Energy and Climate Policy

This is a guest post by Tessa Schreiber, intern for Energy and U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and student at Rice University.  The state of Texas is known for its deference to two seemingly contradictory assets: Its land and its oil. While the tradition of working and preserving the land remains a historic point of state pride, the last decade’s surge in oil and gas development has dominated the landscape and conflicted with environmental considerations such as water quality and scarcity and habitat conservation. The trade-offs between Texas’s rising oil and gas production and conservation and agriculture have grown increasingly pronounced over the past several years, building pressure for policy intervention. Yet regulators’ responses to the environmental effects of fossil fuel production have been perfunctory at best, largely due to oil and gas’s massive role in the state economy. In 2019, oil and gas tax revenues contributed nearly $6 billion to the Texas state budget, while the Texas Oil and Gas Association reported a cumulative $16 billion industry payout in taxes and royalties. Oil and gas production taxes are even more imperative to the state’s economic stabilization “rainy day fund,” supplying 85 percent of its value since its creation in 1988. Many lawmakers agree the fund will be instrumental in smoothing the economic ramifications of COVID-19. Against this backdrop, policymakers are wary of taking regulatory action against oil and gas corporations. But pressure has built from other important voices, including the investors and banks that finance oil and gas activity. The net result of these forces is an emerging trend towards voluntary environmental action by the private sector. If early-stage voluntary projects prove successful, they could lay a constructive groundwork for future market-based policy options and better regulation, creating productive synergies between land, oil, and Texas’s future economy.    For years, environmental groups have criticized the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC)—which regulates oil and gas—for its regulatory inaction. As natural gas flaring in the Permian Basin has risen to unprecedented levels over the past two years, new revelations have increased public pressure to make flaring a consistent item on the RRC agenda, as well as at shareholder meetings for several large Permian producers. The Permian Methane Analysis Project (PermianMAP) found that flaring efficiency rates were 5 percent lower than those assumed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In other words, Permian flaring operations have emitted three times more methane than previously assumed. Though methane remains in the atmosphere for a much shorter duration than carbon dioxide, it is eighty-four times more potent, magnifying its importance to time-sensitive climate change mitigation efforts. In addition to its environmental consequences, flaring is wasteful in commercial and economic terms because flared gas loses its potential value as a revenue source and royalty generator. Instead of producing electricity or heating homes, flared gas lacks any redeeming value to justify its pollution, which prolifically contributes to upstream carbon dioxide emission totals.   Leading Permian operators have publicly recognized that high flaring rates are problematic and some have called for preventative action against routine natural gas flaring and methane leakage. In 2019, a group of major oil and gas companies publicly voiced their opposition to the EPA’s proposed rollback of a rule enacted by the Obama administration that required the installation of methane leak detection and mitigation technology at newly built oil and gas facilities across the United States. Both the Collaboration to Advance Methane Science and the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, two industry climate change-related associations, have advanced voluntary reductions on methane and carbon emissions by their members. The formation of these groups comes amidst recent announcements of new carbon emission reduction goals by individual companies.   The U.S. oil industry’s increased focus on voluntarily controlling emissions from its operations follows a well-established, widespread trend among American corporations to set forth more tangible, aggressive carbon emission reduction targets, even absent state and federal regulations mandating that they do so. This year, several major Fortune 500 companies pledged to be carbon neutral or carbon negative in the next two decades, including tech giants Amazon and Microsoft. In exchange for continued support, investors now seek similar pledges from major oil companies. Already, oil and gas stocks’ share of the S&P 500 has fallen from over 15 percent a decade ago to under 5 percent today. BlackRock, the world’s largest fund manager with significant holdings in oil majors such as BP, Shell, and Exxon Mobil, announced recently that it would begin to exit investments with high-sustainability related risks and screen fossil fuel investments more stringently. Investor efforts like these are contributing to a rising urgency in the C-suites of oil and gas companies to prove their commitments to reducing the carbon intensity of future sales and operations, lest they lose access to capital or their social license to operate.   But voluntary corporate efforts could be hindered by the operational realities of a yet-underdeveloped American carbon reduction environment. Currently, most technological solutions for removing carbon from the atmosphere cost upwards of several hundred dollars per metric ton, making such investments a tough sell. Still, large producers such as Chevron and Occidental Petroleum have invested in Carbon Engineering, a Canadian venture marketing technology that functionally vacuums carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere through a process called direct air capture. In 2019, the U.S. Congress passed a federal tax credit for another carbon technology, underground geologic carbon storage, or CCS (carbon capture and storage). However, CCS is often opposed by environmental groups who argue that captured carbon is too often used in enhanced oil recovery (EOR) before it is sequestered, leading to increased oil production, which they see as counterproductive.   While direct air capture and geologic carbon storage currently face economic barriers, natural, photosynthetic carbon removal and storage strategies such as reforestation and soil sequestration are starting to gain more interest as a cost-effective, quickly-deployable option. Plants naturally absorb carbon dioxide and store it below the ground in their soil and root systems. Scientists generally agree natural carbon sequestration has strong potential to address greenhouse gas emissions. Because this storage process naturally occurs and requires little—if any—technical intervention, it could cost as little as ten dollars per metric ton of carbon. Natural sequestration has great potential in places like Texas with large swaths of open forest and grassland. Landowners could capitalize on responsible land management practices that keep carbon underground by selling their carbon storage capacity to organizations—such as oil and gas companies—interested in reducing their carbon footprint.   The development of a robust soil carbon storage market in the United States has been inhibited by cumbersome requirements in existing protocols for land-based carbon sequestration. Existing standards are derived primarily from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which places multi-decade usage restrictions on landowners who choose to store carbon in their soil. Such restrictions are vital to guaranteeing that carbon will remain undisturbed underground, yet disincentivize landowner participation because they lock in the management decisions of one generation for potentially several to come and can make selling difficult for similar reasons.  To address this problem, the Houston-based Baker Institute for Public Policy’s Center for Energy Studies convened a working group in 2019 to design a new, landowner-friendly soil carbon storage protocol to expedite the creation of a functional carbon market in the United States. The group includes representatives from corporations, regulatory agencies, non-profits, and landowner associations, and hopes to develop market principles that provide both stability for buyers and autonomy for sellers. By the end of its deliberations, the group intends to create a voluntary, land-based carbon program with a credible measurement and verification system for soil carbon storage.   Plans like the Baker Institute’s proposed voluntary program could be bolstered by federal action. Until recently, the federal government had yet to take proactive steps to make voluntary, market-oriented carbon policies mainstream. Earlier this month, a bipartisan group of United States senators introduced the Growing Climate Solutions Act, which would direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to aggregate information about existing carbon protocols and assist landowners with navigating the complex soil sequestration verification process. The bill proposes a USDA certification for third-party consultants familiar with the technical and regulatory nuances of carbon offset markets. If the bill were to pass, it would bring much-needed attention to the immense potential for natural carbon storage in the United States. However, emissions credit offset programs are not without critics. Some political leaders and activists argue that carbon removal schemes that revolve around offsets enable polluters to continue operations, which, they note, often disproportionately harm fenceline communities who have suffered for decades due to their proximity to industrial facilities. These concerns appear in the platform recommendations recently released by the progressive Democratic National Committee Council on the Environment and Climate Crisis, which called for a rejection of carbon offsets in its recommendations for the 2020 Democratic Platform.   The need for broadly-acceptable carbon action has only become more pressing in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. As companies, particularly in the severely depressed oil and gas sector, attempt to restore cash flows and maintain access to capital markets, proving their commitment to viability in a low-carbon future and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors is vital. The unexpected and severe collapse in oil prices following the COVID-19 lockdowns this spring was a reminder of the unpredictable consequences of natural disasters and other black swan events on the oil and gas industry. Corporations will be increasingly expected to prove that they can withstand high-impact risk events, particularly those related to climate change. Taking proactive steps to account for their emissions is a step in the right direction.   For oil and gas corporations in Texas, the current circumstances create a window of opportunity. This spring, the RRC came the closest it has in decades to prorating Texas oil production. Though the Commission ultimately eschewed production quotas, the very fact they considered them could mark a small but significant shift. Only time will tell if stricter regulation will follow, but in the interim, the industry should become a leading advocate for market-based solutions that attach real economic incentives to climate action. Soil carbon storage could be an opportune first issue to address, given Texas’s history of land stewardship. A successful soil carbon storage program in Texas would provide landowners with new cash flow, conservationists with a victory in leaving large swaths of land largely undisturbed, and corporations with the accomplishment of driving constructive changes of their own volition. Texas could become a national example of how unconventional partnerships can achieve progress on climate action, bypassing partisan gridlock at the federal level. The global energy mix is diversifying, and business-as-usual alone will not sustain oil-reliant Texas as an energy hub. However, taking a proactive step on innovative forms of climate change mitigation could.   As interest grows among oil and gas companies to voluntarily reduce their environmental footprints, stock should be taken of the existing opportunities to do so. Corporations stand to benefit immensely from embracing efforts like soil sequestration—instead of waiting for regulation to force their hands. Such action would help participating companies gain a competitive advantage over their peers and drive more transformative actions over time. With a growing number of Americans favoring climate-change mitigation policies on both sides of the aisle, oil and gas companies should take this opportunity, increase their voluntary action, and make their stances unequivocal.  

The coronavirus pandemic has reduced global carbon emissions, but that progress won’t last unless governments act to reduce emissions permanently and prepare for future disasters.

Building a Resilient Tomorrow draws on international and national examples, some revealed for the first time, to provide an interdisciplinary narrative covering a range of climate resilience solutions.

This is a guest post by Zoe Dawson, a recent graduate of The Center for Global Affairs at New York University. She was previously an intern for Energy and Climate Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Approximately thirty-nine U.S. states have renewable or alternative portfolio standards (RPS), mandating a certain share of renewable power generation within a particular time frame. A small yet increasing number of states have set targets for 100 percent renewable generation. Eight states, including Washington DC and Puerto Rico, have committed to 100 percent clean generation by 2050 or earlier. The most ambitious target, recently set out by Rhode Island seeks to achieve 100 percent by 2030. In comparison to the European Union’s most recent announcement aiming to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, the overall percentage of US states pushing for 100 percent is still low. As we enter the 2020 election year+, it will be interesting to see whether support for renewable energy targets could play a role in the election campaigns. According to the Pew Research Center, a majority of Americans support a range of energy policy priorities; 71 percent in favor of increasing reliance on renewable energy sources and 69 percent who are in support of reducing dependence on foreign energy sources. Not surprisingly, democrats and democratic leaning independents give priority to protecting the environment as well as increasing reliance on renewable energy sources, while a larger share of Republicans put priority on reducing U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources. The midterm elections in 2016, highlighted greater concern for promoting more ambitious renewable energy targets. This was evident in Nevada, with Governor Steve Sisolak calling to increase Nevada’s 50 percent renewable generation by 2030 target to 100 percent by 2050. In Colorado, Jarded Polis is calling for 100 percent renewable energy by 2040. Even more notable, in Michigan, the state’s RPS became a selling point in the campaign. Gretchen Whitmer defeated the states Republican attorney general, Bill Schuette, renowned for his lawsuits against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and opposition to clean energy and energy efficiency. Reflective of Schuette’s electoral defeat, Michigan’s two largest utilities committed in 2016 to boost the fuel mix to 50 percent renewables by 2030. Subsequently, in Illinois, Connecticut, Minnesota. Wisconsin, and New Mexico, elected officials are calling for the increase and establishment of 100 percent RPS targets. Since the midterm elections of 2016, a wave of state level clean energy policies are moving ahead through the eleven new Democratic governors that were elected, seven of which flipped previously from Republican seats. Wisconsin’s governor-elect, Democrat Tony Evers, defeated Scott Walker through a campaign that included pledging to join seventeen other governors committed to the goals of the Paris climate agreement. As more politicians and elected officials in the U.S. push to attain 100 percent renewable power generation, the next big question is around how this can be achieved? Over the last decade, the price of renewables has fallen dramatically. Wind energy has reduced in cost by some 70 percent since 2009 and solar has reduced by an extraordinary 88 percent. This has improved the economic viability of transforming the power sector, allowing the levelized cost of energy for wind and solar to become competitive with that of coal, natural gas and nuclear. However, the biggest challenge with increasing dependency on renewable energy sources such as wind and solar is their variability. Solar energy is only available during sunny daylight hours while wind supply can be intermittent at times. Currently, the state closest to meeting its renewable goals is Vermont, with in state electricity generation coming almost entirely (99.7 percent) from renewable sources, 60 percent of which comes from hydroelectric power. Vermont relies primarily on electricity imports, with the largest share of electricity consumed coming from hydroelectric generators in Canada. Behind Vermont follows Idaho, Washington, and Maine, similarly these states have cleaner power systems as a result of access to hydroelectric generating capacity. Hydropower differs from variable renewable energy resources such as wind and solar, given that is more consistently available with stable output and production. Excess hydro-capacity can be called upon at times of day or seasonally to supplement renewables, though its turbines, like natural gas peaking plants, have technical limitations and adjustments are not instantaneous. Thus, hydro is often used to help balance the grid, as a complimentary source to faster responding energy storage, solar or other power electronic based generator systems. Beyond extra capacity at existing hydroelectric plants, water sources can provide the possibility of pumped hydro storage. Pumped hydro operates through the use electricity-powered turbines, potentially solar for example, to pump water uphill in order to fill a reservoir. Then when electricity is needed, the water is released to flow through downhill turbines to generate electricity. To back up solar power, water is pumped uphill during the day using solar energy and then released when solar energy is no longer available. To the extent that water can be pumped uphill at nighttime --for example, using excess wind power--it can shift the availability of power from overnight generation to serve daytime loads, which adds significant value. Pumped storage hydroelectric power plants are the largest source of electricity storage technology used in the United States. This is both in terms of capacity and number of plants. While there are local variations of hydro inflow as a result of weather patterns, a large share of production capacity is flexible. The usage factor each month for pumped storage usually follows the pattern of electricity demand, a large peak during the summer, smaller peak in winter and the lowest use throughout the rest of the year. Hydropower in the United States currently makes up 7 percent of power generation and 52 percent of current renewable power generation. Roughly half of U.S. hydroelectric generation capacity is concentrated in Washington, California and Oregon. Across the U.S.–Canadian border, 37 major two-way transmission connections between Canada and New England, and Canada and the Pacific Northwest imported and exported 82.4 million mega watt-hours of U.S. and Canadian electricity in 2016. New England and New York accounted for 60 percent of total electricity imported to the U.S. from Canada in 2014, representing 12-16 percent of the regions retail sales of electricity, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The Pacific Northwest is a net exporter to Canada due to its hydroelectric capacity generating electricity in excess of the region’s needs during high water periods. In 2017, Professor and Director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program at Stanford University, Mark Jacobson released a report which suggested that all U.S. electricity generation could be met with mainly hydropower, wind, solar and storage to achieve 100 percent renewable generation. The study noted that hydropower, in addition to other storage systems like batteries, can be used to balance the variability of other renewable energy sources such as solar, which is not available in the nighttime, and wind that is sporadically intermittent. Battery storage is more cost effective and valuable at providing small amounts of stored energy over a short time at high power levels, while pumped hydro storage is more cost effective at storing and releasing larger amounts of stored energy over longer periods of time. A subsequent study questioned whether stationary energy storage solutions like batteries and the addition of turbines to existing and new hydroelectric dams or storing excess energy in water, ice and rocks could be sufficient to deliver a 100 percent renewables U.S. energy system.  The second study noted that multi-week battery storage systems have yet to be developed and suggested that the ability to develop swing hydroelectric electricity supply could be difficult since addition of turbines could require major reconstruction at existing facilities and the addition of additional supporting infrastructure. In some cases, competing uses for water and environmental constraints might prevent such expansion in hydroelectric capacity, according to the second study authors.   Another challenge to hydroelectric capacity is the possibility that dam removal is sometimes needed for ecological reasons. Given the geographical concentration of U.S. and Canadian hydropower, a decarbonized grid in many locations in the United States will have to rely heavily on wind and solar generation paired with energy storage including batteries. While the declining costs and technology maturation of lithium ion batteries is contributing to energy storage becoming a viable option throughout the United States, unresolved challenges persist for balancing solar power on a seasonal basis in some northern states where hours of sunshine are reduced in wintertime. Other grid organizational models are under study to solve this problem including conversion of renewable energy to hydrogen fuel that can be stored for later use and small-scale distributed energy models that allow smaller batteries to be deployed widely to individual users with diverse usage needs to enhance flexibility to the system. Australia has utilized such a system to stabilize electricity shortages in the Western part of the country. In the case of hydrogen conversion from renewable energy, the technology is still nascent, and some applications remain commercially too expensive to be competitive in today’s markets. Hydrogen fuel also requires special infrastructure given its chemical properties. The Nord Pool, which is a market based power exchange made up of nine Northern European countries is a good example of how increasing interconnectivity can serve as a way to integrate greater amounts of variable renewable energy on the power grid. Most notably, Denmark, which has nearly twice as much wind capacity per capita than any other nation (making up 43 percent of electricity generation) has been extremely successful in facilitating such a high penetration of weather dependent generation through enhancing grid flexibility and interconnectivity. Growing interconnectivity has allowed Denmark to increase its wind energy build. When Denmark is overproducing, it can sell excess power to neighboring countries including Norway, and when the wind is not blowing it can purchase power from its neighbors. The trading of wind and hydropower between Denmark and Norway, above all else, presents a good business case. On average, Norway usually has about a 10 percent hydro surplus every year. When Denmark is experiencing strong winds and/or Danish power demand is low, the price of Danish wind drops, providing profitable arbitrage opportunities for Norway. The planning for scale and encouragement of healthy competition has been critical to the growth of renewables in Europe. As individual states in the United States seek to advance their renewable energy targets, lessons should be drawn from cross-border coordination taking place in Europe and the leveraging of planned transmission infrastructure to provide resource flexibility and take advantage of economies of scale. In comparison, existing interconnectivity between United States and Canadian power markets has seen similar benefits; includes contributing to economic growth through delivering low cost power to formerly underserved regions in the Pacific Northwest. In New England, electricity imports from Quebec and New Brunswick have lowered wholesale power costs and deliver annual economic benefits in the range of $103 million to $471 million. As the U.S. presidential election approaches, election outcomes could be critical to the future pace of deployment of renewable energy in the United States. GOP efforts on carbon emissions have mainly been focusing on carbon sequestration rather than incentives for clean energy. Carbon Sequestration is favored by the fossil fuel industry but yet to be widely commercially deployable at scale. In addition, most Republican plans focus on free market solutions to the climate crisis as opposed to strictly regulating carbon emitters. Recent details on Republican climate plans places emphasis on planting trees, a natural method to sequester carbon. By contrast, the leading democratic Presidential candidates including Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren, and Amy Klobuchar have all pledged to achieve 100 percent renewable electricity by 2050 or earlier. Democratic contender Michael Bloomberg, a long-time climate activist, released his plan for 100 percent clean energy. Bloomberg’s plan includes extending and expanding solar and wind tax credits and creating new tax incentives for private companies to improve clean energy technology, including battery storage and green hydrogen. No matter the result of the 2020 election, federal policy may not be the leading indicator in the United States where climate and energy policy has been propelled by states and cities. Given the popularity of renewable energy among U.S. constituencies and the falling cost of deployment, renewable energy expansion is likely to remain a major feature of the U.S. energy system in the coming years, catalyzed by state and local policies.  

Daniel Flitton is the editor of The Interpreter, a digital magazine published daily by the Lowy Institute in Sydney. When political dramas unfold in real life, they never seem to feature that one crucial moment you commonly see watching a classic emergency room television series. You know—the kind where frantic doctors desperately struggle to revive a patient, pumping his or her chest and charging defibrillators, only to be defeated, and to mournfully mark the precise instant it all came to an end, with lines like “I’m calling it. Time of death, 11:04 AM.” But future historians likely will look back on what has been a scorching Australian summer as the moment Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s previously successful political career flatlined. Morrison is still far from gone, politically speaking. Yet the jolt to his fortunes after his government’s inept response to bushfires that have raged across the country in recent months has clearly hurt his carefully crafted personal brand. The damage to Morrison’s political prospects looks to be permanent, though in unpredictable realm of Australian politics, one can never be sure. Sometimes, moments arrive in politics where reputations are forever tarnished. A relatively newly re-elected George W. Bush, who still had a favorable approval rating in early 2005, found this out later that year after being seen to botch the initial reaction to Hurricane Katrina. Morrison already has suffered a sharp dip in opinion poll ratings after his performance this Southern Hemisphere summer. The reason why such damage may prove lasting is the baggage he brings to his job—a belligerent and highly personalized style that had to date been a great strength, allowing him to be portrayed as a man who takes on the responsibility to get things done. Only in the case of the fires, he seemed to exert no leadership at all, exactly counter to his brand. As the fires ramped up, he literally took a holiday to Hawaii—and was publicly condemned for it. Later, with smoke blanketing many of Australia’s biggest cities and authorities warning people to avoid exercise and the risk to health, Morrison cheerily gathered with the national cricket team by Sydney’s harbor for a photo-op at New Year’s, still appearing oblivious to the depth of public concern about the fires. It had already been revealed he ignored the pleas of prominent fire chiefs in the months leading up to summer about the dangers ahead. When Morrison did eventually visit some communities battered by the fires, he was treated to that most Australian of sarcastic welcomes: “go on, piss off.” Morrison subsequently conceded he made a mistake by going overseas in the days before Christmas. It was a rare concession that he had gone wrong, and one that will open the way for opponents to question his judgment. Morrison never gave an inch, in the past, on almost any political issue, especially during his years as the face of the conservative coalition’s “stop the boats” policy to prevent asylum seekers crossing dangerous seas to Australia. Even when caught in blatant exaggerations related to the asylum policy, he stood stubbornly firm. Later, when in charge of the nation’s finances as treasurer between 2015 and 2018, he marched into parliament brandishing a lump of coal, taunting the opposition in the face of calls to transition the economy from a dependence on fossil fuels. Morrison’s first instinct when taking a holiday during the fire crisis was similarly not to give ground to the critics. His staff sought to cover up his absence—with journalists insisting his office sought to deny that he was even away, only to be discovered lounging on a Hawaiian beach. When Morrison did return, he stumbled further. His awkward appearances and forced handshakes in areas devastated by the fires were broadcast nationally and across the world, and proved a striking contrast to his usual efforts to present himself as an everyman. And the still relatively recent prevalence of smart phones and social media ensured that the scale of the fires—with footage from deep inside the inferno—was seen by the Australian public much more broadly than it would have been even five years ago. Yet Morrison, the supposedly can-do character, responded in a way that was seen to pass the buck, saying, “I don’t hold a hose, mate.” His subsequent decision to produce an advertisement to promote his response to the fires, only for the ad to feature a way to donate to the ruling Liberal party at a time people were reaching into their own pockets for charity, rankled some Australians. In part, Morrison was caught by a confluence of events beyond his control. His Hawaii holiday coincided with the sad death of volunteer firefighters, further amplifying attention on his absence. And people are understandably angry when their house has burned down, and look for someone to blame. A public survey suggested more than half of the Australian population felt affected by the fire crisis—whether by direct property damage, health concerns from smoke haze, or holiday plans upended. Morrison has not only suffered a fall in his own approval ratings, his poor handling of the fire crisis saw him criticized in influential media outlets usually welded to the conservative side. Even from within his own party, state politicians in New South Wales complained about a lack of consultation with and leadership from the national government. The prime minister remains in office. Morrison’s position is now protected somewhat from revolt within his ruling coalition, because it has become far harder to oust leaders from within parties, between elections, thanks to new procedural rules adopted by both parties. The new rules were put in place to end the cycle of continual fighting from within parties, and replacing prime minister after prime minister without elections. Morrison won power in an internal party leadership contest in 2018, becoming the sixth prime minister in a decade, amidst nonstop petty squabbling and personality clashes within the two major political parties. Morrison won a national election just last May, a result not foreseen by most pre-election polls; that victory should have netted him enduring political capital. He now has more than two years until he faces another national election, under Australia’s system of three-year terms. And the country has enjoyed a roaring economy: It has not had a recession in twenty-seven years. Yet the extra-long season of bushfires in the southern and eastern states, which began much earlier than usual in September and came after a long and painful drought in rural districts, not only damaged Morrison’s personal brand but also again focused the public mind on the problem that has loomed in the background of Australia’s recent decade of political strife. That is, the need to craft a credible and durable response to climate change. Indeed, Australia faces the difficult challenge of balancing combating global warming, securing sources of energy for the domestic market, and keeping Australia’s economy booming through exports of coal, gas, and minerals to regional giants like China, Australia’s biggest trading partner. Even if he can right his personal brand, Morrison will continue struggling because of the fundamental divisions within Australian conservative ranks about how to handle environmental challenges. Australia is in many ways the rich country most endangered by climate change. And some parts of the conservative Liberal-National coalition, supported by prominent voices in the business community, wish the government would take the lead on planning for the changes stemming from global warming, and develop a strategy of more ambitious cuts to carbon emissions to limit the dangers. Other portions of the ruling coalition deny climate change exists, or view any focus on climate change as driven by a “cult-like” global green movement to undermine capitalism and hurt the Australian economy. As the crisis built, Morrison spent weeks pointing to Australia’s long past experience with bushfires, refusing to countenance climate change as a meaningful factor that has made fires worse, more devastating, and more regular. Morrison has shown no sign that his summer scare will change his approach or that he will seek to resolve the schism in his coalition on climate change—a schism that undermines policy-making and leaves Australia as a laggard in both climate diplomacy and responses to global warming at home. He insists, to the cost of relations with neighboring Pacific island nations, that Australia only produces 1.3 percent of global carbon emissions, while neglecting to point out that these emissions stem from a country with 0.3 percent of the world’s population. He has emphasized that the fires result from conservation policies allowing too much forest growth—or even arson—with only the barest nod to problems exacerbated by rising temperatures or declining rainfall. As a result, the ruling coalition remains divided, and any progress on climate change in Australia likely remains stalled. Instead, Morrison has attempted to revert to promoting the image of himself as a man of action. He has called out the military to assist with firefighting and clean-up, and pledged to pass legislation to allow the federal government to respond more swiftly to fires in future. “Further practical resilience measures” was the Morrison mantra in a major speech delivered last week in an attempt recapture the political agenda. But this approach continues to treat the symptoms of what troubles Australia, not the cause. Although he faces no serious prospects of being challenged until election time, the public is again eager for substantive action on climate change, and Morrison surely knows from recent history that leaders rarely recover for a second chance.

The latest episode of The President’s Inbox is live. I sat down with Alice Hill, CFR’s senior fellow for climate change policy, to talk about the coming climate disruption. Alice is the coauthor of Building a Resilient Tomorrow: How to Prepare for the Coming Climate Disruption. It hits the bookstores this Friday. Here are three takeaways from our conversation: 1. Climate disruption is already with us and will only get worse. Consider Norfolk, Virginia. It’s home to twenty-nine U.S. military facilities, including the largest naval base in the world—Naval Station Norfolk. Rising sea levels have turned flooding from an occasional problem to a persistent one. This has required repeated repairs that have come with a high price tag. This single example can be multiplied thousands of times over. Wildfires in California. The geographical spread of insect-borne diseases like Zika and dengue fever. Crop failures that trigger climate-induced migration. The list goes on. 2. Adapting to climate disruption means building a more resilient economy and society. Cutting the emission of heat-trapping gasses is the best resilience strategy of all. But global emissions are increasing, not shrinking. Even if emissions could be cut to zero today, climate disruptions will occur because so many heat-trapping gasses have already been pumped into the atmosphere. The political challenge is to ensure that the efforts to adapt to predictable climate disruptions don’t come at the expense of fighting what is causing them in the first place. 3. Building resiliency requires doing many things differently. Governments will have to impose or tighten regulations on what can be built where. Courts will need to determine whether carbon emitters are legally liable for the costs of a changing climate. Financial markets will need to “price in” the costs of climate disruption. Companies will need to factor climate considerations into where they invest and how they invest. And perhaps most important, decisions will need to be made about who will pay to make the economy and society more resilient. Two things are clear. First, the price tag for rising seas, extreme storms, and wildfires is already high and growing. Second, the longer it takes to develop resilience strategies, the costlier it will be to implement them. As the old commercial put it: Pay me now, or pay me later. Alice’s book explores these and other aspects of climate change disruption in more depth. To see what climate changes will mean for the United States, check out the Fourth National Climate Assessment. Released last November, it compiles the work on climate disruption done by thirteen federal agencies. The assessment’s summary gets straight to the point: Climate change creates new risks and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities in communities across the United States, presenting growing challenges to human health and safety, quality of life, and the rate of economic growth. Also worth reading is the report by the Global Commission on Adaptation, which was released last month. It argues “that adaptation, done right, will lead to better growth and development. It will also protect nature, reduce inequalities, and create opportunities.” Carbon Brief has an interactive map that details examples of climate adaptation projects across the world (from floating islands to helping the whale watching industry). Margaret Gach helped with the preparation of this post.