Energy and Environment

Climate Change

  • 2022 in Review
    Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022
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    It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.
  • Energy and Environment
    Deadly Droughts: Adapting to a Drier World
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    Several regions across the world are experiencing their worst droughts in decades, if not centuries. Crops are failing, exacerbating the global food crisis, and rivers that serve as vital shipping arteries are becoming dangerously low, threatening the global trade system. Panelists discuss the scope of the challenge and what companies and governments can do to adapt.   GOODMAN: Welcome today’s—to today’s Council on Foreign Relations session on “Deadly Droughts: Adapting to a Drier World.” I’m Sherri Goodman. I’m a senior fellow at the Wilson Center, a longtime member of the Council, and also secretary general of the International Military Council on Climate and Security. We have a great set of panelists today and we’re going to get right to it. Let me just set the scene for a moment by observing that, you know, we’re having this session here in the midst of the Africa Leaders Summit that’s occurring this week in Washington, and that many of the African nations that are here this week, especially in the case of the Horn of Africa, have experienced successive failed rain seasons, causing massive drought leaving almost forty million people insecure, and that that food crisis is multidimensional. But it’s not, as we say, unmanageable. And climate change and conflict are exacerbating this challenge, and we’re going to explore that today. Also, Africa bears the brunt of climate change. Sixteen of the most climate-vulnerable countries are in sub-Saharan Africa. And when we try to climate-proof, we need to look at water infrastructure and water insecurity on the frontlines. I’d also note that earlier this year the White House released its Action Plan on Water Security, declaring water security to be an essential component of U.S. national security. But we’ll get further into that, as well, and we know that stressors—water stressors worldwide from poor management to accelerating climate change, and that almost half the world’s population will be under severe water stress by 2030 according to the U.N. And we’ve got an important U.N. Water Conference coming up next year. With that, I want to go right to our speakers. We really have a fantastic group of panelists today, and—two of whom I have the pleasure of knowing and the third I’m excited that he’s joined us today. Lauren Alexander Augustine is at the National Academies of Science. You should—can read her bio. She’s got a very distinguished career working at all aspects of water, natural disasters, and resilience across many domains and a really fantastic background. Matthias Berninger. I love that he started out in the Green Party from Germany, went to Mars where he also led the global chocolate program, and now is at Bayer. And he’s going to talk to us about his—both his private-sector experience and his current role leading up to the U.N. Water Conference next year. And Aaron Salzberg served for many years as the lead State Department coordinator for water. He led development and implementation of the—of U.S. foreign policy on drinking water and water security. And now he is at the University of North Carolina, where he leads the Water Institute there. So the way we’re going to do this, I’m going to start with a question to each of our panelists, and then we’re going to go into an interactive discussion for the first half-hour, and then we will open it to questions from all of our members. And thank you for joining us today. This session, by the way, is on the record. And that’s thanks to Richard Haass, our president, who said this subject is too important; we need to have this session on the record. So thank you. OK. Lauren, your work—your lifetime work, much of it now at the National Academies but more broadly, has been at the nexus of water, natural disasters, and resilience. Why are you concerned about water security, both in the U.S.—and I note you run the Gulf of Mexico research program—and abroad? AUGUSTINE: Thank you so much, Sherri and CFR, for asking me to be here today. So the reason that water security has me the most concerned is because we all depend on water. We depend on it for food, agriculture, economy, fish, every—you know, municipal purposes. And I think that it’s the most vexing of the—of the natural disasters because it’s kind of a slow on set. You don’t exactly know you’re in a drought until you’re well into a drought, so the slow on set sets up a number of challenges. And they rarely happen alone, right? So you have a water quantity issue, too much or too little, and it starts to trigger other things. Water scarcity gets into famine, it gets into an economic decline, and transportation issues. Too much water gets into life, you know, problems as well. So I think that it’s one of the most vexing because the solutions that we might want to kind of pull off the shelf are not always available during a water-scarcity event. We cannot make it rain. We cannot create water. Now, we can move water. As the engineer in me, we can move water, but water, it’s kind of a sum zero. If you move it from one place, you’ve taken it from one place to another. And when you transfer water, you can get unintended consequences. And I think that the final part of this answer is that it is—it is vexing and it also—it’s connected to everything. And so you start to make changes in where we get water, when we get it, how much, who pays, and you start to change this event down the system. And I work in the Gulf of Mexico, and everyone kind of thinks, oh, the Gulf of Mexico has too much water; it’s a flooding place. Except for when it’s not, and then it creates other problems. So it’s kind of a place where all of these issues really come together in terms of energy production, food, and transportation. So, to me, Sherri, this issue, it’s kind of this hidden one. Kind of creeps up on you and then, boom, you got a problem. So I see it as a massive issue in the United States and of course, as you’re talking about, globally. GOODMAN: Thank you very much, Lauren. Matthias, you were a member of parliament from the Green Party prior to joining first Mars—I love than you ran the global chocolate program—and now you’re at Bayer, you said. So you’ve gone from chocolate to aspirin. I guess you need both. But so why—you know, first, why did you pursue this career path? And why is water and water security so central to you? BERNINGER: Well, I believe that detours sometimes understand—or increase the understanding of the surroundings. And for me to—having been both in parliament, in the government, but also in business helps me in these days of quite complex times to help companies, but also in a broader sense the political spectrum to move from admiring the problem to action. And the challenge with water is that water is this topic, as Lauren said, as long as you don’t think about it, it kind of—almost kind of gets ignored. There is a certain underlying water blankness. But a bit of a warning for the audience today: Once you start a focus on water, it just doesn’t, like, allow you to pivot from it, yeah? So if you’re not interested in doing that, then you should actually leave this meeting right now. Water is the way through which we experience climate change. None of us wakes up and says, oh, there was a lot of carbon in the air, yeah? We experience through water. We talk about droughts today, but let’s not forget the other three—highly polluted water, flooding, and, of course, also extreme heat, which is very high temperature with very high humidity. Those are the four ways we experience the climate crisis. And we talk about drought today. And for a company like Bayer, that is leading in the area of crop science, we have a $2.5 billion budget in R&D to innovative in this space. We can innovate for a lot of things, but without water there is no food. And agriculture today consumes almost 20 percent of all fresh water. And to scare you even more, almost half of all fresh water in Asia at one point passes through only one crop, and that is rice. So here you see how this topic is really connected to security, to the climate debate, and, dare I say, also to the biodiversity debate. And it’s kind of telling that we are talking about biodiversity in Montreal without even mentioning water. That’s one of those challenges I spoke with a lot of delegates in recent days related to biodiversity. Without water, we will not be able to achieve any of the biodiversity targets, any of the targets to reduce hunger or, I also think, climate action will be very difficult. Because without water plants cannot absorb carbon dioxide. GOODMAN: So thank you, Matthias. Let me just pull on that thread with you for a moment. So what do you want our members to know about the innovations or sort of solution set that, for example, Bayer is undertaking today? What one story captures the innovation to improve water security in Bayer, that is so dedicated to agricultural science and innovation? BERNINGER: What we are working on at the moment is irrigated rice. For me, it’s the number-one challenge we have to address. If you think about security in Asia, it’s absolutely vital. We just this week and last week saw these disturbing pictures of the border dispute in India—you know, between India and China, because, you know, India and Pakistan live at a very challenging border. So water is this very big topic. And rice, for me, is the number-one crop we need to focus on. The good news is if we change the way we produce rice, if we innovate also on the rice crop, we can reduce the demand—the water demand of rice in significant ways. And that’s the kind of stuff we need to look at, stopping admiring the problem and focusing on big, bold solutions in this space. GOODMAN: Great. Thank you. That’s a perfect—let me bring Aaron into this discussion. Aaron, you know, we’ve known each other for a long time. You have been the U.S. government’s leader on water security. You developed the first global water strategy. You’ve represented the U.S. in many multilateral processes. You know, tell us a little bit about your journey in this space. And also I just—we’re going to very candid her today, you know, where you think we are in terms of, we’ve got a water strategy out there, and something called an action plan, but the question is, what kind of—as we sometimes say in certain government circles, strategy without resources is hallucination. So why don’t you—(laughs)—respond to where we think we’re going on water strategy in the U.S. SALZBERG: Well, thanks, Sherri. You kind of set me up. And thanks to Lauren and Matthias for making that original point. I mean, because they’re both right, right? You know, I didn’t find water. I wasn’t trained as a hydrologist. I didn’t come in thinking I was going to spend my entire career working on water issues. Water found me. And in large part because it is a wickedly hard problem. And it’s a wickedly hard problem that matters—perhaps more than almost anything else that we’re going to have to work on. And, you know, we have this misnomer when we often think about water. You know, we lump it in with the SDGs. And we get this impression that water is a problem that you can solve. And one of the things we have to come to terms with is that water is a problem that we’re going to be managing every single day forever and ever. Providing basic hydrogeological services to all the people that we need to—clean drinking water, sanitation services, water for food, water for energy—these are things that we’re going to struggle with every single day, day after day, for ever and ever. And that means we have to change our mindset from, oh, let’s come up with solutions that’ll solve a problem to how do we build the institutions, how do we build the capacity, how do we make sure we have the right governance structures in place that enable us communities of people, and partnerships, technologies provider sand service providers and others, to work collectively together to solve this problem in a routine way, so that it becomes a way—just a way of working. You know, people always add this discussion about integrated water resources management, where people think it’s a noun. It’s actually a verb, right? So it’s a way of working. It’s just something you’ve got to embrace, and we’ve got to move forward. You know, we’ve seen a lot of progress recently by the United States on the strategic front. We saw the White House Action Plan, as you mentioned, and we saw the new revised version of the U.S. Global Water Strategy. And kudos to both, right. It’s nice to see that we’re maintaining some political pressure on the United States to actually do some of this work. And also, the recognition of water security. And in both those documents, water security played a central role. And I think that acknowledgement that it’s important for us to ensure that countries are water secure is a really nice shift in direction and something that we should all be lauded for. I think my concern is it’s a lot of nice words. And it’s really backed up by very little action. I think, you know, both the White House Action Plan and the Global Water Strategy were kind of launched in a vacuum, which is a little bit of a shame, right/ Because you really want to use the opportunities of launching initiatives like this to solidify partnerships and to bring together the different entities from the private sector, from other governments, that will work together with you to implement these types of things. And I think that was a very big missed opportunity on both sides, that we didn’t really use the launch of these documents to advance the implementation. The other is, you know, how do we implement these? What are the resources? What’s the—you know, for any major initiative, you know, you need the mandate, you need the money, and you need the institutional home. You need someone who’s going to be responsible and accountable for delivering on that mandate. And it’s really not clear to me who’s responsible and accountable for delivering on this mandate. And whether or not they’re properly resourced both in terms of access to expertise, knowledge and funding to be able to carry out that mandate. So I have some concerns around that. GOODMAN: OK, let’s talk for a minute here about water diplomacy. I’ll bring also Matthias and Lauren into this. You know, as an example, you’ve got a project like under EcoPeace Middle East, to do a water sharing for solar agreement between Israel and Jordan, under the rubric of the Abraham Accord. You know, Israel uniquely, unlike many other countries, does treat water as an element of its national power, but now that we’ve seen its—you know, its rivers dry up, the Jordan River, and now there’s the prospect of a deal between—you know, Jordan has abundant solar, Israel has, you know, grew the desert—you know, greened the desert, and manages its water very adeptly. So is that the type of example that we should see more of to improve water sharing and water security in a cross-border setting? SALZBERG: To some degree. You know, those things get a lot of attention. And transboundary solutions can be an important part of ensuring water security for many countries. And that’s something we need to think about. But, look, at the end of the day, individual countries need to focus on long-term plans and strategies that make them water secure. And that’s focusing on, you know, how do you reduce consumption? As Matthias mentioned, how do you improve the productivity of water, for food production in particular? Rice he mentioned, absolutely. Cotton is another one. There are many foodstuffs where we can improve the productivity of water in those uses, and we should be doing that, and that will help move countries to be more water secure. Augmenting supplies through water reuse or through desalination, those are all important. Improving water storage, because climate’s going to increase that variability problem. And so how do we store water so that we’ve got it for later use, in groundwater, in large-scale dams and infrastructure? And there’s where transboundary solutions can really begin to help. You know, I once—you know, I remember I was in—several years ago I was having this discussion with some folks from the NSC. And I said, look, if you gave me control of the WTO, I can solve the world’s water problems. And while I was being a little flippant, there is some truth to the idea that transborder trade and enabling access to—and improving the access of—the flow of water through other goods could be very important in achieving water security for many individual countries. And so improving the accessibility that countries might have to beef products or to other high water intensive products, if they’re importing it from places where it should be grown rather than trying to grow it inside their own country, where they actually don’t have the resources to do that or conditions aren’t favorable to do that, that’s an important part of this process. And that’s where I think some of these transboundary agreements where we can think about exchanging energy for water or food products and virtual water, and shipping that across borders, can play a really important role in the water security of individual countries. GOODMAN: Thank you. Lauren, I want to bring you in on that question, and also through the very substantial Gulf Research Program that you’ve been leading, what research has come out of that that bears importantly on these questions? AUGUSTINE: Well, just following right on Aaron, these transboundary issues—I mean, you think of the United States, big country, and it has different levels of water security, right? There’s parts that are wet and parts that are dry. But at the borders, you know, we have, you know, the Colorado, which is dry right now. And we have an agreement with Mexico on delivering water to Mexico from the Colorado. That is not being met. And, you know, when we think about the transboundary issues, we often think of—like you set up the question—countries in conflict. We are very lucky that we are not in conflict with Canada in the north nor Mexico in the South. Because, you know, we share the Great Lakes with Mexico—or—with Canada. And there are talks when the Mississippi gets low, can we pull a little bit from the Great Lakes? Just a little bit? And it’s like, nah, we don’t want to do that. We want to keep our friends to the north under the terms around our water. We think about Alaska—and Aaron set it up really nicely—about food products. Well, this year in Alaska the salmon runs were very low, at the time when they were supposed to peak. And so Canada—we share that salmon with Canada, right? And so these transboundary issues will look different in the richer countries than they do in the poorer countries. When we talk about the Gulf of Mexico and we talk about the low water, we’re talking about low water on the Mississippi right now. We’re talking about such low water that we’re dredging more, to the tune of billions of dollars, to make sure that channel stays open. If we go back in time, we go back to the flood of 1927, and all the decisions that came after that to make sure that those ports in southern Louisiana, the Port of New Orleans in particular, has enough flow to convey that $60 billion every single year down the Mississippi and out through the Gulf of Mexico. But the water—I am a trained hydrologist, right? But the water really wants to go to the Atchafalaya, but we’ve moved it. We have put up structures at the old river to make sure that water gets to the big port in New Orleans. And we’re all grateful for it, right? We get the grain, we get the steel out. When we talk about low water flow in this region, we’re talking—in the Gulf of Mexico—it comes out kind in water quality, sediment levels and salinity levels, right? And so when you think about the Gulf of Mexico—now, we share this body with Cuba and Mexico. And we all have really big fisheries as an economy in this region. Gulf of Mexico feeds, like, 40 percent of the U.S. seafood. Sixty percent of commercial fishing comes out of Alaska. So these six states give most of the United States its seafood. You change the salinity, now you change the oyster production. You change other shellfish. And you change the production of the big one, the red snapper, right? So when we look at that and we’re talking about—the United States is a massive producer of national food, global food. And we’re starting to see the changes in the chemistry of the water, the turbidity of the water, sediment loads, salinity. And it’s changing the food economy. So these transboundary issues thankfully, here in North America, are not related to conflict. (Laughs.) We are very, very grateful for that. But they’re not unsolved. These are not problems that are unsolved. And so—and they present differently because these are three relatively rich countries. GOODMAN: Great. That was terrific. So let me ask—I’m going to ask each of you to weigh in on this question. Maybe, Matthias, we’ll start with you now. What—particularly since you’re heading up—have got a lead role in the U.N. Global Water Conference coming up next year—what global hot spots concern you most? And what would you like to see us doing about it? BERNINGER: So it’s the first, obviously, U.N. high-level conference on water—it’s the first U.N. conference on the topic of water since 1997. Without disclosing too much, I just start a primary school when folks met in Argentina to kind of discuss it. So most people have never experienced, actually, U.N. conference on water. So I see that as a huge opportunity for us to rally around a topic, and to create the effect that we really include the dimension of water in all of our decisions in ways that we have obviously not done before. The good and the bad of that conference, and it happens without a framework. So we all know UNFCCC, the climate conferences, as I said earlier, the Montreal Conference on Biodiversity, Chinese-led by hosted by Canada at this moment in time, they have frameworks. They have rules of the game. We have a water conference where the result will be the report about the conference. So that could get terribly wrong, or it could be very exciting. We have an opportunity next year to create a framework almost, since we have the holidays, the Christmas tree, and then all the things we do on board are the ornaments we can position nicely on that. That is—that is what’s in the cards at the moment. So that’s the first part of your question. Business community, multinational institutions, donor institutions on the financial side, and governments, as well as NGOs, can rally around something in ways that we haven’t done in a long time. What concerns me the most? I have to say it is the Horn of Africa, it is East Africa. We are now experiencing the third La Nina weather event or phenomenon in a row. That happened before, but it’s kind of more intense. We already see—and it’s been ironic—flooding in Australia, drought in Argentina, pointing towards quite a dramatic La Nina. And the consequence for East Africa will be another year of drought. Now, I hope that that highly probable prediction does not happen, but we already have a famine in many countries there. Somalia is often mentioned. And if you listen to David Beasley, he is starting to lose it. I mean, two years ago his organization received the Nobel Peace Prize as the World Food Program. Two years later, he has, like, record famine to deal with. And it is all related to water. GOODMAN: Right. So we can’t—and if we’re going to go there, then we have to bring in the consequences of the war in Ukraine for affecting global food supplies. That is intimately connected with water. So given all of that, let me ask you then, Aaron, what do you think is needed to better prioritize water in U.S. and international policy? I mean, you could say that over the last decade, we’ve seen much more attention, obviously, to climate change, as a global security threat. We’re probably at the high-water mark right now—water—(laughs)—pun intended—of addressing that as an international system. Biodiversity, even though it hasn’t gotten quite as much attention as climate—and I take your point, Matthias, it doesn’t include water—also growing—sort of ecological security growing in attention. You might say water is still sort of a lagging, although it is very much part of the climate discussion, but not the full dimension of it. And in some ways, it’s not as politicized, at least in the U.S., as climate. So where do want to go on the priorities there? What would you advise the administration now, Aaron? SALZBERG: Well, you know, in some respects, just to reinforce the point that you made, I think water’s still an orphan issue. And it is, in many, many different fora. And the COP is a good example of that, right? I mean, there really is—there are full sections—if you look at the outcome document for COP27—there are full sections dedicated to oceans, to forests, to agriculture. Water is essential to all of them. There’s no section on water. And then that’s traditional, right? The COP just doesn’t bring water in, in what I think is a full way, into the climate agenda. I mean, there are a couple of nuggets that optimists might cling to from the last COP related to water. You know, one was the focus on early warning and climate information services. I mean, this could be read as trying to strengthen hydrological monitoring, monitoring and forecasting networks which, in my view, are absolutely essential to ensuring water security going forward. And so that’s a plus. But the water wasn’t mentioned, hydrology wasn’t mentioned, within that context. The other, of course, is this conversation around losses and damages. And we can all admit most of that is going to be attributable to water-related types of phenomena. But, again, you know, you also have to read the language really carefully here, because, you know, countries didn’t agree to establish a mechanism to compensate countries for loss and damages. And that’s, of course, what everybody’s saying and what we’re hearing a lot about. that’s not what we agreed to do. What we agreed to do is to put in place funding arrangements to respond and address the losses and damages associated with climate change. And that’s fundamentally different, but that does open up the door for greater investments in water-related adaptation and in, you know, investing in early information, early warning systems, and ways of ensuring water security to prevent the losses and damages that might directly result from hydrological variability. In terms of the leadership, you know, at the U.S. level, you know, again, I think we’re giving a lot of nods to water, but we’re not taking the hard steps that we need to, to really prioritize water. Water is still not addressed in the National Security Strategy in a robust way. And that’s really the document that U.S. government agencies use to budget their resources and to set their strategic priorities. And that’s unfortunate. So there really isn’t a clear call by the administration to prioritize water highly in the documents. You know, I think that, you know, water security in particularly is lagging behind and doesn’t get the same budgetary support within the United States architecture as, let’s say, drinking water and sanitation do. And I don’t want to knock that, right? We do need to invest in providing basic services as part of our humanitarian efforts to ensure that people can move along the development continuum. But if we’re going to be serious about water security, we need to communicate that. Congress needs to communicate that. And it needs to be an integral part of our policy strategies and our budgeting to work with governments to increase their capacity to build the infrastructure, to build the institutions that allow us to manage water every single day. Not just provide humanitarian responses, but to put in place the tools that we need to do this daily work every single day. And this is where I think the U.N.—you know, I’m grateful for the meeting, and we do need this global attention. But at the end of the day, you know, we’re going to see a collection of these initiatives that different partners will put together. But, look, we need governments to lead on this. We need every single government to develop their own national security strategy around water, how they’re going to ensure their own water security. And they need to work through a process where they can mobilize the partners to be able to implement that long-term plan and strategy. And this isn’t something you do in a year or in five years. This is ten, twenty, thirty years. And this is theoretically what the HLPF was intended to do, right? The follow-up mechanisms to the SDGs. And we should really be using some of these other institutional mechanisms within the U.N. system to hold countries accountable to developing those long-term plans and strategies, and to hold other countries accountable, and partners accountable, to supporting them underneath national government leadership. And I fear that this U.N. conference is going to be an opportunity for people to check the box and say, oh, great. We had a great meeting, we did everything we’re supposed to do. But then, shy away from doing the hard work of developing those long-term plans and strategies and investment in strategy that needs to be done to get us to where we need to go. Sorry, that was too much. GOODMAN: OK, well, that was—that was great, Aaron. And that was very important commentary on kind of where we are, and what we could be doing more of both particularly in terms of the early warning systems and predictive capabilities that are on the front lines of saving people’s lives in an increasingly drought-inflicted world. So at this time I’d like to invite our participants, our CFR members, to join the conversation with their questions. A reminder that this meeting is on the record. And, Alexis, may we have the first question, please? OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We will take our first question from Marisol Maddox. Q: Hi. Thank you so much. My name is Marisol Maddox. I’m with the Wilson Center. Sherri, Aaron, really great to see you. So, I mean, these issues are more important than ever and, clearly, we have limited time to make decisions that can really have an impact. And, Aaron, I really appreciate your point about the importance of not just checking a box with, you know, the array of issues that we’re dealing with right now. So at the same time, there’s also a growing recognition of the threat that greenwashing poses, because it distorts our ability to find good solutions. And to that point, Congress just released a report on some of those threats around greenwashing. So I do feel like there’s kind of this level of cognitive dissonance with having Bayer on this panel, because they own Monsanto, which has been flooding our waterways and soils with Roundup, the main ingredient being glyphosate, right, which has been found to cause cancer, among other very deleterious health and environmental impacts. And Bayer is still pushing the use of Dicamba, which is a catastrophically destructive poison that contaminates water supplies, kills the crops of neighboring fields through pesticide drift, as well as wreaks havoc on biodiversity. So if we continue to allow these false solutions to be put forward, we’re really ensuring to not get this right. And, honestly, like, we have too much to lose at this point for that to be an option. So the business community is crucial to getting this right but, like I said, we have to navigate the threat of greenwashing. So I would be genuinely interested to hear the thoughts of other panelists on how we can mitigate that risk, to make sure that we’re choosing solutions that really address these issues and actually help to build resilience for the decades to come. GOODMAN: OK, Matthias, you’ve got to take that question. BERNINGER: In any given week I at least once get accused of greenwashing and once of being a woke company representative. So I’m quite used to that. And, Marisol, thank you for addressing the topics. And I really mean it. We have to reduce the overall amount of pesticides being used. One of the interesting facts is that the number-one place where biodiversity loss happens is actually not the oceans, it’s not land, it’s actually sweet water environments. So I’m fully with you on that. And we’ve got to reduce our overall pesticide use quite significantly. We innovate also in alternatives to some of the chemicals you talked about. Currently all the herbicides we use in agriculture, you named two of them, I can add 2,4-D, I can add Glufosinate, all of the herbicides we use have been developed before Pearl Harbor. So they are, like, really, really old. And the question is, can we get to a new generation of herbicides? Can we work more on biologicals? Can we find ways we are not producing fertilizers, but our value chain depends on it? To also reduce the amount of fertilizer being used in agriculture to address one of Lauren’s nightmares. And that is the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico as a result of runoff of fertilizer. So I’m with you on that. We are working on that. We are investing heavily behind it. And our leadership gets rewarded for moving in that direction. I disagree that we should not participate in that conversation. The reason being that with a $2.5 billion R&D budget, we spend three times more on innovation than all other CGIR publicly-funded research institutions in agriculture. We need to work on that stuff together. And that’s why I’m engaged on the topic. And that’s also why I’ve been asked to work on it. So, no, I don’t smell like greenwashing detergent. But, yes, the problems you address are real problems and we need to take them. GOODMAN: Thank you. OK. Let’s go to the next question. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Laurie Garrett. Ms. Garrett, please accept the unmute prompt. Q: Yes, hi. Thank you for this important session. Real quick question: If you look across the landscape of available drinking water, what percentage is in the form of sold plastic-encased water? And how does that compare as a trend over time and as a per drop or milliliter, or however you want to put it, price point to the consumer compared to, say, gasoline prices? And how do you deal with the criticism that major soda companies, like Coca-Cola, and Pepsi, and Nestle, are buying up safe drinking water supplies all over the world, and then reselling them at tremendous profit? Is there a way to reconcile all these issues and still go forward with equitable global access to water? Thank you. GOODMAN: Laurie, as always, a great and incisive question. Who would like to answer that? SALZBERG: Well, this is a tough one, so we’re all kind of shying away a little bit. I don’t know the percent of water that’s being delivered in plastic that’s ending up in people’s homes for—to meet their basic needs. I’m not sure what that number is. And clearly in places like the United States, where we buy a lot of that stuff, it’s going to be different than in others. But what I will comment is on the privatization issue, because I think this is an important one and one that we need to be careful about how we talk about. You know, the private sector can play a critically important role in providing services, right? We have both public and private service providers that provide drinking water in many places around the world. And finding the right mix is important. And making sure that communities and stakeholders are involved in determining that relationship with private service providers is critically important. That said, the idea of private ownership of water rights is something that I do think we have to be particularly sensitive to. And in any place where those relationships are being set up, I think there’s got to be a great deal of oversight to make sure that the right checks and balances are in place, that the right ownership rights are attributed, and that we’re being very conscious of the long-term risks that our water supplies will be under, and whether or not we’re compromising our ability to respond to some of those risks by those private agreements. And so I think as we develop PPPs, public-private partnerships, we’re going to have to be very careful about the contractual arrangements that we put in place so that we don’t tie the hands of governments or communities to respond to risks that are going to emerge from climate change, a long-term drought, or something like that, to reprioritize those allocations of waters and to do some of the transfers that you were talking about, Sherri, either transboundary or that Lauren was talking about doing internally. You know, we need to be able to have that flexibility. And so I do think we have to look very carefully at these PPP arrangements going forward. GOODMAN: OK. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Adam Philipp of Cedar Brook Partners, who asks: This is a fascinating issue for me, living in Cleveland, a Great Lakes city. As water’s importance becomes more and more apparent, how do you see the Great Lakes region changing? I’ve seen books and numerous studies asserting that some of the best places to live amidst climate change are Great Lake states. Curious if you have particular thoughts on water and climate change-oriented trends that may shape the future of the Great Lakes region. GOODMAN: Lauren, over to you. AUGUSTINE: I would say that the Great Lakes will become even more important—recognized as—they will—they will increase in their recognition of being important sources of fresh water, not just in North America, but for the world, right? This is the biggest collection and source of fresh water we have. These Great Lakes move a lot of water from way up in Canada, all the way out through the St. Lawrence seaway. And as commerce, transportation, hypoxia, sediment, all these things, particularly in North America, start to take—start to elevate and become more acute on—for agriculture, all these things, I think there’ll be a lot of recognition on the importance of the Great Lakes. I also think that when we—engineers can do amazing things, right? And so we can move water. We do it all the time. And so there will be more pressure, I can foresee, on the Great Lakes to provide more water to other places. In terms of living there, I’m from Rochester, New York. So I’m a Great Lakes person too. I don’t know what the living experience will feel like or look like as that pressure kind of increases. We do see, under conditions of climate change, for my brethren in Buffalo a couple of weeks ago, getting six, seven feet of lake-effect snow. We will start to see how these lakes might become weather generators, particularly under these conditions of altered climate patterns. So I don’t know the answer to your question, but I feel your—I feel the interest in it. But I think, in terms of water scarcity and water supply, the calls for borrowing from the Great Lakes could possibly increase. And that is, in fact, not a decision the United States can make alone. We do have a pact with Canada for that. So that goes right back to Aaron’s transboundary issues there too. I don’t know. I mean, these are great questions and, wow, these are hard to answer. But those are some thoughts on what you’re asking. GOODMAN: It’s a great question. I will say that I had the privilege a few years ago of traveling to the Middle East with a delegation of water managers from the Great Lakes to share their experience, Canadian and U.S., in transboundary water management with water-parched countries in the Middle East, just for this purpose. And the level of cooperation—of course, we have an abundant resource in the Great Lakes. We’re so blessed. The level of cooperation detail is remarkable. And the problems are increasing. But the cooperation level is also quite extensive here. AUGUSTINE: Can I add one thing to that, Sherri? You know, the one thing I would also say is that at least in the United States, and most places I’ve worked around the world, water management is done at a hyperlocal level, right? I mean, we get our water locally. Most of us can’t afford to move it too far. But water transcends these boundaries. I mean, this is where the Great Lakes become kind of front and center, right, because they’re a source of water under conditions of scarcity. So this connection between the local management, regional, national, global, transboundary supply, that’s one of the pieces that Aaron was alluding to that create this complication of how do we manage this important resource? We manage it hyper local, then we can see differences in inequities. We manage it at a higher level, where maybe we can be a little bit more equitable, but it takes much, much more connection and coordination. OPERATOR: We’ll take the next question as a written question: Could you speak to the state of water stress in indigenous communities in the U.S.? SALZBERG: Yeah, no question it’s not great, for a whole bunch of reasons, right? You know, it’s not just indigenous communities, but many Black communities in the United States as well. You know, we had historical practices that really limited access to some of these services for these communities, both for the Native American population but also for Black communities here in the United States. And, you know, it’s amazing when you see, for example, the progression of municipal services, how in some cases they actually wrapped around these areas. And you have doughnut holes where people are still on wells and on septic—on on-site septic systems because they were never brought into the municipal service network. And this is a real challenge. And, you know, Kudos to the American Recovery Act, because there’s a lot of resources there to hopefully address some of these challenges, and hopefully—you know, I’m certainly seeing states beginning to make lots of investments in correcting some of those longstanding historical practices and extend services into those communities. But that also comes with challenges, right? Paying for services is a complicated process. And this isn’t going to be easy. You know, on some of our tribal areas and tribal lands, they still also lack what we would consider to be, you know, typical service providers. And they’re relying on on-site systems that are not providing good water quality and/or are not providing good septic systems, which are contaminating water quality as well. And so this is a perennial problem that needs greater attention and focus. And I think whenever we talk about the United States meeting its SDG commitment, it’s really focused on how do we ensure access in those areas, and how do we scale up and make sure we’ve got sustainable supplies of safe water? You know, it goes a little bit as well to Marisol’s point. You know, the fact that we have, what, over one hundred thousand chemicals in manufacturing in the United States. And I would venture to guess all of them are inside of our water in some way, shape, or form. And so just keeping up with the challenges of ensuring water quality is hugely complicated. And in many areas, especially out in the West where we’ve got a lot of our superfund sites and things like that, we’ve got some real water challenges that have not been addressed that affect those communities. And I think tribal communities in particular are affected by that. AUGUSTINE: If I could just add, I mean, Aaron is hitting this right on. And I work in the Gulf of Mexico region—Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. And I would say that there’s kind of two sides to this. I do want to bring in the Black communities and Latino communities. And just the under-resourced, disenfranchised, in addition to the native peoples, culmination in Louisiana, Jackson, Mississippi, Flint, Michigan. We are seeing—we are seeing examples—we are seeing it play out that decisions on water infrastructure investments, they take years, decades, generations to play out. But that’s what we’re seeing in these places, right? We’re looking—you know, in my region we have cancer alley, kind of between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. We have the Houston ship channel communities, kind of from Galveston to Houston. These are not water scarcity issues, right, but these are water infrastructure issues. There are contaminants. There are decisions that have been made, maybe a long time ago, that are being meted out now. You’re seeing it in health outcomes, high cancer rates. We’re seeing it in, you know, sanitation issues. And, you know, these are—these are, in fact, policy decisions about where public investments do and do not go. So at least in the United States, which is what you asked about, I can’t speak for indigenous populations across the whole country, but what I see in the Gulf of Mexico region I think is pretty reflective that these underserved communities, one, are underserved for a reason. Two, they’re usually not accidental. And three, it can take decades to see the results of these decisions and poor investment. So we have a long way to go. And I think we’re kind of hitting the end of the design life of some of this infrastructure and all these issues are really coming up right now, right? Like, now, we’re, wow, it’s that bad. And so we’re kind of lucky in the sense that we have the IIJA, the Investment Infrastructure and Job Act, that’s really at the precipice of being able to at least rectify through new investments of infrastructure. Because I think a lot of the answers to your questions is around infrastructure. SALZBERG: Yeah, and just to put a fine point on this, because—sorry, I’m passionate about this, and I can tell Lauren is too—this is a key part of addressing systemic inequalities here in the United States. AUGUSTINE: That’s right. SALZBERG: And, you know, when you look at the impact of lead exposure on lifetime economic earnings, you have to understand that, you know, putting communities in a position where they’re drinking water that’s not safe for them actually impacts them, and their kids, and it goes on and on. And so this is a real serious problem that I just don’t think we’ve come to grips with yet. GOODMAN: Thank you, both. Thank you. OK, Alexis, our next question. OPERATOR: We will take our next question as a written question: Can you speak to the potential of groundwater in supplementing agricultural water supplies, and what barriers exist to fully utilizing it? GOODMAN: Oh, go ahead, Lauren, and then I want to bring Matthias in on that. AUGUSTINE: I would just say this goes back to a statement I think we all made at the beginning, that you can move water, but not without unintended consequences. So you can take the water out of aquifers. And it happens all over the United States. It happens all over the world. And you do see impacts of collapsing aquifers, increased overland sheet flow, lack of absorption. These issues are longer term for the short-term gain of being able to irrigate. Usually, you know, it’s for agriculture, right? There’s usually—there’s a mass balance here. You can’t just take the water and think you’ve solved the problem. But I will let others talk, because I can talk too much on this one. (Laughs.) GOODMAN: Matthias. BERNINGER: I think looking at irrigated agriculture is critical in the water debate. And then the factor of energy plays a very important role. So one thing that worries me in the kind of task for transitioning rice production in India is that electricity there is highly subsidized. So in other words, that depletes groundwater in a really, really fast pace, and also means that we will have a water crisis in some of the especially northern Indian states much faster than many predicted. The same is true for the Midwest. You fly over and you see suddenly fields are all round. They are no longer looking like you would think an agricultural sort of land would look like. On the one hand, it looks like a piece of art, and on the other hand it’s clearly indicating that they have a challenge. So I believe that we need to move away from extracting groundwater in order to ensure our food supply, which also means—and that goes back to what Aaron said earlier—we need to have really good strategies as to where we produce food, how we produce food, what kind of food we are consuming. I think as long as we are consuming the amount of mammals we consume today as humanity, we’ll have a much bigger water problem than when it was a different diet. And these are all the questions that need addressing. My biggest worry is when in the midst of the water crisis also energy is subsidized in ways that just accelerates the depletion of major aquifers. SALZBERG: Yeah, I think just to add to that, at the end of the day it’s about reconciling demand with renewable supplies. And so ensuring that whatever extractions you’re making from groundwater or any sources are being replenished, and are being replenished at the same rate that you’re extracting. It’s balancing those two that’s critical. And groundwater is going to be an important part of climate resiliency going forward. Recharging of groundwater—you know, groundwater storage is a great way of—it’s much easier and much more resilient to store water underground if you can, than to sell it in big, large reservoirs that might be subject to evaporative losses. And so it’s an important component. But we really do over-extract it at a rate that’s just not sustainable in many places in the world. And in many critical places in the world—you know, the breadbasket in India—that we’re going to be in serious trouble if we continue to allow those trends to continue. Sorry to be redundant. GOODMAN: OK. Alexis, I think we—I understand we have two questions left. Let’s take both those questions and then we’ll ask all of our panelists to answer them and provide their final comments in our last four minutes. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Joseph Bower. Q: A very simple question. First, thank you. It’s been fascinating. I’m surprised that there hasn’t been more talk about pricing water. That really one of the—it is obvious that you would then have to provide the poor some way of paying for it. But the simplest way of getting control of this is to price it. We’re taking groundwater and other water and giving it as if it were cheap, rather than expensive. And I mean, Israel had a terrible water problem until they priced it. And then they had to do other things as a matter of policy. Thank you. GOODMAN: OK. Let’s take our next question as well, please. OPERATOR: We’ll take our next question as a written question. NASA just announced a mission to survey global water sources from space. What are your expectations for this mission and what it means for your understanding of water flows? GOODMAN: OK. Great questions. OK. Lauren, can you start with the answers to both those questions and your final comments? AUGUSTINE: I cannot comment on the pricing of water. I could guess and I could extemporize, but I won’t. On the—on the space question, you know, this is—this is one of these wonderful examples of human innovation and engineering prowess. But if we think it’s hard to move water through pipes on Earth, I think it will be extremely expensive and difficult to do it from space. Not impossible, and maybe that is the final frontier. I think it’s an exciting idea and we’ll have to see where and how we can be creative in basically creating new water. And so maybe an extraterrestrial source is in our future. I don’t know. GOODMAN: Matthias. BERNINGER: Let me start with the pricing. There’s a reason that’s similar to the reason for carbon pricing why in the political world folks have difficulties to kind of really impose high prices on both carbon and water. And that is because they get hammered in the elections for doing that. The business community has a bit more freedom here. And we have introduced an internal price for carbon, started with our own operations. We are now moving to our suppliers. And we will do the same on water. And I think that’s a way in the business community to really bring water into the boardroom conversations in ways it is currently not. On the second topic, the GRACE mission NASA is undertaking, which helps us to really understand water flows as well as the current state of aquifers, is the one that excites me much more. Because it helps to put a much stronger focus on depletion. And if you add to it the IPCC work on soil moisture, which is both scary but also very helpful, you really have two very good data points in managing water. And it’s a good foundation for what Aaron talked about, much better water information systems. Last point, I’m actually more optimistic that the topic will get more attention because in Sharm El-Sheikh people decided to combine mitigation and adaptation. Whereas mitigation is all about carbon or carbon equivalents, adaptation is all about water. So as this topic now reaches much more prominence on the climate agenda, I do believe you will also see more energy to focus on water in different ways. SALZBERG: Yeah, so just to follow up, yeah, I’m not sure I share Matthias’ optimism. But on costing, look, this is a really big challenge with water, as to whether it’s an economic good or a public good. And we have this tension that exists. And it’s a real, real problem. I mean, one thing, though, we have to recover the full costs of providing water services. And so whether that’s through the charging of tariffs, whether it’s through taxes, whether it’s through transfers of resources from one sector to another, we’ve got to recover the full costs. And service providers need to be able to operate sustainably—financially sustainably. And that’s critically important. What I’m more concerned about is that we don’t internalize the costs of other production processes on water. And so, for example, we’ve talked about farming. We’ve talked about chemicals. We’ve talked about industry, and stuff like that. We have to remove those things from water to make water palatable to drink again. And so how do we tax then and make sure that the goods that we’re buying—you know, if we’re buying a mug, or if we’re buying a computer, that the costs and the impact that that’s had on our water supplies is integrated into the cost of that product, so that it can get back to those then people who are responsible for cleaning our water. Thank you to whoever asked the question about SWOT. Sorry, if people don’t know about SWOT, you really do need to know about SWOT, the Surface Water and Ocean Topography Mission, which is supposed to be launched today. It’s been postponed for twenty-two hours due to some condensation issues. Hopefully it gets launched tomorrow. This is going to transform our view of the world’s water resources. We are going to know, down to an Olympic-sized swimming pool, what water exists, what surface water exists everywhere on the planet. And everybody will be able to see it. And if we do the right calibrations, we’ll be able to measure discharge rates for every river system—something that we’ve never, ever been able to do. Imagine what that’s going to mean for our transboundary disputes, right? That means Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos will know what the reservoir levels are for every single dam in China and how China is managing those dams. Pakistan will be able to do the same thing for India. Egypt will be able to do the same thing for Ethiopia. All of a sudden, a veil is going to get lifted across the world overnight. And I think that’s going to be transformational. It's also a huge, missed opportunity by the United States. The United States, France, the U.K., Canada, they’re all responsible for this mission. That’s four of the G7 countries. You know, they should—SWOT should be a major initiative within the G7. The SWOT and its data products should be a major initiative that’s launched up at the U.N. in 2023. And we should be mobilizing partners from across the business sector—IBM, Google, and others—who can provide the graphical user interfaces for the consumers on the ground to utilize and access that data, all the way through to the universities, the University of Massachusetts, UNC, others who are providing the software to be able to translate the NASA data into meaningful water metrics. It's a huge opportunity that’s being lost right now by the administration not jumping on it. And I guess if that’s the last message I have to leave with, leadership—there’s really a lack of leadership here. And if the United States is going to capitalize on what’s going on in the U.N. and elsewhere, we need to step up. GOODMAN: OK. Thank you all very much, to our panelists and our participants, for joining us today with such an exciting discussion. We went a few minutes over, but thank you all for staying with us. SALZBERG: Sorry. AUGUSTINE: Thank you. BERNINGER: Thank you. (END)
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    Diplomacy Debrief: COP27, ASEAN, and G20 Summits
    Play
    President Biden just completed an important diplomacy tour with stops at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) in Egypt, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Cambodia, and the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in Indonesia. Panelists discuss what was accomplished during these meetings, and what more can be done to address pressing international challenges, including climate change, instability in global energy markets, and security in the Asia-Pacific region.   CREBO-REDIKER: Hi. Thank you very much for joining us today for the diplomacy debrief on COP27, ASEAN, and the G20 Summits. So we’re here to discuss President Biden’s whirlwind diplomatic tour to these three summits in Egypt, Cambodia, and in Bali, Indonesia. And we’re covering quite a bit of territory—geographic territory, policy territory—all in a context of changing geopolitics. And we have a great panel of experts today from CFR to offer some key takeaways and explore some of the challenges and opportunities that were addressed at all of these summits. Today we have Alice Hill, Miles Kahler, and Zoe Liu. This is a very brief introduction to our three speakers, because I know you have their bios in your—in your materials. Alice Hill is the David Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment. Miles Kahler is a CFR senior fellow for global governance and a professor at the American University School of International Service. And Zoe Liu is a fellow for international political economy at CFR, whose work focuses on international political economy. And her regional expertise is in East Asia, and specifically China and Japan. So we’re going to have a conversation for about the first thirty minutes, and then please think about some questions that you want to ask, and use the raise-hand function or put them in the—in the Q&A box. And I’d like to start today with Alice. We had the agreement come out of COP27 on Sunday. What were some of the main issues that we focused on at this summit, and that you would say had been a success? There have been quite a few—quite a few concerns about objectives not being met in certain parts of COP27, but I guess compared to COP26 in Glasgow what needs more attention and what needs more enthusiasm, I guess? HILL: Well, thank you, Heidi. What a pleasure to join you today. My takeaway from COP27—I did have the pleasure of attending—is that progress—marginal progress was made, but there is a yawning gap between what we need to get done and what we have accomplished. Some good news was loss and damage. That has been an issue lurking at virtually every COP, since they started in the early 1990s. It’s essentially the most vulnerable nations stating: We need some form of compensation for the harm that we’re already experiencing and prepare for the climate impacts, whether they be rain bombs, or wildfires, droughts, extreme heat. So finally, in the late hours, there was an agreement reached to create a loss and damage fund. The details remain to be worked out, but that was an accomplishment. Another accomplishment was to call out that there needs to be—or, should be explored that there’s some kind of reform of the multilateral development bank system in terms of recognizing that the debt loads on the most vulnerable countries—and we have to keep in mind that they’ve had virtually nothing to do with creating the climate crisis. They have not been responsible for the human-caused emissions that are forming this blanket around the globe and causing average temperatures to increase, just trapping the heat inside. They haven’t had much to do with that. So they are, however, saddled with heavy debt loads, worsened under the pandemic. And they need relief, and that came to the fore. Another important endeavor was the Global Methane Pledge. It now is 150 nations. This recognizes that methane is among the most damaging of the greenhouse gases in the short term. It causes about eighty times more heat in a twenty-year period than carbon. So the idea is, if we can cut our methane emissions now that will buy us more time to deal with the carbon, which is longer lasting in the atmosphere but the heating is a bit more delayed. So pledges to address that. But ultimately the big issue is are we going to control heating to keep it to safe levels? At the Paris agreement, nations stretched for 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial times for the increase in temperatures. And subsequent to that in 2018, scientists on a consensus basis said we need to hold to 1.5 to really avoid catastrophic harm. We’re on track now to just blow past that 1.5. Methane, coming out of this agreement, is putting us closer. And unfortunately, in Glasgow there was an agreement to push increased action to this year, in COP27 in Egypt. And we didn’t see the necessary ambition to rein in the growing emissions. In fact, emissions have grown in the past year. They increased by 1 percent. And we saw the largest concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, as measured in Mauna Loa Observatory, on the very top of a mountain in Hawaii, where we’ve been measuring these things since 1958, we hit 421 parts per million. And that doesn’t bode well for the planet. So I think it’s a very mixed review coming out of COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh, on the edge of the Red Sea this year. CREBO-REDIKER: So I would imagine that energy security concerns in many parts of the world were likely to, you know, weigh in heavily on some of the commitments that countries were willing to make at this particular time to go beyond the commitments made in Glasgow. What was—since you were actually—you were there on the ground, what were—you know, what were some of the points of tension? And what countries had, I guess, more weight than others in this—in this particular meeting? HILL: Well, I think the thing that was the most revealing to me is that the fossil fuel nations really don’t want to curb emissions now. And so there was heavy lobbying going on. We had more lobbyists from fossil fuel companies than there were from the vulnerable nations present. So there’s a great deal of invested interest in keeping the attachment to fossil fuels. So the Ukrainian war certainly has highlighted that energy security is a challenge, but the International Energy Agency has noted that it might be actually the jumpstart to clean energy because ultimately there can be more security with clean energy. You’re not importing fossil fuels from some other state. You’re not dependent on the geopolitical system for your own energy with clean energy. So mixed signals, but I think that became evident, that there was a tenacious hold on fossil fuels. So couldn’t get that in the final agreement. And we really couldn’t get that beyond the watered-down language that came out of the Glasgow climate pact that essentially we would work on—not have unabated coal power, and that we would remove inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. But there was no mention of reduction of fossil fuels in the agreement that came out of Sharm El Sheikh, the Sharm El Sheikh Implementation Plan. And that was noted as a huge challenge, if we are serious about—if we, and when I say “we,” the global nations, because virtually all nations have agreed to the Paris agreement and subsequent accords, including this latest agreement. If we are going to stick to this 1.5 degrees. And the challenge is, if we go past that very, very serious implications. With every degree of—tenth of a degree of heating it’s exponentially worse, and to the point where although we have this loss and damage fund, compensation really won’t address the problem. It’ll be just too hot in some places for human civilization as we’ve known it. CREBO-REDIKER: Thank you so much. And I’m sure you’ll get a lot of questions in the later part of this session. I’d like to turn now to Miles, who will be—you know, I’ll ask a few questions about G20 and ASEAN. But I’d like to start with the ASEAN summit, because the significance of ASEAN is often overlooked. And the members are incredibly important. The White House has elevated its engagement with ASEAN countries and with ASEAN to a comprehensive strategic partnership. So we had secretary-level—you know, Cabinet secretary-level attendance to all of the different component parts of the ASEAN summits over this—over this past year in Cambodia. Can you just tell me a little bit about what your main takeaways are? Because when I—you know, when I look, there’s a very, very long, long laundry list of what the White House says we’ve accomplished. Can you make—can you give us your thoughts on that? KAHLER: Well, I think—I think you’re absolutely right, Heidi, that this is a very important group of countries that are often overlooked because, actually, they’re doing quite well and, you know, don’t present the kinds of problems that, for example, the Middle East presents to us every day. Ten economies. Very diverse. From the very richest, Singapore, which has a GDP per capita more than thirty times the poorest economy, which is Cambodia. Very different political regimes. Very different religions. And an amazing degree of ability to deal with conflict resolution. Now, Myanmar is a major dark spot. And that wasn’t dealt with directly at the summit. But this is a—for a government, the United States government, that is concerned about competition with China and turning its attention to the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN is absolutely critical. As a group, this is the seventh-largest economy in the world, and on track to become possibly the fourth largest by 2050. So very important. A region also that is very interested, overshadowed by China. I’m sure, Zoe Liu will want to talk about this, very dependent on China economically, in many ways, but also very intent on diversifying their economies to other parts of the world and continuing to develop their relations with EU and the United States in particular. And also benefitting from the diversification that’s taking place away from China by the United States. Especially countries like Vietnam, which as economic conflict between China and the United States has grown has benefitted enormously from foreign direct investment and trade substituting, in effect, for China. So a very important grouping. I would have to say perhaps the most important thing was we showed up. Because for the last three ASEAN summits of the Trump administration, President Trump did not show up. And the fact that the Biden administration has reengaged with ASEAN I think is a very important step forward. There were several themes, I would say. The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, as you said, is a very long laundry list. It’s not even clear what the actual action items will be, and when they will be actionable. But there were some interesting themes that you could read through the summit press conferences and the description of the Strategic Partnership. One is infrastructure investments, which is a big theme and very important for ASEAN countries and, indeed, many of the emerging economies. And also a big emphasis on climate change, which fits with COP27, and concerns about greening their economies as well. Here, once again, you can see the importance for the United States in shaping this partnership and competing with China and emphasizing these themes as a way of competing with China. And I’d have to say, for ASEAN, a certain degree of competition between the United States and China is a benefit for them. They do not want, however, to have this competition to deepen into a rivalry that would force them to choose between China and the United States or get involved or embroiled in any kind of a military competition between the two. So the negative is, if you read through what happened at the ASEAN summit, in general in the Asia-Pacific region the United States is operating with one hand tied behind its back. And that’s trade since we left TPP. I think there are those that expected the Biden administration to reengage on the trade front. That has not happened. We don’t talk about CPTPP, which is the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And we launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity last spring, but it’s pretty small potatoes, I would have to say, compared to what the countries of the region would like, in that it does not provide any concessions on market access, which is really—market access to the United States—which is what they’re really interested in. So unfortunately, I think everyone is happy in ASEAN that the United States has reengaged with the region. But, once again, it’s a political and, to a degree, military reengagement. But the economic side is still seriously lacking, I would say. And until the United States comes to terms with trade and trade agreements once more, that is likely to continue. CREBO-REDIKER: So, Zoe, I’d like to pick up on something that Miles talked about in terms of the ability of ASEAN to manage between the increasing competition between the U.S. and China. And really, I guess, add some color to how you think this—the U.S. at ASEAN this time around made a difference, or moved the needle, or if the whole context has changed, in your opinion, over the past—over the past year? LIU: Thank you very much, Heidi, for the question. And it’s a privilege to be here with Alice and Miles. I would—to respond to your question, Heidi, I would say this time I would actually agree with what Miles mentioned in terms of, you know, actually this time the United States, we are there, and we are present. I think that has sent a very strong message to the region, in the sense that, you know, the United States is back at the table. I think that’s a very reassuring message, especially with regard to the heightened tension in Taiwan and all that, right? But I have to say, sometimes China’s—simply because of its geographic proximity, because of the cultural and the people-to-people relationship, China’s influence in ASEAN region is simply too big and too difficult for ASEAN countries to divert—to diversify away from anytime soon. And the Chinese diplomat really likes to emphasize China’s many firsts in the context of ASEAN’s relationship with the rest of the world. And, like, for example, I remember talking—doing interviews with Chinese scholars as well as listening to prominent Chinese diplomats talking. So they would like to emphasize China’s—all the firsts, including kind of being the first to forge strategic partnership with ASEAN, the first to sign up or to join ASEAN’s Treaty for Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. They also like to talk about China’s the first to start FTA negotiations with ASEAN, and so on and so forth. So the idea of China being—emphasize China being there—not just being there, but actually being the first to support ASEAN is something that is a strong card that China can play. And apart from the diplomatic support, China also played—especially during the President Xi Jinping’s first two terms in the context of BRI—China spent a lot of BRI-related money in infrastructure in Laos. Like, there is the China-Laos railway already up and running. There is also China and Thailand railway, China-Malaysia, China-Indonesia, this kind of railway at different stages of development. So from that perspective, I think there is a strong case being made to say China is not just a diplomatic—China has not just implemented the diplomatic engagement, but also put money where China’s mouth is. And then on the other hand, China also really has been, over the past—over the past decade, China actually dominated trade with ASEAN. At least China in terms of trade values, China surpassed the United States for about thirteen—for about the past thirteen years. And in particular for the past two years, China’s trade with ASEAN—bilateral trade with ASEAN has been the top. Meaning that China is ASEAN’s largest trading partner, and ASEAN’s largest trading partner is China. And so all this simply means China has a very dominant influence with the region. However, it goes back to your question with regard to what it shows differently as of this summit. I think ASEAN leaders made it very clear that they do not want to choose a side between the United States or China. And I think this is not—this is nothing unusual. I think many of our U.S. allies would not want to make—choose a side. And on the other hand, ASEAN leaders also recognized that right now they are dependent on China for trade, but they also recognized a potential opportunity. If international companies are trying to move their supply chain—not just a segment of their supply chain—outside of China, then ASEAN geographically is relatively close and relatively easy, and cheap, to do that. So they recognize there is an opportunity. And then just to put some numbers in there, right now labor costs in China on a per-month basis is about—in U.S. dollar terms—it is about $380 per month, wage cost. But if you look at Cambodia or Laos, that’s half of what it’s costing international business. There is—a value judgement could be made. So therefore, ASEAN leaders recognize there is an opportunity. And they actually do depend on the United States for innovation as well as security. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to diversify their trade relationship as well as their economic relationship. But that does not necessarily mean it’s going to happen overnight. CREBO-REDIKER: So turning to the—to the last summit that we are speaking about today, the G20, which tends to overshadow ASEAN and other summits, aside from the three-hour meeting with—between President Biden and President Xi Jinping, which eased some of the tensions. At least, the fact that they were communicating directly in person garnered a lot of attention. But, Miles, can you take us through sort of what goals were met and advanced? I mean, a lot of people are saying just the fact that we had a communique come out at all, even though not everyone signed up to every single point, that was sort of flagged as we actually, you know, got to print and sign something. And also, to the way that the Ukraine conflict was managed. If you could just walk us through some of the highlights, from your perspective. KAHLER: Sure. Well, absolutely. The G20 is a kind of perpetual disappointment when it comes to international organizations, I’m afraid. Everyone always comes out of the G20 thinking, what are they doing? Or what is it worth to bring all these leaders together to summits year after year? Well, we have a global agenda that’s growing. It has become even more urgent in one year with the Ukraine conflict. And therefore, consensus becomes harder and harder to reach. So it’s quite remarkable, as you said, that a communique can be even reached. So I’ll leave it to my expert colleague Zoe to talk about the bilateral between Biden and Xi Jinping, because that’s one important part of these summits, is the bilaterals on the side and what’s accomplished there. This was Xi Jinping’s coming out party. He was out of China at a major summit, and he clearly saw it that way. So we would want to talk about the bilaterals themselves. I think the G20 summits had their day, as you certainly know, Heidi, in the global financial crisis. That was when it was created as a summit. It was an important—and it played an important role during the global financial—that’s long in the past. And that role has never really been regained fully. On the other hand, I do think it plays an important signaling function to say that international cooperation is underway. It’s a fifty-two-paragraph declaration—the Bali declaration. Very detailed on many, many items of global importance. And that the top leaders are on board. And almost all the top leaders were there. Putin did not appear, because the U.S. and the Europeans had indicated they would not sit at the table with Putin. But his foreign minister was there. So Russia was represented. No one has walked out of the G20. And it develops a consensus among the largest economies and sets an agenda for other multilateral organizations. I think that’s very important to point out. If you look at the end of the declaration, they give thanks to a list of multilateral organizations—a very long list of multilateral organizations—who are all going to read this declaration and say: This is probably going to be on our agenda going forward, if this is—you know, if these leaders follow through and if their, you know, subordinates follow through. So that’s very important as well. On Ukraine, very interesting and very—I mean, I think—I don’t know whether the United States, the Europeans—probably the Indonesians, who chaired this summit, deserve a lot of credit for this, because at one point the Indonesian line was this is an economic organization. Which is true, basically, in the past, although it covers lots of global issues. And a security issue, like Ukraine, does not—it should not be on the agenda at all. Well, that wasn’t going to fly with the United States and EU in particular. So then the question is, how do we—how do we bring in the Ukraine to satisfy the United States, the EU, and others who support the Ukrainian side, and not cause Russia and China—which has typically been aligned with Russia on this issue—to leave the G20 and leave the summit, or refuse to attend? And the Indonesians made it clear they were not going to exclude Russia, from the very beginning. So very clever drafting. If you look at the agreement, some have said that it issues a condemnation of Russia and Russian aggression. But in fact, what it does is cite the United Nations resolution about Russian aggression, which most of the G20, but not all, supported in March of this year. So there’s unanimous agreement, but a lot of other language that says, well, the members disagreed about Ukraine in part, to kind of hedge that. But what is—what brought everyone on board was a unanimous agreement that the war in Ukraine is harming the global economy. And I think the United States and the Europeans deserve credit for bringing onboard the emerging economies who are not really in favor of the whole Ukraine sanctioning of Russia, and they’ve often abstained or sometimes abstained on U.N. resolutions like the current—the recent one on reparations. So you bring them on board by saying it’s all about the global economy. And the Ukraine war is definitely hurting you in the global economy. Especially food security, which is a very long part of the declaration deals with food security, energy, debt, a whole host of issues. That was the way that Ukraine was brought into the G20. And that was the way that Russia actually ended up being quite isolated, in a way, at the end. The fact that they had to accept a resolution which cited the United Nations language condemning their aggression in Ukraine. I’d also point out that the nuclear weapons issue was very important. And Zoe may wish to talk about the Chinese position on use of nuclear weapons, which there have been different readings. But in the G20 declaration, the use or threat of nuclear weapons was clearly declared as inadmissible. Not just the use, the threat of nuclear weapons. And that suggested China gave a certain amount of ground in this particular forum to be much more critical of the Russians than they had elsewhere. So a very interesting exercise in diplomacy. There were lots of other interesting parts to the declaration. I think the food security issue loomed very large for many of the developing economies, once again echoing what Alice has said about COP27. There was a call on the multilateral development banks to bring forward action to mobilize additional financing. A lot of pressure on the World Bank and other MDBs right now to up their game, basically, on climate and other issues. And a whole host of others you can talk about in the Q&A. But the bilateral was very important. CREBO-REDIKER: So I have—like, I have a lot of points that I think I would like to draw out from what Miles just said, and ask for Zoe’s weigh-in. But just as we’re getting close to the—to the time when I’d like to open up for broader Q&A, there were a number of points in ASEAN and the G20 that touched on climate, on climate finance, on support for—I guess, broader support and energy security. Is there something, Alice, that you think draws all these three summits together in a way that, I guess, could take some of the pressure off the underperformance of COP27, in your view? Or were they lacking across the board in real support for transition? HILL: Well, the G20 essentially previewed what was in the agreement. There is nothing coming out of there that’s especially saying we’re going beyond what is contemplated in the agreement reached at COP27. They reaffirmed the 1.5 degrees. They called on the developed world to honor their promise, which they had not so far, of providing one—mobilizing financing in the form of $100 billion per year. That was supposed to have started no later than 2020. It hasn’t started now. The latest estimate is maybe next year. And of course, that’s been a sore point for a very long time. And the financing doesn’t—so the G20 called on that, the COP27 called on that, and then there’s huge concerns about what the monies that have come forward look like. They mostly go to mitigation, which is cutting the harmful greenhouse gas emissions. And the most vulnerable nations are saying: We need money just to protect ourselves from these climate impacts. They don’t have the type of infrastructure that the developed world has—for example, levees and other means of—air conditioning—means of keeping at bay, or at least blunting some of these impacts. So I don’t see that there was—there were pronouncements from the G20 in the leaders declaration, but I don’t see it as providing the comfort that we are on track to actually tackle the climate problem. That group of nations is responsible for about 80 percent of the emissions. So if they really follow through, they could do a lot to solve the problem. But we’re not there yet. CREBO-REDIKER: All right. I’m going to ask Alexis if she can go over to see if we have any hands raised or any questions in the Q&A, and call on—in the order that you found those hands raised. And can’t wait to continue this conversation. And I want to get Zoe back in on the—on China at the G20 as well. OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We will take our first question from Sheri Fink. Q: Hello. Thank you so much for having this today. I was just wondering if you could comment on any actions on pandemic preparedness and response priorities in these meetings. CREBO-REDIKER: Who wants to take that on? HILL: Well, I have a simple answer. There wasn’t anything about that at the COP27. Certainly there was concern that people were getting sick at COP27, but—(laughs)—but not concern about what we’re going to do about future pandemics. CREBO-REDIKER: Miles, was there something? I think I heard there was something about pandemic preparedness at the G20. KAHLER: There was a restatement of a commitment to pandemic preparedness in the G20 declaration. I honestly don’t have the details here, but they certainly reiterated support for the WHO, which I thought was quite interesting, as a central organization for dealing with pandemics in the future. So attention was paid to it. But I have to say, as often happens with the G20, it seemed to be somewhat overshadowed in the declaration by food security and other immediate issues that flow from the Ukraine crisis and the Ukraine war, in some respects. LIU: And to reiterate what Miles and Alice just said, in the context of COP27, I personally did not see any particular emphasis on pandemic preparedness. But in the context of the G20, in particular bilateral meeting between the United States and China, there are not necessarily agreement on the issue on the page from either the U.S.’s side or China’s side, saying that, you know, the two countries reached some sort of agreement on pandemic cooperation and things related to that. But if we look—but if we look at the ASEAN statement, the summit statement, actually the ASEAN did, dedicated a paragraph talking about pandemic relief, and things related to that. CREBO-REDIKER: So we have a—we have a question comes in through the Q&A from Jenny Tang from Radio Free Asia. And that’s directed at Alice. What role do you think China should play in loss and damage? And do you think China as a developing country, and one of the biggest economies, should or should not contribute to the loss and damage fund? HILL: Well, certainly that was an issue that was bantered about at COP27. Of course, in 1992 China was considered a developing nation, but its economy has grown since then, as has its emissions. And now it is the world’s largest emitter, by far. It’s responsible for about a quarter of current emissions. So it is causing a lot of harm, just as the United States has historically. And the United States is the second-largest emitter at 11 percent. Far less than China at this point. But I believe that China is now at a stage that it should be contributing more to pay for the damage it’s caused. I believe that the countries that have been responsible should stand up and recognize that there is liability here. We don’t call it liability, but I’m a former judge. And if this were a court of law, they’re probably—assuming the statute of limitations hasn’t run—there is a tie to the actions in certain countries and the global warming that’s occurred. So that they should pay up seems the proper thing to do. CREBO-REDIKER: So I’m going to ask if we have—I think we have several more raised hands. If I could hand it over to Alex. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Dee Smith. Q: Thank you, all of you, very much. It’s an excellent discussion. Zoe, good to see you. I have a question for Zoe and a question for Alice. And I’ll make it very quick. So, Zoe, do you—what do you ascribe the less-aggressive tone being taken by China in particular towards the U.S., particularly as reported in at least English language Chinese media? Is it—is it a reflection of Xi Jinping’s strength or of his weakness? And the number of problems he has, and the desire to back off of an upfront or frontal collision with the U.S.? And for Alice, I am aware this is on the record, but I’ve spoken to a number of people with real expertise, as you have, on this subject of climate change. And several of them have said, frankly, that 1.5 is simply no longer reachable as a goal. But they’re not willing to say that publicly. So I wonder if you could give some color to that. Thank you both very much. CREBO-REDIKER: Zoe. LIU: Yeah, sure. Dee, thank you very much for tuning in. It’s great to hear your voice again. That’s an excellent question. And I think, you know, probably Alice and Miles could also chime in here as well. Because, you know, Alice you are—you are in Egypt, and observed a lot of the climate-related conversation going on, right? And personally, I was a little bit—I was a little bit surprised, pleasantly surprised, when reading the news saying that actually—or, reading the news, John Kerry and the Chinese Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua, those two guys met before Xi Jinping and Biden met in person. So I feel like, OK, so now it’s really—the United States and China really are starting to talk again, right? And this—I read in the Economist over the weekend that the Economist made a very good line to say that, you know, only children refuse to talk when they are angry at each other. And I think that’s a really good way to describe the United States and China in the sense that, you know, the two countries being the two most important in terms of global stakes, right, that bilateral relations are probably most important at this current—at the current stage. So the warming—the relatively friendly (talks directed ?) in China, actually I would describe it as a sign of, not necessarily Xi Jinping, his personal position or weakness, but perhaps a recognition of two things. One is, he—at least from domestic politics—the perspective, he consolidated or secured a third term. Therefore, he can move down his priority list. And if I were him, I would prioritize China’s relationship with the United States and with the West, in order to get the economy on track. So that’s one thing. And then secondly, the warming tone probably is also very much reflective of Chinese policymakers’ recognition of the damage being done to the Chinese economy. On the one hand, their COVID-related policies have already caused a lot of damage to the various sectors in the Chinese economy. And on the other hand, waves of U.S. export control policies have really created a dent in a lot of strategic industries that have been highlighted by Xi Jinping and his associates. So I think based on—related to this, the warming tone probably reflects—is probably a result of a self-reflection and awareness of the damage to China’s relationship with the rest of the world, as well as the Chinese economy itself. HILL: So I would add that it was very good news to hear that China was reengaging. And there was a dramatic moment. The Chinese representative did show up unexpectedly at an event that Secretary Kerry was speaking at, now Special Envoy for Climate Kerry, regarding the Global Methane Pledge. And the Global Methane Pledge has been a pledge that has really been tied to the United States. They’ve been pushing this at Glasgow. The Chinese didn’t join the pledge, but there were certain indications that they were concerned about methane as well. And that was a major step forward. So it’s—as Zoe said, it’s important that these two not partners, strategic competitors, are talking, because that’s better for the globe, and certainly better for climate change as well. On your point about 1.5 degrees, before the gavel fell at Sharm El Sheikh to open the ceremonies, the U.N. had issued a report essentially saying there was no credible pathway to 1.5 degrees. And I think most scientists believe that, because in order to be on that pathway we would have to cut our current emissions by about at least 43-45 percent by 2030. That’s seven years from now. I think everyone thinks that would be a very hard task to accomplish. Yet, why do the countries keep hanging onto this 1.5 degrees? And that had been a matter of puzzlement for me. So during the conference I spoke to some representatives who had previously been negotiators for countries. And it’s really a symbolic move, that if we release that goal, that thing in mind, it could give some countries, and particular concern are China and Russia, permission to rollback their efforts to trying to get to what is a safe level. So I think there is recognition in the scientific world that 1.5 isn’t going to be the—where we end up. We will pass it. There’s some hope we might be able to get—pull it back. But we will pass it. And right now, the estimates are closer to three degrees by 2100. And three degrees Celsius is very serious. That’s a lot of change to our climatic system. So negotiators want to push for that 1.5 because on a consensus basis the scientists who report to the U.N. Framework Convention, this group that’s meeting under the 190-plus nations meeting, has said: We need to stay at or below 1.5 degrees to avoid cataclysmic harm. So that’s why everyone is holding tight, even though the evidence is indicating that goal is beyond our reach at this point. CREBO-REDIKER: So hold onto ambition, basically. HILL: Exactly. Exactly. (Laughter.) CREBO-REDIKER: Alexis, I think we have a couple of callers who have raised their hands. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Linda Yang. Ambassador Yang, please accept the unmute prompt. It looks like we’re having technical difficulties. We will take our next question from Craig Charney. Q: This is Craig Charney from Charney Research. We’re doing some work on global governance now, so I was intrigued by the panel. And I think the coincidence of the three conferences has led to a really fruitful discussion. My question deals more with the emergence of the G20 as a forum. And I was particularly interested in Miles’ comments on this. You know, given the nature of the Security Council permanent members and the G7, they’re small and rather exclusive groups. This does seem to be the only grouping that regularly brings together powers east and west, large and mid, and so forth. Perhaps you could call it kind of the central committee of the international system. I wonder if it’s emerging that way? I mean, I was struck, for instance, by the fact that the $100 billion for climate assistance that was such a hot topic at the COP this year was, after all, something that emerged initially at the 2010 Copenhagen G20 meeting, which was, in retrospect, looking like perhaps a more successful failure than it was thought it be at the time. So I’m wondering if Miles or anybody else would actually share my impression that the G20 is rising in significance as a venue in itself, as a consensus forger, as well as a place for bilaterals to occur. CREBO-REDIKER: Miles, you want to give that— KAHLER: Well, I think, as I mentioned, I still think the high point for the G20 was in the time of the global financial crisis in 2008, 2009, 2010. And its role then as a kind of coordinator of regulatory policy, macroeconomic policy, giving coverage to leaders that were pursuing policies of fiscal expansion, was very important, compared to what has ensued since that time. It was very hard to see much, for example, new on economic policy coordination in the G20 Bali declaration. And that’s partly because a lot depends on the United States Federal Reserve. But going to your point about it, it is a directorate, I would say, of multilateralism, in some sense. It is what we have as a directorate of multilateral organizations, particularly those that deal with economic, health, non-security issues. Security agenda’s a very sensitive one. As I mentioned, it was so sensitive that there was a sense that Ukraine should be off this agenda all together, even though it’s this, you know, the proverbial elephant in the room, there were members who thought it shouldn’t be. And Indonesia shared that view, at least initially. So it cannot be a forum like the U.N. Security Council, in that security will always be, I think, an issue that will be complicated for the G20 to deal with. But on other global issues, especially those that involve multilateral action and direction to multilateral organizations—as we mentioned, the MDBs, which are being asked to up their game on climate—that sort of signal being sent and the follow up that can ensue from that I think can be quite important, conceivably. But it’s not—it’s an informal organization. Its membership is very indeterminant. These are the largest economies in the world, but not all the largest economies in the world. For example, Nigeria is now the largest economy in Africa, but it’s not represented in the G20. And South Africa is, even though it’s now the second-largest economy in Africa. And there’s only one economy in Africa represented. So its representative quality and other aspects of its membership pose some issues. But, as you mentioned, it’s an important forum, I would say, where the G7, the industrialized countries, and including the bigger economies like China, have to listen to the other economies that are important about the spillover effects of their policies. And I think that was a major theme of the Bali declaration, which is basically the Ukraine conflict is having big spillover effects. They’re economic. They’re affecting us. Listen to us. And that came up in the bilateral between Xi Jinping—the readout of the bilateral between Xi Jinping and Biden, it had an interesting phrase in it. Which is: We should collaborate on these global issues because that’s what the international community expects. And I think there is a sense of, you know, peer pressure from these near peers among the emerging economies on China, the United States, and the other big powers, kind of to behave yourself. You know, to think about what your actions imply for us. And that’s a very important role for the G20. So I wouldn’t go so far as to say it’s rising. I think since the Trump administration, where the U.S. was in many ways isolated in the G20 very often on climate and other issues, it’s had a comeback. And its performance this time, given all the possible conflicts within the G20 over so many issues, was actually pretty impressive, I think. CREBO-REDIKER: So one of the things that the G20 also does, particularly in an era where we see increasing geopolitical conflict, is it does give that opportunity to meet at the leaders level and have that kind of interaction that President Biden and President Xi Jinping had. And those informal opportunities for leaders to have pull-asides that we may or may not ever hear about or read about, but just to build up rapport, to kind of see the huma on the other side—(laughs)—of that Zoom call or that decision that you’re taking that will have, you know, potentially very significant consequences for, you know, whether they’re economic or security-related. Having that—there’s really no—there’s nothing quite like having that direct interaction available in a one period of time, with such a high-level group. So I would just—I’d add that in there. I know we have several other hands that are up, as well as Q&A coming in the chat. So let me ask—let me ask Alexis to go to the next—the next question, please. OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Tess Davis. Q: Hi. Good afternoon. My name is Tess Davis. And I’m an attorney, as well as executive director of a nonprofit and think tank, The Antiquities Coalition. So this year, in a pretty unprecedented move, all these three initiatives highlighted cultural preservation. The Bali declaration and the ASEAN leaders declaration committed the organizations to, you know, admittedly vague, but to combatting the illicit trade in art and artifacts, while the COP implementation plan also included a broader provision on cultural preservation more broadly. And the fight against antiquities looting and trafficking has also been among the few bright spots in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Cambodia, of course this year’s chair, with Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly referring to America as the world’s number-one country for recovering stolen art, during the joint summit that we held together in Phnom Penh. And so I was just hoping you could say a few word about this either specifically or the role that cultural diplomacy plays in these initiatives more broadly. Thank you. CREBO-REDIKER: Miles, do you want to take a stab at that? KAHLER: Not my—not my normal wheelhouse, to say the least. And I mean, I have been certainly dealing with illicit financial flows, and certainly cultural artifacts are part of the illicit flows that have come along with globalization. I’m not aware that the G20, apart from the parts that were described in the Bali declaration, has a very significant role to play, except, once again, as a signaling device to say this is an important issue on the international agenda, and one that governments should take into account. It is a complicated one. Having just returned from Europe, which is home to many cultural artifacts which were removed from other parts of the world over time, some of them with very questionable provenance, you know, this raises—this is a big issue for museums and other cultural institutions in the industrialized world, and the rich countries in general. So it’s a complicated one to work out. I don’t know if Zoe has a Chinese perspective on this or not. LIU: On my end, I would just add—put a footnote to what Miles just said. Indeed, Europe has been the center for a lot of this—or, at the foreground of returning this illicit or ill-gotten, for a variety of reasons, artifacts. And from China’s perspective, there has been—if you remember, like, a couple of years ago, even inside China, there was a major movement of—at the local provinces, everyone was building out major—like, major museums. And that was the moment when a lot of these—from a domestic politics perspective—Chinese scholars and local politicians, they were really interested in, say, for example, whether the British Museum should return some of the Chinese statues back to China. But right now, I think cultural diplomacy is probably an important aspect for bilateral relations between the United States and China. However, it was not a part of the conversation in the broader discussion. At least, you know, when we read out the White House—the White House readout or the Chinese readout, people highlighted what Alice was talking about, the climate change conversation as well as the food security, but not necessarily culture. Perhaps, you know, culture is this inherent thing. It’s great, and everybody would—it’s a thing that people would agree on it, therefore people may just take it for granted. But it’s very important, I would say. CREBO-REDIKER: So next we have a question from Cameron Thomas-Shah. And his question is: How was Vietnam’s internal challenges related to human rights and aversion to taking on additional debt viewed at COP27, when weighed against its net-zero commitment from COP26? HILL: So I can speak to this. I didn’t hear—and I wasn’t there the entire time, and obviously not in every room. It’s an enormous trade show, with pavilions spreading across a broad geography. So I wasn’t aware of any discussions about Vietnam. I think it’s important to remember that the way the COP is set up, it’s a voluntary agreement. The goal is to have countries bring forward more ambition year after year to chip away at the climate challenge. So although certainly the human rights records of different countries may be of concern to those in attendance, there may be activists. There were fewer activists present that were able to freely express themselves, from what I could tell, at Sharm El Sheikh. But there may be references to that. But in terms of the ultimate goal of these COPs, it’s to get the world closer to containing the heat. And that means that countries need to come forward with their commitments. So how they accomplish those commitments within their countries is not the subject of a great deal of scrutiny by other countries. CREBO-REDIKER: So one thing I just want to go back to, if I can, Zoe, the G20, as we noted, had this sort of geopolitical shadow from the—from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And yet, it’s very hard to read the tea leaves from—on the relationship with China, the friendship without limits, the comments for/against neutrality, you know, what it means. Did you see anything in the tea leaves out of the G20 that you would say can shed light on what that China-Russia relationship, particularly vis-à-vis Ukraine, looks like moving forward? LIU: Sure. Thank you, Heidi. That’s a great way to put it, you know, reading between the tea leaves. And I have always been a firm believer with regard to read between the tea leaves, in particular with regard to China’s so-called unlimited partnership with Russia. And I do think there are—since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, I certainly see a lot of limits in this so-called unlimited partnership, and at this particular G20 summit in particular from the Biden-Xi Jinping in-person meeting. The readout from the White House is saying that both parties disagreed or had aligned with regard to against the nuclear threat, despite that from the Chinese readout there was nothing about it, right? However, I would say—however, I would say if you—there are a lot of Chinese scholars, including after the G20 meeting, a lot of Chinese scholars, they put their discussions on WeChat as well as writing blog posts, talking about, oh, actually, this is a major step forward for U.S.-China relations, at least these two countries not just starting to talk again, but also made concrete steps setting the tone, setting the agenda for the future. And one of which would be, as Alice and Miles observed, food security and climate. And on the other hand, I think scholars and Chinese policymakers have shown they are extremely pragmatic. On the one hand, everybody seems to agree that it’s a good thing that, you know, both sides have low expectations, because when you have low expectations your likelihood of being extremely disappointed, which would further poison the relationship, you know, that likelihood would be low. And actually, I think we achieved what we wanted to do, which was to set a floor for the deterioration of the relationship. Therefore, and the Chinese side reading out of it is to say that the Biden—oh, that the in-person meeting put a brake on this continued deterioration of the relationship, which is—you know, despite that journalists or scholars haven’t talked about it, actually people achieved this recognition. But I would—I would put a sort of, like, a caution or a qualification on a lot of this optimism, simply because, you know, it’s always good to be cautious, recognizing the obstacles. In the sense that fundamentally right now, at least in the immediate term, bilateral relations still face challenges from perhaps three major category in the immediate term. Which is technology, especially U.S. export control. And then Russia’s war against Ukraine. China still did not call it as an invasion, despite recognizing the threat of nuclear threat. And then thirdly, Taiwan. And that—China reiterated that Taiwan is the basis of the basis of U.S.-China relations. So I think that’s quite a warning. And then in the long run, I think there is fundamental differences between the United States and China in terms of perspective of the global order. Therefore, I would say probably it would be too much to say this is a relationship reset. However, it’s always great to have the two leaders talk in person again. And I think Blinken is going to go to China next year, so hopefully that relationship can continue improving. CREBO-REDIKER: So I see we have one more raised hand, and that will probably our last question we’ll be able to get to. Alexis, can you go to the next questioner, please? OPERATOR: We will take our next question from Moushumi Khan. Q: Hi. Good afternoon. Thank you for the interesting panel. I am Moushumi Khan. I’m the U.S. alternative executive director at the Asian Development Bank. And I wanted to ask the question about what role do you think MDBs play in all of this? HILL: Well, I can speak to that. MDBs are critical. What we’re going to need is huge amounts of money. And it’s not just for the green transition, but it’s also for adaptation for these most vulnerable nations. And they have been saddled with debt. When a big event occurs, that leaves them with little money for recovery. So we need to see certainly better understanding from the MDBs, the World Bank, about what climate risk means for these countries, and then what debt instruments or financial instruments could help them be able to weather these big events in a way that allows them to continue to develop successfully. But right now, we’re seeing an albatross of debt surrounding the necks of these countries. And they are really struggling to provide basic needs. That puts—in terms of global security, that’s a risk for the entire world, because as governments are unable to provide the basic necessities, there can be deep instability. So the mechanisms for getting more money—and it can’t be just all grants. It’s got to be including the private sector. That has been a theme that has been coming out of the COP for many years. But that would mean there would be more guarantees, there would be more support from the MDBs to allow private money to play a bigger role here. Until that happens, these countries are really suffering. And they can’t make the kinds of investments that would keep them safer from these worsening climate impacts that not only kill people, they destroy livelihoods, and homes, and cause—can prompt great migration. CREBO-REDIKER: So, I mean, the MDBs actually had a much higher prominence both at the G20 and at COP27, and the more expansive use of the balance sheets, and risk taking, the commitment that wealthy governments made to overhaul the MDBs, so that they can increase their funding, I think was a hallmark of both of those summits. Miles, do you want to add something, and then we’ll just— KAHLER: Well, just very briefly, I think you have to understand that looking at the—for example, the political situation in the United States, with a change in the House of Representatives, getting kind of grants to developing countries as part of the new facility is not going to be an easy task. So then you have to think, where can we get finance that’s not going to be politically—as politically difficult? Well, one obvious place is the MDBs. And I think Alice is absolutely right, there’s a lot of pressure on them now to really deal with the issue of climate with the urgency that the rest of the world sees, and not cling to their AAA bond status and the rest as carefully as they have in the past, and really get the—push the finance out. You know, get it out there. And that includes the public-private partnerships, which they’ve also been rather slow to innovate on. So I think the pressure is there. And it’s because politically it’s kind of an easy way to get the financing out, generally speaking, as compared to bilateral types of finance. And of course, getting the private sector to do more is even easier, if it would do it. (Laughs.) So that’s another—that set of standards is another issue that came up at COP27 and also was mentioned in the G20 declaration. And that’s another set of issues for another discussion. CREBO-REDIKER: So I would like to thank our three speakers today—Zoe, Miles, and Alice—for, I think, a great—a great conversation on, again, a lot of geography, a lot of topics, and do it with the—could have filled up another hour. So thank you for joining us today, and we look forward to seeing you at future CFR events. Thank you so much. HILL: Thank you. (END)  
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