• Politics and Government
    The European Union Sends Election Monitors to Nigeria
    A member of the European Union Election Observation Mission stands beside his luggage as he arrives in the Nigerian capital Abuja. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters) In advance of Nigeria’s elections in April, the European Union Election Observation Mission has deployed 52 Long Term Election Observers to cover rural and urban areas of the country, with an additional 60 Short Term Observers arriving prior to the general election period. I will be paying particularly close attention to what they report. In my view, in 2007 the European Union Election Observation Mission provided the most straightforward account of the largely fraudulent elections in Nigeria. The EU team’s successful coverage of the 2007 elections stemmed not only from the early deployment of Long Term Observers but also because their coverage of the country was so extensive.
  • Economic Crises
    A Divided and Insular EU
    The eurozone fiscal crisis has led many EU members to discount the benefits of European integration, but the bloc is likely to muddle along and focus on inward relations while bonds with Washington weaken, says CFR’s Stewart Patrick.
  • Economic Crises
    The Eurocrisis and the Uncertain Future of European Integration
    This essay assesses the need for deeper integration in the European Union, while questioning where the current European leadership has the vision to implement such reforms in the wake of the euro crisis. Editor's Note: This essay is part of the collection Crisis in the Eurozone. Introduction Eurocrisis? What eurocrisis? This August, the streets of Florence, Barcelona, and London were full of Europeans on their (unimaginably long) holidays, acting with apparent disregard for the dire predictions in the press of a European Union (EU) on the verge of bankruptcy and dissolution. Meanwhile, financial markets backed off from their attacks on the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) while those porcine countries moved forward with significant reforms, slashing their deficit and debt levels. German growth in the last quarter has driven eurozone growth to above U.S. levels, giving pause to euroskeptics and glee to euroboosters on both sides of the Atlantic. And yet the EU is far from out of the woods. The past two years of global economic upheaval have sorely tested the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its crowning achievement, the euro. At base, the problem is simple: the EU is an outlier in political and economic history, and markets do not know what to expect from its unique combination of a single currency and separate nation-states. The eurozone crisis reveals the challenges of the EU's sui generis political status—no longer a mere collection of nation-states, yet not a fully fledged federal entity. What, then, should we expect for the future of European integration? What does the still-unfolding eurozone crisis mean for the larger geopolitical position of the EU? Absent a crystal ball, any response is necessarily hazy and conjectural. Nevertheless, it is possible to sketch out some significant milestones and signposts that will determine the path of Europe's future. The critical question is whether the leaders and citizens of Europe are willing to upgrade their political institutions and equip them with the mechanisms to ease such financial and economic crises in the future. The way these issues are resolved—or not—will fundamentally shape the broader political future of European integration. The stakes are very high, and while the preliminary evidence suggests the EU is muddling through and is far from collapse, there has been little demonstration of the political leadership needed to creatively move the EU forward. History of Innovation The EU is one of the big success stories of international politics. It is astounding that the states of Europe, so long used to dealing with each other with bayonets and tanks, are now tightly bound together within a series of interlocking laws and institutions. Rather than shooting at each other, they spend their time squabbling over the rules of long-haul truck transport and labeling of genetically modified organisms. This degree of integration of sovereign nation-states is unprecedented in modern times and has formed the basis of the peace and prosperity of Europe. In pursuing their political integration through institutional and market means, rather than warfare and territorial acquisition, the EU has created a new type of political entity in the global system, one whose tight institutional linkages and political community will not disintegrate any time soon. However, the EU's political innovation bumps up against the practical economic requirements of monetary unions and single currencies. No monetary union has ever succeeded without concurrent political union—including fiscal consolidation. Monetary unions are a modern invention, only coming into vogue in the latter part of the nineteenth century and spreading rapidly across countries like Italy, the United States, and Germany. The consolidation of rival currencies has always been part of broader state-building efforts, as a single national currency aided in prosecuting wars, building up administrative capacity at the center of a political union, and fueling the construction of a national identity. The few efforts at monetary unions without political union, such as the Latin Monetary Union and Scandinavian Monetary Union, fell apart within years. Indeed, there are intuitive reasons why political union supports monetary union. Difficult decisions around monetary issues are more easily made within communities joined by broader political solidarity. Fiscal and monetary policy work better when they are planned in concert. Thus the strange status of the European Monetary Union: a centralized monetary authority without fiscal capacity, and a relatively weak set of political institutions and identities. For years, the strong ideational consensus on the policy undergirding the EMU papered over the disconnect between political, fiscal, and monetary union. At the creation of EMU in the late 1980s, lingering concerns over inflation and fears of an uncompetitive EU begat a firm agreement on the need for a strong, stable currency based on the deutsche mark. Sober central bankers in Frankfurt would run EMU and the euro with a single focus—price stability—and with a series of rules—the Growth and Stability Pact—that would clamp down on fiscal prolificacy and instill confidence in the euro (the fact that it was always known as the Stability Pact symbolizes the lack of attention to the growth side of the equation). That consensus facilitated bargains between France and Germany at Maastricht in 1992, where plans for EMU were signed into treaty law. Countries worked hard to get within spitting distance of the austere convergence criteria for entry into EMU. Financial markets bought Europe's political commitment and, in advance of actual deficit reduction, made possible the ultimate budget cuts by reducing interest rates on borrowing by highly indebted countries like Italy and Portugal. A happy circle of self-fulfilling beliefs about Europe's further integration predominated and the previously unimaginable idea of a single European currency became a reality in 1999, with euro notes and coins introduced in January 2002. The go-go years of the dot-com expansion and the global credit bubble economy that followed allowed Europe to enjoy a strong euro, fueling real estate booms across the continent and in the United Kingdom without any serious stresses on European unity. The original EMU consensus held fast, and economic circumstances delayed tough decisions about how to coordinate EU political economies in tough times. Need for Political, Monetary, Fiscal Union Today, however, the party is clearly over, the bill has come due, and history is knocking on the door. So what will determine whether the EU stalls in its integration project or moves forward? The current economic narrative in Europe is unsure, fragmented, and does not provide the necessary political foundation for extensive institutional capacity building. For now, the lack of consensus about the correct macroeconomic formula for Europe seriously compromises any further progress in integration. The most advanced area, perhaps, is agreement on the need for more robust financial regulations, and the EU has been developing rules and institutions addressing this issue over the past eighteen months. However, price stability and austerity still have a stranglehold on policymakers, despite the risks of deflation and continued high unemployment. Surely the EU is not alone, as global leaders flirted with Keynesianism at the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in London in spring 2009, then skittered away from a coordinated fiscal expansion in favor of more orthodoxy regardless of economic bad news. For an elite political project that relies on some basic community agreement about the shape of economic governance, this policy disagreement is very difficult to overcome. A clever observer of EU history would ask, however: What about the potential for the dynamics of crisis to resolve these problems through EU institutional innovations? Could this be the time for the type of push for further political integration that a strongly centralized fiscal federalism would imply? Could this be the moment when the EU moves from being a sui generis freak of history to the broader political union needed as the basis for a single currency? The history of the EU shows that crisis often—but not always—leads to increased integration. Crisis alone will not produce results unless there is the political will and creativity to respond with decisive innovation. From the initial establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in response to the challenges of postwar reconstruction to the single-market innovations of the 1980s, examples abound of the ability of political elites to seize crisis for policy innovation. Even so, long periods of stagnation in political, economic, social, and security arenas have persisted even in the face of serious dysfunction. In the early years of the EU, the so-called empty chair crisis blocked movement on needed decision-making reform for years. A long period of economic stagflation and hard times in the 1970s brought little in the way of policy integration. Conclusion: At the Crossroads Today certainly represents a crisis push moment. Yet despite some limited EU capacity building, there has been a striking lack of coordinated political leadership across the European capitals in the face of market pressures. If anything, the zeitgeist favors political entrepreneurs whipping up anti-EU feelings as austerity programs begin to bite, rather than pushing for further integration. The end of the Cold War and the generational change in leadership from a visceral commitment to the EU as a critical bulwark against political instability mean that Germany is no longer playing its postwar role as the engine of integration in tight embrace with France. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy are far from the dynamic duos of Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, or Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, that powered many of the big bangs that formed today's EU. Neither is the European Commission led by an innovative policy entrepreneur like Jacques Delors, who managed to frame the single market initiative and the euro project as imperative for EU competitiveness. Therefore, a combination of historical contingencies, and the particular personalities involved, means that the creative and bold moves of the past will be very hard to come by.
  • Economic Crises
    Eurozone Crisis as Historical Legacy
    This essay examines the historical roots of the eurozone crisis, tracing the roots of ongoing political and economic problems back to agreements that were made around German reunification in 1989. Editor's Note: This essay is part of the collection Crisis in the Eurozone. Introduction As former U.S. secretary of state James A. Baker III once observed, "Almost every achievement contains within its success the seeds of a future problem." The eurozone crisis of 2010 provides a trenchant example of this phenomenon. When the long-sought but controversial implementation of an European Monetary Union (EMU) finally began—as part of the bundle of deals that produced German reunification twenty years ago on October 3—it represented a significant accomplishment. Though the idea of a single European currency had been around at least since the Werner Plan of the 1970s, German reunification provided the necessary catalyst. For all the success of that achievement, however, it left behind fateful seeds, which sprouted into the 2010 crisis. The eurozone crisis resulted not only from the economic woes of weaker member states but also from flaws in the Maastricht Treaty and from Germany's long-term decrease in interest in European cooperation. Since a crisis is a terrible thing to waste, the members of the eurozone should use the sovereign debt debacle of 2010 as a second "1989 moment." They should retrofit the eurozone with the greater political institutionalization needed in the post-Cold War era—a goal that Germany sought but failed to achieve at the end of the Cold War and now no longer prioritizes. In other words, the best way to deal with today's issues is to finally address two decades of unfinished business. The Bargain of 1989-90 European integration, and especially monetary integration, has a long history of "stop-and-start" activity. The 1970 Werner Plan was a prime example: it originally called for an EMU within a decade, but each subsequent effort stalled short of implementation. The prospect of denationalizing currency and surrendering control over a fundamental tool of statecraft—currency valuation—was daunting to the member states of the European Community (EC). Politicians knew that they risked running afoul of voters if they surrendered too much sovereignty. West Germans, in particular, felt an extremely strong attachment to their postwar currency, the deutsche mark; for them, it was synonymous with the economic renewal, prosperity, and stability of the Cold War years, following on the trauma of the Weimar and Nazi eras. Beyond political worries, national capitals clashed over the question of independence for a future European Central Bank (ECB): West Germans cherished their independent Bundesbank and felt certain that it should have independence; the French prioritized political control over central bankers and how strict the convergence criteria should be—that is, how much inflation and sovereign debt would be acceptable. It took the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the actions of two decisive leaders—West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president François Mitterrand—to cut through the controversy and make the single currency a reality. Historian David Marsh singles out the bargain that Kohl and Mitterrand negotiated in 1989-90 as "the essential deal that launched Europe on the Maastricht monetary union path." The deal originated in the work of European Community Commission president Jacques Delors. Heading an eponymous committee, Delors made a fresh effort to map out a path to EMU in an April 1989 report. He found that the critical step, from which all else would follow, would be to convene an intergovernmental conference (IGC) for the purpose of implementing a single currency. However, the Delors Committee Report left deadlines vague, jeopardizing the prospects for its success. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Mitterrand saw an opportunity for rapid convocation of Delors's IGC. He understood that the wall's collapse would motivate Kohl to seek German reunification, and he realized that the smart move would be to embed increased German strength in a monetary union as soon as possible. Both Mitterrand and Kohl realized that it would be extremely difficult to reunite Germany if EC members became worried about a threatening resurgence of German nationalism. Kohl always believed strongly in European integration; the opening of the wall did nothing to undermine his trust in Konrad Adenauer's saying that "German problems can only be solved under a European roof." Kohl fundamentally agreed with the goal of a common currency, although he had previously indicated that it should be accomplished in future decades. Nevertheless, he understood that West German voters, a majority of whom favored European integration and worried about the costs of rebuilding East Germany, would resist a go-it-alone reunification process that alienated the EC. Given France's weight in the EC, this meant that Kohl needed Mitterrand's approval to proceed. In return, Mitterrand asked that Germany assent to move toward a single currency as soon as possible, with the crucial IGC convening by the end of 1990. Mitterrand further insisted that the opening of the IGC be announced in December 1989 during the French presidency of the European Council. If the French president could preside over a significant declaration about the future of European integration on French soil, Mitterrand would advocate within the EC for German unification. In the interest of success, Mitterrand acceded to German wishes for the full independence of a future ECB. Mitterrand's offer was well framed—Germany would get a currency union largely on its terms, but Kohl would have to compromise on timing. Kohl agreed to Mitterrand's bargain. Consequently, the 1989 Strasbourg summit announced both the opening of the IGC and the EC's favorable attitude toward German unification. The IGC commenced roughly a year later in Rome, on December 15, 1990, and completed its work in December 1991 in Maastricht. In the end, the EC convened two IGCs in December 1990—one on EMU and another on political union between the EC's member states. During this period, the West German officials pushed for integration and hoped to combine the single currency with a matching increase in political institution-building. Mitterrand was willing to consider robust economic governance of the eurozone, but was loath to create new political institutions, and he prevailed—Europe would share a currency but not a treasury. It is surprising and somewhat ironic that Kohl and Mitterrand achieved one of the greatest feats in the history of money. Neither had expertise, or even interest, in economic and monetary matters, apart from their political impact. Indeed, the despairing president of the Bundesbank in the 1980s, Karl Otto Pöhl, told the Financial Times—while he and Kohl were both in office—that the chancellor knew nothing about economics. The Maastricht Treaty and Its Legacy In the mad rush toward German unification and EMU, the IGC's grand bargain overlooked critical details. The final Maastricht Treaty, ratified in 1992, contained insufficient crisis contingencies; monetary union proceeded without real political coordination and with excessive faith in the omnipotence and omniscience of financial markets. The treaty's implementation relied on a hope that its terms would become self-fulfilling, obviating the need for real enforcement. The Maastricht Treaty established convergence criteria specifying that general government budget deficits of potential members should not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). The treaty fixed the permitted ratio of government debt-to-GDP at 60 percent. Potential participants were to have, over the year prior to joining, an average rate of inflation that did not exceed the performance of the best three member states by more than 1.5 percent. Similarly, they were to have average nominal long-term interest rates that did not exceed the best three by greater than 2 percent. The later Stability Pact, requested by the Germans, supplemented these criteria by, in theory, levying fines on violators. Further, the so-called no bailout clause specified that member states should not be liable for, nor assume, the commitments or debts of any other. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty also started an irrevocable countdown toward implementation of EMU among qualifying countries by 1999. Finally, as part of this treaty, the EC reestablished itself as the European Union (EU). While this decision had some practical effects, such as greater cooperation in producing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the effects were nowhere near as profound in the political arena as they were in the economic realm. As the eurozone crisis demonstrates, the hope that the Maastricht criteria could run the common-currency area in lieu of careful economic governance proved false. Six factors explain Maastricht's failure. The first is the momentum acquired by the growing membership of the single currency. Policy-makers wanted the new currency to succeed, and started using the number of members and applicants as an oversimplified metric of success, thereby allowing weaker economies to join without due scrutiny. Such laxness allowed the entry not only of members with ratios of debt-to-GDP well in excess of 60 percent (Belgium, Italy) but also of applicants like Greece, which not only flouted the rules but also falsified its records. Second, once accepted into the union, weaker member states could borrow at roughly the same interest rate as Germany due to the ECB practice of treating the sovereign debt of all eurozone members equally at its discount window. This practice contributed to increased spending without reference to what nations could actually afford. Third, more members in the currency area meant more seats at the table, rendering decision-making about enforcing criteria more difficult. Fourth, German attitudes soured on European integration. After the onset of the housing bubble crisis in the United States and the bankruptcy of financial institutions such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, Berlin signaled that each individual European country would look after its own banks. With unification long a fait accompli, and populist resentment toward paying for the sins of other Europeans, German chancellor Angela Merkel ceased to prioritize repairs to the "European roof." Given the state of the eurozone, it is no longer possible to deny a fifth problem: the insufficiency of the Maastricht Treaty. Neither the mere existence of a no bailout clause nor the action of financial markets was, in fact, sufficient to prevent the need for bailouts. Even worse, the treaty contained no guidelines indicating how to proceed if inter-European economic rescue became necessary. Lacking guidance, European leaders held a series of panicky meetings in spring 2010, culminating in the May decision by most eurozone members to pay €500 billion in bailout, and by the ECB to intervene in markets to buy debt. Merkel insisted on involving the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which gave €250 billion in a political move meant to ensure that Europeans would not bail out Greece alone and subsequently face voter wrath. Sixth, and finally, the crisis spotlighted the weakness of eurozone economic governance. Member states had not wanted to impose overly strict penalties on treaty violators, in case they themselves fell into difficulties. Germany in particular was in a sensitive spot. The expense of renovating East Germany and the unrealistic one-to-one exchange rate between eastern and western marks inflated its money supply, destroyed already weak Eastern industries, and increased the final bill for unification. Germany's economic competitiveness declined, with the result that the member state expected to act as the guardian of monetary union standards failed to meet the Maastricht criteria itself. Germany had to ask, humiliatingly, for lenient implementation of the Stability Pact it had insisted upon, and the EU agreed. After such circumstances it was much harder for subsequent German governments to act in a holier-than-thou fashion toward any other member with economic woes. The fact that the French also found themselves in a fiscal hole for much of the 1990s only compounded the problem. Conclusion: Implications for Today The 2010 crisis has had some fortunate consequences. It exposed weaknesses within individual countries and in the Maastricht Treaty. It confirmed that the eurozone cannot rely on financial markets to address its own weaknesses. It revealed that some kind of permanent bailout procedure is necessary. And it showed that European leaders are still grappling with the seeds sown by the rapidity with which both German unification and the Maastricht Treaty were achieved. The challenge now is governance reform, not expulsion of member states. Reverting to national currencies would drive the values of reissued southern currencies into the ground and the deutsch mark into the sky, thereby undermining Germany's export competitiveness and job market, to say nothing of the collateral damage to the EU and the single market. The eurozone crisis should not signal the end of the euro but rather the start of a long-overdue overhaul. The idea of a European Monetary Fund endorsed by Wolfgang Schäuble—an elder statesman from the days of German unification and now a subordinate of Chancellor Angela Merkel—faded after Merkel dismissed it, but deserves broader support. Germany also needs to reconsider its calls for painful fiscal discipline on the part of the weakest countries until their economies regain footing. Ideally, but perhaps not realistically, Merkel should return to previous German form and spearhead a revision of the Maastricht Treaty, leading a fresh effort to do for political union what Kohl and Mitterrand did for monetary union. The unlikelihood of such a move exemplifies a fundamental problem within the whole EU: there exists a built-in tension between the lofty goals of integration and member states' collective unpreparedness to think through the consequences of their ambitious project. The great achievement of the past has been to reconcile these contradictory impulses by focusing on practical agreements. It is time to do so once again, and to realize that the necessary consequence of monetary union is greater political union. European integration has already transformed most of a famously bellicose continent into a stable zone of peace. Europeans should learn from the woes of 2010 and use them to produce momentum and legitimacy for deeper integration.
  • Economic Crises
    The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration
    This essay examines the state of the European Union post-eurozone crisis, and assesses the European Union's prospects as a model for regional integration efforts around the globe. Editor's Note: This essay is part of the collection Crisis in the Eurozone. Introduction While the European Union (EU) has long been the most developed model of regional integration, it was severely shaken by the recent economic crisis, causing increasing doubts about the integration process. The lack of a timely and coherent response to the euro crisis called into question the integrity of the eurozone, whose structural and institutional fault lines have been revealed by the financial crisis. These doubts coincide with dramatic changes in the global economic order involving the relative decline of the EU and United States and the rise of Asia. The likely economic adjustments are already threatening social cohesion and political stability in Europe. The crisis has temporarily weakened the EU's status as a model for regional integration, but as the EU recovers its confidence, as it always has after previous crises, it will continue to be the leading example for other efforts at regional integration. The EU Model Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in regional integration. The most important principles underlying the success of the EU project include: Visionary politicians, such as Robert Schuman of France and Konrad Adenauer of Germany, who conceived of a new form of politics based on the supranational "community method" rather than the traditional balance-of-power model. Support from the United States was also crucial in the early years. Leadership generated by the Franco-German axis. Despite many problems, Paris and Berlin have been and remain the driving force behind European integration. The political will to share sovereignty and construct strong, legally based, common institutions to oversee the integration project. A consensus approach combined with solidarity and tolerance. The EU approach is based on not isolating any member state if they have a major problem (such as Greece in the most recent crisis), hesitance to move forward with policies until the vast majority of member states are ready, and a willingness to provide significant financial transfers to help poorer member states catch up with the norm. These four tenets have guided the EU well over the years and enabled the institutions to survive many crises, from French president Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair" tactic of withdrawing French representatives from EU political bodies in protest of moves to introduce qualified majority voting (QMV) to failed referendums on new treaties in a number of member states, including rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland in 2008. More recently, the EU has adopted a more flexible approach resulting in a multi-speed Europe with several tiers of integration. For example, not all member states are in the eurozone, or in the Schengen passport-free zone; this arrangement has allowed some of the more Euro-skeptic countries such as the United Kingdom to opt out of certain obligations. Nevertheless, the core tenet of the EU is readiness to share sovereignty and operate through strong common institutions. Other Regional Groupings There have been several attempts to achieve regional integration outside of Europe—including the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union (AU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Mercosur in South America—but they have all failed to achieve anything resembling the progress of the EU. ASEAN is the most advanced of these efforts and regularly sends delegations to Brussels to seek ideas from the EU experience; however, ASEAN remains a strictly inter-governmental body and there is no indication of interest in sovereignty sharing. It is a similar story elsewhere: no other regional body is anywhere near the EU in terms of political or economic cooperation, let alone integration. Indeed, no other grouping has even gotten to first base in terms of the basic requirements of integration, namely dealing with historical reconciliation and developing the necessary political will. There have been innumerable declarations from groupings in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central America about the desirability of closer cooperation and even integration, but the record shows that the rhetoric has not been matched by action. Although the EU is also guilty of exaggerated rhetoric, it has steadily moved forward—even if on occasion it seems to take two steps forward, one step back. As the EU's experience demonstrates, historical reconciliation is a critical element in developing the necessary political will for cooperation and, ultimately, integration. The fundamental basis for the success of the EU is the historical reconciliation between France and Germany, achieved by years of sustained political effort from the leaders of both countries. In stark contrast, there has been no such effort in many other parts of the word where there are ambitions of regional integration. In East Asia, for example, there can be no integration without genuine reconciliation between Japan and China, and Japan and Korea. The East Asia experience is replicated elsewhere with unresolved problems and deep suspicions between, for example, Brazil and Argentina, India and Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. Only after historical reconciliation can countries proceed gradually along the various steps required to create a regional community such as a free trade area, a customs union, a single market, a single currency, a common passport area, and a common foreign policy. The State of the Union Compared to most other regions of the world, the EU is a haven of peace, prosperity, and security. Following the global economic crisis, however, there are several major challenges facing the EU that, if not tackled with urgency and determination, could threaten the entire European project. Namely, the EU has grown and integrated rapidly without commensurate strengthening of its political and economic institutions. The emerging gap between necessary coordination and institutional capacity in the EU suggests a lesson for other regional groupings if and when they arrive at later stages of the integration process. The first challenge is increased fiscal coordination amid a worsening economic outlook. The EU needs to cleanse the financial system and follow through on austerity measures introduced by almost all member states. The situation in late summer 2010 is less critical than it appeared in the spring, when many doomsayers were predicting the collapse of the euro and even suggesting the EU might break up. The major risk today is the continuing fragility of the economies of some eurozone member states such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and the possibility of renewed speculation in the financial markets. Although there are some positive signs of economic recovery in Europe, many economists continue to warn of a possible "double dip" recession and the likely impact of the ongoing problems of many European banks. While most passed the "stress tests" at the end of July 2010, there was broad agreement that these tests were not as strenuous as they could have been. The economic troubles of the past few years come amid major, secular shifts of wealth toward Asia. The EU's share of global GDP declined from 24 percent to 22 percent between 1990 and 2010. In addition to sluggish economic growth compared to emerging markets like Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the EU is losing competitiveness. The European labor force is aging and increasingly prefers leisure to work. There are insufficient resources devoted to innovation. The Lisbon Strategy that sought to make the EU the most competitive region in the world by 2010 was a conspicuous failure. The latest 2020 plan, with its similarly lofty ambitions, is likely to fare no better. Rising energy and commodity prices have a negative impact on growth in Europe. Going forward, it is difficult to see how Europe, with its largely immobile and aging population, can compete with the labor markets of Asia, which are unburdened by health or unemployment costs. The Asian development model not only poses challenges to the Anglo-Saxon capitalist model but also to the creation of a reformed, rules-based system of global governance. Few Asian nations are willing to accept EU and U.S. pressure on social, labor, and environmental issues, arguing that they would be disadvantaged at a critical stage in their development. The response of Europe to these troubling circumstances should be obvious: the eurozone will be safe only when discipline is matched by solidarity between the member states of the zone, a very serious challenge for the balance between Germany and the other eurozone countries. A single European voice is needed in all forums of global economic governance, including discussions on climate change and energy security. But this will not be easy to achieve given the continuing attachment most EU member states have to their own seats or shared constituencies in the international financial institutions. The Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009 also revealed the EU's weakness as an international actor. Though it reached a consensus and promoted climate change to the top of the global agenda, the EU was unable to assert itself at the most critical juncture. The second challenge is resolving the EU's long-standing identity crisis. Member states have never been able to agree on the finalité politique, making the European experiment a journey to an unknown destination. Academics have described the debate as one between widening and deepening. On the one hand, the EU has progressed from a customs union to a single market and a eurozone of currently sixteen (soon seventeen) countries; on the other hand, it has gradually extended its membership from six to twenty-seven countries—with more to join—covering almost the whole continent. The EU, however, has proved unable to strengthen its political institutions at a pace and with a depth consistent with the needs of its integration, as well as the number and heterogeneity of its membership. Faced with widespread public skepticism about the EU, European capitals remain attached to national sovereignty and reluctant to give great powers to Brussels. Furthermore, France and Germany remain divided on the issue of economic governance, and questions linger over the EU's final eastern borders. Many hoped that the Lisbon Treaty would provide the impetus for a further deepening of the EU, but the long struggle to achieve ratification of the treaty and the shattering impact of the financial crisis has revealed little appetite for further institutional changes. As noted above, there is little public appetite for "more Europe," and national politicians seem increasingly reluctant to make the case for a strong EU. Germany is the most noticeable example—previously the strongest champion of closer integration, it has moved into the skeptic camp mainly due to public doubts about the euro, reflected also in judgments of the supreme court. There are, however, some experts and politicians, such as Nicolas Sarkozy, president of France, and Guy Verhofstad, the former Belgian prime minister and current leader of the Liberals in the European Parliament, who argue that the best response to the crisis is indeed a radical step forward toward a form of economic governance in Europe. They believe that the EU is severely handicapped by the eurozone's weak central institutions and the insufficient regulation of its financial and energy markets. Unfortunately, Sarkozy and Verhofstad's recommendations have met with a lukewarm response from Germany and other member states. Validity of the EU Model There is little doubt that the recent crisis has affected the EU as a model for regional integration, but the fallout will be temporary. Historically, the EU has rebounded from previous crises and often leveraged adversity to move to the next stage of integration: the failed plan for a European defense community in 1954 led to the creation of the European Economic Community three years later; the empty chair crisis of 1965 led to de facto acceptance of QMV and later de jure acceptance as a result of the 1986 Single European Act; the currency tribulations of the 1980s led to the European Monetary System and ultimately the euro; and the collapse of communism in Europe led to agreement on establishing a common foreign and security policy and the widest enlargement in the EU's history. With regional blocs dominating the globalized economic and financial system, EU member states acting alone will be unable to achieve the results that could be gained through a 500-million-strong bloc. Already the United States is pressing for a reduced number of EU seats in the Group of 20 (G20) and global financial institutions. Over time these changes are likely to give a further impulse to the integration process. Meanwhile, a "multi-speed Europe" is inevitable for the foreseeable future, with a strengthened eurozone increasing the gap between the EU's hard core and its outer periphery. How do other regions view the EU post-crisis? While there has been some unfavorable media attention, governments and other regional bodies have retained faith in the union. Significantly, neither China nor Russia attempted to sell their substantial holdings of euros. Between April and August 2010, the euro fell from over $1.40 to $1.15 before recovering to settle above $1.30. To most European exporters this is a reasonable exchange rate—at $1.50 they were finding it difficult to sell abroad. The EU's problems did not affect the plans of other regional groupings to move forward with cooperation. ASEAN, for example, went ahead with proposals to establish an ambassadorial steering committee, similar to the one in Brussels, which is known as Coreper. Japan, China, and Korea have intensified their trilateral ministerial meetings with a view to establishing closer East Asian cooperation. While the GCC has postponed plans for monetary cooperation, this decision resulted more from regional rivalries than any knock-on effect from the problems of the eurozone. What are the lessons for other regional integration efforts? There is much that can be learned from the EU and its responses to various crises, including that of spring 2010. At the same time, the EU is a sui generis organization and how its members deal with a crisis may not be relevant to other less-advanced groupings. For example, if one were to take monetary union as an objective, then it would seem clear in hindsight that a more integrated political and economic structure would be necessary to monitor public debt and help prevent speculation. But no other grouping is anywhere close to a customs union or single market, let alone a common currency. Integration is a difficult process and there will invariably be setbacks and crises. Nevertheless, in the EU case, the Cassandras are nearly always proven wrong. The EU has an excellent record of recovering from crises and moving ahead even stronger than before due to firm political will. The resounding lesson of the EU model, then, is the necessity of genuine investment by member states in the goal of regional integration. While not always politically expedient, national governments would be wise to put the long-term goal of cooperation above more immediate domestic priorities. More importantly, if integration is to succeed, governments and publics should believe that it is in their vital national interest. Without such commitment, regional groupings will crumble at the first bump in the long road to integration.
  • European Union
    The Potential Twilight of the European Union
    This essay assesses the causes and consequences of the renationalization of politics in the European Union. Editor's Note: This essay is part of the collection Crisis in the Eurozone. Introduction The European Union's (EU) trillion-dollar loan package succeeded in quelling the financial maelstrom spawned by Greek debt. Nonetheless, the financial crisis has taken a painful toll on many EU members, and high national debts and the uncertain health of the continent's banks may mean more trouble ahead. Although these economic woes have of late captured the headlines, they pale in comparison with a more serious malady: Europe's historic experiment in political union is faltering. As the poisonous politics that delayed the EU's rescue of the eurozone revealed, Europe is experiencing a renationalization of political life. The project of European integration, which has steadily advanced since the bitter years after World War II, has been thrown into reverse as its members claw back from the union the traditional powers of national sovereignty. And the causes run much deeper than the ongoing financial crisis, suggesting they are here to stay. Generational change, a backlash against globalization, and the absence of a compelling vision of Europe's place in the world may well mean that the European Union is running out of steam. The EU's uncertain future has enormous stakes for Americans as well as Europeans. Europe remains the United States' go-to partner on every front—from stewardship of the global economy to curbing global warming to bringing stability to Afghanistan. With U.S. debt soaring and Americans tiring of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington could certainly use a collective EU capable of shouldering greater global burdens. Instead, the renationalization of the EU threatens to consign its twenty-seven individual member states to geopolitical irrelevance. The recent backsliding, if it continues, has the potential to compromise one of the most significant and unlikely accomplishments of the twentieth century—an integrated Europe at peace with itself, seeking to project power as a cohesive whole. The Comeback of the Nation Germany has been the economic and political engine behind European integration, motivated by its obsession with banishing the national rivalries that long subjected Europe to great power war. But Berlin's recent reluctance to come to the rescue of Greece—Chancellor Angela Merkel resisted the bailout for months—constituted a breach of the spirit of common welfare that is the hallmark of a collective Europe. Only after the Greek crisis threatened to engulf the eurozone did Merkel override strong popular opposition and approve the loan. Voters in local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia promptly punished her party for doing so, delivering the Christian Democrats their most severe defeat in the postwar era. Such stinginess on economic matters is only the tip of the iceberg. The bigger problem is that German enthusiasm for the EU seems to be fast disappearing. In one of the few signs of life in the European project, member states last December embraced the Lisbon Treaty, endowing the union with a new presidential post, a foreign policy czar, and its own diplomatic service. But Berlin then played a leading role in selecting as the EU's new president and foreign policy chief Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton—two low-profile individuals who would pose little threat to the visibility and authority of national leaders. Even the courts are putting the brakes on the power of EU institutions. Last year, the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling strengthening the sway of the national parliament over EU legislation. As Der Spiegel commented, the ruling "threatens future steps toward European integration." This renationalization of politics has been occurring across the EU. A stark sign of trouble on the horizon came in 2005, when Dutch and French voters rejected the European Constitutional Treaty, which would have consolidated the EU's legal and political character. The Lisbon Treaty, a watered-down version, was then rejected by the Irish in 2008. The Irish changed their minds in 2009, but only after ensuring that the treaty would not jeopardize national control of taxation and military neutrality. British voters in May brought to power a coalition dominated by the Conservative Party, which is well known for its Europhobia. Although constrained by their partnership with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives last year showed their true colors by withdrawing from the European People's Party—the main center-right bloc in the European Parliament—to join a far-right bloc that is a bastion of antipathy toward the EU. Meanwhile, right-wing populism is on the upswing in many EU member states. It is the product primarily of a backlash against immigration (particularly of Muslims), not against European integration. Nevertheless, this hard-edged nationalism aims not only at minorities but also at the loss of autonomy that accompanies political union. Hungary's Jobbik Party, which borders on xenophobic, won forty-seven seats in elections earlier this year—up from zero in 2006. Even in the historically tolerant Netherlands, the far-right Party of Freedom recently won over 15 percent of the vote, giving it only seven fewer seats than the leading party. If these obstacles to a stable union were not sobering enough, in July the EU's presidency rotated to Belgium—a country whose Dutch-speaking Flemish citizens and French-speaking Walloons are so divided that, long after elections in June, a workable governing coalition has yet to emerge. It speaks volumes that the country now guiding the European project suffers exactly the kind of nationalist antagonism that the EU was created to eliminate. The Causes of Renationalization This striking renationalization of European politics is the product first and foremost of generational change. For Europeans who came of age during World War II or the Cold War, the EU enjoys a sacred status; it is Europe's escape from its bloody past. Not so for younger Europeans, who have no past from which they seek escape. A recent poll revealed that French citizens over fifty-five are twice as likely to see the EU as a guarantee of peace as those under thirty-six. Whereas new European leaders tend to assess the value of the EU through a cold calculation of costs and benefits, their predecessors viewed the European project as an article of faith. It is no surprise that matters of European integration no longer animate national politics as they used to. Meanwhile, the competitive demands of the global marketplace, coupled with the financial crisis, are putting severe strains on Europe's comfortable welfare state. As EU members struggle to bring down mountainous debt, retirement ages are rising and benefits dwindling. Although European integration does more to improve than impede economic performance, the EU is often the scapegoat for economic hardship. In France, for example, anti-Europe campaigns have focused their ire on the EU's "Anglo-Saxon" assault on social welfare and on the "Polish plumber" who takes local jobs due to the EU's open labor market. Finally, the EU's rapid enlargement to the east and south has further sapped it of life. Absent the cozy and familiar feel the smaller union had before the Berlin Wall fell, its original members in Western Europe have turned inward. And the new members from Central Europe, who have enjoyed full sovereignty only since the collapse of communism, are none too keen to give it away again—even to consensual institutions in Brussels rather than autocratic ones in Moscow. As Poland's late president Lech Kaczynski asserted soon after taking office in 2005, "What interests the Poles is the future of Poland and not that of the EU." A cautious weariness also stems from European participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, missions for which popular support has been sparse. In Germany, roughly two-thirds of the public opposes the presence of German troops in Afghanistan, and the Dutch have already withdrawn their troops. Such widespread aversion to far-flung commitments rests uneasily with the Lisbon Treaty, which is intended in part to give the EU more geopolitical heft. Indeed, projecting Europe's voice on the global stage is one of the union's raisons d'être. But this vision has no constituency; wars in distant lands, coupled with plunging defense expenditures stemming from the economic downturn, are tempering the European appetite for greater geopolitical responsibility. After all, member states have never shown much enthusiasm for extending the EU's authority over security issues, instead jealously guarding their sovereignty on matters of defense. Buying Time The EU has thus far reacted to this stunning loss of momentum by entering a holding pattern. As a leading member of the European Parliament recently explained, "The EU is now just trying to keep the machine going. The hope is to buy enough time for new leaders to emerge who will reclaim the project." Buying time may be the best the EU can do for now, but its slide is poised to continue, with costs even for those outside Europe. The Obama administration has already expressed frustration with an EU whose geopolitical profile is waning. As Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates complained in February 2010 to a gathering of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials, "The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the twentieth century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the twenty-first." As the United States tries to dig itself out of debt and give its armed forces a breather, it will increasingly judge its allies by what they bring to the table. In Europe's case, the offering is small and shrinking. When other unions stumbled, they suffered bloodshed. The United States enjoyed over seven decades of prosperous federation after 1789, only to descend into civil war in 1861. Yugoslavia suffered a similar fate in the 1990s—and is now gone for good. Europe is hardly headed back to war; its nations have lost their taste for armed rivalries. Instead, less dramatically but no less definitively, European politics will become less European and more national, until the EU becomes a union in name only. This may seem no great loss to some, but in a world that sorely needs the EU's aggregate will, wealth, and muscle, a fragmented and introverted Europe would constitute a historical setback. Six decades ago, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Konrad Adenauer were Europe's founding fathers. Today, the EU needs a new generation of leaders who can breathe life into a project that is perilously close to expiring. For now, they are nowhere to be found.
  • Economic Crises
    Fostering Economic Recovery: The EU Moves from Crisis Management to Reform
    Play
    MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to welcome you all here this evening for a very privileged evening with Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission. And I'd like to welcome you, Mr. President, and also, Mrs. Barroso, and members of your team who are here with you in a very busy week. If I may, I will just remind you the technical aspects of tonight, which is please turn off your cell phones is the first requirement. And the second requirement, which normally is, is to tell you that this meeting would be off the record. But, in fact, tonight, it is on the record. And the framework of the evening will be that we'll ask the president to speak, and we will have, then, a short conversation. And then it'll be open for questions from all of you in relation to the subject tonight of the president, which is stabilize, consolidate, reform E.U. moves from crisis management to reform agenda. And we all very much look forward to hearing from you, Mr. President, on this very important subject not just for Europe but for the world. I think many of you know something of the background of the president which is, indeed, distinguished both as a scholar and as a politician. His work and scholarship includes his starting his career in Portugal and then working at the University of Geneva, then spending some time as a visiting professor at the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. And, subsequently, he became head of the international relations department at Lusiada University in Lisbon and the founder of the University Association of European Studies. But then politics attracted him. And in 1980, he entered that field in the Belgian political scene in the Social Democratic Party. He was elected three times. And in April 2002, he was elected prime minister of Portugal. July 2004, elected president of the European Commission which he is now serving his second five-year term. He holds many honorary degrees and honors of which I shall not, if you don't mind, repeat this evening. But take it that he is well recognized in the international community. His coming here tonight is deeply appreciated by us because it is a very important time, I think, for all of us as we look at the global economy. And to have the leader of Europe come to speak to us gives us an opportunity not only to learn about what is going on in the countries that he represents and speaks for but also to look at our own situation within the context of global economic and political development. So if I may, Mr. President, I would like to call on you immediately so that they don't have to listen to me. And then when you're finished, we'll have a short conversation and we'll open it for questions. President Barroso? (Applause.) EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSE MANUEL BARROSO: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you very much -- (inaudible) -- someone Ivery much admire and respect for the kind words of introduction. Let me start by thanking you for inviting me to speak today. In fact, I came several times to the Council on Foreign Relations, and when I last spoke to you, you were still showing the full force of the financial and economic storm. Certainly, the European economy was then in deep trouble. It had, so far, the most severe stress tests imaginable. And there was a climate of fear. People were worried about their pensions. Companies could not get credit. If they had capital, they could not risk the investment. Business dropped because no one knew of the future health. The storm damage is still all around us. More than 6.3 million Europeans have lost their jobs since 2008. Many families have been pushed towards the poverty line. European Union member states have seen their deficits rise to 7 percent of GDP on average, and debt ratios rise to more than 80 percent of GDP. Many doubt Europeans' determination to respond. Many doubt our capacity to act. I think I can say they were wrong. The nations of Europe looked for answers, and they found them in European Union. We are the overcoming difficulties together. The economic outlook in European Union is now better than when I last addressed you, not least because of our giant action. The recovery is gathering pace, although, admittedly, progress is uneven within the Union. Growth this year will be higher than initially forecast. The unemployment rate is similar to the U.S. rate, and while it is still much too high, it has at least stopped increasing. A degree of cautious optimism has taken root, but we cannot sit back and relax yet. It is too early to write the epitaph of what some call the "Great Recession." Uncertainties and risks remain outside as well as inside the European Union. The after-pains of the crisis are likely to remain with us for quite some time. So to consolidate the progress we have made, it is now vital that Europe moves from crisis management to reform agenda. Budgetary expansion has played its role in countering decline in economic activity. Now, in the context of an accommodating monetary stance, only significant steps to reforms will prevent medium-term growth prospects from being disappointing. The priorities of the to-do list of Europe economic policy making are: completing financial regulatory reform, continued fiscal consolidation and tackling macroeconomic imbalances by frontloading structure reforms. That's quite a challenge. But as I look at how this crisis has changed Europe, there are plenty of reasons to believe we will succeed. First, extremely difficult but necessary and unavoidable decisions have already been implemented at the national level. Greece is the obvious example. But 10 other member states have also embarked on a path of convincing structural reform and fiscal consolidation. Second, there is striking concensus about the way forward forged in a large part by the need to develop a common European position for the G-20. European Commission has been putting forth proposals that have received overall support among our 27 member states. Traditional policy divides between key member states have narrowed considerably. There is now a broad commitment to a balanced exit strategy and a return to fiscal sustainability, particularly as demographic challenges start to bind. Member states agree that fiscal consolidation should involve expenditure cuts, if necessary, that are enforced by tax increases. They also agree that priority should be given to growth-friendly budget items. The third reason for confidence is that the traditional architecture of Europe will be substantially stronger as we exit the crisis. The reform system of fiscal rules, a new system to tackle macroeconomic imbalances and European systemic risk board will help to make the -- (inaudible) -- work more effective. With better enforcement of rules and earlier warning of problems comes greater treatability. In fact, just yesterday, the European parliament gave its final approval to the supervisory package that the commission had put forward last year. Up until now, our market was interdependent but oversight was purely national. From 2011 on, Europe will be the first region in the world to have in place top-notch supervision that is up to the challenges of the future. Moreover, financial facilities which were created to respond to the Euro crisis which amount to 500 billion Euros have put a major hole in Europe's economic and monetary union. And this opened the possibility of developing a more permanent solution. And the adoption of the so-called European semester, which concentrates in one semester the bulk of economic purveyance of the European Union will encourage greater coordination, economic transparency between member states as they plan, discuss and adopt their national budgets. So it will be even before they present budgets to their respective parliaments and then decide of collective and monetary. Taken together, all this represents quite a leap forward for European economic governance. Mechanisms to combine European-led economic reform programs with European financial solidarity have been created which were simply inconceivable before the crisis. Two or three years ago, if you asked me is this possible, I would say not in the forseeable future. In fact, it was probably the greatest driver for accepting reforms that were simply not possible some time ago. So these are historical times for Europe, but they will also have an important impact on global financial markets. In parallel, we are now frontloading growth enhancing structural reforms through a strategy we decided to call Europe 2020, a program to guide our economy towards new sources of growth and social cohesion in order to achieve smart, sustainable -- (inaudible) -- growth. Business is at the heart of this strategy, small and medium enterprises in particular, which is not surprising. Defined as companies employing one to 250 people, SMEs represent more than 99 percent of all the European firms and provide two out of every three private-sector jobs. Getting credit flowing again, investing in innovation and attacking red tape are priorities here. Another priority is Europe's international market. This is a well-developed web of financial and economic relations, but there are still some missing links and bottlenecks acting as a drag on growth and entrepreneurship. We are now mapping all of them out. We will come with an emerging new package of measures. This is necessary because, since 1992, the date of its launching the internal market, like our societies, have changed beyond all recognition. Back then, few people had mobile phones. Even fewer had heard of the Internet. E-commerce had not been invented. Now, we are truly a service economy. The internal market makes itss presence felt in all sectors of the economy, and this is boosting competitiveness across the board with a new push because it is the strongest driver for growth that Europe has. There is no time to lose. So this fall, we will bring forward a single market act that we will be presenting -- (inaudible) -- of measures that stimulate growth. Flanking these priorities are a whole range of measures that add up to a comprehensive reform and modernization program at all levels of government. At the European level, we are launching a number of flagship initiatives. Examples include the digital agenda to create the right environment and infrastructure for emerging high-tech sectors and innovation -- (inaudible) -- improve Europe's innovation performance along the whole chain from research to retail, and industrial policy for the organization era that recognizes the new realities of cross-border production and a jobs and skills agenda. Finally, trade remains an important engine for growth and also for jobs. And trade is very important, also -- (inaudible) -- innovation competitiveness. So a renewed trade policy is also in the pipeline, and we will present our proposals in October. We will open up more markets for Europe and more job opportunities in Europe through new and better free-trade agreements with all corners of the globe. Just now, we have concluded the trade agreement with South Korea. We will open more markets by joining our regulatory rules with our key partners so that we do not have different energy-efficiency or -- (inaudible) -- sanitary standards. And European goods do not sit at foreign ports waiting for extra security clearance. Of course, all these would have been greatly facilitated had there been an agreement on the Doha Trade Round already. So we'll maintain momentum for a successful conclusion. In European Union alone, an agreement will boost GDP by around $40 billion. Trade also has huge potential as a means to enforce a transatlantic partnership -- (inaudible) -- that are quite impressive. European Union and the United States account for the largest trade relationship in the world with 33 percent of world trading goods, 44 percent in services. Transatlantic trade and investment is responsible for 14 million jobs in Europe and America. And I will further discuss these matters together with the president of the European Council, with President Obama in the next European Union-U.S. summit which will take place in Lisbon on the 20th of November. Ladies and gentlemen, I have sketched out the briefest of outlines describing how Europe is moving from crisis management to reform agenda. I could summarize all of this even further with just three words: stabilize, consolidate, reform. But now it is time for others to have their say, so I'd like to discuss these matters with you. These were just some words of introduction. Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause.) MODERATOR: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President, for those very incisive comments. I wonder if I could take you a little bit outside the U.S. and Europe for a moment to direct your attention to a challenge that I know you are well-informed about and, perhaps, can tell us a little bit about, which is how do you see the future with China, with India, with Asia as affecting both the growth of Europe and, indeed, the growth of our country? BARROSO: (Inaudible) -- has been and I hope it will continue to be positive engagement. China and India are the biggest countries in the world in population terms, so it's only natural that they have a bigger share of the world output. What was interesting was why was not that possible before regarding China. And where China's -- (inaudible) -- policy of opening -- in fact, they were benefitting a lot from this opening, and they are, I think, I can say, among at least the key partners, the great beneficiaries of globalization. And as we say to them very often -- and I've been discussing these matters -- (inaudible) -- with the Chinese leadership for many years now, if they are the biggest beneficiaries of this process, they also can contribute more for its success because the reality is -- and, of course, we have to be open and frank about this -- there are some concerns in other parts of the world about what is the consequence of this rise of China. So the point is to make it a win-win situation. And I think the Chinese leadership is perfectly aware of this issue. The leadership is extremely well informed and prepared. And now it's always a question of negotiation. We have -- (inaudible) -- negotiated with the Chinese, as you know very well yourself. And -- but making it as open a situation and expecting not -- I don't think we can expect a kind of a sudden change, but from a gradual point of view, some improvement in the situation. So we tried to engage positively with China and we've, so far, been urging -- (inaudible) -- market not only in Asia. Brazil is a very important case in point, by the way. We have established now what we call strategic partnerships with those countries. And we think, of course it is important to work with them for -- as much as possible a global system of openness, and a system of openness means, as we say very often, open economies need rules so that, as much as possible, you have a cooperative, coordinated approach. That was -- (inaudible) -- the instinct or the intuition behind the G-20. The G-20 -- (inaudible). Of course, there are some successes about it, but I believe that -- (inaudible) -- at least it was possible to have a cooperative approach instead of a crisis and not just a confrontational approach. MODERATOR: And when we talk -- and I should, perhaps, have asked this first -- not just about the competition about China -- we need to be thinking about how strong is Europe today. And in May, authorities, together with the IMF, put together a thousand-billion-dollar fund essentially for backing up Europe in terms of difficulty. And there were a number of countries that were seen as vulnerable. Your remarks were very positive, I thought, in terms of your own assessment of the economic outlook. Do you think we're through the problems of the so-called pigs of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain? Is this something that we can forget about, or just move forward? BARROSO: Yes. I thought, from the beginning, that all this language and this analogy assessments regarding the difficulties of Europe -- (inaudible) -- taken together, your area, as a -- (inaudible) -- lower than American are much lower than the Japanese model. Overall, there is a position of balance. And the Euro has been a great success for Europe. So all this talk about the instability of the Euro -- in fact, if you ask most people who think the Euro is too high, they will not mind if the Euro will be lower because -- now, the point is -- and this is new -- that in Euro area, we have now 16, very soon 17 countries -- one of them will join. There are -- (Inaudible) -- and so what happened was, in fact, that the markets started to discriminate against, in terms of sovereign debt, of some weaker members of Euro. And you've mentioned that. And that's why now we are acting and we have established this fund. From the European Union, only 500 billion Euros. The IMF said that they are -- (inaudible) -- 250, so we can make $1 trillion. It was not just talk. I'm saying that because, frankly, sometimes people are -- outside of Europe, they underestimate, from my point of view -- including some analysts in the market -- they underestimate the interdependence of the European economy and the absolute need for them to act together. I was working on this matter night and day during the worst moment, most difficult moment, and I never had a doubt that, at the end, we would establish the program for Greece and, also, to -- (inaudible) -- because I knew perfectly well what Angela Merkel thinks about it, and all the others despite of all the politics involved. So this is a necessary move we want to convey to you here, our friends -- (inaudible) -- from the United States. I think the Euro is a strong currency and is there to stay and to be reinforced. Now, there are, as you said -- and I'm very -- (inaudible) -- and that's why some of those most vulnerable situations are now facing it. Greece, I have mentioned, took a very important, draconian program, which is now the Greek expression -- draconian program. Other countries like Spain and Portugal are taking those measures as well. Ireland, a case in point. And so I believe we are going to overcome those difficulties and, in fact, all the system is working for that. And the fact that they are in the Euro area is a driver for it because there is some kind of discipline that is now reinforced by the Euro and, also, by the markets. MODERATOR: And we here should overlook the comments that are made about the excessive strength of Germany and the occasional statement by the president of France that maybe the balance is not there to keep Europe cohesive? That's behind us, is it? BARROSO: No, I think it's very good that Germany is strong because Germany is, in fact, the engine of the European economy. And it is -- if Germany was not so strong, there we could have a problem regarding the Euro because the last argument of protection of the Euro is, in fact, also German. And so until recently, I think it was the number-one export in the world alone, which is amazing, a country, as I mentioned, of Germany. The European Union, taken together, is still the number-one exporter in the world. Now China has come up. And so the -- (inaudible) -- is not the export sector of Germany but, also, the culture, the financial culture of Germany, I think, is a great effort not only for Germany but for Europe. And Germany's the number-one client or investor of almost all the other countries in Europe. People should not forget that. So usually, if Germany goes well, that's a signal that others can join in if they are not yet there. It's always the first or the second importer of almost all, if not all the other 26 member states of European Union. So it's -- (inaudible) -- that Germany is doing well. But, of course, as your question suggests, we have a very high benchmark. So when you compare, of course, the performance of other countries while, in other parts of the world, the comparison is not so high as Germany. It makes, of course, things more difficult for other governments, but systemically, it's good that Germany is now having such a successful performance. MODERATOR: In our country, Mr. President, a number of people are saying that we have grown up thinking of the relationships between the United States, Europe and Japan. And people of my generation typically only thought of that -- the billion people that had 80 percent of the world's GDP. Today, as we look out for the next 40 years, we're going to have another two and a half billion people on the planet with less than 100 million going to European and American countries. We're going to see a swing of the middle class significantly towards Asia, but there are going to be a lot of countries left behind. Is Europe concerned about the great differences between the standard of living in the United States and Europe and, at the other end, 2 billion people in Africa that will have maybe standards of living that are 4 (percent) or 5 percent of what it is we have in the West? To what extent is Europe thinking about these markets and these people? BARROSO: We are more than ever now. I can't tell you now. I can make the comparison with situations sometime before. I remember six years ago when I was elected the first time for the European Commission, there was a discussion in European -- (inaudible) -- where all the emphasis -- (inaudible) -- was the commission president. And the discussion was only about the internal issues. This time, five years afterward, the top subject in the discussion, I would say more than 50 percent was China. MODERATOR: Really? BARROSO: So people are completely aware of the new geoeconomic and geopolitical factors. Having said this, we believe it's better to engage and try to make this as cooperative and positive sum game. Africa is mentioned. Africa is another kind of issue, of course. The links with Africa and Europe are extremely strong because post-colonial -- (inaudible) -- links and we tried to do our best with that region. Just now, I came here for the MDG also where I announced -- (inaudible) -- our support for the MDG and our most important partners in cooperation are the African countries and so-called NCP (ph) -- (inaudible) -- countries. And so we are aware of this. In Europe, I want to be very frank with you. In Europe today, there is gloomy -- it's fashionable to be pessimistic. This probably is not so very different. I call it the intellectual -- (inaudible) -- of pessimism. Someone wants to pretend it's intelligence, it should be more pessimism than the other because that -- (inaudible). I do not agree. I simply do not agree with that -- (inaudible). I believe Europe has the intellectual, critical resources to overcome the difficulty. I think the rise of others is not necessarily our crisis. I mean -- and very often, I think about the United States and Europe after the Second World War when the United States -- (inaudible) -- great vision. Europe was destroyed and they -- (inaudible) -- in Europe. And the rise of Europe afterward, great moment was not -- (inaudible) -- the United States. So I mean, the rise of Africa -- in fact, there are hundreds of people in Africa -- I don't think that. On the contrary. I think it can be a great opportunity. So that's why we are very committed to keep markets open, to work with those emerging countries, also, to respect intellectual property rules, procurement rules, to establish, as much as possible, some common standards. But that is our vision. Some will say it's idealistic -- (inaudible) -- will be realistic. So, probably, but it worked. So I think it is our enlightened self-interest, to work with those emerging markets, of course, trying to keep, as much as possible, our common values. Now, if you think about the United States where the United States are looking, I hope the United States will not forget Europe and Europe will not forget the United States because we have a very deep bond, not only economically. Still, the most important economic relationship in the world -- (inaudible) -- trading investment, relations between United States and Europe. And those in the business community really want as much as possible to keep a real transatlantic economic market, and I think we should do for that for a kind of agenda for growth and job both sides of Atlantic. But it's much more than that. It's what happens between Europe and United States -- some people say old-fashioned to speak about it, but I will speak -- (inaudible). Today, President Obama, in a very, I think, inspired speech about trying to -- not only the issue of Middle East, but he was speaking about liberty and freedom and that we should not forget about it. And he invited those that remember when their countries were not democracies not to forget to fight for democracy. I think we should remember, and I think we should keep this kind of special relationship. MODERATOR: Well, I think we certainly welcome it, and I know that my colleagues will, no doubt, have many questions. I could keep on this bilateral conversation, but I'll never be asked to chair a meeting again. (Laughter.) So may I call on the audience? Yes, sir? If you could give your name for the president, it might be helpful. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Bill Drozdiak, president of the American Council on Germany. Mr. President, I wonder if you could explain to us why it is so difficult for NATO and the European Union to work more effectively together. I mean, here you have the two principle institutions of the West based in the same city, facing many of the same problems these days as economic issues blend into security issues and now facing the challenge of Asia. Wouldn't it be a practical and sensible step to find a way to bring these two institutions much more closely together in order to solidify the transatlantic link in dealing with the modern-day problems and, also, take advantage of the fact that there are 22 countries that are now members of both institutions? BARROSO: We are in favor of this, and we are working for this. In fact, what you can -- (inaudible) -- just some days ago, it was another conclusion, and there is a -- Cathy Ashton, the high representative, she received a mandate to work, and the secretary is already working -- the secretary general of NATO has listened. And they are doing it. But you certainly are aware of what is the difficulty with -- diplomatici difficulty that has nothing to do with Turkey and Cyprus; Cyprus, a member of the European Union and Turkey a member of NATO. And that is the real -- going to be -- and diplomatic, but that's the real difficulty sometimes. I remember well, I worked for a minister of my country for some time, and we have some difficulties because there are all kinds of procedural obstacles to any kind of establishment of a more pragmatic partnership between NATO and European Union. But the European Union aside, the commission, we are extremely open to it and, in fact, we are already working because now, as you know, the new concept of defense is more and more comprehensive. It's not just about military power, it's about humanitarian aid, it's about state building, about justice, training police. In the commission, we are funding many, many programs where, by the way, our people sometimes are running the risk of their -- (inaudible) -- because we could get -- achieve the proper protocol with NATO. And the reason was because of those diplomatic difficulties among some members of -- I mean, let's say two members of either the European Union or NATO. It will be good if they could overcome this difficulty because of what is -- it's basically a bilateral issue that is putting difficulty in the cooperation -- (inaudible) -- cooperation between NATO and European Union. MODERATOR: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Various European countries -- Germany in the lead -- are cracking down on massive tax cheating, much of which is affected through the secret bank accounts and offshore financial centers such as Lichtenstein. The OECD effort has failed to significantly change the system. Do you have a strategy for dealing with the global offshore system that facilitates not only massive tax cheating but corporate corruption, bribery, the movement of terrorist money and money of organized crime throughout the world? BARROSO: Yes. Very important point. In fact, that's one of the issues that the G-20 should look at. And we are -- (inaudible) -- trying to go on with that fight against this kind of activity in Europe and some of our partners because of some laws of banks security that, in fact, make it easier, this kind of behavior. And we are doing it, also, in a bilateral context with those countries. Myself has been discussing with some of our partners, European partners and non-members of the European Union. But it will be important where it's not only OECD but also globally. And so far, it has been a difficult issue. It's been a difficult issue. Some of our partners are not reacting very positively with the idea of having, as much as possible, a lateral playing field globally in that matter. But, of course, we will keep our negotiation effort on the table. MODERATOR: Yes, ma'am? QUESTIONER: (Inaudible). Mr. President, one of the big differences between the U.S. and the E.U. is the strength of small businesses and the ease with which people can start companies in the U.S. And you mentioned in your speech the importance of small and medium businesses in the European economy. What would it take for Europe to make it easy for entrepreneurs to start their companies, to make money and to grow so that Europe becomes competitive on that level with the U.S.? BARROSO: That's definitely one of the issues that we have been looking at, namely, in our -- (inaudible) -- with American -- (inaudible) -- a great influence in Europe. Many countries in Europe now adopted programs of simplification. It's now possible, in many of our member states, to create a company -- (inaudible) -- hours to be -- (inaudible). It is, in fact, a great -- (inaudible). There was benchmarks, and there was some kind of looking at best practices. And now, it's much simpler to create -- (inaudible) -- point of view. The huge bureaucracy of the past has been eliminated. The real problem -- the real difficulty in my point of view of the United States -- (inaudible) -- financing. Venture capital in Europe is not as evolved as in the United States. And let's be awful frank about this, the entrepreneurship culture here is different because of -- (inaudible) -- capital factors, cultural factors, the way the state, the public financing. So there are several cultural factors as well that makes the life of a company in Europe a little -- entrepreneurship in Europe different from the United States. Sometimes it's not just about to create an enterprise; it's about to put an end to it when it's no longer profitable or no longer adequate. And precisely, one of the points I was mentioning this in my introductory remarks was about reforms. And this is one of the reforms we are trying to achieve. Some member states are now appreciating ambitious reforms for simplification -- conditions but, also, the labor-market reform. (Inaudible) -- flexibility of their economic -- (inaudible) -- and there, the American -- (inaudible) -- can be -- (inaudible) -- of course, having in mind that we have, in some areas, difference. In Europe, we have -- (inaudible) -- what we call social-market economy. And that comes from Germany because, after the Second World War, social -- (inaudible) -- with the idea that we want a dynamic market, but we want relatively high levels of social inclusion. We also think it is relatively strong compared to the United States. So and this is -- Europeans want to keep it. So I have to be clear about it. If you go to Europe to propose so-called American model, it will not work. Politically, it will not work. There is not support for this. But if you go to Europe and say, look, we have to -- (inaudible) -- the Americans and others in terms of cultural entrepreneurship -- (inaudible) -- some of the best -- (inaudible) -- interactive relation, simplification of -- (inaudible) -- then people are receptive. And, therefore, that is the line we are following in the commission. So to modernize our social market economy without making a revolution but making a reform. MODERATOR: The gentleman here? I guess not. It's a lady. Madame? QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. -- (inaudible). My name is Catherine Hagan (ph) and, Mr. President, I come from Geneva where I work on multi-state culture dialogue. And I'm here because of the MDG summit, but we are also very interested in trade and have been monitoring the activities at the WTO where the issues have been moving beyond the Doha Round to issues of food security, climate change, innovation. I was intrigued by your remark about a new trade proposal coming from the European Union, and I would like to know if you could share with us some of the thinking that is going into that proposal, not necessarily what will be coming out of that proposal because that's to be announced in October, as you said. But it would be very interesting to hear if you are reviving the Singapore proposals or whether there are other issues that have come into the floor and you're thinking about trade and how to take a new approach to this. BARROSO: Look, I cannot anticipate what they are going to propose. We have to first discuss it in the commission. In fact, we have been asked to come with some ideas, and that's what we are preparing. But I can give you the background -- political background of the proposal, why -- To be completely honest with you, in Europe and some of the member states, also a perception that sometimes we are too naive in trade matters. I think the same applies here in the United States sometimes. We open our markets, but we don't -- (inaudible) -- some of our partners, maybe in terms of the monetary experience to make a -- (inaudible) -- effort. And our companies that are in some other parts of the world, they are complaining to us very strongly. They feel discriminated, namely in terms of investment in terms of intellectual property rights and in other matters. And so what we are now trying to do is to reassure also the European public opinion that we'll pursue a trade policy that is more open and we will, at least the commission, will pull any, let's say inflation of protection. I think protection in itself -- (inaudible). Europe is the biggest supporter in the world. So it's quite obvious that it is's also fitting. But at the same time, the assurances to the Europeans, what they have to gain from this kind of open market and linking these issues, also, with our overall interest. And this is what -- political background. Now, political, let's say environment for our proposal that we are now preparing to -- (inaudible) -- so very soon you will be informed about it. But my -- (inaudible) -- is to get more support for open markets and expanding into other areas, not only trade on goods but also on services. Likewise, easier -- (inaudible) -- investment. I think this is very important. And the points you made are also very important. In fact, in European Union now, there is a great concern with many of our stakeholders and member states, and there's a considerable -- (inaudible) -- regarding, for instance, worker's rights regarding the norm of environment protection or fighting climate change. And this is very important and difficult debate because the point is we now have -- (inaudible) -- regulations, very ambitious -- (inaudible) -- to fight climate change. By the way -- (inaudible). It's 20, 20, 20, by 2030. So we have committed and it's in our law -- regulation -- to reduce greenhouse gas by 20 percent in 2020, 20 percent of energy should come from renewables, and 20 percent energy efficiency. And some of those -- (inaudible) -- say okay, but you are competing with others that don't do that. So how can we -- so that's why we have to give some assurances to those sectors -- (inaudible) -- energy sectors that they will not be the victims of this kind of regulation. And that's what we are working. And, in fact, we have some mechanisms for climate change program to avoid them putting in an uncompetitive position. And this is the kind of assurance we want, also, to give to our stakeholders in Europe, but the purpose should be to keep markets open and to open more markets. MODERATOR: Yes? QUESTIONER: This is Bernie Ferrari. I'm a management consultant. Mr. President, this morning in the FT in the front page, there was a discussion of Siemens' extraordinary agreement with its union workers of 150,000 for job security. Given your aspirations for European economic performance around the world, what is your reaction to that agreement? BARROSO: Look, it was exactly following my remark before when I said to you very honestly, I think, Europe is different from the United States in some aspects of economic culture. We are basically open economies and want to -- but this is typical of -- (inaudible) -- disagreement. But that's part of the social-market economy. And it's impressive to see that Germany, for instance -- not only Germany -- but in terms of the criss, the trade unions have accepted something that was impossible to have before in terms of reduction or freezing of their salaries. That was possible, also, because of the culture of compromise in -- (inaudible). So I'm not suggesting that that should be the model, but in that case, apparently, it's working, and so I hope it will work. But it depends. Other countries have a different culture of negotiation. Europe is very complex. We have 27 countries, sometimes very different in its relations. But this is one of the examples. We also have -- as you know, it was -- (inaudible) -- what we call flex security. So it means flexibility in terms of the labor relation but, at the same time, a very developed system of social guarantees -- (inaudible). And so in that case, people accept that enhanced flexibility so you can lose your job, but you are sure that, if you lose your job, you get, let's say, an important contribution from society for some time that you may stay unemployed. This is one of the issues that makes, sometimes, our system different from the American one. And I certainly think that it is important to move the assurances to our workers that they are taken care of because, in the Europen societies now, many people are angry. They have seen what happened coming from financial sector, and they are seeing now huge bonuses again. They are seeing -- I'm going to be very frank with you -- that some people are coming back to business as usual as if nothing had happened. And so the perception in many of our countries -- (inaudible) -- we tax payers, we have to save those banks, and now they are coming back to business as usual and we don't have any guarantees with the worker or with the -- (inaudible). And that's why I think some level of social consensus is extremely important; namely, in some countries where there was a tradition of, let's say, sometimes, social polarization or more conflicting industrial relations. Germany has that German tradition. And if it works for that company, it's a good thing. I wish them the best. MODERATOR: My goodness. Ambassador -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Mr. President, the European Union countries have made very drastic commitments at deficit reduction, fiscal consolidation. At the same time, in the United States, our government and many economists fear that too drastic fiscal consolidation risks a double-dip recession. And our Federal Reserve is engaged in major efforts to increase the money supply and expand and lower interest rates. Are we in danger of getting at cross-purposes here in the macroeconomic policy? BARROSO: We discussed this issue in the G-20 in Toronto. And, in fact, I think there was a real consensus that Europe should do exactly that. Before the G-20, there was some discussion. There was some cross -- let's say, analysis and assessment and sometimes trying to put it in context. But I will say I was in the G-20 and discussed this, also, there. And I think people understood the European position. I have no doubt that, for Europe, there is no other way to be completely -- (inaudible) -- now to those programs in Europe when we have both countries that are actually, I mean, vulnerable in terms of -- because that's the difference between us and the United States. I mean, you are one country. Europe is 27 countries. We are a union of states with some macro-integrated, some policies integrated, like in your area, monetary policy. But we have one monetary policy but, afterward, the budget may be national. And so for us, it's fundamental to restore confidence of the markets. And the confidence of the markets will not be there if we go on with this -- (inaudible) -- policy. This is -- (inaudible) -- here. (Inaudible), but next year, it will not be. And so -- and I think it will be, I repeat, massive for Europe to go for expansive policy at this moment. And nobody, I mean, in Europe is now proposing an incredible, at least -- (inaudible) -- possibility. Having said this, United States is in a different position. Also, the dollar has a different position in the global market. It's for the Americans -- up to them to decide which way. But, for Europe, we have no doubt that this is the way. Having said this, it's not just about this proposal. Actually, it's about structural reform. It's about being more selective. It's not just to look at the expenditure, the quantity but also the quality of the expenditure. It's possible -- we believe it's possible to have some growth-friendly measures of fiscal consolidation. That's what we are trying to do through fine tuning of the policies. But in Europe, I repeat, now if we don't do this -- (inaudible) -- will increase instability of the markets, and I don't think that's good for the United States. If Europe or the Euro starts now -- and that point was made by all of us at the G-20 very clearly, by myself and the heads of government of the European Union member states there and others. And then what it can do, for instance to stimulate demand is not by expansion -- (inaudible) -- reform. For instance, Germany, we are speaking -- (inaudible) -- very much. Germany, they have the potential for growth coming from a reform of their service sector. The service sector in Germany is, I mean, it's less competitive than others in Europe. You know, and that, by the way -- (inaudible) -- the Germans know that perfectly well, and their committed to do it. So there are other ways different from budgetary and stimulus to stimulate demand in Europe. MODERATOR: This lady is next. Go ahead. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett from the council. I want to come back to trade and to Africa. From the perspective of many African countries, the very policies that are in place at the E.U. to protect workers, to protect health, to deal with lower pesticide use, all those sorts of things are, in fact, keeping African agricultural products out of the European marketplace. And in particular, in the context of GM food restrictions and requirements for annotation of fertilizer use, pesticide use, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, seed derivative, everything -- how can you break this down so that the European feels they're eating a same tomato and the African feels they can grow large quantities of tomatoes and become rich selling them to Europeans? BARROSO: Look, first of all, European Union is, by far, the largest importer of agricultural products from developing countries. Europe imports more from the developing countries -- United States, Russia, Canada, Australia -- put together. So that idea that Europe is closed to agricultural products is simply not consumed by fact. Having said this, it's true that we have some reservations that are there because the European public wants us there that are relatively high levels of protection of consumers. And this is something that we discussed not only with Africa but in other parts of the world today. And what we tell our partners is that they should try to get their exports competitive with those conditions that are there not for protection, but because in the European society, people are simply not ready to lower their standards. The issue of GMO is an extremely difficult issue. I think that you are probably an expert on that. You have probably followed my -- and the commission's recent position. We - from one side, we want to respect fully the WTO rules, and we have been doing that. On the other side, in fact, there are some sectors of public opinion in Europe that are extremely concerned about GMOs. What we have now in the system with the -- (inaudible) -- the European Food Agency that gives us, the commission, the scientific opinion, and then we decide. And our position has been to decide in favor of introduction of GMOs if that independent agency confirms there are no risks for environment or for the health. But it remains extremely controversial in Europe. That is why, recently, we have proposed, the commission, to keep the system but, for cultivation, to visit our national level. So the so-called -- (inaudible). So if we go -- (inaudible) -- the introduction of a GMO product in Europe -- (inaudible) -- but we cannot force one country to cultivate a GMO against its own will. And I think this is a good, fair compromise because there are some controversies. I will give you an example -- Austria -- where this issue is really very strong. We've been discussing this at several governments -- (inaudible) -- how can we be forced to cultivate something that our population does not want? And this has been a very difficult issue for us. It has nothing to do with protection. It has nothing to do with the restrictions to Africa. I can tell -- (inaudible). It has to do with the public concern on the issues of public health, issues of environment protection. And this is why we have to keep those standards and try to find a fair way of making our rules competitive, of course -- (inaudible) -- WTO. MODERATOR: The gentleman in front? QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Paul Jather (ph), financial advisory business. One relationship that remains important, I would think, that hasn't been mentioned today is that between Europe -- the European community and Russia. And, of course, there are many aspects of it. The one that I wanted to hang out and see what your thoughts are on the overall relationship with particular emphasis on the fact that, in the last few years, the Russians seem to have used or tended to use their energy exports, sometimes, to exert political pressure. And I wonder what your thoughts are on the relationship, its context and where it's going. BARROSO: You are right it's a vital relation for us and for them. For the Russians, we are the number-one partner in trade and investment. European Union is the number-one partner. And they are also very important partner for Europe. And that's why we try to establish or develop diplomatic -- a good relationship with them. Things are improving. There were, in fact -- some issues were difficult, some political issues. The issue of Georgia, of course, but other matters relating to -- (inaudible). Restrictions of exports from Poland to Russia. But, for instance now, the relationship between Poland and Russia is much more constructive than it was before. And so -- and don't forget that -- (inaudible) -- the Russian leadership, we meet every time -- every year at least twice in a formal summit serving all these years, meeting President Putin and now President Medvedev. I'm speaking for the 27, not only for -- I have to take on board the concerns not only of the countries that are exporting to Russia but those who -- some concerns of some countries, somtimes some small countries that express some concern regarding the relationship. But nowadays, I see there is good potential in the relationship with Russia. President Medvedev wants the result of the developing work because -- (inaudible) -- organization in Russia, and we want to be partners in this effort. And if he's -- repeat, once again, a win-win situation. The relations with -- we have lived with this crisis-- (inaudible). In fact -- it's already public. More than 30 phone calls I have to make to President Putin at the time -- or Prime Minister Putin -- and the leadership in Ukraine -- President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Timoshenko and, also, some talks with President Medvedev. And, of course, this was a great impact and a great impact on public opinion in Europe. What was happening was that European people were suffering a clash between Russia and Ukraine, it was -- and I believe it was not directed against European Union. But was no interest at all in Russia or in Ukraine to make problem with European Union. But, in fact, we were suffering from that, let's say, interruption of the flow of gas. And now we are working more constructively with Russians and Europeans -- European Union -- to try to achieve, once again, a win-win situation, also, in energy. And I think it is, of course important also for our Russian -- (inaudible). MODERATOR: We have two minutes only, I think, Mr. President. Is there a very quick question taking seconds and then we'll give a minute and a half to the president to reply? QUESTIONER: I don't know if this will be quick, but I'll ask -- MODERATOR: It has to be quick. QUESTIONER: You talked about reform, and that's the time for reforming in Europe. But I mean, the banking sector in Europe doesn't seem to be reformed still, and there are some countries where the banks are still weakened. And for many critics, this is why, you know, some of the debt problems are not -- are worrying markets even more. Is there an effort to really get to the bottom of the banking sector in all the countries where the banks are weak and to lead a reform so that there's no -- you know, the way the U.S. sort of really forced the banks to come up with more capital -- and then there were stress tests, but there was really nothing that came out of it is that critic say. So is that -- I mean, is there more effort? Or do you think that you're satisfied? BARROSO: No. I mean, first of all, the stress tests were, I believe, a serious, competent at this time. In fact, we have been pushing for some years to do it every two years to have these open stress tests. Having said this, I want to make it clear we believe that, fundamentally, the banking sector in Europe is healthy. We believe it's healthy, our banking sector. That does not exclude that there were not some cases that should be addressed, and we will address them and, in fact, we are working on that matter. We are working that matter with the possible -- (inaudible) -- difficulties that may happen in the banking sector. But the idea that European banking sector is unhealthy or very vulnerable is completely wrong, completely wrong. Having said this, we also welcome very much the latest decisions of the Basel, and we believe they are going in the right direction to reinforce the quality of capital for our banks. And we are now putting in place, also, the proper mechanisms of coordination of what has been done by international supervisors because, as I said in my introductory remarks, in Europe, until now, supervision was purely national. And this when many of the banks are, indeed, cross-border banks. They are not -- they have had -- (inaudible) -- of course, of member states, but, in fact, they are. European are sometimes mobile banks. And this -- some of the reforms -- (inaudible) -- and that will be coming very soon to improve, I think, the overall credibility of our financial sector. MODERATOR: Mr. President, I think we are all very grateful to you for the time and for the quality in your answers and your openness. And we thank you very much, indeed. We feel very confident about Europe now. Many of us will probably want to come and settle there. (Laughter.) And we thank you very much. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2010, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to welcome you all here this evening for a very privileged evening with Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission. And I'd like to welcome you, Mr. President, and also, Mrs. Barroso, and members of your team who are here with you in a very busy week. If I may, I will just remind you the technical aspects of tonight, which is please turn off your cell phones is the first requirement. And the second requirement, which normally is, is to tell you that this meeting would be off the record. But, in fact, tonight, it is on the record. And the framework of the evening will be that we'll ask the president to speak, and we will have, then, a short conversation. And then it'll be open for questions from all of you in relation to the subject tonight of the president, which is stabilize, consolidate, reform E.U. moves from crisis management to reform agenda. And we all very much look forward to hearing from you, Mr. President, on this very important subject not just for Europe but for the world. I think many of you know something of the background of the president which is, indeed, distinguished both as a scholar and as a politician. His work and scholarship includes his starting his career in Portugal and then working at the University of Geneva, then spending some time as a visiting professor at the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. And, subsequently, he became head of the international relations department at Lusiada University in Lisbon and the founder of the University Association of European Studies. But then politics attracted him. And in 1980, he entered that field in the Belgian political scene in the Social Democratic Party. He was elected three times. And in April 2002, he was elected prime minister of Portugal. July 2004, elected president of the European Commission which he is now serving his second five-year term. He holds many honorary degrees and honors of which I shall not, if you don't mind, repeat this evening. But take it that he is well recognized in the international community. His coming here tonight is deeply appreciated by us because it is a very important time, I think, for all of us as we look at the global economy. And to have the leader of Europe come to speak to us gives us an opportunity not only to learn about what is going on in the countries that he represents and speaks for but also to look at our own situation within the context of global economic and political development. So if I may, Mr. President, I would like to call on you immediately so that they don't have to listen to me. And then when you're finished, we'll have a short conversation and we'll open it for questions. President Barroso? (Applause.) EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSE MANUEL BARROSO: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you very much -- (inaudible) -- someone Ivery much admire and respect for the kind words of introduction. Let me start by thanking you for inviting me to speak today. In fact, I came several times to the Council on Foreign Relations, and when I last spoke to you, you were still showing the full force of the financial and economic storm. Certainly, the European economy was then in deep trouble. It had, so far, the most severe stress tests imaginable. And there was a climate of fear. People were worried about their pensions. Companies could not get credit. If they had capital, they could not risk the investment. Business dropped because no one knew of the future health. The storm damage is still all around us. More than 6.3 million Europeans have lost their jobs since 2008. Many families have been pushed towards the poverty line. European Union member states have seen their deficits rise to 7 percent of GDP on average, and debt ratios rise to more than 80 percent of GDP. Many doubt Europeans' determination to respond. Many doubt our capacity to act. I think I can say they were wrong. The nations of Europe looked for answers, and they found them in European Union. We are the overcoming difficulties together. The economic outlook in European Union is now better than when I last addressed you, not least because of our giant action. The recovery is gathering pace, although, admittedly, progress is uneven within the Union. Growth this year will be higher than initially forecast. The unemployment rate is similar to the U.S. rate, and while it is still much too high, it has at least stopped increasing. A degree of cautious optimism has taken root, but we cannot sit back and relax yet. It is too early to write the epitaph of what some call the "Great Recession." Uncertainties and risks remain outside as well as inside the European Union. The after-pains of the crisis are likely to remain with us for quite some time. So to consolidate the progress we have made, it is now vital that Europe moves from crisis management to reform agenda. Budgetary expansion has played its role in countering decline in economic activity. Now, in the context of an accommodating monetary stance, only significant steps to reforms will prevent medium-term growth prospects from being disappointing. The priorities of the to-do list of Europe economic policy making are: completing financial regulatory reform, continued fiscal consolidation and tackling macroeconomic imbalances by frontloading structure reforms. That's quite a challenge. But as I look at how this crisis has changed Europe, there are plenty of reasons to believe we will succeed. First, extremely difficult but necessary and unavoidable decisions have already been implemented at the national level. Greece is the obvious example. But 10 other member states have also embarked on a path of convincing structural reform and fiscal consolidation. Second, there is striking concensus about the way forward forged in a large part by the need to develop a common European position for the G-20. European Commission has been putting forth proposals that have received overall support among our 27 member states. Traditional policy divides between key member states have narrowed considerably. There is now a broad commitment to a balanced exit strategy and a return to fiscal sustainability, particularly as demographic challenges start to bind. Member states agree that fiscal consolidation should involve expenditure cuts, if necessary, that are enforced by tax increases. They also agree that priority should be given to growth-friendly budget items. The third reason for confidence is that the traditional architecture of Europe will be substantially stronger as we exit the crisis. The reform system of fiscal rules, a new system to tackle macroeconomic imbalances and European systemic risk board will help to make the -- (inaudible) -- work more effective. With better enforcement of rules and earlier warning of problems comes greater treatability. In fact, just yesterday, the European parliament gave its final approval to the supervisory package that the commission had put forward last year. Up until now, our market was interdependent but oversight was purely national. From 2011 on, Europe will be the first region in the world to have in place top-notch supervision that is up to the challenges of the future. Moreover, financial facilities which were created to respond to the Euro crisis which amount to 500 billion Euros have put a major hole in Europe's economic and monetary union. And this opened the possibility of developing a more permanent solution. And the adoption of the so-called European semester, which concentrates in one semester the bulk of economic purveyance of the European Union will encourage greater coordination, economic transparency between member states as they plan, discuss and adopt their national budgets. So it will be even before they present budgets to their respective parliaments and then decide of collective and monetary. Taken together, all this represents quite a leap forward for European economic governance. Mechanisms to combine European-led economic reform programs with European financial solidarity have been created which were simply inconceivable before the crisis. Two or three years ago, if you asked me is this possible, I would say not in the forseeable future. In fact, it was probably the greatest driver for accepting reforms that were simply not possible some time ago. So these are historical times for Europe, but they will also have an important impact on global financial markets. In parallel, we are now frontloading growth enhancing structural reforms through a strategy we decided to call Europe 2020, a program to guide our economy towards new sources of growth and social cohesion in order to achieve smart, sustainable -- (inaudible) -- growth. Business is at the heart of this strategy, small and medium enterprises in particular, which is not surprising. Defined as companies employing one to 250 people, SMEs represent more than 99 percent of all the European firms and provide two out of every three private-sector jobs. Getting credit flowing again, investing in innovation and attacking red tape are priorities here. Another priority is Europe's international market. This is a well-developed web of financial and economic relations, but there are still some missing links and bottlenecks acting as a drag on growth and entrepreneurship. We are now mapping all of them out. We will come with an emerging new package of measures. This is necessary because, since 1992, the date of its launching the internal market, like our societies, have changed beyond all recognition. Back then, few people had mobile phones. Even fewer had heard of the Internet. E-commerce had not been invented. Now, we are truly a service economy. The internal market makes itss presence felt in all sectors of the economy, and this is boosting competitiveness across the board with a new push because it is the strongest driver for growth that Europe has. There is no time to lose. So this fall, we will bring forward a single market act that we will be presenting -- (inaudible) -- of measures that stimulate growth. Flanking these priorities are a whole range of measures that add up to a comprehensive reform and modernization program at all levels of government. At the European level, we are launching a number of flagship initiatives. Examples include the digital agenda to create the right environment and infrastructure for emerging high-tech sectors and innovation -- (inaudible) -- improve Europe's innovation performance along the whole chain from research to retail, and industrial policy for the organization era that recognizes the new realities of cross-border production and a jobs and skills agenda. Finally, trade remains an important engine for growth and also for jobs. And trade is very important, also -- (inaudible) -- innovation competitiveness. So a renewed trade policy is also in the pipeline, and we will present our proposals in October. We will open up more markets for Europe and more job opportunities in Europe through new and better free-trade agreements with all corners of the globe. Just now, we have concluded the trade agreement with South Korea. We will open more markets by joining our regulatory rules with our key partners so that we do not have different energy-efficiency or -- (inaudible) -- sanitary standards. And European goods do not sit at foreign ports waiting for extra security clearance. Of course, all these would have been greatly facilitated had there been an agreement on the Doha Trade Round already. So we'll maintain momentum for a successful conclusion. In European Union alone, an agreement will boost GDP by around $40 billion. Trade also has huge potential as a means to enforce a transatlantic partnership -- (inaudible) -- that are quite impressive. European Union and the United States account for the largest trade relationship in the world with 33 percent of world trading goods, 44 percent in services. Transatlantic trade and investment is responsible for 14 million jobs in Europe and America. And I will further discuss these matters together with the president of the European Council, with President Obama in the next European Union-U.S. summit which will take place in Lisbon on the 20th of November. Ladies and gentlemen, I have sketched out the briefest of outlines describing how Europe is moving from crisis management to reform agenda. I could summarize all of this even further with just three words: stabilize, consolidate, reform. But now it is time for others to have their say, so I'd like to discuss these matters with you. These were just some words of introduction. Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause.) MODERATOR: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President, for those very incisive comments. I wonder if I could take you a little bit outside the U.S. and Europe for a moment to direct your attention to a challenge that I know you are well-informed about and, perhaps, can tell us a little bit about, which is how do you see the future with China, with India, with Asia as affecting both the growth of Europe and, indeed, the growth of our country? BARROSO: (Inaudible) -- has been and I hope it will continue to be positive engagement. China and India are the biggest countries in the world in population terms, so it's only natural that they have a bigger share of the world output. What was interesting was why was not that possible before regarding China. And where China's -- (inaudible) -- policy of opening -- in fact, they were benefitting a lot from this opening, and they are, I think, I can say, among at least the key partners, the great beneficiaries of globalization. And as we say to them very often -- and I've been discussing these matters -- (inaudible) -- with the Chinese leadership for many years now, if they are the biggest beneficiaries of this process, they also can contribute more for its success because the reality is -- and, of course, we have to be open and frank about this -- there are some concerns in other parts of the world about what is the consequence of this rise of China. So the point is to make it a win-win situation. And I think the Chinese leadership is perfectly aware of this issue. The leadership is extremely well informed and prepared. And now it's always a question of negotiation. We have -- (inaudible) -- negotiated with the Chinese, as you know very well yourself. And -- but making it as open a situation and expecting not -- I don't think we can expect a kind of a sudden change, but from a gradual point of view, some improvement in the situation. So we tried to engage positively with China and we've, so far, been urging -- (inaudible) -- market not only in Asia. Brazil is a very important case in point, by the way. We have established now what we call strategic partnerships with those countries. And we think, of course it is important to work with them for -- as much as possible a global system of openness, and a system of openness means, as we say very often, open economies need rules so that, as much as possible, you have a cooperative, coordinated approach. That was -- (inaudible) -- the instinct or the intuition behind the G-20. The G-20 -- (inaudible). Of course, there are some successes about it, but I believe that -- (inaudible) -- at least it was possible to have a cooperative approach instead of a crisis and not just a confrontational approach. MODERATOR: And when we talk -- and I should, perhaps, have asked this first -- not just about the competition about China -- we need to be thinking about how strong is Europe today. And in May, authorities, together with the IMF, put together a thousand-billion-dollar fund essentially for backing up Europe in terms of difficulty. And there were a number of countries that were seen as vulnerable. Your remarks were very positive, I thought, in terms of your own assessment of the economic outlook. Do you think we're through the problems of the so-called pigs of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain? Is this something that we can forget about, or just move forward? BARROSO: Yes. I thought, from the beginning, that all this language and this analogy assessments regarding the difficulties of Europe -- (inaudible) -- taken together, your area, as a -- (inaudible) -- lower than American are much lower than the Japanese model. Overall, there is a position of balance. And the Euro has been a great success for Europe. So all this talk about the instability of the Euro -- in fact, if you ask most people who think the Euro is too high, they will not mind if the Euro will be lower because -- now, the point is -- and this is new -- that in Euro area, we have now 16, very soon 17 countries -- one of them will join. There are -- (Inaudible) -- and so what happened was, in fact, that the markets started to discriminate against, in terms of sovereign debt, of some weaker members of Euro. And you've mentioned that. And that's why now we are acting and we have established this fund. From the European Union, only 500 billion Euros. The IMF said that they are -- (inaudible) -- 250, so we can make $1 trillion. It was not just talk. I'm saying that because, frankly, sometimes people are -- outside of Europe, they underestimate, from my point of view -- including some analysts in the market -- they underestimate the interdependence of the European economy and the absolute need for them to act together. I was working on this matter night and day during the worst moment, most difficult moment, and I never had a doubt that, at the end, we would establish the program for Greece and, also, to -- (inaudible) -- because I knew perfectly well what Angela Merkel thinks about it, and all the others despite of all the politics involved. So this is a necessary move we want to convey to you here, our friends -- (inaudible) -- from the United States. I think the Euro is a strong currency and is there to stay and to be reinforced. Now, there are, as you said -- and I'm very -- (inaudible) -- and that's why some of those most vulnerable situations are now facing it. Greece, I have mentioned, took a very important, draconian program, which is now the Greek expression -- draconian program. Other countries like Spain and Portugal are taking those measures as well. Ireland, a case in point. And so I believe we are going to overcome those difficulties and, in fact, all the system is working for that. And the fact that they are in the Euro area is a driver for it because there is some kind of discipline that is now reinforced by the Euro and, also, by the markets. MODERATOR: And we here should overlook the comments that are made about the excessive strength of Germany and the occasional statement by the president of France that maybe the balance is not there to keep Europe cohesive? That's behind us, is it? BARROSO: No, I think it's very good that Germany is strong because Germany is, in fact, the engine of the European economy. And it is -- if Germany was not so strong, there we could have a problem regarding the Euro because the last argument of protection of the Euro is, in fact, also German. And so until recently, I think it was the number-one export in the world alone, which is amazing, a country, as I mentioned, of Germany. The European Union, taken together, is still the number-one exporter in the world. Now China has come up. And so the -- (inaudible) -- is not the export sector of Germany but, also, the culture, the financial culture of Germany, I think, is a great effort not only for Germany but for Europe. And Germany's the number-one client or investor of almost all the other countries in Europe. People should not forget that. So usually, if Germany goes well, that's a signal that others can join in if they are not yet there. It's always the first or the second importer of almost all, if not all the other 26 member states of European Union. So it's -- (inaudible) -- that Germany is doing well. But, of course, as your question suggests, we have a very high benchmark. So when you compare, of course, the performance of other countries while, in other parts of the world, the comparison is not so high as Germany. It makes, of course, things more difficult for other governments, but systemically, it's good that Germany is now having such a successful performance. MODERATOR: In our country, Mr. President, a number of people are saying that we have grown up thinking of the relationships between the United States, Europe and Japan. And people of my generation typically only thought of that -- the billion people that had 80 percent of the world's GDP. Today, as we look out for the next 40 years, we're going to have another two and a half billion people on the planet with less than 100 million going to European and American countries. We're going to see a swing of the middle class significantly towards Asia, but there are going to be a lot of countries left behind. Is Europe concerned about the great differences between the standard of living in the United States and Europe and, at the other end, 2 billion people in Africa that will have maybe standards of living that are 4 (percent) or 5 percent of what it is we have in the West? To what extent is Europe thinking about these markets and these people? BARROSO: We are more than ever now. I can't tell you now. I can make the comparison with situations sometime before. I remember six years ago when I was elected the first time for the European Commission, there was a discussion in European -- (inaudible) -- where all the emphasis -- (inaudible) -- was the commission president. And the discussion was only about the internal issues. This time, five years afterward, the top subject in the discussion, I would say more than 50 percent was China. MODERATOR: Really? BARROSO: So people are completely aware of the new geoeconomic and geopolitical factors. Having said this, we believe it's better to engage and try to make this as cooperative and positive sum game. Africa is mentioned. Africa is another kind of issue, of course. The links with Africa and Europe are extremely strong because post-colonial -- (inaudible) -- links and we tried to do our best with that region. Just now, I came here for the MDG also where I announced -- (inaudible) -- our support for the MDG and our most important partners in cooperation are the African countries and so-called NCP (ph) -- (inaudible) -- countries. And so we are aware of this. In Europe, I want to be very frank with you. In Europe today, there is gloomy -- it's fashionable to be pessimistic. This probably is not so very different. I call it the intellectual -- (inaudible) -- of pessimism. Someone wants to pretend it's intelligence, it should be more pessimism than the other because that -- (inaudible). I do not agree. I simply do not agree with that -- (inaudible). I believe Europe has the intellectual, critical resources to overcome the difficulty. I think the rise of others is not necessarily our crisis. I mean -- and very often, I think about the United States and Europe after the Second World War when the United States -- (inaudible) -- great vision. Europe was destroyed and they -- (inaudible) -- in Europe. And the rise of Europe afterward, great moment was not -- (inaudible) -- the United States. So I mean, the rise of Africa -- in fact, there are hundreds of people in Africa -- I don't think that. On the contrary. I think it can be a great opportunity. So that's why we are very committed to keep markets open, to work with those emerging countries, also, to respect intellectual property rules, procurement rules, to establish, as much as possible, some common standards. But that is our vision. Some will say it's idealistic -- (inaudible) -- will be realistic. So, probably, but it worked. So I think it is our enlightened self-interest, to work with those emerging markets, of course, trying to keep, as much as possible, our common values. Now, if you think about the United States where the United States are looking, I hope the United States will not forget Europe and Europe will not forget the United States because we have a very deep bond, not only economically. Still, the most important economic relationship in the world -- (inaudible) -- trading investment, relations between United States and Europe. And those in the business community really want as much as possible to keep a real transatlantic economic market, and I think we should do for that for a kind of agenda for growth and job both sides of Atlantic. But it's much more than that. It's what happens between Europe and United States -- some people say old-fashioned to speak about it, but I will speak -- (inaudible). Today, President Obama, in a very, I think, inspired speech about trying to -- not only the issue of Middle East, but he was speaking about liberty and freedom and that we should not forget about it. And he invited those that remember when their countries were not democracies not to forget to fight for democracy. I think we should remember, and I think we should keep this kind of special relationship. MODERATOR: Well, I think we certainly welcome it, and I know that my colleagues will, no doubt, have many questions. I could keep on this bilateral conversation, but I'll never be asked to chair a meeting again. (Laughter.) So may I call on the audience? Yes, sir? If you could give your name for the president, it might be helpful. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Bill Drozdiak, president of the American Council on Germany. Mr. President, I wonder if you could explain to us why it is so difficult for NATO and the European Union to work more effectively together. I mean, here you have the two principle institutions of the West based in the same city, facing many of the same problems these days as economic issues blend into security issues and now facing the challenge of Asia. Wouldn't it be a practical and sensible step to find a way to bring these two institutions much more closely together in order to solidify the transatlantic link in dealing with the modern-day problems and, also, take advantage of the fact that there are 22 countries that are now members of both institutions? BARROSO: We are in favor of this, and we are working for this. In fact, what you can -- (inaudible) -- just some days ago, it was another conclusion, and there is a -- Cathy Ashton, the high representative, she received a mandate to work, and the secretary is already working -- the secretary general of NATO has listened. And they are doing it. But you certainly are aware of what is the difficulty with -- diplomatici difficulty that has nothing to do with Turkey and Cyprus; Cyprus, a member of the European Union and Turkey a member of NATO. And that is the real -- going to be -- and diplomatic, but that's the real difficulty sometimes. I remember well, I worked for a minister of my country for some time, and we have some difficulties because there are all kinds of procedural obstacles to any kind of establishment of a more pragmatic partnership between NATO and European Union. But the European Union aside, the commission, we are extremely open to it and, in fact, we are already working because now, as you know, the new concept of defense is more and more comprehensive. It's not just about military power, it's about humanitarian aid, it's about state building, about justice, training police. In the commission, we are funding many, many programs where, by the way, our people sometimes are running the risk of their -- (inaudible) -- because we could get -- achieve the proper protocol with NATO. And the reason was because of those diplomatic difficulties among some members of -- I mean, let's say two members of either the European Union or NATO. It will be good if they could overcome this difficulty because of what is -- it's basically a bilateral issue that is putting difficulty in the cooperation -- (inaudible) -- cooperation between NATO and European Union. MODERATOR: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Various European countries -- Germany in the lead -- are cracking down on massive tax cheating, much of which is affected through the secret bank accounts and offshore financial centers such as Lichtenstein. The OECD effort has failed to significantly change the system. Do you have a strategy for dealing with the global offshore system that facilitates not only massive tax cheating but corporate corruption, bribery, the movement of terrorist money and money of organized crime throughout the world? BARROSO: Yes. Very important point. In fact, that's one of the issues that the G-20 should look at. And we are -- (inaudible) -- trying to go on with that fight against this kind of activity in Europe and some of our partners because of some laws of banks security that, in fact, make it easier, this kind of behavior. And we are doing it, also, in a bilateral context with those countries. Myself has been discussing with some of our partners, European partners and non-members of the European Union. But it will be important where it's not only OECD but also globally. And so far, it has been a difficult issue. It's been a difficult issue. Some of our partners are not reacting very positively with the idea of having, as much as possible, a lateral playing field globally in that matter. But, of course, we will keep our negotiation effort on the table. MODERATOR: Yes, ma'am? QUESTIONER: (Inaudible). Mr. President, one of the big differences between the U.S. and the E.U. is the strength of small businesses and the ease with which people can start companies in the U.S. And you mentioned in your speech the importance of small and medium businesses in the European economy. What would it take for Europe to make it easy for entrepreneurs to start their companies, to make money and to grow so that Europe becomes competitive on that level with the U.S.? BARROSO: That's definitely one of the issues that we have been looking at, namely, in our -- (inaudible) -- with American -- (inaudible) -- a great influence in Europe. Many countries in Europe now adopted programs of simplification. It's now possible, in many of our member states, to create a company -- (inaudible) -- hours to be -- (inaudible). It is, in fact, a great -- (inaudible). There was benchmarks, and there was some kind of looking at best practices. And now, it's much simpler to create -- (inaudible) -- point of view. The huge bureaucracy of the past has been eliminated. The real problem -- the real difficulty in my point of view of the United States -- (inaudible) -- financing. Venture capital in Europe is not as evolved as in the United States. And let's be awful frank about this, the entrepreneurship culture here is different because of -- (inaudible) -- capital factors, cultural factors, the way the state, the public financing. So there are several cultural factors as well that makes the life of a company in Europe a little -- entrepreneurship in Europe different from the United States. Sometimes it's not just about to create an enterprise; it's about to put an end to it when it's no longer profitable or no longer adequate. And precisely, one of the points I was mentioning this in my introductory remarks was about reforms. And this is one of the reforms we are trying to achieve. Some member states are now appreciating ambitious reforms for simplification -- conditions but, also, the labor-market reform. (Inaudible) -- flexibility of their economic -- (inaudible) -- and there, the American -- (inaudible) -- can be -- (inaudible) -- of course, having in mind that we have, in some areas, difference. In Europe, we have -- (inaudible) -- what we call social-market economy. And that comes from Germany because, after the Second World War, social -- (inaudible) -- with the idea that we want a dynamic market, but we want relatively high levels of social inclusion. We also think it is relatively strong compared to the United States. So and this is -- Europeans want to keep it. So I have to be clear about it. If you go to Europe to propose so-called American model, it will not work. Politically, it will not work. There is not support for this. But if you go to Europe and say, look, we have to -- (inaudible) -- the Americans and others in terms of cultural entrepreneurship -- (inaudible) -- some of the best -- (inaudible) -- interactive relation, simplification of -- (inaudible) -- then people are receptive. And, therefore, that is the line we are following in the commission. So to modernize our social market economy without making a revolution but making a reform. MODERATOR: The gentleman here? I guess not. It's a lady. Madame? QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. -- (inaudible). My name is Catherine Hagan (ph) and, Mr. President, I come from Geneva where I work on multi-state culture dialogue. And I'm here because of the MDG summit, but we are also very interested in trade and have been monitoring the activities at the WTO where the issues have been moving beyond the Doha Round to issues of food security, climate change, innovation. I was intrigued by your remark about a new trade proposal coming from the European Union, and I would like to know if you could share with us some of the thinking that is going into that proposal, not necessarily what will be coming out of that proposal because that's to be announced in October, as you said. But it would be very interesting to hear if you are reviving the Singapore proposals or whether there are other issues that have come into the floor and you're thinking about trade and how to take a new approach to this. BARROSO: Look, I cannot anticipate what they are going to propose. We have to first discuss it in the commission. In fact, we have been asked to come with some ideas, and that's what we are preparing. But I can give you the background -- political background of the proposal, why -- To be completely honest with you, in Europe and some of the member states, also a perception that sometimes we are too naive in trade matters. I think the same applies here in the United States sometimes. We open our markets, but we don't -- (inaudible) -- some of our partners, maybe in terms of the monetary experience to make a -- (inaudible) -- effort. And our companies that are in some other parts of the world, they are complaining to us very strongly. They feel discriminated, namely in terms of investment in terms of intellectual property rights and in other matters. And so what we are now trying to do is to reassure also the European public opinion that we'll pursue a trade policy that is more open and we will, at least the commission, will pull any, let's say inflation of protection. I think protection in itself -- (inaudible). Europe is the biggest supporter in the world. So it's quite obvious that it is's also fitting. But at the same time, the assurances to the Europeans, what they have to gain from this kind of open market and linking these issues, also, with our overall interest. And this is what -- political background. Now, political, let's say environment for our proposal that we are now preparing to -- (inaudible) -- so very soon you will be informed about it. But my -- (inaudible) -- is to get more support for open markets and expanding into other areas, not only trade on goods but also on services. Likewise, easier -- (inaudible) -- investment. I think this is very important. And the points you made are also very important. In fact, in European Union now, there is a great concern with many of our stakeholders and member states, and there's a considerable -- (inaudible) -- regarding, for instance, worker's rights regarding the norm of environment protection or fighting climate change. And this is very important and difficult debate because the point is we now have -- (inaudible) -- regulations, very ambitious -- (inaudible) -- to fight climate change. By the way -- (inaudible). It's 20, 20, 20, by 2030. So we have committed and it's in our law -- regulation -- to reduce greenhouse gas by 20 percent in 2020, 20 percent of energy should come from renewables, and 20 percent energy efficiency. And some of those -- (inaudible) -- say okay, but you are competing with others that don't do that. So how can we -- so that's why we have to give some assurances to those sectors -- (inaudible) -- energy sectors that they will not be the victims of this kind of regulation. And that's what we are working. And, in fact, we have some mechanisms for climate change program to avoid them putting in an uncompetitive position. And this is the kind of assurance we want, also, to give to our stakeholders in Europe, but the purpose should be to keep markets open and to open more markets. MODERATOR: Yes? QUESTIONER: This is Bernie Ferrari. I'm a management consultant. Mr. President, this morning in the FT in the front page, there was a discussion of Siemens' extraordinary agreement with its union workers of 150,000 for job security. Given your aspirations for European economic performance around the world, what is your reaction to that agreement? BARROSO: Look, it was exactly following my remark before when I said to you very honestly, I think, Europe is different from the United States in some aspects of economic culture. We are basically open economies and want to -- but this is typical of -- (inaudible) -- disagreement. But that's part of the social-market economy. And it's impressive to see that Germany, for instance -- not only Germany -- but in terms of the criss, the trade unions have accepted something that was impossible to have before in terms of reduction or freezing of their salaries. That was possible, also, because of the culture of compromise in -- (inaudible). So I'm not suggesting that that should be the model, but in that case, apparently, it's working, and so I hope it will work. But it depends. Other countries have a different culture of negotiation. Europe is very complex. We have 27 countries, sometimes very different in its relations. But this is one of the examples. We also have -- as you know, it was -- (inaudible) -- what we call flex security. So it means flexibility in terms of the labor relation but, at the same time, a very developed system of social guarantees -- (inaudible). And so in that case, people accept that enhanced flexibility so you can lose your job, but you are sure that, if you lose your job, you get, let's say, an important contribution from society for some time that you may stay unemployed. This is one of the issues that makes, sometimes, our system different from the American one. And I certainly think that it is important to move the assurances to our workers that they are taken care of because, in the Europen societies now, many people are angry. They have seen what happened coming from financial sector, and they are seeing now huge bonuses again. They are seeing -- I'm going to be very frank with you -- that some people are coming back to business as usual as if nothing had happened. And so the perception in many of our countries -- (inaudible) -- we tax payers, we have to save those banks, and now they are coming back to business as usual and we don't have any guarantees with the worker or with the -- (inaudible). And that's why I think some level of social consensus is extremely important; namely, in some countries where there was a tradition of, let's say, sometimes, social polarization or more conflicting industrial relations. Germany has that German tradition. And if it works for that company, it's a good thing. I wish them the best. MODERATOR: My goodness. Ambassador -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Mr. President, the European Union countries have made very drastic commitments at deficit reduction, fiscal consolidation. At the same time, in the United States, our government and many economists fear that too drastic fiscal consolidation risks a double-dip recession. And our Federal Reserve is engaged in major efforts to increase the money supply and expand and lower interest rates. Are we in danger of getting at cross-purposes here in the macroeconomic policy? BARROSO: We discussed this issue in the G-20 in Toronto. And, in fact, I think there was a real consensus that Europe should do exactly that. Before the G-20, there was some discussion. There was some cross -- let's say, analysis and assessment and sometimes trying to put it in context. But I will say I was in the G-20 and discussed this, also, there. And I think people understood the European position. I have no doubt that, for Europe, there is no other way to be completely -- (inaudible) -- now to those programs in Europe when we have both countries that are actually, I mean, vulnerable in terms of -- because that's the difference between us and the United States. I mean, you are one country. Europe is 27 countries. We are a union of states with some macro-integrated, some policies integrated, like in your area, monetary policy. But we have one monetary policy but, afterward, the budget may be national. And so for us, it's fundamental to restore confidence of the markets. And the confidence of the markets will not be there if we go on with this -- (inaudible) -- policy. This is -- (inaudible) -- here. (Inaudible), but next year, it will not be. And so -- and I think it will be, I repeat, massive for Europe to go for expansive policy at this moment. And nobody, I mean, in Europe is now proposing an incredible, at least -- (inaudible) -- possibility. Having said this, United States is in a different position. Also, the dollar has a different position in the global market. It's for the Americans -- up to them to decide which way. But, for Europe, we have no doubt that this is the way. Having said this, it's not just about this proposal. Actually, it's about structural reform. It's about being more selective. It's not just to look at the expenditure, the quantity but also the quality of the expenditure. It's possible -- we believe it's possible to have some growth-friendly measures of fiscal consolidation. That's what we are trying to do through fine tuning of the policies. But in Europe, I repeat, now if we don't do this -- (inaudible) -- will increase instability of the markets, and I don't think that's good for the United States. If Europe or the Euro starts now -- and that point was made by all of us at the G-20 very clearly, by myself and the heads of government of the European Union member states there and others. And then what it can do, for instance to stimulate demand is not by expansion -- (inaudible) -- reform. For instance, Germany, we are speaking -- (inaudible) -- very much. Germany, they have the potential for growth coming from a reform of their service sector. The service sector in Germany is, I mean, it's less competitive than others in Europe. You know, and that, by the way -- (inaudible) -- the Germans know that perfectly well, and their committed to do it. So there are other ways different from budgetary and stimulus to stimulate demand in Europe. MODERATOR: This lady is next. Go ahead. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett from the council. I want to come back to trade and to Africa. From the perspective of many African countries, the very policies that are in place at the E.U. to protect workers, to protect health, to deal with lower pesticide use, all those sorts of things are, in fact, keeping African agricultural products out of the European marketplace. And in particular, in the context of GM food restrictions and requirements for annotation of fertilizer use, pesticide use, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, seed derivative, everything -- how can you break this down so that the European feels they're eating a same tomato and the African feels they can grow large quantities of tomatoes and become rich selling them to Europeans? BARROSO: Look, first of all, European Union is, by far, the largest importer of agricultural products from developing countries. Europe imports more from the developing countries -- United States, Russia, Canada, Australia -- put together. So that idea that Europe is closed to agricultural products is simply not consumed by fact. Having said this, it's true that we have some reservations that are there because the European public wants us there that are relatively high levels of protection of consumers. And this is something that we discussed not only with Africa but in other parts of the world today. And what we tell our partners is that they should try to get their exports competitive with those conditions that are there not for protection, but because in the European society, people are simply not ready to lower their standards. The issue of GMO is an extremely difficult issue. I think that you are probably an expert on that. You have probably followed my -- and the commission's recent position. We - from one side, we want to respect fully the WTO rules, and we have been doing that. On the other side, in fact, there are some sectors of public opinion in Europe that are extremely concerned about GMOs. What we have now in the system with the -- (inaudible) -- the European Food Agency that gives us, the commission, the scientific opinion, and then we decide. And our position has been to decide in favor of introduction of GMOs if that independent agency confirms there are no risks for environment or for the health. But it remains extremely controversial in Europe. That is why, recently, we have proposed, the commission, to keep the system but, for cultivation, to visit our national level. So the so-called -- (inaudible). So if we go -- (inaudible) -- the introduction of a GMO product in Europe -- (inaudible) -- but we cannot force one country to cultivate a GMO against its own will. And I think this is a good, fair compromise because there are some controversies. I will give you an example -- Austria -- where this issue is really very strong. We've been discussing this at several governments -- (inaudible) -- how can we be forced to cultivate something that our population does not want? And this has been a very difficult issue for us. It has nothing to do with protection. It has nothing to do with the restrictions to Africa. I can tell -- (inaudible). It has to do with the public concern on the issues of public health, issues of environment protection. And this is why we have to keep those standards and try to find a fair way of making our rules competitive, of course -- (inaudible) -- WTO. MODERATOR: The gentleman in front? QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Paul Jather (ph), financial advisory business. One relationship that remains important, I would think, that hasn't been mentioned today is that between Europe -- the European community and Russia. And, of course, there are many aspects of it. The one that I wanted to hang out and see what your thoughts are on the overall relationship with particular emphasis on the fact that, in the last few years, the Russians seem to have used or tended to use their energy exports, sometimes, to exert political pressure. And I wonder what your thoughts are on the relationship, its context and where it's going. BARROSO: You are right it's a vital relation for us and for them. For the Russians, we are the number-one partner in trade and investment. European Union is the number-one partner. And they are also very important partner for Europe. And that's why we try to establish or develop diplomatic -- a good relationship with them. Things are improving. There were, in fact -- some issues were difficult, some political issues. The issue of Georgia, of course, but other matters relating to -- (inaudible). Restrictions of exports from Poland to Russia. But, for instance now, the relationship between Poland and Russia is much more constructive than it was before. And so -- and don't forget that -- (inaudible) -- the Russian leadership, we meet every time -- every year at least twice in a formal summit serving all these years, meeting President Putin and now President Medvedev. I'm speaking for the 27, not only for -- I have to take on board the concerns not only of the countries that are exporting to Russia but those who -- some concerns of some countries, somtimes some small countries that express some concern regarding the relationship. But nowadays, I see there is good potential in the relationship with Russia. President Medvedev wants the result of the developing work because -- (inaudible) -- organization in Russia, and we want to be partners in this effort. And if he's -- repeat, once again, a win-win situation. The relations with -- we have lived with this crisis-- (inaudible). In fact -- it's already public. More than 30 phone calls I have to make to President Putin at the time -- or Prime Minister Putin -- and the leadership in Ukraine -- President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Timoshenko and, also, some talks with President Medvedev. And, of course, this was a great impact and a great impact on public opinion in Europe. What was happening was that European people were suffering a clash between Russia and Ukraine, it was -- and I believe it was not directed against European Union. But was no interest at all in Russia or in Ukraine to make problem with European Union. But, in fact, we were suffering from that, let's say, interruption of the flow of gas. And now we are working more constructively with Russians and Europeans -- European Union -- to try to achieve, once again, a win-win situation, also, in energy. And I think it is, of course important also for our Russian -- (inaudible). MODERATOR: We have two minutes only, I think, Mr. President. Is there a very quick question taking seconds and then we'll give a minute and a half to the president to reply? QUESTIONER: I don't know if this will be quick, but I'll ask -- MODERATOR: It has to be quick. QUESTIONER: You talked about reform, and that's the time for reforming in Europe. But I mean, the banking sector in Europe doesn't seem to be reformed still, and there are some countries where the banks are still weakened. And for many critics, this is why, you know, some of the debt problems are not -- are worrying markets even more. Is there an effort to really get to the bottom of the banking sector in all the countries where the banks are weak and to lead a reform so that there's no -- you know, the way the U.S. sort of really forced the banks to come up with more capital -- and then there were stress tests, but there was really nothing that came out of it is that critic say. So is that -- I mean, is there more effort? Or do you think that you're satisfied? BARROSO: No. I mean, first of all, the stress tests were, I believe, a serious, competent at this time. In fact, we have been pushing for some years to do it every two years to have these open stress tests. Having said this, I want to make it clear we believe that, fundamentally, the banking sector in Europe is healthy. We believe it's healthy, our banking sector. That does not exclude that there were not some cases that should be addressed, and we will address them and, in fact, we are working on that matter. We are working that matter with the possible -- (inaudible) -- difficulties that may happen in the banking sector. But the idea that European banking sector is unhealthy or very vulnerable is completely wrong, completely wrong. Having said this, we also welcome very much the latest decisions of the Basel, and we believe they are going in the right direction to reinforce the quality of capital for our banks. And we are now putting in place, also, the proper mechanisms of coordination of what has been done by international supervisors because, as I said in my introductory remarks, in Europe, until now, supervision was purely national. And this when many of the banks are, indeed, cross-border banks. They are not -- they have had -- (inaudible) -- of course, of member states, but, in fact, they are. European are sometimes mobile banks. And this -- some of the reforms -- (inaudible) -- and that will be coming very soon to improve, I think, the overall credibility of our financial sector. MODERATOR: Mr. President, I think we are all very grateful to you for the time and for the quality in your answers and your openness. And we thank you very much, indeed. We feel very confident about Europe now. Many of us will probably want to come and settle there. (Laughter.) And we thank you very much. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2010, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to welcome you all here this evening for a very privileged evening with Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission. And I'd like to welcome you, Mr. President, and also, Mrs. Barroso, and members of your team who are here with you in a very busy week. If I may, I will just remind you the technical aspects of tonight, which is please turn off your cell phones is the first requirement. And the second requirement, which normally is, is to tell you that this meeting would be off the record. But, in fact, tonight, it is on the record. And the framework of the evening will be that we'll ask the president to speak, and we will have, then, a short conversation. And then it'll be open for questions from all of you in relation to the subject tonight of the president, which is stabilize, consolidate, reform E.U. moves from crisis management to reform agenda. And we all very much look forward to hearing from you, Mr. President, on this very important subject not just for Europe but for the world. I think many of you know something of the background of the president which is, indeed, distinguished both as a scholar and as a politician. His work and scholarship includes his starting his career in Portugal and then working at the University of Geneva, then spending some time as a visiting professor at the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. And, subsequently, he became head of the international relations department at Lusiada University in Lisbon and the founder of the University Association of European Studies. But then politics attracted him. And in 1980, he entered that field in the Belgian political scene in the Social Democratic Party. He was elected three times. And in April 2002, he was elected prime minister of Portugal. July 2004, elected president of the European Commission which he is now serving his second five-year term. He holds many honorary degrees and honors of which I shall not, if you don't mind, repeat this evening. But take it that he is well recognized in the international community. His coming here tonight is deeply appreciated by us because it is a very important time, I think, for all of us as we look at the global economy. And to have the leader of Europe come to speak to us gives us an opportunity not only to learn about what is going on in the countries that he represents and speaks for but also to look at our own situation within the context of global economic and political development. So if I may, Mr. President, I would like to call on you immediately so that they don't have to listen to me. And then when you're finished, we'll have a short conversation and we'll open it for questions. President Barroso? (Applause.) EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSE MANUEL BARROSO: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you very much -- (inaudible) -- someone Ivery much admire and respect for the kind words of introduction. Let me start by thanking you for inviting me to speak today. In fact, I came several times to the Council on Foreign Relations, and when I last spoke to you, you were still showing the full force of the financial and economic storm. Certainly, the European economy was then in deep trouble. It had, so far, the most severe stress tests imaginable. And there was a climate of fear. People were worried about their pensions. Companies could not get credit. If they had capital, they could not risk the investment. Business dropped because no one knew of the future health. The storm damage is still all around us. More than 6.3 million Europeans have lost their jobs since 2008. Many families have been pushed towards the poverty line. European Union member states have seen their deficits rise to 7 percent of GDP on average, and debt ratios rise to more than 80 percent of GDP. Many doubt Europeans' determination to respond. Many doubt our capacity to act. I think I can say they were wrong. The nations of Europe looked for answers, and they found them in European Union. We are the overcoming difficulties together. The economic outlook in European Union is now better than when I last addressed you, not least because of our giant action. The recovery is gathering pace, although, admittedly, progress is uneven within the Union. Growth this year will be higher than initially forecast. The unemployment rate is similar to the U.S. rate, and while it is still much too high, it has at least stopped increasing. A degree of cautious optimism has taken root, but we cannot sit back and relax yet. It is too early to write the epitaph of what some call the "Great Recession." Uncertainties and risks remain outside as well as inside the European Union. The after-pains of the crisis are likely to remain with us for quite some time. So to consolidate the progress we have made, it is now vital that Europe moves from crisis management to reform agenda. Budgetary expansion has played its role in countering decline in economic activity. Now, in the context of an accommodating monetary stance, only significant steps to reforms will prevent medium-term growth prospects from being disappointing. The priorities of the to-do list of Europe economic policy making are: completing financial regulatory reform, continued fiscal consolidation and tackling macroeconomic imbalances by frontloading structure reforms. That's quite a challenge. But as I look at how this crisis has changed Europe, there are plenty of reasons to believe we will succeed. First, extremely difficult but necessary and unavoidable decisions have already been implemented at the national level. Greece is the obvious example. But 10 other member states have also embarked on a path of convincing structural reform and fiscal consolidation. Second, there is striking concensus about the way forward forged in a large part by the need to develop a common European position for the G-20. European Commission has been putting forth proposals that have received overall support among our 27 member states. Traditional policy divides between key member states have narrowed considerably. There is now a broad commitment to a balanced exit strategy and a return to fiscal sustainability, particularly as demographic challenges start to bind. Member states agree that fiscal consolidation should involve expenditure cuts, if necessary, that are enforced by tax increases. They also agree that priority should be given to growth-friendly budget items. The third reason for confidence is that the traditional architecture of Europe will be substantially stronger as we exit the crisis. The reform system of fiscal rules, a new system to tackle macroeconomic imbalances and European systemic risk board will help to make the -- (inaudible) -- work more effective. With better enforcement of rules and earlier warning of problems comes greater treatability. In fact, just yesterday, the European parliament gave its final approval to the supervisory package that the commission had put forward last year. Up until now, our market was interdependent but oversight was purely national. From 2011 on, Europe will be the first region in the world to have in place top-notch supervision that is up to the challenges of the future. Moreover, financial facilities which were created to respond to the Euro crisis which amount to 500 billion Euros have put a major hole in Europe's economic and monetary union. And this opened the possibility of developing a more permanent solution. And the adoption of the so-called European semester, which concentrates in one semester the bulk of economic purveyance of the European Union will encourage greater coordination, economic transparency between member states as they plan, discuss and adopt their national budgets. So it will be even before they present budgets to their respective parliaments and then decide of collective and monetary. Taken together, all this represents quite a leap forward for European economic governance. Mechanisms to combine European-led economic reform programs with European financial solidarity have been created which were simply inconceivable before the crisis. Two or three years ago, if you asked me is this possible, I would say not in the forseeable future. In fact, it was probably the greatest driver for accepting reforms that were simply not possible some time ago. So these are historical times for Europe, but they will also have an important impact on global financial markets. In parallel, we are now frontloading growth enhancing structural reforms through a strategy we decided to call Europe 2020, a program to guide our economy towards new sources of growth and social cohesion in order to achieve smart, sustainable -- (inaudible) -- growth. Business is at the heart of this strategy, small and medium enterprises in particular, which is not surprising. Defined as companies employing one to 250 people, SMEs represent more than 99 percent of all the European firms and provide two out of every three private-sector jobs. Getting credit flowing again, investing in innovation and attacking red tape are priorities here. Another priority is Europe's international market. This is a well-developed web of financial and economic relations, but there are still some missing links and bottlenecks acting as a drag on growth and entrepreneurship. We are now mapping all of them out. We will come with an emerging new package of measures. This is necessary because, since 1992, the date of its launching the internal market, like our societies, have changed beyond all recognition. Back then, few people had mobile phones. Even fewer had heard of the Internet. E-commerce had not been invented. Now, we are truly a service economy. The internal market makes itss presence felt in all sectors of the economy, and this is boosting competitiveness across the board with a new push because it is the strongest driver for growth that Europe has. There is no time to lose. So this fall, we will bring forward a single market act that we will be presenting -- (inaudible) -- of measures that stimulate growth. Flanking these priorities are a whole range of measures that add up to a comprehensive reform and modernization program at all levels of government. At the European level, we are launching a number of flagship initiatives. Examples include the digital agenda to create the right environment and infrastructure for emerging high-tech sectors and innovation -- (inaudible) -- improve Europe's innovation performance along the whole chain from research to retail, and industrial policy for the organization era that recognizes the new realities of cross-border production and a jobs and skills agenda. Finally, trade remains an important engine for growth and also for jobs. And trade is very important, also -- (inaudible) -- innovation competitiveness. So a renewed trade policy is also in the pipeline, and we will present our proposals in October. We will open up more markets for Europe and more job opportunities in Europe through new and better free-trade agreements with all corners of the globe. Just now, we have concluded the trade agreement with South Korea. We will open more markets by joining our regulatory rules with our key partners so that we do not have different energy-efficiency or -- (inaudible) -- sanitary standards. And European goods do not sit at foreign ports waiting for extra security clearance. Of course, all these would have been greatly facilitated had there been an agreement on the Doha Trade Round already. So we'll maintain momentum for a successful conclusion. In European Union alone, an agreement will boost GDP by around $40 billion. Trade also has huge potential as a means to enforce a transatlantic partnership -- (inaudible) -- that are quite impressive. European Union and the United States account for the largest trade relationship in the world with 33 percent of world trading goods, 44 percent in services. Transatlantic trade and investment is responsible for 14 million jobs in Europe and America. And I will further discuss these matters together with the president of the European Council, with President Obama in the next European Union-U.S. summit which will take place in Lisbon on the 20th of November. Ladies and gentlemen, I have sketched out the briefest of outlines describing how Europe is moving from crisis management to reform agenda. I could summarize all of this even further with just three words: stabilize, consolidate, reform. But now it is time for others to have their say, so I'd like to discuss these matters with you. These were just some words of introduction. Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause.) MODERATOR: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President, for those very incisive comments. I wonder if I could take you a little bit outside the U.S. and Europe for a moment to direct your attention to a challenge that I know you are well-informed about and, perhaps, can tell us a little bit about, which is how do you see the future with China, with India, with Asia as affecting both the growth of Europe and, indeed, the growth of our country? BARROSO: (Inaudible) -- has been and I hope it will continue to be positive engagement. China and India are the biggest countries in the world in population terms, so it's only natural that they have a bigger share of the world output. What was interesting was why was not that possible before regarding China. And where China's -- (inaudible) -- policy of opening -- in fact, they were benefitting a lot from this opening, and they are, I think, I can say, among at least the key partners, the great beneficiaries of globalization. And as we say to them very often -- and I've been discussing these matters -- (inaudible) -- with the Chinese leadership for many years now, if they are the biggest beneficiaries of this process, they also can contribute more for its success because the reality is -- and, of course, we have to be open and frank about this -- there are some concerns in other parts of the world about what is the consequence of this rise of China. So the point is to make it a win-win situation. And I think the Chinese leadership is perfectly aware of this issue. The leadership is extremely well informed and prepared. And now it's always a question of negotiation. We have -- (inaudible) -- negotiated with the Chinese, as you know very well yourself. And -- but making it as open a situation and expecting not -- I don't think we can expect a kind of a sudden change, but from a gradual point of view, some improvement in the situation. So we tried to engage positively with China and we've, so far, been urging -- (inaudible) -- market not only in Asia. Brazil is a very important case in point, by the way. We have established now what we call strategic partnerships with those countries. And we think, of course it is important to work with them for -- as much as possible a global system of openness, and a system of openness means, as we say very often, open economies need rules so that, as much as possible, you have a cooperative, coordinated approach. That was -- (inaudible) -- the instinct or the intuition behind the G-20. The G-20 -- (inaudible). Of course, there are some successes about it, but I believe that -- (inaudible) -- at least it was possible to have a cooperative approach instead of a crisis and not just a confrontational approach. MODERATOR: And when we talk -- and I should, perhaps, have asked this first -- not just about the competition about China -- we need to be thinking about how strong is Europe today. And in May, authorities, together with the IMF, put together a thousand-billion-dollar fund essentially for backing up Europe in terms of difficulty. And there were a number of countries that were seen as vulnerable. Your remarks were very positive, I thought, in terms of your own assessment of the economic outlook. Do you think we're through the problems of the so-called pigs of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain? Is this something that we can forget about, or just move forward? BARROSO: Yes. I thought, from the beginning, that all this language and this analogy assessments regarding the difficulties of Europe -- (inaudible) -- taken together, your area, as a -- (inaudible) -- lower than American are much lower than the Japanese model. Overall, there is a position of balance. And the Euro has been a great success for Europe. So all this talk about the instability of the Euro -- in fact, if you ask most people who think the Euro is too high, they will not mind if the Euro will be lower because -- now, the point is -- and this is new -- that in Euro area, we have now 16, very soon 17 countries -- one of them will join. There are -- (Inaudible) -- and so what happened was, in fact, that the markets started to discriminate against, in terms of sovereign debt, of some weaker members of Euro. And you've mentioned that. And that's why now we are acting and we have established this fund. From the European Union, only 500 billion Euros. The IMF said that they are -- (inaudible) -- 250, so we can make $1 trillion. It was not just talk. I'm saying that because, frankly, sometimes people are -- outside of Europe, they underestimate, from my point of view -- including some analysts in the market -- they underestimate the interdependence of the European economy and the absolute need for them to act together. I was working on this matter night and day during the worst moment, most difficult moment, and I never had a doubt that, at the end, we would establish the program for Greece and, also, to -- (inaudible) -- because I knew perfectly well what Angela Merkel thinks about it, and all the others despite of all the politics involved. So this is a necessary move we want to convey to you here, our friends -- (inaudible) -- from the United States. I think the Euro is a strong currency and is there to stay and to be reinforced. Now, there are, as you said -- and I'm very -- (inaudible) -- and that's why some of those most vulnerable situations are now facing it. Greece, I have mentioned, took a very important, draconian program, which is now the Greek expression -- draconian program. Other countries like Spain and Portugal are taking those measures as well. Ireland, a case in point. And so I believe we are going to overcome those difficulties and, in fact, all the system is working for that. And the fact that they are in the Euro area is a driver for it because there is some kind of discipline that is now reinforced by the Euro and, also, by the markets. MODERATOR: And we here should overlook the comments that are made about the excessive strength of Germany and the occasional statement by the president of France that maybe the balance is not there to keep Europe cohesive? That's behind us, is it? BARROSO: No, I think it's very good that Germany is strong because Germany is, in fact, the engine of the European economy. And it is -- if Germany was not so strong, there we could have a problem regarding the Euro because the last argument of protection of the Euro is, in fact, also German. And so until recently, I think it was the number-one export in the world alone, which is amazing, a country, as I mentioned, of Germany. The European Union, taken together, is still the number-one exporter in the world. Now China has come up. And so the -- (inaudible) -- is not the export sector of Germany but, also, the culture, the financial culture of Germany, I think, is a great effort not only for Germany but for Europe. And Germany's the number-one client or investor of almost all the other countries in Europe. People should not forget that. So usually, if Germany goes well, that's a signal that others can join in if they are not yet there. It's always the first or the second importer of almost all, if not all the other 26 member states of European Union. So it's -- (inaudible) -- that Germany is doing well. But, of course, as your question suggests, we have a very high benchmark. So when you compare, of course, the performance of other countries while, in other parts of the world, the comparison is not so high as Germany. It makes, of course, things more difficult for other governments, but systemically, it's good that Germany is now having such a successful performance. MODERATOR: In our country, Mr. President, a number of people are saying that we have grown up thinking of the relationships between the United States, Europe and Japan. And people of my generation typically only thought of that -- the billion people that had 80 percent of the world's GDP. Today, as we look out for the next 40 years, we're going to have another two and a half billion people on the planet with less than 100 million going to European and American countries. We're going to see a swing of the middle class significantly towards Asia, but there are going to be a lot of countries left behind. Is Europe concerned about the great differences between the standard of living in the United States and Europe and, at the other end, 2 billion people in Africa that will have maybe standards of living that are 4 (percent) or 5 percent of what it is we have in the West? To what extent is Europe thinking about these markets and these people? BARROSO: We are more than ever now. I can't tell you now. I can make the comparison with situations sometime before. I remember six years ago when I was elected the first time for the European Commission, there was a discussion in European -- (inaudible) -- where all the emphasis -- (inaudible) -- was the commission president. And the discussion was only about the internal issues. This time, five years afterward, the top subject in the discussion, I would say more than 50 percent was China. MODERATOR: Really? BARROSO: So people are completely aware of the new geoeconomic and geopolitical factors. Having said this, we believe it's better to engage and try to make this as cooperative and positive sum game. Africa is mentioned. Africa is another kind of issue, of course. The links with Africa and Europe are extremely strong because post-colonial -- (inaudible) -- links and we tried to do our best with that region. Just now, I came here for the MDG also where I announced -- (inaudible) -- our support for the MDG and our most important partners in cooperation are the African countries and so-called NCP (ph) -- (inaudible) -- countries. And so we are aware of this. In Europe, I want to be very frank with you. In Europe today, there is gloomy -- it's fashionable to be pessimistic. This probably is not so very different. I call it the intellectual -- (inaudible) -- of pessimism. Someone wants to pretend it's intelligence, it should be more pessimism than the other because that -- (inaudible). I do not agree. I simply do not agree with that -- (inaudible). I believe Europe has the intellectual, critical resources to overcome the difficulty. I think the rise of others is not necessarily our crisis. I mean -- and very often, I think about the United States and Europe after the Second World War when the United States -- (inaudible) -- great vision. Europe was destroyed and they -- (inaudible) -- in Europe. And the rise of Europe afterward, great moment was not -- (inaudible) -- the United States. So I mean, the rise of Africa -- in fact, there are hundreds of people in Africa -- I don't think that. On the contrary. I think it can be a great opportunity. So that's why we are very committed to keep markets open, to work with those emerging countries, also, to respect intellectual property rules, procurement rules, to establish, as much as possible, some common standards. But that is our vision. Some will say it's idealistic -- (inaudible) -- will be realistic. So, probably, but it worked. So I think it is our enlightened self-interest, to work with those emerging markets, of course, trying to keep, as much as possible, our common values. Now, if you think about the United States where the United States are looking, I hope the United States will not forget Europe and Europe will not forget the United States because we have a very deep bond, not only economically. Still, the most important economic relationship in the world -- (inaudible) -- trading investment, relations between United States and Europe. And those in the business community really want as much as possible to keep a real transatlantic economic market, and I think we should do for that for a kind of agenda for growth and job both sides of Atlantic. But it's much more than that. It's what happens between Europe and United States -- some people say old-fashioned to speak about it, but I will speak -- (inaudible). Today, President Obama, in a very, I think, inspired speech about trying to -- not only the issue of Middle East, but he was speaking about liberty and freedom and that we should not forget about it. And he invited those that remember when their countries were not democracies not to forget to fight for democracy. I think we should remember, and I think we should keep this kind of special relationship. MODERATOR: Well, I think we certainly welcome it, and I know that my colleagues will, no doubt, have many questions. I could keep on this bilateral conversation, but I'll never be asked to chair a meeting again. (Laughter.) So may I call on the audience? Yes, sir? If you could give your name for the president, it might be helpful. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Bill Drozdiak, president of the American Council on Germany. Mr. President, I wonder if you could explain to us why it is so difficult for NATO and the European Union to work more effectively together. I mean, here you have the two principle institutions of the West based in the same city, facing many of the same problems these days as economic issues blend into security issues and now facing the challenge of Asia. Wouldn't it be a practical and sensible step to find a way to bring these two institutions much more closely together in order to solidify the transatlantic link in dealing with the modern-day problems and, also, take advantage of the fact that there are 22 countries that are now members of both institutions? BARROSO: We are in favor of this, and we are working for this. In fact, what you can -- (inaudible) -- just some days ago, it was another conclusion, and there is a -- Cathy Ashton, the high representative, she received a mandate to work, and the secretary is already working -- the secretary general of NATO has listened. And they are doing it. But you certainly are aware of what is the difficulty with -- diplomatici difficulty that has nothing to do with Turkey and Cyprus; Cyprus, a member of the European Union and Turkey a member of NATO. And that is the real -- going to be -- and diplomatic, but that's the real difficulty sometimes. I remember well, I worked for a minister of my country for some time, and we have some difficulties because there are all kinds of procedural obstacles to any kind of establishment of a more pragmatic partnership between NATO and European Union. But the European Union aside, the commission, we are extremely open to it and, in fact, we are already working because now, as you know, the new concept of defense is more and more comprehensive. It's not just about military power, it's about humanitarian aid, it's about state building, about justice, training police. In the commission, we are funding many, many programs where, by the way, our people sometimes are running the risk of their -- (inaudible) -- because we could get -- achieve the proper protocol with NATO. And the reason was because of those diplomatic difficulties among some members of -- I mean, let's say two members of either the European Union or NATO. It will be good if they could overcome this difficulty because of what is -- it's basically a bilateral issue that is putting difficulty in the cooperation -- (inaudible) -- cooperation between NATO and European Union. MODERATOR: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Various European countries -- Germany in the lead -- are cracking down on massive tax cheating, much of which is affected through the secret bank accounts and offshore financial centers such as Lichtenstein. The OECD effort has failed to significantly change the system. Do you have a strategy for dealing with the global offshore system that facilitates not only massive tax cheating but corporate corruption, bribery, the movement of terrorist money and money of organized crime throughout the world? BARROSO: Yes. Very important point. In fact, that's one of the issues that the G-20 should look at. And we are -- (inaudible) -- trying to go on with that fight against this kind of activity in Europe and some of our partners because of some laws of banks security that, in fact, make it easier, this kind of behavior. And we are doing it, also, in a bilateral context with those countries. Myself has been discussing with some of our partners, European partners and non-members of the European Union. But it will be important where it's not only OECD but also globally. And so far, it has been a difficult issue. It's been a difficult issue. Some of our partners are not reacting very positively with the idea of having, as much as possible, a lateral playing field globally in that matter. But, of course, we will keep our negotiation effort on the table. MODERATOR: Yes, ma'am? QUESTIONER: (Inaudible). Mr. President, one of the big differences between the U.S. and the E.U. is the strength of small businesses and the ease with which people can start companies in the U.S. And you mentioned in your speech the importance of small and medium businesses in the European economy. What would it take for Europe to make it easy for entrepreneurs to start their companies, to make money and to grow so that Europe becomes competitive on that level with the U.S.? BARROSO: That's definitely one of the issues that we have been looking at, namely, in our -- (inaudible) -- with American -- (inaudible) -- a great influence in Europe. Many countries in Europe now adopted programs of simplification. It's now possible, in many of our member states, to create a company -- (inaudible) -- hours to be -- (inaudible). It is, in fact, a great -- (inaudible). There was benchmarks, and there was some kind of looking at best practices. And now, it's much simpler to create -- (inaudible) -- point of view. The huge bureaucracy of the past has been eliminated. The real problem -- the real difficulty in my point of view of the United States -- (inaudible) -- financing. Venture capital in Europe is not as evolved as in the United States. And let's be awful frank about this, the entrepreneurship culture here is different because of -- (inaudible) -- capital factors, cultural factors, the way the state, the public financing. So there are several cultural factors as well that makes the life of a company in Europe a little -- entrepreneurship in Europe different from the United States. Sometimes it's not just about to create an enterprise; it's about to put an end to it when it's no longer profitable or no longer adequate. And precisely, one of the points I was mentioning this in my introductory remarks was about reforms. And this is one of the reforms we are trying to achieve. Some member states are now appreciating ambitious reforms for simplification -- conditions but, also, the labor-market reform. (Inaudible) -- flexibility of their economic -- (inaudible) -- and there, the American -- (inaudible) -- can be -- (inaudible) -- of course, having in mind that we have, in some areas, difference. In Europe, we have -- (inaudible) -- what we call social-market economy. And that comes from Germany because, after the Second World War, social -- (inaudible) -- with the idea that we want a dynamic market, but we want relatively high levels of social inclusion. We also think it is relatively strong compared to the United States. So and this is -- Europeans want to keep it. So I have to be clear about it. If you go to Europe to propose so-called American model, it will not work. Politically, it will not work. There is not support for this. But if you go to Europe and say, look, we have to -- (inaudible) -- the Americans and others in terms of cultural entrepreneurship -- (inaudible) -- some of the best -- (inaudible) -- interactive relation, simplification of -- (inaudible) -- then people are receptive. And, therefore, that is the line we are following in the commission. So to modernize our social market economy without making a revolution but making a reform. MODERATOR: The gentleman here? I guess not. It's a lady. Madame? QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. -- (inaudible). My name is Catherine Hagan (ph) and, Mr. President, I come from Geneva where I work on multi-state culture dialogue. And I'm here because of the MDG summit, but we are also very interested in trade and have been monitoring the activities at the WTO where the issues have been moving beyond the Doha Round to issues of food security, climate change, innovation. I was intrigued by your remark about a new trade proposal coming from the European Union, and I would like to know if you could share with us some of the thinking that is going into that proposal, not necessarily what will be coming out of that proposal because that's to be announced in October, as you said. But it would be very interesting to hear if you are reviving the Singapore proposals or whether there are other issues that have come into the floor and you're thinking about trade and how to take a new approach to this. BARROSO: Look, I cannot anticipate what they are going to propose. We have to first discuss it in the commission. In fact, we have been asked to come with some ideas, and that's what we are preparing. But I can give you the background -- political background of the proposal, why -- To be completely honest with you, in Europe and some of the member states, also a perception that sometimes we are too naive in trade matters. I think the same applies here in the United States sometimes. We open our markets, but we don't -- (inaudible) -- some of our partners, maybe in terms of the monetary experience to make a -- (inaudible) -- effort. And our companies that are in some other parts of the world, they are complaining to us very strongly. They feel discriminated, namely in terms of investment in terms of intellectual property rights and in other matters. And so what we are now trying to do is to reassure also the European public opinion that we'll pursue a trade policy that is more open and we will, at least the commission, will pull any, let's say inflation of protection. I think protection in itself -- (inaudible). Europe is the biggest supporter in the world. So it's quite obvious that it is's also fitting. But at the same time, the assurances to the Europeans, what they have to gain from this kind of open market and linking these issues, also, with our overall interest. And this is what -- political background. Now, political, let's say environment for our proposal that we are now preparing to -- (inaudible) -- so very soon you will be informed about it. But my -- (inaudible) -- is to get more support for open markets and expanding into other areas, not only trade on goods but also on services. Likewise, easier -- (inaudible) -- investment. I think this is very important. And the points you made are also very important. In fact, in European Union now, there is a great concern with many of our stakeholders and member states, and there's a considerable -- (inaudible) -- regarding, for instance, worker's rights regarding the norm of environment protection or fighting climate change. And this is very important and difficult debate because the point is we now have -- (inaudible) -- regulations, very ambitious -- (inaudible) -- to fight climate change. By the way -- (inaudible). It's 20, 20, 20, by 2030. So we have committed and it's in our law -- regulation -- to reduce greenhouse gas by 20 percent in 2020, 20 percent of energy should come from renewables, and 20 percent energy efficiency. And some of those -- (inaudible) -- say okay, but you are competing with others that don't do that. So how can we -- so that's why we have to give some assurances to those sectors -- (inaudible) -- energy sectors that they will not be the victims of this kind of regulation. And that's what we are working. And, in fact, we have some mechanisms for climate change program to avoid them putting in an uncompetitive position. And this is the kind of assurance we want, also, to give to our stakeholders in Europe, but the purpose should be to keep markets open and to open more markets. MODERATOR: Yes? QUESTIONER: This is Bernie Ferrari. I'm a management consultant. Mr. President, this morning in the FT in the front page, there was a discussion of Siemens' extraordinary agreement with its union workers of 150,000 for job security. Given your aspirations for European economic performance around the world, what is your reaction to that agreement? BARROSO: Look, it was exactly following my remark before when I said to you very honestly, I think, Europe is different from the United States in some aspects of economic culture. We are basically open economies and want to -- but this is typical of -- (inaudible) -- disagreement. But that's part of the social-market economy. And it's impressive to see that Germany, for instance -- not only Germany -- but in terms of the criss, the trade unions have accepted something that was impossible to have before in terms of reduction or freezing of their salaries. That was possible, also, because of the culture of compromise in -- (inaudible). So I'm not suggesting that that should be the model, but in that case, apparently, it's working, and so I hope it will work. But it depends. Other countries have a different culture of negotiation. Europe is very complex. We have 27 countries, sometimes very different in its relations. But this is one of the examples. We also have -- as you know, it was -- (inaudible) -- what we call flex security. So it means flexibility in terms of the labor relation but, at the same time, a very developed system of social guarantees -- (inaudible). And so in that case, people accept that enhanced flexibility so you can lose your job, but you are sure that, if you lose your job, you get, let's say, an important contribution from society for some time that you may stay unemployed. This is one of the issues that makes, sometimes, our system different from the American one. And I certainly think that it is important to move the assurances to our workers that they are taken care of because, in the Europen societies now, many people are angry. They have seen what happened coming from financial sector, and they are seeing now huge bonuses again. They are seeing -- I'm going to be very frank with you -- that some people are coming back to business as usual as if nothing had happened. And so the perception in many of our countries -- (inaudible) -- we tax payers, we have to save those banks, and now they are coming back to business as usual and we don't have any guarantees with the worker or with the -- (inaudible). And that's why I think some level of social consensus is extremely important; namely, in some countries where there was a tradition of, let's say, sometimes, social polarization or more conflicting industrial relations. Germany has that German tradition. And if it works for that company, it's a good thing. I wish them the best. MODERATOR: My goodness. Ambassador -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Mr. President, the European Union countries have made very drastic commitments at deficit reduction, fiscal consolidation. At the same time, in the United States, our government and many economists fear that too drastic fiscal consolidation risks a double-dip recession. And our Federal Reserve is engaged in major efforts to increase the money supply and expand and lower interest rates. Are we in danger of getting at cross-purposes here in the macroeconomic policy? BARROSO: We discussed this issue in the G-20 in Toronto. And, in fact, I think there was a real consensus that Europe should do exactly that. Before the G-20, there was some discussion. There was some cross -- let's say, analysis and assessment and sometimes trying to put it in context. But I will say I was in the G-20 and discussed this, also, there. And I think people understood the European position. I have no doubt that, for Europe, there is no other way to be completely -- (inaudible) -- now to those programs in Europe when we have both countries that are actually, I mean, vulnerable in terms of -- because that's the difference between us and the United States. I mean, you are one country. Europe is 27 countries. We are a union of states with some macro-integrated, some policies integrated, like in your area, monetary policy. But we have one monetary policy but, afterward, the budget may be national. And so for us, it's fundamental to restore confidence of the markets. And the confidence of the markets will not be there if we go on with this -- (inaudible) -- policy. This is -- (inaudible) -- here. (Inaudible), but next year, it will not be. And so -- and I think it will be, I repeat, massive for Europe to go for expansive policy at this moment. And nobody, I mean, in Europe is now proposing an incredible, at least -- (inaudible) -- possibility. Having said this, United States is in a different position. Also, the dollar has a different position in the global market. It's for the Americans -- up to them to decide which way. But, for Europe, we have no doubt that this is the way. Having said this, it's not just about this proposal. Actually, it's about structural reform. It's about being more selective. It's not just to look at the expenditure, the quantity but also the quality of the expenditure. It's possible -- we believe it's possible to have some growth-friendly measures of fiscal consolidation. That's what we are trying to do through fine tuning of the policies. But in Europe, I repeat, now if we don't do this -- (inaudible) -- will increase instability of the markets, and I don't think that's good for the United States. If Europe or the Euro starts now -- and that point was made by all of us at the G-20 very clearly, by myself and the heads of government of the European Union member states there and others. And then what it can do, for instance to stimulate demand is not by expansion -- (inaudible) -- reform. For instance, Germany, we are speaking -- (inaudible) -- very much. Germany, they have the potential for growth coming from a reform of their service sector. The service sector in Germany is, I mean, it's less competitive than others in Europe. You know, and that, by the way -- (inaudible) -- the Germans know that perfectly well, and their committed to do it. So there are other ways different from budgetary and stimulus to stimulate demand in Europe. MODERATOR: This lady is next. Go ahead. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett from the council. I want to come back to trade and to Africa. From the perspective of many African countries, the very policies that are in place at the E.U. to protect workers, to protect health, to deal with lower pesticide use, all those sorts of things are, in fact, keeping African agricultural products out of the European marketplace. And in particular, in the context of GM food restrictions and requirements for annotation of fertilizer use, pesticide use, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, seed derivative, everything -- how can you break this down so that the European feels they're eating a same tomato and the African feels they can grow large quantities of tomatoes and become rich selling them to Europeans? BARROSO: Look, first of all, European Union is, by far, the largest importer of agricultural products from developing countries. Europe imports more from the developing countries -- United States, Russia, Canada, Australia -- put together. So that idea that Europe is closed to agricultural products is simply not consumed by fact. Having said this, it's true that we have some reservations that are there because the European public wants us there that are relatively high levels of protection of consumers. And this is something that we discussed not only with Africa but in other parts of the world today. And what we tell our partners is that they should try to get their exports competitive with those conditions that are there not for protection, but because in the European society, people are simply not ready to lower their standards. The issue of GMO is an extremely difficult issue. I think that you are probably an expert on that. You have probably followed my -- and the commission's recent position. We - from one side, we want to respect fully the WTO rules, and we have been doing that. On the other side, in fact, there are some sectors of public opinion in Europe that are extremely concerned about GMOs. What we have now in the system with the -- (inaudible) -- the European Food Agency that gives us, the commission, the scientific opinion, and then we decide. And our position has been to decide in favor of introduction of GMOs if that independent agency confirms there are no risks for environment or for the health. But it remains extremely controversial in Europe. That is why, recently, we have proposed, the commission, to keep the system but, for cultivation, to visit our national level. So the so-called -- (inaudible). So if we go -- (inaudible) -- the introduction of a GMO product in Europe -- (inaudible) -- but we cannot force one country to cultivate a GMO against its own will. And I think this is a good, fair compromise because there are some controversies. I will give you an example -- Austria -- where this issue is really very strong. We've been discussing this at several governments -- (inaudible) -- how can we be forced to cultivate something that our population does not want? And this has been a very difficult issue for us. It has nothing to do with protection. It has nothing to do with the restrictions to Africa. I can tell -- (inaudible). It has to do with the public concern on the issues of public health, issues of environment protection. And this is why we have to keep those standards and try to find a fair way of making our rules competitive, of course -- (inaudible) -- WTO. MODERATOR: The gentleman in front? QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Paul Jather (ph), financial advisory business. One relationship that remains important, I would think, that hasn't been mentioned today is that between Europe -- the European community and Russia. And, of course, there are many aspects of it. The one that I wanted to hang out and see what your thoughts are on the overall relationship with particular emphasis on the fact that, in the last few years, the Russians seem to have used or tended to use their energy exports, sometimes, to exert political pressure. And I wonder what your thoughts are on the relationship, its context and where it's going. BARROSO: You are right it's a vital relation for us and for them. For the Russians, we are the number-one partner in trade and investment. European Union is the number-one partner. And they are also very important partner for Europe. And that's why we try to establish or develop diplomatic -- a good relationship with them. Things are improving. There were, in fact -- some issues were difficult, some political issues. The issue of Georgia, of course, but other matters relating to -- (inaudible). Restrictions of exports from Poland to Russia. But, for instance now, the relationship between Poland and Russia is much more constructive than it was before. And so -- and don't forget that -- (inaudible) -- the Russian leadership, we meet every time -- every year at least twice in a formal summit serving all these years, meeting President Putin and now President Medvedev. I'm speaking for the 27, not only for -- I have to take on board the concerns not only of the countries that are exporting to Russia but those who -- some concerns of some countries, somtimes some small countries that express some concern regarding the relationship. But nowadays, I see there is good potential in the relationship with Russia. President Medvedev wants the result of the developing work because -- (inaudible) -- organization in Russia, and we want to be partners in this effort. And if he's -- repeat, once again, a win-win situation. The relations with -- we have lived with this crisis-- (inaudible). In fact -- it's already public. More than 30 phone calls I have to make to President Putin at the time -- or Prime Minister Putin -- and the leadership in Ukraine -- President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Timoshenko and, also, some talks with President Medvedev. And, of course, this was a great impact and a great impact on public opinion in Europe. What was happening was that European people were suffering a clash between Russia and Ukraine, it was -- and I believe it was not directed against European Union. But was no interest at all in Russia or in Ukraine to make problem with European Union. But, in fact, we were suffering from that, let's say, interruption of the flow of gas. And now we are working more constructively with Russians and Europeans -- European Union -- to try to achieve, once again, a win-win situation, also, in energy. And I think it is, of course important also for our Russian -- (inaudible). MODERATOR: We have two minutes only, I think, Mr. President. Is there a very quick question taking seconds and then we'll give a minute and a half to the president to reply? QUESTIONER: I don't know if this will be quick, but I'll ask -- MODERATOR: It has to be quick. QUESTIONER: You talked about reform, and that's the time for reforming in Europe. But I mean, the banking sector in Europe doesn't seem to be reformed still, and there are some countries where the banks are still weakened. And for many critics, this is why, you know, some of the debt problems are not -- are worrying markets even more. Is there an effort to really get to the bottom of the banking sector in all the countries where the banks are weak and to lead a reform so that there's no -- you know, the way the U.S. sort of really forced the banks to come up with more capital -- and then there were stress tests, but there was really nothing that came out of it is that critic say. So is that -- I mean, is there more effort? Or do you think that you're satisfied? BARROSO: No. I mean, first of all, the stress tests were, I believe, a serious, competent at this time. In fact, we have been pushing for some years to do it every two years to have these open stress tests. Having said this, I want to make it clear we believe that, fundamentally, the banking sector in Europe is healthy. We believe it's healthy, our banking sector. That does not exclude that there were not some cases that should be addressed, and we will address them and, in fact, we are working on that matter. We are working that matter with the possible -- (inaudible) -- difficulties that may happen in the banking sector. But the idea that European banking sector is unhealthy or very vulnerable is completely wrong, completely wrong. Having said this, we also welcome very much the latest decisions of the Basel, and we believe they are going in the right direction to reinforce the quality of capital for our banks. And we are now putting in place, also, the proper mechanisms of coordination of what has been done by international supervisors because, as I said in my introductory remarks, in Europe, until now, supervision was purely national. And this when many of the banks are, indeed, cross-border banks. They are not -- they have had -- (inaudible) -- of course, of member states, but, in fact, they are. European are sometimes mobile banks. And this -- some of the reforms -- (inaudible) -- and that will be coming very soon to improve, I think, the overall credibility of our financial sector. MODERATOR: Mr. President, I think we are all very grateful to you for the time and for the quality in your answers and your openness. And we thank you very much, indeed. We feel very confident about Europe now. Many of us will probably want to come and settle there. (Laughter.) And we thank you very much. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2010, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to welcome you all here this evening for a very privileged evening with Jose Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission. And I'd like to welcome you, Mr. President, and also, Mrs. Barroso, and members of your team who are here with you in a very busy week. If I may, I will just remind you the technical aspects of tonight, which is please turn off your cell phones is the first requirement. And the second requirement, which normally is, is to tell you that this meeting would be off the record. But, in fact, tonight, it is on the record. And the framework of the evening will be that we'll ask the president to speak, and we will have, then, a short conversation. And then it'll be open for questions from all of you in relation to the subject tonight of the president, which is stabilize, consolidate, reform E.U. moves from crisis management to reform agenda. And we all very much look forward to hearing from you, Mr. President, on this very important subject not just for Europe but for the world. I think many of you know something of the background of the president which is, indeed, distinguished both as a scholar and as a politician. His work and scholarship includes his starting his career in Portugal and then working at the University of Geneva, then spending some time as a visiting professor at the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. And, subsequently, he became head of the international relations department at Lusiada University in Lisbon and the founder of the University Association of European Studies. But then politics attracted him. And in 1980, he entered that field in the Belgian political scene in the Social Democratic Party. He was elected three times. And in April 2002, he was elected prime minister of Portugal. July 2004, elected president of the European Commission which he is now serving his second five-year term. He holds many honorary degrees and honors of which I shall not, if you don't mind, repeat this evening. But take it that he is well recognized in the international community. His coming here tonight is deeply appreciated by us because it is a very important time, I think, for all of us as we look at the global economy. And to have the leader of Europe come to speak to us gives us an opportunity not only to learn about what is going on in the countries that he represents and speaks for but also to look at our own situation within the context of global economic and political development. So if I may, Mr. President, I would like to call on you immediately so that they don't have to listen to me. And then when you're finished, we'll have a short conversation and we'll open it for questions. President Barroso? (Applause.) EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JOSE MANUEL BARROSO: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, thank you very much -- (inaudible) -- someone Ivery much admire and respect for the kind words of introduction. Let me start by thanking you for inviting me to speak today. In fact, I came several times to the Council on Foreign Relations, and when I last spoke to you, you were still showing the full force of the financial and economic storm. Certainly, the European economy was then in deep trouble. It had, so far, the most severe stress tests imaginable. And there was a climate of fear. People were worried about their pensions. Companies could not get credit. If they had capital, they could not risk the investment. Business dropped because no one knew of the future health. The storm damage is still all around us. More than 6.3 million Europeans have lost their jobs since 2008. Many families have been pushed towards the poverty line. European Union member states have seen their deficits rise to 7 percent of GDP on average, and debt ratios rise to more than 80 percent of GDP. Many doubt Europeans' determination to respond. Many doubt our capacity to act. I think I can say they were wrong. The nations of Europe looked for answers, and they found them in European Union. We are the overcoming difficulties together. The economic outlook in European Union is now better than when I last addressed you, not least because of our giant action. The recovery is gathering pace, although, admittedly, progress is uneven within the Union. Growth this year will be higher than initially forecast. The unemployment rate is similar to the U.S. rate, and while it is still much too high, it has at least stopped increasing. A degree of cautious optimism has taken root, but we cannot sit back and relax yet. It is too early to write the epitaph of what some call the "Great Recession." Uncertainties and risks remain outside as well as inside the European Union. The after-pains of the crisis are likely to remain with us for quite some time. So to consolidate the progress we have made, it is now vital that Europe moves from crisis management to reform agenda. Budgetary expansion has played its role in countering decline in economic activity. Now, in the context of an accommodating monetary stance, only significant steps to reforms will prevent medium-term growth prospects from being disappointing. The priorities of the to-do list of Europe economic policy making are: completing financial regulatory reform, continued fiscal consolidation and tackling macroeconomic imbalances by frontloading structure reforms. That's quite a challenge. But as I look at how this crisis has changed Europe, there are plenty of reasons to believe we will succeed. First, extremely difficult but necessary and unavoidable decisions have already been implemented at the national level. Greece is the obvious example. But 10 other member states have also embarked on a path of convincing structural reform and fiscal consolidation. Second, there is striking concensus about the way forward forged in a large part by the need to develop a common European position for the G-20. European Commission has been putting forth proposals that have received overall support among our 27 member states. Traditional policy divides between key member states have narrowed considerably. There is now a broad commitment to a balanced exit strategy and a return to fiscal sustainability, particularly as demographic challenges start to bind. Member states agree that fiscal consolidation should involve expenditure cuts, if necessary, that are enforced by tax increases. They also agree that priority should be given to growth-friendly budget items. The third reason for confidence is that the traditional architecture of Europe will be substantially stronger as we exit the crisis. The reform system of fiscal rules, a new system to tackle macroeconomic imbalances and European systemic risk board will help to make the -- (inaudible) -- work more effective. With better enforcement of rules and earlier warning of problems comes greater treatability. In fact, just yesterday, the European parliament gave its final approval to the supervisory package that the commission had put forward last year. Up until now, our market was interdependent but oversight was purely national. From 2011 on, Europe will be the first region in the world to have in place top-notch supervision that is up to the challenges of the future. Moreover, financial facilities which were created to respond to the Euro crisis which amount to 500 billion Euros have put a major hole in Europe's economic and monetary union. And this opened the possibility of developing a more permanent solution. And the adoption of the so-called European semester, which concentrates in one semester the bulk of economic purveyance of the European Union will encourage greater coordination, economic transparency between member states as they plan, discuss and adopt their national budgets. So it will be even before they present budgets to their respective parliaments and then decide of collective and monetary. Taken together, all this represents quite a leap forward for European economic governance. Mechanisms to combine European-led economic reform programs with European financial solidarity have been created which were simply inconceivable before the crisis. Two or three years ago, if you asked me is this possible, I would say not in the forseeable future. In fact, it was probably the greatest driver for accepting reforms that were simply not possible some time ago. So these are historical times for Europe, but they will also have an important impact on global financial markets. In parallel, we are now frontloading growth enhancing structural reforms through a strategy we decided to call Europe 2020, a program to guide our economy towards new sources of growth and social cohesion in order to achieve smart, sustainable -- (inaudible) -- growth. Business is at the heart of this strategy, small and medium enterprises in particular, which is not surprising. Defined as companies employing one to 250 people, SMEs represent more than 99 percent of all the European firms and provide two out of every three private-sector jobs. Getting credit flowing again, investing in innovation and attacking red tape are priorities here. Another priority is Europe's international market. This is a well-developed web of financial and economic relations, but there are still some missing links and bottlenecks acting as a drag on growth and entrepreneurship. We are now mapping all of them out. We will come with an emerging new package of measures. This is necessary because, since 1992, the date of its launching the internal market, like our societies, have changed beyond all recognition. Back then, few people had mobile phones. Even fewer had heard of the Internet. E-commerce had not been invented. Now, we are truly a service economy. The internal market makes itss presence felt in all sectors of the economy, and this is boosting competitiveness across the board with a new push because it is the strongest driver for growth that Europe has. There is no time to lose. So this fall, we will bring forward a single market act that we will be presenting -- (inaudible) -- of measures that stimulate growth. Flanking these priorities are a whole range of measures that add up to a comprehensive reform and modernization program at all levels of government. At the European level, we are launching a number of flagship initiatives. Examples include the digital agenda to create the right environment and infrastructure for emerging high-tech sectors and innovation -- (inaudible) -- improve Europe's innovation performance along the whole chain from research to retail, and industrial policy for the organization era that recognizes the new realities of cross-border production and a jobs and skills agenda. Finally, trade remains an important engine for growth and also for jobs. And trade is very important, also -- (inaudible) -- innovation competitiveness. So a renewed trade policy is also in the pipeline, and we will present our proposals in October. We will open up more markets for Europe and more job opportunities in Europe through new and better free-trade agreements with all corners of the globe. Just now, we have concluded the trade agreement with South Korea. We will open more markets by joining our regulatory rules with our key partners so that we do not have different energy-efficiency or -- (inaudible) -- sanitary standards. And European goods do not sit at foreign ports waiting for extra security clearance. Of course, all these would have been greatly facilitated had there been an agreement on the Doha Trade Round already. So we'll maintain momentum for a successful conclusion. In European Union alone, an agreement will boost GDP by around $40 billion. Trade also has huge potential as a means to enforce a transatlantic partnership -- (inaudible) -- that are quite impressive. European Union and the United States account for the largest trade relationship in the world with 33 percent of world trading goods, 44 percent in services. Transatlantic trade and investment is responsible for 14 million jobs in Europe and America. And I will further discuss these matters together with the president of the European Council, with President Obama in the next European Union-U.S. summit which will take place in Lisbon on the 20th of November. Ladies and gentlemen, I have sketched out the briefest of outlines describing how Europe is moving from crisis management to reform agenda. I could summarize all of this even further with just three words: stabilize, consolidate, reform. But now it is time for others to have their say, so I'd like to discuss these matters with you. These were just some words of introduction. Thank you very much for your attention. (Applause.) MODERATOR: Well, thank you very much, Mr. President, for those very incisive comments. I wonder if I could take you a little bit outside the U.S. and Europe for a moment to direct your attention to a challenge that I know you are well-informed about and, perhaps, can tell us a little bit about, which is how do you see the future with China, with India, with Asia as affecting both the growth of Europe and, indeed, the growth of our country? BARROSO: (Inaudible) -- has been and I hope it will continue to be positive engagement. China and India are the biggest countries in the world in population terms, so it's only natural that they have a bigger share of the world output. What was interesting was why was not that possible before regarding China. And where China's -- (inaudible) -- policy of opening -- in fact, they were benefitting a lot from this opening, and they are, I think, I can say, among at least the key partners, the great beneficiaries of globalization. And as we say to them very often -- and I've been discussing these matters -- (inaudible) -- with the Chinese leadership for many years now, if they are the biggest beneficiaries of this process, they also can contribute more for its success because the reality is -- and, of course, we have to be open and frank about this -- there are some concerns in other parts of the world about what is the consequence of this rise of China. So the point is to make it a win-win situation. And I think the Chinese leadership is perfectly aware of this issue. The leadership is extremely well informed and prepared. And now it's always a question of negotiation. We have -- (inaudible) -- negotiated with the Chinese, as you know very well yourself. And -- but making it as open a situation and expecting not -- I don't think we can expect a kind of a sudden change, but from a gradual point of view, some improvement in the situation. So we tried to engage positively with China and we've, so far, been urging -- (inaudible) -- market not only in Asia. Brazil is a very important case in point, by the way. We have established now what we call strategic partnerships with those countries. And we think, of course it is important to work with them for -- as much as possible a global system of openness, and a system of openness means, as we say very often, open economies need rules so that, as much as possible, you have a cooperative, coordinated approach. That was -- (inaudible) -- the instinct or the intuition behind the G-20. The G-20 -- (inaudible). Of course, there are some successes about it, but I believe that -- (inaudible) -- at least it was possible to have a cooperative approach instead of a crisis and not just a confrontational approach. MODERATOR: And when we talk -- and I should, perhaps, have asked this first -- not just about the competition about China -- we need to be thinking about how strong is Europe today. And in May, authorities, together with the IMF, put together a thousand-billion-dollar fund essentially for backing up Europe in terms of difficulty. And there were a number of countries that were seen as vulnerable. Your remarks were very positive, I thought, in terms of your own assessment of the economic outlook. Do you think we're through the problems of the so-called pigs of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain? Is this something that we can forget about, or just move forward? BARROSO: Yes. I thought, from the beginning, that all this language and this analogy assessments regarding the difficulties of Europe -- (inaudible) -- taken together, your area, as a -- (inaudible) -- lower than American are much lower than the Japanese model. Overall, there is a position of balance. And the Euro has been a great success for Europe. So all this talk about the instability of the Euro -- in fact, if you ask most people who think the Euro is too high, they will not mind if the Euro will be lower because -- now, the point is -- and this is new -- that in Euro area, we have now 16, very soon 17 countries -- one of them will join. There are -- (Inaudible) -- and so what happened was, in fact, that the markets started to discriminate against, in terms of sovereign debt, of some weaker members of Euro. And you've mentioned that. And that's why now we are acting and we have established this fund. From the European Union, only 500 billion Euros. The IMF said that they are -- (inaudible) -- 250, so we can make $1 trillion. It was not just talk. I'm saying that because, frankly, sometimes people are -- outside of Europe, they underestimate, from my point of view -- including some analysts in the market -- they underestimate the interdependence of the European economy and the absolute need for them to act together. I was working on this matter night and day during the worst moment, most difficult moment, and I never had a doubt that, at the end, we would establish the program for Greece and, also, to -- (inaudible) -- because I knew perfectly well what Angela Merkel thinks about it, and all the others despite of all the politics involved. So this is a necessary move we want to convey to you here, our friends -- (inaudible) -- from the United States. I think the Euro is a strong currency and is there to stay and to be reinforced. Now, there are, as you said -- and I'm very -- (inaudible) -- and that's why some of those most vulnerable situations are now facing it. Greece, I have mentioned, took a very important, draconian program, which is now the Greek expression -- draconian program. Other countries like Spain and Portugal are taking those measures as well. Ireland, a case in point. And so I believe we are going to overcome those difficulties and, in fact, all the system is working for that. And the fact that they are in the Euro area is a driver for it because there is some kind of discipline that is now reinforced by the Euro and, also, by the markets. MODERATOR: And we here should overlook the comments that are made about the excessive strength of Germany and the occasional statement by the president of France that maybe the balance is not there to keep Europe cohesive? That's behind us, is it? BARROSO: No, I think it's very good that Germany is strong because Germany is, in fact, the engine of the European economy. And it is -- if Germany was not so strong, there we could have a problem regarding the Euro because the last argument of protection of the Euro is, in fact, also German. And so until recently, I think it was the number-one export in the world alone, which is amazing, a country, as I mentioned, of Germany. The European Union, taken together, is still the number-one exporter in the world. Now China has come up. And so the -- (inaudible) -- is not the export sector of Germany but, also, the culture, the financial culture of Germany, I think, is a great effort not only for Germany but for Europe. And Germany's the number-one client or investor of almost all the other countries in Europe. People should not forget that. So usually, if Germany goes well, that's a signal that others can join in if they are not yet there. It's always the first or the second importer of almost all, if not all the other 26 member states of European Union. So it's -- (inaudible) -- that Germany is doing well. But, of course, as your question suggests, we have a very high benchmark. So when you compare, of course, the performance of other countries while, in other parts of the world, the comparison is not so high as Germany. It makes, of course, things more difficult for other governments, but systemically, it's good that Germany is now having such a successful performance. MODERATOR: In our country, Mr. President, a number of people are saying that we have grown up thinking of the relationships between the United States, Europe and Japan. And people of my generation typically only thought of that -- the billion people that had 80 percent of the world's GDP. Today, as we look out for the next 40 years, we're going to have another two and a half billion people on the planet with less than 100 million going to European and American countries. We're going to see a swing of the middle class significantly towards Asia, but there are going to be a lot of countries left behind. Is Europe concerned about the great differences between the standard of living in the United States and Europe and, at the other end, 2 billion people in Africa that will have maybe standards of living that are 4 (percent) or 5 percent of what it is we have in the West? To what extent is Europe thinking about these markets and these people? BARROSO: We are more than ever now. I can't tell you now. I can make the comparison with situations sometime before. I remember six years ago when I was elected the first time for the European Commission, there was a discussion in European -- (inaudible) -- where all the emphasis -- (inaudible) -- was the commission president. And the discussion was only about the internal issues. This time, five years afterward, the top subject in the discussion, I would say more than 50 percent was China. MODERATOR: Really? BARROSO: So people are completely aware of the new geoeconomic and geopolitical factors. Having said this, we believe it's better to engage and try to make this as cooperative and positive sum game. Africa is mentioned. Africa is another kind of issue, of course. The links with Africa and Europe are extremely strong because post-colonial -- (inaudible) -- links and we tried to do our best with that region. Just now, I came here for the MDG also where I announced -- (inaudible) -- our support for the MDG and our most important partners in cooperation are the African countries and so-called NCP (ph) -- (inaudible) -- countries. And so we are aware of this. In Europe, I want to be very frank with you. In Europe today, there is gloomy -- it's fashionable to be pessimistic. This probably is not so very different. I call it the intellectual -- (inaudible) -- of pessimism. Someone wants to pretend it's intelligence, it should be more pessimism than the other because that -- (inaudible). I do not agree. I simply do not agree with that -- (inaudible). I believe Europe has the intellectual, critical resources to overcome the difficulty. I think the rise of others is not necessarily our crisis. I mean -- and very often, I think about the United States and Europe after the Second World War when the United States -- (inaudible) -- great vision. Europe was destroyed and they -- (inaudible) -- in Europe. And the rise of Europe afterward, great moment was not -- (inaudible) -- the United States. So I mean, the rise of Africa -- in fact, there are hundreds of people in Africa -- I don't think that. On the contrary. I think it can be a great opportunity. So that's why we are very committed to keep markets open, to work with those emerging countries, also, to respect intellectual property rules, procurement rules, to establish, as much as possible, some common standards. But that is our vision. Some will say it's idealistic -- (inaudible) -- will be realistic. So, probably, but it worked. So I think it is our enlightened self-interest, to work with those emerging markets, of course, trying to keep, as much as possible, our common values. Now, if you think about the United States where the United States are looking, I hope the United States will not forget Europe and Europe will not forget the United States because we have a very deep bond, not only economically. Still, the most important economic relationship in the world -- (inaudible) -- trading investment, relations between United States and Europe. And those in the business community really want as much as possible to keep a real transatlantic economic market, and I think we should do for that for a kind of agenda for growth and job both sides of Atlantic. But it's much more than that. It's what happens between Europe and United States -- some people say old-fashioned to speak about it, but I will speak -- (inaudible). Today, President Obama, in a very, I think, inspired speech about trying to -- not only the issue of Middle East, but he was speaking about liberty and freedom and that we should not forget about it. And he invited those that remember when their countries were not democracies not to forget to fight for democracy. I think we should remember, and I think we should keep this kind of special relationship. MODERATOR: Well, I think we certainly welcome it, and I know that my colleagues will, no doubt, have many questions. I could keep on this bilateral conversation, but I'll never be asked to chair a meeting again. (Laughter.) So may I call on the audience? Yes, sir? If you could give your name for the president, it might be helpful. Thank you. QUESTIONER: Bill Drozdiak, president of the American Council on Germany. Mr. President, I wonder if you could explain to us why it is so difficult for NATO and the European Union to work more effectively together. I mean, here you have the two principle institutions of the West based in the same city, facing many of the same problems these days as economic issues blend into security issues and now facing the challenge of Asia. Wouldn't it be a practical and sensible step to find a way to bring these two institutions much more closely together in order to solidify the transatlantic link in dealing with the modern-day problems and, also, take advantage of the fact that there are 22 countries that are now members of both institutions? BARROSO: We are in favor of this, and we are working for this. In fact, what you can -- (inaudible) -- just some days ago, it was another conclusion, and there is a -- Cathy Ashton, the high representative, she received a mandate to work, and the secretary is already working -- the secretary general of NATO has listened. And they are doing it. But you certainly are aware of what is the difficulty with -- diplomatici difficulty that has nothing to do with Turkey and Cyprus; Cyprus, a member of the European Union and Turkey a member of NATO. And that is the real -- going to be -- and diplomatic, but that's the real difficulty sometimes. I remember well, I worked for a minister of my country for some time, and we have some difficulties because there are all kinds of procedural obstacles to any kind of establishment of a more pragmatic partnership between NATO and European Union. But the European Union aside, the commission, we are extremely open to it and, in fact, we are already working because now, as you know, the new concept of defense is more and more comprehensive. It's not just about military power, it's about humanitarian aid, it's about state building, about justice, training police. In the commission, we are funding many, many programs where, by the way, our people sometimes are running the risk of their -- (inaudible) -- because we could get -- achieve the proper protocol with NATO. And the reason was because of those diplomatic difficulties among some members of -- I mean, let's say two members of either the European Union or NATO. It will be good if they could overcome this difficulty because of what is -- it's basically a bilateral issue that is putting difficulty in the cooperation -- (inaudible) -- cooperation between NATO and European Union. MODERATOR: Right here. QUESTIONER: Lucy Komisar. I'm a journalist. Various European countries -- Germany in the lead -- are cracking down on massive tax cheating, much of which is affected through the secret bank accounts and offshore financial centers such as Lichtenstein. The OECD effort has failed to significantly change the system. Do you have a strategy for dealing with the global offshore system that facilitates not only massive tax cheating but corporate corruption, bribery, the movement of terrorist money and money of organized crime throughout the world? BARROSO: Yes. Very important point. In fact, that's one of the issues that the G-20 should look at. And we are -- (inaudible) -- trying to go on with that fight against this kind of activity in Europe and some of our partners because of some laws of banks security that, in fact, make it easier, this kind of behavior. And we are doing it, also, in a bilateral context with those countries. Myself has been discussing with some of our partners, European partners and non-members of the European Union. But it will be important where it's not only OECD but also globally. And so far, it has been a difficult issue. It's been a difficult issue. Some of our partners are not reacting very positively with the idea of having, as much as possible, a lateral playing field globally in that matter. But, of course, we will keep our negotiation effort on the table. MODERATOR: Yes, ma'am? QUESTIONER: (Inaudible). Mr. President, one of the big differences between the U.S. and the E.U. is the strength of small businesses and the ease with which people can start companies in the U.S. And you mentioned in your speech the importance of small and medium businesses in the European economy. What would it take for Europe to make it easy for entrepreneurs to start their companies, to make money and to grow so that Europe becomes competitive on that level with the U.S.? BARROSO: That's definitely one of the issues that we have been looking at, namely, in our -- (inaudible) -- with American -- (inaudible) -- a great influence in Europe. Many countries in Europe now adopted programs of simplification. It's now possible, in many of our member states, to create a company -- (inaudible) -- hours to be -- (inaudible). It is, in fact, a great -- (inaudible). There was benchmarks, and there was some kind of looking at best practices. And now, it's much simpler to create -- (inaudible) -- point of view. The huge bureaucracy of the past has been eliminated. The real problem -- the real difficulty in my point of view of the United States -- (inaudible) -- financing. Venture capital in Europe is not as evolved as in the United States. And let's be awful frank about this, the entrepreneurship culture here is different because of -- (inaudible) -- capital factors, cultural factors, the way the state, the public financing. So there are several cultural factors as well that makes the life of a company in Europe a little -- entrepreneurship in Europe different from the United States. Sometimes it's not just about to create an enterprise; it's about to put an end to it when it's no longer profitable or no longer adequate. And precisely, one of the points I was mentioning this in my introductory remarks was about reforms. And this is one of the reforms we are trying to achieve. Some member states are now appreciating ambitious reforms for simplification -- conditions but, also, the labor-market reform. (Inaudible) -- flexibility of their economic -- (inaudible) -- and there, the American -- (inaudible) -- can be -- (inaudible) -- of course, having in mind that we have, in some areas, difference. In Europe, we have -- (inaudible) -- what we call social-market economy. And that comes from Germany because, after the Second World War, social -- (inaudible) -- with the idea that we want a dynamic market, but we want relatively high levels of social inclusion. We also think it is relatively strong compared to the United States. So and this is -- Europeans want to keep it. So I have to be clear about it. If you go to Europe to propose so-called American model, it will not work. Politically, it will not work. There is not support for this. But if you go to Europe and say, look, we have to -- (inaudible) -- the Americans and others in terms of cultural entrepreneurship -- (inaudible) -- some of the best -- (inaudible) -- interactive relation, simplification of -- (inaudible) -- then people are receptive. And, therefore, that is the line we are following in the commission. So to modernize our social market economy without making a revolution but making a reform. MODERATOR: The gentleman here? I guess not. It's a lady. Madame? QUESTIONER: Hello, Mr. -- (inaudible). My name is Catherine Hagan (ph) and, Mr. President, I come from Geneva where I work on multi-state culture dialogue. And I'm here because of the MDG summit, but we are also very interested in trade and have been monitoring the activities at the WTO where the issues have been moving beyond the Doha Round to issues of food security, climate change, innovation. I was intrigued by your remark about a new trade proposal coming from the European Union, and I would like to know if you could share with us some of the thinking that is going into that proposal, not necessarily what will be coming out of that proposal because that's to be announced in October, as you said. But it would be very interesting to hear if you are reviving the Singapore proposals or whether there are other issues that have come into the floor and you're thinking about trade and how to take a new approach to this. BARROSO: Look, I cannot anticipate what they are going to propose. We have to first discuss it in the commission. In fact, we have been asked to come with some ideas, and that's what we are preparing. But I can give you the background -- political background of the proposal, why -- To be completely honest with you, in Europe and some of the member states, also a perception that sometimes we are too naive in trade matters. I think the same applies here in the United States sometimes. We open our markets, but we don't -- (inaudible) -- some of our partners, maybe in terms of the monetary experience to make a -- (inaudible) -- effort. And our companies that are in some other parts of the world, they are complaining to us very strongly. They feel discriminated, namely in terms of investment in terms of intellectual property rights and in other matters. And so what we are now trying to do is to reassure also the European public opinion that we'll pursue a trade policy that is more open and we will, at least the commission, will pull any, let's say inflation of protection. I think protection in itself -- (inaudible). Europe is the biggest supporter in the world. So it's quite obvious that it is's also fitting. But at the same time, the assurances to the Europeans, what they have to gain from this kind of open market and linking these issues, also, with our overall interest. And this is what -- political background. Now, political, let's say environment for our proposal that we are now preparing to -- (inaudible) -- so very soon you will be informed about it. But my -- (inaudible) -- is to get more support for open markets and expanding into other areas, not only trade on goods but also on services. Likewise, easier -- (inaudible) -- investment. I think this is very important. And the points you made are also very important. In fact, in European Union now, there is a great concern with many of our stakeholders and member states, and there's a considerable -- (inaudible) -- regarding, for instance, worker's rights regarding the norm of environment protection or fighting climate change. And this is very important and difficult debate because the point is we now have -- (inaudible) -- regulations, very ambitious -- (inaudible) -- to fight climate change. By the way -- (inaudible). It's 20, 20, 20, by 2030. So we have committed and it's in our law -- regulation -- to reduce greenhouse gas by 20 percent in 2020, 20 percent of energy should come from renewables, and 20 percent energy efficiency. And some of those -- (inaudible) -- say okay, but you are competing with others that don't do that. So how can we -- so that's why we have to give some assurances to those sectors -- (inaudible) -- energy sectors that they will not be the victims of this kind of regulation. And that's what we are working. And, in fact, we have some mechanisms for climate change program to avoid them putting in an uncompetitive position. And this is the kind of assurance we want, also, to give to our stakeholders in Europe, but the purpose should be to keep markets open and to open more markets. MODERATOR: Yes? QUESTIONER: This is Bernie Ferrari. I'm a management consultant. Mr. President, this morning in the FT in the front page, there was a discussion of Siemens' extraordinary agreement with its union workers of 150,000 for job security. Given your aspirations for European economic performance around the world, what is your reaction to that agreement? BARROSO: Look, it was exactly following my remark before when I said to you very honestly, I think, Europe is different from the United States in some aspects of economic culture. We are basically open economies and want to -- but this is typical of -- (inaudible) -- disagreement. But that's part of the social-market economy. And it's impressive to see that Germany, for instance -- not only Germany -- but in terms of the criss, the trade unions have accepted something that was impossible to have before in terms of reduction or freezing of their salaries. That was possible, also, because of the culture of compromise in -- (inaudible). So I'm not suggesting that that should be the model, but in that case, apparently, it's working, and so I hope it will work. But it depends. Other countries have a different culture of negotiation. Europe is very complex. We have 27 countries, sometimes very different in its relations. But this is one of the examples. We also have -- as you know, it was -- (inaudible) -- what we call flex security. So it means flexibility in terms of the labor relation but, at the same time, a very developed system of social guarantees -- (inaudible). And so in that case, people accept that enhanced flexibility so you can lose your job, but you are sure that, if you lose your job, you get, let's say, an important contribution from society for some time that you may stay unemployed. This is one of the issues that makes, sometimes, our system different from the American one. And I certainly think that it is important to move the assurances to our workers that they are taken care of because, in the Europen societies now, many people are angry. They have seen what happened coming from financial sector, and they are seeing now huge bonuses again. They are seeing -- I'm going to be very frank with you -- that some people are coming back to business as usual as if nothing had happened. And so the perception in many of our countries -- (inaudible) -- we tax payers, we have to save those banks, and now they are coming back to business as usual and we don't have any guarantees with the worker or with the -- (inaudible). And that's why I think some level of social consensus is extremely important; namely, in some countries where there was a tradition of, let's say, sometimes, social polarization or more conflicting industrial relations. Germany has that German tradition. And if it works for that company, it's a good thing. I wish them the best. MODERATOR: My goodness. Ambassador -- (inaudible). QUESTIONER: Mr. President, the European Union countries have made very drastic commitments at deficit reduction, fiscal consolidation. At the same time, in the United States, our government and many economists fear that too drastic fiscal consolidation risks a double-dip recession. And our Federal Reserve is engaged in major efforts to increase the money supply and expand and lower interest rates. Are we in danger of getting at cross-purposes here in the macroeconomic policy? BARROSO: We discussed this issue in the G-20 in Toronto. And, in fact, I think there was a real consensus that Europe should do exactly that. Before the G-20, there was some discussion. There was some cross -- let's say, analysis and assessment and sometimes trying to put it in context. But I will say I was in the G-20 and discussed this, also, there. And I think people understood the European position. I have no doubt that, for Europe, there is no other way to be completely -- (inaudible) -- now to those programs in Europe when we have both countries that are actually, I mean, vulnerable in terms of -- because that's the difference between us and the United States. I mean, you are one country. Europe is 27 countries. We are a union of states with some macro-integrated, some policies integrated, like in your area, monetary policy. But we have one monetary policy but, afterward, the budget may be national. And so for us, it's fundamental to restore confidence of the markets. And the confidence of the markets will not be there if we go on with this -- (inaudible) -- policy. This is -- (inaudible) -- here. (Inaudible), but next year, it will not be. And so -- and I think it will be, I repeat, massive for Europe to go for expansive policy at this moment. And nobody, I mean, in Europe is now proposing an incredible, at least -- (inaudible) -- possibility. Having said this, United States is in a different position. Also, the dollar has a different position in the global market. It's for the Americans -- up to them to decide which way. But, for Europe, we have no doubt that this is the way. Having said this, it's not just about this proposal. Actually, it's about structural reform. It's about being more selective. It's not just to look at the expenditure, the quantity but also the quality of the expenditure. It's possible -- we believe it's possible to have some growth-friendly measures of fiscal consolidation. That's what we are trying to do through fine tuning of the policies. But in Europe, I repeat, now if we don't do this -- (inaudible) -- will increase instability of the markets, and I don't think that's good for the United States. If Europe or the Euro starts now -- and that point was made by all of us at the G-20 very clearly, by myself and the heads of government of the European Union member states there and others. And then what it can do, for instance to stimulate demand is not by expansion -- (inaudible) -- reform. For instance, Germany, we are speaking -- (inaudible) -- very much. Germany, they have the potential for growth coming from a reform of their service sector. The service sector in Germany is, I mean, it's less competitive than others in Europe. You know, and that, by the way -- (inaudible) -- the Germans know that perfectly well, and their committed to do it. So there are other ways different from budgetary and stimulus to stimulate demand in Europe. MODERATOR: This lady is next. Go ahead. QUESTIONER: Laurie Garrett from the council. I want to come back to trade and to Africa. From the perspective of many African countries, the very policies that are in place at the E.U. to protect workers, to protect health, to deal with lower pesticide use, all those sorts of things are, in fact, keeping African agricultural products out of the European marketplace. And in particular, in the context of GM food restrictions and requirements for annotation of fertilizer use, pesticide use, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, seed derivative, everything -- how can you break this down so that the European feels they're eating a same tomato and the African feels they can grow large quantities of tomatoes and become rich selling them to Europeans? BARROSO: Look, first of all, European Union is, by far, the largest importer of agricultural products from developing countries. Europe imports more from the developing countries -- United States, Russia, Canada, Australia -- put together. So that idea that Europe is closed to agricultural products is simply not consumed by fact. Having said this, it's true that we have some reservations that are there because the European public wants us there that are relatively high levels of protection of consumers. And this is something that we discussed not only with Africa but in other parts of the world today. And what we tell our partners is that they should try to get their exports competitive with those conditions that are there not for protection, but because in the European society, people are simply not ready to lower their standards. The issue of GMO is an extremely difficult issue. I think that you are probably an expert on that. You have probably followed my -- and the commission's recent position. We - from one side, we want to respect fully the WTO rules, and we have been doing that. On the other side, in fact, there are some sectors of public opinion in Europe that are extremely concerned about GMOs. What we have now in the system with the -- (inaudible) -- the European Food Agency that gives us, the commission, the scientific opinion, and then we decide. And our position has been to decide in favor of introduction of GMOs if that independent agency confirms there are no risks for environment or for the health. But it remains extremely controversial in Europe. That is why, recently, we have proposed, the commission, to keep the system but, for cultivation, to visit our national level. So the so-called -- (inaudible). So if we go -- (inaudible) -- the introduction of a GMO product in Europe -- (inaudible) -- but we cannot force one country to cultivate a GMO against its own will. And I think this is a good, fair compromise because there are some controversies. I will give you an example -- Austria -- where this issue is really very strong. We've been discussing this at several governments -- (inaudible) -- how can we be forced to cultivate something that our population does not want? And this has been a very difficult issue for us. It has nothing to do with protection. It has nothing to do with the restrictions to Africa. I can tell -- (inaudible). It has to do with the public concern on the issues of public health, issues of environment protection. And this is why we have to keep those standards and try to find a fair way of making our rules competitive, of course -- (inaudible) -- WTO. MODERATOR: The gentleman in front? QUESTIONER: Thank you. I'm Paul Jather (ph), financial advisory business. One relationship that remains important, I would think, that hasn't been mentioned today is that between Europe -- the European community and Russia. And, of course, there are many aspects of it. The one that I wanted to hang out and see what your thoughts are on the overall relationship with particular emphasis on the fact that, in the last few years, the Russians seem to have used or tended to use their energy exports, sometimes, to exert political pressure. And I wonder what your thoughts are on the relationship, its context and where it's going. BARROSO: You are right it's a vital relation for us and for them. For the Russians, we are the number-one partner in trade and investment. European Union is the number-one partner. And they are also very important partner for Europe. And that's why we try to establish or develop diplomatic -- a good relationship with them. Things are improving. There were, in fact -- some issues were difficult, some political issues. The issue of Georgia, of course, but other matters relating to -- (inaudible). Restrictions of exports from Poland to Russia. But, for instance now, the relationship between Poland and Russia is much more constructive than it was before. And so -- and don't forget that -- (inaudible) -- the Russian leadership, we meet every time -- every year at least twice in a formal summit serving all these years, meeting President Putin and now President Medvedev. I'm speaking for the 27, not only for -- I have to take on board the concerns not only of the countries that are exporting to Russia but those who -- some concerns of some countries, somtimes some small countries that express some concern regarding the relationship. But nowadays, I see there is good potential in the relationship with Russia. President Medvedev wants the result of the developing work because -- (inaudible) -- organization in Russia, and we want to be partners in this effort. And if he's -- repeat, once again, a win-win situation. The relations with -- we have lived with this crisis-- (inaudible). In fact -- it's already public. More than 30 phone calls I have to make to President Putin at the time -- or Prime Minister Putin -- and the leadership in Ukraine -- President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Timoshenko and, also, some talks with President Medvedev. And, of course, this was a great impact and a great impact on public opinion in Europe. What was happening was that European people were suffering a clash between Russia and Ukraine, it was -- and I believe it was not directed against European Union. But was no interest at all in Russia or in Ukraine to make problem with European Union. But, in fact, we were suffering from that, let's say, interruption of the flow of gas. And now we are working more constructively with Russians and Europeans -- European Union -- to try to achieve, once again, a win-win situation, also, in energy. And I think it is, of course important also for our Russian -- (inaudible). MODERATOR: We have two minutes only, I think, Mr. President. Is there a very quick question taking seconds and then we'll give a minute and a half to the president to reply? QUESTIONER: I don't know if this will be quick, but I'll ask -- MODERATOR: It has to be quick. QUESTIONER: You talked about reform, and that's the time for reforming in Europe. But I mean, the banking sector in Europe doesn't seem to be reformed still, and there are some countries where the banks are still weakened. And for many critics, this is why, you know, some of the debt problems are not -- are worrying markets even more. Is there an effort to really get to the bottom of the banking sector in all the countries where the banks are weak and to lead a reform so that there's no -- you know, the way the U.S. sort of really forced the banks to come up with more capital -- and then there were stress tests, but there was really nothing that came out of it is that critic say. So is that -- I mean, is there more effort? Or do you think that you're satisfied? BARROSO: No. I mean, first of all, the stress tests were, I believe, a serious, competent at this time. In fact, we have been pushing for some years to do it every two years to have these open stress tests. Having said this, I want to make it clear we believe that, fundamentally, the banking sector in Europe is healthy. We believe it's healthy, our banking sector. That does not exclude that there were not some cases that should be addressed, and we will address them and, in fact, we are working on that matter. We are working that matter with the possible -- (inaudible) -- difficulties that may happen in the banking sector. But the idea that European banking sector is unhealthy or very vulnerable is completely wrong, completely wrong. Having said this, we also welcome very much the latest decisions of the Basel, and we believe they are going in the right direction to reinforce the quality of capital for our banks. And we are now putting in place, also, the proper mechanisms of coordination of what has been done by international supervisors because, as I said in my introductory remarks, in Europe, until now, supervision was purely national. And this when many of the banks are, indeed, cross-border banks. They are not -- they have had -- (inaudible) -- of course, of member states, but, in fact, they are. European are sometimes mobile banks. And this -- some of the reforms -- (inaudible) -- and that will be coming very soon to improve, I think, the overall credibility of our financial sector. MODERATOR: Mr. President, I think we are all very grateful to you for the time and for the quality in your answers and your openness. And we thank you very much, indeed. We feel very confident about Europe now. Many of us will probably want to come and settle there. (Laughter.) And we thank you very much. (Applause.) (C) COPYRIGHT 2010, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1000 VERMONT AVE. NW; 5TH FLOOR; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL CARINA NYBERG AT 202-347-1400. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
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