Food and Water Security

Recent events are straining the global watercourse governance system. Countries need to articulate and abide by universal norms and standards on sustainable and equitable water resource use to secure safe access to water.

Stephanie Hanson is the senior vice president of policy and partnerships at One Acre Fund, an agriculture organization serving one million farmers in Africa. The COVID-19 pandemic poses challenges for African agriculture. Farming is the dominant way people in sub-Saharan Africa earn their living and feed their families. But government restrictions on movement designed to slow the spread of COVID-19 have made the daily activities of African farmers more difficult and may well lead to a reduction in the production and availability of food in markets. For example, purchasing seed and fertilizer is more difficult when many agrodealer shops are closed. Obtaining financing to purchase that seed and fertilizer is harder when microfinance organizations are not making new loans. Selling vegetable crops at market can be impossible when markets are closed or curfews limit transportation options to reach markets. In addition, East African farmers are also dealing with a second plague of locusts, a once-in-a-generation scourge that could decimates crops across the region. Though it is still early, the anecdotal evidence is worrisome. There are signs that local food prices are increasing in some countries and reports from farmers that lockdown measures have reduced their ability to grow and sell their produce. In Nigeria, for example, rice farmers are having trouble getting rice to market because of increased transport prices and unclear security regulations further inhibit the movement of food to urban markets. African governments in many countries, including Rwanda and Kenya, have made encouraging steps to allow the agriculture sector to continue to operate during lockdowns and movement restrictions, including recognizing agriculture as an “essential service.” But even in countries where agriculture has been designated an essential service, farmers and other actors in the agriculture sector find themselves uncertain of what’s allowed and what isn’t. In particular, more clarity is urgently needed for transport linkages that bring farm inputs to the last mile and farm production to consumers. Once African governments clearly define these rules, they need to work effectively with local government and local security officials to make sure those rules are implemented correctly. If national government gives farmers an exemption from a curfew to transport crops to market early in the morning, local police need to understand that exemption and allow farmers to reach those markets. International donors should prioritize support for African farmers because African governments have a limited ability to cushion the economic shock of COVID-19 on them. As a result, donors and governments should work together to keep financing flowing to farmers over the next twelve to eighteen months, a critical period for the next two growing seasons. As the Rural and Agriculture Finance Learning Lab suggests, bridge loans and first-loss guarantees can help incentivize financial institutions that provide credit to farmers to continue doing so through the pandemic. Focusing COVID-19 emergency aid on farmers now will reduce the amount of humanitarian food aid required as the pandemic continues, and help to prevent a health crisis from becoming a food security crisis.

Steve Schmida is the chief innovation officer of Resonance, a global development and corporate sustainability consulting firm, and author of Partner with Purpose. Emily Clayton is a senior manager for sustainability at Resonance. The UN is sounding the alarm on a looming disaster in Malawi brought on by the global coronavirus pandemic. Last week, Maria Jose Torres, the UN resident coordinator in Malawi, warned, “Even a fairly low number of cases could overwhelm the health system, cause food shortages, and reverse the progress the country has seen in recent years.” Malawi will need to focus on weathering the current storm with the help of international donors, but it should not return to the fragile status quo afterwards. One of the poorest countries in the world, Malawi is vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic on a number of fronts. It has a high population density and many of its citizens have underlying health conditions, which will likely increase rates of transmission and lethality. Its health system is weak and faces critical shortages of frontline health workers and personal protective gear. Worse still, the pandemic is poised to exacerbate Malawi’s already severe food security challenges. About 80 percent of the country’s population is engaged in subsistence farming, and the changing climate is making growing seasons less predictable. Severe flooding last year caused by Cyclone Idai wiped out crops and left 90,000 homeless, while decades of deforestation have degraded the soil and worsened droughts. Adding to the challenges, the country’s economy is heavily dependent upon a single cash crop—raw tobacco—which makes up nearly 71 percent of agricultural export earnings. A majority of tobacco growers are smallholder farmers who also face food insecurity, most commonly the result of drought. As tobacco use declines globally—a trend that the COVID-19 pandemic may well accelerate—Malawi faces the loss of a critical source of export earnings. To manage the immediate impact of COVID-19 amid the already fragile state of affairs, Malawi will need significant international assistance. While the World Bank has already pledged $37 million to support the COVID-19 response, more will be needed to ensure that the pandemic does not lead to a food security crisis. COVID-19 will not be the last disaster to come to Malawi, so the country should endeavor to build back better, rather than revert to the status quo ante. The agriculture sector that underpins the economy should be the starting point for this effort. First and foremost, the country needs to move away from tobacco as its primary cash crop. Promising alternatives include paprika, chili, groundnuts, and soybean. This transition can build on the robust tobacco supply chain that already exists, utilizing its agricultural extension services and access to market for other commodities. Much needed agriculture diversification will help increase farmer incomes and improve nutritional outcomes as well as help Malawi become more resilient to external shocks. Such a transition will not be easy and it is not something Malawi can tackle on its own. International donors as well as agricultural companies and investors must partner with the Malawian government to promote a systems-level change across the farming sector to improve the policy and regulatory environment, increase access to finance, and assist farmers in the transition from tobacco contract farming to high value horticulture and other crops. In responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, donors and Malawi’s leaders should look to the future. By building a more robust agricultural system post-COVID-19, Malawi can grow its economy and be better prepared for future crises.

The coronavirus pandemic is a major setback for efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

In many African states, food insecurity is a serious problem getting worse by the day. This week, international experts sounded the alarm about acute food shortages affecting some 135 million people, more than half of them Africans. The coronavirus crisis, with its effect on livelihoods, productivity, and agricultural supply chains, could nearly double that already staggering number of people threatened with starvation. In East Africa, a plague of locusts is adding to the misery, decimating crops at a shocking pace. In the Sahel, insecurity and displacement contribute to the problem.  The intersection of the pandemic and hunger sets the stage for the politicization of urgent humanitarian assistance, particularly food. Around the world, leaders who are insecure about their own popularity and legitimacy often compensate by placing a high priority on projecting strength and control. These leaders may be particularly anxious about responding to COVID-19. The threat is difficult to counter and it resists permanent solutions, foreclosing opportunities to bask in the glow of victory. Worse still, the devastating economic fallout is inescapable. The temptation to project and consolidate power by controlling the very means of survival, access to food, may well be too powerful to resist. Already, NGOs on the ground in Zimbabwe have brought attention to food aid distribution being controlled by the ruling ZANU-PF party, which has a history of using food to shore up support. The past week also saw the arrest of a member of Parliament from the country’s main opposition party for violating the lockdown to distribute food. Zimbabweans were already struggling with negative growth and hyperinflation. Nearly 90% of Zimbabweans work in the informal economy, and they are now being cut off from their means of survival by lockdown policies intended to stop the spread of the virus. In this context of desperation, the ruling party may well be able to strengthen its hand, despite the ample evidence of its mismanagement and internal disarray, simply by positioning itself as a gatekeeper to food. Similarly in Uganda, an independent member of Parliament was recently arrested for distributing food to his constituents in contravention of presidential directives to channel all food aid through a national taskforce formed by President Museveni. While it is easy to see how uncoordinated distribution of critical supplies can lead to risky social proximity and undermine efforts to tamp down disease transmission, it is equally easy to see the political upside to President Museveni and his party of ensuring that no one associated with the growing opposition can help Ugandans cope with hunger. Of course, the politicization of assistance is not a new phenomenon. But the combination of draconian social controls associated with the COVID-19 response and the urgency of food insecurity in the region may foster particularly egregious examples going forward.

For a precarious global agricultural system with powerful feedback loops, business as usual means widespread hunger and embedded systemic risk.

Long-standing financial troubles and drought in Zimbabwe have pushed millions to the brink of starvation.

There are new reports of violence, characterized as farmer-herder conflict, in Chad. According to Agence France Presse and Voice of America, thirty-five have died [French] since May 16 in separate incidents across the Sila and Ouaddai provinces of eastern Chad. A Chadian prosecutor reported arresting thirty alleged perpetrators of the violence.  The media reports do not cite religious differences between the herders and farmer—the region in which the clashes took place is predominantly Muslim—though they may exist. Chad itself is about 60 percent Muslim, while the remainder is split between Christians and those of traditional beliefs. However, herders and farmers historically have been from different ethnic groups, and in this case it appears that the herders are Arab and the farmers are black Africans. Hence, an apparent conflict over land use may also have or develop an ethnic dimension.  In Nigeria, Chad’s more populous and more crowded neighbor to the southwest, farmer-herder conflict over water and land is a major source of instability and death tolls are far higher than those reported from Chad. Though concentrated in Nigeria’s middle belt states, such conflict it to be found elsewhere, and it is growing in intensity and geographic spread. Recently, the greatest number of deaths from farmer-herder conflict has been in Zamfara state, north of the middle belt. Ethnic and religious boundaries can coincide with those of conflicts over land and water use. For example, in some parts of Nigeria, Muslim Fulani herdsmen clash with Christian Berom farmers. Too often, a largely absent media reports these conflicts in the context of a struggle between “Muslims” and “Christians,” downplaying or ignoring ethnic rivalries and the competition for land and water, as well as the growing criminal dimension manifest in banditry and cattle rustling. But elsewhere, religious difference play little role, like in Zamfara, whose population is almost entirely Muslim. Chad’s Arabs and Nigeria’s Fulani have similarities: both groups traditionally are herders, both are predominately Muslim, and both historically preyed on smaller ethnic groups to feed the trans-Sahara slave trade, but the two are otherwise distinct. Chad has a small number of its own Fulanis, a semi-nomadic group spanning West Africa and the Sahel and numbering an estimated 40 million. In Nigeria, climate change drives desertification, pushing herders further south, where they compete with farmers for land and water, while a demographic boom puts further stress on these dwindling resources. Reports cited those factors as at play in farmer-herder conflicts in Chad. The Chadian and Nigerian governments are weak, with N'Djamena and Abuja unable to maintain security over large areas of their territory. Hence, cycles of attacks, cattle rustling, and other criminal activity are often a factor in ongoing conflicts between herders and farmers.

Jack McCaslin is a research associate for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC. An article from Fox News recently called attention to the killing of Christians in Nigeria by comparing it to the deadly Easter Sunday suicide bombings of churches and hotels in Sri Lanka. According to the article, the attacks “highlight the dangers that remain from asymmetric terrorism and violence against Christians in ethnically and religiously divided societies.” However, linking these tragedies to each other and to a perceived global trend of violence against Christians mischaracterizes the nature of the conflicts in Nigeria.  The appropriateness of a comparison between Sri Lanka and Nigeria is not clear. Their ethnic make-up, social statistics, and post-colonial experiences are vastly different. Not least, Christians and Muslims are a tiny minority in Sri Lanka, a predominately Buddhist country, while in Nigeria, Christians and Muslims each constitute about half of the population. Identifying the perpetrators of atrocities in both countries is difficult. Although the Islamic State has claimed responsibility, it is not clear what its role was in the Sri Lanka bombings or, for that matter, what its role is in northern Nigeria.  With respect to Nigeria, Fox cites the recent killing of eleven and the wounding of thirty in Gombe. A police officer got into an argument with a procession of children during Easter activities, which reportedly led him to drive into it. It is not clear what the police officer’s motives were; Boko Haram is active in Gombe but it seems that they were not involved. Boko Haram appears to be largely an indigenous movement, and there is little evidence of strategic or tactical cooperation between the Islamic State or al-Qaeda affiliates and Boko Haram, though they share a common belief system, are murderously hostile to Christians, and have exchanged various forms of communication, the significance of which remains unclear. The article also notes the killing of seventeen Christians and the wounding of eight in Nassarawa state early in April. No link is provided, but the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) documented an attack in Numa Kochu, resulting in the death of a pregnant woman and several children. This seems to fit the description in the article. According to reports, Numa Kochu is a predominantly Christian community comprised of those of the Mada ethnic group. The victims’ funeral services were led by local leaders of the Christian Association of Nigeria, a prominent religious organization. As is often the case, the affiliation and motive of the perpetrators are not clear. They have been described as “gunmen” and “herdsmen” by various Nigerian media outlets, and reference is made to the farmer-herder conflict in Nassarawa, which has been intense and deadly. It is worth noting that in some statements made by community leaders and the security services, no reference is made to religion.  Christians are certainly murdered in Nigeria, and in some cases, they are murdered because they are Christian. But, despite Boko Haram’s murderous hostility to Christians, most of its victims have always been Muslim, not least because the insurgency takes place in a predominantly Muslim part of the country. (Boko Haram’s killing of such great numbers of Muslims, based on a wide definition of apostasy, is understood to be one of the reasons that the group split in 2016.) For what it is worth, data from the NST shows a decline in Boko Haram attacks on churches and an increase in attacks on mosques over time. Indeed, the smaller number of Christian deaths at the hands of Boko Haram likely reflects the fact that most of them have fled.  Today, most Christian deaths are occurring in the Middle Belt, where there are overlapping quarrels over land and water use, ethnicity, and religion—and where Christians are numerous. But when Christians or Muslims are killed in the Middle Belt, it is not clear exactly why. Is it because they are a farmer or a herder? Or because they are ethnically Fulani, many of whom are herders, or of a small ethnic group, who are often farmers? Or is it because they are Muslim, which most Fulani are, or Christian, which those of many small ethnic groups are? These questions are not easily answered. Ethnicity can often correspond to a particular religion, both of which can sometimes correspond to a distinct way of life. Or not. In Zamfara, where the violence is particularly bad, both herders and farmers are mostly Muslim and mostly Fulani. There is also an important criminal element involving bandits and cattle rustlers. Another way to think about it: violence may fall along ethnic and religious lines, but it is not necessarily driven by those distinctions.  Religious polarization is a real challenge in Nigeria, and it has likely increased. The government has been unable to destroy Boko Haram or end the local conflicts in the Middle Belt. Further, the economy remains in the doldrums, and the country now has the most people living in extreme poverty in the world. But linking Nigerian tragedies to the tragedy that occurred in Sri Lanka and a global trend of violence against Christians overlooks important nuances in Nigeria’s multiple ongoing conflicts. 

Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab.  Has sectarian violence in the Middle Belt increased significantly in 2018? If so, has it eclipsed the Boko Haram conflict? On December 20, 2018, we published year-to-date data. Below we publish data for the entire year of 2018.  Based on an analysis of Nigeria Security Tracker data, the short answer to the first question is yes, violence has almost doubled since 2017. The NST documented 2,037 deaths through all of 2018, compared to 1,041 sectarian-related deaths in all of 2017.*  The answer to the second is that violence is about even with Boko Haram, in terms of the number of conflict-related victims. Deaths related to the Boko Haram conflict for all of 2018 are 2,016.** (See an in-depth analysis of data related to Boko Haram here.) The NST identifies sectarian conflict as acts of violence that occur between distinct identity-based groups (or are framed as such in the Nigerian press). Examples typically include conflict that is described as occurring between “communities,” religious groups, or between named groups, such as “Fulani herders” and “Berom farmers.” (We exclude Boko Haram from our sectarian violence category.) Given our interest in patterns over time, this sectarian category can be useful. However, it does obscure the complex economic, social, historical, and political (often highly local) factors that fuel this type of conflict. The first graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State/Year,” shows number of deaths by state for each year since 2011. The second graph, “Sectarian Deaths by Year” shows year over year totals.  The escalation in violence through 2018 comes because of a relative "lull" in 2017. The worst overall year since 2011 is 2014, which parallels 2018.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082083611'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   As illustrated in the two maps below, violence in 2018 has been concentrated in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa, Adamawa, and Kaduna. In 2014, it was concentrated in Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, and Katsina. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545089069262'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='387px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='487px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fourth graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State,” shows sectarian-related deaths by month. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082354981'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fifth graphic, “Number of Sectarian Violent Incidents by Month,” aggregates the number of incidents (as opposed to number of deaths). There has been a notable escalation in the number of monthly incidents, starting in January 2018. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082382073'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The last graph is “Sectarian Deaths by LGA,” and shows number of deaths by local government area. Agatu in Benue, and Barkin Ladi in Plateau are clearly the most affected by sectarian violence. Move the slider to adjust the time frame. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082405603'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='487px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='687px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   *The numbers presented here do not match the numbers on the main NST dashboard. For readability sake, we filter out some of the smaller categories, such as conflict involving a “sectarian and other armed actor.”   **This number is a rough estimate. It includes deaths in which Boko Haram is the only perpetrator, clashes between the state and Boko Haram in which there are deaths on both sides, and in which the state is the only perpetrator.  This blog post has been updated with data for the entire calendar year 2018. 

Asch Harwood is a research associate with the Council on Foreign Relations and the creator of the Nigeria Security Tracker. Previously at UNICEF and Reboot, he is the founder of Red Hook Media Lab. Has sectarian violence in the Middle Belt increased significantly in 2018?  If so, has it eclipsed the Boko Haram conflict? Based on an analysis of Nigeria Security Tracker data, the short answer to the first question is yes, violence has almost doubled since 2017. The NST documented 2,037 deaths through all of 2018, compared to 1,041 sectarian-related deaths in all of 2017.*  The answer to the second is that violence is about even with Boko Haram, in terms of the number of conflict-related victims. Deaths related to the Boko Haram conflict for all of 2018 are 2,016.** (See an in-depth analysis of data related to Boko Haram here.) The NST identifies sectarian conflict as acts of violence that occur between distinct identity-based groups (or are framed as such in the Nigerian press). Examples typically include conflict that is described as occurring between “communities,” religious groups, or between named groups, such as “Fulani herders” and “Berom farmers.” (We exclude Boko Haram from our sectarian violence category.) Given our interest in patterns over time, this sectarian category can be useful. However, it does obscure the complex economic, social, historical, and political (often highly local) factors that fuel this type of conflict. The first graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State/Year,” shows number of deaths by state for each year since 2011. The second graph, “Sectarian Deaths by Year” shows year over year totals.  The escalation in violence through 2018 comes because of a relative "lull" in 2017. The worst overall year since 2011 is 2014, which parallels 2018.  var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082083611'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   As illustrated in the two maps below, violence in 2018 has been concentrated in Benue, Plateau, Taraba, Nasarawa, Adamawa, and Kaduna. In 2014, it was concentrated in Kaduna, Nasarawa, Taraba, Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, and Katsina. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545089069262'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='920px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='1020px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='387px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='487px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fourth graphic, “Sectarian Violence by State,” shows sectarian-related deaths by month. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082354981'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The fifth graphic, “Number of Sectarian Violent Incidents by Month,” aggregates the number of incidents (as opposed to number of deaths). There has been a notable escalation in the number of monthly incidents, starting in January 2018. This graph includes all states in Nigeria. Use the drop-down menu to select specific states, and adjust the time frame by moving the slider. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082382073'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='787px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='887px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   The last graph is “Sectarian Deaths by LGA,” and shows number of deaths by local government area. Agatu in Benue, and Barkin Ladi in Plateau are clearly the most affected by sectarian violence. Move the slider to adjust the time frame. var divElement = document.getElementById('viz1545082405603'); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName('object')[0]; vizElement.style.minWidth='720px';vizElement.style.maxWidth='950px';vizElement.style.width='100%';vizElement.style.minHeight='487px';vizElement.style.maxHeight='687px';vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+'px'; var scriptElement = document.createElement('script'); scriptElement.src = 'https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js'; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement);   *The numbers presented here do not match the numbers on the main NST dashboard. For readability sake, we filter out some of the smaller categories, such as conflict involving a “sectarian and other armed actor.”   **This number is a rough estimate. It includes deaths in which Boko Haram is the only perpetrator, clashes between the state and Boko Haram in which there are deaths on both sides, and in which the state is the only perpetrator. The blog post originally contained data through November 2018. It is now updated to include data for all of 2018.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has published a report, “Africa’s Unresolved Conflicts Key Driver of Food Insecurity.” The report includes a graphic with a map showing the overlap between food insecurity and conflict in Africa. The graphic would be an excellent teaching device. Among other things, the report shows that the majority of Africans experiencing high levels of food insecurity, 107 out of 143 million, live in countries experiencing or affected by conflict. Eleven out of the twelve countries in conflict are experiencing the highest level of food insecurity. A bar graph breaks down the number of people by the different levels of food insecurity they face and in what country. Nigeria, Sudan, and Cameroon, respectively, top the list. Based on the percentage of the population facing food insecurity, however, South Sudan is ranked first, followed by Cameroon and Burundi. In fact, almost 80 percent of South Sudan’s population faces some kind of food insecurity, and over 65 percent of Cameroon’s does. That there is a link between conflict in Africa, which is virtually all internal, and food insecurity is intuitively obvious. But the link is sometimes overlooked by commentators and policy makers. The Africa Center has done a service by showing explicitly the link in a user-friendly way.  The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an institution that is part of the U.S. Department of Defense and is located at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. Its focus is on African security issues. It provides a forum for American and other military and civilian personnel to exchange ideas, research, and training. It also sends out a daily and highly useful survey of top media stories related to African security. It can be accessed here.  

With much of the world’s attention fixated on climate change, the Our Ocean conference is a great opportunity to address the health of the oceans and garner commitments to save it from the scourges of pollution, overfishing, and transnational crime.