Disasters

Fires in California and Oregon have been more devastating than ever before, but climate change means the worst is yet to come. Here’s how officials can prepare.

The coronavirus is delivering yet another heavy blow to natural disaster–prone Puerto Rico, threatening to deepen the U.S. territory’s economic and social crisis.

Warming temperatures mean that Australia will likely continue to suffer from massive bushfires. To reduce future damage, the government must act.

For a precarious global agricultural system with powerful feedback loops, business as usual means widespread hunger and embedded systemic risk.

Floodwaters in Mozambique could spread cholera, raising the death toll even after the storm has passed.

As Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi continue struggling to cope with the aftermath of Cyclone Idai, it’s worth noting while the storm was exceptional in its destructive power, the risk of flooding in and around Beira is a chronic problem. As the climate warms, rising sea levels are likely to cause serious ongoing problems for important coastal hubs like Beira even without the increasing frequency of dramatic storms. Of course the immediate humanitarian crisis is where the international community must focus first. But the destruction of infrastructure that was built with climate change adaptation in mind is also worrying, and has implications not just for Mozambique, but also for landlocked states that rely on its ports.  It’s not a novel observation to point out that many of the populations currently suffering most from the effects of climate change had very little to do with generating the emissions causing the problem, but it’s a truth that will increasingly animate relations between African states and global powers like the United States and China in the future. Few would envy the position of U.S. diplomats called on to explain the Trump Administration’s climate policies to the people of southern Africa these days. As Africa becomes more urban, a greater portion of its population directly experiences the vulnerability of many African coastal cities, from giants like Lagos and Dar es Salaam to vitally important but less prominent places like Beira. While Afrobarometer data suggests that in many countries, the general population is not yet widely aware of the science of climate change, these populations are keenly aware of climate change’s effects. The resulting demands on the state – for better infrastructure, better planning, and better crisis response – will be felt by African governments with increasing intensity. Those governments, in turn, will be looking for leverage to demand more urgent action, and more equitable cost-sharing, from the largest economies. When the causes and consequences of a worldwide problem are so disproportionately allocated, it points to fundamental structural flaws in the international system. African leaders and others from the global south have made this point eloquently to date. But as the institutional architecture of the postwar order comes under increasing attack, it’s a truth that will animate alternative ideas and reform agendas.   

Nature and technology pose a worrying array of threats to twenty-first century civilization. These global menaces and the catastrophic risks associated with them are the subject of a new International Institutions and Global Governance program blog series. 

As in the rest of the world, the impacts of climate change are unlikely to abate anytime soon in West Africa. In Nigeria, the devastating effects of climate change are in full view. The low-lying coast off the Gulf of Guinea is especially vulnerable to rising sea levels, the Sahara has expanded about 10 percent since 1920, and natural disasters appear to be on the rise. In 2017, flooding affected an estimated 250,000 Nigerians; in 2016, 92,000 were displaced. At the other end of the climate spectrum, up to 40 percent of the country’s land area is now estimated to be subject to periodic drought.  Uncontrolled urbanization and rapid population growth, without the expansion of the necessary infrastructure to address them, will exacerbate the destructive force of natural disasters. Nigeria is now about half urban, and the population is expected to grow from 200 million people to perhaps 450 million by mid-century. Climate change is not a subject of popular debate in Nigeria, but there is widespread discontent with how the government responds to natural disasters. The Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), similar to its American counterpart, FEMA, is on the front line of providing relief to the victims of natural disasters and plays a major, if not exclusive, role in the relief of internally displaced persons. Nigerians appear to have a low opinion of NEMA’s capabilities. Reform, for its own sake, is badly needed. It will likely require extensive personnel house-cleaning and the assurance of a steady revenue stream. Closer NEMA cooperation with international relief agencies so far as been disappointing, and it might well require presidential leadership, given a general Nigerian aversion, rarely articulated, to partnership with international agencies. But corrupt and weak institutions are notoriously difficult to reform, as the shortcomings of President Buhari’s anti-corruption campaign illustrate. Nevertheless, reforming NEMA should be fiscally feasible and—important to any incoming administration—would be publicly visible. Such reforms might be taken by Nigerians as a down payment by a new or a second-term administration for a commitment to more extensive reform. It therefore presents itself as an opportunity to the incoming Nigerian administration to rebuild trust with the citizens it is sworn to protect. 

A recent study by noted climate scientists is particularly bad news for the planet’s most vulnerable regions, including the Arctic and small Pacific islands. 

Nigerians fear that flooding in October 2018 could be as bad as or worse than it was in 2012, when two million Nigerians were displaced and 363 died. In 2015, floods displaced 100,000 and led to 53 deaths. In 2016, 92,000 were displaced 38 died. In 2017, floods affected 250,000.  The United States, too, has experienced an apparent upsurge in hurricane activity and accompanying flooding. Hurricane Katrina killed about 1,800 in 2005; Super Storm Sandy killed 147 in 2012; Hurricane Harvey killed 106; and Hurricane Maria killed 3,057 in 2017, mostly in Puerto Rico 2018, a U.S. commonwealth whose residents are American citizens. Most recently, Hurricane Florence killed 48 in 2018, but that total could grow.  Though the United States and Nigeria are hardly similar in terms of infrastructure, there are striking similarities with respect to flooding.  In both countries, property destruction and damage to the economy is measured in the billions of dollars, and there is an ongoing conversation about whether rebuilding should take place in flood-prone areas. Flooding, not high winds, results in the greatest property damage and number of lives lost. Rebuilding certain sections of New Orleans generated considerable debate, but in both countries, it is difficult to prevent rebuilding in flood-prone areas. There has been widespread criticism of Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The poor response of NEMA to the 2012 flood appears to have politically damaged President Goodluck Jonathan, while the U.S. federal government’s poor response to Hurricane Katrina did the same to President George W. Bush. There are media reports that President Donald Trump was concerned about criticism of his administration in the aftermath of Puerto Rico’s Hurricane Maria and Hurricane Florence, where most of the damage was in North Carolina. In the United States, the flooding has been the direct result of hurricanes, while in Nigeria, the flooding is associated with heavy rains that cause the Niger and Benue rivers and their tributaries to overflow (as also happened in North Carolina in the aftermath of Hurricane Florence) and in the Niger Delta, sea surges. The elephant in the living room in both countries is the impact of climate change. In the United States, hurricanes appear to be more frequent and more severe. In parts of Nigeria, rains are notably heavier, and the sea level in the Gulf of Guinea is rising. In other parts of Nigeria, rainfall is diminishing and the Sahara is advancing. There is little consensus in the United States about how to respond to climate change, and the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris treaty that set limits on the emissions of greenhouse gases and provided for other measures designed to ameliorate climate change. Unfortunately, Climate change does not appear to be an issue of public debate in Nigeria.

Tedros’s first year as Director-General of the WHO demonstrated his vision, leadership, and ability to seize an opportunity for action. However, concerns remain regarding his willingness to balance public health with governance and human rights challenges.

This post is co-authored by Sungtae "Jacky" Park, research associate for Korea Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific, such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula or disputes over the South China Sea, consistently attract the attention of policymakers within the region and abroad. But their consequences for ordinary people are often dwarfed by the fallout from nontraditional security (NTS) events, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and maritime safety. In a new CFR discussion paper, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security, Jaehyon Lee, senior fellow in the ASEAN and Oceania studies program at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, gives an overview of how the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea could cooperate to bolster NTS security in Southeast Asia. There have been bilateral and multilateral attempts at cooperation on NTS in the Asia-Pacific, but they have been insufficient. Between the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea, cooperation on NTS issues is currently limited to just a few exceptional circumstances. For instance, the United States and South Korea are partners in the ASEAN Regional Forum Disaster Relief Exercise and they work together on the Lower Mekong Initiative. These efforts, however, are not trilateral among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea, since each country joins as a member of the ARF or as one of many countries in each project. Trilateral cooperation among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea would benefit not just the participating parties, but also the region as a whole. Such cooperation would allow South Korea to contribute to the region and is consistent with the Moon Jae-in government’s foreign policy. It would also advance the U.S.-South Korean alliance and give South Korea experience that could be used in future NTS crises in North Korea such as famines, natural disasters, or pandemics. The author recommends the following: Focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Natural disasters are the most serious concern in the region, resulting in disproportionate casualties and economic losses. Working on HADR issues will also pave the way for cooperation on issues such as climate change, the environment, public health, and pandemics. Fix the reverse hub-and-spoke system. Economically and technically capable ASEAN countries should be donating aid instead of receiving it. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are candidates for this shift. Effectively coordinate policy among donor countries. The United States, Australia, China, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea should all join in strengthening government-to-government cooperation. These countries are already individually active in NTS cooperation with ASEAN. Expand the U.S.-ROK alliance to cover cooperation on regional NTS threats. The first step in this direction should be to assess the current state of knowledge and capacity on both sides. The United States and South Korea have to share what they have in order to address regional NTS threats. Create an institution to handle U.S.-ASEAN-ROK trilateral NTS cooperation. The ASEAN Political-Security Community Department in the ASEAN Secretariat is a promising institution that could take on this role. In addition, Lee argues that South Korea should review its NTS ties with its neighbors in the region. Particularly for HADR, military participation is unavoidable. The South Korean military has been reluctant to take on responsibilities outside of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Moon Jae-in government is emphasizing South Korea’s regional contributions and responsibilities, this is a good time for the South Korean military to expand the scope of its operations and be more active in managing regional NTS threats. The United States can use its political, military, and economic capabilities to deepen its involvement in the region to deal with NTS threats, filling a space between hard U.S. military power and soft cultural and developmental assistance power. In this area, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK trilateral cooperation could bolster efforts to counter NTS threats and open a new chapter for the U.S.-ROK alliance, which so far has been narrowly defined as an arrangement on Korean Peninsula issues. Nontraditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific are as important as—or more important than—traditional security issues. More people’s lives are threatened and more economic losses are incurred by various NTS threats than by traditional security threats in the Asia-Pacific. Addressing NTS threats can enhance peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. This post is a summary of the discussion paper, U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security.