perspective, it is possible to see yesterday's vote, where more than 40 percent voted for Marine Le Pen or Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and representatives of the two leading parties finished third and fifth, as a strong repudiation of the status quo. Europe’s economic future remains uncertain, even in the midst of a modest cyclical recovery. The IMF projects growth in the euro area at 1.7 percent this year and 1.6 percent next year, (1.4 and 1.6 percent in France), which should allow for the continued slow reduction in still too-high unemployment rates. Mildly expansionary fiscal policy, easy financial conditions and a weak euro all support activity. But the IMF cautions that without further reform the “medium-term outlook for the euro area as a whole remains dim, as projected potential growth is held back by weak productivity, adverse demographics, and, in some countries, unresolved legacy problems of public and private debt overhang, with a high level of nonperforming loans.” I still believe that a durable cure for the winds buffeting Europe requires a better economic future—and in the current electoral environment it is extraordinarily difficult to convince voters across the region that greater European integration is the way to get there.
  • Global
    The World Next Week: April 20, 2017
    Podcast
    France holds presidential elections, Manila hosts an ASEAN summit, and Brussels stages a special EU summit to discuss Brexit.
  • Digital Policy
    The French Court Case That Threatens to Bring the "Right to be Forgotten" Everywhere
    Nani Jansen Reventlow is a human rights lawyer with Doughty Street Chambers in London and a Fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. You can follow her @InterwebzNani. A court case in France might drastically change what information individuals can access online. The case is pending before the French Council of State—France’s highest court—and concerns a “right to be forgotten” dispute between Google and the French data protection authority, CNIL. In 2014, CNIL ordered Google to remove twenty-one links from its search results (a process known as delisting) based on a right to be forgotten claim of a French citizen. Under EU law, Europeans can petition a search engine to remove links about them if they believe the links refer to information that is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.” Google implemented the delisting request by making the content inaccessible from all its European Union and European Free Trade Association domains, not only by removing the links from search results on local search sites (e.g., google.fr, google.de, google.ch), but also by blocking the links from search results to European users accessing non-European search sites, such as google.com. However, according to CNIL, this is not enough. CNIL argues the links have to be made unavailable not only in France and Europe, but worldwide. At the center of the dispute lies the question of jurisdiction and the basic premise that every country should regulate matters within its own borders, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances in the offline world are matters that qualify as so-called peremptory norms of international law, issues on which there is a consensus amongst states, such as the obligation to prosecute piracy and the prohibition of slavery and torture. In the online world, there is consensus on the illegality of child pornography, and one might argue that there is a substantial degree of consensus in the field of copyright. There clearly is no such consensus, however, on the meaning of the “right to be forgotten.” Since the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down the Costeja decision establishing the concept in 2014, the scope and meaning of the right to be forgotten has been interpreted in vastly different manners by national courts. A right to be forgotten claim therefore does not provide sufficient legal basis for the data protection authority of one country to determine the accessibility of online content in another. In addition, there is a justified fear that condoning CNIL’s conduct will set a dangerous precedent by opening the door for national authorities worldwide to impose global restrictions on freedom of expression based on standards that are solely grounded in domestic law. There are examples abound of governments trying to police online content in an overly restrictive manner. Giving CNIL the green light will provide online censors convenient precedent to hide behind. In addition, it will create incentives for intermediaries to err on the side of caution when dealing with future delisting requests and make them inclined to accept requests that are overly broad in geographical scope, especially if they don't have the capacity or resources to challenge them. The sheer number of opinion pieces, critiques, and amicus briefs filed in the proceedings in France are a testament to this court case’s potential implications. This week, a coalition of eighteen organizations from the global South filed their submissions, arguing that CNIL’s order is an overly broad restriction of the right to freedom of expression that affects the rights of those seeking information beyond France's borders. This last point is poignantly illustrated by the presence of a number of interveners from francophone countries amongst the coalition. While CNIL’s efforts in protecting the interests of a French citizen may be well-intentioned, the Council of State should be mindful of the implications of its decision in this case, as they extend far beyond the individual who wants their information removed from the web. The internet's brilliance as a shared global resource lies in making content posted by a person in one place available—through a search engine of their choice—to everyone, everywhere, with an internet connection. If the French court is not careful, we may all soon wake up to find the internet an eerily empty place.
  • Europe
    The Future of Europe: The EU at a Crossroads
    Play
    Experts reflect on the development of the European Union (EU) since its creation with the Treaty of Maastricht twenty-five years ago, and evaluate the future of the EU and challenges that lie ahead.
  • Netherlands
    Dutch Elections and the European Economy
    European markets celebrated the strong electoral showing by Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s party (VVD), which looks to ensure another term for him leading a center-right coalition in the Netherlands. The far-right party (PVV) led by Geert Wilders finished second, after leading in the polls through much of the campaign. Other parties performed well, supported by a strong turnout, ensuring a pro-euro coalition can be formed. The vote had become an early proxy for the broader nationalistic winds sweeping Europe. Test passed, the euro rallied more than 1 percent to a five week high of 1.07 against the dollar, and stocks rose across Europe on the news. Still, markets are likely to remain on edge ahead of the declaration of Brexit later this month and French elections in May. While recent polls suggest that Marie Le Pen will fall short in her effort to win the French Presidency, even small changes in her standing or that of alternative parties in Germany (where elections are slated for the fall) are likely to be market-moving in the coming months. And, as I wrote yesterday, the risk of a return of the Greek crisis seems to be underestimated by markets. Against this backdrop, I am surprised that we are not seeing more pressure on the banking systems of France and the periphery of Europe that are seen as most at risk. Beyond these dramatic and hard-to-quantify risks of an election result or a failure of a negotiation that leads to a country exiting the European Union or the euro, the broader challenge facing Europe is the how leaders, even those from mainstream parties, respond to these nationalistic and populist pressures now sweeping the continent. It is not surprising that, seven years after the start of the euro crisis, frustration among voters with a poorly performing European economy and continued austerity is on the rise. This could have a positive outcome, if it leads to countries that have the fiscal space increasing spending to support demand. But, conversely, I am concerned that the ability of political leaders to come together and make decisions on economic policy in the collective interest, whether about Greek debt, Italian banks, or exchange rate policy, will be tested in coming months. While I don’t expect any announcements, soon, such issues will surely be a focus for finance and central bank officials from the G20, meeting this weekend in Baden-Baden.
  • Greece
    Global Economics Monthly: March 2017
    Bottom Line: Greece and its creditors are again locked in a showdown over reforms, cash, and debt relief. Another cliff-hanger ahead of heavy July debt payments looks likely. Extend-and-pretend is a dead end for Greece and an increasingly populist Europe, and a more ambitious agreement seems ruled out by bailout fatigue in creditor countries. Markets are once again underestimating the risks of “Grexit.” The Greek government’s negotiations with Europe and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) once again occupy the front page of the papers, and all parties appear to have learned little from past exercises. Ahead of a March 20 meeting of Eurogroup finance ministers, Greece is resisting reforms to pensions, labor and product markets, and fiscal policy that would unlock the next tranche of assistance and pave the way for negotiations on debt relief at some unspecified future date (certainly after German elections). Creditors are resisting a concrete commitment to debt relief that could mobilize support in Greece for reforms, while the IMF is criticizing both sides and threatening to withhold its endorsement (and financial support) of any deal. Most likely, the standoff will continue until July, when $8 billion in debt payments is due to the European Central Bank, the IMF, and private creditors (see figure 1). Greece appears to have neither the will nor the resources to make those payments, so avoiding default will require European creditors to disburse from their existing loan programs. FIGURE 1. GREEK DEBT REDEMPTION SCHEDULE IN 2017 The expectation that, as in the past, Greece and its creditors will reach a deal at the last minute has provided support to markets. Most investors I talked to also assume that the IMF will soften its opposition to a kick-the-can deal and agree to come along in some form. But short-term agreements to provide more cash for incremental reforms—while deferring concrete decisions on debt—mean that a durable solution to the Greek crisis is becoming more remote. From the start of the Greek drama in 2010, successive Greek governments have prioritized fiscal adjustment while deferring the fundamental structural reforms to the economy that would allow Greece to be competitive in the eurozone over the long term. As a consequence, growth remains anemic (even by the standards of an underperforming eurozone), unemployment is sky high, support for continued adjustment is collapsing, and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s governing majority is shrinking. Recognizing his diminished room to maneuver, Tspiras has hardened his resistance to additional austerity. The deal investors expect is not a deal for Greek growth. THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT Although there will be a strong hint of déjà vu to this story for most readers, there are a few elements different from past negotiations. The first is that the IMF has taken a much firmer stance against the current program, and its fire has been aimed at both the creditors and the debtor. The IMF has been sharply critical of Greece’s structural reform effort, including the country’s reliance on temporary tax measures, a continued massive pension deficit, and its desire to roll back earlier reforms to collective bargaining. But the IMF has also attacked European creditor governments for unrealistic program assumptions and not committing to long-term debt relief. This stance between the two sides—on the one hand attacking the ambitious fiscal targets proposed by creditors as unrealistically austere and unlikely to be achieved, and on the other hand pointing out that more realistic fiscal targets will produce unsustainable levels of debt—has made IMF enemies all around. And, in contrast to past negotiations, the IMF appears to be quite dug in this time. The second new element is the rising populist backlash against continued bailouts in the European Union (EU). I have argued in the past that the primary risk to European economic policymaking may not be the risk of anti-EU parties coming to power but how those rising nationalistic pressures constrain policymaking across Europe and make an agreement among the major countries (much less unanimous agreement across all members of the eurozone) increasing difficult. Such is the case here. Notably, it is extraordinarily difficult for a Dutch or German policymaker, pressured by anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiments at home during an election period, to make precedent-setting concessions to Greece on debt. Those same election pressures create incentives to avoid the chaos that would accompany Grexit, but they also limit the capacity to agree on innovative solutions that would provide hope to Greeks. Late last year, I was convinced that a breakthrough was possible. Greece would commit to additional reforms and European creditors would provide a long-term commitment by capping interest payments. This guarantee would be provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and would represent a transfer of resources to Greece. Specifically, if interest rates remained low the guarantee would not come into play, but if rates rose the ESM would cover the difference between the cost of funding Greece and the capped rate. Viewed from the perspective of today’s markets, this would be a backdoor fiscal transfer from creditor countries to Greece in expected value terms, which would give the IMF (and hopefully markets) confidence that Greece’s debt profile would remain sustainable. I still see merit in such an approach, but against the backdrop of Europe’s challenges, the odds of reaching an agreement during the current electoral cycle seem increasingly remote. The public summary from the IMF board’s most recent meeting on Greece showed unusual candor regarding the extent of disagreement among major countries. Reading through the IMF’s coded language, it is clear that the U.S. government and many others back the IMF’s tough line on the negotiations, which has angered European governments. For the U.S. government in particular, this represents a sharp break from the Barack Obama administration, which pushed for continued IMF involvement. It is unclear at this point whether the change reflects the views of the Donald J. Trump administration, but I would not be surprised if, once the new team is fully in place, the United States takes a tougher stance against large but weak IMF programs. If the IMF is serious in its new firm line on Greece, it may find a strong ally in the Trump administration. CONCLUSION All of this suggests that, for economic and political reasons, the window may be closing on a comprehensive resolution of Greece’s crisis. I would not bet against a deal to buy time, though probably without the involvement of the IMF. With each showdown, the risk increases that the Greek government will decide that its economic future is better outside the eurozone. Looking Ahead: Kahn's take on the news on the horizon BREXIT UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s government still plans to trigger Article 50 before the end of March. But the invocation will likely not occur until late March, and formal talks with the EU will not start until mid-May, further exacerbating the uncertainty of the Brexit process. FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION While recent polls suggest Francois Fillon or Emmanuel Macron to be elected in the incoming French election, a surprise victory of Marine Le Pen remains a risk. CHINA The Chinese government has lowered the annual growth target to around 6.5 percent. The shift of focus to containing the risks of high leverage to financial stability is important. However, more tangible results of economic liberalization, such as reforming state-owned enterprises, are necessary to sustain the growth momentum.
  • Netherlands
    Dutch Elections and the Future of the EU
    The rise of populist Geert Wilders in the Netherlands is showcasing the pressing need for European Union reform, says expert Pieter Cleppe.
  • Trade
    Europe or Anti-Europe?
    MILAN – A knowledgeable friend in Milan recently asked me the following question: “If an outside investor, say, from the United States, wanted to invest a substantial sum in the Italian economy, what would you advise?” I replied that, although there are many opportunities to invest in companies and sectors, the overall investment environment is complicated. I would recommend investing alongside a knowledgeable domestic partner, who can navigate the system, and spot partly hidden risks. Of course, the same advice applies to many other countries as well, such as China, India, and Brazil. But the eurozone is increasingly turning into a two-speed economic bloc, and the potential political ramifications of this trend are amplifying investors’ concerns. At a recent meeting of high-level investment advisers, one of the organizers asked everyone if they thought the euro would still exist in five years. Only one person out of 200 thought that it would not – a rather surprising collective assessment of the trending risks, given Europe’s current economic situation. Right now, Italy’s real (inflation-adjusted) GDP is roughly at its 2001 level. Spain is doing better, but its real GDP is still around where it was in 2008, just prior to the financial crisis. And Southern European countries, including France, have experienced extremely weak recoveries and stubbornly high unemployment – in excess of 10%, and much higher for people younger than 30. Sovereign debt levels, meanwhile, have approached or exceeded 100% of GDP (Italy’s is now at 135%), while both inflation and real growth – and thus nominal growth – remain low. This lingering debt overhang is limiting the ability to use fiscal measures to help restore robust growth. The competitiveness of eurozone economies’ tradable sectors varies widely, owing to divergences that emerged after the common currency was first launched. While the euro’s recent weakening will blunt the impact of some of these divergences, it will not eliminate them entirely. Germany will continue to run large surpluses; and countries where the ratio of unit labor costs to productivity is high will continue to generate insufficient growth from trade. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the conventional wisdom has been that a long, difficult recovery for eurozone economies will eventually lead to strong growth. But this narrative is losing credibility. Rather than slowly recovering, Europe seems to be trapped in a semi-permanent low-growth equilibrium. Eurozone countries’ social policies have blunted the distributional impact of job and income polarization fueled by globalization, automation, and digital technologies. But these countries (and, to be fair, many others) still must reckon with three consequential changes affecting the global economy since around the year 2000. First, and closest to home, the euro was introduced without complementary fiscal and regulatory unification. Second, China joined the World Trade Organization, and became more thoroughly integrated into global markets. And, third, digital technologies began to have an ever-larger impact on economic structures, jobs, and global supply chains, which significantly altered global employment patterns, and accelerated the pace of routine-job loss. Shortly thereafter, between 2003 and 2006, Germany implemented far-reaching reforms to improve structural flexibility and competitiveness. And, in 2005, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement lapsed. Without the MFA, which had underpinned quotas for textile and apparel exports since 1974, global textile manufacturing became heavily concentrated in China and, surprisingly, Bangladesh. In 2005 alone, China doubled its textile and apparel exports to the West. This development had a particularly adverse effect on Europe’s poorer regions and less competitive developing countries around the world. These changes created a growth-pattern imbalance across a wide range of countries. As many countries took measures to address shortfalls in aggregate demand, sovereign debt increased, and debt-fueled housing bubbles expanded. These growth patterns were unsustainable, and when they eventually broke down, underlying structural weaknesses were laid bare. Resistance to the current system is now growing. The United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election as US president both reflected public discontent with the distributional aspects of recent growth patterns. And rising support for populist, nationalist, and anti-euro parties could pose a serious threat to Europe as well, not least in large eurozone countries such as France and Italy. Whether or not these parties succeed at the ballot box in the immediate future, their emergence should cast doubt on overly sanguine views about the euro’s longevity. Anti-euro political forces are clearly making electoral inroads, and they will continue to gain ground as long as growth remains anemic and unemployment remains high. In the meantime, the EU will most likely not pursue substantial policy or institutional reforms in the near term, for fear that doing so could adversely affect the outcome of consequential elections this year in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and possibly Italy. Of course, an alternative view holds that Brexit, Trump’s election, and the rise of populist and nationalist parties will serve as a wake-up call, and spur Europe toward broader integration and growth-oriented policies. This would require EU policymakers to abandon the view that each country is solely responsible for getting its own house in order, while upholding EU fiscal, financial, and regulatory commitments. Upholding EU rules is no longer practical, because the current system imposes too many constraints and contains too few effective adjustment mechanisms. To be sure, fiscal, structural, and political reforms are sorely needed; but they will not be sufficient to solve Europe’s growth problem. The bitter irony in all of this is that eurozone countries have enormous growth potential across a wide variety of sectors. Far from being basket cases, they simply need the system’s constraints to be loosened. Will Europe’s future resemble a slow-motion train wreck, or will a new generation of younger leaders pivot toward deeper integration and inclusive growth? It is hard to say, and I, for one, would not dismiss either possibility. One thing seems clear: the status quo is unstable and cannot be sustained indefinitely. Absent a marked shift in policies and economic trajectory, the political circuit breakers will be tripped at some point, just as they have been in the US and the UK. This article originally appeared on project-syndicate.org. 
  • United States
    President Trump’s Unlikely Effect on the U.S.-EU Tech Relationship
    Marietje Schaake is a member of the European Parliament from the Netherlands. You can follow her @MarietjeSchaake The contrast between the early days of the Trump and Obama administrations could not be greater. President Obama started with record high approval ratings around the world, including in Europe. President Trump began by cozying up to the anti-establishment nationalist Nigel Farage and set the United States on a course toward greater nationalism and protectionism. “America first” will rattle the transatlantic relationship and blunt the ability of United States and Europe to jointly lead in setting global rules based on universal values of open societies, rules-based trade, and human rights. But those looking back to the Obama years as a high point of value-based cooperation are viewing history through rose-colored glasses. The U.S.-EU relationship was rocky, especially with respect to tech policy and ensuring that the rule of law is respected and transposed to online life. Whereas Europeans tend to consider privacy rights as non-negotiable, Americans are often quick to dismiss European concerns as over-regulation not in their economic interest. The transatlantic relationship on tech policy matters was challenging even before President Trump. Tech executives were often quick to label any initiative under the EU’s Digital Single Market, a policy designed to harmonize rules across twenty-eight jurisdictions, as protectionism. Silicon Valley libertarians saw almost all policy as obstructionist and believed optimal outcomes could be engineered, not legislated. Companies benefitted from the failure of regulatory efforts to keep up with the speed of innovation. Even Edward Snowden’s revelations did not lead companies to reassess their approach to collecting Europeans’ data, although they did create tensions with Washington. In the absence of legislation adapted for the digital age, U.S. and EU-based courts were left to determine whether breaking encryption is legitimate or whether an EU citizen’s Facebook data could be transferred to the United States in compliance with EU law. Concern with the power of the surveillance state might have initially been tempered in the Bay area because President Obama was “their guy” and understood tech. With President Trump in the White House, that no longer applies. The benefit of having strong checks and balances to limit the power of both government and the private sector is hopefully clearer now for those in the Valley. Americans seeking to put a check on the Trump administration by renewing their commitment to diversity, the rule of law, and open borders online and offline may find more allies in Brussels than in Washington. Silicon Valley’s ethos now seems more aligned with Europe’s values than those embodied in the Trump administration. This shared self-interest could form the basis of a new digital transatlantic relationship. The form of this new relationship is starting to take shape. Tech giants are united in pushing back President Trump’s executive order on immigration. Microsoft and Google are leading the fight to limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. law by fighting overbroad seizure warrants. Nevertheless, more needs to be done. U.S. surveillance authorities still do too little to protect the universal rights of those beyond its shores. It remains unclear whether an individual’s rights are protected based on where they reside or where the company that collects their data is incorporated. Given the immense market power of U.S. tech companies, what happens in the United States will shape laws elsewhere. The manner in which the United States defends online rights, in turn affects the ability of the United States and the European Union to set global norms together. It will be harder to promote net neutrality in developing economies if the new Federal Communications Commission chairman is committed to repealing its protections domestically. It will be harder to promote shared norms for appropriate state behavior in cyberspace if the United States is not seen as abiding by them. Warmer relations with illiberal governments will make the case for liberal democracy a tougher sell. With the president’s approval at historic lows and concerns about his policies growing, the digital transatlantic relationship must be shaped not by government-to-government ties, but rather through clusters of businesses, civil society groups and governments that share the same values. U.S. tech companies should join Europeans in their calls to ensure values such as fair competition, access to information, free speech and non-discrimination are upheld. With the change in the White House, the promotion of these fundamental rights might not be a side-project or diversion from a tech company’s bottom line. On the contrary, it might in their own self-interest. The Trump administration may inadvertently re-align the U.S.-EU tech relationship in unexpected ways.