Disasters

In the wake of the New Year’s Eve stampede along the Bund in Shanghai that resulted in the death of almost forty people, Chinese President Xi Jinping wasted no time calling for hospitals to treat the injured and for an investigation to determine responsibility for the tragedy. Yet beyond that, his response, and that of the rest of the Chinese leadership, has been tone deaf, missing an important opportunity to demonstrate real leadership through compassion and understanding. As people throughout China have sought to express their shared grief and reach out to those who lost loved ones, Beijing has actively discouraged such generosity of spirit. Instead, the leadership has mistakenly understood this terrible disaster as a potential threat to its legitimacy. It is censoring news accounts, trying to prevent victims’ families from speaking with journalists, and placing these families under surveillance. It has expended scores of police hours searching for and interrogating people who have posted their thoughts about the tragedy online. And before one father was allowed to receive his daughter’s body to fly back to Malaysia, he was told that he had to agree to “absolve the government of any wrongdoing.” A commentator in Shanghai explains the government’s reaction thus: “Such a major public safety incident can tug the heartstrings of the public, and the acts and words by victims’ relatives can make the public sentiments swing, making it a key task for authorities to control the families, limiting their contacts with each other or with the media….The method is brusque toward the families, preventing them from resorting to law and to the media, but—in a positive way—it can indeed alleviate the shock to the public.” Yet the Chinese people clearly do not need to be told what matters or how to behave when confronted with tragedy. In the aftermath of the devastating July 2012 Beijing floods—the worst in six decades—that resulted in the death of seventy-seven people, for example, Chinese social commentator Li Chengpeng wrote a beautiful and profound testament to the selflessness and generosity of his fellow Beijing citizens: “the humanity is there, like a luminous pearl, normally ordinary and unremarkable like a rock, but in the key moment shining brightly…this is Chinese people’s civic awareness growing…which is to say, when you participate in community self-government and self-management, you’ll feel a strong sense of existence and security.” Xi Jinping and the rest of the Chinese leaders have allowed their own narrow, self-protective interests to take precedence over the broader desires and needs of the Chinese people. In so doing they have squandered an important opportunity to develop the type of citizen spirit and social unity that they so desperately seek, and deprived the Chinese people and themselves of an essential element of the Chinese dream.

In the past year, Malaysia’s aviation industry has suffered an unprecedented number of tragedies. Although the odds of any person boarding a flight dying in a plane crash are about 1 in 11 million, three Malaysia-based aircraft have apparently gone down, with no survivors. The latest, AirAsia Flight QZ8501, had been traveling from Surabaya, Indonesia, to Singapore when it vanished over the Java Sea. To some extent, the three Malaysian air disasters are just brutal bad luck. Still, they point to several disturbing trends that raise the question of whether flying in peninsular Southeast Asia is completely safe. The air market in the region has embraced low-cost carriers, leading to a proliferation of flights throughout Southeast Asia, stretching air traffic controllers, and possibly allowing some airlines to expand too rapidly. Indonesian carriers, air traffic controllers, and Indonesian airspace in general have become notorious for weak safety regulations. AirAsia has responded to this crisis much more rapidly than state carrier Malaysian Airline did after the disappearance of Flight MH370 last March, but the opaque, authoritarian politics of Malaysia—which are common in Southeast Asia—will likely make the search and rescue operation, and any inquiry into why the flight crashed, more difficult than necessary. For more on my analysis of Southeast Asia’s aviation climate, go to: http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-12-29/why-air-disasters-keep-happening-in-southeast-asia#r=most%20popular.

As of Sunday night on the U.S. East Coast, Typhoon Hagupit had made landfall in the Philippines and moved across parts of the country. The typhoon had weakened and appears to not pack the force of Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated parts of the Philippines last year. Still, Hagupit already has caused significant damage. Casualty and damage figures remain incomplete, but initial estimates suggest that at least 20 people have been killed and thousands of homes have been destroyed by Typhoon Hagupit, with the damage yet to be tolled from the storm’s movement over Metro Manila. Typhoon Hagupit also may have set back some of the reconstruction that has taken place in areas hit by Haiyan last year. Hagupit is a tragedy, but compared to last year’s Typhoon Haiyan, which killed over 6,000 people, this time the Philippine government has prepared more effectively. These preparations are likely to reduce the total amount of damage caused by this typhoon, though of course there is only so much Manila can do in the face of a natural disaster, and global climate change appears to be increasing the fury of the storms that regularly lash the Philippines. Still, whereas last year Manila waited until the last minute to push for evacuations, with Hagupit the government issued evacuation orders well in advance, giving people time to leave their homes. Nearly one million people were evacuated from possible danger zones in advance of the storm, a decision that almost surely has helped keep the casualty count low. The Aquino government made significant preparations for protecting the parts of Metro Manila most vulnerable to flooding, stacking up sandbags and other protective devices, canceling all major public events so that people stay home, and mapping out a plan, in advance, for clearing roads and airports in the capital and other parts of the country. In addition, the Aquino government readily accepted assistance, in advance of Hagupit, from the United States, Japan, and other countries in tracking the storm’s progress, helping with the evacuation process, and putting humanitarian aid stations in place before the storm hit. The national government and local governments also assembled search-and-rescue teams in advance of this storm, so that after the storm hit, the rescue teams would immediately be able to move into action to help survivors and treat the wounded. With Haiyan, by contrast, the Aquino government was dangerously blasé about setting up aid stations before the storm or working with other governments to prepare. After Haiyan, survivors often were left without food or water. Given that the Philippines is, according to the Global Climate Risk Index, one of the countries in the world most affected by extreme weather events, this kind of preparation will, sadly, have to become the norm in Manila.

The Nigerian Daily Independent recently published remarks by Mutiu Sunmonu, the managing director of Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC). The remarks provide insights into Nigeria’s oil industry. Sunmonu said that Nigeria lost over three hundred thousand barrels of crude a day to oil theft, “deferment,” and illegal refining in 2013. Sunmonu confirmed that the federal government takes over 98 percent of the revenue generated by oil producing firms in Nigeria. So, the three hundred thousand barrels per day represent a loss to the Nigerian government of billions of dollars. On the highly controversial issue of oil spills, Sunmonu said that “third party interference” (involving sabotage, illicit tapping of pipes to extract oil, etc.) accounts for 75 percent of oil spillage incidents. Illegal refining of oil and the transport of illegal oil also results in the discharge of oil into the environment. Sunmonu attributed about 15 percent of the spills to “operational spill,” caused by corrosion, equipment failure, or human error. He said that incidents of oil spills resulting from sabotage and theft increased from 137 in 2012 to 157 in 2013. Whatever the cause, Sunmonu said Shell had cleaned up 85 percent of sites that had been identified in 2013 as being in need of “remediation.” Sunmonu’s remarks highlight that it is the Nigerian government that remains the overwhelming beneficiary of oil production, and that its revenue is most negatively impacted by interruption in oil production no matter the cause. This governmental dependency on the oil sector emphasizes the risks the federal government faces should the Niger Delta, where the oil is located, become unstable.

Below is a guest post by Jeffrey Wright, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. On November 8, Typhoon Haiyan blasted through the heart of the Philippines, leaving thousands dead and the country’s midsection flattened. One of the most powerful storms in recorded history, Haiyan carved a path of destruction reminiscent of the Asian tsunami in 2004 that demolished Indonesia’s Aceh province and other coastal areas in the Bay of Bengal. Similar to that disaster, the poorest citizens bore the brunt of calamity in the archipelago, their matchstick homes and enterprises reduced to rubble. Natural disasters are revealing phenomena, and Typhoon Haiyan is no exception. The damage they inflict often unveils systemic domestic problems, especially in poor countries. In the Philippines, a lack of storm protection facilities and decrepit infrastructure on the islands of Leyte and Samar not only exacerbated the devastation and loss of life but now reminds people that entrenched corruption in Manila continues to exact an unsettling toll. Disasters also reveal the capacities of actors to respond effectively. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, it is clear that the region’s most prominent organization possesses no such resilience. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) carries a mandate to respond “to all forms of [security] threats.” But it lacks the political will and resources to fulfill its Charter obligations. Indeed, ASEAN’s role in the Philippines has been limited to basic information-sharing functions. Prior to Haiyan making landfall, the Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance—ASEAN’s disaster management unit—monitored the storm’s movements and deployed logistics personnel to Manila and Tacloban to help coordinate relief efforts with national authorities. Now in the typhoon’s aftermath, ASEAN lies in the shadows altogether, wielding neither the power nor funds to play a substantial part in the humanitarian response. In the absence of a strong ASEAN, the Philippine recovery is simply more fragile and harder to execute, relying on a range of actors to fill the void. The leading international organization in the relief effort is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but OCHA is heavily constrained by having to raise voluntary contributions from member states for every crisis it tackles. Meanwhile, individual countries have pledged extensive aid, with a recognizable cast of donors topping the list, including Australia, Britain, Japan, and the United States. Yet depending on the generosity of foreign governments does not seem a sustainable (nor politically astute) approach to disaster management. Not only do climate scientists predict storms to strike Southeast Asia and elsewhere with increasing frequency and severity—foreshadowing the limits of future aid—but sadly geopolitics have been a factor in decisions to extend humanitarian assistance (read: China’s embarrassingly paltry initial pledge of $100,000). It goes without saying that the politics of help have no place in times of crisis. More importantly, Typhoon Haiyan raises larger questions about the state of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. What is the role of ASEAN in providing regional security, and what is ASEAN’s place in the broader architecture of Asian security? How does ASEAN best leverage the competencies of its partners and allies? Can the organization improve its capacity to respond to emerging threats, including national disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan and the risk of infectious disease in its aftermath? How can states close the development gap in the region? These and other queries were the subject of an enlightening workshop held in Jakarta this past June on “Rising Regionalism: Trends in Southeast and (Wider) Asia.” Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, the workshop convened scholars from the United States, Indonesia, and Singapore to discuss future directions in Southeast Asia. A summary report appears online, but here are a few highlights: ASEAN’s effectiveness suffers at the hands of a weak secretariat and consensus decision-making: The regional organization has lofty ambitions for deepening integration in Southeast Asia, aiming to complete the single market by 2015. Though achieving this goal and making progress in other areas of the ASEAN Community, namely the political-security and socio-cultural pillars, will prove extraordinarily difficult without moving toward some form of majority voting and empowering the secretariat with greater resources. A changing strategic environment threatens the integrity of ASEAN’s centrality: As China continues to amass strength and the United States rebalances toward Asia, ASEAN must promote unity from within its ranks if it intends to manage dynamism in the region. The juxtaposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—two overlapping regional free trade agreements—may threaten the integrity of ASEAN, particularly if the TPP is able to grow its membership with Southeast Asian nations. Consolidating the ASEAN Economic Community will represent an important step to navigating the future of regional trade. ASEAN has responded to public health threats with national strategies at the expense of regional approaches: Since the global SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak in 2003, public health regulators around the world have focused on improving the capacities of governments to respond to emerging threats, such as novel coronaviruses, pandemic influenza, and non-communicable diseases. But in Southeast Asia, countries have concentrated efforts on national rather than multilateral solutions, undermining regional security. ASEAN should use its extensive intergovernmental forums to identify regional health deficiencies as a prelude to further cooperation. In conclusion, it bears mentioning that there are historical reasons for ASEAN’s institutional weaknesses. Borne out of Southeast Asia’s colonial past, norms of sovereignty and noninterference are inviolable pillars of foreign policy in the region. These principles are unlikely to diminish anytime soon. Nevertheless, ASEAN cannot afford to remain sidelined as both cooperation and conflict take shape in Southeast Asia and the broader region. It would risk tarnishing its credibility and backsliding on much of the progress made during its near fifty-year history.

Over the past week, as aid trickled and now is flowing into the Philippines in the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, some broader questions about the country’s preparedness—or lack thereof—have arisen. Although it would be unfair to compare the Philippines, a country with a GDP per capita of around $2,600, with richer countries hit by natural disasters (such as Thailand in the 2004 tsunami), it is worth asking why the Philippines seemed much less prepared for Haiyan than neighboring Vietnam, a country with a GDP per capita of only $1,600. Although the typhoon also passed through Vietnam, albeit after slowing down somewhat over the water in between, Vietnam suffered fourteen deaths, as compared to what appears to be thousands of fatalities in the Philippines. Vietnam managed to evacuate over 800,000 people well before the storm hit; the total number of people who evacuated in the Philippines prior to the storm remains unknown, but a sizable percentage of people on Leyte did not evacuate, a factor that surely increased fatalities. What differed in the two countries’ preparations?  To be sure, Vietnam is an authoritarian state where the central government retains far more power than in the Philippines, one of the most vibrant democracies in Asia. But well before the typhoon hit, Vietnam’s government already had labeled it the most serious possible emergency, making it easier for provincial officials to convince people to leave their homes. Philippines President Benigno Aquino III did not label the typhoon the most serious possible emergency, a categorization that would have allowed him to mobilize more resources and possibly force the evacuation of more people prior to landfall. In addition, those who were evacuated in the Philippines were moved only a few hours before the storm made landfall, leaving authorities little time to look for isolated or elderly people who might not have heard warnings or been able to follow them. Vietnam’s buildings also simply seem to have been stronger; structures designated as storm shelters generally did not collapse, while those in the Philippines frequently did. This difference in the quality of building is a testament to the continuing serious problem of graft in the Philippines, where corruption siphons off funds for infrastructure and leads to shoddy work. Although parts of Leyte are regularly hit by typhoons that carry the risk of surges of water, the area had few significant water breaks; many buildings and roads were built with substandard materials, probably because contractors had to pay kickbacks. Vietnam is hardly a model of clean government—the country was ranked among the most corrupt countries in East Asia last year by Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index—but the Philippines is in many respects worse, particularly in areas of the country long under the control of family dynasties. Indeed, because Vietnam’s graft is more centralized, the government sometimes is able to overcome corruption within the Party, whereas in the freer Philippines a more decentralized kind of corruption is much harder to combat from Manila. Finally, Vietnam appears to have more clearly studied government responses to past major disasters in Asia, including the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. This might seem somewhat surprising, given that Vietnam’s leaders are in many respects suspicious of interactions with other countries and highly opaque in how they run their government. Yet below the senior leadership, Vietnam boasts a relatively (for the size of its economy) qualified group of civil servants and diplomats, particularly in areas that are not politically sensitive, like disaster management. Although the Philippines does have some fine civil servants, particularly in prestigious jobs like the foreign ministry, the overall quality of the civil service is poor, in part because Filipinos with top-quality educations, which includes fluency in English, have more opportunities in the domestic private sector and overseas than educated Vietnamese.

Sharone Tobias and Will Piekos look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. China announces sweeping reforms. A wide range of reforms were announced following China’s third plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress, with many commentators surprised by the scope of  President Xi Jinping’s reform campaign. Though they are too expansive to go into detail here, issues that were tackled included: relaxation of the one-child policy, abolishment of the re-education through labor system, state-owned enterprise reform, interest rate and currency regime liberalization, and establishment of an economic reform working group and a new State Security Council. 2. Typhoon kills thousands in the Philippines. The Philippine government’s official web site reported 3,631 confirmed casualties from Typhoon Haiyan on Thursday, though the United Nations has raised the death toll to 4,460. The main casualties were residents of the city of Tacloban in central Philippines, where many complained of a lack of logistics support, manpower, and supplies. There have also been widespread accounts of looting. 3. China increases aid to devastated Philippines. China announced on Thursday that it is increasing its humanitarian assistance to the Philippines to $1.6 million after it was criticized for only offering $100,000—the new amount is still less than that ($2.7 million) donated by Swedish furniture company Ikea. Many believe that the small donation was a political statement related to the two countries’ territorial disputes in the South China Sea. By contrast, the United States is sending $20 million, Japan is providing $10 million in aid, and Indonesia is giving $2 million. The United States and Japan are also sending troops, naval vessels, and aircraft to aid the in the cleanup and assistance efforts. 4. Court order throws off Maldivian elections. A third attempt at presidential elections was derailed by a court order this week, pushing elections back to November 16. The two leading candidates for the Maldivian presidency, Mohamed Nasheed and Abdulla Yameen, will face off in a runoff election. Mr. Nasheed is expected to win, and his supporters believe the courts, which are loyal to Mr. Yameen’s half-brother (who ruled the Maldives for thirty years), are stalling. The opposition was also upset that the sitting president, Mohammed Waheed Hassan, did not leave office when his term expired; instead, he plans to wait until the runoff election. 5. Caroline Kennedy takes up post in Tokyo. The new U.S. ambassador to Japan arrived in Tokyo on Friday—she is the first woman to serve in the post. Her appointment was widely acclaimed in Japan, as she has the ear of President Obama and comes from a political family familiar to many. Bonus: Batman bin Suparman jailed in Singapore. A young man with the curious name Batman bin Suparman has been jailed on drugs and theft charges in Singapore. Suparman is a not-unheard-of surname in Indonesia; the prefix Su- is often found at the beginning of surnames in Java. Batman, however, is not an Indonesian name at all—it seems the man’s parents simply had an interesting sense of humor. Correction: a previous version of this post stated that China had donated $1.6 billion in aid, while Ikea provided $2.7 billion. The correct amounts are $1.6 million and $2.7 million, respectively.

As more news of the extensive destruction wrought by Typhoon Haiyan rolls in—some storm experts are saying that it is the most powerful typhoon ever to hit land—I have spoken with a number of reporters in the United States and Asia about how the relief effort will be impacted by U.S. relations with the Philippines and the Philippines’ relationships with other major regional powers. The United States and the Philippines, a relationship always fraught with the challenges of former colony/colonizer history and ties between Filipinos in the United States and the Philippines, has clearly been on the upswing over the past five years. The White House would like to credit its rebalancing of U.S. forces and diplomacy to Asia as the driver behind this warming, although I would argue that the Philippines simply was driven to re-embracing Washington by China’s behavior in the South China Sea, and by the rapid realization in Manila of how horribly antiquated the Philippines’ navy was. President Benigno Aquino’s III’s drive against corruption also generally has improved the investment climate in the country and led to greater interest from American companies. Still, despite the upswing I don’t think the U.S. relief effort in Leyte—$20 million in humanitarian aid and an aircraft carrier, several cruisers, and other ships that will help with relief—has much to do with the rebalancing, or pivot.  Washington would deliver a similar relief effort to any country in Southeast Asia with which it had a decent relationship. The U.S. relief effort in Indonesia in 2004 after the Asian tsunami was far larger, despite the fact that Washington and Jakarta at that time had only lukewarm ties, as compared to the treaty alliance between Washington and Manila. The tsunami also was the rare natural disaster that significantly changed domestic and international politics. It helped pave the way to peace in Aceh, and the American relief did help change the image of the United States among some in Indonesia. As Jonah Blank wrote in USA Today: "The goodwill the tsunami relief brought the U.S. is incalculable. Nearly a decade later, the effort may rank as one of the most concrete reasons Southeast Asian nations trust the long-term U.S. commitment to a strategy of ’Asian re-balancing.’" This relief effort, though critical, is not likely to impact U.S.-Philippines relations significantly, since ties are already close. However, I do believe that China’s minimal contribution to relief clearly stems from acrimony between Manila and Beijing and is another sign of Beijing’s departure from its 1990s/early 2000s soft power strategy of investing in building long-term ties in Southeast Asia while minimizing disagreements. China so far has offered the Philippines around $200,000 in disaster aid, with vague promises of more to come, a small sum compared to its 2004 relief efforts after the tsunami. This announcement comes after Beijing essentially revoked Aquino’s permission to attend a prominent China-Southeast Asia trade fair in China earlier in 2013. The aid stinginess is a mistake for Beijing, a squandering of a chance to look like a regional power, a generous country that puts aside disputes in times of humanitarian crisis. Surprisingly, the ultra-nationalist Global Times seems to realize this, noting in an editorial today that China should offer assistance to the Philippines despite disputes over the South China Sea.

In the wake of one of the most powerful storms ever to hit Southeast Asia, Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines is counting its dead and assessing the massive damage to infrastructure from the storm, particularly in Leyte province. The scope of the devastation in Leyte was, on Sunday, being compared by some disaster specialists to the destruction wrought by the 2004 Asian tsunami, which completely leveled parts of Aceh in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia, like the Thai coast around Phuket. The typhoon was more powerful than most, but the Philippines has, sadly, become used to this type of devastation: the country is right in the path of the most dangerous Asian typhoons, and was hit by another deadly storm only a few weeks ago. The Philippines suffers from bad luck, and as one of the poorest countries in East Asia, it could not be expected to have the storm warning systems and storm-safe infrastructure of countries like Japan or Singapore. Still, the horrific quality of infrastructure in the Philippines—even worse than countries in the region with similar levels of economic development—certainly has made these storms deadlier. Because the Philippines is one of the most unequal and corrupt countries in Asia, funds for housing projects, roads, and seawalls and other public monies routinely vanish into the pockets of political dynasties; before the typhoon the country was riveted by a high-profile case involving massive slush funds amassed by several prominent politicians. Several news reports about Typhoon Haiyan already have noted that the horrendous, ramshackle nature of storm protection and houses in Leyte contributed to the high death toll and property damage. Although President Benigno Aquino has made some inroads into fighting corruption, his administration still faces an uphill battle, and many areas, including Leyte, remain dominated by patronage networks and a few political clans. The continuing feudalism has made it hard to attract investment in infrastructure, and the country certainly has not helped the cause of infrastructure upgrading by alienating China, whose state-owned companies have been busily building infrastructure for most other countries in Southeast Asia. The most recent high-profile corruption scandal appears to have catalyzed middle-class Filipino sentiment, potentially leading to the type of public outcry against corruption that could actually turn the country’s political course. In the terrible aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, public pressure to reduce graft in construction projects, and to focus more intensely on upgrading infrastructure, would be at least one positive outcome.