Technology and Innovation

Violence attributed to online hate speech has increased worldwide. Societies confronting the trend must deal with questions of free speech and censorship on widely used tech platforms.

This is a guest post by Chris Bronk, assistant professor of computer and information systems and associate director of the Center for Information Security Research and Education at the University of Houston. In the development of new information technology (IT) there exists a degree of irrational exuberance. Indeed, consultancy Gartner has described the innovation to adoption process of IT as a “hype cycle,” in which the peak of our inflated expectations is soon followed by a trough of disillusionment and an eventual plateau of productivity in which a technology becomes suitably mature. 5G, the Fifth Generation of mobile wireless technologies, is somewhere in the hype cycle. There has been much conversation about 5G, and it will produce some novel capabilities, but a lingering question exists about how much energy it will consume vis-a-viz prior wireless mobile networks. Before 5G’s energy consumption issues are discussed (along with some interesting energy features), it’s useful to know some of what will make it a significant improvement on the current, Long Term Evolution (LTE) systems that our smartphones and other cellular wireless devices use today.  The main event is that 5G will be faster, perhaps as much as twenty times as fast as current LTE networks. It will also be very low latency, which means that the speed at which 5G signals are sent and received will be effectively imperceptible. How fast? Researchers at Deutsche Telekom have reported latency figures of 3 milliseconds (ms). Consider that the amount of time it takes for visual stimuli to travel from the eye to the brain is about 10 ms (LTE latency is about 50 ms). This low latency means that applications in which instantaneous communication is necessary become more possible – think self-driving cars whose processing is faster than the human brain sharing the road via distributed computer control. Such systems could allow traffic flows to be fully automated. No more traffic lights! So what makes 5G different? The transformative nature of 5G will largely be achieved in how radio frequency is allocated and employed. Current U.S. mobile devices “talk” to the network at frequencies from 700 megahertz to 6 gigahertz. This service will continue because base stations (i.e. cell phone towers) at these bands allow for the transmission of data by radio over significant distance. What’s new is in the millimeter wave bands – 24-86 GHz. This slice of radio spectrum can carry large amounts of data, but not nearly as far. That’s where considering energy usage comes in. A lot more equipment needs to be installed and potentially more data needs to be processed. Additionally, energy efficiency needs to be a core design principle. First of all, however, it is important to note that millimeter wave communications are prone to interference. For example, radio at above 20 GHz doesn’t go through walls well. It doesn’t go through leaves well. It doesn’t play nicely with rain. What does this mean? Many, many more antennas. Suddenly 5G starts sounding like WiFi or maybe some evolution of WiMax technologies. In other words, interference means different infrastructure. A number of significant differences exist between LTE and 5G when considering energy usage. First, because of the new millimeter band pieces of spectrum used, there will likely be a densification of existing cellular networks with the massive addition of small cells and a provision for peer-to-peer (P2P) communication. In 5G, simultaneous transmission and reception will be possible, which likely necessitates new investment in fiber optics to move the data. Some wireless functions will move to cloud processing and much more of the infrastructure will be virtual in nature. So what’s the energy angle? Computers use electricity. But how much? This is a question my colleague Krishna Palem and I worked on answering about a decade ago. The problem then was that computer microprocessors had developed a heat problem due to the high frequencies of electric current involved (upwards of 2GHz). Device consumption numbers were increasing, which led to wondering if computer energy utilization was going to rise rapidly and begin rapidly gobbling up much more electricity. At the time we did the work, we assumed that about 3 percent of global energy use was in the IT sector, but some things were hard to measure – like energy usage in cell phone networks. We developed a term for pushing innovation in energy efficiency – a sustainability innovation quotient (SIQ). No, it didn’t take off like wildfire, but efficiency innovation is now widely considered when building new computing hardware. We moved on. What about power consumption in networks? Someone else picked up the ball of calculating energy usage for IT networks. Now this is not a piece about Huawei, but it turns out that the person doing academic research in the same energy analysis vein as we were is a Swedish academic – Dr. Anders Andrae – an employee of Huawei. Because Huawei ships a large amount of networking hardware, it is able to produce solid estimates on electricity demand. Measuring networking power consumption requires the capacity to determine how much energy wired and wireless networks consume. These amount to fairly big numbers of devices and power draw. According to Huawei’s Andrae, fixed access networks consumed about 167 TWh of electricity in 2015 while wireless networks consumed roughly 50 TWh. That’s a big number – 1 TWh is a trillion watts/hour. For perspective the average American household consumes 7,200 kWh of electricity per year, but remember the networking numbers are global figures. Because energy efficiency has become a priority, an efficiency measure, the number of bits transmitted per Joule of energy expended, has become a standard. Having an efficiency metric to work with is useful especially as electricity costs in providing mobile phone/data service represent about 70 percent of the bill. However, a common concern is that if 5G offers much greater speed, say twenty times as much, a similar rise in energy consumption could follow. “A general concern is that higher data rates can only be achieved by consuming more energy; if the EE [energy efficiency] is constant, then 100× higher data rate in 5G is associated with a 100× higher energy consumption.” This is where headlines like, “Tsunami of data could consume 1/5 of global data by 2025,” come from. The data in R&D on this topic are not nearly as discouraging. Today’s cellular site delivering 28Mbit/sec has an energy consumption of 1.35kW, leading to an EE of 20 kbit/Joule. Recent papers report EE numbers in the order of 10Mbit/Joule in 5G systems. So, it’s pretty clearly understood that just allowing unabated increases in power consumption is impossible and the aim for industry is to push energy utilization down, significantly. To the Future! In addition to transmitting or harvesting data, energy can also be moved in 5G networks. With 5G, one of the novel technologies being considered is Radio Frequency (RF) harvesting; converting energy in transmitted radio waves to user devices or even wireless infrastructure (microcells, antenna arrays, etc.). Since RF signals can carry both energy and information, theoretically RF energy harvesting and information reception can be performed from the same RF input signal. This scheme is referred to as the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT). The hardware to support this doesn’t exist yet, but it has promise. However, since the operating power of the energy-harvesting component is much higher than that of the information decoding component, the energy harvesting zone is smaller than the information transmission zone. The Data Center Blues Unfortunately, another energy problem afoot. Although efficiency is now one of the elements incorporated into designing the next generation of mobile telecommunications infrastructure, the vast proliferation of devices, including those labeled the Internet of Things (IoT), will add up to additional energy consumption. Our biggest area of concern, however, is in data centers. Radoslav Danilak asserts that data centers will consume exponentially larger amounts of electricity, arguing, “consumption will double every four years.” While powering data centers with renewable sources is an aspirational goal of the IT industry, of equal importance is increasing energy efficiency. Yale’s Environment 360 program noted, “Insanely, most of the world’s largest centers are in hot or temperate climates, where vast amounts of energy are used to keep them from overheating.” Placement matters in keeping cooling costs down, but designing energy efficient processors and other components for servers is also important. Global data processing does not appear anywhere near a, and 5G will add to the global energy bill of both telecommunications firms and those that conduct computing in the cloud. So what’s the bottom line?  A lot of hyperbole surrounds 5G. The energy consumption issue is being addressed by all of the major equipment manufacturers. Carriers can’t afford massive, new power costs and will not deploy technology they can’t afford to operate. The deployment time for large and complete 5G networks will not be overnight and what constitutes 5G isn’t fully sorted out, but out of control energy consumption growth is not in the cards. That there could be innovation in how energy is harnessed and transmitted is a potentially important area for innovation. Our assumptions can and will change.

The United States should work with partners abroad to reduce orbital congestion, resolve ambiguities surrounding space resource utilization, and defend the planet against asteroids and other space objects. 

China’s industrial policy is aimed at rapidly expanding its high-tech sectors and developing its advanced manufacturing base, but President Trump and other leaders of industrial democracies see the plan as a threat.

A version of this blog was originally published at The Hill website. Guest blogger Daniel Scheitrum, assistant professor, Department of Agriculture and Resource Economics, University of Arizona, contributed as co-author to this blog in collaboration with CFR David M. Rubenstein Senior Fellow for Energy and the Environment Amy Myers Jaffe.    Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill requiring the Trump administration to find a way to remain in the global Paris climate accords. The bill is not expected to find approval in the U.S. Senate.  However, it does reflect a subtle shift in U.S. elective politics. Even among Republican politicians, recognizing the popularity of renewable energy and other climate friendly goals is becoming politically expedient. Members of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Department of Defense, and corporate leaders are calling for a stronger legislative response to climate change with increased regularity. There is also growing concern on both sides of the aisle that the United States needs to be more proactive in countering China’s embrace of advanced clean tech and artificial intelligence assisted energy and transport systems as a major plank of Beijing’s aggressive China 2025 industrial policy.  Energy innovation is a vital U.S. national interest. It is a pivotal factor to ensuring the U.S. military and space program maintain a critical technological edge over geopolitical rivals. Moreover, energy innovation supports U.S. global competitiveness by spurring new industries and successful technology companies and by boosting manufacturing productivity. Sadly, as U.S. federal spending on energy research and development has shrunk, many American innovation companies have turned to China as a source of more patient capital instead of tapping limited U.S. venture capital markets. The Trump administration would like to address this exodus of jobs and technology in its trade war with China but misses the boat by ignoring the link between U.S. energy innovation and the vast future market for goods and services related to climate change mitigation and adaptation that will come to dominate global export trade in the coming years.  By dropping out of the Paris agreement, the United States runs the risk that China or the European Union could use the U.S. absence from official global climate working groups to set energy standards and other carbon-related rules that could harm U.S. exports and the U.S. economy. It might seem counter intuitive, but progress made in global climate talks at Katowice, Poland, laid the groundwork for the U.S. to stick with the Paris accord framework. That’s because countries attending the talks, including the United States, which cannot formally withdraw from the accord until 2020, agreed upon uniform rules for measuring and tracking their own performance in cutting emissions. Climate negotiators also agreed to continue intensive discussions this year in Chile on how to connect emissions reductions efforts across regions, countries and sub-national entities so that regions can exchange credits for emissions reductions. The finalization of such rules offers an opportunity for the U.S. to rethink its posture on the Paris Accords and to take better advantage of economic opportunities to participate in international carbon credit markets where they exist. The U.S. economy can generate roughly 65 percent of the emissions reductions required to meet the 2015 U.S. Paris pledge from existing regulations and market trends. To make up the remainder, Congress should authorize the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue a national call for states and localities to volunteer projects that will cut the emissions of heat-trapping gases. Such a federalist voluntary national tender would create a coalition of the willing while avoiding a legal fight with the few remaining states that oppose participating in clean energy programs. The most successful voluntary programs could prove out policies that might someday be passed as more broadly mandated regulations.  The Paris Agreement requires nationally verified processes, and the proposed national voluntary tender system would accomplish that. It would also facilitate exchange of credits already taking place on the sub-national level. A federal system for promoting and tracking voluntary contributions would allow the United States to use local initiatives that have proved popular around many parts of the country to bring the country back into the Paris accord. This proposed tender program could be administered by the EPA, which has the authority to regulate carbon pollution. A national tender would let states and localities decide whether they want to volunteer contributions to the Paris Agreement. The United States would in turn get the general national benefits of remaining in the Paris Agreement without burdening voters in states and cities that do not wish to take part. Aggressive climate policies such as renewable portfolio standards are popular in many sections of the country, including states that initially opposed the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP) and the Paris Agreement: for example, Texas is home to some of the country’s largest wind farms and ranks third in the nation for new solar capacity. Other states that opposed the CPP—like Georgia, and Michigan—are now embracing renewable energy, given its popularity among corporations and cities: New Jersey originally joined the group of states suing the EPA to stop the CPP in 2015, but it has now rejoined the U.S. East Coast carbon market. In U.S. midterm elections, several newly elected governors—in Colorado, Connecticut, Nevada, Maine, Oregon, and Wisconsin—pledged to pursue 100 percent renewable energy state mandates, mirroring policies recently passed in California and Hawaii. The Math of Verifiable U.S. Contributions to the Paris Pledge Under the Paris Agreement, the United States pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions over the coming decade by 26 to 28 percent of 2005 levels. This equates to a reduction of 1,737 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon-dioxide equivalent (CDE). Achieving this reduction target via federal policies was daunting even for the Barack Obama administration, which proposed the Clean Power Plan (CPP) as a pillar of its climate initiatives. That plan would have regulated the U.S. power sector and required each state to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions significantly by 2030. The Trump administration is repealing the CPP. In August the administration unveiled its vision for a new rule, Affordable Clean Energy (ACE), that will focus greenhouse gas policies more narrowly in each state’s power sector on individual facility–level emissions rather than more ambitious state-wide comprehensive approaches. Based on official U.S. government statistics, modeling, and methods (as would also be the federal government’s basis), the United States could reduce its total greenhouse gas emissions by 1,150 MMT of CDE by 2025, or roughly 65 percent of what the U.S. Paris pledge requires, based on market trends and current policies. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) projects in its 2018 “high-resource scenario” -- which assumes falling U.S. prices for natural gas and solar energy -- that market forces and existing localized clean energy legislation will generate roughly 805 MMT of CDE reduction in the power sector by 2025. This projection represents a greater reduction than the 670 MMT of CDE that the Obama administration projected in 2015 that the CPP would achieve by 2025, according to the Federal Register. Official EPA calculations for emissions trends by 2025 under the proposed ACE mirror many of the assumptions of the DOE’s high-resource scenario. Market uncertainties and projected modeling differences weigh more heavily beyond 2025, when the politics of U.S. climate policy could be different than today’s. U.S. corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards, mandated by Congress in 2007 and to remain in place at least through 2022, are expected to eliminate roughly 270 MMT of CDE by 2025 as compared with 2005 levels. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that reforestation and other voluntary agricultural programs will save up to 60 MMT of CDE. That leaves a gap of roughly 600 MMT of CDE reductions to be met in other ways.  The Proposal The United States can generate the remaining emissions savings by organizing a nationally verifiable record of voluntary state and local action, by launching a program structured as a national tender. Willing states and localities would volunteer projects to be combined into the official U.S. nationally determined contribution based on their verifiability, scale, and capacity to create jobs. The Paris Agreement requires nationally verified processes, and the tender system would accomplish that. The administration could work with governors, tapping state and local efforts to meet the U.S. Paris pledge in a manner that promotes some of Trump’s other economic and foreign policy goals including ensuring economic competitiveness with China. A federal system for promoting and tracking voluntary contributions would allow the United States to use local initiatives that have proved popular around many parts of the country to bring the country back into the Paris accord. The proposed verification system for voluntary action builds on policies, like the newly proposed ACE, that require the EPA to work with each state on individual compliance plans that include evaluating state actions and targets and verifying emissions reductions. Those federal resources could be reconfigured to oversee a tender for states to contribute the remaining carbon reductions needed to meet the Paris pledge. The cost could be relatively low and similar to the approximately $50 million the EPA requested in fiscal year 2016–2017 to develop tools and work with each of the fifty states on the (now defunct) CPP. As DOE forecasts show, emissions from smaller states that strongly oppose the CPP, like Kentucky and West Virginia, are relatively small (in 2015 West Virginia’s were half of those of New York and one-sixth of Texas’s) and unlikely to increase on a scale that would counter reductions elsewhere. Many large carbon-intensive industries have substantial capital assets that would make it highly expensive to relocate just to avoid regulation, but the EPA would need to evaluate any distortions from emissions shuffling in calculating the national pledge. Roughly 70 percent of Americans say the United States should lead on climate change solutions. Many states have already acted, alone or in regional coalitions to reduce emissions, including by carrying out their original CPP plans. Additional urban policies such as car-free pedestrian regions, expanded public transit, and energy-efficiency programs for buildings, trucking, and businesses could be substantive enough to achieve the remaining reductions needed to meet the U.S. Paris pledge commitment. To name a few examples, California, which has already cut carbon emissions by over 60 MMT since 2005 even as the state’s economy grew 41 percent, is accelerating its push for renewable energy, which is expected to reach 50 percent by 2020, ten years ahead of schedule. New York City is working on a plan to reduce emissions by 10 MMT by 2030; the plan includes a 20 percent drop in energy use for buildings and increased use of battery storage. The popularity of 100 percent renewable energy state mandates is growing.  Washington state is the latest U.S. state to announce a more comprehensive clean energy program. Moreover, a recent scientific paper also postulates that as much as 21% of annual U.S. carbon emissions could be offset via comprehensive natural climate solutions such as reforestation and restoration of grasslands, wetlands and seagrass, as well as other methods, such as use of biochar, improved management of plantations, cover crops, and manure management. Policies like these being considered around the country could approach the 600 MMT needed to stay in Paris, if the political signal of a national program were to create momentum. Revisiting Federal Energy and Environmental Policies That Benefit U.S. Competitiveness The Congress could choose to supplement the tender plan with other policies that would reduce emissions without undermining U.S. competitiveness and jobs. For example, Congress should revisit the Trump administration’s rollbacks of regulations on fugitive oil and gas methane emissions. While some oil-sector representatives argue that methane leakage regulations harm the industry, the opposite is true: implementation of these standards in California, Colorado, and Wyoming have spurred new technologies, jobs, and exportable U.S. products and services. Many large U.S. oil and gas producers have already pledged to address methane leakage from their operations. Using new monitoring and capture technologies to reduce methane leakage is vital to ensure that U.S. energy exports meet the future requirements of global investors and customers in Asia and Europe, who are increasingly focused on the relative carbon content of their fuels, as well as carbon pricing and other carbon-related regulations. Other countries would also purchase these new technologies to reduce methane leakage in their own industries. Revisiting U.S. rules for fugitive emissions could contribute up to 100 MMT of CDE of additional reductions of methane and other volatile organic compound emissions toward the Paris pledge. Congress should press the Trump administration to reconsider its approach to California’s stricter vehicle emissions standards by passing its own new bill to promote the manufacturing of advanced clean vehicles in the United States to meet competition from China. California’s policy to implement additional greenhouse gas emissions standards for automobiles from 2023 to 2025 is in limbo after the EPA proposed reversing an Obama-era executive order to align federal rules with these specific California vehicle carbon emissions restrictions. The proposed reversal would not affect greenhouse gas reductions that will come from congressionally mandated federal corporate average automobile efficiency standards that remain in effect. Still, a Trump administration decision to sue California to block these 2023–2025 greenhouse gas emissions vehicle standards, if implemented, would decrease the likelihood that the United States will set global standards for the next generation of vehicles. The aggressive California policy was a lever to press American carmakers to produce more electric and advanced vehicles. The U.S. Congress should revisit this topic. China has said it may ban sales of traditional internal combustion engine cars by 2040; France and the United Kingdom have already announced similar bans. Higher standards push U.S. carmakers to produce non-gasoline vehicles as fast as possible. U.S. cars need to remain competitive, which means retaining or strengthening current automobile standards, not weakening them. Capping the growth of U.S. domestic motor fuel use by improving automobile standards is a key lever that allows the United States to become a larger net energy exporter, thereby reducing the U.S. trade deficit. Congress should also consider improving fuel economy for U.S. trucks. Such a policy would enhance U.S. supply-chain competitiveness. Conclusion The national tender approach would allow the United States to remain in the Paris Agreement and continue a leadership role in climate negotiations that was allowing the United States to promote its global economic dominance in energy and automotive technologies. The United States needs to have a voice in the process to protect exports from border tariffs or taxes on greenhouse gas emissions embedded in U.S. goods and services. Under the Paris terms, the United States has until 2020 before a final decision can be implemented. Remaining in the agreement through a national tender would be a win-win scenario: it would allow unified verification for those states and municipalities that adopt climate-friendly policies, while those that do not choose to act on climate change would still gain all the trade and economic benefits of staying within the Paris accord, for the good of the United States as a whole. Remaining in the agreement is particularly important in light of a recent scientific report that suggests that the speed and scale of the direct consequences of global warming are more dire than previously thought.

The economic performance of lower-income developing countries will be crucial to reducing poverty further. Although these economies face significant headwinds, they could also seize important new growth opportunities—especially with the help of digital platforms.

Working toward a definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems contributes to the creation of norms, even in the absence of binding legal instruments. 

Aspirations to return American astronauts to the moon after a nearly half-century absence should be rooted in science, not foreign policy.

This International Women's Day, we highlight six women whose contributions have helped to shape the contemporary world order.

Technological innovation and strategic competition appear to be increasing the risk of nuclear war. Mending the fraying international nuclear nonproliferation and arms control regimes should be a top global priority. 

Jennifer Spies led Facebook’s product development for the Middle East and Africa, and has over a decade of experience building products that connect communities. Prior to Facebook, she served as a foreign policy advisor for Middle Eastern economic security and worked with Google.org in Rwanda. Known for his ground-breaking business theories on “jobs to be done,” Professor Clayton Christensen of Harvard Business School has a new book on disruptive innovation, The Prosperity Paradox: How Innovation Can Lift Nations Out Of Poverty. I sat down with the book’s co-author, Efosa Ojomo, who leads the global prosperity research at the Clayton Christensen Institute, to learn how policymakers can apply the book’s findings in Africa.  The Prosperity Paradox points to market-creating innovations as a path for growth and economic success. What are some of the African examples you cover in the book? Celtel (now Airtel) is a great example of an African company we profile in the book. In 1998, the prospect of starting a mobile telecommunications business in sub-Saharan Africa was unthinkable as most Africans were very poor. But against those odds, Mo Ibrahim started Celtel, made the mobile phone simple and affordable for millions of Africans, and created a new market in the process. The mobile telecommunications market today adds roughly $200 billion in economic value, provides upwards of $20 billion in tax revenues, and has created close to four million jobs. That’s the power of market-creating innovations. We also introduce readers to Fyodor Biotechnologies, a company that makes noninvasive malaria tests, and Lifestores Pharmacy, which is increasing access to affordable drugs. These businesses all have one thing in common: their products are so simple, affordable, and accessible that they’re able to reach many people—allowing the businesses to prosper and the local economies to benefit from their growth. In a nutshell, what are the mechanisms by which market-creating innovations drive growth? When an organization creates a new market, three things happen. First, the organization generates profits which further fuel the market’s growth and provide revenues for infrastructure and institution building—typically by way of taxes. Second, the organization creates jobs. This makes people in a region more productive and causes crime to become less attractive since there are now better ways to solve problems. Third, the mixture of profits and jobs changes the culture of a region. When citizens begin to see that creating new and vibrant markets is a viable way to develop, a virtuous economic development cycle is created. Twenty years ago, many Western policymakers viewed African economic development as something solved by foreign aid. What are the book's implications for foreign aid in Africa? Perhaps the biggest problem with foreign aid is that, in a way, it works. Foreign aid can alleviate poverty. But poverty alleviation should not be the goal as most people still struggle to eke out a living even after benefiting from aid programs. Instead, foreign aid should change its focus to creating vibrant and prosperous societies, taking a page out of the foreign aid that was given to South Korea. It was described as aid that would end aid. In essence, the book focuses on how to create prosperity, which necessarily alleviates poverty in the process.  What market-creating innovations excite you the most today on the continent?  EarthEnable is a very exciting up-and-coming Rwandan company that provides affordable earthen floors to homes in the country. It costs about a quarter of the price of concrete floors. So far, the company has installed more than half a million square feet of floors in over 300 villages. Another exciting company is Microensure which provides insurance for millions of people who live on less than $3 a day. You have a section on corruption in the book. Can you elaborate on what you found about the role of corruption in African economies? In short, we found that governments would be best served viewing corruption as a solution, instead of the problem. In most low-income countries, efforts to eradicate corruption (which is a near impossibility) blind us to possibilities of making progress in other ways. The Prosperity Paradox sheds a light on how market-creating innovations can mitigate incidents of corruption and, over time, help create a more transparent society. What advice would you have for U.S. policymakers focused on Africa? Perhaps the biggest advice we have is to look at America's own journey to prosperity. As we describe in the book, less than two hundred years ago the U.S. looked similar to some of today's poorest countries. But it climbed its way out of poverty because it fostered a culture of innovation, with innovators like Henry Ford and Issac Singer creating new markets with affordable offerings. Policymakers can help African nations achieve the same progress by keeping their history in mind. It’s important to understand that prosperity is a process, not an event. Where Africa is today isn’t where it’ll necessarily be tomorrow. 

Given its close diplomatic and security ties with the United States and its growing economic ties with China, where does Israel stand amidst the U.S.-China trade war?