Economics

Trade

In this report, Jennifer Hillman and Inu Manak argue that the United States should lead the effort to reshape global rules to better serve its own interests and the international trading system’s changing realities
Sep 6, 2023
In this report, Jennifer Hillman and Inu Manak argue that the United States should lead the effort to reshape global rules to better serve its own interests and the international trading system’s changing realities
Sep 6, 2023
  • China
    Responding to China's Belt and Road Initiative
    Play
    Charles Boustany Jr., partner at Capitol Counsel and former representative from the state of Louisiana, and Jennifer Hillman, senior fellow for trade and international political economy at CFR, and Daniel H. Rosen, partner at Rhodium Group, will discuss the findings of the latest CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and implications for U.S. economic security, climate change, and global health interests. Learn more about CFR’s State and Local Officials Initiative.   FASKIANOS:  Thank you, welcome to the Council on Foreign Relations State and Local Officials webinar. I’m Irina Faskianos, Vice President of the National Program and Outreach and CFR. We’re delighted to have participants with us today from 36 U.S. states and territories. Thank you for taking the time to join us for this discussion, which is on the record. As you know, CFR is an independent and nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher focusing on U.S. foreign policy. CFR is also the publisher of Foreign Affairs magazine. Through our State and Local Officials Initiative, we serve as a resource on international issues affecting the priorities and agendas of state and local governments by providing analysis on a wide range of policy topics. We’re pleased to present to you today the CFR sponsored independent task force report on China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. So we have with us, our project director, co-project director of the report, Jennifer Hillman, and two members of the task force, Charles Boustany and Daniel Rosen. And these task forces are independent, they are bipartisan and they are co-chaired by a Republican and a Democrat. So this task force was co-chaired by Jacob J. Lew and Gary Roughhead. So I am going to introduce our speakers today and then turn to them on to talk about the findings and recommendations of the report. And we are eager to hear from all of you with your questions and comments.   So in alphabetical order, I’m going to start first with Congressman Charles Boustany. He’s a partner with Capital Counsel. From 2005 to 2017, He served as congressman for Louisiana’s third congressional district. While in Congress, Dr. Boustany served on the House Committee on Ways and Means and was chairman of the subcommittee on Tax Policy, Oversight and Human Resources. He currently serves as a member on the National Committee on U.S-China relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.   Jennifer Hellman is a senior fellow for trade and international political economy at CFR. Most recently, she was a professor of practice at Georgetown University Law Center. And from 2007 to 2012, she served as a member of the World Trade Organization’s appellate body. Prior to her time at the World Trade Organization, she served as a commissioner at the United States International Trade Commission and as General Counsel at the office of the United States Trade Representative.   And Daniel Rosen is founding partner of the Rhodium Group and leads the organization’s work on China, India, and Asia. He has twenty-six years of extensive experience analyzing China’s economic development, commercial sector and external relations. He’s also an adjunct associate professor at Columbia University, and previously served as a senior advisor for International Economic Policy at the White House National Economic Council and the National Security Council.   So thank you all for being with us today. We really appreciate it, and thank you for this terrific report, which again we circulated in advance of today’s webinar. So Jennifer, if you could begin by giving us an overview of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the recommendations of the task force that you outlined in this report?   HILLMAN:  Well, thank you very much. Irina, I am delighted to be here to discuss this report, in part because I think China’s Belt and Road initiative is both huge in size and scope and has huge implications for the United States. But it’s often really hard to understand or to get your arms around, and so we really tried in this report to kind of peel back the curtain with respect to what is BRI, what it’s doing, and what its implications are. And I think it’s important to start with, there’s a couple of unique things about this report. First of all, it is very comprehensive. It covers all aspects of the Belt and Road and its implications in the economic arena, the political arena, and the geostrategic. The second thing to me that’s unique is it’s the first report looking at BRI in a post-COVID or potentially post-COVID world. And so we were able to really focus on how COVID has changed BRI, which it has clearly caused a major shift away from a lot of the big infrastructure projects that had been initially at the heart and soul of BRI, the building of ports and railroads and roads and power plants. And that shift has been to move BRI into being very heavily focused on technology, including telecommunications technology, financial technology, and healthcare, now moved becoming a sort of mass diplomacy and now vaccine diplomacy sort of aspects of it. Thirdly, to me unique was that this was a unanimous report, which has not always happened with respect to Council on Foreign Relations Taskforce reports, they’re often sort of dissenting or competing views. Yet we brought together a really wide set of experts, and nonetheless, were able to produce a report that everyone agreed with. And the last thing I think that makes it unique is it includes specific recommendations of what the United States should do to respond to the Belt and Road Initiative.   The report starts out by saying, look, BRI could have been a very positive initiative to fill the major need in many developing countries for basic infrastructure; for power plants and electricity grids, bridges, roads, ports, railroads, but that the way in which China has gone about implementing the Belt And Road has created significant risks for the United States and really for the rest of the world. And I’m going to touch on just sort of six of those clear risks. First, is it can really undermine macroeconomic stability, because it is likely to result in significant debt crises, because it has funded economically questionable projects in heavily indebted countries. It has done so on secretive commercial sort of plus terms, and it has not allowed much sort of debt sustainability analysis. Secondly, it creates risk because it has subsidized privilege market entry for state owned and non-market oriented Chinese companies. Third, it’s enabled China to lock countries in to sort of China’s ecosystems by putting Chinese technology and preferred Chinese technical standards in a number of these countries. Fourthly, it’s made it a lot harder for the World Bank and other traditional lenders to insist on high standards, you know, like environmental impact assessments and social impact assessments. Fifthly, it’s left a lot of countries much more susceptible to Chinese political pressure, where China is saying, okay, you’re now BRI country, we don’t want you to say anything about what we’re doing in Hong Kong or what we’re doing with respect to the Uyghurs, so again, leaving a lot more vulnerability. And the last clear risk that is identified is the fact that China is ensuring a lot of country’s dependence on carbon intensive coal fired power plants that are likely to be in place for 35 or more years.   So then what do we recommend, we recommend that the U.S. has to respond in a number of ways that may implicate the work that many of you are doing, particularly its recommendations that much of the United States response has to be to improve U.S. competitiveness, so that we have a genuine alternative to offer to BRI countries on the premise that, you know, you can’t fight something with nothing. So the United States is going to have to make some significant investments in our own competitiveness, so that we’ve got something significant to offer. And that is going to include a substantial boost to research and development spending, with some of that additional spending being directed very clearly to digital technologies, that we invest in the next generation of technologies such as artificial intelligence, 6G, clean energy and healthcare technologies. Thirdly, that we attract and retain talent to the United States by changes to our immigration and visa system and by continuing to welcome foreign students, particularly in the STEM areas, that we increase U.S. participation in the standard setting organizations. What we’re finding is that China is now leading the way at everything from the International Telecommunications Union, the Codex Alimentarius, the OIE, that are the ones that are setting the standards that are affecting our exports of everything from information and communications technology to agricultural and food products. We’ve got to get reengaged in making sure the standards are not written to the benefit of China and to the exclusion of the United States. And lastly, we recommend a very strong increase in support and additional flexibilities to our development Finance Corporation and our EXIM bank, so that they can do more to promote American exports. The report also has specific recommendations with things that we need to need to do to mitigate the economic risks of the Belt and Road, as well as to partner with our friends and allies and multilateral organizations, as well as specific steps that we need to do to protect us security interests in the BRI countries. But the one that I think it might be of most interest to you are the recommendations that I’ve highlighted, that really go to this issue of what do we need to do to make America more competitive, so that we can reach out to these countries in certain sectors, in certain regions, in a very strategic way to have a legitimate alternative to offer to many of these countries that don’t necessarily want to go down the China road, but who need a genuine alternative. So I will stop there and turn it over to my colleagues that served on this taskforce and whose expertise is what was very much relied upon in drafting this report. Thank you.   FASKIANOS:  Thank you, Jennifer. So Dan, let’s go to you about to talk about the drivers of BRI and how is the initiative affecting the Chinese economy and the economies of recipient countries?   ROSEN:  Thank you so much Irina. And while there were a lot of talented people who served on this task force, if we didn’t have Jennifer to put it all together into a coherent narrative, it would just be a bunch of interesting things lying around on the floor, like a four year olds play room, to be honest. But Jennifer, and the project leaders have done a super job putting it all together. Let me offer a few thoughts here, coming from the sort of global economic perspective around this. You know, Xi Jinping himself, the Chinese leader himself, the Chinese leadership, have postured the Belt and Road Initiative, as a game changingly important Chinese contribution to the international scene. They have defined this, as you know, an development of, you know, epic proportions. So it should not be a surprise to them or anyone else that it would require a lot of adjustment considerations, that there would be a big shock from throwing, as it is, up to like a couple 100 billion dollars a year of Chinese development, purportedly development assistance, into the international economy into the international system. So I think you know, as Jennifer said, it’s kind of a shame here, because it’s not as though there aren’t developmental needs in the world there are, but the manner in which it’s done is critical. And we learned that the hard way, in the advanced economies, right, in the liberal market economies. I have to say, we made a bit of a mess in parts of the world, in the post war era, we learned lessons the hard way about how to do development well, or not so well. China has essentially made a worst basket case out of Venezuela, already a basket case, very hard to do that. But you know, there were many times when the United States too, had a bad experience, trying to do development work. So if the if Beijing had only been ready to build in room for the need to adjust, the need to work with incumbent players in the development world more, as they rolled this huge thing out there really, you know, was the potential maybe still is to get a lot of good stuff done. Unfortunately, that that and that would have been true, even if Beijing did everything right, in how they designed this Belt and Road machine.   However, they have defined it as they’ve gone along. This was not super well-conceived, designed and rolled out right at the start, and it plays many roles. Officially, Beijing will describe it as a development undertaking, of course, meant to help solve the development problem, and many, many nations upwards of 80 or 90 or 100, depending on how you define it around the world. But the reality really is, it is multifunctional for China. China is has been at least as concerned about finding a way to export more of their overcapacity industrial production, at least is concerned about the geopolitical and geostrategic utility to China, of having this big program out there, as they have been about the development, economic development, impact and benefit of this program to so many countries. And I can say that, you know, without any kind of a hawkish spirit, honestly, it really is quite murky, exactly why they say yes, to putting so much debt in the hands of some officials around the world who clearly don’t know how to handle it without getting themselves in their countries in trouble. So the drivers what understanding what the Chinese motivation is, is key to our ability to engage with them to the extent that we want to, and many people in the United States and Europe and around the world have wanted to try to find the most good out of this as we could. And yet the nature of the thing is to actually it’s very hard to do that. Even if you come to it with a kind of good spirit. What is this thing really look like when it when it lands on the ground? On the one hand, it’s China’s policy banks, carrying the Belt and Road program, the imprimatur that gives him the right to offer concessionary low interest financing terms. But it’s also China’s commercial lenders now have the right to use the Belt and Road label to attach themselves to certain privileges and benefits that are available to them back home, that really allow them to compete better, even if they’re not really thinking about the development. And so the boundaries between what sort of Chinese institutions that ostensibly have a development mission, and what sort of Chinese entities that don’t even pretend to be development oriented. For example, China going out as a direct investor and buying Carnival Cruise Lines, and calling it a Belt and Road investment, one of my favorite just because that’s such a colorful notion isn’t it? Sort of, you know, give us a sense of the difficulty of saying, what, what is this and what isn’t it? And some of the smartest people around talking about this stuff would say, well, there’s really no practical use to talk about what’s Belt and Road and what’s not taught Belt And Road in China’s footprint around the world these days, right? It can be that label can or cannot find itself in almost any situation. Let me finish up 60 seconds in terms of the how it is impacted both the host countries and maybe China itself. We learned, as I said a lot about what works in development to really be beneficial locally, right? And what is just kind of helping the center country in some way. And we’ve created rules within the OECD, for example, rules on tied aid that makes sure that when a nation offers to be generous, they’re not really just being generous to their own companies and their own interests, right? So the research shows, unfortunately, that in Belt and Road, lending from China to those countries, 89% of the value of that support is going to come back to Chinese vendors who are selling stuff into the program, right? Only 7% and a little bit more 7.6% I think a BRI money goes to local host country vendors, when China does a BRI financing facility. That’s versus well over 40% when it’s multilateral development banks that are putting money to work in the developing world. So that that’s not the whole story, in some cases, railroads China’s built in Addis Ababa, in Ethiopia, created a lot of economic benefit, I can point to other deals and worked out well for hosts, I can point to many that didn’t, but it’s very much a mixed bag. And in the whole, it sure seems to be benefiting the Chinese export or more than it does local vendors to develop that sort of crowding in of good economic activity in the developing country, that’s being assessed. As for China, there’s a bit of soul searching going on in Beijing these days. Belt and Road, in some ways, is getting China tangled up in the looming crisis of local debt implosions that Jennifer referred to, which, like it or not, they’re gonna own that, you know, they’re making this mess, in part after we did, as I said, we’ve had to clean it up over a year, see the Paris Club and otherwise trying to help create, like better government in the places we’re trying to help. China road in and basically squandered all that good governance work that a lot of really earnest people had been doing for a while by throwing too much money at the situation, I would say. And that, in turn is creating some sense of geopolitical mess that China is going to be blamed for in the not too distant future. Yes, they’ve exports more goods, they’ve gotten the ability to kind of put a wedge in there between some of these host countries and their friends in Washington or elsewhere. But in the long term, there’s some very hard questions they’re gonna have to be answered, I think, in Beijing as well. Thank you.   FASKIANOS:  Thank you. And now we’ll go to Charles, can you talk about how the Belt and Road initiative is affecting U.S. competitiveness in East Asia and how the US might respond to increase competitiveness and love, both at the, you know, in at the federal level and some national level?   BOUSTANY:  Okay, thanks. Thanks, Irina. And it’s a pleasure to join Jennifer and Dan on this webinar. And, Jennifer, I commend you too, for a terrific report and putting it all together as Dan said, this is really readable, a lot of valuable information in it. Belt road is Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy initiative. And if you think about foreign policy, a big part of foreign policy is foreign economic policy of which there are two areas there’s development and development financing, typically debt financing, of which Dan mentioned both the positives and the negatives of what China’s doing with the debt financing piece. But there’s also trade policy and investment policy which drive foreign economic policy in general. And China’s using all of this to sort of advance its political aims, its geostrategic aims globally. By design, this whole program, if successful, will seek to reorient commerce away from the United States and Europe and put us at a competitive disadvantage, at least that’s their objective. Both Jennifer and Dan mentioned the potential debt risk in the macro economic instability that could occur with this. A lot of this has to do with the fact that there are no transparent rules for the operation of the Belt and Road Initiative and there’s no central governing authority for it. So it’s very difficult for outside companies, American European companies to come in and compete. And of course, Jennifer mentioned subsidies that privileged Chinese companies at the expense of American and European companies, but also IP theft and technology transfer issues, create competitiveness issues for the United States. One of the biggest concerns I have is how the Belt and Road Initiative will sort of, work in tandem with trade policy. Written just last year, at the end of last year, after lengthy negotiations, a very large trade agreement was finally signed, involving 30% of global domestic product with the countries in Asia. This is called the Regional Comprehensive and Economic Partnership. It includes China, Japan, South Korea, the ten Southeast Asian countries that comprise ASEAN, along with Australia and New Zealand. This is a very large trade agreement, it’s going to have a significant impact in the Asia Pacific region. It has rules for e-commerce, digital trade, competition, government procurement, rules of origin, many of the things you would expect in a trade agreement. But the overall impact of this, once implemented, it will drive supply chain development and consolidation of supply chain development in the Asia Pacific region with China, still holding its central position in the supply chains, and really having centrality in a regional value chain network. Plus, it will play a complimentary role with BRI because it will enhance the BRI’s transportation energy and telecoms initiatives as well as some of the healthcare initiatives that are in play there.   The problem is the United States has not mounted a reasonable response to this yet, it’s you know, we’ve been sort of in fits and starts, it’s been a decade since we had a really new trade agreement. The last one that was negotiated, and finally signed into ratification was a South Korean trade agreement during the Obama Administration. So the United States is not engaged in trade, we’re not involved in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. And we pulled out of the Trans Pacific Partnership, which is the other high value trade agreement in the region. And as somebody who was involved in policymaking, I’m hearing from ambassadors, others involved in governments and foreign countries in the region, that there’s a real demand for U.S. engagement in economic space, both in the development sense, and in the trade sense in this region, because we’re falling behind. And that’s the risk, that’s the significant risk to competitiveness that we’re facing in the region. Now, there are things that could be done. This report gives a signal a significant number of recommendations in various areas, whether it’s in trade, you know, dealing with the international multilateral bodies, standard setting bodies and so forth. But clearly, we need significant investment in research and development in this country. And that’s going to include federal dollars going in, but also investments in university and research institutions around this country, coupled with private sector incentives for investment. And this is where local and state communities will come in because A, they will benefit from federal dollars that would be invested in this area. But we cannot mount a competitive response without a full, local, state , and federal partnership to strengthen the American economy, to have a vibrant growing American economy with a good education system, both at all levels, and especially STEM education at all levels.   We also need to amend our visa and immigration policies to attract the best and brightest around the world. Whether we’re talking about students, researchers, scientists and engineers. Jennifer mentioned the Development Finance Corporation and the Export Import Bank of the United States. These are critically important. The development Finance Corporation was a consolidation of other development organizations within the federal government into one, that was a good step forward. But it has a paltry amount of money. And it needs reforms. It needs more money for one. But even that’s not going to compete with the Belt and Road Initiative and development projects alone. We need to allow it to partner with other likeminded countries to create incentives for private investment to follow the government dollars, because then we can compete with China in this in this arena, if private, direct investment comes through. But we’re also going to need to put pressure in a multilateral way on China to meet international standards with regard to the way it lends money, because those their practices are out of line with international norms. And this creates problems for U.S. competitiveness, we need to have a transparent playing field with standards that are adhered to, which means the US needs to push China on enforcement of these measures, whether it’s in trade agreements, or in lending practices, and hold China’s feet to the fire with regards to its commitments. And lastly, on some of these recommendations, we have to get back in the trade game, the United States can immediately start to negotiate sectoral trade agreement starting with digital trade, maybe healthcare goods and supplies, we could look at energy and green energy, good trade in those areas, as starting points, and use those sectoral agreements to try to eventually get back to a point where we renegotiate entry into the successor agreement of TPP, which is the CP TPP. It’s the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans Pacific Partnership. If we don’t get back into the trade arena, we’re going to be at a disadvantage in in terms of participation in supply chains and global value chains, particularly in the Asia Pacific region. And the two things that are going to drive investment and commerce and keep American companies competitive will be the development of these of these global value chains, and the standards that surround them. And if we’re absent in both of those arenas, will fall behind in in our competitiveness. So finally, the role for our state and local governments and economic agencies at the state and local level will be to really assist in creating a vibrant growing community in a 21st century with new infrastructure, education at the highest standards, especially in STEM and partnering with our federal government as part of an overall strategy to meet this competitive challenge for the 21st century. So with that, I’ll stop and then let’s move to questions.   FASKIANOS:  Wonderful, thank you. So we’re going to go to all of you now, you can click on the raised hand icon to ask a question, or you can put your question in the Q&A box. And please also tell us who you are. If I call on you, please unmute yourself and identify yourself as well, so that we know. I’m going to go first to a written question from Kevin Haroff, who is the mayor of Larkspur in Larkspur, California. And his question is, he’s a mayor in Northern California active in supporting institutional efforts to promote renewable energy sources and storage technologies. The US has a lead in the sector, while China seems bent on promoting reliance on fossil fuel energy generation, how can we leverage our local expertise with renewables to help to promote these technologies in countries targeted by the Belt and Road Initiative? And I don’t think you all need to answer that, but who wants to take it right?   HILLMAN:  I’ll at least start. First of all, thank you and it is a great question, and it is something that the taskforce spent a lot of time on, because the concern really is that that China is in essence trying to have it both ways. On the one hand, at one of the recent meetings of these huge BRI forums, China came out with this notion that they are now going to green the Belt and Road and put out a lot of statements about the greening of the Belt and Road. And yet what we’re seeing clearly on the ground is that China has already funded more than 260 coal fired power plants being built, you know, in these BRI countries and is basically allowing countries that often simply do don’t really understand renewable energy. I mean, we’ve tried to dig into why is it that countries are going to China for these coal fired plants? And the answer is many fold. But one of them is China is increasingly the only country out there that will continue to, to finance coal fired plants. Again, the United States and many other countries have completely pulled back and I’ve encouraged the multilateral development banks to back out of funding coal fired power. So you got to go to China, if that’s what you want. Why do countries want it? Again, a lot of the data indicating that for many in these BRI countries, they don’t really understand or trust renewable energy, they perceive coal as being cheaper. And that is, again, something China is promoting why because China wants to have an outlet for its coal. I mean, China is one of the largest coal producers. And again, as sort of Dan was saying earlier, part of the motivation for China is to have an outlet for its excess capacity, including in coal. And thirdly, there is a sense that the again, the alternatives are not well known and are not well out there. So one of the things that the task force is clearly recommending is that the United States, in essence, massively expand a program that was begun under President Obama called Power Africa, which is working to build renewable clean energy power plants throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. And it is unique because it brings together local officials in these countries and in the United States, bringing together technical expertise, you know, again, to help educate local officials on how to run a clean power plant, and bringing together financing and technology, again, from across the United States to invest in this Power Africa. And one of the things many things that we’re recommending is take that program global, and put a lot more money into it, and have the sort of Power Africa model of this public private partnership exist in all of the BRI countries, not just in Africa.   FASKIANOS: Does anybody else wants to add to that?   BOUSTANY: The administration put together, the previous administration put together something called the Blue Dot Network, which was focused on infrastructure and standards, but it’s not well defined. And one of the things we recommend in the report is to give this, you know, let’s refine and define this program is Blue Dot Network beyond just some sort of a branding approach, so that it could attract private dollars, private investment only from the US, but from other market based economies into green technology projects, and renewable energy. So we hope that this current administration will look at this and look at ways creative ways to do this and also to coordinate it with our development bank, our multilateral development banks to focus on renewable energy projects in these energy starving countries. They can model it after the Power Africa program, which has been very successful. That’s I mean, that’s a nice model to build off of, as Jennifer laid out.     ROSEN: Let me offer one more thought on this one. Our competitiveness in renewables will be fought and won at home. If in our home economy, we get serious about transitioning to clean, renewable energy systems and we use the scale of the world’s largest economy, otherwise known as the United States of America, to build that out, prove that out and get good at it, we will kick butt around the world, against the Chinese as well. But make no mistake, they are absolutely trying to do both. They’re not just about coal. China is also the largest installed solar capacity on the planet, for example, and are dumping, putting investing both smartly and in silly ways, massive amounts of money into winning the green energy future of the world, which is going to be 100 years, if not 500 years, or the great market to own, you know, so we’ve got legislative work as Charles could probably talk us all into the night to do here, which is just so challenging to make sure that we’ve taken care of our foundations here at home, that will make it credible, that America wants to be a renewable energy vendor globally.   HILLMAN:  I’d only add that one of the sort of ironies that we really, you really notice when you when you study what China is doing here, is China is can has— if you look at the list of companies producing solar producing hydro, producing wind power, they’re all Chinese companies. The entire list of the most competitive companies in this space are Chinese companies. And yet what they’re largely exporting along the BRI, the majority of their exports in terms of building power plants have not been there, so they’re not exporting a lot of this renewal technology to their BRI countries there. That’s where they’re exploiting the coal fired plants. So part of the other part of what the report recommends is that the United States join with its friends and allies to get serious about saying to China, you have to live up to this green belt pledge. I mean, you have to stop funding coal fired plants, you have to stop funding a whole series of things that even China’s own criteria identifies as long term damage to the economy.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Representative Matthew LoPresti. And he is the Hawaii representative. So if you can unmute yourself.   Q: Aloha, can you hear me? So thanks for doing this. I wanted to address something that Dr. Boustany had mentioned. And he’s talking about state and local governments being involved in assisting and creating, I guess opportunities, but I’m at a loss as to what exactly at the state level we can do. You know Hawaii, for example, has special cultural relations with many of the Pacific countries being, let’s say, targeted by BRI investments. But I don’t really, I just hope for a concrete if not maybe an abstract example of what sort of things we could do at the state level.   BOUSTANY: Yeah thanks, Matthew. I think that’s an open question and frankly, we want to hear more about what the needs are, and how state and local officials envision their role in this. But in a broad way, I mean, certainly sitting from Washington, clearly more investment is going to be needed in STEM education. And so it’s one thing to throw money at it, but second, but how do you create a really high quality program in, you know, high schools, middle schools that, you know, wet those students’ appetites to move on into college and in graduate degrees, to be the next innovators in the world. So education is gonna be, I think, a fundamental area, where there’s gonna be a major role for state and local governments to help us with our self-strengthening, building up our own domestic competitive economy so that we can so that we can compete globally and more broadly, I think that’s the number one area. I mean, the other will be infrastructure, because the federal government’s going to have is apparently on track to spend money on infrastructure broadly, as President Biden has laid out, and looking at how the states use that opportunity, to enhance their competitiveness will be will be critical. I know, those are still sort of on the high level, but again, I think it’s really going to be up to local officials and state officials to figure out how they can position their states to be extremely competitive in a global marketplace.   FASKIANOS: Go ahead.   ROSEN: No, I was just gonna say I’m tempted to point out again, that the our biggest challenge with China and BRI is ourselves ultimately, right? China is a formidable, formidable peer competitor out there for global competitiveness. But we can handle that, if we are aligned and together about our priorities here in the United States and there is a lot of catch up work we have to do to get our policy setting, right? And it’s ultimately it’s got to be built up from the local level, right? That sort of top down vision of what America should do, has left many, many, many Americans, you know, unconvinced that they should change how they think about granting a mandate to Washington to do things for them, whether it’s STEM investment, or, you know, some people still fighting for more coal investment, of course, in parts of the country importantly, right? So, you know, the, it’s got to be bottom up, ultimately, and I’m not sure Matt that answers like, what, what, what we can do for you. It’s more like what you can what we all need to do, wherever we’re sitting to try to work toward a shared vision for what it’s going to take to deal with the world we’re in.   FASKIANOS:  Thank you. I’m going to take a written question from Commissioner Felix Lopez. He serves on the Las Animas County Board of Commissioners in Colorado, and he asked what is the Biden administration’s position on holding China’s feet to the fire? It’s a very broad question.   BOUSTANY: But you know, we’re waiting to see exactly how this is going to play out. So broad approach to China right now is on three fronts confrontation where there are certain red lines, national security, human rights, there will be competition on a broad range of areas, technology, economics, and so forth, and there’ll be areas of cooperation. But we have a phase one trade agreement, and I know that the new U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai has taken it upon herself to be very strong and looking at how to enforce that agreement, which so far has not met targets. Secondly, I think, where we deal with China in international bodies, we need to be very concrete with them, and very specific about where they’re violating international norms or rulings with regard to trade, and to build alliances with other countries to keep the pressure on them. And I think Dan mentioned earlier on the debt side, we, you know, along with Europe, the Paris Club and others, we can put a lot of pressure on China to adhere to the standards, but also the US working with allies can help other countries understand what they’re getting into before they sign on the dotted line, and help them build capacity on how to assess whether their projects are feasible and whether they should sign on the dotted line to accept the kind of debt that China is going to put them in. So I think there are a number of areas where we can do these things, to try to hold China accountable. But we need to do a better job in the multilateral organizations, and we need to be very firm with them, head to head, when we negotiate with them.   HILLMAN:  I just really briefly add to that. As a result of this taskforce report, those of us that were sort of the authors and the co-chairs of it have been engaged in a very extensive series of meetings with both members of Congress, as well as the administration to just talk about the report and what we found and what our recommendations are. And what I can pass on to you is that we have met with your sort of very receptive ears. So I think it’s very clear that the Biden administration is trying to take this very, sort of, you know, comprehensive approach to rethinking how we are addressing the issues with China. I think no major decisions have been made yet on exactly how to approach all of the things that were done during the Trump administration. In other words, the imposition of the tariffs under Section 301, which obviously then garnered a lot of retaliation on the other side, exactly what to do about, I mean, a number of the things that were done, including increased export controls. So again, there’s more controls now on what can be lawfully shipped to China. Again, no decisions yet on exactly what’s going to happen there. There have been more again, investment reviews where there is a greater degree of looking at what China is doing when it invest in the U.S. market. Again, those controls are also under examination. Obviously, the Trump administration started the process that has to this date and continued by the Biden administration in terms of banning the imports of cotton and certain other goods that are coming out of Xinjiang Province on the theory that on the evidence that, that there is a lot of forced labor that is going on in those markets. So right now, those are among the many policies that are part of this very comprehensive sort of review and at the same time, over on Capitol Hill, there is a major bipartisan effort to put together a broad package of legislation that addresses again, the issues that we’ve had with China in a very comprehensive way. So the basic answer to your question is to be determined, but know that I think a lot of work is going on to come up with that comprehensive policy. And I personally think it’s the one of the things that is at that top of the list and is getting a lot of priority attention, both on Capitol Hill and within the Biden administration. And I at least am very pleased that they have taken a very serious look at what’s in this report and the recommendations that we’ve made.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m gonna go to Commissioner John Gentry, who is serves on the Wilson County Commission, so if you unmute yourself, that would be great.   Q: Can you hear me now? Okay, yeah, I’m John Gentry. I live down just to the east of Nashville. I just want to talk about energy for a second. China continues to build coal burning plants even in their own country at an alarming rate as well, as well as exporting them. And at the same time, they are doing windmills and solars and all that. But a lot of what we import from China is, well, are those windmill blades and solar panels as well. And I’m just wondering, sometimes I feel that they’re getting a benefit of us going to green, which I think is the correct thing to do. And I think our companies in this country are not producing as much green energy equipment as we should. And how are we going to address that? Thank you.   ROSEN: Can I kick our first crack at that one? Yeah, this is, here’s, here’s the, here’s the trick. As a local official, if you’re trying to get the most bang for your bond, tax dollar revenue, China’s got something for you, right? You’ve got a refurbished school, you’ve got to build local power assets. And the Chinese products on offer, right, might be by far the most attractively priced for you locally. But in the long run, if we don’t sustain and build up American capabilities to be competitive in these industries, China’s not going to be an affordable monopolist in the world economy, which is the way it’s gone and solar panel there, I dare say predatory behavior in that industry, a few years back, knocked most of the players out of the marketplace, who were starting to put businesses together both in the United States and the European Union as well. And so this is an area where the sort of resetting the incentives and the tradeoff between the short term necessity facing the local official, and the long term necessity of protecting a competitive, American environment where good innovators and people put together businesses that can be, you know, without needing huge tariffs into the future competitive, that is the challenge the Biden administration has in front of it right now. Unfortunately, we’ve really squandered I would say the past four years to roll out a viable set of temporary industrial policy interventions that will set reasonable conditions for a period of time to ensure that in critical areas like turbine blades for windmill, what have you, the unnatural aspect of Chinese prices will not displace the opportunity to build good businesses among market economies that can serve the needs that local officials, at the end of the day, are tasked with finding the best product for their available prices without having to tell people they’re going to have to pay even more of their kids college funds or their Walt Disney World money in their local property taxes to buy, to buy a more expensive blade, right? So that is, it comes down to that, it comes down to money. And it’s going to take a big federal budget, frankly, to fix the distorted situation we’re in right now. And the more we do that, with other likeminded market economies in the world, the cheaper it will be. For us the less long term federal American debt there will be if we don’t do this, not just by ourselves, sticking our finger in the eye of every other market economy on the planet. But absolutely in partnership lockstep, I dare say, with our partners in the OECD and other economies. Jennifer, that’s a big part of the report really underscoring how much low hanging fruit there is for us to deal with this whole thing better if we do it in partnership, I think.   HILLMAN:  The only thing I would add for what it’s worth is clearly the Biden administration is recognizing how important this is in that with respect to the issues of government procurement, the Biden ministration has said very strongly that they are going to adopt much more strict rules on buy America. So again, it is a little bit of the chicken and egg that Dan has just talked to, you know, it’s one thing to say buy America, it’s important to then make sure that there is American product out there to buy. And so we’re going to have to go through this balancing of making sure that we are creating enough American competitive product to buy at the same time that we are putting on stronger and stronger restrictions to encourage government procurement to be in that buy America space.   FASKIANOS:  Great, thank you. Um, I am going to go to, we just got an upvote on a Manish Kothari questions, I’ll go that one next, a member of the Maryland Economic Development Commission. Perception in the host countries is China is willing to fund what they want, and U.S. and Europeans are not listening to what they, the host country wants, but pushing for their Western owned agendas. How do we counter this perception?   HILLMAN:  I’ll just start by saying their perception is right on. And it is important that people recognize how significant this is. I mean, if we read a lot of the data coming out of Southeast Asia and coming out of Africa. Those are both regions in which the amount of U.S. foreign direct investment into Southeast Asia is far greater than the amount of Chinese investment, the amount of U.S. foreign direct investment in Africa is greater than Chinese investment. Yet, if you ask people in Southeast Asia and Africa, who is the most important, the most powerful economic player in fill in the blank your country? The answer is China, China, China, China, because China has done so much a better job, if you will, of branding, what they’ve done. And oftentimes, when American companies are competing in those markets, they’re at a subcontractor or sub subcontractor level in which that American flag is not hanging on that project. So again, there’s less awareness. But the other part of it is that China’s lending is being done without paying attention to the important standards that the World Bank that the United States, that the OECD, that many other countries insist upon. And so part of what the task force recommends, and I think part of what is going to be critical, is to do a much better job of providing technical assistance at the very beginning of a project to help countries understand the sort of pros and cons of using China as opposed to using a US or an OECD based approach. And again, when we have done this, we have been fairly successful, because among the many things that countries are starting to understand, is that if you do a BRI project, the vast majority of the labor will be Chinese labor, you will not get any kind of skills transfer to your citizens, you will not even get any jobs for your citizens because the labor is going to come out of China, and there will be little to no skills transfer, that’s one of the things countries are realizing. Countries are starting to realize that doing these BRI projects can also have detrimental impacts on their environment, and in other ways, and that they’re not always very financially a good deal. I mean, the United States went in early to provide technical support. So this is again, U.S. government, you know, economists, diplomats lawyers, in a single port project in Myanmar, and went in and said, hey, wait a minute, here, let us talk to you about it, let us provide you a little bit of technical assistance before you do this, the cost of that project was brought down from $7.3 billion to $1.3 billion as a result of that technical assistance. So part of what we’re also recommending is that we really gear up this kind of technical assistance that can help countries legitimately compare what does China have to offer and what does it mean for us long term versus what would a US offer or consortium of US, European, Japanese, Australian, you know, other countries actually look like in practice, so that we can put more weight on the things that the United States does well, which is to do good environmental impact assessments and to do labor skills, training, and a lot of the other things that need to be part of that overall package. So it is a lot of really, really upscaling our commercial diplomacy in this effort, among other things.   BOUSTANY: Right, to Jennifer’s point, beefing up our embassies, and giving them that charge, making sure they have the proper number of commercial Foreign Service officers who can provide that hands on technical expertise, working with the private sector entities that are trying to go in and do these projects. Because oftentimes, if we have on the ground commercial service officers in our embassies, who know the players in the respective government, they build those relationships. And then they can assist and expedite the technical assistance that needs to be brought to bear early rather than after the fact when the Chinese have already gotten the contract. So one of our recommendations is to beef up the embassies, with the proper personnel across the spectrum to help with, help the private sector trying to invest in these projects. And then secondly, making sure that the ambassadors and senior folks at the embassies have been given that charge from the very top of our government, that this is something they need to do.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I’m going to go next to Chris Naff, Selectman Chris Naff. Chris, if you can accept or unmute yourself.   Q: Thank you very much. Can you all hear me? I appreciate everyone’s time. This is the second CFR Zoom chat I’ve been able to participate in and I always learn a lot, so I thank the CFR for putting this together. I think one of the things I’m most fascinated by in recent economic policy is the shift on how we think about trade. And I know, Representative Boustany, I apologize if I get that name wrong. I mentioned, you know, that is probably important to re-engage on trade and rethink our involvement with TPP. But what I really think is interesting is Paul Ryan and President Obama were probably more closely aligned on TPP, than your typical republican voter in 2020. So I think a huge segment of the voting base, particularly in the Republican Party, but also perhaps in the Democrat Party, with the rise of folks like AOC, and Bernie Sanders, probably are all very concerned about what free trade has done to the country. I live in New England. You know, we saw a huge loss of manufacturing jobs to the south about 50, 60 years ago. And I think, if you ask voters in the rust belt, or the quote unquote, flyover states, how they feel about trade, it probably makes them very uneasy. And I think, you know, my main question is, how do we how do we go about addressing employment for working class Americans of all walks of life throughout the country, but also framing it in a way that, you know, Steve Jobs went to President Obama. And I think, to his credit, Obama wanted to try to bring back manufacturing jobs, particularly for things like iPhones. Steve Jobs simply went to the White House and told the president that those jobs aren’t coming back. And shortly thereafter, the president, you know, repeated that to the public. I think you saw a very different approach between Tim Cook and President Trump, where Apple’s began opening more manufacturing plants, the United States not to say that that’s all due to the Trump administration, that probably was a lot of internal discussions at Apple, but how do we make sure that if we do re engage on free trade, were keeping up the progress the last administration made, and getting better jobs for working class and for a certain demographic seeing a true wage increase for the first time in 40 years?   BOUSTANY: Well, that is a complicated question. Trade, jobs related to trade and tradable goods typically played pay higher wages than those that are not in, in trade. I mean, there’s been a lot of work on that. Now, yes, a lot of jobs are displaced. So I think the key is to understand what is the purpose of trade policy? And purpose of trade policy is to basically have a fair playing field with the free flow of goods and services, which the United States can compete with. The issue of jobs gets back to the competitiveness issue. And so that’s what we need to do a better job with domestic policies in the United States, in terms of making our making us more competitive, so that we see good growth of jobs and wage growth as well, I think the bite administration is focused on this like a laser right now going forward, we’ll be interested in seeing exactly what policies they come out with. But for instance, for those who lost jobs related to trade, we had a program called Trade Adjustment Assistance, but it has never really met, met the goals of what it was intended to do. Many of us, myself included, tried to reform that program, but we’ve had a lot of political opposition, and it failed. But the bigger issue is going to be job displacement from technology. And that’s going to be a monumental task going forward in terms of coming up with the right kinds of policies to deal with the rapid change in advance of technology, which is, you know, whether it’s automation or artificial intelligence, which is going to have much more of a damaging effect on jobs and wages in the long run. So the key is how do you build human productivity, not just overall productivity? And that’s going to require a lot of domestic policy changes, as well as you know, looking at what is the purpose of trade? What, where does trade play a role, trade will open markets, but we also need to enforce our trade agreements to make sure that there is fair trade ongoing.   ROSEN: Yeah, I mean, I know, I know we’re at time, but as an economist, I have to applaud the way Charles just put it and underscore this. Trade can make the whole country wealthier in the aggregate, but there’s no joke about an economist who drowns in a river that’s only one inch deep on average, which if you get it means that one inch on average doesn’t mean that it’s only one inch all along, and the nation could be wealthier, and half the people could be poor and less well off. And so it’s not enough just to and, hey, please give the trade guys some credit, they did their part, which was to get, you know, distortions to commerce down. And that sounded pretty American, right? But it’s not the whole deal. We need to think about income distribution and equality of opportunity as well. And there, we are still fighting ideological wars, as though that’s not the right place where policy, the hell it’s not. Okay, if we don’t get everyone up to a certain degree of education, then even if we close the borders small trade, people are going to continue to get poorer within the United States, because the haves in this country are doing really well come good times and bad, they’re doing a pretty good job of keeping things on track. It’s people that don’t have education, don’t have access to health care, don’t have access to a lot of basics, that we have to figure out as a community as a nation, whether we’re going to address that, or wait for the next electoral upheaval, to teach us that people aren’t going to just watch themselves go down in flames. So it’s, it is a brave new world, compared to the one that that we were we were talking about just a few years ago. But trade is not really the problem. It’s the other side of the coin, that needs to be attended to, in my opinion, I say that as a. as a free trader.   HILLMAN:  And I’ll, there’s so much I could add on this. But again, I only say I will certainly underscore and I think our report sort of underscores the acceptance of the notion that it’s relatively cold comfort to someone that’s lost their job to try to tell them, oh, no, you didn’t lose your job to train, you lost it to technology, you lost it to automation, I mean, that doesn’t work. And so clearly, one of the things that this report is saying is that the huge investment has to be in again, helping make America and American workers more competitive. But the second thing that I will say is that, you know, the task force makes it very clear that the clock is ticking. In other words, you know, it would be great if the United States could, in essence, stop the world and say, let us take the next number of years in order to do all of these investments, to develop our own technologies to be more competitive, but the rest of the world is not waiting. And one of the things that’s very clear that’s happening is the rest of the world is engaging in all of these trade agreements. Again, during the time that we were writing this BRI report, along came the regional cooperative economic partnership and agreement among China, Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and all ten of the members of the ASEAN. That covers a third of the people in the world and a third of the GDP in the world. And what it is creating is a huge draw into China, such that many of the supply chains and everything else in Asia are now being reoriented around China, and we are on the outside looking in. We are not a member of the CP TPP, that’s the other big trade agreement in Asia, we are not part of the RCEP, we are watching the BRI agreement, for example, result in major train lines that now run between China all the way through to London. So that we now are having thousands and thousands of freight trains moving goods from Europe in and out of China such that you know, last month for the first time Europe is sending and trading more goods with China than it is with the United States. So again, part of it is yes, we have to get our domestic house in order and yes, we have to understand what trade and trade agreements do for American workers. But at the same time, we cannot just sit on the sidelines, or it may be too late. By the time we ultimately decide that we’re ready to start reengaging in the trade space.   FASKIANOS:  Well, with that, unfortunately, we are over time. Thank you all for being with us today for writing this report, deliberating and writing the report. I commend it to all of you, if you haven’t had a chance to read it, please do. And you’ll find on the website, additional infographics, blog posts and supporting materials. So it’s really rich, rich of offerings there. And I’m sorry, we couldn’t get to all the questions. There are a lot of questions in my apologies. We will send a link to the webinar recording and transcript soon again. Thank you, Jennifer Hellman, Charles Boustany, and Dan Rosen for doing this. We really appreciate it. We’re having our next webinar next Thursday, May 13, on countering extremism at the municipal level. So I hope you will join us for that we will send the invitation is going out now. And you can also follow State and Local Officials Initiative on Twitter @CFR_Local. We encourage you to visit CFR.org and ForeignAffairs.com for more expertise and analysis and you can always send us an email to [email protected] about other topics you would like us to cover or resources that you need, we’re here to be a resource for all of you a nonpartisan resource, so thank you all again, stay well, stay safe, and thank you.   (END)
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    Susan A. Thornton, senior fellow at Yale University’s Paul Tsai China Center and visiting lecturer in law, leads a conversation on the challenges that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) poses to the United States, and strategies to address economic risks, work with allies and partners on meeting developing countries’ needs, and protect U.S. security interests in BRI countries. FASKIANOS: Welcome to CFR’s Winter Spring 2021 Academic Webinar series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Thank you all for joining us. Today's meeting is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. If you would like to share it with your colleagues or revisit it, please do. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Susan Thornton with us today to talk about China's Belt and Road Initiative. Ms. Thornton is a senior fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center and a visiting lecturer in law at Yale Law School. In 2018, she retired from the State Department after a 28-year diplomatic career focused primarily on East and Central Asia. In leadership roles in Washington, D.C. she worked on China and Korea policy, including stabilizing relations with Taiwan, the U.S-China Cyber Agreement, the Paris Climate accord, and she led a successful negotiation in Pyongyang for monitoring the Agreed Framework on denuclearization. Ms. Thornton is also a member of the recently released CFR Independent Task Force report, China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States. We circulated the task force report to you in advance of this webinar. Just to set the stage, CFR sponsors independent task forces to assess issues of critical importance to U.S. foreign policy. Task force members endorse a general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group—though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. So, Susan was part of this. The task force was chaired by Columbia University's Jacob Lew and Stanford University's Gary Roughead. And these task forces are bipartisan. So, we have a Republican and a Democrat to be the chairs. The directors of the report were Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks. And so with that, I want to turn it over to you, Susan, to talk a little bit about the task force's deliberations, your findings, and the recommendations that you put forward vis-a-vie China's Belt and Road Initiative. THORNTON: Great. Well, thank you so much, Irina, and it's great to have so many of you with us tuning in today, and I'm really happy to be here and to talk about not only the task force report, but also more generally, China's Belt and Road Initiative. I know that many people may have read the task force report or heard about the Belt and Road Initiative, but I just wanted to start off with a story about my first meeting with the so-called Belt and Road Initiative. I was working in Central Asia as a diplomat, when the United States was pushing forward the concept called the New Silk Road. This was an effort that we were undertaking to try to connect North to South—countries of South Asia to countries of Central Asia through Afghanistan—as part of a program to try to develop Afghanistan. And low and behold, working on that project in 2010, 2011, 2012, and all of a sudden, in 2013, Xi Jinping announced his sort of New Silk Road initiative, which initially was called something about the Silk Road, but then was over time, developed and morphed into the so-called Belt and Road Initiative. And I think it's really interesting to look at sort of how the whole thing has developed over time. In 2014, I moved back to the State Department in Washington to work on China policy, and, the Belt and Road, as we talk about in the task force report, sort of started—there were various kinds of justifications or explanations for it by the Chinese government. One was that they wanted to close the gap between their inner-underdeveloped provinces and the coastal areas by connecting the inner part of China to markets further to the west, Central Asia, etc., connecting through to maybe India or other places. Of course, at that time, this was after the great financial crisis and they had a lot of excess construction and manufacturing capability, especially steel, which was creating havoc with international steel markets and cement and things like that. And they had companies that needed markets. So, they were pushing out construction. They also, had a lot of excess foreign exchange reserves and were creating also at this time, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to use some of those reserves. But, they had even more than they needed for that, so they were pushing out some of their finance and lending to new markets. They were looking to, of course, expand markets, also for their manufacturing sector and they wanted transport linkages and connectivity with new markets in that area. And they were also, I think, looking to have transport options. They were very worried about being hemmed in, cut off, encircled, and that the Malacca Straits might at some point no longer be open to their shipping and commerce. And so, they're always looking for new alternatives in these routes, overland, or some kind of a plan B, or a safety valve for Chinese commercial transport. Our task force looked at a lot of the aspects of the Belt and Road as it's developed since Xi Jinping first announced it in 2013 and found a number of areas—you've probably all read in the media, there's lots of aspects of the Belt and Road Initiative that are held up as potentially problematic. So, we looked at these and what we came up with in terms of concerns that we might have and how the Belt and Road might negatively impact U.S. global interest, we first noted—and you've heard a lot about this debt trap phenomenon that's associated with the Belt and Road Initiative—and we did look at that and did find that the debt burdens that were being loaded on to BRI investment countries were of some concern and not always transparent, and not always being considered in terms of what debts those countries already owed. A second concern was the subsidization of state-owned enterprises in China for doing this work might present with an uneven playing field for non-Chinese firms trying to enter those markets. We also found that the Belt and Road would enable China to sort of lock in Chinese ecosystems—economic ecosystems—by installing technology and standards in countries that would then make those countries dependent on a whole line of Chinese imports. We thought that countries’ dependence on—in a lot of cases, China was building sort of carbon-intensive power plants, and that this is potentially problematic from obviously a climate change mitigation point of view, but once they're built, it makes it much more difficult to mitigate CO2 emissions. The standards issue is one that we looked at and found some concerning aspects, not just with respect to power plants, but also the environmental and labor impacts of other projects and other kinds of standards—safety standards—and how those were being looked at and whether or not some of these projects were involving some kind of non-transparent financing arrangements that could undermine governance in these countries and potentially promote corruption. And I think last but not least, there was a concern about whether or not the Belt and Road Initiative is allowing China to sort of—under the cover of economic infrastructure development—also expand its military footprint in the region more widely. So those were some of the concerns that we found. Admittedly, a lot of this opportunity that China was exploiting to build infrastructure was meeting a critical need that wasn't being met otherwise. And I think when we talked about this in the task force, we have to acknowledge that the U.S. has really gotten out of the infrastructure provision business. USAID does not really do infrastructure anymore. OPIC has been sort of beleaguered in terms of financing and has not really been in the business of doing risk insurance for these kinds of projects. And U.S. companies have not really been active as much as they had been in previous decades in the infrastructure business around the world, especially in high-risk environments, as many of these countries were—not all, but some. And then secondly, that international financial institutions, the World Bank, and the other development banks had really also gotten away from infrastructure building. And so, this left the field open, and you can't really blame countries that need infrastructure—and the need has been well identified—for turning to Chinese alternatives that were being offered. And, the Chinese construction companies, it turns out, are actually quite good at building things and can do so quite efficiently, notwithstanding these other concerns that I mentioned. So, I think what we recommended to try to mitigate the potential risks of BRI to U.S. interests is that we should try to come up with an effort that would lead sort of a competing BRI effort or a competing coalition of countries that could offer countries to at least have an alternative to Chinese-financed investment so that they could compare and have some alternative, I guess I will put it that way. We also thought that we should enhance U.S. commercial diplomacy to promote these high-level standards alternatives to BRI and raise public awareness in host countries and among the governments of standards problems in case they're not aware of them. We also thought we should offer some technical support to BRI countries to help them vet prospective projects, so that there's more of an equal playing field in the negotiation part. They can look at standards and maybe demand some higher standards of construction, etc. And that we should encourage countries to be mindful of and to make sure they have safeguards in place against corruption and non-transparent financial dealings. We also recommend a number of other things that the U.S. needs to do to improve its competitiveness in this area: devoting additional funding to research and development, increasing investment in STEM, amending our immigration and visa policies to make it easier for us to attract and retain the world's best talent, etc. And I think some reforms to some of the development banks would also be in order. One of the reasons why countries find it so easy to go with a Chinese project proposal is that the Chinese make it quite easy for governments that have low capacity or have limited resources to scrutinize project documents, etc., they make it quite easy, the project agreements are short, they are understandable, the terms are fairly clear, there's not a lot of lead time, and they do things quickly. So, these are some of the areas where I think criticisms of the international development banks need to be examined and taken into account. So, there are a number of other recommendations, and I don't want to go on too long, but I do just want to mention that from my vantage point, which was inside the U.S. government looking at this pretty closely from 2014 to 2018, there's been a huge range of opinion and a swing in the opinion in the United States about China's Belt and Road Initiative, and the task force really wanted to try to get to the bottom of this and find out what was going on and whether it was really warranted. In 2014, we were talking about, well, maybe we should join the BRI—we even attended the BRI summit in Beijing—and then sort of over the next couple of years opinion swung pretty wildly in a 180-degree fashion to "this is a real Trojan horse, and it's very bad." And I think what the task force shows in our report is that it's really somewhere in the middle and you really have to look at projects and countries on a case-by-case basis and make an assessment. And it's very hard to have a kind of a blanket comment or assessment of the overall sprawling kind of project that the BRI has become. So, I'll just stop there and see if people have questions. Thanks. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you so much, Susan, for that. And we will go to all of you for your questions. In addition, you can also ask Susan about her career if you want to know more about the Foreign Service. So, let’s go into questions now. (Gives queuing instructions). And we will take the first written question from Kevin Lockett, who is a senior student at Ohio University: “How can recipients of the Belt and Road Initiative utilize anti-dumping laws and countervailable subsidies to mitigate its negative effects on their economies?” THORNTON: That is a really interesting question. I think that what Kevin's getting at is there may be countries that are unhappy with the projects that they have taken on from the Chinese government through the Belt and Road Initiative, and are there projects that people are so unhappy with that they would be looking for some kind of mediation or dispute resolution? Normally the dumping and countervailing subsidies duties would come into play when China is—or another country, any country really—has produced sort of overcapacity through subsidization and is dumping it at below market prices in another country and injuring their industry. So, I'm not sure in most of the cases that we're talking about here—if you're talking about countervailing subsidies and dumping of kind of steel and concrete in the form of construction projects—the only reason that a country would bring that to the WTO would be if it's injuring their own concrete and steel industry, and that they want to get protection for that. But, most of these countries have taken these projects on knowing the Chinese were bringing that. So, I'm not sure that that would be a relevant example, as much for a sort of infrastructure case. The steel dumping is something that has been an issue for developed countries who have steel industries that compete with a lot of the steel that China is producing. And there have been steel dumping cases in the U.S., in Europe, Canada and elsewhere. But most of the BRI target countries would not be major steel producers, I think, so that probably hasn't come up. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to a raised hand to Mojubaolu Okome. Q: Thank you very much. I'm a professor at Brooklyn College of political science. I wonder about this assumption that the corruption in the infrastructure development projects is particularly to be identified with the Chinese, but the other actors are not corrupt. Because I am from Nigeria, and I study Nigeria. And actually, there is a lot of corruption in international development. It's quite well known that bribing political officials is part of the way business is done. So, the Chinese didn't bring this. They're just getting into the mode in terms of how business is done. With the abandonment of funding sources, given the funding of such projects, what are the African countries supposed to do? I heard from you that, yes, the Chinese were taking advantage of the absence of alternatives. So, moving forward, how do you think the U.S., as an actor, should proceed? Really an honest assessment of how bad things are in this sector. THORNTON: I could not agree with you more, professor. I'm originally from Boston, and you don't have to go to international development to find corruption in big infrastructure projects. There was a pretty notorious case after the so-called "Big Dig" in Boston, which was a huge highway and tunnel project. So, infrastructure projects are notorious for this, because they are huge sums of money, and they usually involve government permits because you have to set aside large areas, and usually a lot of them are government procurement projects. So again, there's a lot of rent-seeking activity. So you're absolutely right about this. And you're right, that the Chinese didn't bring it, and actually, the Chinese are probably better in this area than some other major construction firms around the world. So, I wouldn't say that, necessarily, we found in the task force report that this was a particular risk with China. It's a particular risk with big infrastructure projects in countries where governance is a little bit less than what we would want to see. So that's what the risk area is that we're talking about. I think what we should look for, and what we should be particularly wary of, is projects that don't make any economic sense. Those are the ones that are the real white elephant projects that are clearly political vanity projects, and that will basically be a complete waste of money for countries that don't have that money to spend and waste. So, the most prominent example that I can think of off the top of my head, in the case of BRI in this category, would be that port in Sri Lanka, that was built at the behest of the previous president of Sri Lanka, who was from that town, who wanted this port there, even though there was another port one hundred miles down the coast that was already set in a big trading port. They also built an airport in that town, and made flights land in the airport, and then take off again and go to the capital city twenty minutes away, in order to have traffic at the airport. So, there are some things that—especially at the beginning, I think, of China's Belt and Road Initiative—that were not very heavily scrutinized, probably. The Chinese really don't want to be financing projects that are not economically viable, because then they have a hard time getting repaid, and that's what happened in that case. So, I think this is what the World Bank and other development banks spend a lot of time doing. They do feasibility studies to find out if the project is going to be economically sustainable, how is the government going to pay it back, what is the rest of the debt picture look like, and then what are the labor impacts and environmental impacts?  But all that bureaucracy also frustrates local populations and governments who need infrastructure, and it takes a long time. So, there's a balance to be struck there. And I think the Chinese are probably not striking the right balance. I think maybe the IFIs are not striking the right balance, and we need to really try to move these two things back together and come up with solutions that can work for local countries and populations; that they can take care of these externality problems and impact on the labor market environment, etc., but not take seven years to do feasibility studies before you can say yes or no to a project. That's just unacceptable as well. I think having competition for Chinese projects is difficult because they have this cushion of foreign exchange reserves that they're sitting on. I will say, though, that in the post-pandemic period, that cushion has diminished a lot. So, we'll probably see more selectivity. I think over the course of the Belt and Road, we are seeing China be more judicious about what it funds, so I would expect it to sort of go that direction; to not be funding as much. Maybe the concerns will be reduced as that happens as well. I think the U.S. really needs to get after the international financial institutions to make their lending more demand driven. They've really gotten out of the business of funding infrastructure because of all of the potential for corruption and environmental and labor impacts. So, I think we've really got to look harder at what we're funding and get back into the business of providing an alternative. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Jon West, who's gotten two up-votes. He's a senior at the Virginia Military Institute: “My question is, how do we, as a leader of the liberal international order, reestablish our appeal to these countries in Africa and South America who are underdeveloped, from the expansionist mentality of China? Seeing as China and Russia are heading there, as you say, to the alternative ‘international order’?" THORNTON: I think some of the things that we need to do have already been mentioned. So first and foremost, I would say, if you're just talking about the United States, we need to make sure that we are the most dynamic, most competitive, most vibrant economy with the most innovative technology, the most talented workforce, and that we keep running faster, so to speak, in the international economic competition. And I think a lot of the things that the Biden administration has put forward in terms of this new bill to invest—I mean I'm not going to get into the specifics of whether the amount of money is right, and whether it's placed right—but the U.S. comparative advantage is that we attract talent from all over the world, we attract the best brains, and they all come here to go to school and do their research, and have scientific collaborations and work on new inventions, and get financing, startup financing from our financial sector. So, we've got to keep that comparative advantage going. And immigration policies are obviously relevant there. I think investing in the R&D sector in the U.S. is something we've gotten away from and that was probably a mistake. None of this, however, is going to bring back U.S. construction companies building infrastructure overseas with USAID funding that as we did in the 1970s and 1980s. Those industries have gone to places like Turkey, Ukraine, China, Korea, and Japan, and we just don't do as much of that as we used to. We have big energy pipeline construction, offshore construction. We have companies that participate in these big projects, but as far as the general contractors in these high-risk areas, we just don't have them as much as we used to. So, I think there are other areas where we will compete in technological and innovative areas. I know that the green technology is going to be a big area of intense international competition going forward and people with low cost, high quality technology will win that competition. But that's what the liberal international economic order is: it's a competition, it should be open market. And to do that, you've got to make sure the playing field is level and you've got to make sure that we get rid of subsidies that advantage non-market players, and that's part of what you heard a lot about in the Trump administration, was trying to tackle all of those aspects of China's economic structure that allows them to sort of subsidize these state-owned enterprises. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Morton Holbrook, who has written a question, but he also raised his hand. So Morton over to you. Please identify yourself and unmute. Q: Yes, thanks for a very clear description of the good points and bad points of Belt and Road. You probably know the China people in the Biden administration. Do you think they'll mostly criticize that? Or will we actually go to bat and try to compete in the ways you've just suggested? What do you think is the likely course?  THORNTON: Thanks for that question. I do know them, and I think they're aware of all of these areas of vulnerability that we have in terms of this infrastructure push in the broader global market. They're looking to partner with allies, I think, in order to tackle and to do a better job in this space. Japan still has a quite robust construction and infrastructure building effort ongoing in East Asia, so do the Koreans. And I think what we've been doing recently is partnering with some of those countries to try to provide financing where the U.S. might have a comparative advantage or certain aspects of technology where we might have a comparative advantage, and let those countries do the bulk of the construction work and doing the contracting. So, I think that's what we're going to be looking at. There have been a few efforts to try to also push on higher standards for infrastructure projects. It may be that at some point, they'll get into a conversation with the Chinese about that. We've talked to the Chinese about suspending debt payments for infrastructure because of the pandemic. The Chinese have been receptive to that. They want to get, I think, the Chinese to be a member of the so-called Paris Club, which is the lenders club that coordinates all the debts and make sure everyone gets paid back in a certain fair way. And so far, the Chinese have been resisting that, but we may see movement on that, which would be good. I think we'll see partnerships in other parts of the world as well to try to give alternatives to what the Chinese are proposing, as well as working the Chinese directly on their standards issues. FASKIANOS: Susan, we got a written question from Gail Evans at Georgia Institute of Technology. “Can you give us an example of a successful project of the Initiative and example of the worst one, and why in each case?” THORNTON: Well, it's kind of hard to come up with an example of the best project because there's not a clear list of projects that are considered Belt and Road. But I would say that quite a large project that has been successful in both China's eyes and the recipient countries’ eyes has been this Central Asian pipeline project, which takes oil and gas from Central Asian states like Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, across Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and brings it all the way to a Terminus in eastern China. It's a multi-thousand mile or thousand kilometer set of pipelines that has been constructed over a long period of time—started before the Belt and Road project actually—but it allows countries that are pretty poor and resource poor to transport their resources to an actual market that can pay top dollar for it. And it also allows countries to get transit fees for the pipeline that goes across their territory if they don't have the resources themselves, but they're allowing transport of it. So, I think that has been a quite successful project where the synergies of the two economies are resource-intensive exporter and the Chinese-importer has allowed all the countries to benefit. The construction projects are huge. And there have been instances where the local countries have required local labor to be used. So, in other words, local populations have gotten training by the Chinese. I know in Turkmenistan, where I actually worked at one point, there was a requirement that 70 percent of the labor force be local. So, the Chinese had to train them all and give them skills in engineering and other things. So that's a good project. There are a lot of examples of the other kind. I mentioned the Sri Lankan port. I would say that another example—and again, this project started before the Belt and Road Initiative but it continues still—and this is the Gwadar port in Pakistan. It may eventually come online and be useful, but it's been in the works now at great expense for decades. And it's in a part of Pakistan where there's an insurgency and so it's been riddled with security problems. The Chinese have been really unable to actually even open it or operate it, never mind make it profitable. This is one of the objectives that people who are concerned about China's security footprint as a result of the Belt and Road, raise this project. But at this point, it's not a concern, because they're still not able to really operate the port safely. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Zoe Steffensen, who has raised her hand. Q: Hi, hope you're doing well. I'm an undergraduate student at UCLA presently studying communication and political science. My question is, what do you perceive as the most effective strategy for curbing China's subsidy of coal exports, and outsourcing of pollution to other countries through its continuous financing of dirty fossil fuel energy projects—an unfortunate outcome to which the BRI has given rise? THORNTON: Good question. I think that people are working on this actually, right now in the context of the COP26, upcoming at the end of the year in the UK, and in the course of all of the negotiations on climate going on right now. It's certainly something that in the last US administration was not addressed directly with China. But I think the Europeans have been working on this with China already for a couple of years and urging them to make a pledge that they will not build any more coal-fired power plants,—no more capacity. So that's a pledge that's been taken on by a number of countries that used to build coal-fired power plants and are no longer building them. And I think especially the Europeans—I'm not sure about the U.S.—but the Europeans would like the Chinese to make a similar pledge as part of their commitments in the context of the climate change negotiations. So, we'll see if they're successful, but it's certainly something that Chinese are well aware of people being very concerned about. FASKIANOS: Okay, I'm going to go to a written question from Wei Liang, a professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies, who says: “Will the intensifying U.S. economic-tech decoupling with China reinforce China's efforts to engage those BRI countries, despite the fact that it could be politically and economically risky to do so?” THORNTON: I think there's a whole bunch of questions embedded in that question. One that would be important for answering this would be how far would the decoupling of U.S. and China in the technology sphere go? I know that the Chinese are worried about how far the technology decoupling will go. And they've also—for even longer than they've been worried about that—been worried about how they will have markets for their technology when all of the developed country markets for technology are already sewn up by high-end producers. For example, in the handset—the smartphone market. Apple and other high-end producers in Asia—Samsung in Korea—have sewn up a lot of the market in the developed world. And so, they were looking for markets for their handsets. This was back a couple of decades ago, and it turned out that their handsets were very popular in the developing world where people couldn't afford maybe as much an Apple iPhone, but still wanted to have a reasonable phone. So, I think they've been working those developing markets for their technology for some time now, and many of the developing countries that are also BRI recipient countries—but even before BRI existed already—were dependent on Chinese telecommunications—backbone equipment, etc. So, a lot of those countries are already using kind of Chinese standard telecoms equipment, and that gives them a leg up in certain markets for telecommunications and infrastructure equipment. So, that is one of the realities and it's probably exacerbated by the BRI, that there is this part of the world that has Chinese equipment, and how will that look going forward if there's a major technology decoupling where there's a curtain or a division between these two systems, I think is something that we should all be worried about, actually, because probably countries have that equipment don't want to be in sort of a separated state. So, how we will manage that is a good question. But certainly, the Chinese have taken advantage of those developing country markets where they've been active to sell their equipment and install it and a lot of those countries are now dependent on it for sure. FASKIANOS: There are a couple questions in the chat about the pandemic. From Catherine McQueeny at St. Louis University, Madrid: “How has the pandemic affected the BRI specifically? Has there been a shift to soft power diplomacy and a shift towards a health Silk Road?” And then one other question from Laila Bichara about the effect of the pandemic on African countries unable to pay China's loans: “Are international organizations such as World Bank, IMF helping them, so they avoid China taking over those loans?” THORNTON: On the issue of loan payments and the pandemic, I think China has suspended most of its loan repayment programs. There's been some discussion about whether a suspension of loan payments is better than a restructuring of the loans. In other words, taking down the interest rates or forgiving some of the principal etc., which the Chinese have not done. And the Chinese have said that at this point during the pandemic, suspending the payments because if you start to restructure loans, then your credit rating drops, and they don't want to see the credit ratings drop. So, we'll see how this develops. I think the Chinese have expressed kind of understanding that it's going to be hard for countries to pay it back and they're probably preparing to take a haircut. But they haven't determined what that's going to be yet. I think as far as the pandemic's effect on the BRI—we're already seeing it—which is that the Chinese are going to have to scale back based on economic realities, not only out there in the field, but also based on what they're going to be willing to put at risk now in the face of economic straightened circumstances. I think the health Silk Road has really been talked about much more since the pandemic—it existed in a very nascent way before the pandemic. And, probably, the vaccines that the Chinese are making available to the developing world, and particularly to BRI countries are being touted as part of the health Silk Road. But that's not really what the health Silk Road was meant to be initially. China does have significant health cooperation programs in a lot of these countries that predate the BRI. So, in looking at this, my sense is that they're wrapping a lot of their pre-existing cooperation into the BRI, and so that's where the health Silk Road comes from. As far as what new development or infrastructure investment they're putting in on health, I'm not really sure that that has been or will continue to be a major focus. It will continue to be a focus, as it always has been, but whether it's something new or not, I haven't really been able to identify. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Owen Greene, who's raised his hand. Q: Thank you very much. Thanks very much for the comments so far. I'm a professor at a UK university, University of Bradford, and a China watcher and I've been investigating BRI for some time. And there are so many issues, can I just raise two linked ones? I'd like you to explore the prospects and the limits of your suggestion from your report to do with the technical support for vetting deals, which obviously in order to enable a more equal set of negotiations when BRI—and other big infrastructure projects are there. So therein lies the first question. And the other: if we were to simply set things up, which are purely targeted at the BRI, rather than as you say, there are many large infrastructure projects, which raise issues about what deal the government—the recipient government is getting. I wonder whether you can elaborate on how you think that would be best organized. You could imagine some scenarios in which you handed over to IFIs or OECD, DAC or something. But then it would become risky in terms of getting entangled in their own bureaucratic procedures as it were. But at the same time, you'd want some multilateralism in some way, and I just wonder what your thinking is about that. And maybe in a similar vein, one of the biggest areas—and one of the areas that I'm personally most engaged with China—is opening the discourse in China to do with the conflict sensitivity of their investments overseas. By conflict sensitivity, often you can do unintentional harm to local tensions and conflicts through the way you design your investments, who you employ, etc. And in my experience, China has become more aware of these risks over the last five years, but in the end isn't well set up to manage or to assess those risks on its own. And so having some forum in which there is a more collective discussion with other outside countries—including the United States—that have done their assessments about the fragility within the country and the areas in which for a sustainable investment, you need to take care. I just wonder whether you consider that and whether you think there's some opportunities for setting up some sort of dialogue process around particular countries, I suppose that would be best organized? THORNTON: Those are all really good questions and really specific but necessary technical aspects of all of the responses that we've seen so far in the Belt and Road Initiative. My initial general thought is that it would have been good in my view, if when this all came about back when the AIIB was being put together—and back when the BRI was first mooted by the Chinese—the thing has been very politicized in the United States, so it complicates everything now that we're trying to do that would be substantive and good in responding to it in a way. So that's a general comment. The first question about setting up an assistance or technical team to help BRI countries assess project proposals and the financing, etc.—I mean, we have done this in a couple of instances. And it is an area that is a good area for the U.S. to be helpful. We've done it, and the only case I know of for sure is Myanmar. And that has now taken on a new direction, unfortunately. So maybe that's not a great example. But, at the time it worked well, and the Myanmar government was appreciative of the help. And I think that's what you need. If you're not doing feasibility studies, with big World Bank teams or ADB teams coming in and looking at things, you can't expect a government with limited resources to be able to take the place of that. So you've got to come up with something that can be approximate stand in. The second question about how to do this—give it to the IFIs—my view is that these things should be multilateralized. We have all these development banks, and we put a lot of money into them. One of the reasons why the U.S. doesn't have a lot of money the way the Chinese do for these kinds of projects is because we give a lot of money to the World Bank and the ADB and all the other development banks to do this kind of work to make these kind of project evaluations and to do the lending and etc. So, I do worry that in a lot of this "competing with China" area, we seem to be coming up with new structures and not fixing the old structures. And I don't think that is the right way to go, although it may be expedient. So one of the examples for this is the blue dot network—which the U.S. set up with a number of partners, including Japan and Asia to try to pursue sustainable development projects and have a label for a high standards project—hasn't really gotten off the ground. And I think you can't do a standard labeling project if you're only a few countries. That has to be multilateral, in my view. And the last part of your question, I'm not sure that I'm going to remember it. FASKIANOS:  I think I should limit it to one question because we have over twenty written questions. So, I am going to go to another question. I'm going to pair these questions because it's interesting, they are from a professor and from a student. So, from Professor Terry Kleven who teaches at Central College in Pella, Iowa: “Thank you for your summary of the BRI, and your example of how you bring your education and background to a life of civil service. By working with students regularly in advising them for career opportunities in Foreign Service, what would you say is the best kind of education background for students to work in an Asian context?” From the student perspective, Mark Kleszczewski, who's a student in the masters in international affairs program at City University of New York, Baruch College, wants you to speak in broader terms about becoming a Foreign Service officer. “How much, do you feel, you were able to make a difference directly? And, would you encourage people to apply?” THORNTON: On educational background, to be a Foreign Service officer, you can study anything and go into the Foreign Service and do very well, we have doctors, we have lawyers, we have people who hadn't even finished undergrad come in. So, it's really a mixed bag. But what you have to know is that being a Foreign Service officer is kind of a jack of all trades type of undertaking, if you're going to make it a career. We are generalists. And maybe an educational background that would prepare you to move every two or three years to a completely new field, and then ramp up on a very steep learning curve, your knowledge about whatever that new place or new functional area is that you're going to have to learn about and be the expert within the first few months and represent the United States and talking to other government officials about it. That is kind of the scope. I would say people come in with scientific backgrounds, with economics backgrounds, political science is a very popular one, and international relations, of course, is good. I always recommend that people should have done some overseas experience, either study abroad, or somehow worked overseas or been an intern overseas—just immersion in a foreign culture in your past is a pretty big prerequisite for this. But it doesn't have to be anything dramatic or earth shattering, but it's just so that you can see that other cultures think differently from us about things, and you have to be able to meet people in the middle and if you're not interested in compromise, it's probably not the career path for you. But, if you are, and if you like being a generalist and working on new things, and meeting people and moving overseas, it's a terrific field. I think the thing I loved about it the most is—I'm a little bit ADD myself—so I loved that every two or three years or four years, I would get the itch and I'd be like, “Okay, now, where are we going to go next? What are we going to do next?" But I think, as far as the impact goes, I am a Foreign Service officer who loved being in the field; I worked a lot in Washington, and so-called [got to] see-the-sausage-get-made. I was having a conversation with a friend of mine who's just gone into the administration, and he's very young, and he said, "Oh, guess what, I don't actually make policy." So, it is important to understand that there are differences within the kinds of different jobs that you'll do. So, you'll get to see a lot and you'll get to learn a lot about the U.S. government and how things work—or don't work, as the case may be. But it's all very exciting and very enriching and very satisfying. And whether you can move the mountain yourself or not—I don't want to pretend that that's the case—but certainly, you can have an impact whenever you're meeting people and representing the United States, I think you can have an impact. FASKIANOS: And languages, Susan? THORNTON: Languages. Yes. Many, as many as possible. FASKIANOS: Good. I am going to go to Mike Nelson next who has raised his hand. Q: Thank you very much. I was glad that Professor Liang asked about technology because I do technology policy and look at how governments shape the evolution of the internet and digital technologies. You've talked about how the Chinese are using the Belt and Road Initiative to promote their companies. I'm just curious, are they really succeeding in doing that? Are they explicitly linking the contracts to the use of Chinese technology and technology standards? And is it only digital technology? Or are there other things that the Belt and Road Initiative is being used to promote? THORNTON: That's a good question. I probably don't know as much about this as you do but the Digital Silk Road is certainly focused on telecommunication, and internet, and cyber technologies. At the beginning, I think it was just that, Huawei had this equipment, we know that they got a lot of subsidies from the Chinese government, they were a low-cost competitor to Western companies, they had entree to a lot of these developing country markets through other things that they've been doing, not just the Belt and Road. The Chinese have been active in Africa for a very long time, way before the Belt and Road was announced, going back thirty to forty years. So, I think they started already before the Belt and Road with their Huawei offers of telecom-backbone, and then once you have the backbone, and you have the entree with the local telecoms companies, then I'm sure that a lot of the Chinese consumer equipment followed from that—not that they had a lock on those markets. I'm not sure that there's a requirement that follows from having the big government infrastructure for using then following with consumer equipment. But the Digital Silk Road is definitely now part of this effort to push Chinese technology out there. And it is now, since the last couple of years, especially, a defensive move or protective move for them from this decoupling that they are so worried about. So, they are making a big push now with the Digital Silk Road to ensure that they can keep those markets and those countries continue to be dependent on Chinese equipment. FASKIANOS: I'm looking for a last question that would be really short to answer, but I'm not seeing one that would take very little time. Tim McNamara asks: “If several countries and several major projects fall into the debt-trap, would that not presumably cause China's economy to suffer to some extent?” THORNTON: That's a really good question. The Sri Lankan port is really the best and really the only case so far of this debt trap, which is that the trap is the "you owe China money and you can't pay," so China takes your port as its own and commandeers it. If China had a lot of debts that could not be repaid, would they take debt for equity swaps? Or would they just take a hit and not be repaid is a good question. I guess it depends on what the object is that they're owed for. But if they end up losing a lot of money on Belt and Road investments, it's probably going to be a hit to their kind of government banking sector. But these are all state-owned banks, so the government has the resources to make them whole. I don't think you'll see a financial crisis in China as a result of debt that is not paid back from the Belt and Road Initiative. But the Chinese government is worried about how many projects there may be out there in this category, and I think that's why you're going to see them start to really clamp down on and unchain the dogs on Belt and Road projects. All these companies went off and made all these deals and the Chinese government probably didn't have the kind of control over it that they now wish that they had had and you're going to see them start to impose that, I think, now to try to prevent that. But bottom line, I don't think they'll have a debt crisis from it. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much. This was a wonderful hour. I apologize— we still have over twenty-five questions lingering, but we cannot get to them all. So, for that, I apologize. But we appreciate your taking the time, Susan Thornton, to be with us. You can follow Susan on Twitter @suea_thornton, so you can follow her tweets. And again, thank you, Susan for your service on our task force. Again, if you haven't had a chance to read the task force report, I hope you will do so. The link was circulated as a background resource and also, if you go that to our website, you'll find a lot of accompanying materials for the task force, so it's really worthwhile. This concludes our Winter/Spring Academic Webinar series. We will be sending the fall lineup in the coming weeks, so stay tuned. And again, follow us on @CFR_Academic, go to CFR.org, ThinkGlobalHealth.org, and ForeignAffairs.com for new research and analysis. Good luck with finals, or whatever is happening at your schools during this pandemic. Stay well and stay safe. For more event audio, subscribe on iTunes or visit us at CFR.org. (END)
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    Global Supply Chains in the Era of COVID-19
    Play
    Our panelists examine the vulnerabilities in global supply chains exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, resiliency options such as supplier diversification, reshoring critical industries, and stockpiling vital supplies, and the effect of such steps on international trade.
  • Asia
    The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor—Hard Reality Greets BRI’s Signature Initiative
    The Belt and Road Initiative's flagship project in Pakistan is struggling to fulfill China's hopes.
  • Climate Change
    Extreme Weather Worsens, Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day, and More
    Podcast
    Extreme weather events ramp up in Australia and the United States; Myanmar’s military junta marks Armed Forces Day; and leaders from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay convene for a virtual trade summit.
  • China
    China’s Belt and Road
    The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests.
  • Trade
    Europe and the Prospects for WTO Reform
    The United States should recognize, and attempt to seize, the opportunity on WTO Appellate Body reform being offered by the European Union.
  • International Organizations
    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala: A Well-Qualified New Leader for the WTO
    When Robert Azevedo stepped down last year from the post of director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the trade body’s top leadership position, former Nigerian Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala quickly became the universal favorite to land the job—except for among members of the Trump administration. Because the WTO operates on the basis of consensus, the Trump administration's opposition effectively vetoed her in favor of the current South Korean Trade Minister Yoo Myung-hee. In an interview with the Financial Times, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer outlined the Trump administration’s objection, claiming that Okonjo-Iweala is “somebody from the World Bank who does development” with no “real trade experience.” (Okonjo-Iweala previously held the number-two position at the Bank.) However, Lighthizer’s comments are not altogether credible, given Okonjo-Iweala’s experience with trade issues as finance minister. Nevertheless, the WTO and its membership could read a calendar as well as anyone else, and so the debate over the next director general remained frozen until after the U.S. presidential elections. After consulting with U.S. officials earlier this month, Myung-hee withdrew her candidacy. The Biden administration then formally expressed its support for Okonjo-Iweala. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala is, among other things, board chair of Gavi, a global alliance to ensure low-income countries can access life-saving vaccines. She has already signaled that high on her agenda at the WTO will be to promote and facilitate the enhanced distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and protective equipment. In traditional and social media, the focus on Okonjo-Iweala has been that she is the first woman and the first African to head the WTO. As such she is a symbol, and symbols are important: many Africans see her as validating the competency and leadership skills of African women.  With the popular focus on Okonjo-Iweala’s gender, race, and country of origin, overlooked could be her competency and expertise, regularly demonstrated during her career at the World Bank and twice as Nigeria's finance minister. Demonstrated competency accounts, at least in part, for her strong support from the beginning within the WTO.  Okonjo-Iweala self-identifies as foremost a Nigerian, and in public always wears Igbo dress. She worked as a cook for rebels on the frontlines in the 1967–70 civil war between Nigeria and Igbo-dominated Biafra. That said, her higher education was at Harvard and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She worked in Washington, D.C. for twenty-five years. Her husband is a physician practicing in Washington, D.C. She became an American citizen in 2019.
  • Trade
    New Cyber Brief: Transatlantic Data Transfers: The Slow-Motion Crisis
    U.S. surveillance activities have alarmed European partners, throwing the future of transatlantic digital trade into question. The United States should embrace collaboration and protections for personal data.