Food and Water Security

In a time of rising global food prices, Africa produces a fraction of the world’s crops. What can be done to foster a Green Revolution in Africa?

Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from greater levels of water stress than many other regions in the world. Experts say wise economic development focused on infrastructure and improved treaties on water allocation are crucial to relieving this stress.

This publication is now archived. World’s hardest-hitIn quantitative terms, there is enough food available to feed the world’s 6.4 billion people, but 852 million people will still go hungry this year. According to the United Nations, nearly a third of the world’s hungry live in Africa, where more than 200 million are suffering from malnutrition.There is no one cause—or solution—for Africa’s famines, which explains why emergency-food crises recur year after year in many parts of the continent. Famines are often caused by drought, flood, conflict, or pandemics like HIV/AIDS or malaria. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates thirty-five countries face food crises requiring emergency assistance, while the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS) narrows the world’s worst cases to five countries in Africa: Somalia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Ethiopia, and Southern Sudan: SomaliaWithout a functioning central government and wracked by rivaling warlords, Somali will not receive enough international food aid to feed its hungry. Gunmen regularly hijack international aid coming into the east African country and then hold the aid ransom, which caused the UN World Food Programme to temporarily suspend food shipments for security concerns in July and exacerbated Somalia’s emergency-food problem. More than 17 percent of Somalia’s 6.8 million people are malnourished. For the past four years, prolonged droughts and diseases like hepatitis and malaria have only aggravated an already desperate situation. ZimbabwePresident Robert Mugabe’s land-redistribution campaign in 2000—which forced thousands of white commercial farmers to give up their properties to landless blacks—has crippled Zimbabwe’s economy and destroyed his citizens’ access to even the most basic commodities. Mugabe now faces an unsustainable fiscal deficit and soaring inflation. According to a report by the Center for Globalization, the purchasing power of the average Zimbabwean in 2005 has fallen back to 1953 levels—an unprecedented drop, except for during times of war. Not unrelated, 36 percent of Zimbabwe’s rural population is expected to require food aid over the year ahead, a number based on the Mugabe administration’s plan to import 1.2 million tons of food aid to address shortages caused by draught. Failure to access the maize will substantially raise the number in need of assistance, and the WFP is preparing to help 4 million Zimbabweans.Until the United Nations received a report (PDF) by Special Envoy Anna Tibaijuka lambasting Mugabe for destroying the homes of thousands of the poor in Harare as part of “Operation Murambatsvina” (“Operation Drive out Rubbish”), the international body had tended to avoid criticizing Zimbabwe’s government. It had publicly accepted the Mugabe administration’s explanations of food shortages as the result of droughts and the spread of HIV/AIDS, which neglected the impact of Mugabe’s land-redistribution campaign that ruined his country’s agricultural sector, once considered the “bread basket” of Africa. ChadHaving survived three decades of civil war and invasions by Libya since gaining independence from France in 1960, Chad remains handicapped by still-simmering internal conflict. Africa’s fifth-largest country and one of the world’s poorest nations, it ranks 167th out of 177 countries on the UN Human Development Index. Eighty percent of the country’s population survives on subsistence agriculture. Arid, landlocked, and prone to regular natural disasters like drought, floods, and locust infestations, Chad is used to food shortages, which were only exacerbated after unrest in neighboring Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003 and 2004 led to thousands of refugees fleeing into Chad.But there is hope for the country: After an oil pipeline from southern Chad to the Atlantic coast in Cameroon was installed, Chad began pumping oil in July 2003, bringing with it heavy foreign investment. To allay fears Chad will fall prey to the corruption that oil has given rise to in other African nations, investors have imposed conditions on the government whereby the bulk of oil revenues would be spent on development. EthiopiaBetter known for its recurring famines than for its distinction as Africa’s oldest independent country, Ethiopia suffers from one of the highest malnutrition levels and lowest primary-education enrollment ratios in the world. The agricultural sector, which accounts for half of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), 60 percent of its exports, and 80 percent of all employment, suffers from frequent droughts and poor farming practices. The country’s poverty-stricken economy has taken a hit in recent years from historically low coffee prices—Ethiopia’s most lucrative export—and a costly war with Eritrea in 1998-2002.According to international aid agencies, things may be looking up for Ethiopia, at least in the short term. A third successive good harvest season will bolster the country’s real GDP growth, which stands at 6 percent. Also, USAID reports that good harvests, in conjunction with “significant improvements in humanitarian assistance,” have helped ease the heavy burden of Ethiopia’s food shortages for the time being. Southern SudanCivil war between the mainly Muslim north and the Animist and Christian south has ravaged Sudan for more than twenty years and cost 1.5 million lives. After two years of negotiations, the two sides signed a peace deal in January 2005 granting the southern rebels autonomy for six years. It was thought that after the peace treaty was signed, the Sudanese could finally begin cultivating their country’s gold, cotton, and oil resources.But in 2003 a separate conflict broke out in Sudan’s western region of Darfur that has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and over 1 million displaced Darfurians. The U.S. Congress has called Darfur genocide, while the United Nations has called the conflict the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Adding to the food pressures this conflict presents, the World Food Programme predicts that returning refugees, who left during the twenty-year civil war, may have a serious negative impact on food availability in Sudan, especially in the northern Bahr al-Gazal region. The United Nations predicts that up to 130,000 people may return to the Bahr al-Gazal region in 2006.

This publication is now archived. What is the controversy over the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program?The UN Security Council started the Oil-for-Food program in 1996 to allow Iraq to sell enough oil to pay for food and other necessities for its population, which was suffering under strict UN sanctions imposed after the first Gulf War. But Saddam Hussein exploited the program, earning some $1.7 billion through kickbacks and surcharges, and $10.9 billion through illegal oil smuggling, according to a 2004 Central Intelligence Agency investigation. Wide-scale mismanagement and unethical conduct on the part of some UN employees also plagued the program, according to the UN Independent Inquiry Committee. What are the latest revelations?The UN committee’s fifth and final 623-page report released October 27, 2005, accused nearly half of the 4,500 participating companies of paying kickbacks and illegal surcharges to win lucrative contracts, and allowing Saddam Hussein to pocket $1.8 billion at the expense of Iraqis suffering under UN economic sanctions. The commission’s lead investigator, former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, stated that it was UN mismanagement and failure of the world’s most powerful nations to end corruption in the program that allowed Saddam to fill his coffers. What did the earlier reports find?A September report faults UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, his deputy, and the UN Security Council for allowing Saddam Hussein to graft over $1 billion from the humanitarian operation. The committee’s January briefing paper charged UN management of the oil-for-food “operated in an ineffective, wasteful, and unsatisfactory manner,” leading to some $5 million in documented contractor overpayments, and “undoubtedly much higher” losses not discovered by the limited UN audits. The February interim report found the program’s procurement office did not follow established rules “designed to assure fairness and accountability.” It also accused the former head of the program, Benon Sevan, of an “irreconcilable conflict of interest” because he helped a company owned by a friend obtain valuable contracts to sell Iraqi oil. Other allegations against Sevan are also being investigated. Sevan retired from the United Nations last year and has denied any wrongdoing. What does the committee’s final report recommend?In conjunction with the September report (PDF), the commission proposed several changes they believe should be enacted within a year, but experts say that is unlikely to happen. UN member states are already grappling with similar reform proposals introduced during September’s General Assembly meetings. Among the report’s recommendations:The UN Security Council should be clearer about UN operations’ purposes and criteria.A Chief Operating Officer should be nominated by the Security Council to provide needed focus for the Secretariat’s administrative responsibilities.An Independent Auditing Board should be established to fully review UN programs and hiring.Tasks should be coordinated more effectively between UN agencies. What were the committee’s earlier findings?The Volcker’s committee has issued four interim reports since it began its work in April 2004. These reports found there is no evidence of corruption on the part of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in administering the program. However, it finds that his son, Kojo, inappropriately concealed his business relationship with a major Oil-for-Food contractor. Kojo Annan, who was not a UN employee, received some $400,000 from Swiss-based Cotecna Inspections S.A. between 1995 and 2004. Kojo Annan formally stopped working for Cotecna in 1998, leaving just before the company won its $10-million a year UN contract. But he continued to receive monthly payments from the firm until 2004, as part of an unusual arrangement in which he was paid thousands of dollars a month to refrain from joining a competing firm.The committee’s January briefing paper charged UN management of the Oil-for-Food “operated in an ineffective, wasteful, and unsatisfactory manner,” leading to some $5 million in documented contractor overpayments, and “undoubtedly much higher” losses not discovered by the limited UN audits. The February interim report found the program’s procurement office did not follow established rules “designed to assure fairness and accountability.” It also accused the former head of the program, Benon Sevan, of an “irreconcilable conflict of interest” because he helped a company owned by a friend obtain valuable contracts to sell Iraqi oil. Other allegations against Sevan are also being investigated. Sevan retired from the United Nations last year and has denied any wrongdoing. What other investigations into Oil-for-Food are there?They include:Five ongoing congressional investigations examining the role of U.S. companies and individuals and the program more generally. The Senate Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has already issued a dozen subpoenas for individuals affiliated with the program, according to news reports. Four House panels are also conducting inquiries: the International Relations Committee—which has already made three trips to the region and issued a subpoena to Paris-based bank BNP Paribas—the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, and the Appropriations subcommittee on commerce.An ongoing U.S. Treasury Department investigation into which U.S. trade laws may have been violated.An ongoing federal criminal investigation by the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York.Oil-for-food-related investigations underway in Iraq, Britain, and Switzerland, according to The Wall Street Journal.An April 2004 report by Congress’s nonpartisan investigative arm, the General Accounting Office, now called the Government Accountability Office. What are the details of the CIA report?The September 30, 2004, report by Iraq weapons inspector Charles Duelfer uncovered the regime’s complicated and lucrative schemes to earn illicit funds. In a particularly egregious abuse, Saddam was found to be using secret “oil vouchers” worth millions of dollars to reward individuals and companies for helping Iraq subvert sanctions. Among the alleged recipients of the vouchers was Sevan, the program’s chief administrator. Duelfer headed the CIA team that authored the report, known as the Iraq Survey Group. How did the oil voucher scam work?Under the Oil-for-Food program, the United Nations was supposed to monitor and approve all of Iraq’s oil sales. All profits went into special escrow accounts that the United Nations controlled. Because the purpose of the program was to help feed and provide for the basic needs of the Iraqi people, Iraq was not permitted to buy military equipment or so-called dual-use items—items that could potentially be used in banned weapons programs—with its oil proceeds. But Iraq was given wide latitude to determine to whom it sold its oil, and was also permitted to select the vendors from which the United Nations would purchase goods with Iraqi oil profits. Saddam Hussein skimmed billions from the program by controlling these decisions. How did Saddam Hussein choose buyers of Iraqi oil?Iraq could sign final oil contracts only with a set number of approved “lifting” companies—major oil companies that could transport the oil. But, officially unreported to the United Nations, Saddam Hussein developed a complex internal system that moved the oil through middlemen before it got to the final buyer. The initial oil sale, the Duelfer report said, was generally to a company or individual whom Saddam wanted to influence or favor. Senior Iraqi leaders, such as former Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, and Iraqi ambassadors could nominate an individual or company to receive secret “oil vouchers”—guarantees from the regime that the holder of the voucher could buy a certain amount of oil at a set price. Iraq priced this oil below market value, so that the holder of the voucher could make a significant profit when he sold it on to another middleman or international oil company. Saddam Hussein personally approved all names on the voucher recipient lists, the Duelfer report states. How much could a voucher holder earn?Depending on the price of oil, voucher holders could earn from ten cents to thirty-five cents per barrel beyond the regular market profit, the report says. Who received the vouchers?The Duelfer report contains a list of more than 1,300 oil vouchers that Saddam Hussein gave to more than a hundred corporations, foreign officials, individuals, and political parties around the world. This information came from lists found at Iraq’s state oil company and interviews with captured regime officials.Thirty percent of the oil vouchers were issued to beneficiaries in Russia, including individual officials in the president’s office, the RussianForeign Ministry, the Russian Communist Party, members of the Russianparliament, and the oil firms Lukoil, Gazprom, Zarubezhneft, Sibneft, Rosneft, and Tatneft.Fifteen percent of the beneficiaries were French, including a formerinterior minister, the Iraqi-French Friendship Society, and the oil companyTotal. Entities in China received 10 percent of the vouchers.Entities in Switzerland , Malaysia , and Syriaeach received 6 percent. U.S. companies and individuals received between 2 percent and 3 percent of the total vouchers—some 111 million barrels out of a total of 4.1 billion. These companies were not named in the report, because of U.S. privacy laws, but were later leaked to the press. Which individuals were named in the report as voucher recipients?Among them:Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Russian Liberal Democratic Party leader, and companies associated with his party were allocated 53 million barrels. Alexander Voloshin, chief of staff under former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, was allocated 3.9 million barrels of oil from May to December 2002.Oscar S. Wyatt Jr., a prominent Texas energy investor with a long history of dealings in Iraq, received vouchers for 29.7 million barrels, according to press reports.Benon Sevan, the UN chief of the Oil-for-Food Program, received an allocation of 13 million barrels.Charles Pasqua, a businessman and former French interior minister, received an allocation of 11 million barrels.Megawati Sukarnoputri, the former Indonesian president, was allocated 6 million barrels. Was it illegal to take vouchers?Yes. If individuals and companies knowingly received profits from oil sales not approved by the Oil-for-Food program, they broke the rules of that program and violated the terms of UN Security Resolutions that established the program and the sanctions against Iraq, say investigators from the House International Relations Committee. In the case of UN employees, accepting bribes would also violate the rules of that body, experts say. Whether individuals on the list will be prosecuted, however, would, in most cases, be the decision of their own governments and subject to the domestic laws of each nation. In the United States, as in some other nations, the sanctions became part of domestic law. Another key question in the American context would be whether these vouchers truly served as bribes that caused individuals to work on Saddam Hussein’s behalf to modify U.S. policy. A series of laws, including the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, regulates the overseas business practices of American citizens. In addition, U.S. firms could be prosecuted if they failed to receive the required approval from the U.S. Department of Treasury to purchase Iraqi oil.  What are the details of the allegations against UN Oil-for-Food chief Sevan?The Duelfer report states that as Sevan was administering the UN’s program, he accepted Iraqi oil vouchers through various companies that he recommended to the Iraqi government. An investigation by the now-defunct Iraqi Governing Council uncovered a letter linking Sevan to a Panamanian-registered company called the African Middle East Petroleum Company, which set up an oil deal on his behalf, the report states. Some 7.3 million barrels were allegedly sold by Sevan before 2003, which could have netted him between $730,000 to $2 million, depending on market conditions. How did Saddam earn his illicit funds?The voucher system may have given Saddam Hussein political influence over world leaders and companies, but it didn’t bring in much cash to the regime. To accomplish that, Saddam Hussein tacked kickbacks and surcharges onto some Oil-for-Food transactions. For example, in some cases he asked that the suppliers of humanitarian goods provide 10 percent kickbacks to the regime in order to be selected as the vendor. This brought $1.5 billion to the regime, the Duelfer report states. Another $228 million was earned through collecting illegal surcharges of twenty-five to thirty cents per barrel to some companies that wished to buy Iraqi oil. However, the bulk of Saddam Hussein’s $11 billion in illegal revenue, collected from 1990 and through 2003, came from illicit cross-border trade and oil sales to countries in the region. Some $8 billion of that total was earned through illegal oil sales and other trade with Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Syria. The regime also earned $1.2 billion from unsanctioned oil sales to private companies outside of the voucher system and the Oil-for-Food program, the report states. Members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, often knew about these transactions. What did Iraq buy with the money?The Duelfer report says that Iraq went to great lengths to build a missile system that exceeded the range limits imposed by the United Nations. Companies from China and Russia sold, or negotiated to sell, missile guidance systems, the report says. A Polish company supplied a propulsion system. An Indian company built and sold Iraq a missile-fuel processing plant. All in all, the report alleges that six governments and private companies from a dozen other nations were willing to ignore sanctions prohibiting arms sales. Among European allies, France’s military industry had extensive contacts with Iraqi officials. The report describes, for example, repeated trips by an executive from the French company Lura, which sold Iraq a tank carrier.

Locust swarms and a lack of rainfall have caused severe food shortages in Niger, leaving more than 2.5 million people in danger of starving to death. John M. Staatz, an agricultural economist at Michigan State University, says the situation in Niger requires long-term development, not just short-term aid, and cites nearby Mali as an example for combating future famines. What caused the latest food crisis in Niger?A widespread lack of income growth over a number of years, combined with a period of climatic and other shocks like the locusts, pushed people over the edge into destitution. But I think this year’s famine, or food crisis, is more of an income collapse than, necessarily, a shortage of food. You had last year’s short rainfall, which hurt both crop and pasture production, and you had the locusts, which hit primarily pastures more than crops. So all the people up north who rely on animals had to start moving them south early. A lot of the livestock died, so people had to sell their animals quickly, which led the price of animals—cattle, goat, sheep—to fall. At the same time, you had a reduction in crop production, so the price of basic grains, such as millet, started going up. What do you mean by “income collapse”?Their ability to acquire food collapsed. It wasn’t that there absolutely was no food available, but the food available got priced out of most people’s market because the price of food went up while prices of what they had to sell, mainly livestock, collapsed. What’s the difference between a famine and a food crisis?A famine, in my mind, is more widespread. You’ve got thousands and thousands of people dying of malnutrition. I think in a food crisis, people are still hurting, but it isn’t generalized over a large area. I see the press referring to the situation in Mali, for example, as a famine. It’s not; it’s a food crisis, because in Mali, at least, food prices are coming down.How can we prevent future food shortages in western Africa?We really need to focus on long-term development. In these countries, where you’re dealing primarily with agrarian populations, you have to focus on how to get agriculture going as a motor that will drive the rest of the economy, and then you can begin tapping some of that income to invest in a better health system, education, and so on. [The West] has pulled away from supporting higher education in agricultural training in these countries because it has a very long-term payoff, and funding agencies have to respond to congresses and parliaments that want to see quick results. If you train a better entomologist who figures out for Niger a better way of treating locusts, that’s a ten-to-fifteen-year investment; that’s not something you can go back in six months to Congress and say, “look at this great result.” If you can show them pictures of airplanes flying in with food relief, that’s something visible to point to. But that’s dealing with a crisis after it’s happened.So just sending more aid is not the answer?I don’t think it’s just a matter of sending more aid. It depends on what kind of aid. Are you dealing with more emergency aid, aimed at trying to relieve human suffering in a short-term crisis, or development aid, which is aimed at trying to get those countries to the point where these crises don’t occur? Last year in Ethiopia, the United States spent approximately $500 million in food aid and $4 million on agricultural-development aid. Well, that’s dealing with a short-term crisis without doing much to avoid the next crisis. However, clearly when people are starving you’ve got to respond. What’s your take on Niger’s president downplaying the famine?There’s some controversy within these countries over how severe the crisis is. Some groups have been perceived by some people as trying to make it look more severe, particularly the UN World Food Program, for whatever reason. They’re in the business of emergency relief. They see crises, and they want to react to them. Naturally, you can overestimate the problem or you can underestimate the problem. If you overestimate the problem and bring in too much food aid, you may have some disruptive effects on the economy. But if you really underestimate it, a lot of people die. Part of the moral dilemma is if you bring in too much [food aid], you solve the immediate crisis but you undermine longer-term development. What does that do to lives lost over the long run if a country stays mired in poverty? So then what would you recommend? If you had a local public-works program that could get up really quickly, employ those people, give them some income or give them food as payment, then that’s a way of dealing with relief without undermining the market. That’s a strategy that India, Botswana, and parts of southern Africa have really developed over the years. It’s something some of these western African countries are beginning to think about; it’s developmentally friendly relief that isn’t a conflict between relief and development. The World Food Program is also trying to think about better ways of [providing relief].  Is there concern that emergency aid creates dependency?There’s always concern you will create dependency. It’s often feared by some that if you give people food, they’re less likely to grow it themselves. There’s also a real concern about corruption, and of hopelessness, that this is something that’s never going to be solved, which creates donor fatigue. We need more press on some of the success stories you never hear about. In Africa, there’ve been some remarkable successes, like Mozambique, which went from abject civil war to something a lot better. I think Mali’s another case; there are occasional crises, but it’s no longer the hundreds of thousands of people who were starving in the mid-70s during the great famines of the Sahel. Why do you think the international community was so slow to respond to what was happening in Niger? Were we simply distracted by other more pressing events, perhaps the war in Iraq, or the tsunami earlier this year? I think people—in [the United States] and in various relief agencies—get focused on the crisis of the day, and if there’s something building quietly in the background, even though some people may be trying to draw attention to it, it gets less attention. In the press, everybody wakes up only when they see pictures of the dying kid. It’s often too late by then.But compare the crisis [in Niger] to Mali, for example, where the donors have invested over twenty-five years, developing a good agricultural market-information system, what they call a local early warning system [for famines]. Malians knew pretty early where locusts were exactly and what was happening in the markets, and so there was a lot more information out there for people to plan ahead. What other lessons have the Malians learned from Niger’s food crisis?I think the Malians have done a pretty good job in managing this crisis, and part of that was getting the information out to all the actors quickly about what was going on. Also, there was an explicit aim by the government to engage the private sector as a partner rather than seeing merchants as an enemy. Most of the food that’s coming in [to the region] is from the private sector. You want to give [merchants] a clear signal so they go out and act; a lot of the time, they’re reticent because they’re not sure if the government, or donor community, is going to come in with tons of food aid and ruin their investments. Nigerand Mali are multiparty democracies. Is [Bengali economist] Amartya Sen’s theory that famines never occur in democracies no longer applicable?I don’t think there’s a famine in Mali. But hunger isn’t necessarily resolved by a parliamentary debate. There is an open press, for instance, in Mali, to help alert people where the problems are. But you could flip it around: Public-opinion surveys done in Mali asked Malians what the most important political issue to them was, and they said food security. People didn’t have enough to eat. If you don’t solve that problem, then I think democracy is under threat.