Turkey

Exactly a decade ago I became a father for the first time. At the very moment I first laid eyes on my daughter I experienced something I had never felt before. It was total. In an instant my life’s mission became: At all costs, whatever it takes, ensure the health and well-being of this human. I went from a guy existing in the goofy, unreal world of impending first-time fatherhood to “parent,” with all the primordial and overwhelming—until it aches—feelings of unconditional love that come with it. These are the reasons why I have been unable to bring myself to read about poor Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian-Kurdish toddler who washed ashore in Bodrum on the southeastern coast of Turkey, fleeing the cataclysm that has engulfed his country. It is why I had to fight back tears at just the sight of his father who has lost Aylan, his older brother, Galip, and their mother. Abdullah Kurdi’s reality is my night terror. So much has been written about the Kurdi family, Europe’s “migrant crisis,” and the Syrian conflict since the photo of Aylan lying facedown on the beach was published last week, but how many little boys and girls have died in the Syria disaster? We have collectively averted our eyes to unbearable suffering. Another picture of Aylan cradled in the arms of a Turkish police officer reminded me that not everyone has, however. Readers of this blog know that I have been routinely critical of the Turkish government, the Justice and Development Party, and especially Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but when it comes to handling the situation of Syrian refugees in their country, the Turks deserve praise. It is true that the Kurdi family—which no longer exists—was from the Syrian town of Kobani, which is within eyesight of the Turkish border and where Turkish military units sat idly by in the fall of 2014 as forces from the self-proclaimed Islamic State pounded the area. American airstrikes and Syrian Kurdish forces, with help from their cousins in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga, eventually beat back the attackers, but at great cost. There is not much left of Kobani, and responsibility for the carnage and destruction there is partly Turkey’s. Still, numbers do not lie. Whereas the United States has taken in 1,500 people fleeing the conflict and Europe has taken in a larger, but still small number of refugees, Turkey has accepted over 1.9 million. That is an official number. There are believed to be many more. Even so, it represents about half of the people who have fled Syria—most of the rest have found refuge in Jordan and Lebanon. The number of Syrians seeking refuge in Turkey is such that according to my friend and colleague, Soner Cagaptay, in the five Turkish provinces where these people are concentrated, they now comprise 6 to 59 percent of the population. (Those numbers are from the summer of 2014). It is not so much that the Turks have let people in; it is the way they have done it. In contrast to past refugee crises like the Iraqi Kurdish rush to safety in Turkey in the spring of 1991, Ankara has upheld internationally accepted practices and norms for the care of refugees. I would not want to be a Syrian refugee in Turkey; who would? Yet to be a Syrian refugee in Turkey is better than being a Syrian in Syria or a Syrian refugee in other places. It has not been easy for Turkey. The recognition that Syrians—many of whom are Kurdish—might be in Turkey for a very long time has produced some political tension, though for the most part Turks have taken the refugees in their midst with a good deal of equanimity. That said, there seem to be few in Turkey who have an appetite for getting more deeply and directly involved in the conflict across the border and question their government’s aggressive posture toward Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. This does not change the fact that whatever criticism can be leveled against President Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu for their approach to Syria—and there are many—Turkey has borne the brunt of the conflict there and acted responsibly. Late last week Davutoglu said he was “proud” that Turkey had taken in so many refugees. His words came in the context of scoring cheap political points in an address to business leaders representing G20 countries, but Davutoglu was correct. Europe, the United States, and the Gulf countries—the wealthiest countries on Earth—have left Turkey (and Lebanon and Jordan) to deal with the “greatest humanitarian disaster since Word War II,” as we have been told several times over this weekend. True, the United States and its European allies have contributed $1,112,683,736 to the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, but at some point writing checks is not enough. I hope there will not be more Aylan and Galip Kurdis in the future, but I know better. Thanks to Turkey, there have been fewer than there might have been.

CFR’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy (CSMD) Program highlights noteworthy events and articles each Friday in “This Week in Markets and Democracy.”  International Anticorruption Efforts Seem to be Working in Guatemala A far-reaching battle against government corruption is unfolding in Guatemala. Prosecutors have uncovered a widespread customs bribery ring through the use of wiretaps, email interceptions, close monitoring of individuals, and financial analyses. They accuse government officials of siphoning off tens of millions of dollars in import duties. Evidence suggests that the fraud’s biggest beneficiaries have been Vice President Roxana Baldetti (who resigned and is awaiting trial), and President Otto Pérez Molina, who so far is resisting demands for his resignation. Whether now or later, it is quite likely both will face jail time—a first for this nation and all of Latin America. These investigations should hearten international anticorruption fighters, showing that international efforts can make a difference even in places with weak institutions and long legacies of graft and impunity. Leading the charge is the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, or CICIG. Founded in 2006, CICIG is a UN-funded independent prosecutor’s office (the United States has contributed some $25 million since its formation) dedicated to strengthening Guatemala’s judicial and security institutions. In this latest and most ambitious case, CICIG’s head, Colombian-born prosecutor Iván Velásquez Gómez, has worked closely alongside the Guatemalan public prosecutor’s office, bolstering their investigations into government corruption. CICIG’s success has led to calls by citizens of El Salvador and Honduras for their own version of the organization. How Democratic Are Snap Elections in Turkey and Greece? In the past week, both the Greek and Turkish governments have called snap elections. With ruling Syriza party ranks split over heavy austerity measures, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras resigned and called for new elections September 20th. In Turkey, where the neighboring Syrian war and Kurdish insurgency threaten stability, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called parliamentary elections for November, and designated his hand-picked successor, Ahmet Davutoglu, as interim Prime Minister to oversee the vote. Scholars tout the benefits of this parliamentary electoral mechanism, enabling leaders to avoid gridlock or a lame duck administration (both perils of presidential electoral regimes). Yet politicians use these elections strategically—dictating the schedule to maintain their political advantage at times in ways that do little to further democratic inclusion or legitimacy. In Greece, Tsipras looks to shuffle his coalition, abandoning the anti-austerity platform that brought him to power last February. The quick turnaround leaves little time for other parties to form a government or rally around voter opposition voiced in a July referendum. Meanwhile, Erdogan is betting that early elections will bolster his power after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority in June and Davutoglu failed to form a coalition. (Opponents charge the move was an attempt to thwart them from forming their own alliance). In both places the leaders are following the democratic rules, yet invite debate over their democratic legitimacy. While shoring up support through early voting may be preferable to an imminent “no” vote, leaders can also manipulate snap elections to extend power in times of political and economic crisis. AGOA’s Challenges Rooted in Structural Weakness U.S. and African officials met this week in Gabon to flesh out what Congress’s ten-year extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) can mean. Since AGOA began in 2000, duty-free market access for thirty-nine sub-Saharan African countries has boosted U.S.-bound exports fourfold to over $26 billion. Yet to truly increase African global competitiveness, a renewed AGOA pact will need to grapple with the economies’ structural challenges. Commodities dominate African trade—oil comprises nearly 90 percent of AGOA exports. The trade deal won’t move Brent crude prices. Another source of exports, agriculture, has yet to modernize—the majority of sub-Saharan African jobs remain in low-productivity farm work. And the United States is reluctant to provide market access—the newly-authorized AGOA provides more technical assistance for agriculture but does little to eliminate tariffs and quotas for African sugar and cotton producers. The U.S. and African officials could and should focus on helping get goods to market. Sporadic electricity, bad roads, silted ports, and general transportation costs are up to ten times higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in Asian economies, eliminating the upside of large and affordable labor forces. For example, slow logistics and customs procedures keep Ethiopia’s growing coffee and flower industries from reaching their full potential. Though total U.S.–Africa trade increased during AGOA’s first fifteen years, the $26 billion represents just a small fraction of U.S. imports. And the vast majority of non-oil imports came from South Africa. Unless agriculture, infrastructure, and structural barriers are tackled, AGOA won’t make a significant difference for Africa’s companies, workers, and broader economies.

This article originally appeared here on Politico.com on Friday, August 21, 2015. On July 23 virtually every news outlet in the United States ran some version of the following headline: “Turkey Joins the Fight Against ISIL; Opens Air Base to Coalition Forces; Washington and Ankara Agree to Safe Zone in Syria.” The media, being what it is, dubbed Ankara’s decision to order up airstrikes on Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s forces a “game changer,” which is what journalists say when they have nothing else to say, do not understand a situation and are itching to get back to covering Donald Trump. The only game that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is actually interested in changing is the political one that he has been uncharacteristically losing since mid-June when his Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost the parliamentary majority it has held since November 2002. Erdogan’s military actions against the self-proclaimed Islamic State are best understood as one part a desperate, highly complex attempt by Erdogan to win back the power he lost. If his plan fails, the risky multi-front war Erdogan has just launched may become his undoing. It’s hard to believe that Erdogan took a fresh look at what was happening in Syria and Iraq and came to the conclusion that joining the American-led fight against the Islamic State was in Turkey’s national interest. The prevailing theory among Turkey watchers instead is this: Ankara agreed to fight against the Islamic State so America would allow it to attack the Kurds (who are also at war with ISIL) and thereby improve the AKP’s political prospects in parliamentary elections that will be scheduled for the fall. Continue reading here...

This weekend Turkey and the United States took steps toward getting more heavily involved in the Syrian quagmire. First, after a year of protracted negotiations, Turkey agreed to allow the United States to use Incirlik airbase to conduct operations against the so-called Islamic State. In return, the Obama administration has agreed to the establishment of a “safe zone” in northwestern Syria that “moderate Syrian opposition forces” would protect along with Turkish and American airpower. Second, Turkey undertook airstrikes against Islamic State positions in Syria and the forces of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. The early reaction has focused almost exclusively on Ankara’s sudden interest in combatting the Islamic State and the establishment of safe zones as potential “game changers” in the fight against Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Assad regime. In reality this effort is likely to achieve much less than expected. It is true that the Turks have gotten more serious about the threat of the Islamic State, especially since the Suruc bombing on July 20, but Ankara, which has grown increasingly uncomfortable as the Kurds have made gains against Islamic State forces in Syria, is primarily interested in suppressing Kurdish nationalism. This has placed Washington in the odd position of having essentially given the go-ahead to its most reluctant ally in the fight against the Islamic State to combat some of the most effective fighters in that conflict —the Kurds, both the Turkish Kurds of the PKK and the affiliated forces of their Syrian cousins, the People’s Protection Units, known by the acronym YPG—under the guise of combatting the same enemy. This seems like a steep price to pay for the use of Incirlik while threatening to draw the United States into a war with no end. Why now? The United States and Turkey have until now disagreed over how to deal with the Islamic State. The Turks have maintained the position that bringing down the Assad regime in Syria would go a long way toward defeating the Islamic State. It is also a position that is politically self-serving since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu have made it a matter of principle that Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad “must go.” The Obama administration has taken the view that Ankara was overlooking the possibility that Assad’s demise might actually benefit al-Baghdadi, whose forces would take advantage of the additional chaos and bloodletting that would surely ensue. The White House has also been more focused on Iraq than Syria, much to Turkish chagrin. As the Washington Post’s Karen DeYoung and Liz Sly reported today, a number of recent developments altered Turkish and American calculations including the Islamic State’s threat to the Azaz border crossing along the northwest of the Syrian-Turkish frontier and Kurdish control of the Tel Abyad border crossing near Kobani. There was also the apparent Islamic State suicide bombing last Monday, which killed thirty-two people in Suruc, demonstrating the Islamic State’s ability to do damage inside of Turkey. All three developments have combined to convince the Turks that it was time to act, but for Ankara it is not just about the Islamic State. What are the Turks up to? Ankara clearly has an Islamic State problem, but it also has a Kurdish nationalism problem. The former is new while the latter has been central in the politics of the Turkish Republic since its founding in 1923. Consequently the Turks have made combatting the Kurds their priority. Over the thirteen years since it came to power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has sought to resolve this historical challenge through a variety of initiatives that would diminish the appeal of Kurdish nationalism for Turkey’s Kurds. These included a $12 billion investment—the AKP insists it was $25 billion—in the predominantly Kurdish southeast in 2005 and 2006, an ill-defined “Kurdish opening” in 2009, and, for the last three years, a peace process with the PKK. Yet the political pressure has become too much given that Syria’s Kurds have sought to establish an independent canton along the Turkish-Syrian frontier and that they have become partners of the United States in the fight against the Islamic State. In the background, of course, is the advanced state of Iraqi Kurdistan’s drive for independence, the failing peace process with the PKK, and the recent strong showing of the Kurdish-based People’s Democratic Party in Turkey’s parliamentary elections. The Turks quite obviously fear that these developments will encourage the fourteen million Kurdish citizens of Turkey to seek changes that threaten the republic. This is in part why the Turks stood by and watched when the Islamic State laid siege to the Kurdish-Syrian town of Kobani last year. For Turkey, taking part in coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State and rounding up suspected supporters is a side benefit to the actual goal of disrupting Kurdish plans in Syria and hitting the PKK. If there is any doubt about Turkish aims, Erdogan declared in late June, “We will never allow the establishment of a state in Syria’s north and our south.” The Turks deserve praise for the way in which they have managed a huge number of Syrian refugees—1.8 million by last official count—but in addition to relieving some of the pressure of hosting so many refugees in Turkey, Ankara’s idea of a “safe zone” carved out of northen Syria seems also intended to make sure that Syria’s Kurds are unable to consolidate their battlefield gains against the Islamic State into what they call Rojava, or Western Kurdistan. The fact that this zone will be under the authority of some as-of-yet-to-be-determined Syrian opposition forces with Turkish and American protection from the air makes it significantly less likely that the Kurds will achieve their aims. Upon the announcement of the safe zone, the Syrian Kurdish leader, Salih Muslim, warned that the Turkish-American plan was essentially a ruse that was cover for sending Turkish forces into northern Syria. If Muslim is correct, then no one should expect that the forces affiliated with his Democratic Union Party will just allow it to happen. So instead of making the Islamic State their battlefield focus, as they have been doing with American support, the Syrian Kurds will also fight the Turkish army. What are the risks for the United States? By signing up with the Turks to establish a safe zone and then provide support to the Syrian opposition in its efforts to liberate Idlib and Aleppo, the United States may have cemented an alliance between Assad and the Islamic State. Defending both the safe zone and liberating large portions of Syrian territory seem way beyond the capacity of “moderate Syrian opposition forces”—though perhaps not the extremist variety. It seems that while Washington has undermined an ally in the fight against the Islamic State, it has given every reason for the Islamic State and Assad’s forces to work together—not unprecedented at all—against the safe zone and approved opposition forces attacking from the north. Based on experience, Turkish and American officials clearly believe that airpower can be decisive against both Assad’s battered forces as well as Islamic State fighters, but there is no guarantee that what worked in one area will work in another. There can be no assurances of success, but after years of avoiding the Syrian conflict, the Incirlik-for-a-safe-zone trade now puts the United States at risk of getting sucked into it. What happens if the Syrian opposition forces assigned to protect the safe zone cannot manage it? The Turks would likely happily deploy forces to help, but there would be tremendous pressure on the United States to do the same if only to keep an eye on the Turks. What if, warnings to Assad aside, Syrian air defenses—a major threat according to the Pentagon—bags an American plane? How would Washington respond? Like the debate about a “no-fly zone” at an earlier stage of the conflict revealed, there are myriad ways in which the United States can be pulled into Syria. How does the agreement with Turkey help the United States achieve its goals in Iraq and Syria? Ankara is a less potent ally in the fight against the Islamic State than the Kurds, it is no longer a significant player in the future of Iraq, and it maintains a wholly unrealistic view of what will happen in Syria if the Assad regime falls. The Middle East is hard and Syria is especially complex, but it is difficult to see what the United States gets out of the deal other than the runways of Incirlik. That is not going to solve either Syria or the problematic conditions that created the Islamic State, but it will pull Washington closer to war on Turkish terms. In Turkish it is called bataklık, or quagmire.

Take a closer look at fragments of one of the earliest extant Qurans today, found recently at the University of Birmingham. Nervana Mahmoud laments the fate of Middle Eastern liberalism in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal. Semih Idiz calls the recent bombings in Suruc, Turkey, a “dreadful wakeup call” for his country.

Nadeen Shaker investigates how Turkey’s Kurds are reclaiming their language in the classroom. Farah Halime of Rebel Economy has published a translation of former Vice President of Egypt Omar Suleiman’s September 2011 court testimony in the case against former President Hosni Mubarak. Sam Houston discusses methods of understanding authority and authenticity in Islam vis-à-vis jihadism.

This article was originally published here on The American Interest on Wednesday, June 10, 2015. Turks can be forgiven for the party they threw themselves late Sunday, stretching into Monday morning. They voted in droves in what was widely regarded as the most important general election in more than a decade and dealt the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) a significant blow. After garnering nearly 50 percent of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections, the AKP ceded about 9 percentage points to a combination of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), a new Kurdish-based group that will enter the Grand National Assembly for the first time. The AKP’s result translates into a loss of either 68 or 69 seats (officials results have yet to be released), meaning that the party will need to find a coalition partner if it wants to continue governing—something it has never had to do. It is true that the AKP still commands the largest number of votes by a significant percentage, but it no longer seems so invincible. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the central figure in Turkish politics, who made the elections about himself and his ambition to transform Turkey from a hybrid parliamentary-presidential system to a purely presidential system is no doubt diminished by the result. Erdogan, who once rode to power on a broad coalition of liberals, the pious, Kurds, big business, and average Turks, is now a deeply polarizing figure for many. Continue reading here...

Upheaval in the Middle East presents both challenges and opportunities for the 30 million Kurds living in the region. The newest InfoGuide outlines these dynamics, their historical underpinnings, and how they could reshape the Middle East.

Serkan Demirtas writes about the AKP and the quest for peace with the Kurds Mohammad Raba’a discusses Wadi Barada, an Islamic State foothold in Syria. Jonathan Guyer explores free speech, satire, and Charlie Hebdo with Arab cartoonists.

Ahmad al-Akla writes about people’s return to rebel-controlled Idlib, Syria. A new party in Egypt calls for a secular constitution. Juan Cole discusses how recent shifts in Syria are driven by Turkish and Saudi policies that may be beneficial for al-Qaeda.

This article was originally published here on ForeignAffairs.com on Thursday, April 23, 2015. On April 25, 1915, when British, French, and Australian and New Zealand troops landed on the strategic Gallipoli Peninsula, their objective was to knock out Ottoman defenses and make way for Allied navies to steam up the Dardanelles strait toward Istanbul. It was a risky and costly endeavor that culminated in their total retreat eight months later. For Gallipoli’s defenders, who lost 86,692 men, the battle was an important victory in defense of the Ottoman Empire. Paradoxically, it also became a touchstone of the nationalism that was so important to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey less than a decade later. Likewise, celebrations planned for the battle’s centenary reflect the tension between the valorization of the Ottoman era and the hallowed memory of Mustafa Kemal—Ataturk—modern Turkey’s founder. In many ways, the memory of Gallipoli is still shaping, and is being shaped by, the country’s political trajectory. When the Allied force landed, Kemal, then a lieutenant colonel, was being held in a reserve unit five miles from the front. He was quickly deployed on horseback with the 57th Regiment to the steep hills overlooking Ariburnu Point and the famous Anzac Cove. There he encountered retreating Turkish forces—whom, in his own telling, he implored to carry on with their fight to the death, ordering those soldiers who had run out of ammunition to fix their bayonets. Kemal managed to hold on for the next 24 hours under heavy Allied pressure, enduring significant losses until reinforcements arrived to shore up Ottoman defenses. Continue reading here...

This article was originally published here on ForeignPolicy.com on Wednesday, April 22, 2015. As the world commemorates the centennial of the Armenian genocide this week, Turkey’s government once again finds itself fighting an old, losing battle. According to Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, the recent spate of calls to recognize the genocide is the work of an “evil gang” bent on slandering the country’s honor. The old members of this gang are well known to Turkey-watchers. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its supporters routinely refer to them as Islamophobes, the “interest rate lobby,” and “provocateurs” — in other words, anyone who might raise a critical question about Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Now, Turkish leaders have added a new name to the list: Welcome to the haters’ party, Pope Francis. Last week, the leader of the world’s 1.2 billion Catholics described the mass killings of Armenians in 1915 as “the first genocide of the 20th century.” The Turkish leadership went into a collective frenzy of denunciations: Ankara recalled its representative to the Holy See and demanded an explanation from the Vatican’s ambassador in Turkey. Erdogan led the charge, lashing out at the pontiff as if he was a cheap pol. “We will not allow historical incidents to be taken out of their genuine context and be used as a tool to campaign against our country,” Erdogan said. “When politicians and clerics take on the work of historians, it is not the truth that comes out but rather, like today, nonsense. I condemn the pope and would like to warn him not to make similar mistakes again.” Continue reading here...