Renewable Energy

Today is my last day at CFR. I’m joining ReNew Power, India’s largest renewable energy firm, as their CTO. I’m excited for a new adventure but sad to leave the Council, which has given me support and autonomy to study the innovations needed for global decarbonization. As I leave, I wanted to share a new article in the energy journal Joule that I published along with John Dabiri at Stanford University and David Hart at ITIF and George Mason University. In it, we write: Solar energy, wind energy, and battery energy storage are widely regarded as the three most prominent clean energy technology success stories. In 2017, the International Energy Agency listed them as the only technologies being deployed rapidly enough to help limit climate change. Power from solar and wind farms is now routinely sold at prices below that of electricity from fossil-fueled generators, and cheaper batteries are fueling rising sales of electric vehicles as well as a building boom of grid-scale electricity storage projects. Governments around the world might conclude that innovation in solar, wind, and storage is no longer a priority. Such a conclusion would be a mistake. The impressive performance and promising projections for these three technologies obscure an underlying stagnation. In each case, a single dominant technological design has emerged, which private industry is presently scaling up. As Figure 1A reveals, crystalline silicon panels have strengthened their near-monopoly in solar photovoltaic energy in recent years. Figure 1B demonstrates that a similar trend is emerging in grid-scale energy storage, as lithium-ion batteries relentlessly increase their market share. And in wind energy, horizontal-axis wind turbines have enjoyed a virtually 100% market share for decades. Figure 1. Global Market Shares of Dominant Designs in Solar Photovoltaic and Nonhydro Grid Energy Storage (A) Percentage of global annual solar photovoltaic panel deployed capacity by technology (Source: Fraunhofer ISE). (B) Percentage of global annual grid-scale energy storage deployed capacity by technology, excluding pumped hydroelectric storage (Source: International Energy Agency, Tracking Clean Energy Progress, 2018). While these ‘‘dominant designs’’ have made clean energy more competitive with fossil fuels in the near term,  they pose a significant risk in the long term: ‘‘technological lock-in.’’ Technological lock-in has been documented across a range of industries in the past—especially in legacy sectors with entrenched incumbent firms and regulatory inertia. Once it sets in, new technologies struggle to achieve commercial traction even if they are superior to existing ones. The warning signs of lock-in are clear across all three fields. Private industry is devoting virtually no investment to the development of next-generation technologies, while making massive bets on the rapid deployment and incremental improvement of existing technologies. If new solar, wind, and storage technologies are ‘‘locked out,’’ global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions could fall well short of those needed to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. To be sure, it is impossible to be certain that new technologies will be needed, but a prudent risk management strategy would be to prepare for the likely scenario that they are. Governments around the world should step in to boost funding for research, development, and demonstration of new solar, wind, and battery technologies that have the potential to outperform the current market leaders. These technologies will not attract substantial private investment without such public support. Well-designed policies would spread public funding across a diverse range of technologies and phase out that support as technologies mature, ensuring maximal return on public investments in innovation. Governments are not the only—or even the primary—entities needed to advance clean energy innovation. The private sector is center stage for the development and commercialization of new technologies, and I’m eager to help my new firm establish itself as a technology leader. Still, I’ve learned through my time at the Council that supportive public policy can unleash private innovation. At the Council, I am grateful to all of my colleagues who have made my time here enjoyable and stimulating. I’m especially thankful to Richard Haass and Jim Lindsay for their support of my work. I’m also indebted to Michael Levi for taking me under his wing (and trusting me with his blog!). None of my work would have been possible without my two superb research associates, Sagatom Saha and Madison Freeman, and our dynamic interns. Finally, I’ve been fortunate to work with world-class collaborators, who have opened my mind to new ways of thinking. I’ll miss the vibrant DC policy ecosystem and would love to host visitors over a cup of chai in New Delhi!

Through an initiative known as the Asia Super Grid, or ASG, the countries made plans to build an ocean-floor power network to connect their electricity grids and enable a cleaner and more efficient pan-Asian electric power system.

This post is about a new book, “Digital Decarbonization: Promoting Digital Innovations to Advance Clean Energy Systems,” edited by Varun Sivaram. It is available as a paperback or e-book on Amazon, and you can also download a free PDF copy here. Digitalization is all the rage in energy circles. The International Energy Agency published a major report last year proclaiming that the global energy system was on the cusp of a new, digital era. And indeed, advances in artificial intelligence and computing power, the falling cost of digital equipment such as sensors, and the connectivity provided by the Internet are transforming the way energy is produced, transported, and consumed. Many cheer on these trends because of the potential for digital innovations to make energy systems cleaner and more efficient. But digitalization is not inherently clean. That’s a prominent theme in a new CFR book published today, Digital Decarbonization, which features an all-star lineup of thirteen expert authors, ranging from university professors to corporate executives to the energy czar of New York state. The authors highlight the dramatic potential for digital innovations, from self-driving cars to smarter grids, to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. But they also warn that digital technologies could instead increase emissions by making it easier to obtain and use fossil fuels. Listed below are the diverse topics the book covers (and if you’re looking for Cliffs Notes, my introductory chapter to the book offers a sneak preview into each of the subsequent chapters): PART I: THE DIGITAL WAVE OF CLEAN ENERGY INNOVATION Stephen D. Comello, (Stanford University) “Trends in Early-Stage Financing for Clean Energy Innovation” David G. Victor (University of California, San Diego), “Digitalization: An Equal Opportunity Wave of Energy Innovation” PART II: DIGITAL OPPORTUNITIES IN ELECTRIC POWER, TRANSPORTATION, AND DATA SCIENCE Lidija Sekaric (Siemens), A Survey of Digital Innovations for a Decentralized and Transactive Electric Power System Ben Hertz-Shargel (EnergyHub), How Distribution Energy Markets Could Enable a Lean and Reliable Power System Peter Fox-Penner (Energy Impact Partners), The Implications of Vehicle Electrification and Autonomy for Global Decarbonization Rohit T. Aggarwala (Sidewalk Labs), Autonomous Vehicles and Cities: Expectations, Uncertainties, and Policy Choices Kyle Bradbury (Duke University), How Data Science Can Enable the Evolution of Energy Systems Sunil Garg (Uptake Technologies), Applying Data Science to Promote Renewable Energy PART III: MANAGING THE RISKS OF DIGITAL INNOVATIONS Erfan Ibrahim (Bit Bazaar), Managing the Cybersecurity Risks of an Increasingly Digital Power System Jesse Scott (Eurogas), Managing the Economic and Privacy Risks Arising From Digital Innovations in Energy PART IV: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Richard Kauffman and John O’Leary (Office of the Governor of New York), How State-Level Regulatory Reform Can Enable the Digital Grid of the Future Hiang Kwee Ho (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore), Lessons from Singapore’s Approach to Developing Clean and Digital Energy Systems Digital innovations stand out against the landscape of clean energy innovation. Whereas technologies such as advanced nuclear reactors, next-generation batteries, and new projects to capture and store carbon dioxide all struggle to raise private funding, digital technologies in energy are successfully attracting a new wave of venture capital investment in cleantech (figure 1; credit: Stephen Comello). So unlike other technology areas, where policymakers must seek to stimulate investments in innovation, policymakers face a different challenge when it comes to digital innovations. Here, policymakers need to harness these technologies –which the private sector is already funding—to reduce, rather than raise, carbon emissions and mitigate risks such as those of cyberattacks and privacy breaches. To find out more on how exactly to do so, I hope you’ll download a copy of Digital Decarbonization. Digitalization presents a rare opportunity to rapidly transform energy systems that are tend to be frustratingly slow to change. Making sure that the changes we do get advance an ultimate goal of decarbonization couldn’t be more important.

Solar energy, the world’s cheapest and fastest-growing power source, could one day supply most of the world’s energy needs. In Taming the Sun, however, Varun Sivaram warns that solar’s current surge is on track to stall, dimming prospects for averting catastrophic climate change. Brightening those prospects, he argues, will require innovation—creative financing, revolutionary technologies, and flexible energy systems.

U.S. oil production is set to surpass its all-time record monthly high (first set in 1970), and U.S. liquefied natural gas exports are roaring ahead, with 800 billion cubic feet already shipped since 2016. The U.S. Energy Information Administration is expecting the United States to become a net exporter of natural gas soon. This all bodes well for the Donald J. Trump administration’s aspiration for America to “dominate” global oil and gas markets and will improve the U.S. trade balance. The geographical diversity of the shale revolution across the United States now also partly shields the U.S. economy from the net ill-effects of sudden oil price rises. This stands in contrast to China, which has become the world’s largest oil importer. But could there be too much of a good thing? Rising U.S. oil and gas production is weakening Russia’s ability to use energy as a lever in international discourse and has diminished Iran’s ability to use its oil and gas sector as a diplomatic lure. Energy abundance provides many strategic and economic advantages. But lawmakers and the White House should think twice before focusing too intently on the current U.S. petro-economy. Petro-economies can become overly vulnerable to cyclical changes in commodity prices or worse in the case of Venezuela and Russia. Ask any Alaskan who is studying the possibility of a state budget crisis, petro-linkages are a double-edged sword. The United States needs to stay the course on advancing its digital economy, even if that means reducing demand for oil. Here’s why: China has recognized the strategic detriment of being too oil dependent when the United States is not and it is making a major energy pivot that could position itself to challenge U.S. energy dominance and even U.S. strategic pre-eminence. U.S. policy makers need to recognize this risk and take steps to mitigate it. As I explain in my latest article in Foreign Affairs, it is in the vital U.S. interest to remain in the Paris accord. China is banking on clean energy technologies as major industrial exports that will compete with U.S. and Russian oil and gas and make China the renewable energy and electric vehicle superpower of a future energy world. According to the International Energy Agency, the Chinese public and private sectors will invest more than $6 trillion in low carbon power generation and other clean energy technologies by 2040. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that Beijing has spent as much as $47 billion so far supporting domestic solar panel manufacturing, an effort that allowed China to dominate the panel export market and cratered costs. Chinese investment in battery technology is likely to have a similar effect on battery prices. Later this year, Goldman Sachs is bringing a $2 billion initial public offering to market for Chinese firm CATL that analysts are saying will quickly make the company the dominant battery manufacturer in the world. China is also betting big on electric vehicles, with BYD now the largest producer of electric vehicles in the world and another half dozen Chinese firms in the top twenty. Over a hundred Chinese companies currently make electric cars and buses. What’s more, China is hoping to bring all of its clean energy products to market as part of its $1.4 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, an infrastructure program designed to expand Beijing’s influence throughout Asia. To accomplish this, China is also working to dominate the financing of clean tech and renewable energy, opening the world’s largest carbon market and encouraging its major banks, including the People’s Bank of China, to promote and underwrite green bonds. China’s goal is not just to reduce its own dependence on foreign oil and gas. It hopes to use its clean energy exports to challenge the United States’ leading role in many regional alliances and trading relationships as well as to fashion an international order more to its interests. Its clean energy pivot is providing a platform for Beijing to court countries in Europe, Central Asia, and Asia with offers of cheap finance, advanced energy and transportation infrastructure, and solutions to pollution and energy insecurity. That raises the question of how the United States will sustain its energy dominance if it abdicates its role in multinational settings that will determine global rulemaking for energy exports and greenhouse gas emissions. Presumably, China intends to fashion a global energy architecture that will favor its interests. At some point down the road, that will not be defending coal use. It will be to sell its clean energy technologies free of tariffs (and possibly aided by subsidies) while European, Chinese, and other nation’s fees on carbon emissions hamper U.S. oil and gas exports. It could also make Chinese, rather than U.S., standards for green finance, energy product labeling, and advanced vehicles the global standard. The take away from this Chinese challenge is that the United States needs to find creative ways to meet its Paris climate accord commitments and continue to develop a substantive technology innovation and climate change policy approach. Washington should consider additional policies to promote private sector investment in clean energy, including allowing renewable energy investors to form master limited partnerships in the same way as their oil and gas compatriots. Washington should also consider new uses for natural gas and bio-methane that can help meet the U.S. emission reduction pledge and stay the course on automobile efficiency standards that contribute to our shrinking oil import bill. During the Cold War, the United States rose to the task of reasserting itself in science when it realized the dire consequences of losing the space race. Meeting the challenge of China’s pivot to clean energy will be no different. The United States needs to work diligently inside and outside the Paris accord framework to fashion trade rules and carbon market systems that will accommodate U.S. oil and gas exports now and lay the groundwork to promote clean energy technologies in the future. A version of this article first appeared as a “Gray Matters” column in the Houston Chronicle.

This guest post is co-authored by Joshua Busby, associate professor of public affairs at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the LBJ School at the University of Texas at Austin, and Sarang Shidore, a visiting scholar at the LBJ School at the University of Texas at Austin. This is the third post in a series on the topic of scaling up solar power in India, following posts in December 2015 and February 2017. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the IC² Institute at the University of Texas. In late 2014, in the lead up to the Paris negotiations, the Indian government established an ambitious solar target of 100GW of installed solar generation capacity by 2022. At the time, India had about 2.5GW of installed solar capacity. Since then, India has made significant progress towards the goal and has installed 20 GW, perhaps as much as 9.6 GW in 2017 alone (for a slightly lower estimate, see here). However, while the 100 GW target was always going to be difficult to achieve, we are less optimistic than we were last year in the future prospects of India’s solar scale-up. The overall target might not be met by 2022, and the solar scale-up seems likely to slow down. Bridge to India, an energy consultancy, has estimated that India will not meet its 100GW target by 2022. Its current estimate is that India will install only about 55GW of solar by 2022, including about 44GW of utility-scale solar and 10.8 GW of distributed solar. Here are the reasons for our increased pessimism. Solar projects are threatened by rising costs. Solar developers have built projects at very low cost, and these projects are threatened by rising costs of Chinese solar panels and likely increases in taxes. Nearly all of the installed capacity (18.4 GW of the 20GW) has been large, utility-scale solar parks rather than distributed solar power on residential, commercial, and industrial rooftops. India has deployed large-scale solar power through competitive auctions, whereby would-be solar developers compete to offer the lowest cost of electricity to the grid and in return earn the right to build solar projects. As prices for Chinese solar panels have plummeted, there has been a steep decline in the electricity prices offered by solar developers. Bid prices have come down from more than 8 rupees, or 12 cents, per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 2011 to as low as 2.44 rupees, or 4 cents, per kWh in 2017 for some projects. As we warned in our February 2017 piece, the price declines have been so steep that there is some concern that solar developers have not built in enough of a profit margin to ensure business viability if their costs increase. Since we wrote our last piece, the Financial Times warned of a bubble in solar auctions as the number of projects has ballooned. With Chinese solar panel prices increasing for the first time in years and with the imposition of a new goods and services tax (GST) of 5 percent on solar equipment, costs have increased, threatening the economics underpinning many of the low-cost project bids. One Indian solar developer of ACME Solar lamented his bid: “When we made our bid, we factored in a price for every solar panel of 30 cents per watt of power, but since then it has risen to around 35 cents. Our bid works at 30 cents.” Moreover, other costs associated with solar, namely financing costs, remain high in India, though they have come down somewhat over the past years. As panel prices have declined significantly, other costs, particularly finance, have become more important in determining the total costs of solar. In 2016, the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), a think tank that works closely with the Indian government, evaluated the costs of a solar bid in the Indian state of Telangana. They found that 70 percent of the bid cost was composed of financing costs, compared to only 20 percent for a comparable project in Dubai that had a much lower price per kilowatt-hour. CEEW noted that while cost of debt is around 5 to 7 percent in the United States, it exceeds 10 percent in India. The quality of many imported panels is unclear. As we signaled last year, there are concerns about the quality of imported solar panels, and it is unclear if these panels will hold up over 25 years as intended. A lack of quality controls means that it is difficult to tell what caliber of solar panels are being purchased by Indian firms, and there may be diminished generating capacity over time because panel quality is poor, particularly in rooftop installations. There has been some effort to roll out guidance on panel quality and inspections for panels, with standards to be enforced beginning in April 2018. Rooftop solar has taken off but has limited room to grow. The government had an initial goal of expanding rooftop solar to 40GW as part of its 100GW plan. This aim has largely been shelved. Though rooftop installation has tripled over the past year and is now up to over 1.5GW, most analysts think that this growth will slow, and India will have at most 10-12GW of rooftop installed by 2022. Developers have found that rooftop solar on commercial and industrial properties makes for good business and have quickly implemented a lot of projects with customers who can reliably pay them. As developers are financing most of the capacity, it is getting harder for them to find customers who they think are low risks for non-payment. Some assessments see the rooftop sector’s growth having occurred despite of, not because, of policy decisions by the Indian government. Few policy instruments have supported the sector’s growth, save for $625 million in subsidized credit from the World Bank and $500 million from the Asian Development Bank that were approved in 2016. Efforts to support net metering, which allows solar system owners to get credit for electricity they produce, have been met with considerable resistance. There is excess power generating capacity in many states. Economic growth and industrial demand have not increased by as much as anticipated, meaning that expected demand shortfalls have not materialized. As a consequence, new solar projects are coming online at a time when there is excess generation capacity in many states. In November 2017, India had an installed capacity of about 330GW of electricity while its peak demand was much lower at 164 GW. This surplus could tempt electricity distribution companies to renege on their contracted payments for solar electricity if excess coal-fired electricity is on offer for a lower price. So far, coal has borne the brunt of the consequences of market oversupply, and some firms have had to shut down older, less efficient coal burning power plants and to run some coal plants below their typical plant load factors. That trend may soon run its course, however, because the remaining old coal plants are often the cheapest source of available power. In comparison with new coal power plants, though, solar remains a much more attractive proposition. Of the 50 GW of new coal plants slated to be built through 2022, it is not clear if many of them will ultimately be constructed. Distribution companies are still in trouble. We also warned that the electric distribution companies (DISCOMS) in India–which purchase electricity from solar projects and distribute it to end-customers–remained heavily indebted, despite aggressive efforts by the government to help them clear their balance sheets of debt. This increased the risk that distribution companies would fail to pay for solar electricity in the long run, which would make the solar projects unprofitable to build. Enacted in November 2015, UDAY is the acronym for the government’s effort to bail out the struggling distribution companies by transferring their debts to state government balance sheets and trying to help them become solvent by removing the factors that led to losses, such as reducing transmission losses and chronic underpayment. Even with the UDAY scheme, many of the same factors that led to unprofitability in the first place, like the need to offer low-cost power to farmers, have not gone away (except for undercollection of electricity bills, which is improving). Technical losses in the system, which are high at more than 20 percent of the generated power, are not being reduced fast enough. Most distribution companies are still not in good shape. In May 2017, about half of the distribution companies were graded as B or lower for below average operational and financial performance capability or worse. This was comparable to the previous year’s ratings.  The government is sending mixed signals about its commitment to its renewable energy goals. On the positive side, the Indian government has announced plans for solar mega-auctions of 20GW for 2018. We have seen fewer auctions than some anticipated, but there are efforts to keep the pipeline of projects going with a lot of capacity being bid out at once. The International Solar Alliance (ISA), an intergovernmental organization launched by Prime Minister Modi, headquartered in India, and signed onto by 121 countries, also entered into force in December 2017. The visibility of the ISA enhances the on-going political significance of solar to the Modi government as it prepares for elections in 2019. However, on other fronts, the government’s commitment to solar is wavering. Revenue collections from a tax on coal that went to the National Clean Energy Fund aimed to fund climate and renewables goals will now fund other programs, including compensating states for revenue lost through recent tax reform. Though solar panels were exempt from taxation under the old fiscal regime, the newly introduced tax reform, known as GST, taxes solar panels at 5 percent. The government is also considering applying two new tariffs on imported solar panels, which could have serious implications for the costs of new solar projects.  The Modi government may issue new solar tariffs. India tried to develop its own subsidized panel production industry, but this has largely failed. The U.S. successfully pursued a WTO case against India for unfair local content rules in support of solar. Without the local content rules, Indian firms have had trouble competing with the Chinese panel producers that now dominate the market. The Modi government is poised to rule whether Chinese solar firms are dumping their panels in India. Recent reports suggest India’s Commerce Ministry is considering a 7.5 percent tax on imported solar panels. The Modi government would like to boost domestic manufacturing capacity under its Make in India campaign, including domestic manufacturing of solar. More worryingly, a 70 percent additional safeguards tariff explicitly aimed to protect domestic manufacturers from “serious injury” is being considered by India’s Ministry of Finance. Although projects currently in the pipeline are expected to be exempted from this tariff, subsequent additions will almost certainly be dealt a heavy blow, as it may increase the sustainable price of bids by 20 percent to 40 percent, making solar more expensive than new coal power in most cases after extra costs of grid integration are taken into account. The United States just imposed tariffs of its own on imported panels, which will likely, as Varun Sivaram argues, lead to job losses in the U.S. solar sector and do little to make U.S. companies more competitive. These decisions could cause a sharp increase in the prices of Chinese solar panels at a time when both India and U.S. solar installations are heavily reliant on cheap Chinese panels to keep the costs of their projects low. Domestic demand in China for panels is also picking up, making Chinese panels more expensive. Restricted imports or pricier Chinese panels could damage the Indian solar sector’s ability to build out more capacity. Concluding Thoughts The solar space remains a lively area for growth and experimentation in India. Some of the obstacles, such as distribution company finance, endure. New tensions have emerged as the Indian government would like to revitalize and support domestic manufacturing, including for solar panel manufacturers, which may conflict with its own aggressive solar deployment targets. With energy demand rising slower than expected, India will be faced with more challenges of integrating solar polar as coal plants are run even further below optimal capacity. We look forward to filling you in on developments in 2018 a year from now.

This post is co-written by Joan Ogden, professor of environmental science and policy at UC Davis and director of the Sustainable Transportation Energy Pathways (STEPS) program at the campus’ Institute of Transportation Studies. The United Kingdom is moving forward with a novel plan to lower carbon emissions in home heating by injecting low carbon hydrogen into the country’s natural gas grid. National Grid’s Cadent Gas and Northern Gas Networks, together with Keele University, have been studying how to safely add hydrogen (H2) to natural gas residential networks to clean up the country's heating sector which constitutes a fifth of the U.K.’s total carbon emissions. The pilot, if successful, would put more teeth behind the idea of natural gas as a bridge to lower carbon substitutes. However, there are many technical barriers to the practice that could be more than meets the eye. Hydrogen embrittles many of the steels used for natural gas pipelines, creating the potential for dangerous leaks. Some sections of the U.K. system already have advanced materials more suitable for hydrogen transport but adjusting end-use appliances to be hydrogen blend ready still needs to be done. The current hydrogen blending pilot will begin with safety work in 130 homes and businesses in a limited geography to convert appliances and avoid any dangerous leaks. Recent U.S. studies suggest that transporting a hydrogen-natural gas blend over an existing natural gas pipeline network safely is technically possible at levels between 5 to 15 percent hydrogen by volume, assuming the system in question is in top notch maintenance with no potentially dangerous cracks or leaks. Current European regulations allow between 0.1–12 percent hydrogen in natural gas lines. All analyses stress the critical importance of a case by case assessment before introducing hydrogen into a natural gas system. Officials are saying the U.K. system can specifically accommodate 20 percent given its history and materials. For residential use, U.K. officials believe some six million tons of carbon could be saved if the program could extend across the country. But blending does not necessarily enable major reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in transport applications, unless the “green” hydrogen—that is hydrogen produced from renewable sources as opposed to chemically “reformed” from methane—can be separated from the blend and then delivered to a highly efficient fuel cell vehicle. At this juncture, our newly published survey article of the latest science shows that costs to do so are currently prohibitive. Blending into existing networks ultimately limits the scale of possible H2 fuel adoption, because of the technical constraints on the allowed hydrogen fraction. For these reasons, locations such as Germany or California that intend to make a large H2 fueling push for automobiles are likely to build out separate networks, rather than relying on upgrading existing natural gas distribution systems. Natural gas is already in wide use as a fuel for fleet vehicles, medium-duty work trucks, and short haul drayage trucks. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is increasingly being used in long haul freight applications. By contrast, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles are just beginning to be adopted in some early adopter regional settings, mainly for light-duty passenger applications. About 5,500 hydrogen cars are on the road today. Interest in using hydrogen fuel cells for zero emission medium- and heavy-duty transport is also growing. A few dozen hydrogen fuel cell buses and work trucks are being demonstrated. California policy makers were hoping synergies between natural gas fueling infrastructure and hydrogen could ease transition costs of shifting to hydrogen to get deep cuts in transport related GHG emissions. But our work suggests that biogas could be a better fit in the coming years. We find that it is not going to be commercially rewarding to re-purpose or overbuild natural gas fueling station equipment and storage for future hydrogen use. Ultimately, a dedicated renewable hydrogen system would be needed for hydrogen to play a major role in reducing transport-related GHG emissions. In the meantime, California is investigating the benefits of greening its current truck fleets by blending cleaned up bio-methane, so called renewable natural gas, into the natural gas fueling system in the state. Injection of landfill gas would be one of the more commercial and productive alternatives, for example. However, the bio-methane resource is smaller than the future potential of hydrogen manufacturing, which has led California to continue to promote a pilot for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructure in select markets such as Los Angeles, as one of the central pillars in its strategy toward a zero-emissions, low carbon future.

President Trump announced the first sweeping tariffs of his administration, enacting tariffs on solar panels and components from nearly every country in the world—but they create virtually no winners and a broad swathe of losers across the economy.