Renewable Energy

Introduction Nuclear power has been an important, if understated, aspect of South Korea's National Strategy for Green Growth, a set of policies reflecting the idea that economic growth and environmental protection can be compatible activities rather than conflicting. Former president Lee Myung-bak did not mention nuclear power when he announced his administration's national vision for green growth in a 2008 speech, although nuclear power later made an appearance as one of ten major green growth policy objectives.[1] Arguing that nuclear energy use improves energy independence while mitigating carbon emissions, Lee championed a green growth framework that provided a new justification for South Korea to expand nuclear power at home and promote it abroad.[2] Plans are under way to increase nuclear power's share of the country's electricity generation from 33 percent to 59 percent by 2030.[3] In addition to the twenty-three reactors currently operating, five new reactors are under construction and eight more are planned.[4] However, recent reports of safety and quality-control problems at nuclear power plants in South Korea have undermined public trust in the safety and reliability of the country's cheapest source of electricity.[5] Although South Korea has experienced no major nuclear accidents since its first reactor began commercial operations in 1978, the nuclear power rethink in many countries resulting from the March 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan, has created an atmosphere that only heightens these concerns.[6] At the same time, the government must also secure public acceptance of new storage sites for radioactive waste from spent nuclear fuel—an issue that highlights how doubts about nuclear power's green credentials can clash with the desire to meet rising electricity demand with low-carbon sources. Complicating this situation is the new South Korean president Park Geun-hye, who must decide how to put her stamp on green growth. Linking Nuclear Power and Green Growth South Korea's 1970s-era decision to adopt and expand nuclear power long predates the green growth initiative, although the two efforts share a common motivator: the quest for energy security in a country that is poor in energy resources and relies on imports to meet almost all its high energy demand. Currently, South Korea consumes more energy than all but ten other countries.[7] Added to the country's long struggle with energy security are the global economic slowdown of 2008–2009, a growing consensus about the need to tackle climate change, and the concomitant inability of global climate talks to achieve meaningful action on emissions reduction. These dynamics have recently given rise to the concept of green growth, which, under Lee's rubric, aims to curb carbon emissions while improving energy independence, create new engines of economic growth, and enhance South Korea's international standing. Although nuclear power—already firmly entrenched in South Korea's energy mix—seems tailor-made for achieving all three of these overarching goals, its broader impact on South Korea's energy landscape renders its use much more complex. In an era of widespread concern about climate change, the emissions mitigation potential of nuclear power generation, which emits no carbon, provides a new leg on which South Korea's nuclear expansion ambitions can stand. According to a recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), South Korea's per capita CO2 emissions increased 115.4 percent between 1990 and 2010.[8] The same report noted that electricity demand from all sectors "has grown significantly since 2000," while "production of nuclear electricity increased by almost 50 percent over the same period.[9] In 2009, the government of South Korea announced a voluntary target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30 percent below the expected level by 2020.[10] The challenge of following through on this commitment while meeting increasing electricity demand provides double justification for South Korea's plans to expand nuclear power. Expanding nuclear power is not the only way South Korea is attempting to reign in its carbon emissions. There is already a program in place that requires the country's top emitters to meet designated emissions reduction targets or face a financial penalty. An emissions trading scheme (ETS) is expected to take effect in 2015 and the government is aggressively pursuing a smart-grid strategy aimed at reducing demand by providing real-time consumption and pricing information to consumers. But these efforts remain works in progress, whereas nuclear power is longstanding and proven. Determining the relationship between improved energy independence and nuclear power in South Korea requires an assessment of the country's electricity sources. Together, coal and natural gas account for two-thirds of electricity production in South Korea and nuclear energy accounts for most of the remaining third.[11] Coal—the majority of which is imported—is the largest single source of electricity, making up 45 percent of total electricity production.[12] Nuclear power expansion can offset the need for additional imports of coal and natural gas, diversifying the energy mix and improving energy independence. Moreover, indigenous technology is now used in critical systems in new reactors; at a groundbreaking ceremony for two new reactors last year, President Lee noted that South Korea had "achieved the dream of independent nuclear technology."[13] However, South Korea is wholly reliant on imported uranium and uranium conversion services to fuel its reactors.[14] This means nuclear energy is not entirely an autonomous power source for the country. There is evidence that nuclear power expansion can create new engines of economic growth. A 2009 paper published by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute found that "the total net contribution of nuclear technologies as a percentage share of GDP amounted to 2.38 percent in 2005."[15] This amount includes economic activity generated from the construction and operation of nuclear power plants as well as industrial output stimulated by the electricity produced from nuclear power. Furthermore, South Korea's aggressive pursuit of new export opportunities for its nuclear expertise has already boosted economic growth. In 2009, a South Korean consortium won a bid to build four nuclear reactors in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), prevailing over competitors from Japan and France. According to projections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), global demand growth for nuclear power is expected to continue, although at rates lower than predicted prior to the Fukushima accident.[16] Strategic marketing of nuclear power as a zero-carbon alternative to fossil fuels may enhance the country's efforts to capture more of this market. In 2010, President Lee wrote in the journal Global Asia, "Nuclear is one of the most efficient power generation methods that will lead us to a low-carbon society, and I intend to make sure that [South] Korea keeps up with its role as one of the major suppliers of these zero-carbon power plants."[17] He went on to say the nuclear reactors South Korea is building in the UAE would equal "40 million tons of carbon mitigation."[18] This UAE deal was a critical initial win in the country's quest to export eighty nuclear reactors by 2030, which could reportedly total $300 billion in sales for South Korea.[19] However, experts question the feasibility of this goal, noting it would require a significant uptick in production of nuclear reactors at a time of diminishing human resource capacity in South Korea's nuclear industry.[20] Therefore, nuclear power's future contribution as a green growth export engine is questionable. Finally, nuclear power can serve the third pillar of the green growth strategy—enhancing international standing—in three ways. First, South Korea's contract to build four nuclear reactors in the UAE is a major opportunity for South Korea to show it can deliver a nuclear power plant export on time and on budget while building safety credentials. One executive who was involved in the UAE contract decision cited "world-class safety performance" of South Korean plants as one reason for the win.[21] Other sources have emphasized the South Korean project's smaller budget relative to those of other proposals.[22] Second, whereas some countries, such as Germany, responded to the Fukushima accident by retreating from nuclear power production, South Korea is taking the opportunity to promote nuclear safety, beginning at home. Following Fukushima, President Lee emphasized, "We must learn from the Fukushima accident and redouble our efforts to enhance nuclear safety in keeping up with new technology and demands of the times, and to restore public confidence."[23] South Korea already houses the world's first International Nuclear Safety School to train safety experts from other countries. This can be a basis for bolstering international collaborative efforts on nuclear safety. Finally, nuclear power could also strengthen South Korea's international standing in an indirect fashion by serving as an important means for the country to deliver on its voluntary emissions reduction target. A report released by South Korea's Ministry of Knowledge Economy projecting electricity supply and demand indicates the country may overshoot the target by 10 percent in 2020.[24] In any case, if South Korea can meet its target, or make significant emissions reductions in later years, nuclear power will surely have played a role. Nuclear power has an important role to play in South Korean green growth, especially as a near-term tactic for meeting rising electricity demand without increasing emissions. Its future as a green growth engine is buttressed by the cost advantage it enjoys over other forms of electricity generation. However, this potential is complicated by the task of regaining public trust in the safety of nuclear power and the debate over nuclear power's green credentials at a time when the government must secure public acquiescence to new storage sites for nuclear waste. Bolstering Public Trust in Nuclear Safety Public confidence in the safety of nuclear power plummeted in South Korea after the March 2011 nuclear accident at Fukushima, Japan.[25] The monumental accident ultimately resulted in the idling of almost all of Japan's nuclear power plants. Promoting the expansion of nuclear power in South Korea might have been difficult enough in such an environment, but domestic safety problems and a quality control scandal that unfolded during the closing months of 2012 have further hampered these efforts. In February 2012, a power loss at a South Korean nuclear plant went unreported until authorities discovered it.[26] The revelation that falsified quality-control documents had been used to certify more than seven-thousand reactor parts led to the temporary closure of two reactors in November of that year, sparking fears of power shortages at a time of unusually cold temperature forecasts and record-high levels of electricity consumption.[27] One month later, hundreds of falsely certified parts were discovered in two other reactors, as well as in their water-cooling systems.[28] These reactors have remained online during replacement work. Discerning the implications of these events on public opinion was made more difficult after Fukushima, when the Korean Nuclear Energy Promotion Agency (KONEPA) declined to publish its regular polls on the public opinion of nuclear safety in South Korea.[29] According to a report by Reuters, South Korean opposition lawmaker Woo Yoon-guen has called on KONEPA to resume publishing the polls and has also revealed some of the agency's data himself.[30] A September 2012 KONEPA poll indicated that public confidence may have begun to regain its footing, showing that 53.3 percent of respondents viewed nuclear power plants as safe compared with 41.5 percent who did not.[31] However, public confidence dipped to 34.8 percent by the end of 2012 as the quality control scandal was unfolding.[32] The Fukushima accident galvanized existing antinuclear movements and gave rise to new ones in South Korea, but these do not appear to have gained widespread traction. The situation in the east-coast town of Samcheok, where there are plans to build a nuclear power plant, may illustrate a measure of ambivalence about nuclear power among some citizens in South Korea. According to a March 2011 survey of residents taken before the Fukushima accident, 75 percent of respondents favored locating the new plant in their town.[33] Seven months later, following the accident, support dropped to 50 percent.[34] A local group tried to recall the pronuclear mayor, though the effort failed.[35] By contrast, some residents seemed to value the need for economic resurgence over safety concerns. According to a report by Reuters, even after the Fukushima accident, local pronuclear activists based their support for building a nuclear plant in their town on the estimation that the construction and operation of the plant would pump 6.2 trillion won ($5.7 billion) into Samcheok's economy.[36] Public opinion of nuclear power expansion seems to result in part from a complicated mix of safety perceptions and self-interest; the citizens were conflicted between concerns about the government response to the recent scandals and the recognition that nuclear power is, for now at least, a low-cost electricity source that can bestow economic benefits on the communities where plants are located. Nuclear power may be the one piece of the green growth strategy most vulnerable to changes in public perception, especially because its expansion requires some level of public acceptance to manage the tangible problem of storing spent nuclear fuel. There was no broad public debate over the ETS, which passed the National Assembly with little fanfare. Investments in smart-grid technology and new forms of renewable energy, including wind and solar power, do not attract as much opposition due to safety concerns as nuclear power does. In January, the government announced new measures responding to the quality control scandal and safety problems. These include new procedures for procuring reactor parts and dealing with mechanical problems.[37] However, any indication that the government is suppressing data that reflects negatively on nuclear power—such as the refusal to publish KONEPA polls—could undermine public trust and ultimately backfire. Cost Advantages of Nuclear Power Nuclear power has one advantage that would make it difficult to dislodge from South Korea's energy mix: it is the cheapest source of electricity in the country.[38] The IEA report notes that "while the Korean consumer price index increased by 254 percent from 1982 to 2011, electricity prices increased by 29.9 percent in the same period."[39] Although the initial investments and operations and maintenance costs are higher for nuclear power plants than coal or gas plants, the cost advantage of generating electricity with nuclear power instead of using imported fossil fuels outweighs the start-up costs of a nuclear power plant in South Korea.[40] When a carbon price is added to the cost of fossil fuel electricity generation, nuclear power's cost advantage becomes even starker.[41] South Korea's ETS may eventually result in a carbon price, making nuclear power even more affordable relative to fossil fuels than it already is. The country also seems to be well positioned to build new nuclear power plants at a lower cost than many other developed countries, due to its recent experience and lower construction costs.[42] Nuclear power's cost advantage is even clearer when compared with renewable forms of energy such as wind, solar, and tidal power. According to one researcher at the Korea Energy Economics Institute, the wholesale cost of power from alternative sources in South Korea is six times higher than that of nuclear power.[43] The green growth strategy sets out a goal of increasing the share of renewables to 11 percent of total primary energy supply by 2030 (though it is unclear how much of that share is intended for the electricity sector versus other sectors, such as transportation).[44] South Korea has a long way to go on this score. Renewable energy sources currently make up a meager 1.5 percent of the country's electricity generation, with the bulk of that supply coming from biofuels and renewable waste.[45] Although solar and wind power are growing in South Korea, they still account for only a tiny share of renewable energy.[46] Moreover, as is widely noted, "their intermittent and variable supply make them poorly suited for large-scale use in the absence of an affordable way to store electricity.[47] In addition, as the IEA has noted, South Korea's climate and geography present a steeper challenge for the development of renewable energy compared with other IEA countries.[48] Nuclear power is the only major energy source that South Korea can rely on for wide-scale, zero-carbon electricity in the near term as more costly renewable energy sources struggle to gain a foothold. Han Seung-soo, former prime minister of South Korea and then chairman of the Seoul-based Global Green Growth Institute, acknowledged this in 2011 when he said, "If we pursue clean energy, we need to accept nuclear power as a reality until we have better options readily available."[49] Is Nuclear Power Really "Green"? Although nuclear power can help meet energy needs without emitting carbon, there is disagreement over whether it truly serves the purpose of green growth. The Lee administration emphasized nuclear power as a "clean" source of energy, focusing on its zero-carbon characteristics, but some environmental groups, such as Green Korea United, reject its no-carbon credentials, arguing that emissions from the mining and refining of the uranium fuel source must be taken into account.[50] In addition, the problem of finding new storage sites for high-level radioactive waste from spent nuclear fuel further tarnishes nuclear power's "green" image and is likely to be a pressing challenge for the government in the coming years as it runs up against storage limits at current sites amid "not in my backyard" opposition to new sites. The three reactor sites where spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in South Korea are projected to reach capacity in 2016.[51] Reprocessing spent fuel is a strategy for managing nuclear waste, but South Korea does not have this option. A longstanding agreement with the United States that was recently extended for two more years prohibits this practice over concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Although the South Korean government is pressing for the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, in part to help manage the storage problem, the United States remains reluctant to agree to this. Nuclear power expansion will create more nuclear waste that must be handled without reprocessing spent fuel. The real challenge for the near term may be overcoming public opposition to new storage sites for spent nuclear fuel. The government already spent 300 million won ($247 million) in cash and other benefits to tamp down local opposition to a low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste storage site at Gyeongju.[52] Construction of this repository was twice prolonged due to "weak bedrock and groundwater problems," a situation that does not bode well for public acceptance of new storage spaces for high-level radioactive waste.[53] Government-sponsored public discussions to help determine new locations for storing high-level waste from spent nuclear fuel are expected to begin in the coming weeks. If these talks are a true give-and-take between citizens and government, they could help build the "culture of transparency" in the nuclear power industry that President Lee called for.[54] Regardless, the challenge of managing nuclear waste that remains radioactive for centuries is a powerful argument against labeling nuclear power as "green." However, the need for a zero-carbon electricity source to meet rising demand is likely to win out, as long as the government can gain enough public acceptance to new storage sites. Conclusion When it comes to nuclear power in South Korea, green growth is a new banner for an old strategy. South Korea's long experience with nuclear power, its reliance on this form of energy to meet rising demand, and its recognition of nuclear power's carbon mitigation potential together render a natural and convenient relationship between nuclear power and South Korea's green growth strategy. Public trust in nuclear safety has faltered but can recover, as polls have shown. Going forward, President Park is likely to continue the aggressive nuclear agenda she inherited from President Lee. She has indicated that she does not support closing all of the country's aging nuclear plants.[55] However, working with the public to find new storage sites for nuclear waste from spent fuel will be an important task during her tenure—one that complicates the challenge of selling nuclear power as "green." In an early signal that she may decouple nuclear power from green growth, her newly appointed environment minister, Yoon Seong-kyu, publicly questioned nuclear power's relevance to green growth in a recent hearing.[56] In any case, Fukushima did not stop South Korea from breaking ground for two new reactors a little more than one year after the accident, a signal of how important nuclear power is to meeting the country's electricity demand. Nuclear power expansion is likely to continue in South Korea. It is less certain whether President Park is as eager as her predecessor to embrace green growth as a justification for it. Endnotes ^ Yonhap News Agency, Text of South Korean president's liberation anniversary address, August 15, 2008. ^ According to Korea's Future in Green Growth, a 2009 report of the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, nuclear power expansion is mentioned as one of ten major policy directions for the purpose of reducing the use of fossil fuels and improving energy independence, p. 10. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012), pp. 102–3. ^ Ibid. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review, OECD/IEA, 2012, p. 109. ^ A report by the UAE Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism noted South Korea's nuclear safety record, as cited in Xinhua News, "Will S. Korea's nuclear power ambition make sense?" February 16, 2010. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries: The Republic of Korea 2012 Review (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2012), p. 9. ^ Ibid, p. 35. ^ Ibid, p. 77–78. ^ Kim Young-won, "S. Korea likely to fall short of emissions reduction target," Korea Herald, February 12, 2013. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 77. Oil, hydro, and other sources together make up a small share of electricity production, about 4.4 percent. ^ Ibid. ^ Yonhap, "South Korea starts work on two nuclear reactors," May 4, 2012. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 105. ^ Manki Lee, Kee-yung Nam, Kiho Jeong, Byungjoo Min, and Young-eek Jung, "Contribution of Nuclear Power to the National Economic Development in Korea," Nuclear Engineering and Technology, vol. 41, no. 4, May 2009, p. 549. ^ International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Updates Its Projections for Nuclear Power in 2030," September 25, 2012. ^ Lee Myung-bak, "Shifting Paradigms: The Road to Global Green Growth," Global Asia, vol. 4, no. 4, January 2010, p. 11–12. ^ Ibid. ^ Meeyoung Cho, "South Korea urged to restore trust in nuclear power," Reuters, Nov. 22, 2012. ^ Center for Strategic and International Studies and Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Report from a Workshop on South Korea as a Responsible Nuclear Supplier, February 18, 2013. ^ Andrew England, Peggy Hollinger, and Song Jung-a, "S. Koreans win $20bn UAE nuclear power contract," Financial Times, December 28, 2009. ^ Ann McLachlan, "Lauvergeon: French lost UAE bid because of expensive EPR safety features," Nucleonics Week, January 14, 2010. ^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Address by President Lee Myung-bak at High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security," September 22, 2011. ^ Kim Young-won, "S. Korea likely to fall short." ^ Yonhap News Agency, "Seoul to overhaul operator of scandals-hit nuclear power plant," Yonhap, January 8, 2013. ^ Sangim Han and Yuriy Humber, "Nuclear Halt in South Korea Seen Boosting Coal: Energy Markets," Bloomberg Businessweek, April 13, 2012. ^ See "Looming blackout threat," Korea Herald, December 6, 2012, and "Electricity consumption shoots up to record high," Korea Herald, January 3, 2013. ^ Park Si-soo, "More fake certificates for nuclear reactor parts found," Korea Times, December 6, 2012. ^ Jack Kim and David Chance, "Secrecy cloaks South Korea's civil nuclear program," Reuters, Nov. 13, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ According to an unpublished poll revealed by Woo Yoon-geun, as cited in Kim and Chance, "Secrecy cloaks." ^ According to the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, as reported by Yonhap, "Seoul to overhaul operator." ^ Survey data cited in article by Yoon Ja-young, "Yeongdeok, Samcheok tapped as candidates for nuclear power plants," Korea Times, Dec. 23, 2011. ^ Ibid. ^ Kim and Chance, "Secrecy cloaks." ^ Ibid. ^ Yonhap, "Seoul to overhaul operator." ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 109. ^ Ibid, p. 99. ^ International Energy Agency and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2010 Edition (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2010), p. 75. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid, p. 50. ^ States News Service, "Reactor Shutdown in South Korea Raises Blackout Fears," July 31, 2012. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 98. ^ Ibid, p. 93. ^ Ibid, p. 93. ^ Ernest Moniz, "Why We Still Need Nuclear Power," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, p. 84. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, p. 98. ^ Cho Jin-seo, "Green growth is second industrial revolution," Korea Times, June 26, 2011. ^ Green Korea United, "Green Growth Policy of the Korean Government and its Critics," http://green-korea.tistory.com/101. ^ Seongho Sheen, "Nuclear Sovereignty versus Nuclear Security: Renewing the ROK-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2011, p. 276. ^ "Nuclear waste a growing headache for S. Korea," Associated Press, March 26, 2013. ^ International Energy Agency, Energy Polices of IEA Countries, p. 106. ^ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by President." at High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security, Sept. 22, 2011. ^ Lee Sun-young, "Major environmental policy change unlikely under Park," Korea Herald, Dec. 27, 2012. ^ Shin Hyon-hee, "Park ditches 'green growth' in environmental policy shift," Korea Herald, March 28, 2013.

Introduction On October 23, 2012, a new international organization dedicated to changing the way countries grow economically made its official debut on the world stage. The eighteen member countries of the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) convened for the first time as an international body in Seoul during a ministerial meeting just a month in advance of the United Nations (UN) climate talks in Qatar.[1] Three years ago, the GGGI was only an idea championed by South Korean president Lee Myung-bak, who has made green growth a centerpiece of his administration's policy agenda. Since the institute's launch in June 2010, it has evolved from a small South Korean nonprofit into an organization that has built the necessary foundation for conversion to an international organization.[2] It currently has sixty-two staff members and three regional offices in Abu Dhabi, Copenhagen, and London, in addition to its Seoul headquarters.[3] The GGGI has an estimated 2012 budget of more than $35 million.[4] The GGGI reflects President Lee's "me first" approach to climate change, which he has described as the idea that countries should take initiative and execute policies appropriate to their respective circumstances without waiting for others to act first.[5] The GGGI is already at work on the ground in ten countries. The institute focuses on developing and emerging economies that want technical and policy advice on how to pursue more sustainable economic growth. It is intended to be an economic counterpart to the global bodies that focus on the scientific aspects of climate change.[6] Generally, green growth refers to the idea that economic growth and environmental protection are not at odds, but can be mutually reinforcing. Though green growth is now widely discussed, it remains an aspiration. The GGGI has staked its future on its ability to prove that green growth is possible. It is a grand experiment. While other international organizations have been formed in order to address collective challenges, the GGGI is organized around the pursuit of a solution that is not yet proven. Can developing countries achieve broad-based economic growth while avoiding environmental damage? And can avoiding environmental damage in itself present new opportunities for growth? The GGGI will test these ideas in countries that want to integrate green growth into their core economic development agendas and use those experiences to advance the body of knowledge. If it is successful, the GGGI's work could revolutionize international economic development efforts. However, the institute will face obstacles related to maintaining international political support, recruiting staff, and securing funding. Ultimately, the GGGI's success depends on its ability to effectively address developing countries' institutional and technical shortcomings over the long term. Maintaining continuity of political support for green growth plans inside South Korea will also need attention. In this way, it faces the same challenges that have dogged traditional development efforts for decades. Economics First The Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in June 2012 generated a slew of epithets. A news release from CARE International claimed the conference was "nothing more than a political charade."[7] Greenpeace International executive director Kumi Naidoo said it was "a failure of epic proportions."[8] Rio+20 secretary-general Sha Zukang's verdict: "An outcome that makes nobody happy."[9] Over the past several years, many observers have expressed frustration with the inability of environmental talks that include thousands of participants to produce concrete action or meaningful results. However, Rio+20 did produce numerous side agreements on a variety of sustainable development actions. These were negotiated on the margins of the conference between communities, countries, and corporations.[10] In a sense, this do-it-yourself spirit reflects the ethos of the GGGI, which seeks to combine coherence and technical capacity with local desires for action on green growth initiatives. There are two important premises to the GGGI's approach. The first is that environmental challenges, such as water stress, biodiversity loss, and climate change, are economic policy challenges.[11] Though the GGGI expects that its work will make positive contributions to climate change mitigation and poverty reduction, it operates by looking through a wider lens that assesses how countries can use resources more efficiently. The first step is to take an economic view of the situation. "We view ourselves as an economic institution, not an environmental institution," GGGI executive director Richard Samans said of the institute.[12] By acknowledging that economic growth and rising living standards are crucial for developing countries, and by accounting for the incentives that have led to stress on natural resources, this view is a welcome complement to the global climate bodies that tend not to emphasize these points as first principles. The second premise is that years of intense focus on global, top-down, legalistic solutions to climate change have come at the expense of a "how-to" focus on the ground.[13] The result is severe underinvestment in the economic framework necessary for countries to attract private and public capital to achieve economic development goals that can produce both economic and environmental payoffs, such as projects that can simultaneously produce new jobs and access to clean energy sources. The GGGI seeks to fill this economic gap by developing an "enabling economic architecture," or frameworks for integrating economic and environmental goals that include plans to attract investment to fulfill them.[14] In this way, the GGGI's country-by-country (or in some cases, province-by-province), bottom-up approach is the right supplement to top-down, global negotiations. In short, global discussions advance ideas about what to do. The GGGI focuses on how to do it. A core activity of the GGGI is advising countries on forming what it calls a Green Growth Plan (GGP). This begins with assessing the country's own goals for economic development. The GGGI then helps make a thorough evaluation of where economic performance targets can overlap with potential environmental benefits. It also helps identify policy options, taking into consideration the trade-offs inherent in policy choices. "Green growth is not a free lunch in most cases," Samans argues.[15] The GGGI also assists with the crucial step of investment analysis—building quantifiable investment cases that can help attract public and private sector resources—to help countries fulfill their plans. Reducing information and policy barriers to investment through rigorous analysis is seen as a critical part of the GGGI's work. In effect, the GGGI diagnoses an economy's green growth potential and then helps to craft investment cases to translate policy into reality. This is a distinguishing feature of the GGGI: a whole-of-government approach that seeks to integrate green growth into a country's economic development agenda, rather than produce disparate, one-off environmental projects. This is ambitious but necessary: uncoordinated, small-scale projects are unlikely to be enough to achieve the paradigm shift to a green economy that the GGGI seeks. Building a Green Growth Model The idea that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to economic development has become something of a mantra in the development community. Consideration of political, environmental, and economic conditions on the ground is an imperative often mentioned in discussions about development. This is as true when striving for green growth as it is for traditional growth. How then can the GGGI achieve its mission of building a green growth model that is widely applicable? The GGGI aims to do this by focusing intensively on a small number of countries that vary by region, income level, and type of economy in order to test green growth in diverse locations.[16] The goal is to produce successful examples that show green growth is possible in a variety of settings and that there are best practices that can be adapted to different situations. These on-the-ground experiences will also feed into the GGGI's own research, including through two multilateral initiatives for which it is acting as the secretariat: the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative.[17] According to Samans, the GGGI plans to work with ten to twenty countries over the next several years "that are serious about driving green growth into their economic development plans."[18] How to judge whether a country is serious about green growth? The GGGI pursues projects only in countries from which it has received a high-level request, usually at the ministerial level, and also consults widely with interested parties and ministries.[19] This ensures buy-in at the highest levels, though this may last only as long as the current government is in place. What happens when administrations change, and along with them, the political dynamics that initially favored green growth? The GGGI hopes that successful cases of green growth will eventually inspire other countries to adapt green growth models to their own situations.[20] However, changes in political support or opposition from domestic interest groups will be potential risks to successful implementation of green growth plans. Even where political conditions are supportive of green growth, underlying problems can stymie the best of green growth intentions. A recent World Bank report cautions, "[Green growth] is not a panacea to a country's economic ills: if economic growth is insufficient because of institutional or policy problems, green growth will not boost it in the absence of other structural changes."[21] Buy-in without strong institutions and technical knowledge is not enough. The GGGI tries to address such deficiencies head-on from the beginning by integrating a strategy to strengthen institutional and technical capacity into its plans. Although such foresight is commendable, the task of fortifying institutions so that they can absorb and retain technical know-how for the long term remains a tall order for broader international development efforts. As a young organization, the GGGI is still building a pipeline of projects. Ethiopia is one of the first countries in which the GGGI began its work, and it offers one of the most complete cases so far to illustrate the GGGI's approach. In 2010, the government of Ethiopia announced an ambitious Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) that set a goal of achieving middle-income status and a climate-resilient economy through low-emissions growth.[22] The country's contribution to global carbon emissions is minimal and it already generates the bulk of its power from renewable sources, mostly hydropower.[23] Ethiopia's interests are avoiding future increases in emissions, using resources more efficiently, and reducing its vulnerability to changes in the climate.[24] Working within the context of the GTP, the GGGI assisted the Ethiopian government with developing a green growth plan called the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) strategy. To build domestic support, the GGGI helped create a cross-ministerial committee to coordinate actions for shepherding the process along. The institute invested in local technical capacity from the start by forming technical committees to develop sectoral strategies and to serve as a repository for transferring technical knowledge to teams from relevant ministries.[25] The CRGE includes over sixty projects in multiple sectors for low-emissions growth. The GGGI is currently working with the Ethiopian government on an implementation and investment plan, called the "iPlan," to achieve these and other green growth objectives.[26] A country's decision to commit to sustainable development through green growth can offer an attractive benefit: access to financing. Economic development plans that can be sold as "green" can attract new sources of financing dedicated explicitly to green initiatives. Last month, the Ethiopian government launched the Climate Resilient Green Economy Facility, a tool for mobilizing public and private sources of funding to support projects in line with the CRGE. So far, the fund has received pledges of $60 million from the Norwegian government and $24.3 million from the government of the United Kingdom.[27] This is far short of the estimated $150 billion that the Ethiopian government is seeking to support the iPlan.[28] Current economic conditions may make it difficult for governments to follow through on funding pledges for new financing vehicles. The GGGI acknowledges that bringing Ethiopia's plan into action will require strong commitment from the government and others.[29] A look at some of its proposed projects for low-emissions growth is instructive.[30] For example, some could require significant investment, such as building a light rail transit system. Some may require serious expertise and introduce competing demands for a resource, such as bringing non-forest land into agricultural production through new irrigation projects. Still others may require political action and enforcement mechanisms, such as enacting fuel efficiency standards. Culture matters, too. For example, Ethiopia's CRGE cites "cultural reasons" as a barrier to the adoption of efficient cooking stove technologies, a strategy for reducing forest degradation.[31] The "enabling economic architecture" that the GGGI seeks to build requires complementary institutional strength and political support in order to translate these priorities into reality. This will be the real test for the GGGI. Building institutional capacity is a long-term project and political dynamics can be unpredictable and difficult to maneuver. The best green growth plan will not help a country achieve a true paradigm shift to green economic development if it stays on the shelf because the capacity to implement it is lacking or political support is weak. Recognizing this, the GGGI addresses these challenges from the time it begins working in a country. Whether it can manage them over the long term and leave in place something that will endure when its time in a country is over is an open question. Becoming an International Organization There are other organizations that pursue green economy projects around the globe, such as the UN Development Program and the Climate Knowledge and Development Network. Consulting powerhouses such as McKinsey & Company have generated numerous ideas related to advancing green growth strategies in recent years.[32] Until now, however, there has never been an international organization dedicated solely to developing green growth strategies for integration into a country's core economic development agenda. The GGGI will remain small for now, but it sees itself as a new kind of organization.[33] The GGGI aims to be a hybrid organization, linking developed and developing countries as well as governments and nonstate actors. Its advisory committee will consist entirely of nonstate actors, such as leading experts in fields related to green growth.[34] In addition, its executive body, called the council, which will oversee the GGGI's strategy and budget, will include a range of contributing member countries and participating member countries, along with experts or other nonstate actors, the host country, and the director general.[35] The GGGI's financing has come primarily from voluntary contributions from members, with additional project funding from member and nonmember countries and international financial institutions.[36] The GGGI has also received funds from Korean steel giant POSCO and Denmark-based manufacturer the Danfoss Group.[37] The institute will seek Official Development Assistance (ODA) eligibility status from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a means to enhance its attractiveness to some donor countries.[38] On October 20, South Korea won a bid to host the secretariat of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a victory that could enhance the GGGI's prospects for securing future financing from a fund that aims to raise $100 billion per year by 2020.[39] The GCF was established during global climate talks last year to help developing countries access financing for climate change mitigation and adaptation projects. Locating the GCF secretariat in Songdo, near Seoul, could reinforce the GGGI's efforts and pave the way for relationship building between the two organizations. The decision to choose South Korea will become final upon endorsement by countries participating in the annual UN climate negotiations later this year in Qatar.[40] Prospects for Success There are at least two important criteria for the GGGI's success in the long run. First, can it amass enough evidence to prove that green growth is possible? Second, can it show that successful cases can be emulated in diverse settings? These are two separate challenges. Even if green growth is shown to be possible somewhere, is this a guarantee that it can succeed anywhere? It will take only one successful case of implementing a wide-ranging green growth plan in a country to show that green growth has potential. The second question is more difficult because answering it with an unequivocal "yes" means overcoming the same challenges that traditional development efforts have long faced: finding a way to address developing countries' institutional and technical limitations in a way that endures over the long term and successfully navigating in-country political dynamics. As a brand-new international organization, the GGGI has the benefit of decades of lessons learned in the broader development community, and the institute's embrace of these insights are evident in its approach, especially in the priority it places on gaining wide-ranging domestic support from the start and creating platforms for helping countries learn from each other's green growth experiences. Still, in order to achieve a paradigm shift, it will have to clear the same hurdles that continue to confront traditional development efforts. The GGGI will need many years of sustained support before it can show that green growth is truly possible in any setting. Maintaining international political support will be an ongoing task. The GGGI has begun to operate as an international organization without the ratification of its host country. The South Korean National Assembly has yet to ratify the agreement that established the GGGI; fourteen other member countries have also not ratified the agreement.[41] Distractions related to South Korea's upcoming presidential election may be one reason why the National Assembly has not acted. The National Assembly's lack of action raises the question of who will be the GGGI's national champion in the international sphere after President Lee's term is over. It is unclear whether South Korea will continue to be the driver of the GGGI that it has been under President Lee. Does South Korea see the GGGI specifically, and green growth more generally, as an agenda of the Lee administration, or will internationalizing the institute firmly establish it as an organization with its own identity? Denmark's early and strong support of the GGGI has endured, and the GGGI has amassed eighteen institutional partnerships so far, including with the Asian Development Bank and the World Economic Forum. These relationships may help it gain long-term traction. Winning over countries and other partners through the power of its ideas may also be a driver for its eventual success: the participants will be the ones who want to be there. This could add to unity of purpose, even if differences emerge among member countries on where to focus the institute's efforts. The GGGI will have to recruit more expert staff to carry out its goals of diagnosing the economies of up to twenty countries for their green growth potential and devising follow-up actions. This will be a big task in the months ahead; the GGGI plans to more than double its staff of sixty-two by 2014.[42] Its elevated status as an international organization is expected to confer a certain gravitas upon it that will be useful in attracting talent and boosting its credibility.[43] Operating as an international organization might also help it attract more funding, but where will the money come from? The Green Climate Fund is in its infancy; details about how it will operate and raise funds are not yet settled.[44] It will be important for the GGGI to show successful cases of green growth to attract more financial support in the future. To that end, one of the GGGI's strengths seems to be a willingness to show restraint—it will be a cheerleader for green growth only to the extent that its own theory and practices show evidence for its success. This approach can help build confidence in its work. "We will build a body of evidence and call it like we see it," said Samans. "We are not an advocacy organization."[45] The GGGI is unique for forging ahead and pursuing a bottom-up approach to green growth without waiting for a global, consensus-based organization to agree on what should be done. The self-starter gene that seems fundamental to this international organization's DNA is commendable. The GGGI will be successful in the short term because action trumps inaction. The only way to know for sure if green growth is possible is to try it. Green growth as a concept has already caught on in the global discourse about the environment, development, and climate change. The real question is whether the GGGI will be able to succeed fast enough to maintain interest in and funding for its work. Achieving a wholesale paradigm shift, if that is possible, is likely to take many years. The GGGI itself acknowledges that this is an ambitious vision.[46] However, one thing is certain: the GGGI is sure to advance the body of knowledge about green growth in a way that would likely not occur if this organization had never come into existence. By kick-starting green growth efforts on the ground and learning by doing, the GGGI is already contributing to green growth theory. In a few years' time, the world will know more about the possibilities of green growth than it does today because of the GGGI's work. Endnotes ^ Australia, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Indonesia, Kiribati, Korea, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Qatar, the UAE, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam are the seventeen member countries that signed an agreement in June to convert the GGGI into an international organization. Mexico became the eighteenth member country on October 15, 2012. ^ The Republic of Kiribati's approval of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute on September 18 officially paved the way for the GGGI's conversion into an international organization in October. The governments of Denmark and Guyana had previously ratified the agreement. According to the GGGI, under international law, three countries were required to ratify the treaty in order to convert the GGGI into an international organization. ^ Global Green Growth Institute website, www.gggi.org. ^ Speech by Richard Samans, September 21, 2012, Seoul. ^ For example, see Lee Myung-bak, "Shifting Paradigms: The Road to Global Green Growth," Global Asia volume 4, no. 4, 2010, pp. 8–12. ^ As noted by President Lee Myung-bak, see "S. Korea Establishes 'Strategic Point' for Global Green Growth," Yonhap, June 17, 2010. ^ See CARE International media release, http://www.care-international.org/Media-Releases/rio20-nothing-more-than-a-political-charade.html. ^ Mark McDonald, "U.N. Report from Rio on Environment a 'Suicide Note,'" International Herald Tribune, June 24, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/u-n-report-from-rio-on-environment-a-suicide-note/. ^ Ibid. ^ Simon Romero and John M. Broder, "Progress on the Sidelines as Rio Conference Ends," New York Times, June 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/world/americas/rio20-conference-ends-with-some-progress-on-the-sidelines.html?_r=1. ^ As noted by Richard Samans in an interview with the author, October 3, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ Ibid. ^ As noted by GGGI staff in an email interview, August 25, 2012. The GGGI is currently working on national green growth plans in Brazil, Ethiopia, Mongolia, United Arab Emirates, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand. The institute is working on provincial-level green growth plans in Indonesia, the Philippines, and China. See http://www.gggi.org/project/public. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ Interview with author, October 3, 2012. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ Ibid. ^ "Inclusive Green Growth: A Pathway to Sustainable Development," World Bank, 2012, p. 153. ^ "Growth and Transformation Plan," draft, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. ^ "Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy," Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, http://www.undp-aap.org/sites/undp-aap.org/files/Ethiopia%20CRGE%20Strategy%20Final.pdf. ^ "Growth and Transformation Plan," draft, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. ^ "Green Growth Planning: GGGI Country Programs," Global Green Growth Institute, http://www.gggi.org/sites/www.gggi.org/files/attachment/20120514_GGGI_Country_Programs.pdf. ^ Email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ "Ethiopia: Govt Launches Green Economic Funding Facility," Afrik-News, September 18, 2012, http://www.afrik-news.com/article19299.html. ^ Green Growth Planning: GGGI Country Programs," Global Green Growth Institute, http://www.gggi.org/sites/www.gggi.org/files/attachment/20120514_GGGI_Country_Programs.pdf. ^ Ibid. ^ "Ethiopia's Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy," Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, http://www.undp-aap.org/sites/undp-aap.org/files/Ethiopia%20CRGE%20Strategy%20Final.pdf. ^ Ibid, p. 112. ^ For example, see "India: Taking on the Green Growth Challenge," McKinsey on Sustainability & Resource Productivity, by Rajat Gupta, Sushant Mantry, and Ganesh Srinivasan, Number 1, Summer 2012. ^ See comments by GGGI chairman Lars Rasmussen in "Green institute seeks quality-driven expansion," by Shin Hyon-hee, Korea Herald, August 23, 2012. ^ See "GGGI's Conversion into an International Organization," GGGI News Release, July 2, 2012, http://www.gggi.org/news/release/2011/00/00/gggi-s-conversion-international-organization. ^ Ibid. ^ According to a speech by Richard Samans on September 21, 2012, in Seoul, core funding for 2012 comes from "Australia, Denmark, Japan, and UAE and project funding from Germany, Norway, UK, and international financial institutions." ^ Interview with Richard Samans, October 3, 2012. ^ Speech by Richard Samans, September 21, 2012, Seoul and email interview with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ "S. Korea selected as host of GCF secretariat," Yonhap, October 20, 2012. South Korea prevailed over five other countries vying to host the GCF: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, and Switzerland. ^ Green Climate Fund press advisory, "Republic of Korea selected to host the Green Climate Fund," October 20, 2012. ^ Lee Jae-min, "A bumpy road for the GGGI," Korea Herald, October 2, 2012. ^ Shin Hyon-hee, "Green institute seeks quality-driven expansion," Korea Herald, August 23, 2012. ^ Interview via email with GGGI staff, August 25, 2012. ^ For an assessment of the Green Climate Fund, see http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/08/09/guest-post-ready-for-primetime-the-100-billion-climate-fund/. ^ Interview with author, October 3, 2012. ^ As noted on the Global Green Growth Institute website, www.gggi.org.

ROK Green Growth: Looking Back on Three Years In a major speech in August 2011, President Lee Myung-bak said, "Our vision of green growth is the first time in our history where a global issue is recognized as our own. It is also pivotal to our mission of becoming a greater Republic of Korea." The growing recognition of Korea as a global leader in green growth policies may in fact be one of the greatest achievements of President Lee's green growth strategy since he first announced it three years ago. Since then, Korea has acted quickly to establish new domestic and international institutions that lay the foundation for future work, but concrete success resulting from these efforts remains modest so far. Two recent reports by the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) that reflect on Korea's progress over the past three years tend to emphasize efforts more than results. For example, one report identified progress in promoting green lifestyles as a significant achievement, pointing to the ramp-up of two incentive programs designed to make it easier for consumers to make choices that result in fewer greenhouse gas emissions. The first is Korea's carbon-point system, through which participants earn points redeemable for awards by reducing energy use. Two million households were registered in the program as of July, about 11.4 percent of all Korean households. The second is the Green Card program, which rewards consumers with up to 200,000 won ($168) annually when they choose eco-friendly products or use public transportation. The report touted the existence of these programs as a success, but they have not yet produced the desired results. A second report acknowledges this fact. In that report, titled The Past Three Years of Achievements in Green Growth, the PCGG expressed disappointment with the public's track record in incorporating the tenets of green growth into their daily lifestyles, noting that household energy consumption increased 7.2 percent during the three-year period. (Energy consumption by industry was up 7.9 percent and overall consumption increased 6.7 percent, outpacing GDP growth, which registered at 6.1 percent in 2010.) The report also hinted at a need for more comprehensive polices, stating that "the Korean government evaluates that initiatives such as electricity price and taxation have not reached the point of encouraging people and businesses to voluntarily reduce greenhouse gas emissions and conserve energy." The second report had praise for the private sector, noting that private investment in green growth businesses over the past three years translated into a higher level of sales and exports. From 2008 to 2010, green investment by Korea's thirty largest business groups soared 74.5 percent annually, amounting to 15.1 trillion won ($12.7 billion) during this period, according to the report. (The criteria by which investment was considered "green" is not spelled out in the report.) The Ministry of Knowledge Economy (MKE) released some figures that indicate these investments paid off: according to MKE, sales of "green industrial goods" amounted to 8.08 trillion won ($6.7 billion) in 2010, up 6.5-fold from 1.25 trillion won ($1 billion) in 2007. During the same period, exports in the green and renewable energy sector grew sevenfold from $625 million to $4.54 billion. Green Diplomacy: Bearing Fruit South Korea has proven its ability to keep itself at the forefront of the global green growth conversation, and this quarter was no exception. The Korean government's robust efforts to promote green growth around the globe resulted in new partnerships, new opportunities for Korea to host international conferences, and increased activity at the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). South Korea's vaunted new alliance with Denmark has given rise to yet another multilateral forum, complete with its own shorthand: the Global Green Growth Forum, or 3GF, convened two hundred business and government leaders in October in Copenhagen to discuss how the public and private sectors can cooperate on green growth. The forum focused on energy and transportation, with plans to present recommendations at the World Climate Summit in December, held in conjunction with UN climate talks in South Africa. In September, South Korean finance minister Bahk Jae-wan signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with World Bank president Robert B. Zoellick, launching a new partnership to support developing countries' research and investment in green growth. Under the MOU, South Korea will commit $40 million over four years to a new Korea Green Growth Partnership Trust Fund. Efforts to attract high-level environmental talks to South Korea paid off; the country beat out Mexico in a bid to host the fifth World Conservation Congress next year on Jeju Island. President Lee also continues to lobby his foreign counterparts for their support of his bid to hold next year's UN climate talks (COP-18) in Seoul. This topic was on his agenda on a state visit to Uzbekistan in August. The GGGI made several forward strides this quarter. Under the terms of an MOU signed earlier between GGGI and the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the GGGI launched its office in Abu Dhabi's Masdar City. Intended as a "regional hub" to address climate change and promote green growth, the GGGI will also develop a system to monitor greenhouse gas emissions on a national level in the UAE. GGGI deputy executive director Jung Tae-yong will serve as the interim director of the Abu Dhabi office. In August, the GGGI released a detailed account of Korea's green growth ambitions in English, "Green Growth in Motion: Sharing Korea's Experience." In addition, the GGGI signed an MOU with Mexico's Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources to build a cooperative partnership on global green growth. Specific activities are yet to be determined. Moving Forward on President Lee's "Me First" Policy The Lee administration has already demonstrated that it will not wait for a successful outcome to UN-sponsored climate talks before taking action to reduce the country's greenhouse gas emissions, an approach that President Lee has coined as a "me first" policy. GGGI chairman Dr. Han Seung-soo said he sees little possibility that a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol will be reached at the next round of climate negotiations in December in South Africa. Dr. Han, the former UN envoy on climate change, said in a report by the National, a United Arab Emirates newspaper, that "developed countries want to have internationally legally binding pledges, whereas developing countries want domestically legally binding pledges. These are totally different approaches to the problem. At this juncture there is no agreement." Dr. Han and others are embracing an alternative approach called Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA). NAMA, an idea long championed by Korea, calls for developing countries to fashion their own emissions reduction targets and strategies. Korea has already set its voluntary target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at 30 percent below the expected level in 2020. Legislation to create an emissions trading scheme (ETS)—an important strategy for cutting emissions—is pending in the National Assembly. The legislation's path to becoming law has been slowed by opposition from business groups, but Dr. Han expressed optimism that Korean industry will eventually get on board. "When we announced that [the emissions reduction target], the industry reaction was not very positive," Dr. Han told the National. "The government began to persuade them that this is in the long run to the benefit of the industry, not to the government. In the long run the business community realizes that this is the way forward—not backward, forward." While there is still industry opposition to an ETS in Korea, some firms are seeing opportunities. Samsung SDI is one of them, calculating that an ETS will fuel demand for solar power as companies seek to reduce carbon emissions by using renewable energy. The company is upping its investment in solar, planning to make 2.2 trillion won ($1.8 billion) worth of investment in its solar business by 2015, the same year the ETS is expected to take effect in Korea. Samsung SDI is looking outside Korea as well; one executive in the company's solar energy division told Reuters that his company expects the global solar cell market to be worth $70 billion by 2020, more than double the size of the market last year. Other Developments in ROK Green Growth Other developments in ROK green growth during the third quarter involved tidal power, incentives for electric vehicles, the designation of green university campuses, and the smart grid. There were also announcements from the private sector about plans for new investments in green growth. In addition, the ROK government continued its pursuit of overseas oil resources and access to mineral elements important in renewable energy technologies, illustrating a short-term focus on increasing energy self-sufficiency in a world that relies heavily on oil and a long-term focus on green growth. In August, President Lee presided over the opening of the Shihwa Station, a tidal power plant that is set to become the world's largest when fully completed in December. It will supplant the Rance Tidal Power Station in France for the number one spot. The Shihwa Station, on the west coast near Seoul, can reportedly provide enough electricity to power a city of 500,000 residents. While the plant has been under construction for seven years, predating Lee's term in office and his green growth strategy, he claimed it as a victory for green growth. According to Yonhap, he said, "This is not only a symbol of 'low-carbon, green growth,' but also represents a landmark on the path the world should take." Lee said that the plant will save South Korea more than 860,000 barrels of oil and reduce CO2 emissions by 320,000 tons. The plant is something of a test case. According to UPI Energy, Keyyong Hong, director of marine structure and plant research at the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute, said, "depending on the results of Shihwa, we can justify further development of tidal power." In a bid to boost the electric vehicle industry, the government announced that South Koreans who purchase electric cars will receive up to 6 million won ($5,000) in tax incentives starting early next year. In addition, the Korea Environment Corporation (KECO) announced plans to confirm agreements with thirty-eight local governments and state institutions to install 204 chargers for electric vehicles by the end of the year. The Ministry of Environment and KECO selected ten Korean universities as "low carbon green campuses." The universities will incorporate green growth into their curricula and look for ways to reduce the emissions generated by their campuses. Progress on the Jeju smart grid test bed offers a glimpse at how all Koreans might be able to save energy in the future. As of July, more than two thousand homes on Jeju Island were connected to the test grid. In a profile of the one of the first residents on Jeju to have his home fully wired to the test grid, the International Herald Tribune explained how Korea's test grid is intended to improve energy efficiency and save money. In addition, Doosan Heavy Industries and Construction, Korea Electric Power Company, and POSCO ICT have agreed to build a 60-megawatt wind farm off the coast of Jeju Island. LG announced in September that it will invest 8 trillion won ($6.7 billion) in "green new business" sectors such as electric vehicle batteries and solar cell wafers. Korea's Hanwha Group announced plans to build a solar energy facility to power a tree nursery in northwestern China as part of a reforestation effort cosponsored by the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. Under the terms of the MOU between Hanwha's two renewable energy arms and China's Ningxia Province, Hanwha will construct the facility free of charge, although the company is clear about its plans to strengthen its foothold in China. Hanwha Group China CEO Keum Choon-soo told Yonhap that his company "will become one of the top environment-friendly companies in China by strengthening our low-carbon green-growth business." In other developments, the South Korea-EU Free Trade Agreement went into effect on July 1. Green growth businesses, such as energy efficient home appliances and LED lights, are expected to attract interest from European firms; according to SERI Quarterly, Korea's "markets for solar energy, wind power, and bio-energy are expected to grow three-fold in ten years." On the U.S.-ROK cooperation front, the U.S.-based Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA) closed a deal with the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards (KATS) to collaborate on global standards for smart grid, light-emitting diodes, and other technologies. Bill Ash, IEEE-SA's strategic program manager, said in an interview with the Korea Herald, "In order to be globally relevant, we need Korea's participation and the interaction between IEEE-SA and the Korean market." During this quarter, President Lee sought mineral elements and new oil resources from Africa. While traveling in Africa, Lee agreed in principle to joint development of mineral resources like copper in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Ethiopia, one of the first countries to receive assistance from the GGGI, he said he hopes that South Korean companies will be able to participate in energy infrastructure projects and mineral resources development. During the first meeting of the Korea-Gabon Joint Committee on Energy and Mineral Resources Cooperation in July, the focus was on Korea's plans to advise Gabon as it forms a state-owned oil company. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy announced that it is seeking a formal agreement to participate in developing rare earth elements at a mine in South Africa. According to Yonhap, under the agreement, Seoul would be entitled to about six thousand tons of rare earth elements, almost twice the amount South Korea needed last year. United States: A Bad Day for Solar Power and New Priorities From the Department of Energy A handful of high-profile bankruptcy filings cast a cloud over the U.S. solar industry this quarter as companies buckled under the pressure of rising costs and overseas competition that has driven down the price of solar panels. Solar panel maker Solyndra Inc., the first company to receive funds under a Department of Energy (DOE) loan-guarantee program, halted manufacturing operations, laid off 1,100 employees, and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in September. According to an analysis by the Pittsburgh Tribune Review, Solyndra's bankruptcy filing listed several foreign firms as creditors; Korea's Advanced Nano Products is listed as being owed $1.35 million. The DOE loan guarantee program drew heavy criticism for what was seen as a hasty and potentially politically motivated approval of a $535 million loan guarantee to Solyndra, sparking new debate over whether the government should be in the business of picking renewable energy winners. Solyndra's implosion came on the heels of other solar industry bankruptcy filings. Evergreen Solar filed for bankruptcy in August after closing a plant in Massachusetts, and Intel spinoff SpectraWatt sought bankruptcy protection after closing a New York factory. After several months of seeking input across the country, the Department of Energy released its first Quadrennial Technology Review (QTR) in late September. The QTR is intended to develop a framework for making choices about investing in energy technologies. The report states that "mere technical promise—that something could work—is an unjustifiably low bar for the commitment of DOE R&D funds. As every dollar matters, DOE's research portfolio will give priority to those technologies most likely to have significant impact on timescales commensurate with the urgency of national energy challenges." In recommending priority areas for DOE research, the report offers a basis for discussion of new ideas about potential U.S.-ROK cooperation on green growth. For example, among the report's findings was a lack of DOE investment in the transportation sector relative to the stationary sector (such as energy efficiency or the power grid). This, combined with the view that reliance on oil is the greatest threat to U.S. economic and national security and that vehicle efficiency has the largest near-term impact on oil consumption, led the report authors to conclude that "DOE should gradually increase its effort on vehicle efficiency and electrification relative to alternative fuels."