Europe and Eurasia

United Kingdom

  • Trade
    Meeting the New Global Challenges
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    New York, NY ROBERT E. RUBIN:  I'm Bob Rubin and I'm pleased to welcome all of you, both here in the room and also around the country and around the world, via teleconference, to our Council on Foreign Relations meeting. We are exceedingly honored to have with us a very, very special guest, Gordon Brown, prime minister of the United Kingdom.  As is the practice of the council, I will not recite from his resume.  It's in your materials.  But I would like to relate two brief anecdotes which, I think, shed a little bit of light on our distinguished speaker. When the Labor Party was running to unseat John Major's Conservative Party, Gordon Brown as the then, I guess, shadow chancellor visited Washington.  My deputy secretary, Larry Summers, told me, said, this guy is really bright; he's really smart; he's really thoughtful; he's like us.  (Laughter.) I'm not sure he meant us.  I think he meant something a little more limited.  But in any event -- (laughter) -- he said, you really ought to meet him.  So I was pleased to be thought to be up to that standard.  (Laughter.) So I met with the shadow chancellor.  And indeed he was exactly what Larry said.  And that was the beginning of a fabulous relationship.  And when Gordon Brown became chancellor, he worked very closely with Larry and myself and, after I left, with Larry as secretary.  And it was really a remarkably good working relationship. Fast forward to two-three years ago, when Gordon Brown was prime minister.  And he invited me to London to be with him, as he was going to speak to some British businesspeople.  And I was going to say a word or two. And I said afterwards to people that it was really a remarkable speech.  It was a sound and sensible path forward on economic policy.  And it was remarkably candid and thoughtful on issues that American politicians find very difficult to talk about: trade, regulation and the like. So at a time when the global economy is struggling, as all of us know so well, through the most difficult stresses, I would say, since the 1930s, not only the U.K. but the global economy is fortunate to have a leader of the extraordinary stature, effectiveness, thoughtfulness and intelligence of Gordon Brown. The prime minister will begin our session with a few comments on meeting the new global challenges.  And he and I will have a little conversation, which will consist of my posing questions and his providing wisdom in response.  Then we'll open up to questions from all of us -- all the rest of -- all the people here and also around the nation, around the world. This session will be on the record.  And please turn off your cell phones. With that, it is my honor and pleasure to introduce our friend, the council's friend and the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown.  (Applause.) PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN:  Can I say, first of all, what a great privilege it is to speak to the Council for Foreign Relations?  Set up almost 90 years ago to bridge differences that existed in the world, to build links between America and Europe and today producing outstanding work under Richard Haass's leadership -- and so I'm very grateful to have the opportunity to speak to you today. This council has been renowned for furthering debate on new ideas and new insights into both the world economy and our world society.  And what we need now, in my view, is new ideas and new insights into how we can deal with what is a quite unique and unprecedented problem, which I describe as the first problems of the new global age. One of my predecessors as an economic advisor was John Maynard Keynes.  And John Maynard Keynes did not have the same good fortune when he put new ideas to the British government in the 1920s and '30s.  He produced what he called his "solution to unemployment" as early as 1929.  He sent it to the Treasury -- the Treasury where I was a minister before.  When I arrived at the Treasury, I walked into the Treasury library for a day and I found the copy of Keynes's book that he had sent to the Treasury for their ideas -- with all ideas -- (inaudible) -- should, I argue, have been adopted at the time.  And on it was only three words from the British treasury.  The permanent secretary had written:  inflation, extravagance, bankruptcy.  (Laughter.)  And that is how Mr. Keynes was dealt with. When he came to Washington in the 1940s to produce his great plans for the IMF to be an independent central bank, he arrived at the U.S. Treasury on his own, unaccompanied, just the sole representative of the British government's position.  He met the Treasury secretary and the Treasury secretary said, "Hello."  He said, "Where's your lawyer?"  And he said, "Why haven't you got your lawyer?"  And then the Treasury says, "Who does your thinking for you?"  (Laughter.) Now, I'm also delighted to be here with my old friend Bob Rubin, who's been a mentor to me over the years.  And I'm very grateful for the time that he gave me, not only when we were in government but when we were preparing for government.  And he was very kind to us indeed. I suppose he got some of the similar advice that I got when I became chancellor of the Exchequer and the finance minister.  One of my predecessors sent me this note with three envelopes included inside it. And he said, look, things are going to get bad; then they might get worse and then they might get terrible.  If things get bad, open the first envelope.  If they get worse, open the second.  And if they get really critical, open the third. And so as you do, the first crisis comes, you open the envelope and you get pretty good advice:  Blame your predecessor.  (Laughter.)  The second crisis comes, and you get quite good advice.  It says, blame the statistics.  (Laughter.)  And then the third crisis gets worse and worse.  So you open the envelope, and it says, start writing three envelopes to your successor, to your successor.  (Laughter.) We are, we are in what, I believe, is a unique set of events.  I believe it is the first financial crisis of the global age.  I believe it's also the first resources crisis of the global age. I believe what we've seen, in the last 10 years, is some of the great things that globalization can offer, which makes me positive about an open, free market, inclusive and sustainable globalization. We've seen cheaper consumer products available to millions of people, who otherwise would not have been able to buy them, as a result of the changes that have been taking place, in manufacturing, all over the world. We've seen a period of low interest rates, partly as a result of the disinflationary effect, of what has actually happened, coming out of China and out of Asia. We've seen, as a result, many hundreds of thousands of people taken out of poverty, in some of the poorest countries, as a result of the developing of these economies. But we have four problems that arise inevitably, from the globalization of new economies, problems that were going to have to be solved anyway.  But problems if solved can point to an opportunity-rich future. The problems are, of course, the restructuring of industries and services that have to take place.  And I think we know ourselves that that is what is happening in our own countries at the moment. The second is, of course, the resources problems.  We've had a period where there's been demand for all the resources higher than our ability to supply, particularly a growing Chinese-Asian oil-producing countries population wanting to have not only resources but wanting to have better-quality food and wanting to have access to all the commodities that we have access to.  That is a problem that globalization will always have to deal with. We've got a third problem.  And that is the gap between rich and poor countries.  We've got to be very careful, as people know what is happening round the world, that resentments don't build up.  And we have a duty to do something about that as well. And of course, the fourth problem is the financial system, that we have now global flows of capital, global financial arrangements.  But we don't necessarily have a global means of dealing with these problems, between continents, when they arise. But my view is an optimistic one.  If we solve these problems, which are inherent in the move to a global economy, then we can be very optimistic about the future. Whatever happens in the next 20 years, I believe that the world economy will double in size.  Simply the pressures in China, Asia and elsewhere; people becoming consumers as well as producers; the rise of some of the oil-producing countries, Africa -- the world will double in its economic size in 20 years.  And to put it one way, that's twice as many opportunities there for good businesses to sell their products. Put another way, there's going to be a billion new skilled jobs in that world economy over these next 20 years.  And what I see us doing at the moment -- and perhaps it's giving a longer-term perspective to the present troubles we face -- is that we've got the birth pangs of this new global order.  We're having to deal with the problems of them.  We are in the transition to what I believe is a more opportunity-rich economy for the future.  And we have now, instead of just muddling through, dealing with this crisis, as people think we are doing at the moment, we've got to show people that we're actually making the adjustments in the proper way to this global age.  And if we are successful, I believe that American firms, British firms, with the great technologies that we have, with the high valued-added goods and services we can produce, with the ingenuity of our scientists and innovators, we are extremely well-placed to benefit from the expansion of the global economy in the years to come. But first we've got to deal with these problems.  Restructuring -- it seems to me we would be sending an illusion to people if we gave the impression that every job that is at risk at the moment is one that will always be there when this crisis is over.  Instead we've got to say to people we cannot help, necessarily, in some cases, you to keep the last job, but we will help you get the next job.  And that's what a positive approach to an open, flexible and inclusive globalization is about.  When restructuring is taking place, we will help you with the skills you need, with the training opportunities you may not have yet, and with obviously the -- dealing with all the other facilities and help and information, (advice, people ?), to get the next job.  And that, in my view, is dependent -- us remaining an open and not protectionist economy. If we have an open, inclusive, flexible and sustainable globalization, we can bring people to see the benefit of it.  If it is simply open free trade and flexible, then there will be a protectionist reaction from people who feel they'll not included.  If it is not open, of course, it is simply protectionist in the first place.  And I believe that the dividing line here is between an open society that is capable of trading round the world, benefitting from the openness that you have, against a protectionist response, which is similar to what happened in the 1930s and totally unacceptable.  So the restructuring must take place on the basis of helping people into the next jobs, but at the same time making sure that we keep our economy open. I think when resources -- we're learning now that long-term demand for oil, commodities and food is going to grow, even though there has been a lull in the last few months.  We've therefore got to have an energy and environment policy that is fit for the times.  And I believe we've got to diversify out of oil into nuclear, is my view -- some would say that's wrong -- renewables, into persuading the oil countries to recycle their revenues, particularly into non-oil sources of energy investment in the longer term, so that we have a stable energy policy, rather than a high and volatile oil price.  And I believe, having talked to the Saudis and other countries in the OPEC states, this is actually possible -- a coordinated approach from consumers and producers, to get what we need, which is stability in energy prices. And I believe you solve three problems by doing that.  The first problem is obviously the problem of the volatility, oil price and its affordability.  The second is obviously our climate change challenges, where we need to diversify out of fossil fuels, and therefore a huge climate change and environmental initiative is possible as a result of that and could be a huge job creator.  And the third thing, of course, is the strategic problems.  We've got to deal with strategic problems where we're dependent on volatile states for the supply of our energy.  And if you could deal with these three problems by having coordination on the energy and environmental problems that we face, leading to Copenhagen next year, I believe we'd make a major advance in showing that we can work together to make globalization work. But the third problem is the one we're facing at the moment, and that the is the financial sector issues.  And when you see that share prices have gone down 40 percent in the year, when you see a trillion of write-offs taking place, when you see the slowdown and actually stalling of lending in different countries, when you see the number of banks that have had to be recapitalized, you know that we have, in my view, four big problems to solve in this area before we can say that we've got the global path to recovery that we need. We realize that liquidity was not enough.  We realized that the other means of raising funding -- through sovereign wealth funds and through private equity and also through issuing shares to the public -- were not going to work to restructure and recapitalize our banks. So we made the decision to recapitalize our banks as a government, and I'm pleased to say that large numbers of countries round the world have recognized that that is the way to bring back the confidence into the banking system. Now the problem we have to solve -- and it's worth a debate on this in itself -- is how we can get the resumption of lending that is necessary for small businesses to have the cash flow, people to be able in new circumstances to take out mortgages.  Our problem, by the way, in Britain is not a shortage -- demand for housing -- we have not overbuilt, but that is an issue that's got to be solved obviously in different ways in different countries. So the first is the recapitalization of the system and the resumption of lending.  And that is a priority for gaining confidence. The second is obviously making monetary policy work to best effect.  And you in America have reduced interest rates to 1 percent.  You probably know in the European area we've been slower to do so.  We're at 3-1/4 percent in the ECB, 3 percent in the United Kingdom. There is scope, therefore, as the governor of the Bank of England has said, for further reduction in interest rates, and that is an essential element of what we are doing. But as Keynes recognized in the 1930s, when he talked about the problems of not being able to see the effective action -- the effective response that he expected from interest rates, you've got to look at other means too.  And a fiscal response, in my view, in a situation where we've moved from high inflation last year to what will be low inflation -- very low inflation indeed, as a result of the fall of the oil prices and the fall in food prices next year -- to move from a situation of high inflation to low inflation makes it possible, I think, to argue that countries should be involved, if possible, in a coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus, if possible countries across borders agreeing that the fiscal stimulus they take will complement the stimulus in other countries, and then the benefits of the stimulus don't leak in the way that they have traditionally tended to leak, and you get the benefit being greater in individual countries from the action that is taken cooperatively together. Now this is a huge debate about what works fiscally, whether it's tax cuts, whether it's public works investment, whether it's incentives for the lower-paid, who have a greater propensity to spend.  But these are the issues that I think every country is now grappling with, that you need to coordinate the re-stabilization of banks and the resumption of lending with monetary policy that is active.  But that will not work in itself unless it is now backed by fiscal stimulus. Germany announced a fiscal stimulus a few days ago; equally, China announced a fiscal stimulus just before the meeting we're having in Washington.  (Australia has just now ?) done so.  Other countries around the world are doing so.  And I believe the more we can coordinate that fiscal and monetary stimulus, the more we can give confidence that the economy can move forward. Roosevelt said there is nothing to fear but far itself.  I think the corollary of that is, confidence in the future depends on people being confident today.  And we have got to ensure that we can build confidence through the actions that governments take. Now, the fourth area is, of course, the reforms in the international financial system and in our own domestic systems that are clearly necessary.  The principles on which we will build the reforms, without going into the details, are, first of all, transparency; responsibility -- people taking responsibility in the companies they're involved in; integrity -- removing conflicts of interest in the system.  Some banking practice is obvious.  But also to try and build global financial arrangements that meet the needs of what is now a wholly global economy. And that's why we have been looking at the reform of international monitoring.  First of all, of course, it's got to help distressed economies from Hungary to Pakistan, to now other countries like Iceland, that have come to the International Monetary Fund for help.  The World Bank has got to help those developing countries that face huge rises in oil and food prices.  That is absolutely necessary. A world trade deal is absolutely crucial, in my view, to send a message that protectionism is unacceptable and we're not going back to the problems of the 1930s.  But we need to rebuild these international institutions:  to have an early warning system so that we are better prepared for what happens; to have greater cooperation across borders between supervisors and regulators so that there is cross-border supervision where it is necessary; to have a better crisis prevention mechanism so that when things happen, the international community can come together more effectively -- and that has been missing there for some of the period in which we've been dealing with this financial crisis; to have a better surveillance of the world economy and therefore a better guide for countries in difficulty to take action there for the future. And I have no doubt that out of the discussions we are having -- and I know you've got big study groups looking at this -- we'll have an international financial monetary fund that looks more like an independent central bank, where we'll have a World Bank that looks like a bank for the environment as well as development, and we will reform the relationships between the Financial Stability Forum, the Bank of International Settlements, and international institutions.  But the whole purpose of this is so that we can better coordinate our actions to deal with the fact that we have a global economy. In 1933, the World Economic Conference was held in London.  It was a conference that was supposed to bring the countries together, to prevent protectionism and to deal with the problems together.  That conference failed.  And as a result of that, protectionism was rampant in the 1930s, and many of the other problems that we all know about that flowed from it. I believe that international cooperation is absolutely essential, and I believe that the meeting in Washington is the first stage of a number of meetings that we need to have to deal with all these problems together, not simply the global financial system, but the global energy problems that we've got to deal with and, of course, how we help with the restructuring of our industries and services over a longer period of time and whether there is common action we can take -- (inaudible). Churchill once said, when the World Economic Conference broke down, that politicians were resolved to be (irresolute ?), adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, and all-powerful for impotence.  (Laughter.)  He also, by the way, said that politicians usually get things right after trying everything else.  (Laughter.) But the point I would make this morning:  We have got to be resolved, we have got to be adamant, we have got to be determined.  There is a way forward to an optimistic view of a global economy as it develops to serve us.  We are in the transition to that better economy; regard these as the problems that we have got to solve so that we have the stronger future that I believe is possible.  But let us make sure that we work together, Britain and America, America and Europe, America, Europe and the rest of the world, to solve these problems together. Thank you very much.  (Applause.) RUBIN:  That was terrific, Gordon.  (Applause continues.) Well, you can now see why I made the comment in my brief opening remarks that when you hear the prime minister speak, you do get a sense of somebody who really has his arms around the issues of the global economy and is extraordinarily sound, sensible, and, I would say, courageous in laying out a way forward. Let me ask you a micro-question, if I may, Prime Minister.  This thing that we were discussing before -- how do you reconcile the call for fiscal stimulus across many nations with the current fiscal imbalances that your country has and our country has and a number of other countries have? BROWN:  Well, first, they've got to be temporary.  So you've got to be absolutely clear that these are temporary stimuluses that are necessary to take us out of this position that we're in, working with monetary policy.  And secondly, you've got to have a sustainable path back to sustainable finances.  So you've got a path back to sustainable finances. Now, I believe if you do these two things, then it -- then this is a necessary means of taking us through this difficult period of time.  And I would like us to think, when we're looking at a fiscal stimulus, is what is necessary not just to take us through the difficult times but at the same time to build for what we need to do for the future.  I mean, it's absolutely clear that if we're going to succeed in a global economy, education, infrastructure, technological infrastructure, science, innovation all are going to be important, getting people who are unemployed and others with skills that are necessary for the future.  And I would like us to be able to think of the policies that we're pursuing as at least, in some cases, contributing to that vision of a society where we have the value-added products based on higher levels of skill and innovation.  And what we're trying to do is to encourage ourselves along that path. If you look at Germany at the moment, Germany's got 55 percent debt, as a proportion of its national income.  It's got a fiscal stimulus.  France is about 55 percent; fiscal stimulus.  We're about, at the moment, 37 percent of debt, and (I should mention ?) I think we can afford to do this, even if the current borrowing is high. And I think America's in the same position.  Your debt's about 35 percent, excluding what you've had to do with Fannie Maes and everything else, and I think you're in a position to take the action that is necessary. I think we've reached the stage where monetary policy must be accompanied by fiscal policy.  And we can, I think, show that in a period where you've got very low inflation coming next year -- I mean, there's no doubt, unless things dramatically change, that some countries could have zero inflation next year -- that this is not the time to prevent fiscal policy helping and supporting monetary policy. RUBIN:  And how would you -- that's -- BROWN:  (Inaudible.) RUBIN:  Right.  (Chuckles.)  And -- but how would you -- would you -- how would you try to construct a link between that and a longer-term path, as you describe it? BROWN:  Well, that's the issue that we're looking at.  Clearly, one area is in the environment, and obviously a lot of people are thinking about how you can make the changes that will make you more environmentally sensitive and more environmentally efficient while at the same time taking people through this crisis.  So I mean -- and obviously the very small thing is in insulation of people's home -- draft-proofing, building low-carbon homes and taking that industry forward. Large numbers of jobs can be created in green industries and green technologies in the future.  It could be for employment that IT was in the 1990s, a big expanding area of employment.  But I think you've got to tailor your incentives properly for that to happen. To be honest, it would be far better if other countries were doing this as well.  It would be far better if there's a coordinated approach to invest in environmental technologies, industries and skills, so that you could see the rest of the world responding to the climate change agenda as well.  But I think there's a lot of scope for international talk on that. There are other areas -- transport, infrastructure -- but what people are looking at at the moment is what we have learned from the past about what actually works as an immediate fiscal stimulus.  Tax cuts, I think probably half -- less than half your tax cuts a few months ago were spent; they were saved.  Public works, the time it takes to get public works projects up -- these are all the issues that we've got to deal with.  People with a propensity to consume -- that is, lower-income citizens -- obviously, are more likely to spend if credits are higher.  These are all the things that we've got -- you've got to look at. But again, I just say that the benefits of a fiscal stimulus -- temporary as it's going to be, the benefits would be all that greater if other countries are part of it.  And that's, I think, an important point that we've all got to recognize. RUBIN:  Can I ask you a different question, Prime Minister, sort of step back for a moment? Every economy has some balance between -- or every modern economy has some balance between market-based economics and globalization, on the one hand, and then the role of government performing the various purposes that markets by their nature can't perform.  How do you think this crisis and everything around it is going to affect that balance across the world -- the U.K., continental Europe, the United States, around the world? BROWN:  But we're a market economy, and nothing that we -- RUBIN:  It's a political question more than anything else. BROWN:  Yeah, but I think -- I think it's important to say that, you know, having bought shares in banks to keep them going, we've got no intention of being permanent shareholders of banks.  We want to pass these shares to other investors as soon as possible.  So this is not an era where you're going to see government, in my view, wanting, for ideological or other reasons, to take over and put into the public sector things that have been in the private sector for years. I think what we're seeing is redefining of the relationship between the individual markets and (state ?).  I think that happened in the 1930s and '40s -- the '30s in America, '40s in Britain.  I think it's happening now. You see, for an individual, what they need to face with the challenges of globalization is obviously going to be higher skills. I mean, the value of their labor is going to lie in their skills.  And so government must have a role in making sure that the investment is available for education and for research and innovation, so that we get the best skilled, the best creative, the best innovative people. So the investments in education, in my view, are going to go up.  And I would say that an economy that's not investing 10 percent, public or private, in education soon will not be an economy that's going to do as well in the future as others who are. I think the second thing is, we're realizing, there are strategic markets.  So you cannot in the long run, I think, everyone would agree, have an economy that is wholly dependent on the volatile commodity of oil.  And it's caused havoc in the last year, because standards of living have fallen dramatically.  Now even with the prices down, the volatility makes people worried about investing, even if you're oil producers with massive, massive resources. So we've got to do something about what is actually an impassive market, the oil market.  Because if there's a cartel, it's not actually market.  People are prevented from investing in different countries.  There are so many rules that prevent others being involved in the decision-making process in OPEC.  So we've got to look at oil and energy as a strategic market.  I think we've got to look at financial services, round the world, as a strategic issue. So while it doesn't affect my view of the importance of market economies, it does affect my view of how we could better coordinate, in those strategic areas: finance, energy.  And I think food is another area where we've really got to look at what we can do.  Because it is absolutely -- just one point. Africa is a net importer of food.  Africa has got 70 percent of the population on the land.  It is absolutely scandalous that the level of agriculture productivity, in Africa, is so low that they cannot even feed their own people, with 70 percent of the people on the land. Now, if we could make it possible for Africa to become more productive, with investment in food, then Africa could help feed the world.  And these food shortages that have existed, over these last few years, because we haven't made some of the big and bold decisions we should, about protections in food and subsidies in food, are something that, I think, we've got to deal with. So oil and food are examples where we've actually got markets that don't work well at all.  And they should be working better. RUBIN:  Let me ask you two more questions, if I may. The first one is, in the time that you were chancellor, and I was secretary, we worked together globally on crises in emerging-market countries.  When you get beyond that, there really isn't much evidence of effective global coordination, I would argue, in the economic arena. BROWN:  Well, let me say, first of all, you were absolutely brilliant; the response to the Asian crisis and to the problems in Latin America.  I'm not as modest a man as Larry, you know. (Laughter, cross talk.) RUBIN:  Those are standards that I'm not going to discuss.  (Laughter.) BROWN:  But you and Larry did a wonderful job.  And people forget that the last 10 years, you had the Russian crisis.  You had the Asian crisis.  You then had the IT bubble.  You then had a Wall Street crash.  You had a recession in America.  The beginning was 2001. These are all problems that we've had to deal with.  And this is a bigger problem.  It's partly because of the global economy that we've got these problems.  They couldn't have happened, in the same way, in any other decade, just because of the nature of the global spread of the problem so quickly and the fact that you're dealing with global commodities like oil and figuring the effect that they have. Yet we're better at dealing with problems in individual countries.  But I think we've got to learn, as we tried to do, in the 1970s -- (inaudible) -- not terribly successful in the end, but I mean the G-7 and the G-8. The G-7 came together because of these problems.  And we've got to get the right mechanisms, which is broader now than the G-8, for dealing with these problems.  But I sense, in talking to Premier Wen in China, as I've done on a few occasions, that they now appear that they want to be part of this international order. Now, that carries responsibilities as well as opportunities.  But I think there is a chance that people are looking over the precipice, seeing what's actually happening and now know that the cooperation that perhaps has been tenuous and not really been at a regular level, in the way they should be, can now be made into a more permanent arrangement of continuous cooperation between people. RUBIN:  Just to wind that up, you think that will be institutionalized in some way that will involve countries ceding some degree of their sovereignty to some sort of a national structure. BROWN:  Well, in 1945, when the IMF and the World Bank were created, there was this massive optimism about what could be achieved.  And people were prepared to say that prosperity is indivisible.  They were prepared to contribute to the IMF, to give it powers to do things. And you know, they said, at the time in these great visionary statements, that prosperity to be sustained had to be shared.  And you had the Marshall Plan and its effect on Europe at the time as well.  And I think we've lost sight of some of that visionary idealism.  But we have got to see it restored, in my view. And people should be prepared to say, in the interests of a well-functioning global economy, where what happens in America affects everywhere else, and what can happen in the poorest country and the poorest city can affect the richest city, as we've learned, in the world here, that we have got to find a better mechanism for working together. So I still say the IMF and the Financial Stability Forum; you've got to have reform there.  But I think it could be done.  And I know we've had these debates about that, because you were party to setting up the Financial Stability Forum with us in 1998.  And then the World Bank, I think, could play a lighter role as well. The fact is, these institutions were built for the problems of 1945 -- (inaudible) -- problems in individual countries.  They were built for closed economies and sheltered economies.  They were in a completely different world. And we should respond likewise to create these international institutions that mean something, for what we've got to do, with global stores of capital, global competition and problems that can only be solved globally, as you know, with climate change and, to a great extent, this financial problem. RUBIN:  My final question is this. If you go back -- I don't know when it was exactly, but you'll remember better than I -- you were having considerable political difficulty.  Now you're an acclaimed leader -- (laughter) -- you are -- in the global community, in the U.K. (Audio break.) How would you recommend, to future political figures, when they have some difficulty, working your way through that and then getting to where you are today? BROWN:  Just everybody should know that every politician will go through ups and downs.  I actually think that -- RUBIN:  Which is more fun? BROWN:  (Laughs.)  If you can treat the downs with equanimity, you can enjoy the ups.  (Laughs.)  But I think that there's two things happening.  When people -- people are clearly skeptical of whether politicians can come together to take action and don't like divisive politics.  You know that great line, Shelley talking about his grandmother applied to politics -- politicians -- people say they've lost the art of communication, but not, alas, the gift of speech.  (Laughs, laughter.) And I suppose the second thing is I think one of the problems in politics is people taking the short-term view.  And I think you really have got to take a long-term view.  The question is can you persuade the electorate that -- you know, if you're going to succeed in a global world -- if you're going to succeed, you've got to have better skills and invest in that, better science and invest in that, get a better planning system and more flexibility in your labor market, build your transport infrastructure.  Now, all these are long-term decisions.  You don't get an immediate payback the next day.  And you've got to somehow persuade people that while, as Keynes said, in the long run we're all dead, the long run is still worthwhile, investing.  (Laughs.) RUBIN:  Which convinces me we should rejoin the mother country.  But anyway -- (laughter) -- be that as it may, we are now open to questions.  Who would like to start us off?  Way in the back.  Yeah. QUESTIONER:  Good morning, sir.  Kevin Owens.  I'm here with the council.  Both of our nations have significant troop numbers in Afghanistan.  And you've recently stated this remains of national interest to Great Britain.  And the United States is going to increase their troop numbers in the coming months.  If you would, for us, please define what that end state or success may look like in Afghanistan and what the keys of that success are. BROWN:  Well, there are 41 countries part of the coalition in Afghanistan.  And we shouldn't forget that, that the world has come together in the way that it didn't come together over Iraq to mount an effort to keep the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan, stop the Taliban and al Qaeda linking up as a concerted group and therefore stopping what happens in Afghanistan arriving in the streets of America and in the streets of Britain. So to that extent, it's the front line against the Taliban and also the strengthening of al Qaeda.  And I think we've got to do more to persuade public opinion that let Afghanistan go and you will immediately have problems with both the Taliban taking power back in Afghanistan but also with the al Qaeda strengthened for the things that they would want to do in other countries. Now, I think the problem in Afghanistan is it cannot just be a military solution.  Afghanistan is a vast country.  The governance of Afghanistan is still through tribes as well as through central government.  We perhaps have got to have a better relationship with the local organizations that are actually working, while not having a relationship with those of the tribes that are associated with the drug trafficking. We've got to do more on the economic and social development of Afghanistan to give people a stake in the future.  We've got this big dam project that will open up a great deal of irrigation and everything else, but there are economic and social initiatives we've got to take.  And we've got to train the Afghan army and the Afghan police.  I don't think the Afghan people -- girls now in schools, where they were banned from schools under the Taliban -- they're people who suffered huge injuries and violence against them because they stood out against the Taliban.  I don't think there's a popular will to have the Taliban back.  But I think you've got to show that governance in Afghanistan is working both at a local and a national level. Now, our challenge is to persuade other countries to be part not only of the coalition but of the burden-sharing.  America's the largest contributor of troops.  Britain's the second largest contributor of troops.  Three countries have announced that they will want to pull their troops out by 2010, 2011.  I think we've got to persuade people if we're going to succeed here then it's got to be on the basis of burden-sharing and all countries who have got an interest in the future should be part either of the military action or supporting with equipment, helicopters and everything else, or helping with the doubling of the training of the Afghan army and making a police that is free from corruption.  These are the problems we've got to deal with. And I think what you'll see in the next few months -- and I think President Bush has already been starting this process of complementing the military action -- which of course has had to change its tactics because of the way the Taliban are operating on a guerrilla warfare now, not head-to-head conflict but guerrilla warfare with roadside bombs -- get our military position right, but complement that with economic, social and actually political initiatives to work with the tribes to see if we can get a better position in swatting the Taliban. Now, just one other thing.  We've got solve the problem of the Pakistani-Afghan border in doing so. QUESTIONER:  This may sound like a strange question, but to follow-up, is there any chance China would put troops in? BROWN:  I think we've got to -- we've got to look at that as a possibility for the future.  I think that's -- I think the 41 countries being in -- not just NATO countries, obviously, countries from all over the world,  I think people do see this as the front line against the return of at least a country that is totally taken over by a terrorist group. RUBIN:  Yes, ma'am. QUESTIONER:  Morning.  Paula Broadwell at King's College London and Harvard University.  My question is also about China.  What role -- you've been an advocate for China playing a larger role in solving or addressing the global economic crisis.  Can you speak about the potential role that they could have and the challenges ahead for China? BROWN:  I had the pleasure a few months ago, being in China, of hosting with Premier Wen the first town hall meeting that he had ever had.  And I know that the British press, when they came, were quite cynical about how it went.  But the questions that were coming to Premier Wen were about poor housing, about inadequate health services, about lack of opportunities in education, and he was clearly taking this incredibly serious.  And he says the great achievement is to have taken a hundred million people out of poverty. Now, China's domestic interest is to maintain a higher rate of growth, to take large numbers of people out of poverty, to accommodate the people who now want to move from the rural areas to the cities.  And if people are in the cities and towns, working in this huge production and manufacturing sector that they've got, then it's in their interest not to have them laid off or unemployed as a result of what's happening around the world.  So the domestic interest of China is to cooperate in maintaining high levels of economic growth. Now that's the beginning of the discussion.  There are issues about the exchange rate.  There are issues how far, even with the last package, we've expanded domestic demand.  But the fact that Premier Wen could announce a few days before Washington this 586 billion (dollar) package, a determination to show that China is determined to expand its domestic demand, as we have been requesting to them -- I've been telling them about this and other have been telling -- shows that China wants to be a part of the global solution to this problem. Now, as you know, there are many issues that arise -- human rights and other issues.  But I think the important thing is that China wants to be part of this new international order.  And I do say, for us in America and Europe, this the time to change the international order, to bring it up to date.  Ten years, 20 years from now, it might look a very different picture.  But I think India, China and the oil-producing countries want to be part of the order that is basically similar to what we created after the Second World War, but updated by dealing with all the new challenges.  And I think this is an opportunity we should not miss.  Ten or 20 years ago it would look -- from now it might look very different, and China and India may feel that they want to dictate the terms of it in a different way. RUBIN:  Henry?  Mike. QUESTIONER:  Prime Minister, how has the election of Obama, in your view, changed the perspectives of other people around the world about America, if at all? BROWN:  It's certainly changed people's views of America. I don't want to enter into the party politics of this -- (chuckles) -- RUBIN:  (Laughs.)  No. BROWN:  Now I did (have) a very good conversation with John McCain yesterday, and I think he was incredibly dignified in his acceptance of defeat, and in a way that characterizes a man who has done a great deal of public service, for which I know your country is proud. But Barack Obama has inspired a younger generation, not just in America but right across the world, with an interest in political debate and political argument.  I think people see Barack Obama reaching out to the rest of the world, and that's incredibly important.  He spoke in Berlin about building one world where people were united.  And obviously we look forward to working with him on the domestic economic policies in our country and in your country to see what common ground can be built up over a period of time. But you know, you have -- the Constitution says that all men are created equal, that every American should have the opportunity to reach the top.  You have proved to the world, in the most dramatic way, in the last few weeks that that is a reality in your country.  And I think everybody is proud of what America has been able to do. RUBIN:  Jay? QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Excellency, your diffidence about meddling in American politics aside, the world has a great interest in American economic policy.  And given the protectionist pressures that attend the new administration, I wonder if you can speak to what you think is the appropriate world or international response to those pressures. BROWN:  Well, I'm very grateful for that question, because I do think it is really important that we send a signal that protectionism today would be the road to ruin.  If we got ourselves into a position where countries made their own decisions irrespective of what's happening anywhere else -- a world trade deal didn't happen, lots of people were then just violating the trade agreements we've had in the past, none of the trade agreements could move forward -- then you will see the same problems that happened at other times when protectionist sentiment was very high. Now I can see why people take protectionist attitudes.  The immediate fear is losing your job.  The fact that you're getting cheaper consumer products, that the interest rates have been lower, is not as direct as the fact that in an industry which is competing with an industry abroad, you are faced with the prospect of losing your job. So I can see these threats, and I can see how it is possible to build up a very strong protectionist campaign and say no other countries should be outdoing us by (full/false ?) subsidies and everything else. And I was telling the story a few weeks ago of being in Washington for one of the IMF meetings, Bob, and there was a banner outside, with the demonstrations that were taking place, and it said "Worldwide campaign against globalization."  (Laughter.)  And you can see what people mean, that they're worried about the effects on their lives. In France, it was a bit worse.  We had one of these demonstrations for protectionism, and it said, "No" -- it was in 2006, and it said, "No to 2007."  (Laughter.) (Chuckles.)  But you can see the -- that -- why people react in that protectionist way.  But in -- for the better future of all our countries, a world trade deal would send a massive signal that the world could come together to try to solve its problems.  Now the benefits flow to the developing countries, some of the poorest countries in the world. There's no major sacrifice that I believe Europe or America has to make.  There are sacrifices.  But not major, and yet the benefits of sending out that message we've rejected protectionism -- the benefits are very, very big indeed and that we'd show the world it was able to cooperate. Now, it so happens that the disputes about the detail are actually more or less sorted out.  There's not many issues that require to be sorted out.  There is a dispute between India and America; there's some worries about some aspects of services and (complement ?) and -- but these are issues that can be sorted out. If you could announce a world trade deal within the next few months, people would then have what's been missing.  It's the most precious asset of all; it's confidence, confidence about the future. RUBIN:  Let me ask a question that came in from -- there are listeners -- there are (listeners ?) around the world, as I mentioned.  This is from Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, International Crisis Group, Beijing, China. It goes to the question -- the point you raised about Africa.  Following this week's deployment of Angolan troops in the crisis in Democratic Republic of the Congo, what steps can the U.K. take to prevent a wider regional war?  And maybe that's a more general question, Mr. Prime Minister, about Africa and what the U.K. and the rest of the industrial world and the rest of the world more generally can do to try to help in Africa. BROWN:  Well, it's a tragedy that 850,000 people have been displaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  And people fear that the events in Rwanda a few years ago, with the tribal tensions are going to affect the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are now 17,000 peacekeepers.  We have just provided some money so that that can go up to 20,000 if other countries are able to contribute.  The peacekeeping group needs to be led, but in the end you need a political solution.  President Kagame of Rwanda and Kabila of the DRC -- and I think the international pressure will grow.  Obasanjo's become the U.N. envoy.  And this is a conflict that is avoidable, and it's got to be solved by a political intervention. And I think in Africa, right across Africa, to down in Darfur, Zimbabwe, these are tragedies where you want the African Union to be stronger in its ability to deal with these problems themselves, but you also need the United Nations' support to do so. Africa's actually grown quite fast over the last few years, in general terms.  There are some great countries in Africa that are making major reforms and doing far better.  So one of the pictures of Africa is one of optimism. But the problem is, 40 million children are still not going to school.  You've got children dying in -- child deaths completely unnecessary because of inadequate health care.  You've got one mother dying every minute in childbirth, the time that should be the happiest time of her life becoming the saddest as the mother dies in childbirth.  And all these things are avoidable. If you take Sierra Leone -- 6 million people, 80 midwives, 200 nurses, and a hundred doctors -- you cannot run a health-care system.  One in eight mothers die in childbirth, and that -- these are problems that can be avoided. My deal with Africa would be, open up, stop corruption, be ready to trade with the rest of the world, but we will help you with education, with support for microcredit and economic development and health.  And that seems to be a deal that can actually work. I do say to this American audience that if we don't act together on Africa, China -- there are 900,000 Chinese workers in Africa at the moment.  China is buying up the resources of Africa. But there's another, more insidious problem, and that is al Qaeda moving down into Somalia and into other countries in Africa with terrorist cells. And I was at a school in Nigeria, in Abuja, just outside Abuja, and there's these kids in a pretty dilapidated school, wanting to learn and to be educated, very keen.  In fact, when we went round them and asked them, they all wanted to be engineers and nurses and doctors, I mean.  Nobody wanted to be a politician, by the way.  (Laughter.)  So the -- but they have all the ambitions that every child has, but they were in totally dilapidated conditions, three to a desk. And then they told me that up the road there was a madrassas (sic) that had been run by one of the violent extremist Islamic groups, ready to offer free education to kids, but of course, the condition was indoctrination.  Now, if we don't provide education and help provide that education in Africa, then others will. And that's why I'm very pleased that for President Obama, the investment in education for all is one of his priorities.  If we could have Africa educate its people and then had a level of economic development, they could make a huge contribution to the food problem, to solving climate change and to the economic development of the world. RUBIN:  Any thoughts, Prime Minister, on how to reduce corruption and improve effectiveness of governments? BROWN:  I think some of the transparency initiatives -- you know, the -- for the oil and energy industries -- a requirement on companies to be transparent about their transaction -- I mean, look, when I (came to government ?) in 1997, British law had been so affected by corruption round the world that we even gave tax relief for bribes.  (Laughter.)  We did change that -- (laughing) -- but that was the way it used to be. And I actually went to a conference in Mauritius and then went over -- it was the first time I'd been, when I became chancellor -- to Madagascar.  I'd just making a speech -- made a speech with others about how to eliminate corruption from Africa.  I arrived at Madagascar airport with this plane that had to refuel, and the guy at the airport refused to allow us to refuel and -- unless you got a bribe!  (Laughter.)  And -- it's absolutely true.  But that's going to be stamped out by these transparency initiatives, and by making a condition of funding for the countries that they have actually got to clean up their financial system, particularly their public expenditures.  And I think the IMF and the World Bank can play quite a big role in that. And increasingly, you know, people in Africa are not going to vote for leaders who are corrupt, and that is one of the lessons of recent years.  We've seen the changes in Liberia.  We've seen changes happen in Kenya.  We see changes where -- of course, if there had been a fair election in Zimbabwe, we would have had a new person there as well. RUBIN:  I think we have time for -- we always end on time in the council, and we're scheduled to end at 9:00, so we'll either have one or two questions, depending on what happens. Ma'am, right there. QUESTIONER:  Katherine Grover, American University.  Prime Minister, I wondered if -- you had mentioned the Copenhagen meeting; I wondered if you could describe the principles that you see in a post-2012 climate agreement. BROWN:  I think the issue for Copenhagen is that there is general agreement on a 2050 target -- we are for 80 percent cuts in emissions, but there's general agreement that there will be that target. The question is, where is the agreement for the years 2020 and 2025?  And that's where the debate was with the G-8 when I attended it in Japan.  That's the debate that's taking place in Europe at the moment, because, you know, Europe is a combination of the old Eastern European states, who've got lots of coal-fired power stations and have got lots of problems there from diversifying out of less efficient sources of energy.  So the agreement will have to be about what we can do to 2020 and 2025, and that's where the big argument, I think, has got to be resolved. But I'm more confident with -- both that President-elect Obama and John McCain said in the election campaign that they want to see America very much part of these reductions.  I think we've got to consider the financial (message ?), because it's going to be a very big problem.  If you say to a developing country, an emerging-market country, "You've got to cut your emissions by x," but provide no means by which they can do it, then you've got to find a way of financing what is a less-cheap form of energy development, given that you've made this policy decision to move out of, say, coal, into nuclear or into something else. But we have got to have a means by which we can finance the implementation of the Copenhagen agreement, and that's why I'm attracted to the World Bank having a role in loans or in grants, but particularly loans, to emerging markets in developing countries. So you need a system of clear targets.  You need to have them quite specific for what people have got to do, not just in the long term but in the medium term.  And you need to find a way of financing the changes that you're expecting other countries to make in energy. And of course the whole idea of the carbon market is actually really exciting, because a lot of these changes could be made by market incentives, and I think that's where most countries now want to be. So these are the challenges.  I'm optimistic that we can meet them. And I do feel in some way that the way out of this economic set of problems we face, for employment and for new businesses, is going to be in the encouragement of energy-efficient businesses and services. RUBIN:  Prime Minister, we thank you enormously.  And as I said in my remarks, it's not only the U.K. but the entire globe that is very fortunate in having you as a leader.  (Applause.) .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. New York, NY ROBERT E. RUBIN:  I'm Bob Rubin and I'm pleased to welcome all of you, both here in the room and also around the country and around the world, via teleconference, to our Council on Foreign Relations meeting. We are exceedingly honored to have with us a very, very special guest, Gordon Brown, prime minister of the United Kingdom.  As is the practice of the council, I will not recite from his resume.  It's in your materials.  But I would like to relate two brief anecdotes which, I think, shed a little bit of light on our distinguished speaker. When the Labor Party was running to unseat John Major's Conservative Party, Gordon Brown as the then, I guess, shadow chancellor visited Washington.  My deputy secretary, Larry Summers, told me, said, this guy is really bright; he's really smart; he's really thoughtful; he's like us.  (Laughter.) I'm not sure he meant us.  I think he meant something a little more limited.  But in any event -- (laughter) -- he said, you really ought to meet him.  So I was pleased to be thought to be up to that standard.  (Laughter.) So I met with the shadow chancellor.  And indeed he was exactly what Larry said.  And that was the beginning of a fabulous relationship.  And when Gordon Brown became chancellor, he worked very closely with Larry and myself and, after I left, with Larry as secretary.  And it was really a remarkably good working relationship. Fast forward to two-three years ago, when Gordon Brown was prime minister.  And he invited me to London to be with him, as he was going to speak to some British businesspeople.  And I was going to say a word or two. And I said afterwards to people that it was really a remarkable speech.  It was a sound and sensible path forward on economic policy.  And it was remarkably candid and thoughtful on issues that American politicians find very difficult to talk about: trade, regulation and the like. So at a time when the global economy is struggling, as all of us know so well, through the most difficult stresses, I would say, since the 1930s, not only the U.K. but the global economy is fortunate to have a leader of the extraordinary stature, effectiveness, thoughtfulness and intelligence of Gordon Brown. The prime minister will begin our session with a few comments on meeting the new global challenges.  And he and I will have a little conversation, which will consist of my posing questions and his providing wisdom in response.  Then we'll open up to questions from all of us -- all the rest of -- all the people here and also around the nation, around the world. This session will be on the record.  And please turn off your cell phones. With that, it is my honor and pleasure to introduce our friend, the council's friend and the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown.  (Applause.) PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN:  Can I say, first of all, what a great privilege it is to speak to the Council for Foreign Relations?  Set up almost 90 years ago to bridge differences that existed in the world, to build links between America and Europe and today producing outstanding work under Richard Haass's leadership -- and so I'm very grateful to have the opportunity to speak to you today. This council has been renowned for furthering debate on new ideas and new insights into both the world economy and our world society.  And what we need now, in my view, is new ideas and new insights into how we can deal with what is a quite unique and unprecedented problem, which I describe as the first problems of the new global age. One of my predecessors as an economic advisor was John Maynard Keynes.  And John Maynard Keynes did not have the same good fortune when he put new ideas to the British government in the 1920s and '30s.  He produced what he called his "solution to unemployment" as early as 1929.  He sent it to the Treasury -- the Treasury where I was a minister before.  When I arrived at the Treasury, I walked into the Treasury library for a day and I found the copy of Keynes's book that he had sent to the Treasury for their ideas -- with all ideas -- (inaudible) -- should, I argue, have been adopted at the time.  And on it was only three words from the British treasury.  The permanent secretary had written:  inflation, extravagance, bankruptcy.  (Laughter.)  And that is how Mr. Keynes was dealt with. When he came to Washington in the 1940s to produce his great plans for the IMF to be an independent central bank, he arrived at the U.S. Treasury on his own, unaccompanied, just the sole representative of the British government's position.  He met the Treasury secretary and the Treasury secretary said, "Hello."  He said, "Where's your lawyer?"  And he said, "Why haven't you got your lawyer?"  And then the Treasury says, "Who does your thinking for you?"  (Laughter.) Now, I'm also delighted to be here with my old friend Bob Rubin, who's been a mentor to me over the years.  And I'm very grateful for the time that he gave me, not only when we were in government but when we were preparing for government.  And he was very kind to us indeed. I suppose he got some of the similar advice that I got when I became chancellor of the Exchequer and the finance minister.  One of my predecessors sent me this note with three envelopes included inside it. And he said, look, things are going to get bad; then they might get worse and then they might get terrible.  If things get bad, open the first envelope.  If they get worse, open the second.  And if they get really critical, open the third. And so as you do, the first crisis comes, you open the envelope and you get pretty good advice:  Blame your predecessor.  (Laughter.)  The second crisis comes, and you get quite good advice.  It says, blame the statistics.  (Laughter.)  And then the third crisis gets worse and worse.  So you open the envelope, and it says, start writing three envelopes to your successor, to your successor.  (Laughter.) We are, we are in what, I believe, is a unique set of events.  I believe it is the first financial crisis of the global age.  I believe it's also the first resources crisis of the global age. I believe what we've seen, in the last 10 years, is some of the great things that globalization can offer, which makes me positive about an open, free market, inclusive and sustainable globalization. We've seen cheaper consumer products available to millions of people, who otherwise would not have been able to buy them, as a result of the changes that have been taking place, in manufacturing, all over the world. We've seen a period of low interest rates, partly as a result of the disinflationary effect, of what has actually happened, coming out of China and out of Asia. We've seen, as a result, many hundreds of thousands of people taken out of poverty, in some of the poorest countries, as a result of the developing of these economies. But we have four problems that arise inevitably, from the globalization of new economies, problems that were going to have to be solved anyway.  But problems if solved can point to an opportunity-rich future. The problems are, of course, the restructuring of industries and services that have to take place.  And I think we know ourselves that that is what is happening in our own countries at the moment. The second is, of course, the resources problems.  We've had a period where there's been demand for all the resources higher than our ability to supply, particularly a growing Chinese-Asian oil-producing countries population wanting to have not only resources but wanting to have better-quality food and wanting to have access to all the commodities that we have access to.  That is a problem that globalization will always have to deal with. We've got a third problem.  And that is the gap between rich and poor countries.  We've got to be very careful, as people know what is happening round the world, that resentments don't build up.  And we have a duty to do something about that as well. And of course, the fourth problem is the financial system, that we have now global flows of capital, global financial arrangements.  But we don't necessarily have a global means of dealing with these problems, between continents, when they arise. But my view is an optimistic one.  If we solve these problems, which are inherent in the move to a global economy, then we can be very optimistic about the future. Whatever happens in the next 20 years, I believe that the world economy will double in size.  Simply the pressures in China, Asia and elsewhere; people becoming consumers as well as producers; the rise of some of the oil-producing countries, Africa -- the world will double in its economic size in 20 years.  And to put it one way, that's twice as many opportunities there for good businesses to sell their products. Put another way, there's going to be a billion new skilled jobs in that world economy over these next 20 years.  And what I see us doing at the moment -- and perhaps it's giving a longer-term perspective to the present troubles we face -- is that we've got the birth pangs of this new global order.  We're having to deal with the problems of them.  We are in the transition to what I believe is a more opportunity-rich economy for the future.  And we have now, instead of just muddling through, dealing with this crisis, as people think we are doing at the moment, we've got to show people that we're actually making the adjustments in the proper way to this global age.  And if we are successful, I believe that American firms, British firms, with the great technologies that we have, with the high valued-added goods and services we can produce, with the ingenuity of our scientists and innovators, we are extremely well-placed to benefit from the expansion of the global economy in the years to come. But first we've got to deal with these problems.  Restructuring -- it seems to me we would be sending an illusion to people if we gave the impression that every job that is at risk at the moment is one that will always be there when this crisis is over.  Instead we've got to say to people we cannot help, necessarily, in some cases, you to keep the last job, but we will help you get the next job.  And that's what a positive approach to an open, flexible and inclusive globalization is about.  When restructuring is taking place, we will help you with the skills you need, with the training opportunities you may not have yet, and with obviously the -- dealing with all the other facilities and help and information, (advice, people ?), to get the next job.  And that, in my view, is dependent -- us remaining an open and not protectionist economy. If we have an open, inclusive, flexible and sustainable globalization, we can bring people to see the benefit of it.  If it is simply open free trade and flexible, then there will be a protectionist reaction from people who feel they'll not included.  If it is not open, of course, it is simply protectionist in the first place.  And I believe that the dividing line here is between an open society that is capable of trading round the world, benefitting from the openness that you have, against a protectionist response, which is similar to what happened in the 1930s and totally unacceptable.  So the restructuring must take place on the basis of helping people into the next jobs, but at the same time making sure that we keep our economy open. I think when resources -- we're learning now that long-term demand for oil, commodities and food is going to grow, even though there has been a lull in the last few months.  We've therefore got to have an energy and environment policy that is fit for the times.  And I believe we've got to diversify out of oil into nuclear, is my view -- some would say that's wrong -- renewables, into persuading the oil countries to recycle their revenues, particularly into non-oil sources of energy investment in the longer term, so that we have a stable energy policy, rather than a high and volatile oil price.  And I believe, having talked to the Saudis and other countries in the OPEC states, this is actually possible -- a coordinated approach from consumers and producers, to get what we need, which is stability in energy prices. And I believe you solve three problems by doing that.  The first problem is obviously the problem of the volatility, oil price and its affordability.  The second is obviously our climate change challenges, where we need to diversify out of fossil fuels, and therefore a huge climate change and environmental initiative is possible as a result of that and could be a huge job creator.  And the third thing, of course, is the strategic problems.  We've got to deal with strategic problems where we're dependent on volatile states for the supply of our energy.  And if you could deal with these three problems by having coordination on the energy and environmental problems that we face, leading to Copenhagen next year, I believe we'd make a major advance in showing that we can work together to make globalization work. But the third problem is the one we're facing at the moment, and that the is the financial sector issues.  And when you see that share prices have gone down 40 percent in the year, when you see a trillion of write-offs taking place, when you see the slowdown and actually stalling of lending in different countries, when you see the number of banks that have had to be recapitalized, you know that we have, in my view, four big problems to solve in this area before we can say that we've got the global path to recovery that we need. We realize that liquidity was not enough.  We realized that the other means of raising funding -- through sovereign wealth funds and through private equity and also through issuing shares to the public -- were not going to work to restructure and recapitalize our banks. So we made the decision to recapitalize our banks as a government, and I'm pleased to say that large numbers of countries round the world have recognized that that is the way to bring back the confidence into the banking system. Now the problem we have to solve -- and it's worth a debate on this in itself -- is how we can get the resumption of lending that is necessary for small businesses to have the cash flow, people to be able in new circumstances to take out mortgages.  Our problem, by the way, in Britain is not a shortage -- demand for housing -- we have not overbuilt, but that is an issue that's got to be solved obviously in different ways in different countries. So the first is the recapitalization of the system and the resumption of lending.  And that is a priority for gaining confidence. The second is obviously making monetary policy work to best effect.  And you in America have reduced interest rates to 1 percent.  You probably know in the European area we've been slower to do so.  We're at 3-1/4 percent in the ECB, 3 percent in the United Kingdom. There is scope, therefore, as the governor of the Bank of England has said, for further reduction in interest rates, and that is an essential element of what we are doing. But as Keynes recognized in the 1930s, when he talked about the problems of not being able to see the effective action -- the effective response that he expected from interest rates, you've got to look at other means too.  And a fiscal response, in my view, in a situation where we've moved from high inflation last year to what will be low inflation -- very low inflation indeed, as a result of the fall of the oil prices and the fall in food prices next year -- to move from a situation of high inflation to low inflation makes it possible, I think, to argue that countries should be involved, if possible, in a coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus, if possible countries across borders agreeing that the fiscal stimulus they take will complement the stimulus in other countries, and then the benefits of the stimulus don't leak in the way that they have traditionally tended to leak, and you get the benefit being greater in individual countries from the action that is taken cooperatively together. Now this is a huge debate about what works fiscally, whether it's tax cuts, whether it's public works investment, whether it's incentives for the lower-paid, who have a greater propensity to spend.  But these are the issues that I think every country is now grappling with, that you need to coordinate the re-stabilization of banks and the resumption of lending with monetary policy that is active.  But that will not work in itself unless it is now backed by fiscal stimulus. Germany announced a fiscal stimulus a few days ago; equally, China announced a fiscal stimulus just before the meeting we're having in Washington.  (Australia has just now ?) done so.  Other countries around the world are doing so.  And I believe the more we can coordinate that fiscal and monetary stimulus, the more we can give confidence that the economy can move forward. Roosevelt said there is nothing to fear but far itself.  I think the corollary of that is, confidence in the future depends on people being confident today.  And we have got to ensure that we can build confidence through the actions that governments take. Now, the fourth area is, of course, the reforms in the international financial system and in our own domestic systems that are clearly necessary.  The principles on which we will build the reforms, without going into the details, are, first of all, transparency; responsibility -- people taking responsibility in the companies they're involved in; integrity -- removing conflicts of interest in the system.  Some banking practice is obvious.  But also to try and build global financial arrangements that meet the needs of what is now a wholly global economy. And that's why we have been looking at the reform of international monitoring.  First of all, of course, it's got to help distressed economies from Hungary to Pakistan, to now other countries like Iceland, that have come to the International Monetary Fund for help.  The World Bank has got to help those developing countries that face huge rises in oil and food prices.  That is absolutely necessary. A world trade deal is absolutely crucial, in my view, to send a message that protectionism is unacceptable and we're not going back to the problems of the 1930s.  But we need to rebuild these international institutions:  to have an early warning system so that we are better prepared for what happens; to have greater cooperation across borders between supervisors and regulators so that there is cross-border supervision where it is necessary; to have a better crisis prevention mechanism so that when things happen, the international community can come together more effectively -- and that has been missing there for some of the period in which we've been dealing with this financial crisis; to have a better surveillance of the world economy and therefore a better guide for countries in difficulty to take action there for the future. And I have no doubt that out of the discussions we are having -- and I know you've got big study groups looking at this -- we'll have an international financial monetary fund that looks more like an independent central bank, where we'll have a World Bank that looks like a bank for the environment as well as development, and we will reform the relationships between the Financial Stability Forum, the Bank of International Settlements, and international institutions.  But the whole purpose of this is so that we can better coordinate our actions to deal with the fact that we have a global economy. In 1933, the World Economic Conference was held in London.  It was a conference that was supposed to bring the countries together, to prevent protectionism and to deal with the problems together.  That conference failed.  And as a result of that, protectionism was rampant in the 1930s, and many of the other problems that we all know about that flowed from it. I believe that international cooperation is absolutely essential, and I believe that the meeting in Washington is the first stage of a number of meetings that we need to have to deal with all these problems together, not simply the global financial system, but the global energy problems that we've got to deal with and, of course, how we help with the restructuring of our industries and services over a longer period of time and whether there is common action we can take -- (inaudible). Churchill once said, when the World Economic Conference broke down, that politicians were resolved to be (irresolute ?), adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, and all-powerful for impotence.  (Laughter.)  He also, by the way, said that politicians usually get things right after trying everything else.  (Laughter.) But the point I would make this morning:  We have got to be resolved, we have got to be adamant, we have got to be determined.  There is a way forward to an optimistic view of a global economy as it develops to serve us.  We are in the transition to that better economy; regard these as the problems that we have got to solve so that we have the stronger future that I believe is possible.  But let us make sure that we work together, Britain and America, America and Europe, America, Europe and the rest of the world, to solve these problems together. Thank you very much.  (Applause.) RUBIN:  That was terrific, Gordon.  (Applause continues.) Well, you can now see why I made the comment in my brief opening remarks that when you hear the prime minister speak, you do get a sense of somebody who really has his arms around the issues of the global economy and is extraordinarily sound, sensible, and, I would say, courageous in laying out a way forward. Let me ask you a micro-question, if I may, Prime Minister.  This thing that we were discussing before -- how do you reconcile the call for fiscal stimulus across many nations with the current fiscal imbalances that your country has and our country has and a number of other countries have? BROWN:  Well, first, they've got to be temporary.  So you've got to be absolutely clear that these are temporary stimuluses that are necessary to take us out of this position that we're in, working with monetary policy.  And secondly, you've got to have a sustainable path back to sustainable finances.  So you've got a path back to sustainable finances. Now, I believe if you do these two things, then it -- then this is a necessary means of taking us through this difficult period of time.  And I would like us to think, when we're looking at a fiscal stimulus, is what is necessary not just to take us through the difficult times but at the same time to build for what we need to do for the future.  I mean, it's absolutely clear that if we're going to succeed in a global economy, education, infrastructure, technological infrastructure, science, innovation all are going to be important, getting people who are unemployed and others with skills that are necessary for the future.  And I would like us to be able to think of the policies that we're pursuing as at least, in some cases, contributing to that vision of a society where we have the value-added products based on higher levels of skill and innovation.  And what we're trying to do is to encourage ourselves along that path. If you look at Germany at the moment, Germany's got 55 percent debt, as a proportion of its national income.  It's got a fiscal stimulus.  France is about 55 percent; fiscal stimulus.  We're about, at the moment, 37 percent of debt, and (I should mention ?) I think we can afford to do this, even if the current borrowing is high. And I think America's in the same position.  Your debt's about 35 percent, excluding what you've had to do with Fannie Maes and everything else, and I think you're in a position to take the action that is necessary. I think we've reached the stage where monetary policy must be accompanied by fiscal policy.  And we can, I think, show that in a period where you've got very low inflation coming next year -- I mean, there's no doubt, unless things dramatically change, that some countries could have zero inflation next year -- that this is not the time to prevent fiscal policy helping and supporting monetary policy. RUBIN:  And how would you -- that's -- BROWN:  (Inaudible.) RUBIN:  Right.  (Chuckles.)  And -- but how would you -- would you -- how would you try to construct a link between that and a longer-term path, as you describe it? BROWN:  Well, that's the issue that we're looking at.  Clearly, one area is in the environment, and obviously a lot of people are thinking about how you can make the changes that will make you more environmentally sensitive and more environmentally efficient while at the same time taking people through this crisis.  So I mean -- and obviously the very small thing is in insulation of people's home -- draft-proofing, building low-carbon homes and taking that industry forward. Large numbers of jobs can be created in green industries and green technologies in the future.  It could be for employment that IT was in the 1990s, a big expanding area of employment.  But I think you've got to tailor your incentives properly for that to happen. To be honest, it would be far better if other countries were doing this as well.  It would be far better if there's a coordinated approach to invest in environmental technologies, industries and skills, so that you could see the rest of the world responding to the climate change agenda as well.  But I think there's a lot of scope for international talk on that. There are other areas -- transport, infrastructure -- but what people are looking at at the moment is what we have learned from the past about what actually works as an immediate fiscal stimulus.  Tax cuts, I think probably half -- less than half your tax cuts a few months ago were spent; they were saved.  Public works, the time it takes to get public works projects up -- these are all the issues that we've got to deal with.  People with a propensity to consume -- that is, lower-income citizens -- obviously, are more likely to spend if credits are higher.  These are all the things that we've got -- you've got to look at. But again, I just say that the benefits of a fiscal stimulus -- temporary as it's going to be, the benefits would be all that greater if other countries are part of it.  And that's, I think, an important point that we've all got to recognize. RUBIN:  Can I ask you a different question, Prime Minister, sort of step back for a moment? Every economy has some balance between -- or every modern economy has some balance between market-based economics and globalization, on the one hand, and then the role of government performing the various purposes that markets by their nature can't perform.  How do you think this crisis and everything around it is going to affect that balance across the world -- the U.K., continental Europe, the United States, around the world? BROWN:  But we're a market economy, and nothing that we -- RUBIN:  It's a political question more than anything else. BROWN:  Yeah, but I think -- I think it's important to say that, you know, having bought shares in banks to keep them going, we've got no intention of being permanent shareholders of banks.  We want to pass these shares to other investors as soon as possible.  So this is not an era where you're going to see government, in my view, wanting, for ideological or other reasons, to take over and put into the public sector things that have been in the private sector for years. I think what we're seeing is redefining of the relationship between the individual markets and (state ?).  I think that happened in the 1930s and '40s -- the '30s in America, '40s in Britain.  I think it's happening now. You see, for an individual, what they need to face with the challenges of globalization is obviously going to be higher skills. I mean, the value of their labor is going to lie in their skills.  And so government must have a role in making sure that the investment is available for education and for research and innovation, so that we get the best skilled, the best creative, the best innovative people. So the investments in education, in my view, are going to go up.  And I would say that an economy that's not investing 10 percent, public or private, in education soon will not be an economy that's going to do as well in the future as others who are. I think the second thing is, we're realizing, there are strategic markets.  So you cannot in the long run, I think, everyone would agree, have an economy that is wholly dependent on the volatile commodity of oil.  And it's caused havoc in the last year, because standards of living have fallen dramatically.  Now even with the prices down, the volatility makes people worried about investing, even if you're oil producers with massive, massive resources. So we've got to do something about what is actually an impassive market, the oil market.  Because if there's a cartel, it's not actually market.  People are prevented from investing in different countries.  There are so many rules that prevent others being involved in the decision-making process in OPEC.  So we've got to look at oil and energy as a strategic market.  I think we've got to look at financial services, round the world, as a strategic issue. So while it doesn't affect my view of the importance of market economies, it does affect my view of how we could better coordinate, in those strategic areas: finance, energy.  And I think food is another area where we've really got to look at what we can do.  Because it is absolutely -- just one point. Africa is a net importer of food.  Africa has got 70 percent of the population on the land.  It is absolutely scandalous that the level of agriculture productivity, in Africa, is so low that they cannot even feed their own people, with 70 percent of the people on the land. Now, if we could make it possible for Africa to become more productive, with investment in food, then Africa could help feed the world.  And these food shortages that have existed, over these last few years, because we haven't made some of the big and bold decisions we should, about protections in food and subsidies in food, are something that, I think, we've got to deal with. So oil and food are examples where we've actually got markets that don't work well at all.  And they should be working better. RUBIN:  Let me ask you two more questions, if I may. The first one is, in the time that you were chancellor, and I was secretary, we worked together globally on crises in emerging-market countries.  When you get beyond that, there really isn't much evidence of effective global coordination, I would argue, in the economic arena. BROWN:  Well, let me say, first of all, you were absolutely brilliant; the response to the Asian crisis and to the problems in Latin America.  I'm not as modest a man as Larry, you know. (Laughter, cross talk.) RUBIN:  Those are standards that I'm not going to discuss.  (Laughter.) BROWN:  But you and Larry did a wonderful job.  And people forget that the last 10 years, you had the Russian crisis.  You had the Asian crisis.  You then had the IT bubble.  You then had a Wall Street crash.  You had a recession in America.  The beginning was 2001. These are all problems that we've had to deal with.  And this is a bigger problem.  It's partly because of the global economy that we've got these problems.  They couldn't have happened, in the same way, in any other decade, just because of the nature of the global spread of the problem so quickly and the fact that you're dealing with global commodities like oil and figuring the effect that they have. Yet we're better at dealing with problems in individual countries.  But I think we've got to learn, as we tried to do, in the 1970s -- (inaudible) -- not terribly successful in the end, but I mean the G-7 and the G-8. The G-7 came together because of these problems.  And we've got to get the right mechanisms, which is broader now than the G-8, for dealing with these problems.  But I sense, in talking to Premier Wen in China, as I've done on a few occasions, that they now appear that they want to be part of this international order. Now, that carries responsibilities as well as opportunities.  But I think there is a chance that people are looking over the precipice, seeing what's actually happening and now know that the cooperation that perhaps has been tenuous and not really been at a regular level, in the way they should be, can now be made into a more permanent arrangement of continuous cooperation between people. RUBIN:  Just to wind that up, you think that will be institutionalized in some way that will involve countries ceding some degree of their sovereignty to some sort of a national structure. BROWN:  Well, in 1945, when the IMF and the World Bank were created, there was this massive optimism about what could be achieved.  And people were prepared to say that prosperity is indivisible.  They were prepared to contribute to the IMF, to give it powers to do things. And you know, they said, at the time in these great visionary statements, that prosperity to be sustained had to be shared.  And you had the Marshall Plan and its effect on Europe at the time as well.  And I think we've lost sight of some of that visionary idealism.  But we have got to see it restored, in my view. And people should be prepared to say, in the interests of a well-functioning global economy, where what happens in America affects everywhere else, and what can happen in the poorest country and the poorest city can affect the richest city, as we've learned, in the world here, that we have got to find a better mechanism for working together. So I still say the IMF and the Financial Stability Forum; you've got to have reform there.  But I think it could be done.  And I know we've had these debates about that, because you were party to setting up the Financial Stability Forum with us in 1998.  And then the World Bank, I think, could play a lighter role as well. The fact is, these institutions were built for the problems of 1945 -- (inaudible) -- problems in individual countries.  They were built for closed economies and sheltered economies.  They were in a completely different world. And we should respond likewise to create these international institutions that mean something, for what we've got to do, with global stores of capital, global competition and problems that can only be solved globally, as you know, with climate change and, to a great extent, this financial problem. RUBIN:  My final question is this. If you go back -- I don't know when it was exactly, but you'll remember better than I -- you were having considerable political difficulty.  Now you're an acclaimed leader -- (laughter) -- you are -- in the global community, in the U.K. (Audio break.) How would you recommend, to future political figures, when they have some difficulty, working your way through that and then getting to where you are today? BROWN:  Just everybody should know that every politician will go through ups and downs.  I actually think that -- RUBIN:  Which is more fun? BROWN:  (Laughs.)  If you can treat the downs with equanimity, you can enjoy the ups.  (Laughs.)  But I think that there's two things happening.  When people -- people are clearly skeptical of whether politicians can come together to take action and don't like divisive politics.  You know that great line, Shelley talking about his grandmother applied to politics -- politicians -- people say they've lost the art of communication, but not, alas, the gift of speech.  (Laughs, laughter.) And I suppose the second thing is I think one of the problems in politics is people taking the short-term view.  And I think you really have got to take a long-term view.  The question is can you persuade the electorate that -- you know, if you're going to succeed in a global world -- if you're going to succeed, you've got to have better skills and invest in that, better science and invest in that, get a better planning system and more flexibility in your labor market, build your transport infrastructure.  Now, all these are long-term decisions.  You don't get an immediate payback the next day.  And you've got to somehow persuade people that while, as Keynes said, in the long run we're all dead, the long run is still worthwhile, investing.  (Laughs.) RUBIN:  Which convinces me we should rejoin the mother country.  But anyway -- (laughter) -- be that as it may, we are now open to questions.  Who would like to start us off?  Way in the back.  Yeah. QUESTIONER:  Good morning, sir.  Kevin Owens.  I'm here with the council.  Both of our nations have significant troop numbers in Afghanistan.  And you've recently stated this remains of national interest to Great Britain.  And the United States is going to increase their troop numbers in the coming months.  If you would, for us, please define what that end state or success may look like in Afghanistan and what the keys of that success are. BROWN:  Well, there are 41 countries part of the coalition in Afghanistan.  And we shouldn't forget that, that the world has come together in the way that it didn't come together over Iraq to mount an effort to keep the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan, stop the Taliban and al Qaeda linking up as a concerted group and therefore stopping what happens in Afghanistan arriving in the streets of America and in the streets of Britain. So to that extent, it's the front line against the Taliban and also the strengthening of al Qaeda.  And I think we've got to do more to persuade public opinion that let Afghanistan go and you will immediately have problems with both the Taliban taking power back in Afghanistan but also with the al Qaeda strengthened for the things that they would want to do in other countries. Now, I think the problem in Afghanistan is it cannot just be a military solution.  Afghanistan is a vast country.  The governance of Afghanistan is still through tribes as well as through central government.  We perhaps have got to have a better relationship with the local organizations that are actually working, while not having a relationship with those of the tribes that are associated with the drug trafficking. We've got to do more on the economic and social development of Afghanistan to give people a stake in the future.  We've got this big dam project that will open up a great deal of irrigation and everything else, but there are economic and social initiatives we've got to take.  And we've got to train the Afghan army and the Afghan police.  I don't think the Afghan people -- girls now in schools, where they were banned from schools under the Taliban -- they're people who suffered huge injuries and violence against them because they stood out against the Taliban.  I don't think there's a popular will to have the Taliban back.  But I think you've got to show that governance in Afghanistan is working both at a local and a national level. Now, our challenge is to persuade other countries to be part not only of the coalition but of the burden-sharing.  America's the largest contributor of troops.  Britain's the second largest contributor of troops.  Three countries have announced that they will want to pull their troops out by 2010, 2011.  I think we've got to persuade people if we're going to succeed here then it's got to be on the basis of burden-sharing and all countries who have got an interest in the future should be part either of the military action or supporting with equipment, helicopters and everything else, or helping with the doubling of the training of the Afghan army and making a police that is free from corruption.  These are the problems we've got to deal with. And I think what you'll see in the next few months -- and I think President Bush has already been starting this process of complementing the military action -- which of course has had to change its tactics because of the way the Taliban are operating on a guerrilla warfare now, not head-to-head conflict but guerrilla warfare with roadside bombs -- get our military position right, but complement that with economic, social and actually political initiatives to work with the tribes to see if we can get a better position in swatting the Taliban. Now, just one other thing.  We've got solve the problem of the Pakistani-Afghan border in doing so. QUESTIONER:  This may sound like a strange question, but to follow-up, is there any chance China would put troops in? BROWN:  I think we've got to -- we've got to look at that as a possibility for the future.  I think that's -- I think the 41 countries being in -- not just NATO countries, obviously, countries from all over the world,  I think people do see this as the front line against the return of at least a country that is totally taken over by a terrorist group. RUBIN:  Yes, ma'am. QUESTIONER:  Morning.  Paula Broadwell at King's College London and Harvard University.  My question is also about China.  What role -- you've been an advocate for China playing a larger role in solving or addressing the global economic crisis.  Can you speak about the potential role that they could have and the challenges ahead for China? BROWN:  I had the pleasure a few months ago, being in China, of hosting with Premier Wen the first town hall meeting that he had ever had.  And I know that the British press, when they came, were quite cynical about how it went.  But the questions that were coming to Premier Wen were about poor housing, about inadequate health services, about lack of opportunities in education, and he was clearly taking this incredibly serious.  And he says the great achievement is to have taken a hundred million people out of poverty. Now, China's domestic interest is to maintain a higher rate of growth, to take large numbers of people out of poverty, to accommodate the people who now want to move from the rural areas to the cities.  And if people are in the cities and towns, working in this huge production and manufacturing sector that they've got, then it's in their interest not to have them laid off or unemployed as a result of what's happening around the world.  So the domestic interest of China is to cooperate in maintaining high levels of economic growth. Now that's the beginning of the discussion.  There are issues about the exchange rate.  There are issues how far, even with the last package, we've expanded domestic demand.  But the fact that Premier Wen could announce a few days before Washington this 586 billion (dollar) package, a determination to show that China is determined to expand its domestic demand, as we have been requesting to them -- I've been telling them about this and other have been telling -- shows that China wants to be a part of the global solution to this problem. Now, as you know, there are many issues that arise -- human rights and other issues.  But I think the important thing is that China wants to be part of this new international order.  And I do say, for us in America and Europe, this the time to change the international order, to bring it up to date.  Ten years, 20 years from now, it might look a very different picture.  But I think India, China and the oil-producing countries want to be part of the order that is basically similar to what we created after the Second World War, but updated by dealing with all the new challenges.  And I think this is an opportunity we should not miss.  Ten or 20 years ago it would look -- from now it might look very different, and China and India may feel that they want to dictate the terms of it in a different way. RUBIN:  Henry?  Mike. QUESTIONER:  Prime Minister, how has the election of Obama, in your view, changed the perspectives of other people around the world about America, if at all? BROWN:  It's certainly changed people's views of America. I don't want to enter into the party politics of this -- (chuckles) -- RUBIN:  (Laughs.)  No. BROWN:  Now I did (have) a very good conversation with John McCain yesterday, and I think he was incredibly dignified in his acceptance of defeat, and in a way that characterizes a man who has done a great deal of public service, for which I know your country is proud. But Barack Obama has inspired a younger generation, not just in America but right across the world, with an interest in political debate and political argument.  I think people see Barack Obama reaching out to the rest of the world, and that's incredibly important.  He spoke in Berlin about building one world where people were united.  And obviously we look forward to working with him on the domestic economic policies in our country and in your country to see what common ground can be built up over a period of time. But you know, you have -- the Constitution says that all men are created equal, that every American should have the opportunity to reach the top.  You have proved to the world, in the most dramatic way, in the last few weeks that that is a reality in your country.  And I think everybody is proud of what America has been able to do. RUBIN:  Jay? QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Excellency, your diffidence about meddling in American politics aside, the world has a great interest in American economic policy.  And given the protectionist pressures that attend the new administration, I wonder if you can speak to what you think is the appropriate world or international response to those pressures. BROWN:  Well, I'm very grateful for that question, because I do think it is really important that we send a signal that protectionism today would be the road to ruin.  If we got ourselves into a position where countries made their own decisions irrespective of what's happening anywhere else -- a world trade deal didn't happen, lots of people were then just violating the trade agreements we've had in the past, none of the trade agreements could move forward -- then you will see the same problems that happened at other times when protectionist sentiment was very high. Now I can see why people take protectionist attitudes.  The immediate fear is losing your job.  The fact that you're getting cheaper consumer products, that the interest rates have been lower, is not as direct as the fact that in an industry which is competing with an industry abroad, you are faced with the prospect of losing your job. So I can see these threats, and I can see how it is possible to build up a very strong protectionist campaign and say no other countries should be outdoing us by (full/false ?) subsidies and everything else. And I was telling the story a few weeks ago of being in Washington for one of the IMF meetings, Bob, and there was a banner outside, with the demonstrations that were taking place, and it said "Worldwide campaign against globalization."  (Laughter.)  And you can see what people mean, that they're worried about the effects on their lives. In France, it was a bit worse.  We had one of these demonstrations for protectionism, and it said, "No" -- it was in 2006, and it said, "No to 2007."  (Laughter.) (Chuckles.)  But you can see the -- that -- why people react in that protectionist way.  But in -- for the better future of all our countries, a world trade deal would send a massive signal that the world could come together to try to solve its problems.  Now the benefits flow to the developing countries, some of the poorest countries in the world. There's no major sacrifice that I believe Europe or America has to make.  There are sacrifices.  But not major, and yet the benefits of sending out that message we've rejected protectionism -- the benefits are very, very big indeed and that we'd show the world it was able to cooperate. Now, it so happens that the disputes about the detail are actually more or less sorted out.  There's not many issues that require to be sorted out.  There is a dispute between India and America; there's some worries about some aspects of services and (complement ?) and -- but these are issues that can be sorted out. If you could announce a world trade deal within the next few months, people would then have what's been missing.  It's the most precious asset of all; it's confidence, confidence about the future. RUBIN:  Let me ask a question that came in from -- there are listeners -- there are (listeners ?) around the world, as I mentioned.  This is from Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, International Crisis Group, Beijing, China. It goes to the question -- the point you raised about Africa.  Following this week's deployment of Angolan troops in the crisis in Democratic Republic of the Congo, what steps can the U.K. take to prevent a wider regional war?  And maybe that's a more general question, Mr. Prime Minister, about Africa and what the U.K. and the rest of the industrial world and the rest of the world more generally can do to try to help in Africa. BROWN:  Well, it's a tragedy that 850,000 people have been displaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  And people fear that the events in Rwanda a few years ago, with the tribal tensions are going to affect the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are now 17,000 peacekeepers.  We have just provided some money so that that can go up to 20,000 if other countries are able to contribute.  The peacekeeping group needs to be led, but in the end you need a political solution.  President Kagame of Rwanda and Kabila of the DRC -- and I think the international pressure will grow.  Obasanjo's become the U.N. envoy.  And this is a conflict that is avoidable, and it's got to be solved by a political intervention. And I think in Africa, right across Africa, to down in Darfur, Zimbabwe, these are tragedies where you want the African Union to be stronger in its ability to deal with these problems themselves, but you also need the United Nations' support to do so. Africa's actually grown quite fast over the last few years, in general terms.  There are some great countries in Africa that are making major reforms and doing far better.  So one of the pictures of Africa is one of optimism. But the problem is, 40 million children are still not going to school.  You've got children dying in -- child deaths completely unnecessary because of inadequate health care.  You've got one mother dying every minute in childbirth, the time that should be the happiest time of her life becoming the saddest as the mother dies in childbirth.  And all these things are avoidable. If you take Sierra Leone -- 6 million people, 80 midwives, 200 nurses, and a hundred doctors -- you cannot run a health-care system.  One in eight mothers die in childbirth, and that -- these are problems that can be avoided. My deal with Africa would be, open up, stop corruption, be ready to trade with the rest of the world, but we will help you with education, with support for microcredit and economic development and health.  And that seems to be a deal that can actually work. I do say to this American audience that if we don't act together on Africa, China -- there are 900,000 Chinese workers in Africa at the moment.  China is buying up the resources of Africa. But there's another, more insidious problem, and that is al Qaeda moving down into Somalia and into other countries in Africa with terrorist cells. And I was at a school in Nigeria, in Abuja, just outside Abuja, and there's these kids in a pretty dilapidated school, wanting to learn and to be educated, very keen.  In fact, when we went round them and asked them, they all wanted to be engineers and nurses and doctors, I mean.  Nobody wanted to be a politician, by the way.  (Laughter.)  So the -- but they have all the ambitions that every child has, but they were in totally dilapidated conditions, three to a desk. And then they told me that up the road there was a madrassas (sic) that had been run by one of the violent extremist Islamic groups, ready to offer free education to kids, but of course, the condition was indoctrination.  Now, if we don't provide education and help provide that education in Africa, then others will. And that's why I'm very pleased that for President Obama, the investment in education for all is one of his priorities.  If we could have Africa educate its people and then had a level of economic development, they could make a huge contribution to the food problem, to solving climate change and to the economic development of the world. RUBIN:  Any thoughts, Prime Minister, on how to reduce corruption and improve effectiveness of governments? BROWN:  I think some of the transparency initiatives -- you know, the -- for the oil and energy industries -- a requirement on companies to be transparent about their transaction -- I mean, look, when I (came to government ?) in 1997, British law had been so affected by corruption round the world that we even gave tax relief for bribes.  (Laughter.)  We did change that -- (laughing) -- but that was the way it used to be. And I actually went to a conference in Mauritius and then went over -- it was the first time I'd been, when I became chancellor -- to Madagascar.  I'd just making a speech -- made a speech with others about how to eliminate corruption from Africa.  I arrived at Madagascar airport with this plane that had to refuel, and the guy at the airport refused to allow us to refuel and -- unless you got a bribe!  (Laughter.)  And -- it's absolutely true.  But that's going to be stamped out by these transparency initiatives, and by making a condition of funding for the countries that they have actually got to clean up their financial system, particularly their public expenditures.  And I think the IMF and the World Bank can play quite a big role in that. And increasingly, you know, people in Africa are not going to vote for leaders who are corrupt, and that is one of the lessons of recent years.  We've seen the changes in Liberia.  We've seen changes happen in Kenya.  We see changes where -- of course, if there had been a fair election in Zimbabwe, we would have had a new person there as well. RUBIN:  I think we have time for -- we always end on time in the council, and we're scheduled to end at 9:00, so we'll either have one or two questions, depending on what happens. Ma'am, right there. QUESTIONER:  Katherine Grover, American University.  Prime Minister, I wondered if -- you had mentioned the Copenhagen meeting; I wondered if you could describe the principles that you see in a post-2012 climate agreement. BROWN:  I think the issue for Copenhagen is that there is general agreement on a 2050 target -- we are for 80 percent cuts in emissions, but there's general agreement that there will be that target. The question is, where is the agreement for the years 2020 and 2025?  And that's where the debate was with the G-8 when I attended it in Japan.  That's the debate that's taking place in Europe at the moment, because, you know, Europe is a combination of the old Eastern European states, who've got lots of coal-fired power stations and have got lots of problems there from diversifying out of less efficient sources of energy.  So the agreement will have to be about what we can do to 2020 and 2025, and that's where the big argument, I think, has got to be resolved. But I'm more confident with -- both that President-elect Obama and John McCain said in the election campaign that they want to see America very much part of these reductions.  I think we've got to consider the financial (message ?), because it's going to be a very big problem.  If you say to a developing country, an emerging-market country, "You've got to cut your emissions by x," but provide no means by which they can do it, then you've got to find a way of financing what is a less-cheap form of energy development, given that you've made this policy decision to move out of, say, coal, into nuclear or into something else. But we have got to have a means by which we can finance the implementation of the Copenhagen agreement, and that's why I'm attracted to the World Bank having a role in loans or in grants, but particularly loans, to emerging markets in developing countries. So you need a system of clear targets.  You need to have them quite specific for what people have got to do, not just in the long term but in the medium term.  And you need to find a way of financing the changes that you're expecting other countries to make in energy. And of course the whole idea of the carbon market is actually really exciting, because a lot of these changes could be made by market incentives, and I think that's where most countries now want to be. So these are the challenges.  I'm optimistic that we can meet them. And I do feel in some way that the way out of this economic set of problems we face, for employment and for new businesses, is going to be in the encouragement of energy-efficient businesses and services. RUBIN:  Prime Minister, we thank you enormously.  And as I said in my remarks, it's not only the U.K. but the entire globe that is very fortunate in having you as a leader.  (Applause.) .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. New York, NY ROBERT E. RUBIN:  I'm Bob Rubin and I'm pleased to welcome all of you, both here in the room and also around the country and around the world, via teleconference, to our Council on Foreign Relations meeting. We are exceedingly honored to have with us a very, very special guest, Gordon Brown, prime minister of the United Kingdom.  As is the practice of the council, I will not recite from his resume.  It's in your materials.  But I would like to relate two brief anecdotes which, I think, shed a little bit of light on our distinguished speaker. When the Labor Party was running to unseat John Major's Conservative Party, Gordon Brown as the then, I guess, shadow chancellor visited Washington.  My deputy secretary, Larry Summers, told me, said, this guy is really bright; he's really smart; he's really thoughtful; he's like us.  (Laughter.) I'm not sure he meant us.  I think he meant something a little more limited.  But in any event -- (laughter) -- he said, you really ought to meet him.  So I was pleased to be thought to be up to that standard.  (Laughter.) So I met with the shadow chancellor.  And indeed he was exactly what Larry said.  And that was the beginning of a fabulous relationship.  And when Gordon Brown became chancellor, he worked very closely with Larry and myself and, after I left, with Larry as secretary.  And it was really a remarkably good working relationship. Fast forward to two-three years ago, when Gordon Brown was prime minister.  And he invited me to London to be with him, as he was going to speak to some British businesspeople.  And I was going to say a word or two. And I said afterwards to people that it was really a remarkable speech.  It was a sound and sensible path forward on economic policy.  And it was remarkably candid and thoughtful on issues that American politicians find very difficult to talk about: trade, regulation and the like. So at a time when the global economy is struggling, as all of us know so well, through the most difficult stresses, I would say, since the 1930s, not only the U.K. but the global economy is fortunate to have a leader of the extraordinary stature, effectiveness, thoughtfulness and intelligence of Gordon Brown. The prime minister will begin our session with a few comments on meeting the new global challenges.  And he and I will have a little conversation, which will consist of my posing questions and his providing wisdom in response.  Then we'll open up to questions from all of us -- all the rest of -- all the people here and also around the nation, around the world. This session will be on the record.  And please turn off your cell phones. With that, it is my honor and pleasure to introduce our friend, the council's friend and the prime minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown.  (Applause.) PRIME MINISTER GORDON BROWN:  Can I say, first of all, what a great privilege it is to speak to the Council for Foreign Relations?  Set up almost 90 years ago to bridge differences that existed in the world, to build links between America and Europe and today producing outstanding work under Richard Haass's leadership -- and so I'm very grateful to have the opportunity to speak to you today. This council has been renowned for furthering debate on new ideas and new insights into both the world economy and our world society.  And what we need now, in my view, is new ideas and new insights into how we can deal with what is a quite unique and unprecedented problem, which I describe as the first problems of the new global age. One of my predecessors as an economic advisor was John Maynard Keynes.  And John Maynard Keynes did not have the same good fortune when he put new ideas to the British government in the 1920s and '30s.  He produced what he called his "solution to unemployment" as early as 1929.  He sent it to the Treasury -- the Treasury where I was a minister before.  When I arrived at the Treasury, I walked into the Treasury library for a day and I found the copy of Keynes's book that he had sent to the Treasury for their ideas -- with all ideas -- (inaudible) -- should, I argue, have been adopted at the time.  And on it was only three words from the British treasury.  The permanent secretary had written:  inflation, extravagance, bankruptcy.  (Laughter.)  And that is how Mr. Keynes was dealt with. When he came to Washington in the 1940s to produce his great plans for the IMF to be an independent central bank, he arrived at the U.S. Treasury on his own, unaccompanied, just the sole representative of the British government's position.  He met the Treasury secretary and the Treasury secretary said, "Hello."  He said, "Where's your lawyer?"  And he said, "Why haven't you got your lawyer?"  And then the Treasury says, "Who does your thinking for you?"  (Laughter.) Now, I'm also delighted to be here with my old friend Bob Rubin, who's been a mentor to me over the years.  And I'm very grateful for the time that he gave me, not only when we were in government but when we were preparing for government.  And he was very kind to us indeed. I suppose he got some of the similar advice that I got when I became chancellor of the Exchequer and the finance minister.  One of my predecessors sent me this note with three envelopes included inside it. And he said, look, things are going to get bad; then they might get worse and then they might get terrible.  If things get bad, open the first envelope.  If they get worse, open the second.  And if they get really critical, open the third. And so as you do, the first crisis comes, you open the envelope and you get pretty good advice:  Blame your predecessor.  (Laughter.)  The second crisis comes, and you get quite good advice.  It says, blame the statistics.  (Laughter.)  And then the third crisis gets worse and worse.  So you open the envelope, and it says, start writing three envelopes to your successor, to your successor.  (Laughter.) We are, we are in what, I believe, is a unique set of events.  I believe it is the first financial crisis of the global age.  I believe it's also the first resources crisis of the global age. I believe what we've seen, in the last 10 years, is some of the great things that globalization can offer, which makes me positive about an open, free market, inclusive and sustainable globalization. We've seen cheaper consumer products available to millions of people, who otherwise would not have been able to buy them, as a result of the changes that have been taking place, in manufacturing, all over the world. We've seen a period of low interest rates, partly as a result of the disinflationary effect, of what has actually happened, coming out of China and out of Asia. We've seen, as a result, many hundreds of thousands of people taken out of poverty, in some of the poorest countries, as a result of the developing of these economies. But we have four problems that arise inevitably, from the globalization of new economies, problems that were going to have to be solved anyway.  But problems if solved can point to an opportunity-rich future. The problems are, of course, the restructuring of industries and services that have to take place.  And I think we know ourselves that that is what is happening in our own countries at the moment. The second is, of course, the resources problems.  We've had a period where there's been demand for all the resources higher than our ability to supply, particularly a growing Chinese-Asian oil-producing countries population wanting to have not only resources but wanting to have better-quality food and wanting to have access to all the commodities that we have access to.  That is a problem that globalization will always have to deal with. We've got a third problem.  And that is the gap between rich and poor countries.  We've got to be very careful, as people know what is happening round the world, that resentments don't build up.  And we have a duty to do something about that as well. And of course, the fourth problem is the financial system, that we have now global flows of capital, global financial arrangements.  But we don't necessarily have a global means of dealing with these problems, between continents, when they arise. But my view is an optimistic one.  If we solve these problems, which are inherent in the move to a global economy, then we can be very optimistic about the future. Whatever happens in the next 20 years, I believe that the world economy will double in size.  Simply the pressures in China, Asia and elsewhere; people becoming consumers as well as producers; the rise of some of the oil-producing countries, Africa -- the world will double in its economic size in 20 years.  And to put it one way, that's twice as many opportunities there for good businesses to sell their products. Put another way, there's going to be a billion new skilled jobs in that world economy over these next 20 years.  And what I see us doing at the moment -- and perhaps it's giving a longer-term perspective to the present troubles we face -- is that we've got the birth pangs of this new global order.  We're having to deal with the problems of them.  We are in the transition to what I believe is a more opportunity-rich economy for the future.  And we have now, instead of just muddling through, dealing with this crisis, as people think we are doing at the moment, we've got to show people that we're actually making the adjustments in the proper way to this global age.  And if we are successful, I believe that American firms, British firms, with the great technologies that we have, with the high valued-added goods and services we can produce, with the ingenuity of our scientists and innovators, we are extremely well-placed to benefit from the expansion of the global economy in the years to come. But first we've got to deal with these problems.  Restructuring -- it seems to me we would be sending an illusion to people if we gave the impression that every job that is at risk at the moment is one that will always be there when this crisis is over.  Instead we've got to say to people we cannot help, necessarily, in some cases, you to keep the last job, but we will help you get the next job.  And that's what a positive approach to an open, flexible and inclusive globalization is about.  When restructuring is taking place, we will help you with the skills you need, with the training opportunities you may not have yet, and with obviously the -- dealing with all the other facilities and help and information, (advice, people ?), to get the next job.  And that, in my view, is dependent -- us remaining an open and not protectionist economy. If we have an open, inclusive, flexible and sustainable globalization, we can bring people to see the benefit of it.  If it is simply open free trade and flexible, then there will be a protectionist reaction from people who feel they'll not included.  If it is not open, of course, it is simply protectionist in the first place.  And I believe that the dividing line here is between an open society that is capable of trading round the world, benefitting from the openness that you have, against a protectionist response, which is similar to what happened in the 1930s and totally unacceptable.  So the restructuring must take place on the basis of helping people into the next jobs, but at the same time making sure that we keep our economy open. I think when resources -- we're learning now that long-term demand for oil, commodities and food is going to grow, even though there has been a lull in the last few months.  We've therefore got to have an energy and environment policy that is fit for the times.  And I believe we've got to diversify out of oil into nuclear, is my view -- some would say that's wrong -- renewables, into persuading the oil countries to recycle their revenues, particularly into non-oil sources of energy investment in the longer term, so that we have a stable energy policy, rather than a high and volatile oil price.  And I believe, having talked to the Saudis and other countries in the OPEC states, this is actually possible -- a coordinated approach from consumers and producers, to get what we need, which is stability in energy prices. And I believe you solve three problems by doing that.  The first problem is obviously the problem of the volatility, oil price and its affordability.  The second is obviously our climate change challenges, where we need to diversify out of fossil fuels, and therefore a huge climate change and environmental initiative is possible as a result of that and could be a huge job creator.  And the third thing, of course, is the strategic problems.  We've got to deal with strategic problems where we're dependent on volatile states for the supply of our energy.  And if you could deal with these three problems by having coordination on the energy and environmental problems that we face, leading to Copenhagen next year, I believe we'd make a major advance in showing that we can work together to make globalization work. But the third problem is the one we're facing at the moment, and that the is the financial sector issues.  And when you see that share prices have gone down 40 percent in the year, when you see a trillion of write-offs taking place, when you see the slowdown and actually stalling of lending in different countries, when you see the number of banks that have had to be recapitalized, you know that we have, in my view, four big problems to solve in this area before we can say that we've got the global path to recovery that we need. We realize that liquidity was not enough.  We realized that the other means of raising funding -- through sovereign wealth funds and through private equity and also through issuing shares to the public -- were not going to work to restructure and recapitalize our banks. So we made the decision to recapitalize our banks as a government, and I'm pleased to say that large numbers of countries round the world have recognized that that is the way to bring back the confidence into the banking system. Now the problem we have to solve -- and it's worth a debate on this in itself -- is how we can get the resumption of lending that is necessary for small businesses to have the cash flow, people to be able in new circumstances to take out mortgages.  Our problem, by the way, in Britain is not a shortage -- demand for housing -- we have not overbuilt, but that is an issue that's got to be solved obviously in different ways in different countries. So the first is the recapitalization of the system and the resumption of lending.  And that is a priority for gaining confidence. The second is obviously making monetary policy work to best effect.  And you in America have reduced interest rates to 1 percent.  You probably know in the European area we've been slower to do so.  We're at 3-1/4 percent in the ECB, 3 percent in the United Kingdom. There is scope, therefore, as the governor of the Bank of England has said, for further reduction in interest rates, and that is an essential element of what we are doing. But as Keynes recognized in the 1930s, when he talked about the problems of not being able to see the effective action -- the effective response that he expected from interest rates, you've got to look at other means too.  And a fiscal response, in my view, in a situation where we've moved from high inflation last year to what will be low inflation -- very low inflation indeed, as a result of the fall of the oil prices and the fall in food prices next year -- to move from a situation of high inflation to low inflation makes it possible, I think, to argue that countries should be involved, if possible, in a coordinated fiscal and monetary stimulus, if possible countries across borders agreeing that the fiscal stimulus they take will complement the stimulus in other countries, and then the benefits of the stimulus don't leak in the way that they have traditionally tended to leak, and you get the benefit being greater in individual countries from the action that is taken cooperatively together. Now this is a huge debate about what works fiscally, whether it's tax cuts, whether it's public works investment, whether it's incentives for the lower-paid, who have a greater propensity to spend.  But these are the issues that I think every country is now grappling with, that you need to coordinate the re-stabilization of banks and the resumption of lending with monetary policy that is active.  But that will not work in itself unless it is now backed by fiscal stimulus. Germany announced a fiscal stimulus a few days ago; equally, China announced a fiscal stimulus just before the meeting we're having in Washington.  (Australia has just now ?) done so.  Other countries around the world are doing so.  And I believe the more we can coordinate that fiscal and monetary stimulus, the more we can give confidence that the economy can move forward. Roosevelt said there is nothing to fear but far itself.  I think the corollary of that is, confidence in the future depends on people being confident today.  And we have got to ensure that we can build confidence through the actions that governments take. Now, the fourth area is, of course, the reforms in the international financial system and in our own domestic systems that are clearly necessary.  The principles on which we will build the reforms, without going into the details, are, first of all, transparency; responsibility -- people taking responsibility in the companies they're involved in; integrity -- removing conflicts of interest in the system.  Some banking practice is obvious.  But also to try and build global financial arrangements that meet the needs of what is now a wholly global economy. And that's why we have been looking at the reform of international monitoring.  First of all, of course, it's got to help distressed economies from Hungary to Pakistan, to now other countries like Iceland, that have come to the International Monetary Fund for help.  The World Bank has got to help those developing countries that face huge rises in oil and food prices.  That is absolutely necessary. A world trade deal is absolutely crucial, in my view, to send a message that protectionism is unacceptable and we're not going back to the problems of the 1930s.  But we need to rebuild these international institutions:  to have an early warning system so that we are better prepared for what happens; to have greater cooperation across borders between supervisors and regulators so that there is cross-border supervision where it is necessary; to have a better crisis prevention mechanism so that when things happen, the international community can come together more effectively -- and that has been missing there for some of the period in which we've been dealing with this financial crisis; to have a better surveillance of the world economy and therefore a better guide for countries in difficulty to take action there for the future. And I have no doubt that out of the discussions we are having -- and I know you've got big study groups looking at this -- we'll have an international financial monetary fund that looks more like an independent central bank, where we'll have a World Bank that looks like a bank for the environment as well as development, and we will reform the relationships between the Financial Stability Forum, the Bank of International Settlements, and international institutions.  But the whole purpose of this is so that we can better coordinate our actions to deal with the fact that we have a global economy. In 1933, the World Economic Conference was held in London.  It was a conference that was supposed to bring the countries together, to prevent protectionism and to deal with the problems together.  That conference failed.  And as a result of that, protectionism was rampant in the 1930s, and many of the other problems that we all know about that flowed from it. I believe that international cooperation is absolutely essential, and I believe that the meeting in Washington is the first stage of a number of meetings that we need to have to deal with all these problems together, not simply the global financial system, but the global energy problems that we've got to deal with and, of course, how we help with the restructuring of our industries and services over a longer period of time and whether there is common action we can take -- (inaudible). Churchill once said, when the World Economic Conference broke down, that politicians were resolved to be (irresolute ?), adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, and all-powerful for impotence.  (Laughter.)  He also, by the way, said that politicians usually get things right after trying everything else.  (Laughter.) But the point I would make this morning:  We have got to be resolved, we have got to be adamant, we have got to be determined.  There is a way forward to an optimistic view of a global economy as it develops to serve us.  We are in the transition to that better economy; regard these as the problems that we have got to solve so that we have the stronger future that I believe is possible.  But let us make sure that we work together, Britain and America, America and Europe, America, Europe and the rest of the world, to solve these problems together. Thank you very much.  (Applause.) RUBIN:  That was terrific, Gordon.  (Applause continues.) Well, you can now see why I made the comment in my brief opening remarks that when you hear the prime minister speak, you do get a sense of somebody who really has his arms around the issues of the global economy and is extraordinarily sound, sensible, and, I would say, courageous in laying out a way forward. Let me ask you a micro-question, if I may, Prime Minister.  This thing that we were discussing before -- how do you reconcile the call for fiscal stimulus across many nations with the current fiscal imbalances that your country has and our country has and a number of other countries have? BROWN:  Well, first, they've got to be temporary.  So you've got to be absolutely clear that these are temporary stimuluses that are necessary to take us out of this position that we're in, working with monetary policy.  And secondly, you've got to have a sustainable path back to sustainable finances.  So you've got a path back to sustainable finances. Now, I believe if you do these two things, then it -- then this is a necessary means of taking us through this difficult period of time.  And I would like us to think, when we're looking at a fiscal stimulus, is what is necessary not just to take us through the difficult times but at the same time to build for what we need to do for the future.  I mean, it's absolutely clear that if we're going to succeed in a global economy, education, infrastructure, technological infrastructure, science, innovation all are going to be important, getting people who are unemployed and others with skills that are necessary for the future.  And I would like us to be able to think of the policies that we're pursuing as at least, in some cases, contributing to that vision of a society where we have the value-added products based on higher levels of skill and innovation.  And what we're trying to do is to encourage ourselves along that path. If you look at Germany at the moment, Germany's got 55 percent debt, as a proportion of its national income.  It's got a fiscal stimulus.  France is about 55 percent; fiscal stimulus.  We're about, at the moment, 37 percent of debt, and (I should mention ?) I think we can afford to do this, even if the current borrowing is high. And I think America's in the same position.  Your debt's about 35 percent, excluding what you've had to do with Fannie Maes and everything else, and I think you're in a position to take the action that is necessary. I think we've reached the stage where monetary policy must be accompanied by fiscal policy.  And we can, I think, show that in a period where you've got very low inflation coming next year -- I mean, there's no doubt, unless things dramatically change, that some countries could have zero inflation next year -- that this is not the time to prevent fiscal policy helping and supporting monetary policy. RUBIN:  And how would you -- that's -- BROWN:  (Inaudible.) RUBIN:  Right.  (Chuckles.)  And -- but how would you -- would you -- how would you try to construct a link between that and a longer-term path, as you describe it? BROWN:  Well, that's the issue that we're looking at.  Clearly, one area is in the environment, and obviously a lot of people are thinking about how you can make the changes that will make you more environmentally sensitive and more environmentally efficient while at the same time taking people through this crisis.  So I mean -- and obviously the very small thing is in insulation of people's home -- draft-proofing, building low-carbon homes and taking that industry forward. Large numbers of jobs can be created in green industries and green technologies in the future.  It could be for employment that IT was in the 1990s, a big expanding area of employment.  But I think you've got to tailor your incentives properly for that to happen. To be honest, it would be far better if other countries were doing this as well.  It would be far better if there's a coordinated approach to invest in environmental technologies, industries and skills, so that you could see the rest of the world responding to the climate change agenda as well.  But I think there's a lot of scope for international talk on that. There are other areas -- transport, infrastructure -- but what people are looking at at the moment is what we have learned from the past about what actually works as an immediate fiscal stimulus.  Tax cuts, I think probably half -- less than half your tax cuts a few months ago were spent; they were saved.  Public works, the time it takes to get public works projects up -- these are all the issues that we've got to deal with.  People with a propensity to consume -- that is, lower-income citizens -- obviously, are more likely to spend if credits are higher.  These are all the things that we've got -- you've got to look at. But again, I just say that the benefits of a fiscal stimulus -- temporary as it's going to be, the benefits would be all that greater if other countries are part of it.  And that's, I think, an important point that we've all got to recognize. RUBIN:  Can I ask you a different question, Prime Minister, sort of step back for a moment? Every economy has some balance between -- or every modern economy has some balance between market-based economics and globalization, on the one hand, and then the role of government performing the various purposes that markets by their nature can't perform.  How do you think this crisis and everything around it is going to affect that balance across the world -- the U.K., continental Europe, the United States, around the world? BROWN:  But we're a market economy, and nothing that we -- RUBIN:  It's a political question more than anything else. BROWN:  Yeah, but I think -- I think it's important to say that, you know, having bought shares in banks to keep them going, we've got no intention of being permanent shareholders of banks.  We want to pass these shares to other investors as soon as possible.  So this is not an era where you're going to see government, in my view, wanting, for ideological or other reasons, to take over and put into the public sector things that have been in the private sector for years. I think what we're seeing is redefining of the relationship between the individual markets and (state ?).  I think that happened in the 1930s and '40s -- the '30s in America, '40s in Britain.  I think it's happening now. You see, for an individual, what they need to face with the challenges of globalization is obviously going to be higher skills. I mean, the value of their labor is going to lie in their skills.  And so government must have a role in making sure that the investment is available for education and for research and innovation, so that we get the best skilled, the best creative, the best innovative people. So the investments in education, in my view, are going to go up.  And I would say that an economy that's not investing 10 percent, public or private, in education soon will not be an economy that's going to do as well in the future as others who are. I think the second thing is, we're realizing, there are strategic markets.  So you cannot in the long run, I think, everyone would agree, have an economy that is wholly dependent on the volatile commodity of oil.  And it's caused havoc in the last year, because standards of living have fallen dramatically.  Now even with the prices down, the volatility makes people worried about investing, even if you're oil producers with massive, massive resources. So we've got to do something about what is actually an impassive market, the oil market.  Because if there's a cartel, it's not actually market.  People are prevented from investing in different countries.  There are so many rules that prevent others being involved in the decision-making process in OPEC.  So we've got to look at oil and energy as a strategic market.  I think we've got to look at financial services, round the world, as a strategic issue. So while it doesn't affect my view of the importance of market economies, it does affect my view of how we could better coordinate, in those strategic areas: finance, energy.  And I think food is another area where we've really got to look at what we can do.  Because it is absolutely -- just one point. Africa is a net importer of food.  Africa has got 70 percent of the population on the land.  It is absolutely scandalous that the level of agriculture productivity, in Africa, is so low that they cannot even feed their own people, with 70 percent of the people on the land. Now, if we could make it possible for Africa to become more productive, with investment in food, then Africa could help feed the world.  And these food shortages that have existed, over these last few years, because we haven't made some of the big and bold decisions we should, about protections in food and subsidies in food, are something that, I think, we've got to deal with. So oil and food are examples where we've actually got markets that don't work well at all.  And they should be working better. RUBIN:  Let me ask you two more questions, if I may. The first one is, in the time that you were chancellor, and I was secretary, we worked together globally on crises in emerging-market countries.  When you get beyond that, there really isn't much evidence of effective global coordination, I would argue, in the economic arena. BROWN:  Well, let me say, first of all, you were absolutely brilliant; the response to the Asian crisis and to the problems in Latin America.  I'm not as modest a man as Larry, you know. (Laughter, cross talk.) RUBIN:  Those are standards that I'm not going to discuss.  (Laughter.) BROWN:  But you and Larry did a wonderful job.  And people forget that the last 10 years, you had the Russian crisis.  You had the Asian crisis.  You then had the IT bubble.  You then had a Wall Street crash.  You had a recession in America.  The beginning was 2001. These are all problems that we've had to deal with.  And this is a bigger problem.  It's partly because of the global economy that we've got these problems.  They couldn't have happened, in the same way, in any other decade, just because of the nature of the global spread of the problem so quickly and the fact that you're dealing with global commodities like oil and figuring the effect that they have. Yet we're better at dealing with problems in individual countries.  But I think we've got to learn, as we tried to do, in the 1970s -- (inaudible) -- not terribly successful in the end, but I mean the G-7 and the G-8. The G-7 came together because of these problems.  And we've got to get the right mechanisms, which is broader now than the G-8, for dealing with these problems.  But I sense, in talking to Premier Wen in China, as I've done on a few occasions, that they now appear that they want to be part of this international order. Now, that carries responsibilities as well as opportunities.  But I think there is a chance that people are looking over the precipice, seeing what's actually happening and now know that the cooperation that perhaps has been tenuous and not really been at a regular level, in the way they should be, can now be made into a more permanent arrangement of continuous cooperation between people. RUBIN:  Just to wind that up, you think that will be institutionalized in some way that will involve countries ceding some degree of their sovereignty to some sort of a national structure. BROWN:  Well, in 1945, when the IMF and the World Bank were created, there was this massive optimism about what could be achieved.  And people were prepared to say that prosperity is indivisible.  They were prepared to contribute to the IMF, to give it powers to do things. And you know, they said, at the time in these great visionary statements, that prosperity to be sustained had to be shared.  And you had the Marshall Plan and its effect on Europe at the time as well.  And I think we've lost sight of some of that visionary idealism.  But we have got to see it restored, in my view. And people should be prepared to say, in the interests of a well-functioning global economy, where what happens in America affects everywhere else, and what can happen in the poorest country and the poorest city can affect the richest city, as we've learned, in the world here, that we have got to find a better mechanism for working together. So I still say the IMF and the Financial Stability Forum; you've got to have reform there.  But I think it could be done.  And I know we've had these debates about that, because you were party to setting up the Financial Stability Forum with us in 1998.  And then the World Bank, I think, could play a lighter role as well. The fact is, these institutions were built for the problems of 1945 -- (inaudible) -- problems in individual countries.  They were built for closed economies and sheltered economies.  They were in a completely different world. And we should respond likewise to create these international institutions that mean something, for what we've got to do, with global stores of capital, global competition and problems that can only be solved globally, as you know, with climate change and, to a great extent, this financial problem. RUBIN:  My final question is this. If you go back -- I don't know when it was exactly, but you'll remember better than I -- you were having considerable political difficulty.  Now you're an acclaimed leader -- (laughter) -- you are -- in the global community, in the U.K. (Audio break.) How would you recommend, to future political figures, when they have some difficulty, working your way through that and then getting to where you are today? BROWN:  Just everybody should know that every politician will go through ups and downs.  I actually think that -- RUBIN:  Which is more fun? BROWN:  (Laughs.)  If you can treat the downs with equanimity, you can enjoy the ups.  (Laughs.)  But I think that there's two things happening.  When people -- people are clearly skeptical of whether politicians can come together to take action and don't like divisive politics.  You know that great line, Shelley talking about his grandmother applied to politics -- politicians -- people say they've lost the art of communication, but not, alas, the gift of speech.  (Laughs, laughter.) And I suppose the second thing is I think one of the problems in politics is people taking the short-term view.  And I think you really have got to take a long-term view.  The question is can you persuade the electorate that -- you know, if you're going to succeed in a global world -- if you're going to succeed, you've got to have better skills and invest in that, better science and invest in that, get a better planning system and more flexibility in your labor market, build your transport infrastructure.  Now, all these are long-term decisions.  You don't get an immediate payback the next day.  And you've got to somehow persuade people that while, as Keynes said, in the long run we're all dead, the long run is still worthwhile, investing.  (Laughs.) RUBIN:  Which convinces me we should rejoin the mother country.  But anyway -- (laughter) -- be that as it may, we are now open to questions.  Who would like to start us off?  Way in the back.  Yeah. QUESTIONER:  Good morning, sir.  Kevin Owens.  I'm here with the council.  Both of our nations have significant troop numbers in Afghanistan.  And you've recently stated this remains of national interest to Great Britain.  And the United States is going to increase their troop numbers in the coming months.  If you would, for us, please define what that end state or success may look like in Afghanistan and what the keys of that success are. BROWN:  Well, there are 41 countries part of the coalition in Afghanistan.  And we shouldn't forget that, that the world has come together in the way that it didn't come together over Iraq to mount an effort to keep the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan, stop the Taliban and al Qaeda linking up as a concerted group and therefore stopping what happens in Afghanistan arriving in the streets of America and in the streets of Britain. So to that extent, it's the front line against the Taliban and also the strengthening of al Qaeda.  And I think we've got to do more to persuade public opinion that let Afghanistan go and you will immediately have problems with both the Taliban taking power back in Afghanistan but also with the al Qaeda strengthened for the things that they would want to do in other countries. Now, I think the problem in Afghanistan is it cannot just be a military solution.  Afghanistan is a vast country.  The governance of Afghanistan is still through tribes as well as through central government.  We perhaps have got to have a better relationship with the local organizations that are actually working, while not having a relationship with those of the tribes that are associated with the drug trafficking. We've got to do more on the economic and social development of Afghanistan to give people a stake in the future.  We've got this big dam project that will open up a great deal of irrigation and everything else, but there are economic and social initiatives we've got to take.  And we've got to train the Afghan army and the Afghan police.  I don't think the Afghan people -- girls now in schools, where they were banned from schools under the Taliban -- they're people who suffered huge injuries and violence against them because they stood out against the Taliban.  I don't think there's a popular will to have the Taliban back.  But I think you've got to show that governance in Afghanistan is working both at a local and a national level. Now, our challenge is to persuade other countries to be part not only of the coalition but of the burden-sharing.  America's the largest contributor of troops.  Britain's the second largest contributor of troops.  Three countries have announced that they will want to pull their troops out by 2010, 2011.  I think we've got to persuade people if we're going to succeed here then it's got to be on the basis of burden-sharing and all countries who have got an interest in the future should be part either of the military action or supporting with equipment, helicopters and everything else, or helping with the doubling of the training of the Afghan army and making a police that is free from corruption.  These are the problems we've got to deal with. And I think what you'll see in the next few months -- and I think President Bush has already been starting this process of complementing the military action -- which of course has had to change its tactics because of the way the Taliban are operating on a guerrilla warfare now, not head-to-head conflict but guerrilla warfare with roadside bombs -- get our military position right, but complement that with economic, social and actually political initiatives to work with the tribes to see if we can get a better position in swatting the Taliban. Now, just one other thing.  We've got solve the problem of the Pakistani-Afghan border in doing so. QUESTIONER:  This may sound like a strange question, but to follow-up, is there any chance China would put troops in? BROWN:  I think we've got to -- we've got to look at that as a possibility for the future.  I think that's -- I think the 41 countries being in -- not just NATO countries, obviously, countries from all over the world,  I think people do see this as the front line against the return of at least a country that is totally taken over by a terrorist group. RUBIN:  Yes, ma'am. QUESTIONER:  Morning.  Paula Broadwell at King's College London and Harvard University.  My question is also about China.  What role -- you've been an advocate for China playing a larger role in solving or addressing the global economic crisis.  Can you speak about the potential role that they could have and the challenges ahead for China? BROWN:  I had the pleasure a few months ago, being in China, of hosting with Premier Wen the first town hall meeting that he had ever had.  And I know that the British press, when they came, were quite cynical about how it went.  But the questions that were coming to Premier Wen were about poor housing, about inadequate health services, about lack of opportunities in education, and he was clearly taking this incredibly serious.  And he says the great achievement is to have taken a hundred million people out of poverty. Now, China's domestic interest is to maintain a higher rate of growth, to take large numbers of people out of poverty, to accommodate the people who now want to move from the rural areas to the cities.  And if people are in the cities and towns, working in this huge production and manufacturing sector that they've got, then it's in their interest not to have them laid off or unemployed as a result of what's happening around the world.  So the domestic interest of China is to cooperate in maintaining high levels of economic growth. Now that's the beginning of the discussion.  There are issues about the exchange rate.  There are issues how far, even with the last package, we've expanded domestic demand.  But the fact that Premier Wen could announce a few days before Washington this 586 billion (dollar) package, a determination to show that China is determined to expand its domestic demand, as we have been requesting to them -- I've been telling them about this and other have been telling -- shows that China wants to be a part of the global solution to this problem. Now, as you know, there are many issues that arise -- human rights and other issues.  But I think the important thing is that China wants to be part of this new international order.  And I do say, for us in America and Europe, this the time to change the international order, to bring it up to date.  Ten years, 20 years from now, it might look a very different picture.  But I think India, China and the oil-producing countries want to be part of the order that is basically similar to what we created after the Second World War, but updated by dealing with all the new challenges.  And I think this is an opportunity we should not miss.  Ten or 20 years ago it would look -- from now it might look very different, and China and India may feel that they want to dictate the terms of it in a different way. RUBIN:  Henry?  Mike. QUESTIONER:  Prime Minister, how has the election of Obama, in your view, changed the perspectives of other people around the world about America, if at all? BROWN:  It's certainly changed people's views of America. I don't want to enter into the party politics of this -- (chuckles) -- RUBIN:  (Laughs.)  No. BROWN:  Now I did (have) a very good conversation with John McCain yesterday, and I think he was incredibly dignified in his acceptance of defeat, and in a way that characterizes a man who has done a great deal of public service, for which I know your country is proud. But Barack Obama has inspired a younger generation, not just in America but right across the world, with an interest in political debate and political argument.  I think people see Barack Obama reaching out to the rest of the world, and that's incredibly important.  He spoke in Berlin about building one world where people were united.  And obviously we look forward to working with him on the domestic economic policies in our country and in your country to see what common ground can be built up over a period of time. But you know, you have -- the Constitution says that all men are created equal, that every American should have the opportunity to reach the top.  You have proved to the world, in the most dramatic way, in the last few weeks that that is a reality in your country.  And I think everybody is proud of what America has been able to do. RUBIN:  Jay? QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Excellency, your diffidence about meddling in American politics aside, the world has a great interest in American economic policy.  And given the protectionist pressures that attend the new administration, I wonder if you can speak to what you think is the appropriate world or international response to those pressures. BROWN:  Well, I'm very grateful for that question, because I do think it is really important that we send a signal that protectionism today would be the road to ruin.  If we got ourselves into a position where countries made their own decisions irrespective of what's happening anywhere else -- a world trade deal didn't happen, lots of people were then just violating the trade agreements we've had in the past, none of the trade agreements could move forward -- then you will see the same problems that happened at other times when protectionist sentiment was very high. Now I can see why people take protectionist attitudes.  The immediate fear is losing your job.  The fact that you're getting cheaper consumer products, that the interest rates have been lower, is not as direct as the fact that in an industry which is competing with an industry abroad, you are faced with the prospect of losing your job. So I can see these threats, and I can see how it is possible to build up a very strong protectionist campaign and say no other countries should be outdoing us by (full/false ?) subsidies and everything else. And I was telling the story a few weeks ago of being in Washington for one of the IMF meetings, Bob, and there was a banner outside, with the demonstrations that were taking place, and it said "Worldwide campaign against globalization."  (Laughter.)  And you can see what people mean, that they're worried about the effects on their lives. In France, it was a bit worse.  We had one of these demonstrations for protectionism, and it said, "No" -- it was in 2006, and it said, "No to 2007."  (Laughter.) (Chuckles.)  But you can see the -- that -- why people react in that protectionist way.  But in -- for the better future of all our countries, a world trade deal would send a massive signal that the world could come together to try to solve its problems.  Now the benefits flow to the developing countries, some of the poorest countries in the world. There's no major sacrifice that I believe Europe or America has to make.  There are sacrifices.  But not major, and yet the benefits of sending out that message we've rejected protectionism -- the benefits are very, very big indeed and that we'd show the world it was able to cooperate. Now, it so happens that the disputes about the detail are actually more or less sorted out.  There's not many issues that require to be sorted out.  There is a dispute between India and America; there's some worries about some aspects of services and (complement ?) and -- but these are issues that can be sorted out. If you could announce a world trade deal within the next few months, people would then have what's been missing.  It's the most precious asset of all; it's confidence, confidence about the future. RUBIN:  Let me ask a question that came in from -- there are listeners -- there are (listeners ?) around the world, as I mentioned.  This is from Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, International Crisis Group, Beijing, China. It goes to the question -- the point you raised about Africa.  Following this week's deployment of Angolan troops in the crisis in Democratic Republic of the Congo, what steps can the U.K. take to prevent a wider regional war?  And maybe that's a more general question, Mr. Prime Minister, about Africa and what the U.K. and the rest of the industrial world and the rest of the world more generally can do to try to help in Africa. BROWN:  Well, it's a tragedy that 850,000 people have been displaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  And people fear that the events in Rwanda a few years ago, with the tribal tensions are going to affect the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are now 17,000 peacekeepers.  We have just provided some money so that that can go up to 20,000 if other countries are able to contribute.  The peacekeeping group needs to be led, but in the end you need a political solution.  President Kagame of Rwanda and Kabila of the DRC -- and I think the international pressure will grow.  Obasanjo's become the U.N. envoy.  And this is a conflict that is avoidable, and it's got to be solved by a political intervention. And I think in Africa, right across Africa, to down in Darfur, Zimbabwe, these are tragedies where you want the African Union to be stronger in its ability to deal with these problems themselves, but you also need the United Nations' support to do so. Africa's actually grown quite fast over the last few years, in general terms.  There are some great countries in Africa that are making major reforms and doing far better.  So one of the pictures of Africa is one of optimism. But the problem is, 40 million children are still not going to school.  You've got children dying in -- child deaths completely unnecessary because of inadequate health care.  You've got one mother dying every minute in childbirth, the time that should be the happiest time of her life becoming the saddest as the mother dies in childbirth.  And all these things are avoidable. If you take Sierra Leone -- 6 million people, 80 midwives, 200 nurses, and a hundred doctors -- you cannot run a health-care system.  One in eight mothers die in childbirth, and that -- these are problems that can be avoided. My deal with Africa would be, open up, stop corruption, be ready to trade with the rest of the world, but we will help you with education, with support for microcredit and economic development and health.  And that seems to be a deal that can actually work. I do say to this American audience that if we don't act together on Africa, China -- there are 900,000 Chinese workers in Africa at the moment.  China is buying up the resources of Africa. But there's another, more insidious problem, and that is al Qaeda moving down into Somalia and into other countries in Africa with terrorist cells. And I was at a school in Nigeria, in Abuja, just outside Abuja, and there's these kids in a pretty dilapidated school, wanting to learn and to be educated, very keen.  In fact, when we went round them and asked them, they all wanted to be engineers and nurses and doctors, I mean.  Nobody wanted to be a politician, by the way.  (Laughter.)  So the -- but they have all the ambitions that every child has, but they were in totally dilapidated conditions, three to a desk. And then they told me that up the road there was a madrassas (sic) that had been run by one of the violent extremist Islamic groups, ready to offer free education to kids, but of course, the condition was indoctrination.  Now, if we don't provide education and help provide that education in Africa, then others will. And that's why I'm very pleased that for President Obama, the investment in education for all is one of his priorities.  If we could have Africa educate its people and then had a level of economic development, they could make a huge contribution to the food problem, to solving climate change and to the economic development of the world. RUBIN:  Any thoughts, Prime Minister, on how to reduce corruption and improve effectiveness of governments? BROWN:  I think some of the transparency initiatives -- you know, the -- for the oil and energy industries -- a requirement on companies to be transparent about their transaction -- I mean, look, when I (came to government ?) in 1997, British law had been so affected by corruption round the world that we even gave tax relief for bribes.  (Laughter.)  We did change that -- (laughing) -- but that was the way it used to be. And I actually went to a conference in Mauritius and then went over -- it was the first time I'd been, when I became chancellor -- to Madagascar.  I'd just making a speech -- made a speech with others about how to eliminate corruption from Africa.  I arrived at Madagascar airport with this plane that had to refuel, and the guy at the airport refused to allow us to refuel and -- unless you got a bribe!  (Laughter.)  And -- it's absolutely true.  But that's going to be stamped out by these transparency initiatives, and by making a condition of funding for the countries that they have actually got to clean up their financial system, particularly their public expenditures.  And I think the IMF and the World Bank can play quite a big role in that. And increasingly, you know, people in Africa are not going to vote for leaders who are corrupt, and that is one of the lessons of recent years.  We've seen the changes in Liberia.  We've seen changes happen in Kenya.  We see changes where -- of course, if there had been a fair election in Zimbabwe, we would have had a new person there as well. RUBIN:  I think we have time for -- we always end on time in the council, and we're scheduled to end at 9:00, so we'll either have one or two questions, depending on what happens. Ma'am, right there. QUESTIONER:  Katherine Grover, American University.  Prime Minister, I wondered if -- you had mentioned the Copenhagen meeting; I wondered if you could describe the principles that you see in a post-2012 climate agreement. BROWN:  I think the issue for Copenhagen is that there is general agreement on a 2050 target -- we are for 80 percent cuts in emissions, but there's general agreement that there will be that target. The question is, where is the agreement for the years 2020 and 2025?  And that's where the debate was with the G-8 when I attended it in Japan.  That's the debate that's taking place in Europe at the moment, because, you know, Europe is a combination of the old Eastern European states, who've got lots of coal-fired power stations and have got lots of problems there from diversifying out of less efficient sources of energy.  So the agreement will have to be about what we can do to 2020 and 2025, and that's where the big argument, I think, has got to be resolved. But I'm more confident with -- both that President-elect Obama and John McCain said in the election campaign that they want to see America very much part of these reductions.  I think we've got to consider the financial (message ?), because it's going to be a very big problem.  If you say to a developing country, an emerging-market country, "You've got to cut your emissions by x," but provide no means by which they can do it, then you've got to find a way of financing what is a less-cheap form of energy development, given that you've made this policy decision to move out of, say, coal, into nuclear or into something else. But we have got to have a means by which we can finance the implementation of the Copenhagen agreement, and that's why I'm attracted to the World Bank having a role in loans or in grants, but particularly loans, to emerging markets in developing countries. So you need a system of clear targets.  You need to have them quite specific for what people have got to do, not just in the long term but in the medium term.  And you need to find a way of financing the changes that you're expecting other countries to make in energy. And of course the whole idea of the carbon market is actually really exciting, because a lot of these changes could be made by market incentives, and I think that's where most countries now want to be. So these are the challenges.  I'm optimistic that we can meet them. And I do feel in some way that the way out of this economic set of problems we face, for employment and for new businesses, is going to be in the encouragement of energy-efficient businesses and services. RUBIN:  Prime Minister, we thank you enormously.  And as I said in my remarks, it's not only the U.K. but the entire globe that is very fortunate in having you as a leader.  (Applause.) .STX (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA.  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.  ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.  NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
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    A Conversation with David Miliband
    Play
    New York City, NY-- FAREED ZAKARIA: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be here. Thank you so much for coming. I first met our guest this afternoon many years ago when he was introduced to me as the future prime minister of Britain. He was then 25 years old, I think. He was the head of the policy unit at Number 10 Downing Street for Tony Blair. Between then and the time that that prediction will be fulfilled, he has been -- (laughter) -- he has been schools minister, environmental minister, and is currently hanging his hat as Her Majesty's secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. David Miliband will probably be prime minister one day, so you can say you saw him at the council before he was David Miliband. (Laughter.) Let me ask you, David, what are the things as foreign secretary that principally occupy you these days? I mean, you are probably dealing with Iran, but Iran is part of a broader challenge, you were telling me. FOREIGN SECRETARY DAVID MILIBAND: Yeah, and -- well, thank you very much to everyone for coming. You want to sort of ski off-piece, really? ZAKARIA: Yeah. Yeah. MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: This is -- David wanted to give a speech, so this is his opportunity to -- (laughter) -- MILIBAND: No, no -- (inaudible) -- all these people have come for a discussion about counterproliferation, so you might want to take a vote at some point as to whether or not we want to talk about that. ZAKARIA: This is -- this is guided democracy. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: It's -- (inaudible) -- you might say. No votes. We're with the wisdom of the crowd. MILIBAND: If they all walk out, we'll know. What's on my mind at the moment is following, that I think you can make a pretty good case that this is the last election, the last U.S. presidential election that gives the winner the chance, with the European Union, to use the transatlantic alliance to forge and define a global foreign policy agenda. But if the next president stays in office for eight years, in eight years' time, the idea that a transatlantic alliance can come together and set a global agenda that is an inclusive global agenda of the rising powers -- so we're under no illusion, I'm not talking about recreating a transatlantic empire, but I do think that eight years' time, it's easy to imagine that it will be practically impossible for a transatlantic alliance to set a global agenda for the global rules of the road. I still think it's possible -- ZAKARIA: Why? Because power will have shifted -- MILIBAND: Yeah. I mean, there are three great shifts in power going on around the world. There's obviously a shift in power from West to East. There's a huge shift in power from the national to the international level. And there's a critical shift in power, in my view, going from governments to people. That's why I talk about civilian surge around the world, the benefits of -- it goes to technology, the fact that there's an emerging global consciousness powered by those technologies. That people are inspired by what they see and know about around the world allows them to recognize how other people live their lives and to ask questions about why they're living their lives in a particular way. I think that there's a -- that's an underestimated shift in the balance of power and it's why, you know, whether it's bloggers in Iran or demonstrators in Yangon, these are people who are trying to live out their own sense that they want to define their own future. And I think that's a big part of the shift of power. Now, in that context, I think that there remains scope for a transatlantic agenda that takes some of the things that we believe in very strongly -- you can call them enlightenment values; you could call them a quest for order and stability on the basis of individual rights and taking a collective risk. I think you can see how, in the right circumstances, Europe and America could come together in the next three or four months. And I would put three things at the top of our list, top of -- as what could define a global agenda. I think the first thing is we have to be very clear what attitude we take towards nation-building, above all, democracy-building, because if you look at Pakistan and -- Afghanistan, Pakistan, which is probably the number one foreign policy priority for me in the U.K., those two countries face an enormous shared challenge of democracy-building or nation-building. Secondly, I think that the challenge of global inequality is something that should concern us, not just out of moral interest but also out of self interest. And I think that the debate about inequality around the world is going to be transformed over the next 20 to 30 years by climate change, which I think is a massive issue not of technology or environment, but actually of equity. And the third issue that I think is -- we need to resolve ourselves around is how we understand shared sovereignty and how collective international institutions can come together to tackle shared risks. The European Union was created to share sovereignty and to tackle shared risks. Many of the things that we're debating at the U.N. this week, from the reach of the ICC into Sudan to the defense of the nonproliferation treaty and sanctions against Iran, those are issues of the balance between national power and international rules, and I think that it's right that we get into that in a very fundamental way. ZAKARIA: So let's just talk about some of these things in kind of no particular order. And my apologies to whoever -- the three of you who came for a counterterrorism seminar -- (laughter) -- counterproliferation seminar, sorry. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the two candidates here are both agreed on very few things and one of them is that there should be a surge, Iraq-style, in Afghanistan. Many, many knowledgeable Afghan experts -- and somebody like Rory Stewart, for example, argues that this is a terrible idea, that it will provoke a greater and greater Afghan and particularly Pashtun nationalism, that what you need is actually to reduce the footprint of Western forces and work with the tribes in a way that somehow allows for a kind of more settled and organic order. What's the right answer? MILIBAND: One of the first rules of British diplomacy is you must never take sides in a American presidential election. (Laughter.) But I'm in the happy position where I can either agree with both of them or disagree with them. (Laughter.) I mean, I think you'll know what I'm saying if I -- if I choose my words carefully and say more foreign troops are certainly not the answer to Afghanistan's problems. They may be part of an answer, but I think it's very, very clear that we're never going to have the level of troops in Afghanistan that the Soviets had and they were not able to subjugate the people of Afghanistan. They had 200,000 troops at some point in the 1980s in Afghanistan. Now, coalition troops at the moment are 40,000, give or take. We have 8,000 troops in Helmand. The key variable is not the number of foreign troops, it's the number of Afghan troops. The Afghan National Army now has 58,000 members. It's pretty clean. It's pretty effective. If I talk to our troops in Afghanistan, they say, if they go out with the Afghan National Army, they feel like they're with serious and relatively safe people, people they'd want to be working with. So when it comes to the military side, the key variable is building up the Afghan National Army. They've already had a target of getting to 122,000. But obviously there isn't a military solution in Afghanistan. That's why, you know, you can talk about a civilian surge or a political surge -- are talked about in Afghanistan. And the issue of governments, especially local governments but also national governments, in Afghanistan is absolutely central. And it's going to be -- the military can create the space and in the five population centers of Helmand where we are, more or less, we are supporting the Afghan National Army and creating space for civic institutions to grow. But I think it's important that we recognize that there isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution," and there certainly isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution" that comes from the imposition of foreign troops. ZAKARIA: Which is a good thing given the state of the British expeditionary forces. Is it fair to say -- MILIBAND: Why do you say that? ZAKARIA: -- is it fair to say that you don't have many more troops to send? In other words, Max Boot -- who I was looking for -- a Council senior fellow, has written very eloquently on the -- on what he sees as the decline and fall of the British armed forces, that you have hollowed out your military to the point where it would be very difficult for you to send expeditionary forces in any greater numbers. MILIBAND: We have about 100(,000) -- 103(,000) -- 105,000 men and women in uniform. ZAKARIA: Yeah. Well, Europe has 2 million men in uniform, but very few of those can be mobilized for expedition. MILIBAND: A rather high percentage of ours do things. (Laughter.) The -- or do dangerous things would be a better of putting it. The -- I mean, Europe also has -- literally, I can't remember the exact figure, hundreds of helicopters, but none are available to -- for use in Afghanistan -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: I think that we are -- look, our armed forces are in a different size or shape and a smaller size than they were 20 or 30 years ago, but I think that the work that they're doing in Afghanistan and some of the work that's being done in Iraq, nevermind the work that's been done in Kosovo -- of unbelievably high levels of intellect, skill, bravery. ZAKARIA: Nobody's disputing that. But the question is is there political will in Britain to move -- to restore some of its capacity? MILIBAND: Well, I think -- I mean, we have 8,200 troops in Helmand province. The future of Helmand province is not going to be achieved by having larger numbers of British troops. That's not the answer because we can play an important role in training. We can play an embedded role. The sort of MiTT experience in Iraq, I think, is quite relevant in all this. But we're not trying to create a colony. We had a very large army when we had colonies. We don't have a colony anymore, and we're certainly not trying to create a colony in Afghanistan. ZAKARIA: Well, actually, most of the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq were Indians, I would point out, when Britain ruled, it ruled through the India office. (Laughter.) So -- but another of your great problems, Iran. Everybody -- everybody -- MILIBAND: You've been very kind not pointing out that the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan was drawn from my office. (Laughter.) And still it's disputed. ZAKARIA: Exactly, and you still have -- the Pakistani president and the Afghan president say the whole problem is the Durand Line. MILIBAND: But the new Pakistani president and the new -- and the existing -- and the Afghan president. They're actually going to make a go of this in a way that the previous Pakistani president couldn't do with the present -- ZAKARIA: Do you feel that the current president of Pakistan has the army on board and that this will -- MILIBAND: Well, he's a democratically elected president -- ZAKARIA: So that would mean no -- MILIBAND: -- it's very -- (laughter) -- it's very important, it's very important, it's very important that he has the whole of the army. And when you referred to the armed forces, you know as well as I do that it's important to refer to all aspects of the armed services. ZAKARIA: And what's your sense on that? I mean, have you -- ? MILIBAND: Well, I think that he's got a massive challenge. I think that the army does not want to be returning to lead the government. I'm confident that the leadership of the Pakistani army would prefer to run the armed services rather than the whole country. And I think it's all hands to the pump, really, to support the new government. And my own view is that 30 out of 60 years of military rule is an important part of explaining the Pakistani problem. And the fact that the Pakistani army is the most efficient, revered, effective institution in Pakistani society says a lot about the strength of that institution but also about the problems of the country. ZAKARIA: Iran. You've been very outspoken and taken a kind of fairly tough line on Iran. But yet, nobody has sort of solved the Gordian -- you know, the problem, which is Iran continues to enrich and the West continues to talk, and the sanctions do not seem to have any effect. So, what do we do? MILIBAND: Well, I think the policy hasn't yet worked, but I don't think it's failed. And I don't think one can spend 30 minutes looking at the Iranian economy without -- and say that the sanctions are having no effect. ZAKARIA: (Inaudible) -- having the effect of stopping them from -- MILIBAND: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) The Bazari (ph), who are a critical political group, although they're a relatively small economic group in Iran, are really being squeezed. The financial sanctions and the high levels of the insurance (premium ?) are really squeezing them. I think that's a significant factor in Iran at the moment. When that's combined, we run an embassy -- inflation index. We obviously have diplomatic representation in Iran, and our inflation index is 30 to 35 percent in Iran. This is a country whose finance minister has just been -- resigned and given a speech denouncing the policies of his own government. I think that there is a debate now happening in the Iranian media, as well, about the wisdom of the current course that they're pursuing. So I think it's premature to say that this policy has failed. You're right that the IAEA are clear that they're continuing to seek to enrich and to develop their technical capacity. I think that we have a job to do to turn the tables of the debate, because the presentation from -- and this speaks to the whole counterproliferation agenda, actually. The presentation from Iran is that we are trying to deny them their rights under the NPT, whereas actually the offer that is now on the table, including from the Untied States, is of economic, political but also scientific collaboration, including on civilian nuclear power; in other words, Iran fulfilling its right under the NPT. What we're not willing to see is it disobey its responsibilities under the NPT, which are to avoid proliferation. I mean, Iran is a signatory of the NPT and it's clearly seeking to be proliferator. And that's, I think, the reason why the IAEA has blown up -- or blown the whistle on what they're doing, and it's why there have been three successive U.N. Security Council resolutions. Have they yet changed the equation? No. Has the policy failed? I don't think it has yet. ZAKARIA: Yesterday morning Ahmadinejad had a little breakfast for some -- about 10 people. I was there. I asked him about the international consortium idea. He said, we have always been in principle in favor. The problem is the Brits and the Americans. MILIBAND: Well, the idea of an enrichment bond is something that we've been pushing. The supply for the Bushehr reactor -- ZAKARIA: No, but an international consortium in Iran. MILIBAND: Well, I think that the key is whether or not they are willing to disavow that dual-use program that they've got at the moment. That's why the E-3 plus three have been very, very clear that the suspension of the existing program in phase three of the negotiation is the prerequisite for serious discussion about the way in which the civilian nuclear program can develop for or in Iran. ZAKARIA: But let me understand. You are saying that it is conceivable that there could be enrichment -- that the fuel cycle could be established in Iran but there would be an international consortium of scientists monitoring it? Because I thought -- MILIBAND: I'm saying something different. I'm saying that we have specified that Iran must come into compliance with its NPT obligations. In other words, it must overcome the distrust and malfeasance that's been -- and the mendacity that's been at the heart of their program. We have not specified that there are only a certain number of trajectories for the civilian nuclear program for the future. What we specified is what is not acceptable. I mean, it's not acceptable to have secret programs. It's not acceptable to deny data and information for the international community. It's not acceptable to deny access to key papers before the IAEA. And I think that if Iran is willing to play by the international rules, it will find that actually there is a serious hand of engagement that is there from the six. And it's actually written down. You can read it on the website. The papers that we've sent to Iran are published. ZAKARIA: And an international consortium in Iran would -- MILIBAND: I haven't specified that. ZAKARIA: No, I think it's not ruled out. MILIBAND: Nowhere in our documents, as I understand it -- ZAKARIA: You do not rule that out. MILIBAND: No, we haven't ruled it out. What we've ruled out is the defiance of the IAEA and of international rule, and international law, actually, in this case. And the trouble is that the history of the Iranian program means that no one is going to approach their propositions with anything other than extremely skeptical eye, for very good reason. I (hope/heard ?) someone asked President Ahmadinejad whether he stood by his description of Israel as a cesspool of humanity that deserved to go down the slope of delivery from the face of the Earth, which is what he said at the U.N. on Monday. So that is the context in which people are extremely skeptical about Iranian professions of innocence. ZAKARIA: We're in New York. You can be rest assured that he was asked that question. (Laughter.) Let me ask you about other challenges you face. The Russian attack on Georgia. Do you think that President Saakashvili made a tactical mistake, as Carl Bildt put it, in attacking Russian forces? MILIBAND: Well, it's clear that there were rights and wrongs both on the Ossetian side and on the Georgian side, in the run-up to the invasion. And we said that from the beginning. We've also said that if there's any evidence of the human rights and war crimes that -- the human rights abuse and the war crimes that Russia's alleged, they should be investigated without fear or favor by third parties and appropriate steps taken. And I'm sure there were wrongs. The question is, does that justify the Russian invasion? Does it justify the recognition of two territories that are actually part of Georgia, to which our answer is (no ?). ZAKARIA: Do you think they are indisputably part of Georgia, or are they sort of frozen conflicts whose status has to be determined? MILIBAND: Well, that they are part of Georgia, over which there is conflict. They clearly are part of Georgia. I mean, no one disputes that they -- the territorial integrity of Georgia includes those territories. But they've been disputed. The civil wars of the early '90s cost huge numbers of lives. There was effectively -- (inaudible) -- ethnic cleansing have gone on. The conflicts were frozen, but the territory of Georgia includes those enclaves. ZAKARIA: Going forward, Secretary of Defense Gates gave a speech last week, I think it was, in which he said, in effect -- I think I'm quoting roughly accurately -- NATO should be very careful about the commitments it makes going forward; it should instead focus on honoring the commitments it has already made -- which I took to mean we should be very careful about making Georgia a member of NATO; instead, we should be sure that we can actually protect Poland and the Baltic Republics from a Russian attack. Should Georgia be a member of NATO in any foreseeable timeframe? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the leaders of NATO answered that question in April. And they were -- they were faced with this debate about the Membership Action Plan, which does not guarantee membership, and they decided that Georgia and Ukraine will be members if they wanted, if they wanted. And in the Ukraine, there's far from a universal aspiration to join NATO. It's a pretty universal aspiration to join the European Union, but it's not a universal aspiration to join NATO. I think that no one is talking about them joining NATO in the next -- in the immediate period. What I think we're talking about now through the NATO-Georgia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council is building up the capacity of those countries. And I think the most important thing that -- in thinking about this, the fundamental divide about these countries is whether or not they are independent sovereign countries that can control their own destiny or whether they are, quote-unquote, "ex-Soviet space." And if you still see the map of that part of the Caucasus as ex-Soviet space, then you have a different view than if you see them as populated by independent countries with their own sovereign populations or making their own decisions. And I think it's very important for the future of Russia, actually, that it comes to terms with the fact that while they may have interests, and they obviously do, that they'll always be neighbors of Georgia, but I don't think they have -- I think they've got to realize that actually, the world's moved on and that the relationship that Georgia will have with the West is not to the exclusion of its relationship with Russia. And actually now, it's in the interests of Russia to have a (sovereign ?) Georgia, not a (supile ?) one. ZAKARIA: But were Georgia to become a member of NATO, Article 5 would commit -- Britain is now in favor officially of Georgia being part of NATO. Article 5 would mean that Britain is saying that if Russia and Georgia went to war, Britain would go to war with Russia over Georgia. MILIBAND: Well, they couldn't join NATO unless we were willing to make that commitment. ZAKARIA: So you are willing to make that commitment? MILIBAND: Well, that depends, doesn't it? It depends on the development of Georgia. It depends on the choices the Georgians make and it depends on the final decision that's made by NATO. What I would say to you is that is still an open question, how that development takes place and what the Georgians want to do and what the Ukrainians want to do. But it would be irresponsible to allow them to become members unless you're willing to make that commitment. And I think what's really important is to look at the experience in the Baltics. See, those three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, they're now members of the EU and they're members of NATO. And they are embedded in Western liberal institutions more or less. And that's fundamentally why they're safe. They are confident in themselves, they're confident in their own people, and the idea of them trying to be subjugated from outside is something that, you know, I don't think is really in the cards. Now, the Ukraine question is different from the Georgia question; I think that's worth teasing out. You -- I don't really accept that -- you said, is there a -- they're either -- you either consolidate existing members or think about future members. I think that that's a bit of a false choice, really, because the future members, you are going to build up their capacity and then you'll be able to make a decision about them. Or they'll be able to make a decision and you're going to have to decide whether to ratify. ZAKARIA: I'm going to turn it over to all the rest of you, but I wanted to ask you one thing. You know, you think you're in -- you're outside Britain, so you're going to be spared the unending questions that you're asked in Britain. But I'm going to ask you a variant of the questions that you're asked in Britain all the time. Why do you think that the Labor Party is in so much trouble these days? I mean, do you -- is it just the exhaustion of having been in power this long? Or is it that -- if you look at Europe, Sarkozy is doing well in France, Merkel is nominally chancellor of Germany. The left in Britain seems to be doing badly, you know, Boris Johnson is mayor of London. It doesn't seem as though this is a good time in Europe to be a left wing politician. Why? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the left is on the rebound at the moment, because we were -- if you think back to 2002, France had a socialist prime minister, Germany had Schroder, the Social Democratic chancellor -- Spain, Sweden, U.K. Now, incumbency is an act of -- you have to defy political gravity, and that's the definition of incumbency. And the longer you're in, the harder it is to do it. And winning the fourth time is harder than winning three times and winning twice is harder than winning once. And we're trying to defy political gravity, because in the end, the assumption is the -- the pendulum swings. And we're trying to defy political gravity at a time of big economic change. And actually, Sarkozy's more popular than he was, but I don't think -- you know, if you look at the -- if -- I think he'll want to be doing much better. It's not an easy time to be an incumbent anywhere. And under your system, the incumbents are spared having to run for a third time. So the incumbent party can run as the party of change. (Laughter.) And the -- and that's what we are -- what I always used to say for the -- in the 2005 election, I said that we were offering more change than the Tories, even though we were the incumbents. And the key to success, especially if you're a progressive party, I think, is to always be -- the way I put it is you've got to be an insurgent, not an incumbent. And once you become an incumbent and become part of the establishment, then you're going to ask for a kicking, really. And I think that mid-terms are always a tricky time, but I think that what's interesting about the U.K. at the moment is that there hasn't been a shift in the ideological balance of power that would mirror the -- or be a precursor of the shift in the polls at the moment. And in '97 and '79, you saw big shifts in the ideological center of gravity. That hasn't happened. You've got the Conservative Party in the U.K. trying to repeat what they've done in Sweden, actually, which is to run as progressive ends with conservative means -- so compassionate conservatives, as I suppose you'd say in this country. And that's something that will have to tested, hopefully to destruction in the next couple of years. (Laughter.) ZAKARIA: All right. Questions. Again, identify yourself. By the way, this whole thing is on the record, so don't expect any bombshells. MILIBAND: Are you saying I'm not being very interesting? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Hello. I'm Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. You mentioned in passing that you've been dealing with the effort by a number of African states to convince the U.N. Security Council to suspend the International Criminal Court's efforts to prosecute Bashir, the president of Sudan. And I wanted to follow up on the British position on that, because as I understand it, Britain has articulated appropriately high standards before it would even contemplate a so-called Article 16 deferral. I mean, essentially, complete cooperation with the deployment of peacekeepers, serious peace negotiations, an end to the attacks on the camps and surrender of the two ICC suspects. I think everybody agrees that there is no way in the world that in the next three to four months before these charges are confirmed that Sudan would ever meet those standards. And so my question is really sort of why the charade. I mean, I'm not sure that this is convincing any African states that it's a real dialogue about this issue. And what I fear, frankly, is that you're going to very quickly end up having to negotiate under threats of violence by a mass murderer or promises from a serial liar. And wouldn't it be better just to say this guy should be -- you know, should have his day in court in The Hague? MILIBAND: Well, I'm slightly concerned that presumably on the basis of one article in the Observer, you think that there is a charade, that we are -- (inaudible) -- article in the Observer. (Inaudible) -- before the prosecutor issued his appeal to the court or his -- I mean, not appeal, his -- ZAKARIA: His recommendation or his - MILIBAND: Yeah, his application, his application to the court. And I was very clear, this is an independent prosecutor, not a political decision. If you ignore the court, the court won't go away, it'll keep coming after you. And it's incumbent on -- and I was able to say this because we're a signatory to the ICC -- it's incumbent on all states to engage and follow through. And that remains our position. And we're not setting conditions for the entry into force of Article 16. Article 16 exists -- that's a fact -- as part of the ICC statute. So other people can debate it, but it's absolutely clear that the court needs to have its day in court. And that is written into the ICC status. The bar is set high. I think -- I can't remember the exact language, but essentially Article 16 is triggered in exceptional circumstances, more or less. That seems to me to be right, and it's simply a matter of fact that that is the situation, and we will continue to advocate for the court as an independent entity and continue to fulfill our responsibilities as a P-5 member, in saying, well, yes, there is this Article 16 but it sets the bar very high and it's for exceptional circumstances. And that's the plainest way of speaking on it. ZAKARIA: Yeah? QUESTIONER: Evelyn Leopold, a journalist at the U.N. If I can follow up Ken Roth's question, you are considering invoking Article 16. I mean, this is pretty common knowledge, and I'm wondering in what way and how. MILIBAND: I don't think that -- QUESTIONER: And, secondly, can I ask something on Iran quickly? ZAKARIA: No, not now. One question per person, and you just asked it. MILIBAND: I don't think -- you allege that we're considering it. That's not true, actually. Other people are advocating the invocation of Article 16, and we've said nothing's happened to justify the -- ZAKARIA: Do you want to explain Article 16? MILIBAND: Article 16 is to postpone by a year an indictment and to give a year's stay of the indictment. Other people are proposing that publicly. We said we haven't see anything yet that justifies the invocation of Article 16. The facts of Article 16's existence and the role it plays in exceptional circumstances is there. ZAKARIA: Let me ask you a kind of slightly stepping-back question. If you're trying to get Bashir to do something, is it helpful or unhelpful to have an indictment? In other words, is it going to be easier to scare him into doing something, or does it put his back up against the wall and actually makes it -- complicates your life? If the point here is to get some kind of a political resolution where maybe, you know, he does resign, but more importantly, that there's some kind of resolution of Darfur -- MILIBAND: I think that that is a question which is reasonable for commentators to make, to pronounce on. But if you're a foreign minister and you say the decisions of the court are independent decisions that should be taken on the basis of the facts and the law, and that political decisions should be taken on the basis of -- the situation is not helpful for me to speculate as to the right way to put, quote-unquote, "pressure" on a member state. I believe all member states should cooperate with the ICC in full. ZAKARIA: Including your closest ally? MILIBAND: All member states should -- all states should cooperate. But I don't think it would be -- I think that would -- if I said to you how I thought the court should be, quote-unquote, "used" to put pressure on a president of a country, I think that would be to abuse the independence of the court. I think I have to be careful in that. ZAKARIA: There, at the back. QUESTIONER: Stewart Patrick. I am a senior fellow here directing a new program on International Institutions and Global Governance. And I wanted to pick up on the third of your points for a Transatlantic Global Agenda. It seems to me that in addition to coming up with new rules for sovereignty in an age of global threats, one of the things we have to worry about is trying to make existing bedrock institutions of international governance more representative, more effective and more accountable. And in that regard, I understand that the prime minister's office and probably your office as well has done some significant thinking on this, and I'd wonder if you would address in particular three different sets of institutions -- the Security Council, the G-8 and the international financial institutions, and give us some sense of -- I realize it's a tall order. You can choose one if you'd like, but -- (laughter). ZAKARIA: Very quickly. MILIBAND: We support U.N. reform, (the four new ?) members plus plus representations from Africa. I think that there's no argument, India, Japan, et cetera, getting them on, is that a way to -- will you get -- will you make the Security Council less or more effective. I believe that there is a -- we are coming towards a crunch, where the lack of legitimacy in the institution is going to fatally wound it. And I think that that is really dangerous. And so that's why I think it's right, although we are one of the P-5 now, I think it's right that we should be advocates of reform. I also think that the G-8 needs to expand. I think, you know, it's interesting. We were the country that expanded the G-8 to take over the climate agenda in 2005 and created the G-13. I have no sort of theological view that it should be 13, not 14 or -- but I think that it's not going to -- QUESTIONER: Do you think China should be in or out? MILIBAND: Oh, in. Definitely in. Definitely in. It's got to be in. ZAKARIA: Ma'am, at the back there. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Peggy Hicks, Human Rights Watch. I wanted to ask about the U.K.'s reluctance to acknowledge the extent of human rights abuses committed by its ally, Ethiopia, in Somalia and the Ogaden. And wouldn't U.K. interests be better served in combatting terrorism and development in those places by confronting those abuses and pushing for accountability? MILIBAND: That's really tough. I mean, I don't know is the answer to that, really. I think that -- I think it's less about whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards, which I think we do. I think it's more how on earth are we going to make progress. As we're meeting now, my colleague, the secretary for International Development, is meeting the Ethiopian prime minister. I don't know the answer to your question, is the truth. I mean, I know what you're saying and I can see what you're arguing for. I don't think -- and I don't think it's actually about the sort of -- it's not really -- it's a rather more profound question than whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards. It's about how are you going to get progress there. I don't know the answer to that. Sorry. ZAKARIA: Oh, Andy Moravcsik. QUESTIONER: Andy Moravcsik from Princeton University and Brookings Institution. We're now into year seven of what used to be called the European Constitution, and we still don't have one. I'm wondering if you think there's still something essential at stake in that constitution, from a British point of view, and if there is, and the constitution cum treaty doesn't go through, whether there's some other way to get it? MILIBAND: You write about -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Yeah. MILIBAND: I think I've read some of your -- your stuff, which is good, really good, about Europe. I mean, we're not going to have a constitution, because that's been abandoned. And the attempt to scrap all previous EU treaties and create new ones has been abandoned. What we've got -- an amending treaty, the greatest achievement of which is to ban further institutional reform for at least 10 years. And that is a very important thing. Because one reason the EU is unpopular is it's spent the last seven years examining its own plumbing. And that is a very, very bad thing to do. It completely hollows out the institution's capacity to be a powerful and effective voice, because it's examining itself. And I think that the most important -- I mean, the treaty has to be passed in all 27 countries in order to come into force. It does make some useful institutional reforms, help the EU cope with being rather than 15. But I don't think it's -- no one would claim it's a revolutionary change. There's some more qualified majority voting in areas like energy, which is quite useful, overseas aid. It cleans up some of the commission structures so that there's real integrity to the foreign policy structures, and that's a good thing. But I don't think it's -- the most significant thing is it ends this period of institutional introspection, and I'm a great believer that you've got to -- you lead with function and then get the form, rather than get the form and then get the function. And I think that the EU's challenge is really an exciting one, because for 40 years, the EU has been driven forward by a view that the threats to its security and prosperity come from within its borders. Originally they came from the idea of war between states. But then it became through unemployment and poor labor standards and poor environmental standards. And that project carries on. You've got (internal ?) market, single currency, et cetera. However, in the modern world, the big threats to Europe's security and prosperity come from beyond its borders. So that's why I talk about a second wing of the European airplane. The first wing is internal market, internal social standards, et cetera. The second wing is that Europe should be a powerful voice in the world. ZAKARIA: Does Europe need a powerful foreign minister, if that's the case? MILIBAND: Well, I think it would be -- at the moment, it's got two, almost three. In this -- it's got Xavier Solana, High Representative, it's got a Benita Ferrero Waldner, External Relations, it's got Barroso, the head of the Commission. I think that the proposal in the Lisbon Treaty, which is to merge at least two of those jobs, I think is a good thing. We don't call it foreign minister. But we -- there are 27 foreign ministers, and it's the job of the high representative, I mean, the job is ghastly. The -- is to carry out the will of the 27. And the real challenge is can you have a coherent foreign policy of 27 or will you always fall to the lowest common denominator. If you think about what's happened in Kosovo in the last year, that has not been lowest common denominator politics. It's actually a story of highest common factor. Not every country has recognized the new Kosovo, 21 countries are recognized. But 27 countries agreed to put 2,000 ESPP monitors in there -- or ESPP peacekeepers in there. And you've got 16,000 NATO troops as well, and they're not being fired on. And anyone who knows anything about the Western Balkans in the '90s will know that's a pretty remarkable development. ZAKARIA: Sir. QUESTIONER: Henry Breed from the U.N. General Assembly. Two of the principle themes in this week's general debate have been the financial crisis on one hand and the Millennium Development Goals on the other. Your government this morning talked very effectively, very convincingly about the need to maintain commitment to the Millennium Development Goals in the face of the financial crisis. How do you see that happening, and how do you see convincing your constituency of its virtue? MILIBAND: Hmm, that's really interesting. I mean, when the prime minister spoke at the U.N. General Assembly today, and he talked -- he took head-on the argument does the financial crisis mean that the world is going to relax on the Millennium Development Goals. And he argued it mustn't. And in the end, that comes down to politics. Now, what's happened in U.K. in the last 11 years is that -- and that's been a period of economic growth, it's not yet a test for the proposition. Year on year, average incomes have grown. Over a few days, instead of going down, it's gone up. And we've now got a timetable to reach our (1.7 percent ?). And I think that the -- and all the other parties are now committed to the same timetable. So the politics has changed in a pretty fundamental way. And I don't think it'll get rolled back, interestingly enough because I think the political center of gravity has shifted on this issue. Whether or not that is doable internationally -- I mean, there is pressure on some European countries on overseas aid commitment. I just think it's very, very important that they're going because it's a matter of politics. One thing that will make a difference -- I think -- I wrote the '97 Manifesto and it -- the -- (inaudible) -- Manifesto -- and it was too easy to say you can make poverty history by increasing aid. I think people now are much more conscious that trade, conflict prevention, good governance as well as aid are vital to it. And I would say that people will, if we look like we're taking the pressure off on good governance and trade and conflict prevention, then we'll be in trouble on the aid commitment. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Joanna Wechsler, Security Council Report. You started out talking about the power shifts, and it seems that there have been some power shifts also within the Security Council of the U.N. And in particular, within the P-5, we had two double vetoes -- the first two double vetoes since the end of the Cold War -- one on Burma, one on Zimbabwe. These just happened to be cases related to democracy and human rights. So A, do you think this is a trend? And B, what needs to be done -- what can be done for the Council to regain a degree of consensus and to simply be able to be effective? MILIBAND: Can I ask you a question? Were those really the first double vetoes since the end of the Cold War? QUESTIONER: Yeah, double. MILIBAND: That's really significant. That's very, very significant -- Burma and Zimbabwe. Look, the issue at the heart of it is ironic given what's happened in South Ossetia, because the issue that drew the Russians and then the Chinese to veto was, quote, "We don't interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." So it -- this is a profound issue, not a -- not a peripheral one. And I think it is significant that -- someone said that the Zimbabwe vote was a sort of canary in the mine for Russia's new attitude. In fact, you could argue it was the opposite, because they argued against intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. I think that there is real -- we've got to be honest, there's division about it, a fundamental division. And I went to China in February, and I gave a speech there about what I called responsible sovereignty, which tried to take head-on -- Bob Zoellick made a speech about responsible stakeholder. There was no such word as stakeholder in Mandarin. So I thought it was important to try to take on -- to accept national sovereignty as being a really important foundation of global order. But then ask yourself, is it qualified at all? I mean, I think it's qualified in two senses. One, it's qualified -- if you abuse your own people, then your sovereignty is qualified and you do make yourself susceptible to foreign intervention of a range of kinds, not only military. But secondly, if you abuse the rights of others beyond your own borders, that also carries consequences. And so I think that it's -- sovereignty is qualified. But I think we have to engage on that debate. Now, what's interesting, I think, about the debate in China in an area -- let's think of a less contentious area, so climate change. The debate has changed there, partly because they recognize responsibilities for the wider community. And I think that the Chinese debate has moved on climate change, myself -- there are probably Chinese scholars here who've got a better view than I, but I think it has changed. Now, that's, in a way, the easy one, because it's -- or easy is the wrong way of putting it. It's an easier one. On the hard security end, there's still very, very strong difficulties. And I think that the way this will be played out, which is a way of answering your question, is how responsibility to protect is developed or is not developed because is I think is why quite a few people have got a buyer's remorse about the R2P. And I think that's pretty serious. But that's the way you'll see these developed. QUESTIONER: Were the Chinese helpful on Burma or not? Condi Rice says that they were actually somewhat helpful. MILIBAND: I think she's -- (inaudible). They were more helpful than some other countries. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: There are two countries that border Burma, China and India. QUESTIONER: My name is Roland Paul. I hope you don't think this is an awkward or tactless question, but it's common knowledge that Gordon Brown is struggling to be -- to retain his position as prime minister of England, and your name is mentioned as a likely alternative. But according to The New York Times, a couple of days ago, Brown said or did something that was a brilliant stroke to turn the tables on you and, you know, The Times, in its fine reporting, failed to say what that was. So maybe you could -- (laughter) -- if you could tell us what the -- MILIBAND: I can put your mind -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: -- he didn't need to turn the tables. He made an outstanding speech at the party conference, which is a good thing. I don't support the leadership election in the Labor Party, and we carry on on that basis. He made a great speech. He's got -- he's a man of real values and integrity and drive. And I think you've seen that on show, actually, in -- (inaudible) -- of the U.N. fora this week. The Millennium Development Goals summit yesterday was in large part his creation. And so I would say to you, don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: What? QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. MILIBAND: Why The Guardian? QUESTIONER: Your article in The Guardian in which you laid out a vision for the Labor Party. MILIBAND: But that -- I mean, Gordon himself said -- this was an article that any member of the cabinet could've written and he could've written. So it's slightly odd to say that that's sort of against what he's saying. And I think it's important that if you're in politics, you've got to run your own department. You've also got to stand up for the correct of -- responsibility of the government as a whole, and that's what I'm doing. QUESTIONER: Hi. Lane Green from the Economist Magazine. I think it MacMillan (ph) who said that Britain should be wise old Greece to America's Rome. Right now, it's looking like we're Rome at about 475 A.D. (Laughter.) And a quick plug. On Economist.com, we're running a thing called the Global Electoral College, where everybody in the world outside the United States can vote for president. We have an embarrassingly blue map, almost entirely except for El Salvador, which is currently barely leaning John McCain. (Laughter.) But one of these guys is going to be president of the United States. And without fear or favor, what's the first piece of advice you would, as wise old Greece, give to -- (laughter) -- give to Rome? What's the first symbolic or practical thing that a new president can do to restore America's reputation? MILIBAND: Well, that's interesting. That's interesting. I mean, I hate the sort of snobbery that's associated with British pretensions to lecturing in a (minimite ?) way, so I'd prefer not to do it in that -- you can probably learn more from our mistakes than from our electorates. But what would be the first -- QUESTIONER: -- don't invade Iraq, but that's done. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: I think -- I tell you what -- actually, what I would think -- the last time I was here, I -- we had a dinner at the -- our ambassador to the U.N., and we spent quite a lot of the dinner debating this man's book, which none of us had read, but we'd all read the -- (laughter) -- QUESTIONER: So was it like Oxford High Table all over again? MILIBAND: Actually, if I'd really had my wits about me, which none of us had brought, then yeah. (Laughter.) But we had read the helpful summary on the Sons of Foreign Affairs. The title -- we all knew the title. I think the most -- don't underestimate American power would be my piece of advice. This is still -- I mean, Brent Scowcroft wrote this article saying -- and it's partly -- remember, I started by talking about how this may be one of the last chances for the trans-Atlantic alliance to set a global agenda. And part of my thinking on that is inspired by what Brent Scowcroft said, which was -- I think in The National Interest, he wrote an article saying America is the only superpower, and it will remain superordinary in all sorts of ways for the next 20 years, but name one country that can get the world to do what it wants on its own in the modern world. And I think that's an important point. However, don't underestimate American power and don't become too sort of hangdog or embarrassed about yourselves, because this is still a country with huge ability to be a force for good around the world and is a force for good around in the world in all sorts of ways. And I think that if the next president comes in in the sense of somehow feeling that things can't be done, that's going to be a problem. Any of the big problems that need to be done can only be done if you're on the bus. And so whether it's inequality and climate change or conflict prevention or counterproliferation, which we have to mention because these people have come here to talk about it. (Laughter.) (Cross talk.) QUESTIONER: -- gives you a chance to talk about -- on Iran, the -- MILIBAND: The counterproliferation -- remember, but two challenges to the counterproliferation agenda, just to let me do my 30 seconds on this. There are three commitments in the NPT. One is not to proliferate; the other is not to -- it's to disarm; and the other is to promote safe use of civilian nuclear power. And the whole disarmament argument is a very important part of this because the allegation of hypocrisy is that we rearm like crazy ourselves and we stop everyone else. Actually, we're serious about our disarmament responsibility. We've had a 75 percent reduction in our nuclear arsenal over the last 10 years. And I think that the debate has been started about -- by the shots at our group, a world full of nuclear weapons, et cetera, is an important part of the conditioning to help -- we make the NPT bargain. And I think the bargain has to be remade because it's been a brilliant bargain. I mean, it is amazing that in a world where 40 or 50 countries have the power -- economic, scientific, et cetera -- to be nuclear weapons states, you know, less than 10 are. That is a remarkable thing. Kennedy predicted, I think, by mid-80s -- or mid-70s, he said -- mid '80s -- he predicted in 1962 that there would be 30 nuclear weapons states. There could be, but there aren't. And that is significantly because of the NPT regime. But I think the bargain has to be remade because the forces that are trying to split it asunder are strong. The P-5, I think, has lost a bit of focus on this -- which I think is dangerous -- since the Cold War. The spread of civilian nuclear power has given lots more explanation of how to do this stuff. There's various people trying to spread knowledge about how you weaponize. So we've got to -- we can't -- I think for sometime, since the Cold War, we've lived in a world where we thought, oh, well the NPT is fine, it's okay. We've got to really defend it aggressively if we want it to last, and that means you have to defend it aggressively on the nonproliferation front. We also defend it aggressively on the disarmament front. That's the end of my piece. ZAKARIA: Benjamin Barber? QUESTIONER: Thanks. Benjamin Barber at Demos, New York. Hi, David. MILIBAND: Hi. QUESTIONER: This question about the global blue vote suggests to me one of the reasons so many Americans vote red, and it's a problem because that sense that the world votes one way pushes America the other way. And my question, therefore, comes back to your starting point where you said that we -- this is the last, perhaps, American vote where there will be a chance to elect leadership that's capable of a shared EU-UK-USA global leadership role. And my question is, do you think that depends exclusively on geopolitical factors so that the outcome of the vote here and the outcome next year in England have nothing to do with that and there's a chance, no matter who wins, either side, that goes forward? Or does it depend on, not just geopolitical but ideological alignments -- say, a Labor victory or a Democratic victory or David Cameron and McCain. In other words, is there an ideological impediment to that shared leadership in place? Or do you think, really, the issues are generic and geopolitical and it's not so important who wins the election on either side? MILIBAND: Well, I think it's -- the important thing to -- I tried to say, Europe-America, not just UK-U.S., and I think that's important. And I think you've got quite an important constellation across the left-right divide in Europe -- you know, Mrs. Merkel, Sarkozy, Brown -- Gordon Brown, spanning the political spectrum. You've got real commitments to trans-Atlantic joint work. And I think that's significant. And so in that sense, I don't think this is a simple left-right thing. Having said that, I do believe that if you want order and stability in the modern world, you can only forge it on the basis of progressive values. Unless you're willing to take on forces of inequality, unless you're willing to stand up for promoting democracy, unless you're willing to share sovereignty, I don't see how you tackle the modern problems. And so you can take that as you will, but I don't think it's a simple left-right thing. I think that there's an important -- I think that's -- interestingly enough, within Europe, you can get people to sign up for those propositions from both a center-right and a center-left perspective, which I think is interesting. And so of course the individuals are elected who can make a difference. And it's not just all sort of ineluctable forces. But I think that -- what I think is significant and what a really important message for an American audience, I think, is that there is a real recognition on the side of Europe that we've got to get our act together and become better partners, but we want to. And I think it's quite a significant thing that certainly would accrue in the same way. I yield again. ZAKARIA: All right. Our Council traditions are not as old as British traditions, but one of them is that we always end on time. You can see why David Miliband is regarded as having such an extraordinary political future. He has this hollowed millstone around his neck, which is the current job he occupies that would normally be considered the most important -- (inaudible) -- the crowning job of any politician's career, and people are just waiting for him to ascend to Number 10 Downing Street. But I think it is worth saying he has been an extraordinary foreign secretary so far, extraordinarily energetic and intelligent, and we look forward to many more years in this job and whatever else the future may hold. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. ------------------------- .STX New York City, NY-- FAREED ZAKARIA: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be here. Thank you so much for coming. I first met our guest this afternoon many years ago when he was introduced to me as the future prime minister of Britain. He was then 25 years old, I think. He was the head of the policy unit at Number 10 Downing Street for Tony Blair. Between then and the time that that prediction will be fulfilled, he has been -- (laughter) -- he has been schools minister, environmental minister, and is currently hanging his hat as Her Majesty's secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. David Miliband will probably be prime minister one day, so you can say you saw him at the council before he was David Miliband. (Laughter.) Let me ask you, David, what are the things as foreign secretary that principally occupy you these days? I mean, you are probably dealing with Iran, but Iran is part of a broader challenge, you were telling me. FOREIGN SECRETARY DAVID MILIBAND: Yeah, and -- well, thank you very much to everyone for coming. You want to sort of ski off-piece, really? ZAKARIA: Yeah. Yeah. MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: This is -- David wanted to give a speech, so this is his opportunity to -- (laughter) -- MILIBAND: No, no -- (inaudible) -- all these people have come for a discussion about counterproliferation, so you might want to take a vote at some point as to whether or not we want to talk about that. ZAKARIA: This is -- this is guided democracy. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: It's -- (inaudible) -- you might say. No votes. We're with the wisdom of the crowd. MILIBAND: If they all walk out, we'll know. What's on my mind at the moment is following, that I think you can make a pretty good case that this is the last election, the last U.S. presidential election that gives the winner the chance, with the European Union, to use the transatlantic alliance to forge and define a global foreign policy agenda. But if the next president stays in office for eight years, in eight years' time, the idea that a transatlantic alliance can come together and set a global agenda that is an inclusive global agenda of the rising powers -- so we're under no illusion, I'm not talking about recreating a transatlantic empire, but I do think that eight years' time, it's easy to imagine that it will be practically impossible for a transatlantic alliance to set a global agenda for the global rules of the road. I still think it's possible -- ZAKARIA: Why? Because power will have shifted -- MILIBAND: Yeah. I mean, there are three great shifts in power going on around the world. There's obviously a shift in power from West to East. There's a huge shift in power from the national to the international level. And there's a critical shift in power, in my view, going from governments to people. That's why I talk about civilian surge around the world, the benefits of -- it goes to technology, the fact that there's an emerging global consciousness powered by those technologies. That people are inspired by what they see and know about around the world allows them to recognize how other people live their lives and to ask questions about why they're living their lives in a particular way. I think that there's a -- that's an underestimated shift in the balance of power and it's why, you know, whether it's bloggers in Iran or demonstrators in Yangon, these are people who are trying to live out their own sense that they want to define their own future. And I think that's a big part of the shift of power. Now, in that context, I think that there remains scope for a transatlantic agenda that takes some of the things that we believe in very strongly -- you can call them enlightenment values; you could call them a quest for order and stability on the basis of individual rights and taking a collective risk. I think you can see how, in the right circumstances, Europe and America could come together in the next three or four months. And I would put three things at the top of our list, top of -- as what could define a global agenda. I think the first thing is we have to be very clear what attitude we take towards nation-building, above all, democracy-building, because if you look at Pakistan and -- Afghanistan, Pakistan, which is probably the number one foreign policy priority for me in the U.K., those two countries face an enormous shared challenge of democracy-building or nation-building. Secondly, I think that the challenge of global inequality is something that should concern us, not just out of moral interest but also out of self interest. And I think that the debate about inequality around the world is going to be transformed over the next 20 to 30 years by climate change, which I think is a massive issue not of technology or environment, but actually of equity. And the third issue that I think is -- we need to resolve ourselves around is how we understand shared sovereignty and how collective international institutions can come together to tackle shared risks. The European Union was created to share sovereignty and to tackle shared risks. Many of the things that we're debating at the U.N. this week, from the reach of the ICC into Sudan to the defense of the nonproliferation treaty and sanctions against Iran, those are issues of the balance between national power and international rules, and I think that it's right that we get into that in a very fundamental way. ZAKARIA: So let's just talk about some of these things in kind of no particular order. And my apologies to whoever -- the three of you who came for a counterterrorism seminar -- (laughter) -- counterproliferation seminar, sorry. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the two candidates here are both agreed on very few things and one of them is that there should be a surge, Iraq-style, in Afghanistan. Many, many knowledgeable Afghan experts -- and somebody like Rory Stewart, for example, argues that this is a terrible idea, that it will provoke a greater and greater Afghan and particularly Pashtun nationalism, that what you need is actually to reduce the footprint of Western forces and work with the tribes in a way that somehow allows for a kind of more settled and organic order. What's the right answer? MILIBAND: One of the first rules of British diplomacy is you must never take sides in a American presidential election. (Laughter.) But I'm in the happy position where I can either agree with both of them or disagree with them. (Laughter.) I mean, I think you'll know what I'm saying if I -- if I choose my words carefully and say more foreign troops are certainly not the answer to Afghanistan's problems. They may be part of an answer, but I think it's very, very clear that we're never going to have the level of troops in Afghanistan that the Soviets had and they were not able to subjugate the people of Afghanistan. They had 200,000 troops at some point in the 1980s in Afghanistan. Now, coalition troops at the moment are 40,000, give or take. We have 8,000 troops in Helmand. The key variable is not the number of foreign troops, it's the number of Afghan troops. The Afghan National Army now has 58,000 members. It's pretty clean. It's pretty effective. If I talk to our troops in Afghanistan, they say, if they go out with the Afghan National Army, they feel like they're with serious and relatively safe people, people they'd want to be working with. So when it comes to the military side, the key variable is building up the Afghan National Army. They've already had a target of getting to 122,000. But obviously there isn't a military solution in Afghanistan. That's why, you know, you can talk about a civilian surge or a political surge -- are talked about in Afghanistan. And the issue of governments, especially local governments but also national governments, in Afghanistan is absolutely central. And it's going to be -- the military can create the space and in the five population centers of Helmand where we are, more or less, we are supporting the Afghan National Army and creating space for civic institutions to grow. But I think it's important that we recognize that there isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution," and there certainly isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution" that comes from the imposition of foreign troops. ZAKARIA: Which is a good thing given the state of the British expeditionary forces. Is it fair to say -- MILIBAND: Why do you say that? ZAKARIA: -- is it fair to say that you don't have many more troops to send? In other words, Max Boot -- who I was looking for -- a Council senior fellow, has written very eloquently on the -- on what he sees as the decline and fall of the British armed forces, that you have hollowed out your military to the point where it would be very difficult for you to send expeditionary forces in any greater numbers. MILIBAND: We have about 100(,000) -- 103(,000) -- 105,000 men and women in uniform. ZAKARIA: Yeah. Well, Europe has 2 million men in uniform, but very few of those can be mobilized for expedition. MILIBAND: A rather high percentage of ours do things. (Laughter.) The -- or do dangerous things would be a better of putting it. The -- I mean, Europe also has -- literally, I can't remember the exact figure, hundreds of helicopters, but none are available to -- for use in Afghanistan -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: I think that we are -- look, our armed forces are in a different size or shape and a smaller size than they were 20 or 30 years ago, but I think that the work that they're doing in Afghanistan and some of the work that's being done in Iraq, nevermind the work that's been done in Kosovo -- of unbelievably high levels of intellect, skill, bravery. ZAKARIA: Nobody's disputing that. But the question is is there political will in Britain to move -- to restore some of its capacity? MILIBAND: Well, I think -- I mean, we have 8,200 troops in Helmand province. The future of Helmand province is not going to be achieved by having larger numbers of British troops. That's not the answer because we can play an important role in training. We can play an embedded role. The sort of MiTT experience in Iraq, I think, is quite relevant in all this. But we're not trying to create a colony. We had a very large army when we had colonies. We don't have a colony anymore, and we're certainly not trying to create a colony in Afghanistan. ZAKARIA: Well, actually, most of the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq were Indians, I would point out, when Britain ruled, it ruled through the India office. (Laughter.) So -- but another of your great problems, Iran. Everybody -- everybody -- MILIBAND: You've been very kind not pointing out that the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan was drawn from my office. (Laughter.) And still it's disputed. ZAKARIA: Exactly, and you still have -- the Pakistani president and the Afghan president say the whole problem is the Durand Line. MILIBAND: But the new Pakistani president and the new -- and the existing -- and the Afghan president. They're actually going to make a go of this in a way that the previous Pakistani president couldn't do with the present -- ZAKARIA: Do you feel that the current president of Pakistan has the army on board and that this will -- MILIBAND: Well, he's a democratically elected president -- ZAKARIA: So that would mean no -- MILIBAND: -- it's very -- (laughter) -- it's very important, it's very important, it's very important that he has the whole of the army. And when you referred to the armed forces, you know as well as I do that it's important to refer to all aspects of the armed services. ZAKARIA: And what's your sense on that? I mean, have you -- ? MILIBAND: Well, I think that he's got a massive challenge. I think that the army does not want to be returning to lead the government. I'm confident that the leadership of the Pakistani army would prefer to run the armed services rather than the whole country. And I think it's all hands to the pump, really, to support the new government. And my own view is that 30 out of 60 years of military rule is an important part of explaining the Pakistani problem. And the fact that the Pakistani army is the most efficient, revered, effective institution in Pakistani society says a lot about the strength of that institution but also about the problems of the country. ZAKARIA: Iran. You've been very outspoken and taken a kind of fairly tough line on Iran. But yet, nobody has sort of solved the Gordian -- you know, the problem, which is Iran continues to enrich and the West continues to talk, and the sanctions do not seem to have any effect. So, what do we do? MILIBAND: Well, I think the policy hasn't yet worked, but I don't think it's failed. And I don't think one can spend 30 minutes looking at the Iranian economy without -- and say that the sanctions are having no effect. ZAKARIA: (Inaudible) -- having the effect of stopping them from -- MILIBAND: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) The Bazari (ph), who are a critical political group, although they're a relatively small economic group in Iran, are really being squeezed. The financial sanctions and the high levels of the insurance (premium ?) are really squeezing them. I think that's a significant factor in Iran at the moment. When that's combined, we run an embassy -- inflation index. We obviously have diplomatic representation in Iran, and our inflation index is 30 to 35 percent in Iran. This is a country whose finance minister has just been -- resigned and given a speech denouncing the policies of his own government. I think that there is a debate now happening in the Iranian media, as well, about the wisdom of the current course that they're pursuing. So I think it's premature to say that this policy has failed. You're right that the IAEA are clear that they're continuing to seek to enrich and to develop their technical capacity. I think that we have a job to do to turn the tables of the debate, because the presentation from -- and this speaks to the whole counterproliferation agenda, actually. The presentation from Iran is that we are trying to deny them their rights under the NPT, whereas actually the offer that is now on the table, including from the Untied States, is of economic, political but also scientific collaboration, including on civilian nuclear power; in other words, Iran fulfilling its right under the NPT. What we're not willing to see is it disobey its responsibilities under the NPT, which are to avoid proliferation. I mean, Iran is a signatory of the NPT and it's clearly seeking to be proliferator. And that's, I think, the reason why the IAEA has blown up -- or blown the whistle on what they're doing, and it's why there have been three successive U.N. Security Council resolutions. Have they yet changed the equation? No. Has the policy failed? I don't think it has yet. ZAKARIA: Yesterday morning Ahmadinejad had a little breakfast for some -- about 10 people. I was there. I asked him about the international consortium idea. He said, we have always been in principle in favor. The problem is the Brits and the Americans. MILIBAND: Well, the idea of an enrichment bond is something that we've been pushing. The supply for the Bushehr reactor -- ZAKARIA: No, but an international consortium in Iran. MILIBAND: Well, I think that the key is whether or not they are willing to disavow that dual-use program that they've got at the moment. That's why the E-3 plus three have been very, very clear that the suspension of the existing program in phase three of the negotiation is the prerequisite for serious discussion about the way in which the civilian nuclear program can develop for or in Iran. ZAKARIA: But let me understand. You are saying that it is conceivable that there could be enrichment -- that the fuel cycle could be established in Iran but there would be an international consortium of scientists monitoring it? Because I thought -- MILIBAND: I'm saying something different. I'm saying that we have specified that Iran must come into compliance with its NPT obligations. In other words, it must overcome the distrust and malfeasance that's been -- and the mendacity that's been at the heart of their program. We have not specified that there are only a certain number of trajectories for the civilian nuclear program for the future. What we specified is what is not acceptable. I mean, it's not acceptable to have secret programs. It's not acceptable to deny data and information for the international community. It's not acceptable to deny access to key papers before the IAEA. And I think that if Iran is willing to play by the international rules, it will find that actually there is a serious hand of engagement that is there from the six. And it's actually written down. You can read it on the website. The papers that we've sent to Iran are published. ZAKARIA: And an international consortium in Iran would -- MILIBAND: I haven't specified that. ZAKARIA: No, I think it's not ruled out. MILIBAND: Nowhere in our documents, as I understand it -- ZAKARIA: You do not rule that out. MILIBAND: No, we haven't ruled it out. What we've ruled out is the defiance of the IAEA and of international rule, and international law, actually, in this case. And the trouble is that the history of the Iranian program means that no one is going to approach their propositions with anything other than extremely skeptical eye, for very good reason. I (hope/heard ?) someone asked President Ahmadinejad whether he stood by his description of Israel as a cesspool of humanity that deserved to go down the slope of delivery from the face of the Earth, which is what he said at the U.N. on Monday. So that is the context in which people are extremely skeptical about Iranian professions of innocence. ZAKARIA: We're in New York. You can be rest assured that he was asked that question. (Laughter.) Let me ask you about other challenges you face. The Russian attack on Georgia. Do you think that President Saakashvili made a tactical mistake, as Carl Bildt put it, in attacking Russian forces? MILIBAND: Well, it's clear that there were rights and wrongs both on the Ossetian side and on the Georgian side, in the run-up to the invasion. And we said that from the beginning. We've also said that if there's any evidence of the human rights and war crimes that -- the human rights abuse and the war crimes that Russia's alleged, they should be investigated without fear or favor by third parties and appropriate steps taken. And I'm sure there were wrongs. The question is, does that justify the Russian invasion? Does it justify the recognition of two territories that are actually part of Georgia, to which our answer is (no ?). ZAKARIA: Do you think they are indisputably part of Georgia, or are they sort of frozen conflicts whose status has to be determined? MILIBAND: Well, that they are part of Georgia, over which there is conflict. They clearly are part of Georgia. I mean, no one disputes that they -- the territorial integrity of Georgia includes those territories. But they've been disputed. The civil wars of the early '90s cost huge numbers of lives. There was effectively -- (inaudible) -- ethnic cleansing have gone on. The conflicts were frozen, but the territory of Georgia includes those enclaves. ZAKARIA: Going forward, Secretary of Defense Gates gave a speech last week, I think it was, in which he said, in effect -- I think I'm quoting roughly accurately -- NATO should be very careful about the commitments it makes going forward; it should instead focus on honoring the commitments it has already made -- which I took to mean we should be very careful about making Georgia a member of NATO; instead, we should be sure that we can actually protect Poland and the Baltic Republics from a Russian attack. Should Georgia be a member of NATO in any foreseeable timeframe? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the leaders of NATO answered that question in April. And they were -- they were faced with this debate about the Membership Action Plan, which does not guarantee membership, and they decided that Georgia and Ukraine will be members if they wanted, if they wanted. And in the Ukraine, there's far from a universal aspiration to join NATO. It's a pretty universal aspiration to join the European Union, but it's not a universal aspiration to join NATO. I think that no one is talking about them joining NATO in the next -- in the immediate period. What I think we're talking about now through the NATO-Georgia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council is building up the capacity of those countries. And I think the most important thing that -- in thinking about this, the fundamental divide about these countries is whether or not they are independent sovereign countries that can control their own destiny or whether they are, quote-unquote, "ex-Soviet space." And if you still see the map of that part of the Caucasus as ex-Soviet space, then you have a different view than if you see them as populated by independent countries with their own sovereign populations or making their own decisions. And I think it's very important for the future of Russia, actually, that it comes to terms with the fact that while they may have interests, and they obviously do, that they'll always be neighbors of Georgia, but I don't think they have -- I think they've got to realize that actually, the world's moved on and that the relationship that Georgia will have with the West is not to the exclusion of its relationship with Russia. And actually now, it's in the interests of Russia to have a (sovereign ?) Georgia, not a (supile ?) one. ZAKARIA: But were Georgia to become a member of NATO, Article 5 would commit -- Britain is now in favor officially of Georgia being part of NATO. Article 5 would mean that Britain is saying that if Russia and Georgia went to war, Britain would go to war with Russia over Georgia. MILIBAND: Well, they couldn't join NATO unless we were willing to make that commitment. ZAKARIA: So you are willing to make that commitment? MILIBAND: Well, that depends, doesn't it? It depends on the development of Georgia. It depends on the choices the Georgians make and it depends on the final decision that's made by NATO. What I would say to you is that is still an open question, how that development takes place and what the Georgians want to do and what the Ukrainians want to do. But it would be irresponsible to allow them to become members unless you're willing to make that commitment. And I think what's really important is to look at the experience in the Baltics. See, those three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, they're now members of the EU and they're members of NATO. And they are embedded in Western liberal institutions more or less. And that's fundamentally why they're safe. They are confident in themselves, they're confident in their own people, and the idea of them trying to be subjugated from outside is something that, you know, I don't think is really in the cards. Now, the Ukraine question is different from the Georgia question; I think that's worth teasing out. You -- I don't really accept that -- you said, is there a -- they're either -- you either consolidate existing members or think about future members. I think that that's a bit of a false choice, really, because the future members, you are going to build up their capacity and then you'll be able to make a decision about them. Or they'll be able to make a decision and you're going to have to decide whether to ratify. ZAKARIA: I'm going to turn it over to all the rest of you, but I wanted to ask you one thing. You know, you think you're in -- you're outside Britain, so you're going to be spared the unending questions that you're asked in Britain. But I'm going to ask you a variant of the questions that you're asked in Britain all the time. Why do you think that the Labor Party is in so much trouble these days? I mean, do you -- is it just the exhaustion of having been in power this long? Or is it that -- if you look at Europe, Sarkozy is doing well in France, Merkel is nominally chancellor of Germany. The left in Britain seems to be doing badly, you know, Boris Johnson is mayor of London. It doesn't seem as though this is a good time in Europe to be a left wing politician. Why? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the left is on the rebound at the moment, because we were -- if you think back to 2002, France had a socialist prime minister, Germany had Schroder, the Social Democratic chancellor -- Spain, Sweden, U.K. Now, incumbency is an act of -- you have to defy political gravity, and that's the definition of incumbency. And the longer you're in, the harder it is to do it. And winning the fourth time is harder than winning three times and winning twice is harder than winning once. And we're trying to defy political gravity, because in the end, the assumption is the -- the pendulum swings. And we're trying to defy political gravity at a time of big economic change. And actually, Sarkozy's more popular than he was, but I don't think -- you know, if you look at the -- if -- I think he'll want to be doing much better. It's not an easy time to be an incumbent anywhere. And under your system, the incumbents are spared having to run for a third time. So the incumbent party can run as the party of change. (Laughter.) And the -- and that's what we are -- what I always used to say for the -- in the 2005 election, I said that we were offering more change than the Tories, even though we were the incumbents. And the key to success, especially if you're a progressive party, I think, is to always be -- the way I put it is you've got to be an insurgent, not an incumbent. And once you become an incumbent and become part of the establishment, then you're going to ask for a kicking, really. And I think that mid-terms are always a tricky time, but I think that what's interesting about the U.K. at the moment is that there hasn't been a shift in the ideological balance of power that would mirror the -- or be a precursor of the shift in the polls at the moment. And in '97 and '79, you saw big shifts in the ideological center of gravity. That hasn't happened. You've got the Conservative Party in the U.K. trying to repeat what they've done in Sweden, actually, which is to run as progressive ends with conservative means -- so compassionate conservatives, as I suppose you'd say in this country. And that's something that will have to tested, hopefully to destruction in the next couple of years. (Laughter.) ZAKARIA: All right. Questions. Again, identify yourself. By the way, this whole thing is on the record, so don't expect any bombshells. MILIBAND: Are you saying I'm not being very interesting? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Hello. I'm Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. You mentioned in passing that you've been dealing with the effort by a number of African states to convince the U.N. Security Council to suspend the International Criminal Court's efforts to prosecute Bashir, the president of Sudan. And I wanted to follow up on the British position on that, because as I understand it, Britain has articulated appropriately high standards before it would even contemplate a so-called Article 16 deferral. I mean, essentially, complete cooperation with the deployment of peacekeepers, serious peace negotiations, an end to the attacks on the camps and surrender of the two ICC suspects. I think everybody agrees that there is no way in the world that in the next three to four months before these charges are confirmed that Sudan would ever meet those standards. And so my question is really sort of why the charade. I mean, I'm not sure that this is convincing any African states that it's a real dialogue about this issue. And what I fear, frankly, is that you're going to very quickly end up having to negotiate under threats of violence by a mass murderer or promises from a serial liar. And wouldn't it be better just to say this guy should be -- you know, should have his day in court in The Hague? MILIBAND: Well, I'm slightly concerned that presumably on the basis of one article in the Observer, you think that there is a charade, that we are -- (inaudible) -- article in the Observer. (Inaudible) -- before the prosecutor issued his appeal to the court or his -- I mean, not appeal, his -- ZAKARIA: His recommendation or his - MILIBAND: Yeah, his application, his application to the court. And I was very clear, this is an independent prosecutor, not a political decision. If you ignore the court, the court won't go away, it'll keep coming after you. And it's incumbent on -- and I was able to say this because we're a signatory to the ICC -- it's incumbent on all states to engage and follow through. And that remains our position. And we're not setting conditions for the entry into force of Article 16. Article 16 exists -- that's a fact -- as part of the ICC statute. So other people can debate it, but it's absolutely clear that the court needs to have its day in court. And that is written into the ICC status. The bar is set high. I think -- I can't remember the exact language, but essentially Article 16 is triggered in exceptional circumstances, more or less. That seems to me to be right, and it's simply a matter of fact that that is the situation, and we will continue to advocate for the court as an independent entity and continue to fulfill our responsibilities as a P-5 member, in saying, well, yes, there is this Article 16 but it sets the bar very high and it's for exceptional circumstances. And that's the plainest way of speaking on it. ZAKARIA: Yeah? QUESTIONER: Evelyn Leopold, a journalist at the U.N. If I can follow up Ken Roth's question, you are considering invoking Article 16. I mean, this is pretty common knowledge, and I'm wondering in what way and how. MILIBAND: I don't think that -- QUESTIONER: And, secondly, can I ask something on Iran quickly? ZAKARIA: No, not now. One question per person, and you just asked it. MILIBAND: I don't think -- you allege that we're considering it. That's not true, actually. Other people are advocating the invocation of Article 16, and we've said nothing's happened to justify the -- ZAKARIA: Do you want to explain Article 16? MILIBAND: Article 16 is to postpone by a year an indictment and to give a year's stay of the indictment. Other people are proposing that publicly. We said we haven't see anything yet that justifies the invocation of Article 16. The facts of Article 16's existence and the role it plays in exceptional circumstances is there. ZAKARIA: Let me ask you a kind of slightly stepping-back question. If you're trying to get Bashir to do something, is it helpful or unhelpful to have an indictment? In other words, is it going to be easier to scare him into doing something, or does it put his back up against the wall and actually makes it -- complicates your life? If the point here is to get some kind of a political resolution where maybe, you know, he does resign, but more importantly, that there's some kind of resolution of Darfur -- MILIBAND: I think that that is a question which is reasonable for commentators to make, to pronounce on. But if you're a foreign minister and you say the decisions of the court are independent decisions that should be taken on the basis of the facts and the law, and that political decisions should be taken on the basis of -- the situation is not helpful for me to speculate as to the right way to put, quote-unquote, "pressure" on a member state. I believe all member states should cooperate with the ICC in full. ZAKARIA: Including your closest ally? MILIBAND: All member states should -- all states should cooperate. But I don't think it would be -- I think that would -- if I said to you how I thought the court should be, quote-unquote, "used" to put pressure on a president of a country, I think that would be to abuse the independence of the court. I think I have to be careful in that. ZAKARIA: There, at the back. QUESTIONER: Stewart Patrick. I am a senior fellow here directing a new program on International Institutions and Global Governance. And I wanted to pick up on the third of your points for a Transatlantic Global Agenda. It seems to me that in addition to coming up with new rules for sovereignty in an age of global threats, one of the things we have to worry about is trying to make existing bedrock institutions of international governance more representative, more effective and more accountable. And in that regard, I understand that the prime minister's office and probably your office as well has done some significant thinking on this, and I'd wonder if you would address in particular three different sets of institutions -- the Security Council, the G-8 and the international financial institutions, and give us some sense of -- I realize it's a tall order. You can choose one if you'd like, but -- (laughter). ZAKARIA: Very quickly. MILIBAND: We support U.N. reform, (the four new ?) members plus plus representations from Africa. I think that there's no argument, India, Japan, et cetera, getting them on, is that a way to -- will you get -- will you make the Security Council less or more effective. I believe that there is a -- we are coming towards a crunch, where the lack of legitimacy in the institution is going to fatally wound it. And I think that that is really dangerous. And so that's why I think it's right, although we are one of the P-5 now, I think it's right that we should be advocates of reform. I also think that the G-8 needs to expand. I think, you know, it's interesting. We were the country that expanded the G-8 to take over the climate agenda in 2005 and created the G-13. I have no sort of theological view that it should be 13, not 14 or -- but I think that it's not going to -- QUESTIONER: Do you think China should be in or out? MILIBAND: Oh, in. Definitely in. Definitely in. It's got to be in. ZAKARIA: Ma'am, at the back there. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Peggy Hicks, Human Rights Watch. I wanted to ask about the U.K.'s reluctance to acknowledge the extent of human rights abuses committed by its ally, Ethiopia, in Somalia and the Ogaden. And wouldn't U.K. interests be better served in combatting terrorism and development in those places by confronting those abuses and pushing for accountability? MILIBAND: That's really tough. I mean, I don't know is the answer to that, really. I think that -- I think it's less about whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards, which I think we do. I think it's more how on earth are we going to make progress. As we're meeting now, my colleague, the secretary for International Development, is meeting the Ethiopian prime minister. I don't know the answer to your question, is the truth. I mean, I know what you're saying and I can see what you're arguing for. I don't think -- and I don't think it's actually about the sort of -- it's not really -- it's a rather more profound question than whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards. It's about how are you going to get progress there. I don't know the answer to that. Sorry. ZAKARIA: Oh, Andy Moravcsik. QUESTIONER: Andy Moravcsik from Princeton University and Brookings Institution. We're now into year seven of what used to be called the European Constitution, and we still don't have one. I'm wondering if you think there's still something essential at stake in that constitution, from a British point of view, and if there is, and the constitution cum treaty doesn't go through, whether there's some other way to get it? MILIBAND: You write about -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Yeah. MILIBAND: I think I've read some of your -- your stuff, which is good, really good, about Europe. I mean, we're not going to have a constitution, because that's been abandoned. And the attempt to scrap all previous EU treaties and create new ones has been abandoned. What we've got -- an amending treaty, the greatest achievement of which is to ban further institutional reform for at least 10 years. And that is a very important thing. Because one reason the EU is unpopular is it's spent the last seven years examining its own plumbing. And that is a very, very bad thing to do. It completely hollows out the institution's capacity to be a powerful and effective voice, because it's examining itself. And I think that the most important -- I mean, the treaty has to be passed in all 27 countries in order to come into force. It does make some useful institutional reforms, help the EU cope with being rather than 15. But I don't think it's -- no one would claim it's a revolutionary change. There's some more qualified majority voting in areas like energy, which is quite useful, overseas aid. It cleans up some of the commission structures so that there's real integrity to the foreign policy structures, and that's a good thing. But I don't think it's -- the most significant thing is it ends this period of institutional introspection, and I'm a great believer that you've got to -- you lead with function and then get the form, rather than get the form and then get the function. And I think that the EU's challenge is really an exciting one, because for 40 years, the EU has been driven forward by a view that the threats to its security and prosperity come from within its borders. Originally they came from the idea of war between states. But then it became through unemployment and poor labor standards and poor environmental standards. And that project carries on. You've got (internal ?) market, single currency, et cetera. However, in the modern world, the big threats to Europe's security and prosperity come from beyond its borders. So that's why I talk about a second wing of the European airplane. The first wing is internal market, internal social standards, et cetera. The second wing is that Europe should be a powerful voice in the world. ZAKARIA: Does Europe need a powerful foreign minister, if that's the case? MILIBAND: Well, I think it would be -- at the moment, it's got two, almost three. In this -- it's got Xavier Solana, High Representative, it's got a Benita Ferrero Waldner, External Relations, it's got Barroso, the head of the Commission. I think that the proposal in the Lisbon Treaty, which is to merge at least two of those jobs, I think is a good thing. We don't call it foreign minister. But we -- there are 27 foreign ministers, and it's the job of the high representative, I mean, the job is ghastly. The -- is to carry out the will of the 27. And the real challenge is can you have a coherent foreign policy of 27 or will you always fall to the lowest common denominator. If you think about what's happened in Kosovo in the last year, that has not been lowest common denominator politics. It's actually a story of highest common factor. Not every country has recognized the new Kosovo, 21 countries are recognized. But 27 countries agreed to put 2,000 ESPP monitors in there -- or ESPP peacekeepers in there. And you've got 16,000 NATO troops as well, and they're not being fired on. And anyone who knows anything about the Western Balkans in the '90s will know that's a pretty remarkable development. ZAKARIA: Sir. QUESTIONER: Henry Breed from the U.N. General Assembly. Two of the principle themes in this week's general debate have been the financial crisis on one hand and the Millennium Development Goals on the other. Your government this morning talked very effectively, very convincingly about the need to maintain commitment to the Millennium Development Goals in the face of the financial crisis. How do you see that happening, and how do you see convincing your constituency of its virtue? MILIBAND: Hmm, that's really interesting. I mean, when the prime minister spoke at the U.N. General Assembly today, and he talked -- he took head-on the argument does the financial crisis mean that the world is going to relax on the Millennium Development Goals. And he argued it mustn't. And in the end, that comes down to politics. Now, what's happened in U.K. in the last 11 years is that -- and that's been a period of economic growth, it's not yet a test for the proposition. Year on year, average incomes have grown. Over a few days, instead of going down, it's gone up. And we've now got a timetable to reach our (1.7 percent ?). And I think that the -- and all the other parties are now committed to the same timetable. So the politics has changed in a pretty fundamental way. And I don't think it'll get rolled back, interestingly enough because I think the political center of gravity has shifted on this issue. Whether or not that is doable internationally -- I mean, there is pressure on some European countries on overseas aid commitment. I just think it's very, very important that they're going because it's a matter of politics. One thing that will make a difference -- I think -- I wrote the '97 Manifesto and it -- the -- (inaudible) -- Manifesto -- and it was too easy to say you can make poverty history by increasing aid. I think people now are much more conscious that trade, conflict prevention, good governance as well as aid are vital to it. And I would say that people will, if we look like we're taking the pressure off on good governance and trade and conflict prevention, then we'll be in trouble on the aid commitment. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Joanna Wechsler, Security Council Report. You started out talking about the power shifts, and it seems that there have been some power shifts also within the Security Council of the U.N. And in particular, within the P-5, we had two double vetoes -- the first two double vetoes since the end of the Cold War -- one on Burma, one on Zimbabwe. These just happened to be cases related to democracy and human rights. So A, do you think this is a trend? And B, what needs to be done -- what can be done for the Council to regain a degree of consensus and to simply be able to be effective? MILIBAND: Can I ask you a question? Were those really the first double vetoes since the end of the Cold War? QUESTIONER: Yeah, double. MILIBAND: That's really significant. That's very, very significant -- Burma and Zimbabwe. Look, the issue at the heart of it is ironic given what's happened in South Ossetia, because the issue that drew the Russians and then the Chinese to veto was, quote, "We don't interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." So it -- this is a profound issue, not a -- not a peripheral one. And I think it is significant that -- someone said that the Zimbabwe vote was a sort of canary in the mine for Russia's new attitude. In fact, you could argue it was the opposite, because they argued against intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. I think that there is real -- we've got to be honest, there's division about it, a fundamental division. And I went to China in February, and I gave a speech there about what I called responsible sovereignty, which tried to take head-on -- Bob Zoellick made a speech about responsible stakeholder. There was no such word as stakeholder in Mandarin. So I thought it was important to try to take on -- to accept national sovereignty as being a really important foundation of global order. But then ask yourself, is it qualified at all? I mean, I think it's qualified in two senses. One, it's qualified -- if you abuse your own people, then your sovereignty is qualified and you do make yourself susceptible to foreign intervention of a range of kinds, not only military. But secondly, if you abuse the rights of others beyond your own borders, that also carries consequences. And so I think that it's -- sovereignty is qualified. But I think we have to engage on that debate. Now, what's interesting, I think, about the debate in China in an area -- let's think of a less contentious area, so climate change. The debate has changed there, partly because they recognize responsibilities for the wider community. And I think that the Chinese debate has moved on climate change, myself -- there are probably Chinese scholars here who've got a better view than I, but I think it has changed. Now, that's, in a way, the easy one, because it's -- or easy is the wrong way of putting it. It's an easier one. On the hard security end, there's still very, very strong difficulties. And I think that the way this will be played out, which is a way of answering your question, is how responsibility to protect is developed or is not developed because is I think is why quite a few people have got a buyer's remorse about the R2P. And I think that's pretty serious. But that's the way you'll see these developed. QUESTIONER: Were the Chinese helpful on Burma or not? Condi Rice says that they were actually somewhat helpful. MILIBAND: I think she's -- (inaudible). They were more helpful than some other countries. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: There are two countries that border Burma, China and India. QUESTIONER: My name is Roland Paul. I hope you don't think this is an awkward or tactless question, but it's common knowledge that Gordon Brown is struggling to be -- to retain his position as prime minister of England, and your name is mentioned as a likely alternative. But according to The New York Times, a couple of days ago, Brown said or did something that was a brilliant stroke to turn the tables on you and, you know, The Times, in its fine reporting, failed to say what that was. So maybe you could -- (laughter) -- if you could tell us what the -- MILIBAND: I can put your mind -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: -- he didn't need to turn the tables. He made an outstanding speech at the party conference, which is a good thing. I don't support the leadership election in the Labor Party, and we carry on on that basis. He made a great speech. He's got -- he's a man of real values and integrity and drive. And I think you've seen that on show, actually, in -- (inaudible) -- of the U.N. fora this week. The Millennium Development Goals summit yesterday was in large part his creation. And so I would say to you, don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: What? QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. MILIBAND: Why The Guardian? QUESTIONER: Your article in The Guardian in which you laid out a vision for the Labor Party. MILIBAND: But that -- I mean, Gordon himself said -- this was an article that any member of the cabinet could've written and he could've written. So it's slightly odd to say that that's sort of against what he's saying. And I think it's important that if you're in politics, you've got to run your own department. You've also got to stand up for the correct of -- responsibility of the government as a whole, and that's what I'm doing. QUESTIONER: Hi. Lane Green from the Economist Magazine. I think it MacMillan (ph) who said that Britain should be wise old Greece to America's Rome. Right now, it's looking like we're Rome at about 475 A.D. (Laughter.) And a quick plug. On Economist.com, we're running a thing called the Global Electoral College, where everybody in the world outside the United States can vote for president. We have an embarrassingly blue map, almost entirely except for El Salvador, which is currently barely leaning John McCain. (Laughter.) But one of these guys is going to be president of the United States. And without fear or favor, what's the first piece of advice you would, as wise old Greece, give to -- (laughter) -- give to Rome? What's the first symbolic or practical thing that a new president can do to restore America's reputation? MILIBAND: Well, that's interesting. That's interesting. I mean, I hate the sort of snobbery that's associated with British pretensions to lecturing in a (minimite ?) way, so I'd prefer not to do it in that -- you can probably learn more from our mistakes than from our electorates. But what would be the first -- QUESTIONER: -- don't invade Iraq, but that's done. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: I think -- I tell you what -- actually, what I would think -- the last time I was here, I -- we had a dinner at the -- our ambassador to the U.N., and we spent quite a lot of the dinner debating this man's book, which none of us had read, but we'd all read the -- (laughter) -- QUESTIONER: So was it like Oxford High Table all over again? MILIBAND: Actually, if I'd really had my wits about me, which none of us had brought, then yeah. (Laughter.) But we had read the helpful summary on the Sons of Foreign Affairs. The title -- we all knew the title. I think the most -- don't underestimate American power would be my piece of advice. This is still -- I mean, Brent Scowcroft wrote this article saying -- and it's partly -- remember, I started by talking about how this may be one of the last chances for the trans-Atlantic alliance to set a global agenda. And part of my thinking on that is inspired by what Brent Scowcroft said, which was -- I think in The National Interest, he wrote an article saying America is the only superpower, and it will remain superordinary in all sorts of ways for the next 20 years, but name one country that can get the world to do what it wants on its own in the modern world. And I think that's an important point. However, don't underestimate American power and don't become too sort of hangdog or embarrassed about yourselves, because this is still a country with huge ability to be a force for good around the world and is a force for good around in the world in all sorts of ways. And I think that if the next president comes in in the sense of somehow feeling that things can't be done, that's going to be a problem. Any of the big problems that need to be done can only be done if you're on the bus. And so whether it's inequality and climate change or conflict prevention or counterproliferation, which we have to mention because these people have come here to talk about it. (Laughter.) (Cross talk.) QUESTIONER: -- gives you a chance to talk about -- on Iran, the -- MILIBAND: The counterproliferation -- remember, but two challenges to the counterproliferation agenda, just to let me do my 30 seconds on this. There are three commitments in the NPT. One is not to proliferate; the other is not to -- it's to disarm; and the other is to promote safe use of civilian nuclear power. And the whole disarmament argument is a very important part of this because the allegation of hypocrisy is that we rearm like crazy ourselves and we stop everyone else. Actually, we're serious about our disarmament responsibility. We've had a 75 percent reduction in our nuclear arsenal over the last 10 years. And I think that the debate has been started about -- by the shots at our group, a world full of nuclear weapons, et cetera, is an important part of the conditioning to help -- we make the NPT bargain. And I think the bargain has to be remade because it's been a brilliant bargain. I mean, it is amazing that in a world where 40 or 50 countries have the power -- economic, scientific, et cetera -- to be nuclear weapons states, you know, less than 10 are. That is a remarkable thing. Kennedy predicted, I think, by mid-80s -- or mid-70s, he said -- mid '80s -- he predicted in 1962 that there would be 30 nuclear weapons states. There could be, but there aren't. And that is significantly because of the NPT regime. But I think the bargain has to be remade because the forces that are trying to split it asunder are strong. The P-5, I think, has lost a bit of focus on this -- which I think is dangerous -- since the Cold War. The spread of civilian nuclear power has given lots more explanation of how to do this stuff. There's various people trying to spread knowledge about how you weaponize. So we've got to -- we can't -- I think for sometime, since the Cold War, we've lived in a world where we thought, oh, well the NPT is fine, it's okay. We've got to really defend it aggressively if we want it to last, and that means you have to defend it aggressively on the nonproliferation front. We also defend it aggressively on the disarmament front. That's the end of my piece. ZAKARIA: Benjamin Barber? QUESTIONER: Thanks. Benjamin Barber at Demos, New York. Hi, David. MILIBAND: Hi. QUESTIONER: This question about the global blue vote suggests to me one of the reasons so many Americans vote red, and it's a problem because that sense that the world votes one way pushes America the other way. And my question, therefore, comes back to your starting point where you said that we -- this is the last, perhaps, American vote where there will be a chance to elect leadership that's capable of a shared EU-UK-USA global leadership role. And my question is, do you think that depends exclusively on geopolitical factors so that the outcome of the vote here and the outcome next year in England have nothing to do with that and there's a chance, no matter who wins, either side, that goes forward? Or does it depend on, not just geopolitical but ideological alignments -- say, a Labor victory or a Democratic victory or David Cameron and McCain. In other words, is there an ideological impediment to that shared leadership in place? Or do you think, really, the issues are generic and geopolitical and it's not so important who wins the election on either side? MILIBAND: Well, I think it's -- the important thing to -- I tried to say, Europe-America, not just UK-U.S., and I think that's important. And I think you've got quite an important constellation across the left-right divide in Europe -- you know, Mrs. Merkel, Sarkozy, Brown -- Gordon Brown, spanning the political spectrum. You've got real commitments to trans-Atlantic joint work. And I think that's significant. And so in that sense, I don't think this is a simple left-right thing. Having said that, I do believe that if you want order and stability in the modern world, you can only forge it on the basis of progressive values. Unless you're willing to take on forces of inequality, unless you're willing to stand up for promoting democracy, unless you're willing to share sovereignty, I don't see how you tackle the modern problems. And so you can take that as you will, but I don't think it's a simple left-right thing. I think that there's an important -- I think that's -- interestingly enough, within Europe, you can get people to sign up for those propositions from both a center-right and a center-left perspective, which I think is interesting. And so of course the individuals are elected who can make a difference. And it's not just all sort of ineluctable forces. But I think that -- what I think is significant and what a really important message for an American audience, I think, is that there is a real recognition on the side of Europe that we've got to get our act together and become better partners, but we want to. And I think it's quite a significant thing that certainly would accrue in the same way. I yield again. ZAKARIA: All right. Our Council traditions are not as old as British traditions, but one of them is that we always end on time. You can see why David Miliband is regarded as having such an extraordinary political future. He has this hollowed millstone around his neck, which is the current job he occupies that would normally be considered the most important -- (inaudible) -- the crowning job of any politician's career, and people are just waiting for him to ascend to Number 10 Downing Street. But I think it is worth saying he has been an extraordinary foreign secretary so far, extraordinarily energetic and intelligent, and we look forward to many more years in this job and whatever else the future may hold. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. ------------------------- .STX New York City, NY-- FAREED ZAKARIA: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be here. Thank you so much for coming. I first met our guest this afternoon many years ago when he was introduced to me as the future prime minister of Britain. He was then 25 years old, I think. He was the head of the policy unit at Number 10 Downing Street for Tony Blair. Between then and the time that that prediction will be fulfilled, he has been -- (laughter) -- he has been schools minister, environmental minister, and is currently hanging his hat as Her Majesty's secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. David Miliband will probably be prime minister one day, so you can say you saw him at the council before he was David Miliband. (Laughter.) Let me ask you, David, what are the things as foreign secretary that principally occupy you these days? I mean, you are probably dealing with Iran, but Iran is part of a broader challenge, you were telling me. FOREIGN SECRETARY DAVID MILIBAND: Yeah, and -- well, thank you very much to everyone for coming. You want to sort of ski off-piece, really? ZAKARIA: Yeah. Yeah. MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: This is -- David wanted to give a speech, so this is his opportunity to -- (laughter) -- MILIBAND: No, no -- (inaudible) -- all these people have come for a discussion about counterproliferation, so you might want to take a vote at some point as to whether or not we want to talk about that. ZAKARIA: This is -- this is guided democracy. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: Right. ZAKARIA: It's -- (inaudible) -- you might say. No votes. We're with the wisdom of the crowd. MILIBAND: If they all walk out, we'll know. What's on my mind at the moment is following, that I think you can make a pretty good case that this is the last election, the last U.S. presidential election that gives the winner the chance, with the European Union, to use the transatlantic alliance to forge and define a global foreign policy agenda. But if the next president stays in office for eight years, in eight years' time, the idea that a transatlantic alliance can come together and set a global agenda that is an inclusive global agenda of the rising powers -- so we're under no illusion, I'm not talking about recreating a transatlantic empire, but I do think that eight years' time, it's easy to imagine that it will be practically impossible for a transatlantic alliance to set a global agenda for the global rules of the road. I still think it's possible -- ZAKARIA: Why? Because power will have shifted -- MILIBAND: Yeah. I mean, there are three great shifts in power going on around the world. There's obviously a shift in power from West to East. There's a huge shift in power from the national to the international level. And there's a critical shift in power, in my view, going from governments to people. That's why I talk about civilian surge around the world, the benefits of -- it goes to technology, the fact that there's an emerging global consciousness powered by those technologies. That people are inspired by what they see and know about around the world allows them to recognize how other people live their lives and to ask questions about why they're living their lives in a particular way. I think that there's a -- that's an underestimated shift in the balance of power and it's why, you know, whether it's bloggers in Iran or demonstrators in Yangon, these are people who are trying to live out their own sense that they want to define their own future. And I think that's a big part of the shift of power. Now, in that context, I think that there remains scope for a transatlantic agenda that takes some of the things that we believe in very strongly -- you can call them enlightenment values; you could call them a quest for order and stability on the basis of individual rights and taking a collective risk. I think you can see how, in the right circumstances, Europe and America could come together in the next three or four months. And I would put three things at the top of our list, top of -- as what could define a global agenda. I think the first thing is we have to be very clear what attitude we take towards nation-building, above all, democracy-building, because if you look at Pakistan and -- Afghanistan, Pakistan, which is probably the number one foreign policy priority for me in the U.K., those two countries face an enormous shared challenge of democracy-building or nation-building. Secondly, I think that the challenge of global inequality is something that should concern us, not just out of moral interest but also out of self interest. And I think that the debate about inequality around the world is going to be transformed over the next 20 to 30 years by climate change, which I think is a massive issue not of technology or environment, but actually of equity. And the third issue that I think is -- we need to resolve ourselves around is how we understand shared sovereignty and how collective international institutions can come together to tackle shared risks. The European Union was created to share sovereignty and to tackle shared risks. Many of the things that we're debating at the U.N. this week, from the reach of the ICC into Sudan to the defense of the nonproliferation treaty and sanctions against Iran, those are issues of the balance between national power and international rules, and I think that it's right that we get into that in a very fundamental way. ZAKARIA: So let's just talk about some of these things in kind of no particular order. And my apologies to whoever -- the three of you who came for a counterterrorism seminar -- (laughter) -- counterproliferation seminar, sorry. Pakistan, Afghanistan, the two candidates here are both agreed on very few things and one of them is that there should be a surge, Iraq-style, in Afghanistan. Many, many knowledgeable Afghan experts -- and somebody like Rory Stewart, for example, argues that this is a terrible idea, that it will provoke a greater and greater Afghan and particularly Pashtun nationalism, that what you need is actually to reduce the footprint of Western forces and work with the tribes in a way that somehow allows for a kind of more settled and organic order. What's the right answer? MILIBAND: One of the first rules of British diplomacy is you must never take sides in a American presidential election. (Laughter.) But I'm in the happy position where I can either agree with both of them or disagree with them. (Laughter.) I mean, I think you'll know what I'm saying if I -- if I choose my words carefully and say more foreign troops are certainly not the answer to Afghanistan's problems. They may be part of an answer, but I think it's very, very clear that we're never going to have the level of troops in Afghanistan that the Soviets had and they were not able to subjugate the people of Afghanistan. They had 200,000 troops at some point in the 1980s in Afghanistan. Now, coalition troops at the moment are 40,000, give or take. We have 8,000 troops in Helmand. The key variable is not the number of foreign troops, it's the number of Afghan troops. The Afghan National Army now has 58,000 members. It's pretty clean. It's pretty effective. If I talk to our troops in Afghanistan, they say, if they go out with the Afghan National Army, they feel like they're with serious and relatively safe people, people they'd want to be working with. So when it comes to the military side, the key variable is building up the Afghan National Army. They've already had a target of getting to 122,000. But obviously there isn't a military solution in Afghanistan. That's why, you know, you can talk about a civilian surge or a political surge -- are talked about in Afghanistan. And the issue of governments, especially local governments but also national governments, in Afghanistan is absolutely central. And it's going to be -- the military can create the space and in the five population centers of Helmand where we are, more or less, we are supporting the Afghan National Army and creating space for civic institutions to grow. But I think it's important that we recognize that there isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution," and there certainly isn't a military, quote, unquote, "solution" that comes from the imposition of foreign troops. ZAKARIA: Which is a good thing given the state of the British expeditionary forces. Is it fair to say -- MILIBAND: Why do you say that? ZAKARIA: -- is it fair to say that you don't have many more troops to send? In other words, Max Boot -- who I was looking for -- a Council senior fellow, has written very eloquently on the -- on what he sees as the decline and fall of the British armed forces, that you have hollowed out your military to the point where it would be very difficult for you to send expeditionary forces in any greater numbers. MILIBAND: We have about 100(,000) -- 103(,000) -- 105,000 men and women in uniform. ZAKARIA: Yeah. Well, Europe has 2 million men in uniform, but very few of those can be mobilized for expedition. MILIBAND: A rather high percentage of ours do things. (Laughter.) The -- or do dangerous things would be a better of putting it. The -- I mean, Europe also has -- literally, I can't remember the exact figure, hundreds of helicopters, but none are available to -- for use in Afghanistan -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: I think that we are -- look, our armed forces are in a different size or shape and a smaller size than they were 20 or 30 years ago, but I think that the work that they're doing in Afghanistan and some of the work that's being done in Iraq, nevermind the work that's been done in Kosovo -- of unbelievably high levels of intellect, skill, bravery. ZAKARIA: Nobody's disputing that. But the question is is there political will in Britain to move -- to restore some of its capacity? MILIBAND: Well, I think -- I mean, we have 8,200 troops in Helmand province. The future of Helmand province is not going to be achieved by having larger numbers of British troops. That's not the answer because we can play an important role in training. We can play an embedded role. The sort of MiTT experience in Iraq, I think, is quite relevant in all this. But we're not trying to create a colony. We had a very large army when we had colonies. We don't have a colony anymore, and we're certainly not trying to create a colony in Afghanistan. ZAKARIA: Well, actually, most of the troops in Afghanistan and Iraq were Indians, I would point out, when Britain ruled, it ruled through the India office. (Laughter.) So -- but another of your great problems, Iran. Everybody -- everybody -- MILIBAND: You've been very kind not pointing out that the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan was drawn from my office. (Laughter.) And still it's disputed. ZAKARIA: Exactly, and you still have -- the Pakistani president and the Afghan president say the whole problem is the Durand Line. MILIBAND: But the new Pakistani president and the new -- and the existing -- and the Afghan president. They're actually going to make a go of this in a way that the previous Pakistani president couldn't do with the present -- ZAKARIA: Do you feel that the current president of Pakistan has the army on board and that this will -- MILIBAND: Well, he's a democratically elected president -- ZAKARIA: So that would mean no -- MILIBAND: -- it's very -- (laughter) -- it's very important, it's very important, it's very important that he has the whole of the army. And when you referred to the armed forces, you know as well as I do that it's important to refer to all aspects of the armed services. ZAKARIA: And what's your sense on that? I mean, have you -- ? MILIBAND: Well, I think that he's got a massive challenge. I think that the army does not want to be returning to lead the government. I'm confident that the leadership of the Pakistani army would prefer to run the armed services rather than the whole country. And I think it's all hands to the pump, really, to support the new government. And my own view is that 30 out of 60 years of military rule is an important part of explaining the Pakistani problem. And the fact that the Pakistani army is the most efficient, revered, effective institution in Pakistani society says a lot about the strength of that institution but also about the problems of the country. ZAKARIA: Iran. You've been very outspoken and taken a kind of fairly tough line on Iran. But yet, nobody has sort of solved the Gordian -- you know, the problem, which is Iran continues to enrich and the West continues to talk, and the sanctions do not seem to have any effect. So, what do we do? MILIBAND: Well, I think the policy hasn't yet worked, but I don't think it's failed. And I don't think one can spend 30 minutes looking at the Iranian economy without -- and say that the sanctions are having no effect. ZAKARIA: (Inaudible) -- having the effect of stopping them from -- MILIBAND: (Inaudible.) (Laughter.) The Bazari (ph), who are a critical political group, although they're a relatively small economic group in Iran, are really being squeezed. The financial sanctions and the high levels of the insurance (premium ?) are really squeezing them. I think that's a significant factor in Iran at the moment. When that's combined, we run an embassy -- inflation index. We obviously have diplomatic representation in Iran, and our inflation index is 30 to 35 percent in Iran. This is a country whose finance minister has just been -- resigned and given a speech denouncing the policies of his own government. I think that there is a debate now happening in the Iranian media, as well, about the wisdom of the current course that they're pursuing. So I think it's premature to say that this policy has failed. You're right that the IAEA are clear that they're continuing to seek to enrich and to develop their technical capacity. I think that we have a job to do to turn the tables of the debate, because the presentation from -- and this speaks to the whole counterproliferation agenda, actually. The presentation from Iran is that we are trying to deny them their rights under the NPT, whereas actually the offer that is now on the table, including from the Untied States, is of economic, political but also scientific collaboration, including on civilian nuclear power; in other words, Iran fulfilling its right under the NPT. What we're not willing to see is it disobey its responsibilities under the NPT, which are to avoid proliferation. I mean, Iran is a signatory of the NPT and it's clearly seeking to be proliferator. And that's, I think, the reason why the IAEA has blown up -- or blown the whistle on what they're doing, and it's why there have been three successive U.N. Security Council resolutions. Have they yet changed the equation? No. Has the policy failed? I don't think it has yet. ZAKARIA: Yesterday morning Ahmadinejad had a little breakfast for some -- about 10 people. I was there. I asked him about the international consortium idea. He said, we have always been in principle in favor. The problem is the Brits and the Americans. MILIBAND: Well, the idea of an enrichment bond is something that we've been pushing. The supply for the Bushehr reactor -- ZAKARIA: No, but an international consortium in Iran. MILIBAND: Well, I think that the key is whether or not they are willing to disavow that dual-use program that they've got at the moment. That's why the E-3 plus three have been very, very clear that the suspension of the existing program in phase three of the negotiation is the prerequisite for serious discussion about the way in which the civilian nuclear program can develop for or in Iran. ZAKARIA: But let me understand. You are saying that it is conceivable that there could be enrichment -- that the fuel cycle could be established in Iran but there would be an international consortium of scientists monitoring it? Because I thought -- MILIBAND: I'm saying something different. I'm saying that we have specified that Iran must come into compliance with its NPT obligations. In other words, it must overcome the distrust and malfeasance that's been -- and the mendacity that's been at the heart of their program. We have not specified that there are only a certain number of trajectories for the civilian nuclear program for the future. What we specified is what is not acceptable. I mean, it's not acceptable to have secret programs. It's not acceptable to deny data and information for the international community. It's not acceptable to deny access to key papers before the IAEA. And I think that if Iran is willing to play by the international rules, it will find that actually there is a serious hand of engagement that is there from the six. And it's actually written down. You can read it on the website. The papers that we've sent to Iran are published. ZAKARIA: And an international consortium in Iran would -- MILIBAND: I haven't specified that. ZAKARIA: No, I think it's not ruled out. MILIBAND: Nowhere in our documents, as I understand it -- ZAKARIA: You do not rule that out. MILIBAND: No, we haven't ruled it out. What we've ruled out is the defiance of the IAEA and of international rule, and international law, actually, in this case. And the trouble is that the history of the Iranian program means that no one is going to approach their propositions with anything other than extremely skeptical eye, for very good reason. I (hope/heard ?) someone asked President Ahmadinejad whether he stood by his description of Israel as a cesspool of humanity that deserved to go down the slope of delivery from the face of the Earth, which is what he said at the U.N. on Monday. So that is the context in which people are extremely skeptical about Iranian professions of innocence. ZAKARIA: We're in New York. You can be rest assured that he was asked that question. (Laughter.) Let me ask you about other challenges you face. The Russian attack on Georgia. Do you think that President Saakashvili made a tactical mistake, as Carl Bildt put it, in attacking Russian forces? MILIBAND: Well, it's clear that there were rights and wrongs both on the Ossetian side and on the Georgian side, in the run-up to the invasion. And we said that from the beginning. We've also said that if there's any evidence of the human rights and war crimes that -- the human rights abuse and the war crimes that Russia's alleged, they should be investigated without fear or favor by third parties and appropriate steps taken. And I'm sure there were wrongs. The question is, does that justify the Russian invasion? Does it justify the recognition of two territories that are actually part of Georgia, to which our answer is (no ?). ZAKARIA: Do you think they are indisputably part of Georgia, or are they sort of frozen conflicts whose status has to be determined? MILIBAND: Well, that they are part of Georgia, over which there is conflict. They clearly are part of Georgia. I mean, no one disputes that they -- the territorial integrity of Georgia includes those territories. But they've been disputed. The civil wars of the early '90s cost huge numbers of lives. There was effectively -- (inaudible) -- ethnic cleansing have gone on. The conflicts were frozen, but the territory of Georgia includes those enclaves. ZAKARIA: Going forward, Secretary of Defense Gates gave a speech last week, I think it was, in which he said, in effect -- I think I'm quoting roughly accurately -- NATO should be very careful about the commitments it makes going forward; it should instead focus on honoring the commitments it has already made -- which I took to mean we should be very careful about making Georgia a member of NATO; instead, we should be sure that we can actually protect Poland and the Baltic Republics from a Russian attack. Should Georgia be a member of NATO in any foreseeable timeframe? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the leaders of NATO answered that question in April. And they were -- they were faced with this debate about the Membership Action Plan, which does not guarantee membership, and they decided that Georgia and Ukraine will be members if they wanted, if they wanted. And in the Ukraine, there's far from a universal aspiration to join NATO. It's a pretty universal aspiration to join the European Union, but it's not a universal aspiration to join NATO. I think that no one is talking about them joining NATO in the next -- in the immediate period. What I think we're talking about now through the NATO-Georgia Council and the NATO-Ukraine Council is building up the capacity of those countries. And I think the most important thing that -- in thinking about this, the fundamental divide about these countries is whether or not they are independent sovereign countries that can control their own destiny or whether they are, quote-unquote, "ex-Soviet space." And if you still see the map of that part of the Caucasus as ex-Soviet space, then you have a different view than if you see them as populated by independent countries with their own sovereign populations or making their own decisions. And I think it's very important for the future of Russia, actually, that it comes to terms with the fact that while they may have interests, and they obviously do, that they'll always be neighbors of Georgia, but I don't think they have -- I think they've got to realize that actually, the world's moved on and that the relationship that Georgia will have with the West is not to the exclusion of its relationship with Russia. And actually now, it's in the interests of Russia to have a (sovereign ?) Georgia, not a (supile ?) one. ZAKARIA: But were Georgia to become a member of NATO, Article 5 would commit -- Britain is now in favor officially of Georgia being part of NATO. Article 5 would mean that Britain is saying that if Russia and Georgia went to war, Britain would go to war with Russia over Georgia. MILIBAND: Well, they couldn't join NATO unless we were willing to make that commitment. ZAKARIA: So you are willing to make that commitment? MILIBAND: Well, that depends, doesn't it? It depends on the development of Georgia. It depends on the choices the Georgians make and it depends on the final decision that's made by NATO. What I would say to you is that is still an open question, how that development takes place and what the Georgians want to do and what the Ukrainians want to do. But it would be irresponsible to allow them to become members unless you're willing to make that commitment. And I think what's really important is to look at the experience in the Baltics. See, those three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, they're now members of the EU and they're members of NATO. And they are embedded in Western liberal institutions more or less. And that's fundamentally why they're safe. They are confident in themselves, they're confident in their own people, and the idea of them trying to be subjugated from outside is something that, you know, I don't think is really in the cards. Now, the Ukraine question is different from the Georgia question; I think that's worth teasing out. You -- I don't really accept that -- you said, is there a -- they're either -- you either consolidate existing members or think about future members. I think that that's a bit of a false choice, really, because the future members, you are going to build up their capacity and then you'll be able to make a decision about them. Or they'll be able to make a decision and you're going to have to decide whether to ratify. ZAKARIA: I'm going to turn it over to all the rest of you, but I wanted to ask you one thing. You know, you think you're in -- you're outside Britain, so you're going to be spared the unending questions that you're asked in Britain. But I'm going to ask you a variant of the questions that you're asked in Britain all the time. Why do you think that the Labor Party is in so much trouble these days? I mean, do you -- is it just the exhaustion of having been in power this long? Or is it that -- if you look at Europe, Sarkozy is doing well in France, Merkel is nominally chancellor of Germany. The left in Britain seems to be doing badly, you know, Boris Johnson is mayor of London. It doesn't seem as though this is a good time in Europe to be a left wing politician. Why? MILIBAND: Well, I think that the left is on the rebound at the moment, because we were -- if you think back to 2002, France had a socialist prime minister, Germany had Schroder, the Social Democratic chancellor -- Spain, Sweden, U.K. Now, incumbency is an act of -- you have to defy political gravity, and that's the definition of incumbency. And the longer you're in, the harder it is to do it. And winning the fourth time is harder than winning three times and winning twice is harder than winning once. And we're trying to defy political gravity, because in the end, the assumption is the -- the pendulum swings. And we're trying to defy political gravity at a time of big economic change. And actually, Sarkozy's more popular than he was, but I don't think -- you know, if you look at the -- if -- I think he'll want to be doing much better. It's not an easy time to be an incumbent anywhere. And under your system, the incumbents are spared having to run for a third time. So the incumbent party can run as the party of change. (Laughter.) And the -- and that's what we are -- what I always used to say for the -- in the 2005 election, I said that we were offering more change than the Tories, even though we were the incumbents. And the key to success, especially if you're a progressive party, I think, is to always be -- the way I put it is you've got to be an insurgent, not an incumbent. And once you become an incumbent and become part of the establishment, then you're going to ask for a kicking, really. And I think that mid-terms are always a tricky time, but I think that what's interesting about the U.K. at the moment is that there hasn't been a shift in the ideological balance of power that would mirror the -- or be a precursor of the shift in the polls at the moment. And in '97 and '79, you saw big shifts in the ideological center of gravity. That hasn't happened. You've got the Conservative Party in the U.K. trying to repeat what they've done in Sweden, actually, which is to run as progressive ends with conservative means -- so compassionate conservatives, as I suppose you'd say in this country. And that's something that will have to tested, hopefully to destruction in the next couple of years. (Laughter.) ZAKARIA: All right. Questions. Again, identify yourself. By the way, this whole thing is on the record, so don't expect any bombshells. MILIBAND: Are you saying I'm not being very interesting? (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: Hello. I'm Ken Roth from Human Rights Watch. You mentioned in passing that you've been dealing with the effort by a number of African states to convince the U.N. Security Council to suspend the International Criminal Court's efforts to prosecute Bashir, the president of Sudan. And I wanted to follow up on the British position on that, because as I understand it, Britain has articulated appropriately high standards before it would even contemplate a so-called Article 16 deferral. I mean, essentially, complete cooperation with the deployment of peacekeepers, serious peace negotiations, an end to the attacks on the camps and surrender of the two ICC suspects. I think everybody agrees that there is no way in the world that in the next three to four months before these charges are confirmed that Sudan would ever meet those standards. And so my question is really sort of why the charade. I mean, I'm not sure that this is convincing any African states that it's a real dialogue about this issue. And what I fear, frankly, is that you're going to very quickly end up having to negotiate under threats of violence by a mass murderer or promises from a serial liar. And wouldn't it be better just to say this guy should be -- you know, should have his day in court in The Hague? MILIBAND: Well, I'm slightly concerned that presumably on the basis of one article in the Observer, you think that there is a charade, that we are -- (inaudible) -- article in the Observer. (Inaudible) -- before the prosecutor issued his appeal to the court or his -- I mean, not appeal, his -- ZAKARIA: His recommendation or his - MILIBAND: Yeah, his application, his application to the court. And I was very clear, this is an independent prosecutor, not a political decision. If you ignore the court, the court won't go away, it'll keep coming after you. And it's incumbent on -- and I was able to say this because we're a signatory to the ICC -- it's incumbent on all states to engage and follow through. And that remains our position. And we're not setting conditions for the entry into force of Article 16. Article 16 exists -- that's a fact -- as part of the ICC statute. So other people can debate it, but it's absolutely clear that the court needs to have its day in court. And that is written into the ICC status. The bar is set high. I think -- I can't remember the exact language, but essentially Article 16 is triggered in exceptional circumstances, more or less. That seems to me to be right, and it's simply a matter of fact that that is the situation, and we will continue to advocate for the court as an independent entity and continue to fulfill our responsibilities as a P-5 member, in saying, well, yes, there is this Article 16 but it sets the bar very high and it's for exceptional circumstances. And that's the plainest way of speaking on it. ZAKARIA: Yeah? QUESTIONER: Evelyn Leopold, a journalist at the U.N. If I can follow up Ken Roth's question, you are considering invoking Article 16. I mean, this is pretty common knowledge, and I'm wondering in what way and how. MILIBAND: I don't think that -- QUESTIONER: And, secondly, can I ask something on Iran quickly? ZAKARIA: No, not now. One question per person, and you just asked it. MILIBAND: I don't think -- you allege that we're considering it. That's not true, actually. Other people are advocating the invocation of Article 16, and we've said nothing's happened to justify the -- ZAKARIA: Do you want to explain Article 16? MILIBAND: Article 16 is to postpone by a year an indictment and to give a year's stay of the indictment. Other people are proposing that publicly. We said we haven't see anything yet that justifies the invocation of Article 16. The facts of Article 16's existence and the role it plays in exceptional circumstances is there. ZAKARIA: Let me ask you a kind of slightly stepping-back question. If you're trying to get Bashir to do something, is it helpful or unhelpful to have an indictment? In other words, is it going to be easier to scare him into doing something, or does it put his back up against the wall and actually makes it -- complicates your life? If the point here is to get some kind of a political resolution where maybe, you know, he does resign, but more importantly, that there's some kind of resolution of Darfur -- MILIBAND: I think that that is a question which is reasonable for commentators to make, to pronounce on. But if you're a foreign minister and you say the decisions of the court are independent decisions that should be taken on the basis of the facts and the law, and that political decisions should be taken on the basis of -- the situation is not helpful for me to speculate as to the right way to put, quote-unquote, "pressure" on a member state. I believe all member states should cooperate with the ICC in full. ZAKARIA: Including your closest ally? MILIBAND: All member states should -- all states should cooperate. But I don't think it would be -- I think that would -- if I said to you how I thought the court should be, quote-unquote, "used" to put pressure on a president of a country, I think that would be to abuse the independence of the court. I think I have to be careful in that. ZAKARIA: There, at the back. QUESTIONER: Stewart Patrick. I am a senior fellow here directing a new program on International Institutions and Global Governance. And I wanted to pick up on the third of your points for a Transatlantic Global Agenda. It seems to me that in addition to coming up with new rules for sovereignty in an age of global threats, one of the things we have to worry about is trying to make existing bedrock institutions of international governance more representative, more effective and more accountable. And in that regard, I understand that the prime minister's office and probably your office as well has done some significant thinking on this, and I'd wonder if you would address in particular three different sets of institutions -- the Security Council, the G-8 and the international financial institutions, and give us some sense of -- I realize it's a tall order. You can choose one if you'd like, but -- (laughter). ZAKARIA: Very quickly. MILIBAND: We support U.N. reform, (the four new ?) members plus plus representations from Africa. I think that there's no argument, India, Japan, et cetera, getting them on, is that a way to -- will you get -- will you make the Security Council less or more effective. I believe that there is a -- we are coming towards a crunch, where the lack of legitimacy in the institution is going to fatally wound it. And I think that that is really dangerous. And so that's why I think it's right, although we are one of the P-5 now, I think it's right that we should be advocates of reform. I also think that the G-8 needs to expand. I think, you know, it's interesting. We were the country that expanded the G-8 to take over the climate agenda in 2005 and created the G-13. I have no sort of theological view that it should be 13, not 14 or -- but I think that it's not going to -- QUESTIONER: Do you think China should be in or out? MILIBAND: Oh, in. Definitely in. Definitely in. It's got to be in. ZAKARIA: Ma'am, at the back there. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Peggy Hicks, Human Rights Watch. I wanted to ask about the U.K.'s reluctance to acknowledge the extent of human rights abuses committed by its ally, Ethiopia, in Somalia and the Ogaden. And wouldn't U.K. interests be better served in combatting terrorism and development in those places by confronting those abuses and pushing for accountability? MILIBAND: That's really tough. I mean, I don't know is the answer to that, really. I think that -- I think it's less about whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards, which I think we do. I think it's more how on earth are we going to make progress. As we're meeting now, my colleague, the secretary for International Development, is meeting the Ethiopian prime minister. I don't know the answer to your question, is the truth. I mean, I know what you're saying and I can see what you're arguing for. I don't think -- and I don't think it's actually about the sort of -- it's not really -- it's a rather more profound question than whether or not the U.K. is living up to its own high standards. It's about how are you going to get progress there. I don't know the answer to that. Sorry. ZAKARIA: Oh, Andy Moravcsik. QUESTIONER: Andy Moravcsik from Princeton University and Brookings Institution. We're now into year seven of what used to be called the European Constitution, and we still don't have one. I'm wondering if you think there's still something essential at stake in that constitution, from a British point of view, and if there is, and the constitution cum treaty doesn't go through, whether there's some other way to get it? MILIBAND: You write about -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Yeah. MILIBAND: I think I've read some of your -- your stuff, which is good, really good, about Europe. I mean, we're not going to have a constitution, because that's been abandoned. And the attempt to scrap all previous EU treaties and create new ones has been abandoned. What we've got -- an amending treaty, the greatest achievement of which is to ban further institutional reform for at least 10 years. And that is a very important thing. Because one reason the EU is unpopular is it's spent the last seven years examining its own plumbing. And that is a very, very bad thing to do. It completely hollows out the institution's capacity to be a powerful and effective voice, because it's examining itself. And I think that the most important -- I mean, the treaty has to be passed in all 27 countries in order to come into force. It does make some useful institutional reforms, help the EU cope with being rather than 15. But I don't think it's -- no one would claim it's a revolutionary change. There's some more qualified majority voting in areas like energy, which is quite useful, overseas aid. It cleans up some of the commission structures so that there's real integrity to the foreign policy structures, and that's a good thing. But I don't think it's -- the most significant thing is it ends this period of institutional introspection, and I'm a great believer that you've got to -- you lead with function and then get the form, rather than get the form and then get the function. And I think that the EU's challenge is really an exciting one, because for 40 years, the EU has been driven forward by a view that the threats to its security and prosperity come from within its borders. Originally they came from the idea of war between states. But then it became through unemployment and poor labor standards and poor environmental standards. And that project carries on. You've got (internal ?) market, single currency, et cetera. However, in the modern world, the big threats to Europe's security and prosperity come from beyond its borders. So that's why I talk about a second wing of the European airplane. The first wing is internal market, internal social standards, et cetera. The second wing is that Europe should be a powerful voice in the world. ZAKARIA: Does Europe need a powerful foreign minister, if that's the case? MILIBAND: Well, I think it would be -- at the moment, it's got two, almost three. In this -- it's got Xavier Solana, High Representative, it's got a Benita Ferrero Waldner, External Relations, it's got Barroso, the head of the Commission. I think that the proposal in the Lisbon Treaty, which is to merge at least two of those jobs, I think is a good thing. We don't call it foreign minister. But we -- there are 27 foreign ministers, and it's the job of the high representative, I mean, the job is ghastly. The -- is to carry out the will of the 27. And the real challenge is can you have a coherent foreign policy of 27 or will you always fall to the lowest common denominator. If you think about what's happened in Kosovo in the last year, that has not been lowest common denominator politics. It's actually a story of highest common factor. Not every country has recognized the new Kosovo, 21 countries are recognized. But 27 countries agreed to put 2,000 ESPP monitors in there -- or ESPP peacekeepers in there. And you've got 16,000 NATO troops as well, and they're not being fired on. And anyone who knows anything about the Western Balkans in the '90s will know that's a pretty remarkable development. ZAKARIA: Sir. QUESTIONER: Henry Breed from the U.N. General Assembly. Two of the principle themes in this week's general debate have been the financial crisis on one hand and the Millennium Development Goals on the other. Your government this morning talked very effectively, very convincingly about the need to maintain commitment to the Millennium Development Goals in the face of the financial crisis. How do you see that happening, and how do you see convincing your constituency of its virtue? MILIBAND: Hmm, that's really interesting. I mean, when the prime minister spoke at the U.N. General Assembly today, and he talked -- he took head-on the argument does the financial crisis mean that the world is going to relax on the Millennium Development Goals. And he argued it mustn't. And in the end, that comes down to politics. Now, what's happened in U.K. in the last 11 years is that -- and that's been a period of economic growth, it's not yet a test for the proposition. Year on year, average incomes have grown. Over a few days, instead of going down, it's gone up. And we've now got a timetable to reach our (1.7 percent ?). And I think that the -- and all the other parties are now committed to the same timetable. So the politics has changed in a pretty fundamental way. And I don't think it'll get rolled back, interestingly enough because I think the political center of gravity has shifted on this issue. Whether or not that is doable internationally -- I mean, there is pressure on some European countries on overseas aid commitment. I just think it's very, very important that they're going because it's a matter of politics. One thing that will make a difference -- I think -- I wrote the '97 Manifesto and it -- the -- (inaudible) -- Manifesto -- and it was too easy to say you can make poverty history by increasing aid. I think people now are much more conscious that trade, conflict prevention, good governance as well as aid are vital to it. And I would say that people will, if we look like we're taking the pressure off on good governance and trade and conflict prevention, then we'll be in trouble on the aid commitment. QUESTIONER: Thank you. Joanna Wechsler, Security Council Report. You started out talking about the power shifts, and it seems that there have been some power shifts also within the Security Council of the U.N. And in particular, within the P-5, we had two double vetoes -- the first two double vetoes since the end of the Cold War -- one on Burma, one on Zimbabwe. These just happened to be cases related to democracy and human rights. So A, do you think this is a trend? And B, what needs to be done -- what can be done for the Council to regain a degree of consensus and to simply be able to be effective? MILIBAND: Can I ask you a question? Were those really the first double vetoes since the end of the Cold War? QUESTIONER: Yeah, double. MILIBAND: That's really significant. That's very, very significant -- Burma and Zimbabwe. Look, the issue at the heart of it is ironic given what's happened in South Ossetia, because the issue that drew the Russians and then the Chinese to veto was, quote, "We don't interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." So it -- this is a profound issue, not a -- not a peripheral one. And I think it is significant that -- someone said that the Zimbabwe vote was a sort of canary in the mine for Russia's new attitude. In fact, you could argue it was the opposite, because they argued against intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. I think that there is real -- we've got to be honest, there's division about it, a fundamental division. And I went to China in February, and I gave a speech there about what I called responsible sovereignty, which tried to take head-on -- Bob Zoellick made a speech about responsible stakeholder. There was no such word as stakeholder in Mandarin. So I thought it was important to try to take on -- to accept national sovereignty as being a really important foundation of global order. But then ask yourself, is it qualified at all? I mean, I think it's qualified in two senses. One, it's qualified -- if you abuse your own people, then your sovereignty is qualified and you do make yourself susceptible to foreign intervention of a range of kinds, not only military. But secondly, if you abuse the rights of others beyond your own borders, that also carries consequences. And so I think that it's -- sovereignty is qualified. But I think we have to engage on that debate. Now, what's interesting, I think, about the debate in China in an area -- let's think of a less contentious area, so climate change. The debate has changed there, partly because they recognize responsibilities for the wider community. And I think that the Chinese debate has moved on climate change, myself -- there are probably Chinese scholars here who've got a better view than I, but I think it has changed. Now, that's, in a way, the easy one, because it's -- or easy is the wrong way of putting it. It's an easier one. On the hard security end, there's still very, very strong difficulties. And I think that the way this will be played out, which is a way of answering your question, is how responsibility to protect is developed or is not developed because is I think is why quite a few people have got a buyer's remorse about the R2P. And I think that's pretty serious. But that's the way you'll see these developed. QUESTIONER: Were the Chinese helpful on Burma or not? Condi Rice says that they were actually somewhat helpful. MILIBAND: I think she's -- (inaudible). They were more helpful than some other countries. (Laughter.) QUESTIONER: There are two countries that border Burma, China and India. QUESTIONER: My name is Roland Paul. I hope you don't think this is an awkward or tactless question, but it's common knowledge that Gordon Brown is struggling to be -- to retain his position as prime minister of England, and your name is mentioned as a likely alternative. But according to The New York Times, a couple of days ago, Brown said or did something that was a brilliant stroke to turn the tables on you and, you know, The Times, in its fine reporting, failed to say what that was. So maybe you could -- (laughter) -- if you could tell us what the -- MILIBAND: I can put your mind -- (Cross talk.) MILIBAND: -- he didn't need to turn the tables. He made an outstanding speech at the party conference, which is a good thing. I don't support the leadership election in the Labor Party, and we carry on on that basis. He made a great speech. He's got -- he's a man of real values and integrity and drive. And I think you've seen that on show, actually, in -- (inaudible) -- of the U.N. fora this week. The Millennium Development Goals summit yesterday was in large part his creation. And so I would say to you, don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: What? QUESTIONER: Except The Guardian. MILIBAND: Why The Guardian? QUESTIONER: Your article in The Guardian in which you laid out a vision for the Labor Party. MILIBAND: But that -- I mean, Gordon himself said -- this was an article that any member of the cabinet could've written and he could've written. So it's slightly odd to say that that's sort of against what he's saying. And I think it's important that if you're in politics, you've got to run your own department. You've also got to stand up for the correct of -- responsibility of the government as a whole, and that's what I'm doing. QUESTIONER: Hi. Lane Green from the Economist Magazine. I think it MacMillan (ph) who said that Britain should be wise old Greece to America's Rome. Right now, it's looking like we're Rome at about 475 A.D. (Laughter.) And a quick plug. On Economist.com, we're running a thing called the Global Electoral College, where everybody in the world outside the United States can vote for president. We have an embarrassingly blue map, almost entirely except for El Salvador, which is currently barely leaning John McCain. (Laughter.) But one of these guys is going to be president of the United States. And without fear or favor, what's the first piece of advice you would, as wise old Greece, give to -- (laughter) -- give to Rome? What's the first symbolic or practical thing that a new president can do to restore America's reputation? MILIBAND: Well, that's interesting. That's interesting. I mean, I hate the sort of snobbery that's associated with British pretensions to lecturing in a (minimite ?) way, so I'd prefer not to do it in that -- you can probably learn more from our mistakes than from our electorates. But what would be the first -- QUESTIONER: -- don't invade Iraq, but that's done. (Laughter.) MILIBAND: I think -- I tell you what -- actually, what I would think -- the last time I was here, I -- we had a dinner at the -- our ambassador to the U.N., and we spent quite a lot of the dinner debating this man's book, which none of us had read, but we'd all read the -- (laughter) -- QUESTIONER: So was it like Oxford High Table all over again? MILIBAND: Actually, if I'd really had my wits about me, which none of us had brought, then yeah. (Laughter.) But we had read the helpful summary on the Sons of Foreign Affairs. The title -- we all knew the title. I think the most -- don't underestimate American power would be my piece of advice. This is still -- I mean, Brent Scowcroft wrote this article saying -- and it's partly -- remember, I started by talking about how this may be one of the last chances for the trans-Atlantic alliance to set a global agenda. And part of my thinking on that is inspired by what Brent Scowcroft said, which was -- I think in The National Interest, he wrote an article saying America is the only superpower, and it will remain superordinary in all sorts of ways for the next 20 years, but name one country that can get the world to do what it wants on its own in the modern world. And I think that's an important point. However, don't underestimate American power and don't become too sort of hangdog or embarrassed about yourselves, because this is still a country with huge ability to be a force for good around the world and is a force for good around in the world in all sorts of ways. And I think that if the next president comes in in the sense of somehow feeling that things can't be done, that's going to be a problem. Any of the big problems that need to be done can only be done if you're on the bus. And so whether it's inequality and climate change or conflict prevention or counterproliferation, which we have to mention because these people have come here to talk about it. (Laughter.) (Cross talk.) QUESTIONER: -- gives you a chance to talk about -- on Iran, the -- MILIBAND: The counterproliferation -- remember, but two challenges to the counterproliferation agenda, just to let me do my 30 seconds on this. There are three commitments in the NPT. One is not to proliferate; the other is not to -- it's to disarm; and the other is to promote safe use of civilian nuclear power. And the whole disarmament argument is a very important part of this because the allegation of hypocrisy is that we rearm like crazy ourselves and we stop everyone else. Actually, we're serious about our disarmament responsibility. We've had a 75 percent reduction in our nuclear arsenal over the last 10 years. And I think that the debate has been started about -- by the shots at our group, a world full of nuclear weapons, et cetera, is an important part of the conditioning to help -- we make the NPT bargain. And I think the bargain has to be remade because it's been a brilliant bargain. I mean, it is amazing that in a world where 40 or 50 countries have the power -- economic, scientific, et cetera -- to be nuclear weapons states, you know, less than 10 are. That is a remarkable thing. Kennedy predicted, I think, by mid-80s -- or mid-70s, he said -- mid '80s -- he predicted in 1962 that there would be 30 nuclear weapons states. There could be, but there aren't. And that is significantly because of the NPT regime. But I think the bargain has to be remade because the forces that are trying to split it asunder are strong. The P-5, I think, has lost a bit of focus on this -- which I think is dangerous -- since the Cold War. The spread of civilian nuclear power has given lots more explanation of how to do this stuff. There's various people trying to spread knowledge about how you weaponize. So we've got to -- we can't -- I think for sometime, since the Cold War, we've lived in a world where we thought, oh, well the NPT is fine, it's okay. We've got to really defend it aggressively if we want it to last, and that means you have to defend it aggressively on the nonproliferation front. We also defend it aggressively on the disarmament front. That's the end of my piece. ZAKARIA: Benjamin Barber? QUESTIONER: Thanks. Benjamin Barber at Demos, New York. Hi, David. MILIBAND: Hi. QUESTIONER: This question about the global blue vote suggests to me one of the reasons so many Americans vote red, and it's a problem because that sense that the world votes one way pushes America the other way. And my question, therefore, comes back to your starting point where you said that we -- this is the last, perhaps, American vote where there will be a chance to elect leadership that's capable of a shared EU-UK-USA global leadership role. And my question is, do you think that depends exclusively on geopolitical factors so that the outcome of the vote here and the outcome next year in England have nothing to do with that and there's a chance, no matter who wins, either side, that goes forward? Or does it depend on, not just geopolitical but ideological alignments -- say, a Labor victory or a Democratic victory or David Cameron and McCain. In other words, is there an ideological impediment to that shared leadership in place? Or do you think, really, the issues are generic and geopolitical and it's not so important who wins the election on either side? MILIBAND: Well, I think it's -- the important thing to -- I tried to say, Europe-America, not just UK-U.S., and I think that's important. And I think you've got quite an important constellation across the left-right divide in Europe -- you know, Mrs. Merkel, Sarkozy, Brown -- Gordon Brown, spanning the political spectrum. You've got real commitments to trans-Atlantic joint work. And I think that's significant. And so in that sense, I don't think this is a simple left-right thing. Having said that, I do believe that if you want order and stability in the modern world, you can only forge it on the basis of progressive values. Unless you're willing to take on forces of inequality, unless you're willing to stand up for promoting democracy, unless you're willing to share sovereignty, I don't see how you tackle the modern problems. And so you can take that as you will, but I don't think it's a simple left-right thing. I think that there's an important -- I think that's -- interestingly enough, within Europe, you can get people to sign up for those propositions from both a center-right and a center-left perspective, which I think is interesting. And so of course the individuals are elected who can make a difference. And it's not just all sort of ineluctable forces. But I think that -- what I think is significant and what a really important message for an American audience, I think, is that there is a real recognition on the side of Europe that we've got to get our act together and become better partners, but we want to. And I think it's quite a significant thing that certainly would accrue in the same way. I yield again. ZAKARIA: All right. Our Council traditions are not as old as British traditions, but one of them is that we always end on time. You can see why David Miliband is regarded as having such an extraordinary political future. He has this hollowed millstone around his neck, which is the current job he occupies that would normally be considered the most important -- (inaudible) -- the crowning job of any politician's career, and people are just waiting for him to ascend to Number 10 Downing Street. But I think it is worth saying he has been an extraordinary foreign secretary so far, extraordinarily energetic and intelligent, and we look forward to many more years in this job and whatever else the future may hold. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2008, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. ------------------------- .STX
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