Economics

Economic Crises

  • Europe
    Europe’s December Surprise?
    Over the past year, Europe has enjoyed calm financial markets.  At the core of the market’s comfort were two assumptions about policy. First, that the European governments would do just enough to keep the process of European integration moving forward. Second, that the ECB would, in the words of Mario Draghi, do “whatever it takes”  to save the euro. The centerpiece of the ECB’s subsequent efforts was expanded liquidity (through long-term repurchase operations and easier collateral requirements for banks to access ECB liquidity) and a commitment to purchase government bonds to support countries return to market (the OMT program).  Even many pessimists who fear that Europe is trapped on a unsustainable, low-growth trajectory remain optimistic that Europe will do what it takes to navigate the near term risks.  It may be time to question that optimism. As many have noted, there is an increasing sense of adjustment fatigue in Europe, reflected in pressure on governments and the rise of anti-austerity, anti-establishment parties across the Eurozone.  In rhetorical terms, Europe has responded, and fiscal policy looks likely to be broadly neutral in the year ahead.  However, an overall fiscal relaxation that is needed in the euro area as a whole looks unlikely, as peripheral countries can’t afford much additional spending, while the core countries that can spend more seem disinclined to. Monetary policy also falls short of what is needed to establish the conditions for growth.  Unlike the United States, where a decision to recapitalize banks was coupled with strong Federal Reserve easing policies that established the basis of recovery, the ECB has to date resisted quantitative easing or a significant easing of collateral requirements to spur lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the periphery.  While it’s fair to point out that the ECB faces a more constraining legal and governance framework than the Fed, it’s also hard as a result to be confident in the IMF’s (and others) view that recovery is coming to Europe in 2014.  Even the IMF acknowledges that currently, "centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere." Finally, there seems to be little political consensus on creating a true banking union (with deposit insurance and a strong pan-European resolution authority), dealing with the legacy sovereign debt, or honestly addressing the scale of the non-performing loan problem.  All these are critical to a long-term solution to the crisis.  All of these are long-term pressures on Spain, France and Italy, on which the future of the Eurozone no doubt rests. However, in the coming months Europe will face tests from a number of smaller countries.  Notably, economic programs in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal are all heading off track.  In the case of Greece, money promised for later years has been moved forward, resulting in a financing gap that will be impossible to ignore at the next review of the program in September.  Cyprus will need expanded ECB access if it is to ease capital controls.  Each of these countries will require new programs with more money, and eventually a debt restructuring.  Reviews of these programs in the fall likely will be too early for Europe to agree to debt official debt reduction, but fresh new money with an unsustainable debt profile may be similarly hard to justify.  Meanwhile, Ireland looks ready to press for better treatment on its debt as well. In each of these cases, the argument has been made that concessions cannot be made to these countries ahead of German elections in September (and  a German constitutional court ruling  on the ECB’s bond-purchase program).  This of course creates expectations that things will be much better for these countries after elections.  There is talk of a December European leader’s meeting being the forum for a “move towards more Europe.” The problem is not the scale of the support needed in each cases.  These are small programs that can readily afford to be expanded within the existing framework.  The problem is that they could become the place where broader battles over the future of Europe–on official sector debt reduction, on banking union, and on fiscal federalism—are fought out.  In that case, will existing ECB liquidity facilities and the threat of OMT be enough to keep markets calm?  If pressures on banks or governments intensify, questions will no doubt be raised on whether the ECB’s threat to buy bonds is a bluff.  It’s hard to imagine countries accepting material new conditionality to access the bond-buying facility, or that the ECB could materially ease its conditions for use.  The period of financial market calm may be coming to an end.
  • Europe
    The IMF’s Outlook: Less Growth, Inadequate Policies
    The IMF is out with a global update and a statement on Europe.  Unsurprisingly, it has revised its outlook down (again).  It still, optimistically, expects a return to growth in Europe next year, but it recognizes the risks are on the downside.  A few points to highlight. 1.       We are all in this together. The largest downward revision is to emerging markets (-0.3% revision this year and next).  While there are idiosyncratic factors (e.g., credit squeeze in China, infrastructure in India, lessened policy support in Brazil), the common issue affecting the emerging world is a weaker external environment due to slow industrial country growth.  I’d emphasize here, of course, that these countries can depreciate their exchange rates, ensuring a faster recovery than we will see in the periphery of Europe. 2.      Downside risks dominate.  The reports candidly acknowledge the downside risks, including the upcoming debt-ceiling fight in the United States and deteriorating financial conditions in Europe.  The overall sense is of a Fund frustrated with policies across the major industrial countries (except Japan, where it has revised growth up on Abenomics) 3.      A boost to macroprudential  regulation.  The Fund continues to support  accommodative monetary policies in the G3; thus its not surprising that they emphasize regulatory and macroprudential policies to deal with potential bubbles.  This ties in with earlier Fund work suggesting a more positive view of macroprudential measures and capital controls to address financial imbalances. 4.      For Europe, easier fiscal and monetary policies.   They support further rate cuts from the ECB (including negative ECB deposit rates) and endorse the ECB’s recent forward guidance.  Further fiscal “flexibility” is likely to be needed in Europe, as current targets are unlikely to be met. I don’t think there is much new here, but it’s still the right call. 5.      The path to European union must be accelerated. More aggressive measures to repair bank balance sheets, a faster move to banking union, and stronger ECB efforts to reduce fragmentation are needed.  On the latter, they support new long-term lending (LTRO) coupled with an easing of collateral requirements to provide a greater incentive to lend to the periphery.  This approach mirrors the “funding for lending” scheme in the United Kingdom.  They also would support ECB purchase of private assets, a more full-throated quantitative easing (QE). The Fund clearly is increasingly unhappy with the policy framework in Europe.  The question is what, if anything, they will do about it.  The test will likely come this fall on Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus--all programs that seemed destined to fail without stronger European support.
  • Europe
    Greece and the Troika: Summer Break
    The Greek government has reached agreement with the Troika (European Central Bank, European Commission, and IMF) on a set of policies putting its program back on track and opening the door for €8.1 billion in tranches over the summer, which should finance the government until September.  To get this done involves moving forward lending originally scheduled for later years.  That means a large financing gap looms for 2014.  But that’s an issue for after the summer break. Under the agreement, the Greek government will take a number of fiscal measures to meet their fiscal targets (closing a €2 billion gap) and achieve primary balance this year.  This includes a luxury tax, a unified property tax, reduced pensions for military personel, and other social safety net reforms.  The government also has agreed to move forward with plans to reduce government employment by up to 25,000 through a mobility and reallocation scheme.  These were tough measures, which for a while looked like they could destabilize the government.  The government will get credit from European leaders for getting this done, even as it becomes apparent that prospects for recovery remain distant.  (The IMF forecasts a fall in activity in excess of 4 percent this year followed by positive growth of just 0.6 percent in 2014.) Austrian Finance Minister Maria Fekter summarized the optimism:  "I’m convinced that Greece is making every effort to meet these goals…The summer break is coming up and I really don’t fancy coming to Brussels during that period." My concern here, as in Cyprus (where the program is going off track) and Portugal (where an agreement to preserve the government appears predicated on a request for a relaxation of their program) is that flaws in these countries’ programs are being papered over on the hope that easier times—additional financing and/or debt relief—will come after German elections in September. It’s a big ask, and sets us up for disappointment this fall.  But summer vacations are saved.
  • Greece
    Global Economics Monthly: July 2013
    Bottom Line: Recognizing that the recent debt restructuring was insufficient to restore Greece's creditworthiness, the IMF will likely toughen conditions for lending to countries with unsustainable debt levels What is in the espresso at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? In well-publicized discussions of debt restructuring and the Greek crisis, the IMF has shown refreshing candor and clear-headed analysis of what has gone wrong. The Fund readily admits that mistakes were made, to which European policymakers have taken offense. Beyond the headlines, the reports provide hints of how the Fund's involvement, and the broader strategy for resolving debt crises, is likely to evolve in coming years. Mostly, the change is for the better. Too Little, Too Late The IMF's core insight is that recent debt restructurings have come too late and have often been insufficient to restore creditworthiness. The answer in some cases is to pull the plug earlier. For example, the Fund acknowledges that Greece deserved support in 2010 despite severe doubts about creditworthiness (doubts that could have been more properly acknowledged at the time), and that a restructuring should have taken place in early 2011 when it became clear the bailout program was failing. The 200-billion-euro sovereign debt restructuring did not occur until February 2012. Where solvency is uncertain but risks are high, the alternative would be to extend maturities and keep creditors at the table until success or failure becomes clear. In some cases, that can include "moral suasion" (e.g., Korea in 1997); in other cases it can involve more formal agreements to maintain exposure (e.g., the Vienna Agreement for coordinating commercial bank exposure to eastern Europe in 2009). The Fund also sees merit in a restructuring that extends maturities on similar terms so official funds don't go to financing the exit of private creditors—a "light dusting" restructuring in the words of law professors Lee Buchehit and Mitu Gulati. Time will tell whether a subsequent restructuring will be needed to achieve debt sustainability. Last week's €1 billion bond exchange by Cyprus showed this approach in action. The Power of Yes A second set of arguments questions whether fear of contagion, the time needed to build firewalls, or the desire to put off hard choices is delaying smart policies. In his play about the financial crisis, The Power of Yes, David Hare commented on the inherent allure of deal-making in the private sector and the optimism it engenders that all can go well. So, too, for international rescue efforts. It will nearly always be the case that countries on the precipice of default will see the temptations of deal-making as a route out of their problems and plead for a chance to make good. Faced with the possibility of a successful deal, it is difficult for the official community to say to countries "no, we don't believe you can make it," especially when faced with severe risks of contagion. Thus, there will always be a built-in bias toward giving the country another chance. Similarly, countries will put off hared choices when "friends with money" are willing to finance the delay. This scenario is as true in Egypt, where aid from countries in the region is allowing the government to delay agreement with the Fund on a sustainable energy and food-subsidy program, as it is in Europe. Particularly at a time of systemic crisis, when creditor countries may flinch at taking tough stands for fear of contagion, the risk of delay rises. A Problem Worth Fixing? The Fund's argument that the recent experience with debt restructuring reflects a problem with markets that requires a policy change is problematic. Absent a few well-publicized cases (e.g., Angola and Argentina), holdouts and litigation have not been an important deterrent to getting deals done or countries achieving their macroeconomic objectives. The Fund fears the upcoming decision in Argentina's legal battle in New York courts will change that. But it is hard to argue the current approach of market-based debt restructuring is failing. In fact, government sensitivities about holdouts, especially in Europe, are more likely behind the current drive to punish "vultures." "Its Stated Political Preference" The Fund's admission of fault about its involvement in Greece further stirred the pot in Europe. Its report blames excessive optimism about economic growth for contributing to other misjudgments about fiscal policy, financial sector stress, the capability of the government to implement structural reforms, and debt sustainability. The analysis brought a sharp reaction from Olli Rehn, the European Union's economic chief, who complained, "I don't think it's fair and just for the IMF to wash its hands and throw the dirty water on the Europeans." The report highlights a number of successes with the program, including strong fiscal consolidation and pension reform. And, in classic Fund speak, it notes that "Greece remained in the euro area, which was its stated political preference." What it does not do is make a convincing case that Greece benefits from remaining there. It is surprising that Greece has not yet left the eurozone. The country has endured through a profound economic depression. Gross domestic product fell by 22 percent between 2008 and 2012, unemployment increased to about 27 percent in the same period, and prospects for growth remain distant. The program remains on track for now, but a financial gap of around 4 percent of GDP remains to be filled, and, even the Fund admits, more debt relief will be needed to restore a viable debt path toward the Fund's target of 110 percent of GDP in 2022. Even if this is achieved, something on the order of 60 percent is more reasonable for Greece. Ultimately, however, Greece will likely decide to leave the eurozone, and the subsequent depreciation and financial distress, though painful at the time, will set the basis for recovery. Public Debt-to-GDP and Timeline of Debt Restructuring and Fund Arrangements Source: IMF The Way Forward All this suggests that the Fund will act differently in future crises. A bitter divorce, however, is unlikely: the Fund will remain engaged in Europe and will still provide financing to countries in need. But there will be changes. The Fund will likely support strengthening binding rules for dissident creditors (collective action), and is likely to toughen up the conditions for lending when debt sustainability is in question. This is already happening in the IMF's threat to cut lending to Greece if there is not a fix for a shortfall in the financing of its program, which has resulted from European central banks being unwilling to take previously expected haircuts on their debt holdings. And they are likely to modify or eliminate their rule (put in place for Greece) allowing extra IMF funding when contagion is a concern. All these are important steps toward a better framework that reflects lessons learned from past mistakes. Looking Ahead: Kahn's take on the news on the horizon Greek Aid Cutoff? The Greek program has a financing gap in 2014. Will the Fund approve a disbursement in July? Perhaps, but a showdown over shortfalls in official aid is coming soon. China's Shadow Banking Sector Allowing shadow banks to fail could be a sign of needed discipline, or the canary in the coal mine for bigger problems. The Fed's Unemployment Threshold Expect a debate to heat up on lowering the threshold for exit from 6.5 to 6 percent. Does it matter?
  • Financial Markets
    C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics with Neil Irwin
    Podcast
    Join Neil Irwin as he discusses the central bankers' role in the great financial crisis and the historical relationship between capitalism and the state. The C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics is presented by the Corporate Program and the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • Europe and Eurasia
    Global Economics Monthly: June 2013
    Bottom Line: Eurozone countries that need to ease fiscal policy cannot afford to take on more debt, while those that have the capacity to stimulate their economies do not want to. Advocates of austerity appear to be in retreat. The idea that economic growth drops precipitously after a government's debt reaches 90 percent—a much-cited reason for fiscal consolidation—has been discredited. Steep cuts in government spending aimed at reducing national debt are damaging growth prospects in both the United States and Europe, leading policymakers and academics alike to call for austerity measures to ease up until recoveries are more firmly entrenched. In the peripheral countries of Europe in particular, a vicious cycle of fiscal tightening resulting in lower economic growth, missed fiscal targets, and financing shortfalls—which in turn require more cuts—is becoming a major concern. Advocates of more government spending note that borrowing rates for the major industrial countries remain at extraordinarily low levels, hardly signaling an imminent crisis. Thus, the case for easing austerity seems compelling. Debt Still Matters Much of the industrial world emerged from the crisis with high and rising levels of debt that limited sovereign nations' abilities to adopt countercyclical stimulus measures. Concerns about long-term fiscal and debt sustainability increased borrowing costs and limited market access, requiring several European countries to seek bailouts. Even where financing is readily available, such as in the United States, the difficult politics of fixing the long-term fiscal challenge rules out the ability to ease policy now. Across countries with vastly different debt policy situations, it may take many years before debt is reduced to manageable levels and growth returns to precrisis levels, if at all. But How Much Debt Is Too Much? The levels of public debt vary widely in Europe, and debt peaks at a manageable 90 percent of GDP for Europe as a whole. However, most peripheral European countries have surpassed the sustainable public-debt capacity they can manage on their own. The chart below shows peak sovereign debt as a share of country GDP, using IMF data released in April 2013. Data is for gross sovereign debt as a share of GDP. Source: IMF April 2013 World Economic Outlook. Any of a number of shocks—such as a sudden rise in interest rates, a dip in growth, or an increase in government spending—would send the projected debt ratios to unsustainable levels. Last year's IMF review of Spain, for example, assumed that sovereign debt would peak at just over 100 percent of GDP in 2011 and decline gradually to below 90 percent by 2017. The IMF then looked at shocks to interest rates, growth, and fiscal policy in peripheral countries; shocks in each area sent the debt ratio soaring. Even in a rosy economic-growth scenario, markets are likely to demand a cost premium on debt due to these risks. Left unaddressed, the risks associated with high debt levels will have substantial costs for the economy and undermine the consensus in support of reform. Despite these concerns, the cost of borrowing in the periphery is at multiyear lows. Extraordinary ECB actions last fall—committing to "do whatever it takes" in the words of ECB governor Mario Draghi—and growing expectations of German concessions after September elections have stabilized markets. These promises and expectations are likely to be tested by future crises, underscoring both the fragility of market stability and its dependence on an implicit federalism that is, at best, many years away. There is a delicate balance between taking advantage of low borrowing costs today and risking a loss of market confidence. Growth Is Essential The IMF now forecasts a 0.3 percent decline in output in the euro area this year, followed by slow growth in 2014. Recent data point to a 1 percent to 2 percent decline in growth in the second quarter with little sign of a turnaround. The ECB's May 2 cut in interest rates will help, but with rates near zero and growing evidence that credit rationing is clogging the transmission of monetary easing to the periphery, an easing of fiscal austerity makes sense as the best remaining option to spur growth. Yet, in spite of the need for growth-inducing policies, fiscal spending continues to be cut. Recent EU announcements that governments can delay meeting deficit targets will be postive for growth, but to a significant degree represents easing that was already anticipated. It still remains the case that Eurozone-wide government spending will decrease by one-half to three-quarters of a percentage point this year after adjusting for cyclical factors. From this perspective, recent announcements delaying fiscal adjustment may not reflect an easing from what was feasible earlier. There lies the dilemma. Those countries that need to stimulate aggregate demand the most, and those where the politics would allow it are least able to take on additional debt to do so. A future fiscal union in Europe would address this dilemma by allowing borrowing costs to be spread across all EU countries rather than fall on struggling peripheral economies. For now, the IMF's solution is to call for Germany and other countries with the capacity to expand ("fiscal space") to loosen policy and allow sovereign debt levels to rise while the periphery pursues economic growth. Bailout fatigue and Germany's own confidence that its fiscal path is appropriate make this outcome unlikely. Absent these options, any easing of fiscal policy in the periphery requires that debt first be put on a sustainable trajectory and confidence be restored. Ultimately, comprehensive official debt relief will likely be required to reach that goal. Looking Ahead: Kahn's take on the news on the horizon Will Central Banks Deliver? The Bank of Japan has promised "shock and awe," while the European Central Bank (ECB) has cut rates and hinted at more. Upcoming monetary policy meetings need to deliver. Is Slovenia Next? A government bond issue was successful, but the European Union is stepping up pressure on the government to clean up its financial sector. Fiscal Exit Strategy The U.S. deficit has fallen sharply, pushing back the debt limit until September/October. Hopes are fading for an extension linked to corporate tax reform. Is there a plan B?
  • Europe
    Cyprus and the IMF
    The IMF program for Cyprus has been released (here and here).  Growth is projected to fall 13 percent over the next two years, though the discussion of risks implicitly acknowledges that a larger decline is likely (many private analysts expect a decline of 15 percent this year alone).  Given that the program contains 6.6 percent of fiscal consolidation measures during 2013-14, and a major deleveraging of the financial system is underway, skepticism is warranted.  The Fund also acknowledges that should these downside risks materialize, or program implementation slip, government debt (which is forecast to peak at 126 percent of GDP in 2015) becomes unsustainable. The programs have buffers, but financing looks inadequate.  Coming after a negotiation where the Troika publicly promoted one financing gap (17 billion euros) knowing that the actual gap was far larger (shortly after agreement on the program, the gap was revised to 23 billion euros) further undermines confidence in these projections.  The next review, slated for September 15, likely will have to confront these issues.
  • United States
    C. Peter McColough Series with Lael Brainard, Undersecretary for International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Treasury
    Play
    FARYAR SHIRZAD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let's go ahead and get started.Welcome to today's CFR meeting with Lael Brainard. This is part of the C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics.As you've heard, please completely turn off, not just put on vibrate, your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all wireless devices to ensure that we avoid interference with the sound system. And as was just said, we're going to do this session on the record.We'll start this session with some remarks by Lael. We'll follow that by some questions that I will get to ask her, and then we'll turn it to all of you in the audience so that the members can ask questions as well. In keeping with the traditions of the council, we will stay on time and finish at 9:00.Lael, as everyone knows, is well-known to the council. And you all have her bio in front of you, so I'll keep this introduction short. Lael is one of the leading thinkers and practitioners in the area of international economic policy. She's currently the undersecretary for international affairs at Treasury. In that role, Lael is the administration's point person on international economic and financial matters, making her one of the key architects of the post-crisis economic order and one of our country's chief economic diplomats.She has over the last four years dealt with an extraordinary range of challenges that are almost unprecedented in their complexity and scale. She has been the U.S. chief representative at the G-7 and G-20 tables as countries have attempted to restore their economies, build a new international economic architecture and create a new framework for financial regulation, all with a view towards promoting economic growth and putting people back to work.She has undertaken this role at a time when it's increasingly critical for the United States to work with multiple geopolitical powers and market stakeholders and through increasingly complicated and multilateral mechanisms to build consensus on economic issues. Despite the challenges of multilateral policymaking, Lael has adeptly and diplomatically advanced U.S. interests. So it is in that context that we look forward to hearing from her this morning on her perspectives on the global economy and on the agenda ahead. Lael? (Applause.)LAEL BRAINARD: Well, thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. It's nice to be here with all of you at the Council on Foreign Relations, and it's always good to work with Faryar.The U.S. economy is on the mend. Private demand has now expanded for 15 consecutive quarters. Early on, the United States took very difficult steps to rebuild the capital of our financial institutions, combining tough transparent stress tests with a backstop. The buffer against losses in our largest banks has doubled over the past four years, and our banks are again lending to households and small businesses.Restoring financial stability was only the first chapter. It was necessary but not sufficient. Policy action was needed to jump-start the recovery of private demand, followed by a careful withdrawal of public support calibrated to support the pace of recovery and private demand. According to the CBO, we're on track to bring our deficit down significantly to 4 percent of GDP this year, less than half the level in 2009.Flexibility on the pace of fiscal withdrawal has proven to be vital to sustaining the recovery in the face of strong headwinds, as you will recall, with a payroll tax cut enacted at the end of 2010 and its subsequent extension through 2012.Today there is broad agreement the sequester should be replaced by a balanced approach to better support the recovery, but importantly, the current consolidation comes after three years of gathering strength in the private sector. The headwinds from deleveraging are fading, and the overall pace of growth is expected to accelerate, which is critical to finish the healing process.Global recovery has been held back by a lack of demand growth in many of the major advanced economies and by reluctance in many emerging economies to move more quickly toward the currency flexibility needed to durable rebalancing.It's now important to guard again the risk that global recovery remains fragile and excessively dependent on U.S. demand.The key to a resilient global recovery, where growth in each country advances growth in every country, is action directed at supporting demand at home. That's been the core focus of Secretary Lew's discussions in Europe, at the spring meetings and most recently, of course, at the G-7 in the U.K.But that key test, strengthening European demand is the most important immediate imperative on the global growth agenda. Domestic demand in the euro area is now below the low point of the global crisis in 2009 in real terms. The recovery in European output since that time has come entirely from net exports. That is not sustainable for a region that accounts for one-fifth of the global economy.Euro area leaders deserve credit for the difficult steps they've taken to restore financial stability and address the risk of cascading defaults and exit. Spain and Italy are now able to borrow at rates significantly lower than a year ago. But one of the key lessons of our own crisis is that restoring financial stability, while critical, is only the first step for the economy to heal. The focus of the policy debate in Europe must now shift from restoring financial stability to developing a plan to boost demand and employment.Last year, demand contracted 2 percent across the euro area. Unemployment has reached the highest level in at least 20 years. It's clear that decisive action is needed now to restart demand and avoid the risk of protracted stagnation. And there are steps that can be taken to do so. First, European leaders need to recalibrate the pace of their fiscal consolidation. As we know from our experience, course correction can make an important difference. The consolidation path should be stretched out in some countries, and those with fiscal space should shift to supporting demand. We welcome indications that France, Spain and The Netherlands, most recently, have decided to take additional time to meet their budget targets.Second, the core of Europe can make a difference by rebalancing demand. Increased demand in Europe's strongest economies would not only provide relief to weaker euro area economies but would also spur the global economy. In those countries in the euro area where current account surpluses remain above 6 percent of GDP, faster wage growth and greater homeownership are some of the steps that can be taken to make an important contribution.Third, the discussions on lowering borrowing costs for small- and medium-sized enterprises in southern Europe are extremely important. With weakening growth and disinflation, we welcome the ongoing discussions at the ECB and more broadly about additional measures to improve transmission and to address the credit crunch in the periphery. And fourth, events in Cyprus only have served to underscore the importance of moving forward with a full concept of banking union. Upcoming bank stress tests and bank asset reviews are a critical opportunity to restore confidence in bank balance sheets and restart credit to starving local economies. Our experience in the U.S. suggests that the credibility of those exercises will be enhanced when there's a strong backstop in place, permitting capital to be built without a further downward spiral of deleveraging.We've also learned from our own experience, it's much easier to wind down banks in an orderly manner where there's a well-established framework for resolution that clearly prioritizes deposits, buttressed by a strong system of deposit insurance and, ideally, backstopped at the euro area level. Drawing back to the global level, adjustment has thus far relied more broadly, heavily on compressed demand in deficit economies when stronger demand from surplus economies would enable higher growth overall. Avoiding competitive devaluation and a downward spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is critical to ensure growth strategies are mutually reinforcing at this critical time for the global economy. In February, the G-7 members affirmed their commitment to rules of the game on exchange rate. The G-7 makes clear that domestic monetary and fiscal policy should be directed toward meeting clear domestic objectives, using domestic instruments to ensure growth in each country is compatible with growth across countries.G-7 members, by making this commitment, have ruled out the pursuit of macroeconomic accommodation by the purchase of foreign assets, or targeting exchange rates. It's critical that Japan's efforts work through an expansion of domestic demand. Moreover, Japan's macroeconomic policy measures need to be complemented by the critical third arrow of structural reform, which the Abe administration has made clear will be a next step.With demand in the advanced economies weak, some G-20 members still run managed exchange rate regimes and intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist adjustment. That kind of approach puts an undue burden of adjustment on those emerging economies that have market exchange rates, that contribute to the weakness of demand and intensify the risk of inflation and asset bubbles in those economies with undervalued exchange rates.As G-20 countries follow through on their recent commitment not to target exchange rates for competitive purposes, it's extremely important China take additional measures to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate regime. Last year the band was widened modestly and the full band was used for the first time. But intervention subsequently has risen. China's path towards market determination implies further widening along with significantly greater transparency on reserves and intervention.Going forward, that will be the continued emphasis of our global efforts, action to support domestic demand and making sure that the pursuit of growth in each of the G-20 and G-7 economies supports growth more broadly.So let me wrap up there. And then, Faryar, I think we're going to take some questions. Thank you.SHIRZAD: Lael, thank you for that comprehensive overview. What I'll do is I'll ask questions for a few minutes and then we'll turn to the audience.So let's start with Europe. You talked about sort of the imperative of Europe becoming a part of the economic growth picture. The Wall Street Journal this morning described them as the weak link. Even with all the steps that Europe has taken to try to put in mechanisms of rescue, are you fundamentally optimistic or pessimistic in terms of their ability to undertake the necessary structural reforms to become a part of the growth picture over the long haul?BRAINARD: You know, I think the past few years have shown that European leaders can make very important decisions when it's necessary. And the steps they've taken to restore financial stability, I think, have been extraordinarily important, not just for Europe, but of course for us in the U.S., for financial markets globally.But the focus now really needs to be on demand. You see unemployment rates up 25 percent in several southern European countries, large countries, you see youth unemployment of 55 percent; that's not sustainable. And that's certainly not sustainable for an economy that accounts for one fifth of the global economy. So the focus now really needs to be on restoring demand.And we're seeing a debate in Europe. We're seeing some welcome moves. We've seen moves in the direction of adjusting fiscal consolidation paths to better support recovery. We think there's more room there. We think that surplus economies have a tremendous capacity to boost demand in Europe and in the world through mechanisms that really operate through private demand. We think that unclogging the credit channels in southern European countries are vitally important for getting young people back to jobs.And of course, we think that the debate on banking union needs to move forward with greater urgency and a comprehensive banking union is necessary, not in five years, not in four years, but now.SHIRZAD: You know, it's interesting, the OECD recently put out a study essentially arguing that the two primary mechanisms for stimulating the economy, monetary policy and fiscal policy, have run their course and that structural reform is ultimately the recipe for sustained growth in Europe and elsewhere. Do you feel like the reforms that have been undertaken as a part of these various rescue mechanisms -- Spain, Portugal, Italy, places like that -- are these fundamentally going to bear fruit in any time soon in a way that promotes the kind of growth we're all looking for?BRAINARD: Well, I think the last few years, we've seen significant structural reforms that over time, will bear fruit in boosting the potential of many European economies. The difficulty of course is, right now, what's needed is demand.And so you know, our general view is that they have now anchored their credibility, they have important structural reforms that are in place. And it gives them space to do more -- to do more in terms of stretching out fiscal consolidation paths and using fiscal space where they have to do more on private demand. Wage growth in some countries, where wages have grown slower than productivity for many years, could grow faster and that could provide a boost to the overall euro area. You know, we've seen that important recent academic debates have real bearing here. You know, we've seen that fiscal multipliers, the impact of fiscal withdrawal on the economy is much sharper under current circumstances when monetary policy is close to the -- to the zero bound and when there is synchronized consolidation. And so all of those things would suggest not only that there is the case for doing more, but that there is space for doing more.SHIRZAD: A lot of the issues you talked about are the kinds of issues that at least in theory or at least in principle are the kinds of things on which you should -- you could or you would hope to get agreement at the G-7 table, the G-20 table, essentially trading a coordinated framework for economic recovery.Can you talk about those mechanisms and what role they play? Has the consensus fundamentally broken down in a way that bilateral diplomacy, the trip that you and Secretary Lew took recently to Europe, are ultimately the mechanisms by which these policies get advanced, or should we still look at the multilateral mechanisms?BRAINARD: You know, I think that there's always -- as you know, because you have been the chief negotiator for some of these meetings in the past -- there's always the public record of what takes place and the commitments that members are willing to sign up for. And then there are the very important discussions in the room. In terms of what members are willing to sign up for, that, of course, is a more contentious process, but we saw in February in Moscow extremely important commitments on rules of the game on both exchange rates in the G-7 going into Moscow, and then on the G-20 more broadly in Moscow. And I would not understate the significance of that.At a time when, I think, the public debate was quite contentious, that that really provided an important path forward that would help guide members as they were undertaking their own macroeconomic policy choices. In terms of the discussions on the pace of fiscal consolidation -- the need for surplus economies to do more, the relative prioritization of demand versus longer-run fiscal consolidation, that's the most important debate right now in the international arena. And I think you've seen a shift -- the most recent communique coming out of the G-20 clearly prioritized employment and demand, but I anticipate that that argument, that debate will continue in the months ahead.SHIRZAD: The problem you have, or one of the challenges you have is that you have the central banks and all the major economic regions of the world all pursuing accommodative monetary policy, and as you said, you know, there's a bit of a better beggar thy neighbor dimension to that that's unsustainable over the long term, and the domestic demand has to be a part of the -- a critical part of the picture.Do you think -- do you have some hope that there is a balance that will be found on that, or are -- where are we going to go?BRAINARD: So I think there is a very important distinction that has come out in this debate between what has traditionally been viewed as beggar thy neighbor policies -- policies that are designed specifically to operate on the exchange rate, to promote growth in one country by changing relative prices, by promoting net exports in a way that fundamentally leads to a race to the bottom.I think that it's important to distinguish between that and macroeconomic policy that is designed to achieve clear domestic targets using clear domestic instruments, and that's what the G-7 statement does. It's very clear, both in the G-7 now and the G-20, that members will not target exchange rates, which has really been the traditional locus of problems on competitive devaluation.And what we know from studies at the IMF and elsewhere is that when accommodative macroeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal, are designed in such a way to promote domestic demand, that the spillovers are overwhelmingly positive, and we've seen that in the case of the U.S. And of course, as we've had discussions more recently, as Japan has moved forward on its three-arrow framework, the focus has really been on channels of transmission through domestic demand.SHIRZAD: So Europe is an important test case for that framework, to see how it's applied? Another one that you mentioned earlier is China. There's a new leadership there; you've talked to them. Secretary Lew has as well. Can you give us a sense of where they're headed? Are they really looking at building a -- more of a domestically -- demand-oriented economic growth model, or is it going to be a -- more of an export model, as we've seen in the past?BRAINARD: Well, Secretary Lew was out, really, in the first few days of office of the new team and had a really good opportunity to meet with all the top leadership and hear from them. And then, subsequent to that, of course, we're now in planning for the July meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue -- the first -- the first meeting with new teams on both sides.But the leadership in China is very focused on promoting consumer-led, domestic-led demand, and it's a -- it's a very important shift in terms of what we're hearing. And of course, we're hearing this at a time when you can see major shifts under way in their economy as their labor force starts to slow, and of course, will reverse as wages have been growing, as domestic consumers have demanded better standards of living -- less pollution, more focus on standards of living at home, less distortionary policies that rely excessively on very resource-intensive, and of course, for us, export-intensive investments.So that debate, I think, has changed quite a lot. We've seen some policies oriented in that direction, but a great deal more, I think, will be necessary to make sure that the micro structure of incentives, the price structure of the economy really pushes in that direction. That's why we've pushed so hard. The exchange rate is one of the most powerful tools. And we've seen 15 (percent), 16 percent appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in real terms, but more is needed there. Again, they need to take the next step in terms of allowing their exchange rate to move within a wider range, to move to greater market determination. But it's also true that they're state-owned enterprises, who are doing a lot of this investment, still have much different dividend policies than private enterprises. Credit is still allocated with administered interest rates and rationed to enterprises that might not be serving domestic consumers. So all of those things, I think, are going to need to be changed in order for that very important machine of the Chinese economy to reorient to the domestic consumer. And of course, for our companies to give them a more level playing field, we've got tremendous capacity in areas across services -- financial services, across the services area as they open up services, which they need to do to lift the lives of their consumers, our companies will also be able to bring their innovative products to bear.SHIRZAD: You know, one interesting thing in your recent speeches has been the degree to which trade has now featured very prominently. You talk about the International Services Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a new trade agreement with Europe that you're all developing the framework for. Could you talk about the trade initiatives and how they fit into the broader framework of it?BRAINARD: Absolutely. Yeah, no, this is an extraordinarily important part of the president's overall agenda for growth -- for restarting growth, really globally. And, you know, as you'll recall, early on in the administration he set this very ambitious target on exports, and it's served to focus, I think, all of us on what more we can do through all the various parts of the U.S. government to support our companies, our workers as they are working to sell into growing markets abroad. Right now, as you know, we are engaged in a very important set of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has the potential to unlock the most dynamic economies in the world and to sign up for, I think, some of the best in-class standards across a whole host of areas where increasingly we'll need to have a level playing field in order to bring the biggest benefit to consumers and to lift growth. And of course, the most recent announcement is that Japan sees the TPP as a vital part of its structural reform agenda, and that could go a long way for both sides.Now on the other side -- on the one side we've got the Pacific, on the other the Atlantic -- a critical part of Europe's growth agenda is also going to be unlocking greater trade opportunities, and that's why we're so excited about the potential for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We're still in the stakeholder consultation phase, but there's a lot of excitement there, too, and a lot of potential to set the highest standards.And of course, given that our services, producers are the most competitive, the most innovative in the world, we're very excited about the trade and investment services agreement that is being discussed at the WTO. That, again, has the potential to unlock sectors that have traditionally lagged in terms of the trade liberalization agenda, and we think there might be a little bit of a window of opportunity there to make a big difference for our companies, and again, for growth.SHIRZAD: You know, as a guy who's been involved in trade for a while, I was both impressed and a little bit fretful on your behalf in the sense that, you know, with the U.S. and Europe, there are very few border measures that are at issue in terms of trade between the two economies. It's really sort of fundamental sovereign decisions that each side has made regarding the shape of regulation that a trade agreement could help harmonize so that you create a more coherent regulatory framework that then allows a more -- for a more integrated set of economies. Is the -- is the administration really ready to take that on? I mean, these are hard issues, and all the various sectors that would help ultimately become the elements of a deal like this.BRAINARD: Well, I think first, as you know, there have been certain trade sectors that have -- even though our trade with Europe is already extremely important, among the biggest trading relationships in the world, there are sectors that have not been really part of the trade liberalization agenda and very protected in Europe, as we know. So I'm hoping that we unlock some of that. But you're right, that regulatory convergence has also got to be a central part of the conversation in any trade agreement -- in any deeper trade agreement in today's world. And that's why everything in the regulatory convergence agenda across a whole variety of sectors is being discussed right now. And hopefully we'll make some progress. Of course, it's very important to converge on a high level of standards. And I think there is going to be a very rich agenda going forward on that front. SHIRZAD: Are the -- one of the things that Secretary Lew had as a welcoming kind of gift when he became secretary was a letter from seven, eight of his colleagues, admonishing the United States for problems with extraterritoriality in terms of financial regulation. Could you talk about that? Do you think that was a fair kind of concern that the finance ministers raised? And what do -- what is the administration trying to do to deal with that?BRAINARD: You know, I will say that the G-20, the FSB have a very, very ambitious agenda across the whole set of financial reform initiatives that are encompassed in Dodd-Frank. And the work that is underway there -- and of course I participate on behalf of Treasury and the FSB piece, but it's really our regulators who are working with their European, Asian, Latin American counterparts -- that that agenda has progressed. It has -- it has not progressed as quickly as it needs to. I think the U.S. is out ahead of other jurisdiction in terms of implementing in a number of areas. And in particular, the U.S. has moved forward -- according to its Dodd-Frank timelines -- on putting in place comprehensive reform of the derivatives space for the first time -- very significant -- for the first time really putting in place incentives to move things to central clearing, reporting, trading, you know, a whole set of extraordinarily important reforms.And of course, the world has signed on for those through the G-20 and the FSB. Now what we need to see is other jurisdictions move to the same level. And Europe has lagged in that respect. And so I will say that our regulators are very closely engaged. And we've been part of those conversations in our role through the FSB and the FSOC in trying to get the greatest convergence possible because these are inherently global markets. We know it's important for market participants that there not be big distortions that cause business to move to one side of the border or the other, for artificial reasons. And so my sense is actually conversations there between the regulators are very engaged, and they are progressing. So you know, I think we have to guard against extraterritoriality. We are dismayed by the extraterritorial aspects of the financial transactions tax that has been passed in France and has -- also in Italy. We're working on that. We think it's extraordinarily important that that be removed. But I will say, in the derivatives space, conversations are granular and they are progressing and we are seeing a convergence that we think is going to be critically important for these markets.SHIRZAD: You know, there were news reports that said at the last G-7 meeting there was a lot of discussion about dealing with "too big to fail" resolution planning, making sure that large financial institutions that get into trouble are ultimately able to be wound down in a way that doesn't create systemic implications. Can you give us a sense of what the discussion was and where it's headed?BRAINARD: Well, I think recent events in Cyprus only highlighted that this is a part of the reform agenda that's extraordinarily important to move forward in Europe. As you know, European banks tend to be much larger, relative to their home markets, relative to their sovereigns -- the largest banks -- than -- certainly than is the case here in the U.S. And they are still quite a bit farther behind in terms of putting in place a legal regime on resolution that provides certainty to financial institutions, to investors. And it is extraordinarily important that they do so. In the G-7 discussions, Secretary Lew had a chance to go into some depth on the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority. And you know, the FDIC itself has tremendous experience in the area of orderly resolutions. And now, with Title 2 orderly liquidation authority, they believe they have the capacity to wind down even the largest, most complex institutions, through a single point of entry model which other regulators around the world see as having tremendous promise not just domestically but also in terms of the cross-border area, which is extraordinarily important, as we know from the crisis.So there was a general consensus that this is a good model; it's extremely important to see ex-ante clear party of claims with depositors getting preference, strong deposit insurance systems. And because of the interconnected nature of the European banking systems, that that really should take place at the Euro area level, which is why the discussion about full banking (in union ?) has to move in conjunction with the discussion about resolution and what resolution means for bank funding models as well.SHIRZAD: Let me ask you another Europe question. You know, you talked about -- earlier about the fact that Europe has the capacity, and it has made incredibly difficult decisions to deal with its sort of internal challenges. It seems, though, to play the devil's advocate, that as they make their decisions, they make their processes of decision-making even more complicated -- add layers of bureaucracy, mechanisms of decision-making that require national ratification each time a big crisis is confronted. Is the European model fundamentally -- I mean, is it -- is it fundamentally sustainable given how, as they make difficult decisions, they seem to make their system more complicated than they started with?BRAINARD: Well, I think the financial crisis demonstrated, you know, in ways that were not fully foreseen, that, in fact, it is quite complex to have a monetary union encompassing very disparate economies, without greater risk-sharing, greater centralization on the banking front and on the fiscal front.And so that is going to continue to be an institutional process of evolution. If you think about it, the -- you know, in full, kind of firefighting mode, there's only one institution that has the capacity -- has the instruments across the entire Euro area, and that's the ECB. And yet, there were -- you know, there were constraints on the ECB's ability to deploy that set of instruments across the Euro area.So I think, you know, as the -- as this very important partner of ours -- very important strategic partner, very important economic partner moves forward, they're going to grapple with this broader question of institutional design. And we're seeing it very actively on the banking union. Of course, you know, at the moment of crisis, you need to use the instruments you have, and create, you know, instruments.And of course, the creation of the ESM, the creation of the OMT -- those were critically important moments. The, you know, decisions that were made to keep Greece within the Euro area -- critically important not just for the Euro area but for the world. But in order to solve the demand deficiency, in order to make this a really vibrant and stable Euro area, I think that discussion about institutional changes will continue.SHIRZAD: I'll ask you one more question, and then we'll open it up to the audience. The G-20 meeting under the Russian presidency -- the leaders meeting is, I guess, set for the fall. Can you give us a sneak preview as to what will happen at that meeting, both on economic coordination as well as on financial regulation or any other issue?BRAINARD: Yeah, I think Petersburg -- you know, we have a -- at least on the -- on the finance side of the agenda, we have a pretty clear, already, view about that trajectory. I think the discussion is going to continue (to ?) intensify about how we do a better job of coordinating so that we make sure that countries are doing the right policies in terms of boosting demand, and that as a result, we grow together. And that's important not just for the G-20 -- not just for the economies in the room, but it's really vitally important for the developing economies, smaller economies that are not in the room.I think, you know, we'll want to see the consensus on exchange rates continuing to be upheld, and further movements, as has been committed, on market-determined exchange rates, not targeting exchange rates. On the financial regulatory agenda, there are a number of commitments that have been made across the spectrum that really now are in the implementation phase. So we've -- you know, we've had the systemically important designations for the banks, but we have to do that in the nonbank arena.At the G-20 level, we need to see derivatives reforms, as we were saying earlier, put in place in a way that's convergent and consistent with the timelines that we're committed to. So that discussion will be very robust. And you know, of course, I think the trade discussion is also going to be very robust. There's just so much excitement about the initiatives that the U.S. is undertaking with various members of the G-20, and the questions about what can the multilateral system do, I think, will be on the table.SHIRZAD: Great.OK, why don't we turn to the audience. If you have a -- Hamid, why don't you wait for the microphone. When you're about to ask you question, make sure you identify yourself, as well as any affiliation you may have.QUESTIONER: Hamid Biglari. There have been repeated incidents of cyberattacks against financial institutions, cross-border cyberattacks. And while each financial institution has been responsible for its own security, there is a point at which this gets elevated to the point of national security. How is the U.S. government thinking about it? Who has primary jurisdiction? What is the role of the Defense Department versus the Treasury versus our various national intelligence agencies, if you could give us some guidance on that?BRAINARD: Yeah. Well, as you know, the president has put out an executive order in this space. We're working on legislation. We think this is a matter of very high national priority, from a perspective of our critical infrastructure, financial infrastructure, but more broadly, as well as, of course -- this is core to our -- one of our greatest competitive strengths, our intellectual property and our innovation.So we're working very tightly across the administration on these issues. We work with the Department of Homeland Security and the other agencies on the security side.And of course, this has also become one of the top priorities in our deep discussions with the Chinese. This is an issue that the president raised in his first conversation with President Xi. This is an issue that Secretary Lew had good conversations on, as did Secretary Kerry. And you know, for us, it's important that we make progress so that our Chinese counterparts understand that in particular, cyberintrusions from state-involved entities create a real -- real difficulties in terms of trade secrets and intellectual property more generally, and reputational risk, we think, for them. And so, you know, this is an area where we think we have to make progress over the next little while. Of course, separately, we're working with the private sector to help the private sector work together and work internally to protect itself to the greatest extent possible.So we're working all of those fronts. And it'll continue, I think, to be a very high priority in years to come, for all the reasons you said.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Patrick Dirkin, Barclays. Nice to see you. Combining your comments on financial reform in the trans-Atlantic trade discussions, would you put financial institutions and markets in a trade deal? If yes or no, why? And if we do arrive at dislocations in regulations, would including it give us a chance to come back a second time and create better harmonization, whether it's in resolution, cross-border derivatives, capital rules, which seem to be going, at least from a markets perspective, to a certain degree in different directions? Also, the financial transaction tax. Thank you.BRAINARD: Yep, so on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, we are right now in the period of consultations. So we're in listening mode. And you know, we're talking to members of Congress. We're talking to the business community, to labor, to all the various stakeholders, consumer groups that have an interest in this. In terms of what the scope of those discussions should be -- you know, I can tell you that from my own perspective, obviously, financial services needs to be part of the conversation. It's very important to make progress on market access, to nail down access that we've already secured. So I think, at least in terms of our inclination, it would be to make sure that's a very important part of the conversation.On the regulatory convergence front, you know, we are already signed up for very tight timelines, most of which are in the next year to 18 months. And we're already engaged in very detailed conversations with clear commitments on regulatory convergence. And we're -- those conversations are partly bilateral because, you know, we have important depth of engagement of our private sectors across the Atlantic. But they are, by necessity, multilateral.Asia is just going to be an increasingly important market, and Latin America already is an important market. So there are -- there are a variety of reasons why, partly because the time is now, these things need to get done now -- I don't think -- I don't think the business community wants to wait another several years for certainty; I don't think we can afford to -- and partly because we need other partners in the room that we want to use the G-20 and the FSB to get these things as far along as we possibly can in the near term.QUESTIONER: Hi. Massimo Gaggi from the Italian Daily Corriere Della Serea . Mario Monti two years ago was welcomed also here in the States almost as a hero. I remember a cover story on Time magazine: This man can save Europe. Now his policies are considered one of the major reasons for the deepening of Italian recession. Do you think that Italy in its current fiscal conditions has room for initiatives from the new Letta government for sustaining the internal demand and the growth and that Europe should do something to lower the -- at least the short-term limits on its budget deficit, and if there is any possible role for United States in this area? And I know that President Obama after the G-8 in Britain is going to Berlin. Thank you.BRAINARD: So I think, you know, Italy is a very important economy and a very important player within the broader euro area. If you look at the course of the crisis over the last two years or so, you know, Italy has put in place important reforms. They've moved very rapidly on the fiscal front. They've put in place some structural reforms. But as you say, Italy is struggling with rising unemployment and continued demand contraction, and it's part of this broader picture of very disappointing demand. And, you know, I think the entire euro area really is facing the need for decisive action or the risk of protracted stagnation, which is not in the interest of Europeans. It's certainly not in our interests or the world's interest.We think there are things that can be done, and I spoke a little bit about those earlier, that there is space in many countries. You know, Italy is now engaged in a process of paying off some of the very substantial arrears that are weighing on the small business sector. We think that is important.So, you know, again as countries in the euro area continue to move forward on structural reforms, which will bear fruit in the longer run, we think it's important to stretch out fiscal timelines where possible or provide fiscal space where possible, better balance that need for longer-term consolidation with short-term support for the recovery, and of course for employment.SHIRZAD: Stay back there.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Name inaudible) -- from Chinese Taichi (ph) Media. You talk about S&ED talk. What are the most important issues does the United States think they want to address with their Chinese counterpart? And also, last year you talked about greater access to high-tech components, but that doesn't seem to have any substantial progress after last year's talk. Could you explain on that? Thank you.BRAINARD: So our agenda for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the economics side -- I won't speak to the strategic side -- but on the economic side, you know, there are very important areas where we think we need to make further progress for the bilateral economic relationship to be strengthened. And, you know, those are areas that we think for the most part are beneficial for both sides and closely aligned with the Chinese leadership's own agenda.The Chinese leadership talks about a higher value, more innovation in their economy. We talk about how important it is to strop trade secret theft and to provide protection for all intellectual property, not just indigenous intellectual property, that that will be positive both for growth and the value of production in China, but also important -- critically important for giving fair access to private enterprises and foreign enterprises, U.S. companies. We have very much heard the Chinese leadership as they talk about the domestic consumer and making domestic demand-led growth the kind of central thrust of their policies. Well, of course, the exchange rate has to be central to that. And allowing the exchange rate to fully reflect market forces is something they've made some progress on, but there's still some distance and there's scope to move now.The way that credit is allocated, still a lot of administrative controls that distort capital to large investments, to state enterprises that choke off more innovative, more competitive private enterprises -- foreign enterprises but also domestic private enterprises. So that's an extraordinarily important part of it.Cybersecurity has got to be front and central. That is just simply too much of a threat, really, to our competitiveness and to critical infrastructure not to make that a central part. We'd like to make some progress on the bilateral investment treaty. It's an area of great potential for both sides. And so we'd like to see how fast and how far we can push those discussions.We'd like to see some services sector access. You know, we got equity caps lifted for the first time. In very important parts of the financial services market there is ample opportunity to allow greater foreign participation and thereby have a more dynamic financial sector, services sector more generally, by lifting equity caps and lifting investment restrictions.SHIRZAD: Let's actually go down here.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Allen Batkin (sp). I wanted to ask about Japan and the weakening of the yen. There's been some press recently about the impact on the economies and exports of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines from the weaker yen. So my questions are: How serious are those implications, the impact on their economies? Can that affect our economies -- our economy and our export markets if those countries are weakened? And how does this strategy of Japan fit into your comments earlier about the G-7 and the -- not using exchange rate mechanism?BRAINARD: So we have had extensive conversations in the G-7 more broadly. It is extraordinarily important that when countries are pursuing macroeconomic policies, that their fiscal and monetary policies be oriented very clearly to domestic objectives, to domestic demand, and that they are oriented in that way under clear rules, using domestic instruments, not targeting exchange rates.We think those rules are important to make sure that those policies actually boost global growth and are not -- are not going lead to a downward spiral. So you know, in the current context, we think Japan has said they're going to move forward with their third arrow, structural reform. That's going to be a vital component in order to restore growth. And we've only seen the beginnings of that with the TPP, but it's extraordinarily important to see a very robust structural reform agenda.Japan's growth is important obviously to the world, but the way they pursue it, we want to make sure is through the domestic channels. Now, more broadly in Asia, of course, it's important that countries not fall back on undervalued exchange rates and export-led growth strategies. Those haven't worked. They haven't worked for the world and they certainly are not the path forward. And so we're going to continue to push for a clear commitment to exchange rates that are market-determined and growth strategies that are demand-led. QUESTIONER: Glenn Gerstell from Millbank, Tweed. Thank you very much for your comments this morning. One country that the discussion this morning hasn't touched on is India. And I wondered if -- I know you recently hosted a delegation of some senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Finance. Could you comment on prospects for India opening up a little more to trade and investment?BRAINARD: Yeah. I think our engagement with India is also -- glad you raised it -- has also really deepened over the last few years, with a lot of bilateral engagement, you know, both through economic channels, but more broadly between the -- President Obama's broader administration.And what we've seen there is, you know, some forward momentum on the reform front, but not enough. There, too, you know, if the Indian government can move forward on the reform agenda that it has articulated, and get public support for it -- we think it would very meaningful in terms of spurring growth there. They have huge infrastructure needs, but they need to be able to catalyze private investment into infrastructure, and right now, there are a whole host of impediments why private investors are reluctant to participate.But the kinds of scale of infrastructure investments they need requires -- inherently requires, we think, private capital to be unlocked for that, and so our conversations have very much been around reform in the financial sector, reform of their regulatory environments to make investment much more predictable -- more predictability about the tax regime.And -- you know, as you know, we've made some progress there, but , you know, India has ambitious growth goals, and we -- our companies and -- you know, we would -- we would like to help be part of that. It's a very exciting potential growth story, but it's going to require continued and much deeper reforms. And we'll keep pushing for them, because we think it's important. But they're still -- they've got quite a ways to go.SHIRZAD: In the corner.QUESTIONER: (I work for ?) -- (inaudible) -- (Blackrock ?). You mentioned several times about China's desire to increase their economic growth through increasing consumer spending. That would seem like an extremely easy to do with a savings rate that is estimated to be 35 percent. However, to get that savings rate to decline and consumption to increase, one would think that they would have to put in some safety net provisions that I'm not sure they've put in.My question is, how quickly are they moving to put in these safety net provisions and also whether -- how are they going to communicate that to the Chinese public in order to get the savings rate down and to turn it into domestic consumption? MS. BRAINARD: Well, I think this is a central challenge -- is, you know, providing enough of a social safety net and providing clarity about who's responsible for that -- at what level? Is it the, you know, traditional state-owned enterprise, is it the locality, is it the, you know, urban area where migrant workers have moved into but still have really no rights in some cases? That clarity is going to be critically important for Chinese consumers to consume, to feel like they don't need to build up really massive amounts of precautionary savings.So of course, it's also important that they earn a real return on their savings, and right now, what we know is that they have interest rate caps that don't give them the kinds of returns that they would normally earn. And of course, they don't have access to the full suite of savings -- products that we would -- you know, our companies would love to provide and do so such a great job of providing elsewhere.So there is a whole set of important reforms there that, you know, you'll see in our strategic and economic dialogue commitments. You know, we made a big deal last year about their commitment to ensure that state-owned enterprises would pay out dividends at the same rate as a publicly-listed company. Why is that important?Because a lot of that funding is just sitting in state-owned enterprises -- massive build-up of savings that might get directed, in some cases, to noneconomic investments -- and this is part of the -- you know, excessive reliance on investment, but is not getting put into the government coffers to provide health and pension kinds of insurance education, insurance that would give Chinese consumers the comfort they need to go out and actually raise their living standards.QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Faryad. Thank you very much, Lael. Carol Brookins (sp). You've spent a lot of time focused on Europe, and I'm glad to hear that, but we've seen in the past -- and the past being a prologue to the future, this kind of crisis lurching forward -- being able to do something, but only after several iterations of things that may not have been the right things to do. Given that the timelines and the urgency of this agenda going forward for domestic demand to be increased -- are you optimistic, pessimistic, neutral, given the timeline of the German elections?BRAINARD: What -- you know, what I said earlier I think is the dominant kind of approach on our end, which is to say, look, this is important to us, it's important to you, it's -- you know, it is not sustainable to have 55 percent youth unemployment. That has long-lasting damage that gets inflicted on the economy. You know, nobody -- it's in nobody's interest for the euro area, which is such a vital partner strategically and economically, to be in protracted stagnation. So we just think it's extraordinarily important that these issues be squarely on the agenda.And, you know, we are seeing these debates. We think there is a path forward. I think I talked about the four key areas that we think would have the most impact in the short run. And so, you know, we'll continue to offer our views based on our own crisis playbook and recovery playbook and what worked, what didn't work, in an effort to help that debate move forward, recognizing that their institutional constraints are quite different and, you know, challenging -- 17 national parliaments; you know, we are challenged with one, so I think -- I think it -- I -- you know, we take seriously that it's a complicated institutional environment. We think we -- they have capacity to act, and they need to act.SHIRZAD: So Lael, let me take the prerogative last -- ask the last question. We only have about 60 seconds. Big question, short answer. We have a new World Bank president, a huge development agenda that you inherited and you guys are pursuing. Can you talk about the development agenda?BRAINARD: Yeah, so, we're -- we, you know, have been pretty excited about what we've been able to do with our partners in development countries on lifting the lives of the poor, on addressing gradual states. And that's both through the bilateral as well as the development banks.We -- in the last year we recapitalized every single one of the development banks. That's never happened before, and it's at a time when people say that, you know, Congress won't move forward. And I think it was on a bipartisan basis that we recapitalized every institutions because of their performance in the wake of the financial crisis. They really stepped up. They helped countries keep trade finance at a time when trade was plummeting. They helped countries keep in place safety nets, infrastructure projects. They really proved their worth.And Jim Kim is really bringing a lot of energy, a lot of focus. You know, he's very focused on what more middle-income countries can do to lift their poor populations, because that's, of course, where most of the poor live today. Very focused on some of the win-wins between addressing environmental challenges like climate change and poverty, improving resilience of agriculture. And that squares very closely with, you know, our own food security agenda. We've got a terrific new trust fund at the World Bank called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program that's part of the broader present Food Security Initiative. We think he can do more on empowering women, on locking the productive potential of women. We're really encouraging that at the World Bank because it's such a flagship.And of course, we have emphasized that the World Bank is most powerful not through its -- not primarily through its lending but through its knowledge products. And there is no better example of that than doing business report -- it's -- very simple benchmarking exercise, which has helped numerous countries, from Colombia to Sierra Leone, to slash red tape and really see rates of business formation double in some cases.SHIRZAD: Great. Lael, thank you very much. Our meeting is adjourned.BRAINARD: Thank you. Good to see everybody. (Applause.) (C) 2013 Federal News Service FARYAR SHIRZAD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let's go ahead and get started.Welcome to today's CFR meeting with Lael Brainard. This is part of the C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics.As you've heard, please completely turn off, not just put on vibrate, your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all wireless devices to ensure that we avoid interference with the sound system. And as was just said, we're going to do this session on the record.We'll start this session with some remarks by Lael. We'll follow that by some questions that I will get to ask her, and then we'll turn it to all of you in the audience so that the members can ask questions as well. In keeping with the traditions of the council, we will stay on time and finish at 9:00.Lael, as everyone knows, is well-known to the council. And you all have her bio in front of you, so I'll keep this introduction short. Lael is one of the leading thinkers and practitioners in the area of international economic policy. She's currently the undersecretary for international affairs at Treasury. In that role, Lael is the administration's point person on international economic and financial matters, making her one of the key architects of the post-crisis economic order and one of our country's chief economic diplomats.She has over the last four years dealt with an extraordinary range of challenges that are almost unprecedented in their complexity and scale. She has been the U.S. chief representative at the G-7 and G-20 tables as countries have attempted to restore their economies, build a new international economic architecture and create a new framework for financial regulation, all with a view towards promoting economic growth and putting people back to work.She has undertaken this role at a time when it's increasingly critical for the United States to work with multiple geopolitical powers and market stakeholders and through increasingly complicated and multilateral mechanisms to build consensus on economic issues. Despite the challenges of multilateral policymaking, Lael has adeptly and diplomatically advanced U.S. interests. So it is in that context that we look forward to hearing from her this morning on her perspectives on the global economy and on the agenda ahead. Lael? (Applause.)LAEL BRAINARD: Well, thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. It's nice to be here with all of you at the Council on Foreign Relations, and it's always good to work with Faryar.The U.S. economy is on the mend. Private demand has now expanded for 15 consecutive quarters. Early on, the United States took very difficult steps to rebuild the capital of our financial institutions, combining tough transparent stress tests with a backstop. The buffer against losses in our largest banks has doubled over the past four years, and our banks are again lending to households and small businesses.Restoring financial stability was only the first chapter. It was necessary but not sufficient. Policy action was needed to jump-start the recovery of private demand, followed by a careful withdrawal of public support calibrated to support the pace of recovery and private demand. According to the CBO, we're on track to bring our deficit down significantly to 4 percent of GDP this year, less than half the level in 2009.Flexibility on the pace of fiscal withdrawal has proven to be vital to sustaining the recovery in the face of strong headwinds, as you will recall, with a payroll tax cut enacted at the end of 2010 and its subsequent extension through 2012.Today there is broad agreement the sequester should be replaced by a balanced approach to better support the recovery, but importantly, the current consolidation comes after three years of gathering strength in the private sector. The headwinds from deleveraging are fading, and the overall pace of growth is expected to accelerate, which is critical to finish the healing process.Global recovery has been held back by a lack of demand growth in many of the major advanced economies and by reluctance in many emerging economies to move more quickly toward the currency flexibility needed to durable rebalancing.It's now important to guard again the risk that global recovery remains fragile and excessively dependent on U.S. demand.The key to a resilient global recovery, where growth in each country advances growth in every country, is action directed at supporting demand at home. That's been the core focus of Secretary Lew's discussions in Europe, at the spring meetings and most recently, of course, at the G-7 in the U.K.But that key test, strengthening European demand is the most important immediate imperative on the global growth agenda. Domestic demand in the euro area is now below the low point of the global crisis in 2009 in real terms. The recovery in European output since that time has come entirely from net exports. That is not sustainable for a region that accounts for one-fifth of the global economy.Euro area leaders deserve credit for the difficult steps they've taken to restore financial stability and address the risk of cascading defaults and exit. Spain and Italy are now able to borrow at rates significantly lower than a year ago. But one of the key lessons of our own crisis is that restoring financial stability, while critical, is only the first step for the economy to heal. The focus of the policy debate in Europe must now shift from restoring financial stability to developing a plan to boost demand and employment.Last year, demand contracted 2 percent across the euro area. Unemployment has reached the highest level in at least 20 years. It's clear that decisive action is needed now to restart demand and avoid the risk of protracted stagnation. And there are steps that can be taken to do so. First, European leaders need to recalibrate the pace of their fiscal consolidation. As we know from our experience, course correction can make an important difference. The consolidation path should be stretched out in some countries, and those with fiscal space should shift to supporting demand. We welcome indications that France, Spain and The Netherlands, most recently, have decided to take additional time to meet their budget targets.Second, the core of Europe can make a difference by rebalancing demand. Increased demand in Europe's strongest economies would not only provide relief to weaker euro area economies but would also spur the global economy. In those countries in the euro area where current account surpluses remain above 6 percent of GDP, faster wage growth and greater homeownership are some of the steps that can be taken to make an important contribution.Third, the discussions on lowering borrowing costs for small- and medium-sized enterprises in southern Europe are extremely important. With weakening growth and disinflation, we welcome the ongoing discussions at the ECB and more broadly about additional measures to improve transmission and to address the credit crunch in the periphery. And fourth, events in Cyprus only have served to underscore the importance of moving forward with a full concept of banking union. Upcoming bank stress tests and bank asset reviews are a critical opportunity to restore confidence in bank balance sheets and restart credit to starving local economies. Our experience in the U.S. suggests that the credibility of those exercises will be enhanced when there's a strong backstop in place, permitting capital to be built without a further downward spiral of deleveraging.We've also learned from our own experience, it's much easier to wind down banks in an orderly manner where there's a well-established framework for resolution that clearly prioritizes deposits, buttressed by a strong system of deposit insurance and, ideally, backstopped at the euro area level. Drawing back to the global level, adjustment has thus far relied more broadly, heavily on compressed demand in deficit economies when stronger demand from surplus economies would enable higher growth overall. Avoiding competitive devaluation and a downward spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is critical to ensure growth strategies are mutually reinforcing at this critical time for the global economy. In February, the G-7 members affirmed their commitment to rules of the game on exchange rate. The G-7 makes clear that domestic monetary and fiscal policy should be directed toward meeting clear domestic objectives, using domestic instruments to ensure growth in each country is compatible with growth across countries.G-7 members, by making this commitment, have ruled out the pursuit of macroeconomic accommodation by the purchase of foreign assets, or targeting exchange rates. It's critical that Japan's efforts work through an expansion of domestic demand. Moreover, Japan's macroeconomic policy measures need to be complemented by the critical third arrow of structural reform, which the Abe administration has made clear will be a next step.With demand in the advanced economies weak, some G-20 members still run managed exchange rate regimes and intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist adjustment. That kind of approach puts an undue burden of adjustment on those emerging economies that have market exchange rates, that contribute to the weakness of demand and intensify the risk of inflation and asset bubbles in those economies with undervalued exchange rates.As G-20 countries follow through on their recent commitment not to target exchange rates for competitive purposes, it's extremely important China take additional measures to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate regime. Last year the band was widened modestly and the full band was used for the first time. But intervention subsequently has risen. China's path towards market determination implies further widening along with significantly greater transparency on reserves and intervention.Going forward, that will be the continued emphasis of our global efforts, action to support domestic demand and making sure that the pursuit of growth in each of the G-20 and G-7 economies supports growth more broadly.So let me wrap up there. And then, Faryar, I think we're going to take some questions. Thank you.SHIRZAD: Lael, thank you for that comprehensive overview. What I'll do is I'll ask questions for a few minutes and then we'll turn to the audience.So let's start with Europe. You talked about sort of the imperative of Europe becoming a part of the economic growth picture. The Wall Street Journal this morning described them as the weak link. Even with all the steps that Europe has taken to try to put in mechanisms of rescue, are you fundamentally optimistic or pessimistic in terms of their ability to undertake the necessary structural reforms to become a part of the growth picture over the long haul?BRAINARD: You know, I think the past few years have shown that European leaders can make very important decisions when it's necessary. And the steps they've taken to restore financial stability, I think, have been extraordinarily important, not just for Europe, but of course for us in the U.S., for financial markets globally.But the focus now really needs to be on demand. You see unemployment rates up 25 percent in several southern European countries, large countries, you see youth unemployment of 55 percent; that's not sustainable. And that's certainly not sustainable for an economy that accounts for one fifth of the global economy. So the focus now really needs to be on restoring demand.And we're seeing a debate in Europe. We're seeing some welcome moves. We've seen moves in the direction of adjusting fiscal consolidation paths to better support recovery. We think there's more room there. We think that surplus economies have a tremendous capacity to boost demand in Europe and in the world through mechanisms that really operate through private demand. We think that unclogging the credit channels in southern European countries are vitally important for getting young people back to jobs.And of course, we think that the debate on banking union needs to move forward with greater urgency and a comprehensive banking union is necessary, not in five years, not in four years, but now.SHIRZAD: You know, it's interesting, the OECD recently put out a study essentially arguing that the two primary mechanisms for stimulating the economy, monetary policy and fiscal policy, have run their course and that structural reform is ultimately the recipe for sustained growth in Europe and elsewhere. Do you feel like the reforms that have been undertaken as a part of these various rescue mechanisms -- Spain, Portugal, Italy, places like that -- are these fundamentally going to bear fruit in any time soon in a way that promotes the kind of growth we're all looking for?BRAINARD: Well, I think the last few years, we've seen significant structural reforms that over time, will bear fruit in boosting the potential of many European economies. The difficulty of course is, right now, what's needed is demand.And so you know, our general view is that they have now anchored their credibility, they have important structural reforms that are in place. And it gives them space to do more -- to do more in terms of stretching out fiscal consolidation paths and using fiscal space where they have to do more on private demand. Wage growth in some countries, where wages have grown slower than productivity for many years, could grow faster and that could provide a boost to the overall euro area. You know, we've seen that important recent academic debates have real bearing here. You know, we've seen that fiscal multipliers, the impact of fiscal withdrawal on the economy is much sharper under current circumstances when monetary policy is close to the -- to the zero bound and when there is synchronized consolidation. And so all of those things would suggest not only that there is the case for doing more, but that there is space for doing more.SHIRZAD: A lot of the issues you talked about are the kinds of issues that at least in theory or at least in principle are the kinds of things on which you should -- you could or you would hope to get agreement at the G-7 table, the G-20 table, essentially trading a coordinated framework for economic recovery.Can you talk about those mechanisms and what role they play? Has the consensus fundamentally broken down in a way that bilateral diplomacy, the trip that you and Secretary Lew took recently to Europe, are ultimately the mechanisms by which these policies get advanced, or should we still look at the multilateral mechanisms?BRAINARD: You know, I think that there's always -- as you know, because you have been the chief negotiator for some of these meetings in the past -- there's always the public record of what takes place and the commitments that members are willing to sign up for. And then there are the very important discussions in the room. In terms of what members are willing to sign up for, that, of course, is a more contentious process, but we saw in February in Moscow extremely important commitments on rules of the game on both exchange rates in the G-7 going into Moscow, and then on the G-20 more broadly in Moscow. And I would not understate the significance of that.At a time when, I think, the public debate was quite contentious, that that really provided an important path forward that would help guide members as they were undertaking their own macroeconomic policy choices. In terms of the discussions on the pace of fiscal consolidation -- the need for surplus economies to do more, the relative prioritization of demand versus longer-run fiscal consolidation, that's the most important debate right now in the international arena. And I think you've seen a shift -- the most recent communique coming out of the G-20 clearly prioritized employment and demand, but I anticipate that that argument, that debate will continue in the months ahead.SHIRZAD: The problem you have, or one of the challenges you have is that you have the central banks and all the major economic regions of the world all pursuing accommodative monetary policy, and as you said, you know, there's a bit of a better beggar thy neighbor dimension to that that's unsustainable over the long term, and the domestic demand has to be a part of the -- a critical part of the picture.Do you think -- do you have some hope that there is a balance that will be found on that, or are -- where are we going to go?BRAINARD: So I think there is a very important distinction that has come out in this debate between what has traditionally been viewed as beggar thy neighbor policies -- policies that are designed specifically to operate on the exchange rate, to promote growth in one country by changing relative prices, by promoting net exports in a way that fundamentally leads to a race to the bottom.I think that it's important to distinguish between that and macroeconomic policy that is designed to achieve clear domestic targets using clear domestic instruments, and that's what the G-7 statement does. It's very clear, both in the G-7 now and the G-20, that members will not target exchange rates, which has really been the traditional locus of problems on competitive devaluation.And what we know from studies at the IMF and elsewhere is that when accommodative macroeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal, are designed in such a way to promote domestic demand, that the spillovers are overwhelmingly positive, and we've seen that in the case of the U.S. And of course, as we've had discussions more recently, as Japan has moved forward on its three-arrow framework, the focus has really been on channels of transmission through domestic demand.SHIRZAD: So Europe is an important test case for that framework, to see how it's applied? Another one that you mentioned earlier is China. There's a new leadership there; you've talked to them. Secretary Lew has as well. Can you give us a sense of where they're headed? Are they really looking at building a -- more of a domestically -- demand-oriented economic growth model, or is it going to be a -- more of an export model, as we've seen in the past?BRAINARD: Well, Secretary Lew was out, really, in the first few days of office of the new team and had a really good opportunity to meet with all the top leadership and hear from them. And then, subsequent to that, of course, we're now in planning for the July meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue -- the first -- the first meeting with new teams on both sides.But the leadership in China is very focused on promoting consumer-led, domestic-led demand, and it's a -- it's a very important shift in terms of what we're hearing. And of course, we're hearing this at a time when you can see major shifts under way in their economy as their labor force starts to slow, and of course, will reverse as wages have been growing, as domestic consumers have demanded better standards of living -- less pollution, more focus on standards of living at home, less distortionary policies that rely excessively on very resource-intensive, and of course, for us, export-intensive investments.So that debate, I think, has changed quite a lot. We've seen some policies oriented in that direction, but a great deal more, I think, will be necessary to make sure that the micro structure of incentives, the price structure of the economy really pushes in that direction. That's why we've pushed so hard. The exchange rate is one of the most powerful tools. And we've seen 15 (percent), 16 percent appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in real terms, but more is needed there. Again, they need to take the next step in terms of allowing their exchange rate to move within a wider range, to move to greater market determination. But it's also true that they're state-owned enterprises, who are doing a lot of this investment, still have much different dividend policies than private enterprises. Credit is still allocated with administered interest rates and rationed to enterprises that might not be serving domestic consumers. So all of those things, I think, are going to need to be changed in order for that very important machine of the Chinese economy to reorient to the domestic consumer. And of course, for our companies to give them a more level playing field, we've got tremendous capacity in areas across services -- financial services, across the services area as they open up services, which they need to do to lift the lives of their consumers, our companies will also be able to bring their innovative products to bear.SHIRZAD: You know, one interesting thing in your recent speeches has been the degree to which trade has now featured very prominently. You talk about the International Services Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a new trade agreement with Europe that you're all developing the framework for. Could you talk about the trade initiatives and how they fit into the broader framework of it?BRAINARD: Absolutely. Yeah, no, this is an extraordinarily important part of the president's overall agenda for growth -- for restarting growth, really globally. And, you know, as you'll recall, early on in the administration he set this very ambitious target on exports, and it's served to focus, I think, all of us on what more we can do through all the various parts of the U.S. government to support our companies, our workers as they are working to sell into growing markets abroad. Right now, as you know, we are engaged in a very important set of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has the potential to unlock the most dynamic economies in the world and to sign up for, I think, some of the best in-class standards across a whole host of areas where increasingly we'll need to have a level playing field in order to bring the biggest benefit to consumers and to lift growth. And of course, the most recent announcement is that Japan sees the TPP as a vital part of its structural reform agenda, and that could go a long way for both sides.Now on the other side -- on the one side we've got the Pacific, on the other the Atlantic -- a critical part of Europe's growth agenda is also going to be unlocking greater trade opportunities, and that's why we're so excited about the potential for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We're still in the stakeholder consultation phase, but there's a lot of excitement there, too, and a lot of potential to set the highest standards.And of course, given that our services, producers are the most competitive, the most innovative in the world, we're very excited about the trade and investment services agreement that is being discussed at the WTO. That, again, has the potential to unlock sectors that have traditionally lagged in terms of the trade liberalization agenda, and we think there might be a little bit of a window of opportunity there to make a big difference for our companies, and again, for growth.SHIRZAD: You know, as a guy who's been involved in trade for a while, I was both impressed and a little bit fretful on your behalf in the sense that, you know, with the U.S. and Europe, there are very few border measures that are at issue in terms of trade between the two economies. It's really sort of fundamental sovereign decisions that each side has made regarding the shape of regulation that a trade agreement could help harmonize so that you create a more coherent regulatory framework that then allows a more -- for a more integrated set of economies. Is the -- is the administration really ready to take that on? I mean, these are hard issues, and all the various sectors that would help ultimately become the elements of a deal like this.BRAINARD: Well, I think first, as you know, there have been certain trade sectors that have -- even though our trade with Europe is already extremely important, among the biggest trading relationships in the world, there are sectors that have not been really part of the trade liberalization agenda and very protected in Europe, as we know. So I'm hoping that we unlock some of that. But you're right, that regulatory convergence has also got to be a central part of the conversation in any trade agreement -- in any deeper trade agreement in today's world. And that's why everything in the regulatory convergence agenda across a whole variety of sectors is being discussed right now. And hopefully we'll make some progress. Of course, it's very important to converge on a high level of standards. And I think there is going to be a very rich agenda going forward on that front. SHIRZAD: Are the -- one of the things that Secretary Lew had as a welcoming kind of gift when he became secretary was a letter from seven, eight of his colleagues, admonishing the United States for problems with extraterritoriality in terms of financial regulation. Could you talk about that? Do you think that was a fair kind of concern that the finance ministers raised? And what do -- what is the administration trying to do to deal with that?BRAINARD: You know, I will say that the G-20, the FSB have a very, very ambitious agenda across the whole set of financial reform initiatives that are encompassed in Dodd-Frank. And the work that is underway there -- and of course I participate on behalf of Treasury and the FSB piece, but it's really our regulators who are working with their European, Asian, Latin American counterparts -- that that agenda has progressed. It has -- it has not progressed as quickly as it needs to. I think the U.S. is out ahead of other jurisdiction in terms of implementing in a number of areas. And in particular, the U.S. has moved forward -- according to its Dodd-Frank timelines -- on putting in place comprehensive reform of the derivatives space for the first time -- very significant -- for the first time really putting in place incentives to move things to central clearing, reporting, trading, you know, a whole set of extraordinarily important reforms.And of course, the world has signed on for those through the G-20 and the FSB. Now what we need to see is other jurisdictions move to the same level. And Europe has lagged in that respect. And so I will say that our regulators are very closely engaged. And we've been part of those conversations in our role through the FSB and the FSOC in trying to get the greatest convergence possible because these are inherently global markets. We know it's important for market participants that there not be big distortions that cause business to move to one side of the border or the other, for artificial reasons. And so my sense is actually conversations there between the regulators are very engaged, and they are progressing. So you know, I think we have to guard against extraterritoriality. We are dismayed by the extraterritorial aspects of the financial transactions tax that has been passed in France and has -- also in Italy. We're working on that. We think it's extraordinarily important that that be removed. But I will say, in the derivatives space, conversations are granular and they are progressing and we are seeing a convergence that we think is going to be critically important for these markets.SHIRZAD: You know, there were news reports that said at the last G-7 meeting there was a lot of discussion about dealing with "too big to fail" resolution planning, making sure that large financial institutions that get into trouble are ultimately able to be wound down in a way that doesn't create systemic implications. Can you give us a sense of what the discussion was and where it's headed?BRAINARD: Well, I think recent events in Cyprus only highlighted that this is a part of the reform agenda that's extraordinarily important to move forward in Europe. As you know, European banks tend to be much larger, relative to their home markets, relative to their sovereigns -- the largest banks -- than -- certainly than is the case here in the U.S. And they are still quite a bit farther behind in terms of putting in place a legal regime on resolution that provides certainty to financial institutions, to investors. And it is extraordinarily important that they do so. In the G-7 discussions, Secretary Lew had a chance to go into some depth on the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority. And you know, the FDIC itself has tremendous experience in the area of orderly resolutions. And now, with Title 2 orderly liquidation authority, they believe they have the capacity to wind down even the largest, most complex institutions, through a single point of entry model which other regulators around the world see as having tremendous promise not just domestically but also in terms of the cross-border area, which is extraordinarily important, as we know from the crisis.So there was a general consensus that this is a good model; it's extremely important to see ex-ante clear party of claims with depositors getting preference, strong deposit insurance systems. And because of the interconnected nature of the European banking systems, that that really should take place at the Euro area level, which is why the discussion about full banking (in union ?) has to move in conjunction with the discussion about resolution and what resolution means for bank funding models as well.SHIRZAD: Let me ask you another Europe question. You know, you talked about -- earlier about the fact that Europe has the capacity, and it has made incredibly difficult decisions to deal with its sort of internal challenges. It seems, though, to play the devil's advocate, that as they make their decisions, they make their processes of decision-making even more complicated -- add layers of bureaucracy, mechanisms of decision-making that require national ratification each time a big crisis is confronted. Is the European model fundamentally -- I mean, is it -- is it fundamentally sustainable given how, as they make difficult decisions, they seem to make their system more complicated than they started with?BRAINARD: Well, I think the financial crisis demonstrated, you know, in ways that were not fully foreseen, that, in fact, it is quite complex to have a monetary union encompassing very disparate economies, without greater risk-sharing, greater centralization on the banking front and on the fiscal front.And so that is going to continue to be an institutional process of evolution. If you think about it, the -- you know, in full, kind of firefighting mode, there's only one institution that has the capacity -- has the instruments across the entire Euro area, and that's the ECB. And yet, there were -- you know, there were constraints on the ECB's ability to deploy that set of instruments across the Euro area.So I think, you know, as the -- as this very important partner of ours -- very important strategic partner, very important economic partner moves forward, they're going to grapple with this broader question of institutional design. And we're seeing it very actively on the banking union. Of course, you know, at the moment of crisis, you need to use the instruments you have, and create, you know, instruments.And of course, the creation of the ESM, the creation of the OMT -- those were critically important moments. The, you know, decisions that were made to keep Greece within the Euro area -- critically important not just for the Euro area but for the world. But in order to solve the demand deficiency, in order to make this a really vibrant and stable Euro area, I think that discussion about institutional changes will continue.SHIRZAD: I'll ask you one more question, and then we'll open it up to the audience. The G-20 meeting under the Russian presidency -- the leaders meeting is, I guess, set for the fall. Can you give us a sneak preview as to what will happen at that meeting, both on economic coordination as well as on financial regulation or any other issue?BRAINARD: Yeah, I think Petersburg -- you know, we have a -- at least on the -- on the finance side of the agenda, we have a pretty clear, already, view about that trajectory. I think the discussion is going to continue (to ?) intensify about how we do a better job of coordinating so that we make sure that countries are doing the right policies in terms of boosting demand, and that as a result, we grow together. And that's important not just for the G-20 -- not just for the economies in the room, but it's really vitally important for the developing economies, smaller economies that are not in the room.I think, you know, we'll want to see the consensus on exchange rates continuing to be upheld, and further movements, as has been committed, on market-determined exchange rates, not targeting exchange rates. On the financial regulatory agenda, there are a number of commitments that have been made across the spectrum that really now are in the implementation phase. So we've -- you know, we've had the systemically important designations for the banks, but we have to do that in the nonbank arena.At the G-20 level, we need to see derivatives reforms, as we were saying earlier, put in place in a way that's convergent and consistent with the timelines that we're committed to. So that discussion will be very robust. And you know, of course, I think the trade discussion is also going to be very robust. There's just so much excitement about the initiatives that the U.S. is undertaking with various members of the G-20, and the questions about what can the multilateral system do, I think, will be on the table.SHIRZAD: Great.OK, why don't we turn to the audience. If you have a -- Hamid, why don't you wait for the microphone. When you're about to ask you question, make sure you identify yourself, as well as any affiliation you may have.QUESTIONER: Hamid Biglari. There have been repeated incidents of cyberattacks against financial institutions, cross-border cyberattacks. And while each financial institution has been responsible for its own security, there is a point at which this gets elevated to the point of national security. How is the U.S. government thinking about it? Who has primary jurisdiction? What is the role of the Defense Department versus the Treasury versus our various national intelligence agencies, if you could give us some guidance on that?BRAINARD: Yeah. Well, as you know, the president has put out an executive order in this space. We're working on legislation. We think this is a matter of very high national priority, from a perspective of our critical infrastructure, financial infrastructure, but more broadly, as well as, of course -- this is core to our -- one of our greatest competitive strengths, our intellectual property and our innovation.So we're working very tightly across the administration on these issues. We work with the Department of Homeland Security and the other agencies on the security side.And of course, this has also become one of the top priorities in our deep discussions with the Chinese. This is an issue that the president raised in his first conversation with President Xi. This is an issue that Secretary Lew had good conversations on, as did Secretary Kerry. And you know, for us, it's important that we make progress so that our Chinese counterparts understand that in particular, cyberintrusions from state-involved entities create a real -- real difficulties in terms of trade secrets and intellectual property more generally, and reputational risk, we think, for them. And so, you know, this is an area where we think we have to make progress over the next little while. Of course, separately, we're working with the private sector to help the private sector work together and work internally to protect itself to the greatest extent possible.So we're working all of those fronts. And it'll continue, I think, to be a very high priority in years to come, for all the reasons you said.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Patrick Dirkin, Barclays. Nice to see you. Combining your comments on financial reform in the trans-Atlantic trade discussions, would you put financial institutions and markets in a trade deal? If yes or no, why? And if we do arrive at dislocations in regulations, would including it give us a chance to come back a second time and create better harmonization, whether it's in resolution, cross-border derivatives, capital rules, which seem to be going, at least from a markets perspective, to a certain degree in different directions? Also, the financial transaction tax. Thank you.BRAINARD: Yep, so on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, we are right now in the period of consultations. So we're in listening mode. And you know, we're talking to members of Congress. We're talking to the business community, to labor, to all the various stakeholders, consumer groups that have an interest in this. In terms of what the scope of those discussions should be -- you know, I can tell you that from my own perspective, obviously, financial services needs to be part of the conversation. It's very important to make progress on market access, to nail down access that we've already secured. So I think, at least in terms of our inclination, it would be to make sure that's a very important part of the conversation.On the regulatory convergence front, you know, we are already signed up for very tight timelines, most of which are in the next year to 18 months. And we're already engaged in very detailed conversations with clear commitments on regulatory convergence. And we're -- those conversations are partly bilateral because, you know, we have important depth of engagement of our private sectors across the Atlantic. But they are, by necessity, multilateral.Asia is just going to be an increasingly important market, and Latin America already is an important market. So there are -- there are a variety of reasons why, partly because the time is now, these things need to get done now -- I don't think -- I don't think the business community wants to wait another several years for certainty; I don't think we can afford to -- and partly because we need other partners in the room that we want to use the G-20 and the FSB to get these things as far along as we possibly can in the near term.QUESTIONER: Hi. Massimo Gaggi from the Italian Daily Corriere Della Serea . Mario Monti two years ago was welcomed also here in the States almost as a hero. I remember a cover story on Time magazine: This man can save Europe. Now his policies are considered one of the major reasons for the deepening of Italian recession. Do you think that Italy in its current fiscal conditions has room for initiatives from the new Letta government for sustaining the internal demand and the growth and that Europe should do something to lower the -- at least the short-term limits on its budget deficit, and if there is any possible role for United States in this area? And I know that President Obama after the G-8 in Britain is going to Berlin. Thank you.BRAINARD: So I think, you know, Italy is a very important economy and a very important player within the broader euro area. If you look at the course of the crisis over the last two years or so, you know, Italy has put in place important reforms. They've moved very rapidly on the fiscal front. They've put in place some structural reforms. But as you say, Italy is struggling with rising unemployment and continued demand contraction, and it's part of this broader picture of very disappointing demand. And, you know, I think the entire euro area really is facing the need for decisive action or the risk of protracted stagnation, which is not in the interest of Europeans. It's certainly not in our interests or the world's interest.We think there are things that can be done, and I spoke a little bit about those earlier, that there is space in many countries. You know, Italy is now engaged in a process of paying off some of the very substantial arrears that are weighing on the small business sector. We think that is important.So, you know, again as countries in the euro area continue to move forward on structural reforms, which will bear fruit in the longer run, we think it's important to stretch out fiscal timelines where possible or provide fiscal space where possible, better balance that need for longer-term consolidation with short-term support for the recovery, and of course for employment.SHIRZAD: Stay back there.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Name inaudible) -- from Chinese Taichi (ph) Media. You talk about S&ED talk. What are the most important issues does the United States think they want to address with their Chinese counterpart? And also, last year you talked about greater access to high-tech components, but that doesn't seem to have any substantial progress after last year's talk. Could you explain on that? Thank you.BRAINARD: So our agenda for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the economics side -- I won't speak to the strategic side -- but on the economic side, you know, there are very important areas where we think we need to make further progress for the bilateral economic relationship to be strengthened. And, you know, those are areas that we think for the most part are beneficial for both sides and closely aligned with the Chinese leadership's own agenda.The Chinese leadership talks about a higher value, more innovation in their economy. We talk about how important it is to strop trade secret theft and to provide protection for all intellectual property, not just indigenous intellectual property, that that will be positive both for growth and the value of production in China, but also important -- critically important for giving fair access to private enterprises and foreign enterprises, U.S. companies. We have very much heard the Chinese leadership as they talk about the domestic consumer and making domestic demand-led growth the kind of central thrust of their policies. Well, of course, the exchange rate has to be central to that. And allowing the exchange rate to fully reflect market forces is something they've made some progress on, but there's still some distance and there's scope to move now.The way that credit is allocated, still a lot of administrative controls that distort capital to large investments, to state enterprises that choke off more innovative, more competitive private enterprises -- foreign enterprises but also domestic private enterprises. So that's an extraordinarily important part of it.Cybersecurity has got to be front and central. That is just simply too much of a threat, really, to our competitiveness and to critical infrastructure not to make that a central part. We'd like to make some progress on the bilateral investment treaty. It's an area of great potential for both sides. And so we'd like to see how fast and how far we can push those discussions.We'd like to see some services sector access. You know, we got equity caps lifted for the first time. In very important parts of the financial services market there is ample opportunity to allow greater foreign participation and thereby have a more dynamic financial sector, services sector more generally, by lifting equity caps and lifting investment restrictions.SHIRZAD: Let's actually go down here.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Allen Batkin (sp). I wanted to ask about Japan and the weakening of the yen. There's been some press recently about the impact on the economies and exports of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines from the weaker yen. So my questions are: How serious are those implications, the impact on their economies? Can that affect our economies -- our economy and our export markets if those countries are weakened? And how does this strategy of Japan fit into your comments earlier about the G-7 and the -- not using exchange rate mechanism?BRAINARD: So we have had extensive conversations in the G-7 more broadly. It is extraordinarily important that when countries are pursuing macroeconomic policies, that their fiscal and monetary policies be oriented very clearly to domestic objectives, to domestic demand, and that they are oriented in that way under clear rules, using domestic instruments, not targeting exchange rates.We think those rules are important to make sure that those policies actually boost global growth and are not -- are not going lead to a downward spiral. So you know, in the current context, we think Japan has said they're going to move forward with their third arrow, structural reform. That's going to be a vital component in order to restore growth. And we've only seen the beginnings of that with the TPP, but it's extraordinarily important to see a very robust structural reform agenda.Japan's growth is important obviously to the world, but the way they pursue it, we want to make sure is through the domestic channels. Now, more broadly in Asia, of course, it's important that countries not fall back on undervalued exchange rates and export-led growth strategies. Those haven't worked. They haven't worked for the world and they certainly are not the path forward. And so we're going to continue to push for a clear commitment to exchange rates that are market-determined and growth strategies that are demand-led. QUESTIONER: Glenn Gerstell from Millbank, Tweed. Thank you very much for your comments this morning. One country that the discussion this morning hasn't touched on is India. And I wondered if -- I know you recently hosted a delegation of some senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Finance. Could you comment on prospects for India opening up a little more to trade and investment?BRAINARD: Yeah. I think our engagement with India is also -- glad you raised it -- has also really deepened over the last few years, with a lot of bilateral engagement, you know, both through economic channels, but more broadly between the -- President Obama's broader administration.And what we've seen there is, you know, some forward momentum on the reform front, but not enough. There, too, you know, if the Indian government can move forward on the reform agenda that it has articulated, and get public support for it -- we think it would very meaningful in terms of spurring growth there. They have huge infrastructure needs, but they need to be able to catalyze private investment into infrastructure, and right now, there are a whole host of impediments why private investors are reluctant to participate.But the kinds of scale of infrastructure investments they need requires -- inherently requires, we think, private capital to be unlocked for that, and so our conversations have very much been around reform in the financial sector, reform of their regulatory environments to make investment much more predictable -- more predictability about the tax regime.And -- you know, as you know, we've made some progress there, but , you know, India has ambitious growth goals, and we -- our companies and -- you know, we would -- we would like to help be part of that. It's a very exciting potential growth story, but it's going to require continued and much deeper reforms. And we'll keep pushing for them, because we think it's important. But they're still -- they've got quite a ways to go.SHIRZAD: In the corner.QUESTIONER: (I work for ?) -- (inaudible) -- (Blackrock ?). You mentioned several times about China's desire to increase their economic growth through increasing consumer spending. That would seem like an extremely easy to do with a savings rate that is estimated to be 35 percent. However, to get that savings rate to decline and consumption to increase, one would think that they would have to put in some safety net provisions that I'm not sure they've put in.My question is, how quickly are they moving to put in these safety net provisions and also whether -- how are they going to communicate that to the Chinese public in order to get the savings rate down and to turn it into domestic consumption? MS. BRAINARD: Well, I think this is a central challenge -- is, you know, providing enough of a social safety net and providing clarity about who's responsible for that -- at what level? Is it the, you know, traditional state-owned enterprise, is it the locality, is it the, you know, urban area where migrant workers have moved into but still have really no rights in some cases? That clarity is going to be critically important for Chinese consumers to consume, to feel like they don't need to build up really massive amounts of precautionary savings.So of course, it's also important that they earn a real return on their savings, and right now, what we know is that they have interest rate caps that don't give them the kinds of returns that they would normally earn. And of course, they don't have access to the full suite of savings -- products that we would -- you know, our companies would love to provide and do so such a great job of providing elsewhere.So there is a whole set of important reforms there that, you know, you'll see in our strategic and economic dialogue commitments. You know, we made a big deal last year about their commitment to ensure that state-owned enterprises would pay out dividends at the same rate as a publicly-listed company. Why is that important?Because a lot of that funding is just sitting in state-owned enterprises -- massive build-up of savings that might get directed, in some cases, to noneconomic investments -- and this is part of the -- you know, excessive reliance on investment, but is not getting put into the government coffers to provide health and pension kinds of insurance education, insurance that would give Chinese consumers the comfort they need to go out and actually raise their living standards.QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Faryad. Thank you very much, Lael. Carol Brookins (sp). You've spent a lot of time focused on Europe, and I'm glad to hear that, but we've seen in the past -- and the past being a prologue to the future, this kind of crisis lurching forward -- being able to do something, but only after several iterations of things that may not have been the right things to do. Given that the timelines and the urgency of this agenda going forward for domestic demand to be increased -- are you optimistic, pessimistic, neutral, given the timeline of the German elections?BRAINARD: What -- you know, what I said earlier I think is the dominant kind of approach on our end, which is to say, look, this is important to us, it's important to you, it's -- you know, it is not sustainable to have 55 percent youth unemployment. That has long-lasting damage that gets inflicted on the economy. You know, nobody -- it's in nobody's interest for the euro area, which is such a vital partner strategically and economically, to be in protracted stagnation. So we just think it's extraordinarily important that these issues be squarely on the agenda.And, you know, we are seeing these debates. We think there is a path forward. I think I talked about the four key areas that we think would have the most impact in the short run. And so, you know, we'll continue to offer our views based on our own crisis playbook and recovery playbook and what worked, what didn't work, in an effort to help that debate move forward, recognizing that their institutional constraints are quite different and, you know, challenging -- 17 national parliaments; you know, we are challenged with one, so I think -- I think it -- I -- you know, we take seriously that it's a complicated institutional environment. We think we -- they have capacity to act, and they need to act.SHIRZAD: So Lael, let me take the prerogative last -- ask the last question. We only have about 60 seconds. Big question, short answer. We have a new World Bank president, a huge development agenda that you inherited and you guys are pursuing. Can you talk about the development agenda?BRAINARD: Yeah, so, we're -- we, you know, have been pretty excited about what we've been able to do with our partners in development countries on lifting the lives of the poor, on addressing gradual states. And that's both through the bilateral as well as the development banks.We -- in the last year we recapitalized every single one of the development banks. That's never happened before, and it's at a time when people say that, you know, Congress won't move forward. And I think it was on a bipartisan basis that we recapitalized every institutions because of their performance in the wake of the financial crisis. They really stepped up. They helped countries keep trade finance at a time when trade was plummeting. They helped countries keep in place safety nets, infrastructure projects. They really proved their worth.And Jim Kim is really bringing a lot of energy, a lot of focus. You know, he's very focused on what more middle-income countries can do to lift their poor populations, because that's, of course, where most of the poor live today. Very focused on some of the win-wins between addressing environmental challenges like climate change and poverty, improving resilience of agriculture. And that squares very closely with, you know, our own food security agenda. We've got a terrific new trust fund at the World Bank called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program that's part of the broader present Food Security Initiative. We think he can do more on empowering women, on locking the productive potential of women. We're really encouraging that at the World Bank because it's such a flagship.And of course, we have emphasized that the World Bank is most powerful not through its -- not primarily through its lending but through its knowledge products. And there is no better example of that than doing business report -- it's -- very simple benchmarking exercise, which has helped numerous countries, from Colombia to Sierra Leone, to slash red tape and really see rates of business formation double in some cases.SHIRZAD: Great. Lael, thank you very much. Our meeting is adjourned.BRAINARD: Thank you. Good to see everybody. (Applause.) (C) 2013 Federal News Service FARYAR SHIRZAD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let's go ahead and get started.Welcome to today's CFR meeting with Lael Brainard. This is part of the C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics.As you've heard, please completely turn off, not just put on vibrate, your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all wireless devices to ensure that we avoid interference with the sound system. And as was just said, we're going to do this session on the record.We'll start this session with some remarks by Lael. We'll follow that by some questions that I will get to ask her, and then we'll turn it to all of you in the audience so that the members can ask questions as well. In keeping with the traditions of the council, we will stay on time and finish at 9:00.Lael, as everyone knows, is well-known to the council. And you all have her bio in front of you, so I'll keep this introduction short. Lael is one of the leading thinkers and practitioners in the area of international economic policy. She's currently the undersecretary for international affairs at Treasury. In that role, Lael is the administration's point person on international economic and financial matters, making her one of the key architects of the post-crisis economic order and one of our country's chief economic diplomats.She has over the last four years dealt with an extraordinary range of challenges that are almost unprecedented in their complexity and scale. She has been the U.S. chief representative at the G-7 and G-20 tables as countries have attempted to restore their economies, build a new international economic architecture and create a new framework for financial regulation, all with a view towards promoting economic growth and putting people back to work.She has undertaken this role at a time when it's increasingly critical for the United States to work with multiple geopolitical powers and market stakeholders and through increasingly complicated and multilateral mechanisms to build consensus on economic issues. Despite the challenges of multilateral policymaking, Lael has adeptly and diplomatically advanced U.S. interests. So it is in that context that we look forward to hearing from her this morning on her perspectives on the global economy and on the agenda ahead. Lael? (Applause.)LAEL BRAINARD: Well, thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. It's nice to be here with all of you at the Council on Foreign Relations, and it's always good to work with Faryar.The U.S. economy is on the mend. Private demand has now expanded for 15 consecutive quarters. Early on, the United States took very difficult steps to rebuild the capital of our financial institutions, combining tough transparent stress tests with a backstop. The buffer against losses in our largest banks has doubled over the past four years, and our banks are again lending to households and small businesses.Restoring financial stability was only the first chapter. It was necessary but not sufficient. Policy action was needed to jump-start the recovery of private demand, followed by a careful withdrawal of public support calibrated to support the pace of recovery and private demand. According to the CBO, we're on track to bring our deficit down significantly to 4 percent of GDP this year, less than half the level in 2009.Flexibility on the pace of fiscal withdrawal has proven to be vital to sustaining the recovery in the face of strong headwinds, as you will recall, with a payroll tax cut enacted at the end of 2010 and its subsequent extension through 2012.Today there is broad agreement the sequester should be replaced by a balanced approach to better support the recovery, but importantly, the current consolidation comes after three years of gathering strength in the private sector. The headwinds from deleveraging are fading, and the overall pace of growth is expected to accelerate, which is critical to finish the healing process.Global recovery has been held back by a lack of demand growth in many of the major advanced economies and by reluctance in many emerging economies to move more quickly toward the currency flexibility needed to durable rebalancing.It's now important to guard again the risk that global recovery remains fragile and excessively dependent on U.S. demand.The key to a resilient global recovery, where growth in each country advances growth in every country, is action directed at supporting demand at home. That's been the core focus of Secretary Lew's discussions in Europe, at the spring meetings and most recently, of course, at the G-7 in the U.K.But that key test, strengthening European demand is the most important immediate imperative on the global growth agenda. Domestic demand in the euro area is now below the low point of the global crisis in 2009 in real terms. The recovery in European output since that time has come entirely from net exports. That is not sustainable for a region that accounts for one-fifth of the global economy.Euro area leaders deserve credit for the difficult steps they've taken to restore financial stability and address the risk of cascading defaults and exit. Spain and Italy are now able to borrow at rates significantly lower than a year ago. But one of the key lessons of our own crisis is that restoring financial stability, while critical, is only the first step for the economy to heal. The focus of the policy debate in Europe must now shift from restoring financial stability to developing a plan to boost demand and employment.Last year, demand contracted 2 percent across the euro area. Unemployment has reached the highest level in at least 20 years. It's clear that decisive action is needed now to restart demand and avoid the risk of protracted stagnation. And there are steps that can be taken to do so. First, European leaders need to recalibrate the pace of their fiscal consolidation. As we know from our experience, course correction can make an important difference. The consolidation path should be stretched out in some countries, and those with fiscal space should shift to supporting demand. We welcome indications that France, Spain and The Netherlands, most recently, have decided to take additional time to meet their budget targets.Second, the core of Europe can make a difference by rebalancing demand. Increased demand in Europe's strongest economies would not only provide relief to weaker euro area economies but would also spur the global economy. In those countries in the euro area where current account surpluses remain above 6 percent of GDP, faster wage growth and greater homeownership are some of the steps that can be taken to make an important contribution.Third, the discussions on lowering borrowing costs for small- and medium-sized enterprises in southern Europe are extremely important. With weakening growth and disinflation, we welcome the ongoing discussions at the ECB and more broadly about additional measures to improve transmission and to address the credit crunch in the periphery. And fourth, events in Cyprus only have served to underscore the importance of moving forward with a full concept of banking union. Upcoming bank stress tests and bank asset reviews are a critical opportunity to restore confidence in bank balance sheets and restart credit to starving local economies. Our experience in the U.S. suggests that the credibility of those exercises will be enhanced when there's a strong backstop in place, permitting capital to be built without a further downward spiral of deleveraging.We've also learned from our own experience, it's much easier to wind down banks in an orderly manner where there's a well-established framework for resolution that clearly prioritizes deposits, buttressed by a strong system of deposit insurance and, ideally, backstopped at the euro area level. Drawing back to the global level, adjustment has thus far relied more broadly, heavily on compressed demand in deficit economies when stronger demand from surplus economies would enable higher growth overall. Avoiding competitive devaluation and a downward spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is critical to ensure growth strategies are mutually reinforcing at this critical time for the global economy. In February, the G-7 members affirmed their commitment to rules of the game on exchange rate. The G-7 makes clear that domestic monetary and fiscal policy should be directed toward meeting clear domestic objectives, using domestic instruments to ensure growth in each country is compatible with growth across countries.G-7 members, by making this commitment, have ruled out the pursuit of macroeconomic accommodation by the purchase of foreign assets, or targeting exchange rates. It's critical that Japan's efforts work through an expansion of domestic demand. Moreover, Japan's macroeconomic policy measures need to be complemented by the critical third arrow of structural reform, which the Abe administration has made clear will be a next step.With demand in the advanced economies weak, some G-20 members still run managed exchange rate regimes and intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist adjustment. That kind of approach puts an undue burden of adjustment on those emerging economies that have market exchange rates, that contribute to the weakness of demand and intensify the risk of inflation and asset bubbles in those economies with undervalued exchange rates.As G-20 countries follow through on their recent commitment not to target exchange rates for competitive purposes, it's extremely important China take additional measures to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate regime. Last year the band was widened modestly and the full band was used for the first time. But intervention subsequently has risen. China's path towards market determination implies further widening along with significantly greater transparency on reserves and intervention.Going forward, that will be the continued emphasis of our global efforts, action to support domestic demand and making sure that the pursuit of growth in each of the G-20 and G-7 economies supports growth more broadly.So let me wrap up there. And then, Faryar, I think we're going to take some questions. Thank you.SHIRZAD: Lael, thank you for that comprehensive overview. What I'll do is I'll ask questions for a few minutes and then we'll turn to the audience.So let's start with Europe. You talked about sort of the imperative of Europe becoming a part of the economic growth picture. The Wall Street Journal this morning described them as the weak link. Even with all the steps that Europe has taken to try to put in mechanisms of rescue, are you fundamentally optimistic or pessimistic in terms of their ability to undertake the necessary structural reforms to become a part of the growth picture over the long haul?BRAINARD: You know, I think the past few years have shown that European leaders can make very important decisions when it's necessary. And the steps they've taken to restore financial stability, I think, have been extraordinarily important, not just for Europe, but of course for us in the U.S., for financial markets globally.But the focus now really needs to be on demand. You see unemployment rates up 25 percent in several southern European countries, large countries, you see youth unemployment of 55 percent; that's not sustainable. And that's certainly not sustainable for an economy that accounts for one fifth of the global economy. So the focus now really needs to be on restoring demand.And we're seeing a debate in Europe. We're seeing some welcome moves. We've seen moves in the direction of adjusting fiscal consolidation paths to better support recovery. We think there's more room there. We think that surplus economies have a tremendous capacity to boost demand in Europe and in the world through mechanisms that really operate through private demand. We think that unclogging the credit channels in southern European countries are vitally important for getting young people back to jobs.And of course, we think that the debate on banking union needs to move forward with greater urgency and a comprehensive banking union is necessary, not in five years, not in four years, but now.SHIRZAD: You know, it's interesting, the OECD recently put out a study essentially arguing that the two primary mechanisms for stimulating the economy, monetary policy and fiscal policy, have run their course and that structural reform is ultimately the recipe for sustained growth in Europe and elsewhere. Do you feel like the reforms that have been undertaken as a part of these various rescue mechanisms -- Spain, Portugal, Italy, places like that -- are these fundamentally going to bear fruit in any time soon in a way that promotes the kind of growth we're all looking for?BRAINARD: Well, I think the last few years, we've seen significant structural reforms that over time, will bear fruit in boosting the potential of many European economies. The difficulty of course is, right now, what's needed is demand.And so you know, our general view is that they have now anchored their credibility, they have important structural reforms that are in place. And it gives them space to do more -- to do more in terms of stretching out fiscal consolidation paths and using fiscal space where they have to do more on private demand. Wage growth in some countries, where wages have grown slower than productivity for many years, could grow faster and that could provide a boost to the overall euro area. You know, we've seen that important recent academic debates have real bearing here. You know, we've seen that fiscal multipliers, the impact of fiscal withdrawal on the economy is much sharper under current circumstances when monetary policy is close to the -- to the zero bound and when there is synchronized consolidation. And so all of those things would suggest not only that there is the case for doing more, but that there is space for doing more.SHIRZAD: A lot of the issues you talked about are the kinds of issues that at least in theory or at least in principle are the kinds of things on which you should -- you could or you would hope to get agreement at the G-7 table, the G-20 table, essentially trading a coordinated framework for economic recovery.Can you talk about those mechanisms and what role they play? Has the consensus fundamentally broken down in a way that bilateral diplomacy, the trip that you and Secretary Lew took recently to Europe, are ultimately the mechanisms by which these policies get advanced, or should we still look at the multilateral mechanisms?BRAINARD: You know, I think that there's always -- as you know, because you have been the chief negotiator for some of these meetings in the past -- there's always the public record of what takes place and the commitments that members are willing to sign up for. And then there are the very important discussions in the room. In terms of what members are willing to sign up for, that, of course, is a more contentious process, but we saw in February in Moscow extremely important commitments on rules of the game on both exchange rates in the G-7 going into Moscow, and then on the G-20 more broadly in Moscow. And I would not understate the significance of that.At a time when, I think, the public debate was quite contentious, that that really provided an important path forward that would help guide members as they were undertaking their own macroeconomic policy choices. In terms of the discussions on the pace of fiscal consolidation -- the need for surplus economies to do more, the relative prioritization of demand versus longer-run fiscal consolidation, that's the most important debate right now in the international arena. And I think you've seen a shift -- the most recent communique coming out of the G-20 clearly prioritized employment and demand, but I anticipate that that argument, that debate will continue in the months ahead.SHIRZAD: The problem you have, or one of the challenges you have is that you have the central banks and all the major economic regions of the world all pursuing accommodative monetary policy, and as you said, you know, there's a bit of a better beggar thy neighbor dimension to that that's unsustainable over the long term, and the domestic demand has to be a part of the -- a critical part of the picture.Do you think -- do you have some hope that there is a balance that will be found on that, or are -- where are we going to go?BRAINARD: So I think there is a very important distinction that has come out in this debate between what has traditionally been viewed as beggar thy neighbor policies -- policies that are designed specifically to operate on the exchange rate, to promote growth in one country by changing relative prices, by promoting net exports in a way that fundamentally leads to a race to the bottom.I think that it's important to distinguish between that and macroeconomic policy that is designed to achieve clear domestic targets using clear domestic instruments, and that's what the G-7 statement does. It's very clear, both in the G-7 now and the G-20, that members will not target exchange rates, which has really been the traditional locus of problems on competitive devaluation.And what we know from studies at the IMF and elsewhere is that when accommodative macroeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal, are designed in such a way to promote domestic demand, that the spillovers are overwhelmingly positive, and we've seen that in the case of the U.S. And of course, as we've had discussions more recently, as Japan has moved forward on its three-arrow framework, the focus has really been on channels of transmission through domestic demand.SHIRZAD: So Europe is an important test case for that framework, to see how it's applied? Another one that you mentioned earlier is China. There's a new leadership there; you've talked to them. Secretary Lew has as well. Can you give us a sense of where they're headed? Are they really looking at building a -- more of a domestically -- demand-oriented economic growth model, or is it going to be a -- more of an export model, as we've seen in the past?BRAINARD: Well, Secretary Lew was out, really, in the first few days of office of the new team and had a really good opportunity to meet with all the top leadership and hear from them. And then, subsequent to that, of course, we're now in planning for the July meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue -- the first -- the first meeting with new teams on both sides.But the leadership in China is very focused on promoting consumer-led, domestic-led demand, and it's a -- it's a very important shift in terms of what we're hearing. And of course, we're hearing this at a time when you can see major shifts under way in their economy as their labor force starts to slow, and of course, will reverse as wages have been growing, as domestic consumers have demanded better standards of living -- less pollution, more focus on standards of living at home, less distortionary policies that rely excessively on very resource-intensive, and of course, for us, export-intensive investments.So that debate, I think, has changed quite a lot. We've seen some policies oriented in that direction, but a great deal more, I think, will be necessary to make sure that the micro structure of incentives, the price structure of the economy really pushes in that direction. That's why we've pushed so hard. The exchange rate is one of the most powerful tools. And we've seen 15 (percent), 16 percent appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in real terms, but more is needed there. Again, they need to take the next step in terms of allowing their exchange rate to move within a wider range, to move to greater market determination. But it's also true that they're state-owned enterprises, who are doing a lot of this investment, still have much different dividend policies than private enterprises. Credit is still allocated with administered interest rates and rationed to enterprises that might not be serving domestic consumers. So all of those things, I think, are going to need to be changed in order for that very important machine of the Chinese economy to reorient to the domestic consumer. And of course, for our companies to give them a more level playing field, we've got tremendous capacity in areas across services -- financial services, across the services area as they open up services, which they need to do to lift the lives of their consumers, our companies will also be able to bring their innovative products to bear.SHIRZAD: You know, one interesting thing in your recent speeches has been the degree to which trade has now featured very prominently. You talk about the International Services Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a new trade agreement with Europe that you're all developing the framework for. Could you talk about the trade initiatives and how they fit into the broader framework of it?BRAINARD: Absolutely. Yeah, no, this is an extraordinarily important part of the president's overall agenda for growth -- for restarting growth, really globally. And, you know, as you'll recall, early on in the administration he set this very ambitious target on exports, and it's served to focus, I think, all of us on what more we can do through all the various parts of the U.S. government to support our companies, our workers as they are working to sell into growing markets abroad. Right now, as you know, we are engaged in a very important set of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has the potential to unlock the most dynamic economies in the world and to sign up for, I think, some of the best in-class standards across a whole host of areas where increasingly we'll need to have a level playing field in order to bring the biggest benefit to consumers and to lift growth. And of course, the most recent announcement is that Japan sees the TPP as a vital part of its structural reform agenda, and that could go a long way for both sides.Now on the other side -- on the one side we've got the Pacific, on the other the Atlantic -- a critical part of Europe's growth agenda is also going to be unlocking greater trade opportunities, and that's why we're so excited about the potential for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We're still in the stakeholder consultation phase, but there's a lot of excitement there, too, and a lot of potential to set the highest standards.And of course, given that our services, producers are the most competitive, the most innovative in the world, we're very excited about the trade and investment services agreement that is being discussed at the WTO. That, again, has the potential to unlock sectors that have traditionally lagged in terms of the trade liberalization agenda, and we think there might be a little bit of a window of opportunity there to make a big difference for our companies, and again, for growth.SHIRZAD: You know, as a guy who's been involved in trade for a while, I was both impressed and a little bit fretful on your behalf in the sense that, you know, with the U.S. and Europe, there are very few border measures that are at issue in terms of trade between the two economies. It's really sort of fundamental sovereign decisions that each side has made regarding the shape of regulation that a trade agreement could help harmonize so that you create a more coherent regulatory framework that then allows a more -- for a more integrated set of economies. Is the -- is the administration really ready to take that on? I mean, these are hard issues, and all the various sectors that would help ultimately become the elements of a deal like this.BRAINARD: Well, I think first, as you know, there have been certain trade sectors that have -- even though our trade with Europe is already extremely important, among the biggest trading relationships in the world, there are sectors that have not been really part of the trade liberalization agenda and very protected in Europe, as we know. So I'm hoping that we unlock some of that. But you're right, that regulatory convergence has also got to be a central part of the conversation in any trade agreement -- in any deeper trade agreement in today's world. And that's why everything in the regulatory convergence agenda across a whole variety of sectors is being discussed right now. And hopefully we'll make some progress. Of course, it's very important to converge on a high level of standards. And I think there is going to be a very rich agenda going forward on that front. SHIRZAD: Are the -- one of the things that Secretary Lew had as a welcoming kind of gift when he became secretary was a letter from seven, eight of his colleagues, admonishing the United States for problems with extraterritoriality in terms of financial regulation. Could you talk about that? Do you think that was a fair kind of concern that the finance ministers raised? And what do -- what is the administration trying to do to deal with that?BRAINARD: You know, I will say that the G-20, the FSB have a very, very ambitious agenda across the whole set of financial reform initiatives that are encompassed in Dodd-Frank. And the work that is underway there -- and of course I participate on behalf of Treasury and the FSB piece, but it's really our regulators who are working with their European, Asian, Latin American counterparts -- that that agenda has progressed. It has -- it has not progressed as quickly as it needs to. I think the U.S. is out ahead of other jurisdiction in terms of implementing in a number of areas. And in particular, the U.S. has moved forward -- according to its Dodd-Frank timelines -- on putting in place comprehensive reform of the derivatives space for the first time -- very significant -- for the first time really putting in place incentives to move things to central clearing, reporting, trading, you know, a whole set of extraordinarily important reforms.And of course, the world has signed on for those through the G-20 and the FSB. Now what we need to see is other jurisdictions move to the same level. And Europe has lagged in that respect. And so I will say that our regulators are very closely engaged. And we've been part of those conversations in our role through the FSB and the FSOC in trying to get the greatest convergence possible because these are inherently global markets. We know it's important for market participants that there not be big distortions that cause business to move to one side of the border or the other, for artificial reasons. And so my sense is actually conversations there between the regulators are very engaged, and they are progressing. So you know, I think we have to guard against extraterritoriality. We are dismayed by the extraterritorial aspects of the financial transactions tax that has been passed in France and has -- also in Italy. We're working on that. We think it's extraordinarily important that that be removed. But I will say, in the derivatives space, conversations are granular and they are progressing and we are seeing a convergence that we think is going to be critically important for these markets.SHIRZAD: You know, there were news reports that said at the last G-7 meeting there was a lot of discussion about dealing with "too big to fail" resolution planning, making sure that large financial institutions that get into trouble are ultimately able to be wound down in a way that doesn't create systemic implications. Can you give us a sense of what the discussion was and where it's headed?BRAINARD: Well, I think recent events in Cyprus only highlighted that this is a part of the reform agenda that's extraordinarily important to move forward in Europe. As you know, European banks tend to be much larger, relative to their home markets, relative to their sovereigns -- the largest banks -- than -- certainly than is the case here in the U.S. And they are still quite a bit farther behind in terms of putting in place a legal regime on resolution that provides certainty to financial institutions, to investors. And it is extraordinarily important that they do so. In the G-7 discussions, Secretary Lew had a chance to go into some depth on the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority. And you know, the FDIC itself has tremendous experience in the area of orderly resolutions. And now, with Title 2 orderly liquidation authority, they believe they have the capacity to wind down even the largest, most complex institutions, through a single point of entry model which other regulators around the world see as having tremendous promise not just domestically but also in terms of the cross-border area, which is extraordinarily important, as we know from the crisis.So there was a general consensus that this is a good model; it's extremely important to see ex-ante clear party of claims with depositors getting preference, strong deposit insurance systems. And because of the interconnected nature of the European banking systems, that that really should take place at the Euro area level, which is why the discussion about full banking (in union ?) has to move in conjunction with the discussion about resolution and what resolution means for bank funding models as well.SHIRZAD: Let me ask you another Europe question. You know, you talked about -- earlier about the fact that Europe has the capacity, and it has made incredibly difficult decisions to deal with its sort of internal challenges. It seems, though, to play the devil's advocate, that as they make their decisions, they make their processes of decision-making even more complicated -- add layers of bureaucracy, mechanisms of decision-making that require national ratification each time a big crisis is confronted. Is the European model fundamentally -- I mean, is it -- is it fundamentally sustainable given how, as they make difficult decisions, they seem to make their system more complicated than they started with?BRAINARD: Well, I think the financial crisis demonstrated, you know, in ways that were not fully foreseen, that, in fact, it is quite complex to have a monetary union encompassing very disparate economies, without greater risk-sharing, greater centralization on the banking front and on the fiscal front.And so that is going to continue to be an institutional process of evolution. If you think about it, the -- you know, in full, kind of firefighting mode, there's only one institution that has the capacity -- has the instruments across the entire Euro area, and that's the ECB. And yet, there were -- you know, there were constraints on the ECB's ability to deploy that set of instruments across the Euro area.So I think, you know, as the -- as this very important partner of ours -- very important strategic partner, very important economic partner moves forward, they're going to grapple with this broader question of institutional design. And we're seeing it very actively on the banking union. Of course, you know, at the moment of crisis, you need to use the instruments you have, and create, you know, instruments.And of course, the creation of the ESM, the creation of the OMT -- those were critically important moments. The, you know, decisions that were made to keep Greece within the Euro area -- critically important not just for the Euro area but for the world. But in order to solve the demand deficiency, in order to make this a really vibrant and stable Euro area, I think that discussion about institutional changes will continue.SHIRZAD: I'll ask you one more question, and then we'll open it up to the audience. The G-20 meeting under the Russian presidency -- the leaders meeting is, I guess, set for the fall. Can you give us a sneak preview as to what will happen at that meeting, both on economic coordination as well as on financial regulation or any other issue?BRAINARD: Yeah, I think Petersburg -- you know, we have a -- at least on the -- on the finance side of the agenda, we have a pretty clear, already, view about that trajectory. I think the discussion is going to continue (to ?) intensify about how we do a better job of coordinating so that we make sure that countries are doing the right policies in terms of boosting demand, and that as a result, we grow together. And that's important not just for the G-20 -- not just for the economies in the room, but it's really vitally important for the developing economies, smaller economies that are not in the room.I think, you know, we'll want to see the consensus on exchange rates continuing to be upheld, and further movements, as has been committed, on market-determined exchange rates, not targeting exchange rates. On the financial regulatory agenda, there are a number of commitments that have been made across the spectrum that really now are in the implementation phase. So we've -- you know, we've had the systemically important designations for the banks, but we have to do that in the nonbank arena.At the G-20 level, we need to see derivatives reforms, as we were saying earlier, put in place in a way that's convergent and consistent with the timelines that we're committed to. So that discussion will be very robust. And you know, of course, I think the trade discussion is also going to be very robust. There's just so much excitement about the initiatives that the U.S. is undertaking with various members of the G-20, and the questions about what can the multilateral system do, I think, will be on the table.SHIRZAD: Great.OK, why don't we turn to the audience. If you have a -- Hamid, why don't you wait for the microphone. When you're about to ask you question, make sure you identify yourself, as well as any affiliation you may have.QUESTIONER: Hamid Biglari. There have been repeated incidents of cyberattacks against financial institutions, cross-border cyberattacks. And while each financial institution has been responsible for its own security, there is a point at which this gets elevated to the point of national security. How is the U.S. government thinking about it? Who has primary jurisdiction? What is the role of the Defense Department versus the Treasury versus our various national intelligence agencies, if you could give us some guidance on that?BRAINARD: Yeah. Well, as you know, the president has put out an executive order in this space. We're working on legislation. We think this is a matter of very high national priority, from a perspective of our critical infrastructure, financial infrastructure, but more broadly, as well as, of course -- this is core to our -- one of our greatest competitive strengths, our intellectual property and our innovation.So we're working very tightly across the administration on these issues. We work with the Department of Homeland Security and the other agencies on the security side.And of course, this has also become one of the top priorities in our deep discussions with the Chinese. This is an issue that the president raised in his first conversation with President Xi. This is an issue that Secretary Lew had good conversations on, as did Secretary Kerry. And you know, for us, it's important that we make progress so that our Chinese counterparts understand that in particular, cyberintrusions from state-involved entities create a real -- real difficulties in terms of trade secrets and intellectual property more generally, and reputational risk, we think, for them. And so, you know, this is an area where we think we have to make progress over the next little while. Of course, separately, we're working with the private sector to help the private sector work together and work internally to protect itself to the greatest extent possible.So we're working all of those fronts. And it'll continue, I think, to be a very high priority in years to come, for all the reasons you said.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Patrick Dirkin, Barclays. Nice to see you. Combining your comments on financial reform in the trans-Atlantic trade discussions, would you put financial institutions and markets in a trade deal? If yes or no, why? And if we do arrive at dislocations in regulations, would including it give us a chance to come back a second time and create better harmonization, whether it's in resolution, cross-border derivatives, capital rules, which seem to be going, at least from a markets perspective, to a certain degree in different directions? Also, the financial transaction tax. Thank you.BRAINARD: Yep, so on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, we are right now in the period of consultations. So we're in listening mode. And you know, we're talking to members of Congress. We're talking to the business community, to labor, to all the various stakeholders, consumer groups that have an interest in this. In terms of what the scope of those discussions should be -- you know, I can tell you that from my own perspective, obviously, financial services needs to be part of the conversation. It's very important to make progress on market access, to nail down access that we've already secured. So I think, at least in terms of our inclination, it would be to make sure that's a very important part of the conversation.On the regulatory convergence front, you know, we are already signed up for very tight timelines, most of which are in the next year to 18 months. And we're already engaged in very detailed conversations with clear commitments on regulatory convergence. And we're -- those conversations are partly bilateral because, you know, we have important depth of engagement of our private sectors across the Atlantic. But they are, by necessity, multilateral.Asia is just going to be an increasingly important market, and Latin America already is an important market. So there are -- there are a variety of reasons why, partly because the time is now, these things need to get done now -- I don't think -- I don't think the business community wants to wait another several years for certainty; I don't think we can afford to -- and partly because we need other partners in the room that we want to use the G-20 and the FSB to get these things as far along as we possibly can in the near term.QUESTIONER: Hi. Massimo Gaggi from the Italian Daily Corriere Della Serea . Mario Monti two years ago was welcomed also here in the States almost as a hero. I remember a cover story on Time magazine: This man can save Europe. Now his policies are considered one of the major reasons for the deepening of Italian recession. Do you think that Italy in its current fiscal conditions has room for initiatives from the new Letta government for sustaining the internal demand and the growth and that Europe should do something to lower the -- at least the short-term limits on its budget deficit, and if there is any possible role for United States in this area? And I know that President Obama after the G-8 in Britain is going to Berlin. Thank you.BRAINARD: So I think, you know, Italy is a very important economy and a very important player within the broader euro area. If you look at the course of the crisis over the last two years or so, you know, Italy has put in place important reforms. They've moved very rapidly on the fiscal front. They've put in place some structural reforms. But as you say, Italy is struggling with rising unemployment and continued demand contraction, and it's part of this broader picture of very disappointing demand. And, you know, I think the entire euro area really is facing the need for decisive action or the risk of protracted stagnation, which is not in the interest of Europeans. It's certainly not in our interests or the world's interest.We think there are things that can be done, and I spoke a little bit about those earlier, that there is space in many countries. You know, Italy is now engaged in a process of paying off some of the very substantial arrears that are weighing on the small business sector. We think that is important.So, you know, again as countries in the euro area continue to move forward on structural reforms, which will bear fruit in the longer run, we think it's important to stretch out fiscal timelines where possible or provide fiscal space where possible, better balance that need for longer-term consolidation with short-term support for the recovery, and of course for employment.SHIRZAD: Stay back there.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Name inaudible) -- from Chinese Taichi (ph) Media. You talk about S&ED talk. What are the most important issues does the United States think they want to address with their Chinese counterpart? And also, last year you talked about greater access to high-tech components, but that doesn't seem to have any substantial progress after last year's talk. Could you explain on that? Thank you.BRAINARD: So our agenda for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the economics side -- I won't speak to the strategic side -- but on the economic side, you know, there are very important areas where we think we need to make further progress for the bilateral economic relationship to be strengthened. And, you know, those are areas that we think for the most part are beneficial for both sides and closely aligned with the Chinese leadership's own agenda.The Chinese leadership talks about a higher value, more innovation in their economy. We talk about how important it is to strop trade secret theft and to provide protection for all intellectual property, not just indigenous intellectual property, that that will be positive both for growth and the value of production in China, but also important -- critically important for giving fair access to private enterprises and foreign enterprises, U.S. companies. We have very much heard the Chinese leadership as they talk about the domestic consumer and making domestic demand-led growth the kind of central thrust of their policies. Well, of course, the exchange rate has to be central to that. And allowing the exchange rate to fully reflect market forces is something they've made some progress on, but there's still some distance and there's scope to move now.The way that credit is allocated, still a lot of administrative controls that distort capital to large investments, to state enterprises that choke off more innovative, more competitive private enterprises -- foreign enterprises but also domestic private enterprises. So that's an extraordinarily important part of it.Cybersecurity has got to be front and central. That is just simply too much of a threat, really, to our competitiveness and to critical infrastructure not to make that a central part. We'd like to make some progress on the bilateral investment treaty. It's an area of great potential for both sides. And so we'd like to see how fast and how far we can push those discussions.We'd like to see some services sector access. You know, we got equity caps lifted for the first time. In very important parts of the financial services market there is ample opportunity to allow greater foreign participation and thereby have a more dynamic financial sector, services sector more generally, by lifting equity caps and lifting investment restrictions.SHIRZAD: Let's actually go down here.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Allen Batkin (sp). I wanted to ask about Japan and the weakening of the yen. There's been some press recently about the impact on the economies and exports of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines from the weaker yen. So my questions are: How serious are those implications, the impact on their economies? Can that affect our economies -- our economy and our export markets if those countries are weakened? And how does this strategy of Japan fit into your comments earlier about the G-7 and the -- not using exchange rate mechanism?BRAINARD: So we have had extensive conversations in the G-7 more broadly. It is extraordinarily important that when countries are pursuing macroeconomic policies, that their fiscal and monetary policies be oriented very clearly to domestic objectives, to domestic demand, and that they are oriented in that way under clear rules, using domestic instruments, not targeting exchange rates.We think those rules are important to make sure that those policies actually boost global growth and are not -- are not going lead to a downward spiral. So you know, in the current context, we think Japan has said they're going to move forward with their third arrow, structural reform. That's going to be a vital component in order to restore growth. And we've only seen the beginnings of that with the TPP, but it's extraordinarily important to see a very robust structural reform agenda.Japan's growth is important obviously to the world, but the way they pursue it, we want to make sure is through the domestic channels. Now, more broadly in Asia, of course, it's important that countries not fall back on undervalued exchange rates and export-led growth strategies. Those haven't worked. They haven't worked for the world and they certainly are not the path forward. And so we're going to continue to push for a clear commitment to exchange rates that are market-determined and growth strategies that are demand-led. QUESTIONER: Glenn Gerstell from Millbank, Tweed. Thank you very much for your comments this morning. One country that the discussion this morning hasn't touched on is India. And I wondered if -- I know you recently hosted a delegation of some senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Finance. Could you comment on prospects for India opening up a little more to trade and investment?BRAINARD: Yeah. I think our engagement with India is also -- glad you raised it -- has also really deepened over the last few years, with a lot of bilateral engagement, you know, both through economic channels, but more broadly between the -- President Obama's broader administration.And what we've seen there is, you know, some forward momentum on the reform front, but not enough. There, too, you know, if the Indian government can move forward on the reform agenda that it has articulated, and get public support for it -- we think it would very meaningful in terms of spurring growth there. They have huge infrastructure needs, but they need to be able to catalyze private investment into infrastructure, and right now, there are a whole host of impediments why private investors are reluctant to participate.But the kinds of scale of infrastructure investments they need requires -- inherently requires, we think, private capital to be unlocked for that, and so our conversations have very much been around reform in the financial sector, reform of their regulatory environments to make investment much more predictable -- more predictability about the tax regime.And -- you know, as you know, we've made some progress there, but , you know, India has ambitious growth goals, and we -- our companies and -- you know, we would -- we would like to help be part of that. It's a very exciting potential growth story, but it's going to require continued and much deeper reforms. And we'll keep pushing for them, because we think it's important. But they're still -- they've got quite a ways to go.SHIRZAD: In the corner.QUESTIONER: (I work for ?) -- (inaudible) -- (Blackrock ?). You mentioned several times about China's desire to increase their economic growth through increasing consumer spending. That would seem like an extremely easy to do with a savings rate that is estimated to be 35 percent. However, to get that savings rate to decline and consumption to increase, one would think that they would have to put in some safety net provisions that I'm not sure they've put in.My question is, how quickly are they moving to put in these safety net provisions and also whether -- how are they going to communicate that to the Chinese public in order to get the savings rate down and to turn it into domestic consumption? MS. BRAINARD: Well, I think this is a central challenge -- is, you know, providing enough of a social safety net and providing clarity about who's responsible for that -- at what level? Is it the, you know, traditional state-owned enterprise, is it the locality, is it the, you know, urban area where migrant workers have moved into but still have really no rights in some cases? That clarity is going to be critically important for Chinese consumers to consume, to feel like they don't need to build up really massive amounts of precautionary savings.So of course, it's also important that they earn a real return on their savings, and right now, what we know is that they have interest rate caps that don't give them the kinds of returns that they would normally earn. And of course, they don't have access to the full suite of savings -- products that we would -- you know, our companies would love to provide and do so such a great job of providing elsewhere.So there is a whole set of important reforms there that, you know, you'll see in our strategic and economic dialogue commitments. You know, we made a big deal last year about their commitment to ensure that state-owned enterprises would pay out dividends at the same rate as a publicly-listed company. Why is that important?Because a lot of that funding is just sitting in state-owned enterprises -- massive build-up of savings that might get directed, in some cases, to noneconomic investments -- and this is part of the -- you know, excessive reliance on investment, but is not getting put into the government coffers to provide health and pension kinds of insurance education, insurance that would give Chinese consumers the comfort they need to go out and actually raise their living standards.QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Faryad. Thank you very much, Lael. Carol Brookins (sp). You've spent a lot of time focused on Europe, and I'm glad to hear that, but we've seen in the past -- and the past being a prologue to the future, this kind of crisis lurching forward -- being able to do something, but only after several iterations of things that may not have been the right things to do. Given that the timelines and the urgency of this agenda going forward for domestic demand to be increased -- are you optimistic, pessimistic, neutral, given the timeline of the German elections?BRAINARD: What -- you know, what I said earlier I think is the dominant kind of approach on our end, which is to say, look, this is important to us, it's important to you, it's -- you know, it is not sustainable to have 55 percent youth unemployment. That has long-lasting damage that gets inflicted on the economy. You know, nobody -- it's in nobody's interest for the euro area, which is such a vital partner strategically and economically, to be in protracted stagnation. So we just think it's extraordinarily important that these issues be squarely on the agenda.And, you know, we are seeing these debates. We think there is a path forward. I think I talked about the four key areas that we think would have the most impact in the short run. And so, you know, we'll continue to offer our views based on our own crisis playbook and recovery playbook and what worked, what didn't work, in an effort to help that debate move forward, recognizing that their institutional constraints are quite different and, you know, challenging -- 17 national parliaments; you know, we are challenged with one, so I think -- I think it -- I -- you know, we take seriously that it's a complicated institutional environment. We think we -- they have capacity to act, and they need to act.SHIRZAD: So Lael, let me take the prerogative last -- ask the last question. We only have about 60 seconds. Big question, short answer. We have a new World Bank president, a huge development agenda that you inherited and you guys are pursuing. Can you talk about the development agenda?BRAINARD: Yeah, so, we're -- we, you know, have been pretty excited about what we've been able to do with our partners in development countries on lifting the lives of the poor, on addressing gradual states. And that's both through the bilateral as well as the development banks.We -- in the last year we recapitalized every single one of the development banks. That's never happened before, and it's at a time when people say that, you know, Congress won't move forward. And I think it was on a bipartisan basis that we recapitalized every institutions because of their performance in the wake of the financial crisis. They really stepped up. They helped countries keep trade finance at a time when trade was plummeting. They helped countries keep in place safety nets, infrastructure projects. They really proved their worth.And Jim Kim is really bringing a lot of energy, a lot of focus. You know, he's very focused on what more middle-income countries can do to lift their poor populations, because that's, of course, where most of the poor live today. Very focused on some of the win-wins between addressing environmental challenges like climate change and poverty, improving resilience of agriculture. And that squares very closely with, you know, our own food security agenda. We've got a terrific new trust fund at the World Bank called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program that's part of the broader present Food Security Initiative. We think he can do more on empowering women, on locking the productive potential of women. We're really encouraging that at the World Bank because it's such a flagship.And of course, we have emphasized that the World Bank is most powerful not through its -- not primarily through its lending but through its knowledge products. And there is no better example of that than doing business report -- it's -- very simple benchmarking exercise, which has helped numerous countries, from Colombia to Sierra Leone, to slash red tape and really see rates of business formation double in some cases.SHIRZAD: Great. Lael, thank you very much. Our meeting is adjourned.BRAINARD: Thank you. Good to see everybody. (Applause.) (C) 2013 Federal News Service FARYAR SHIRZAD: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let's go ahead and get started.Welcome to today's CFR meeting with Lael Brainard. This is part of the C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics.As you've heard, please completely turn off, not just put on vibrate, your cellphones, BlackBerrys and all wireless devices to ensure that we avoid interference with the sound system. And as was just said, we're going to do this session on the record.We'll start this session with some remarks by Lael. We'll follow that by some questions that I will get to ask her, and then we'll turn it to all of you in the audience so that the members can ask questions as well. In keeping with the traditions of the council, we will stay on time and finish at 9:00.Lael, as everyone knows, is well-known to the council. And you all have her bio in front of you, so I'll keep this introduction short. Lael is one of the leading thinkers and practitioners in the area of international economic policy. She's currently the undersecretary for international affairs at Treasury. In that role, Lael is the administration's point person on international economic and financial matters, making her one of the key architects of the post-crisis economic order and one of our country's chief economic diplomats.She has over the last four years dealt with an extraordinary range of challenges that are almost unprecedented in their complexity and scale. She has been the U.S. chief representative at the G-7 and G-20 tables as countries have attempted to restore their economies, build a new international economic architecture and create a new framework for financial regulation, all with a view towards promoting economic growth and putting people back to work.She has undertaken this role at a time when it's increasingly critical for the United States to work with multiple geopolitical powers and market stakeholders and through increasingly complicated and multilateral mechanisms to build consensus on economic issues. Despite the challenges of multilateral policymaking, Lael has adeptly and diplomatically advanced U.S. interests. So it is in that context that we look forward to hearing from her this morning on her perspectives on the global economy and on the agenda ahead. Lael? (Applause.)LAEL BRAINARD: Well, thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. It's nice to be here with all of you at the Council on Foreign Relations, and it's always good to work with Faryar.The U.S. economy is on the mend. Private demand has now expanded for 15 consecutive quarters. Early on, the United States took very difficult steps to rebuild the capital of our financial institutions, combining tough transparent stress tests with a backstop. The buffer against losses in our largest banks has doubled over the past four years, and our banks are again lending to households and small businesses.Restoring financial stability was only the first chapter. It was necessary but not sufficient. Policy action was needed to jump-start the recovery of private demand, followed by a careful withdrawal of public support calibrated to support the pace of recovery and private demand. According to the CBO, we're on track to bring our deficit down significantly to 4 percent of GDP this year, less than half the level in 2009.Flexibility on the pace of fiscal withdrawal has proven to be vital to sustaining the recovery in the face of strong headwinds, as you will recall, with a payroll tax cut enacted at the end of 2010 and its subsequent extension through 2012.Today there is broad agreement the sequester should be replaced by a balanced approach to better support the recovery, but importantly, the current consolidation comes after three years of gathering strength in the private sector. The headwinds from deleveraging are fading, and the overall pace of growth is expected to accelerate, which is critical to finish the healing process.Global recovery has been held back by a lack of demand growth in many of the major advanced economies and by reluctance in many emerging economies to move more quickly toward the currency flexibility needed to durable rebalancing.It's now important to guard again the risk that global recovery remains fragile and excessively dependent on U.S. demand.The key to a resilient global recovery, where growth in each country advances growth in every country, is action directed at supporting demand at home. That's been the core focus of Secretary Lew's discussions in Europe, at the spring meetings and most recently, of course, at the G-7 in the U.K.But that key test, strengthening European demand is the most important immediate imperative on the global growth agenda. Domestic demand in the euro area is now below the low point of the global crisis in 2009 in real terms. The recovery in European output since that time has come entirely from net exports. That is not sustainable for a region that accounts for one-fifth of the global economy.Euro area leaders deserve credit for the difficult steps they've taken to restore financial stability and address the risk of cascading defaults and exit. Spain and Italy are now able to borrow at rates significantly lower than a year ago. But one of the key lessons of our own crisis is that restoring financial stability, while critical, is only the first step for the economy to heal. The focus of the policy debate in Europe must now shift from restoring financial stability to developing a plan to boost demand and employment.Last year, demand contracted 2 percent across the euro area. Unemployment has reached the highest level in at least 20 years. It's clear that decisive action is needed now to restart demand and avoid the risk of protracted stagnation. And there are steps that can be taken to do so. First, European leaders need to recalibrate the pace of their fiscal consolidation. As we know from our experience, course correction can make an important difference. The consolidation path should be stretched out in some countries, and those with fiscal space should shift to supporting demand. We welcome indications that France, Spain and The Netherlands, most recently, have decided to take additional time to meet their budget targets.Second, the core of Europe can make a difference by rebalancing demand. Increased demand in Europe's strongest economies would not only provide relief to weaker euro area economies but would also spur the global economy. In those countries in the euro area where current account surpluses remain above 6 percent of GDP, faster wage growth and greater homeownership are some of the steps that can be taken to make an important contribution.Third, the discussions on lowering borrowing costs for small- and medium-sized enterprises in southern Europe are extremely important. With weakening growth and disinflation, we welcome the ongoing discussions at the ECB and more broadly about additional measures to improve transmission and to address the credit crunch in the periphery. And fourth, events in Cyprus only have served to underscore the importance of moving forward with a full concept of banking union. Upcoming bank stress tests and bank asset reviews are a critical opportunity to restore confidence in bank balance sheets and restart credit to starving local economies. Our experience in the U.S. suggests that the credibility of those exercises will be enhanced when there's a strong backstop in place, permitting capital to be built without a further downward spiral of deleveraging.We've also learned from our own experience, it's much easier to wind down banks in an orderly manner where there's a well-established framework for resolution that clearly prioritizes deposits, buttressed by a strong system of deposit insurance and, ideally, backstopped at the euro area level. Drawing back to the global level, adjustment has thus far relied more broadly, heavily on compressed demand in deficit economies when stronger demand from surplus economies would enable higher growth overall. Avoiding competitive devaluation and a downward spiral of beggar-thy-neighbor policies is critical to ensure growth strategies are mutually reinforcing at this critical time for the global economy. In February, the G-7 members affirmed their commitment to rules of the game on exchange rate. The G-7 makes clear that domestic monetary and fiscal policy should be directed toward meeting clear domestic objectives, using domestic instruments to ensure growth in each country is compatible with growth across countries.G-7 members, by making this commitment, have ruled out the pursuit of macroeconomic accommodation by the purchase of foreign assets, or targeting exchange rates. It's critical that Japan's efforts work through an expansion of domestic demand. Moreover, Japan's macroeconomic policy measures need to be complemented by the critical third arrow of structural reform, which the Abe administration has made clear will be a next step.With demand in the advanced economies weak, some G-20 members still run managed exchange rate regimes and intervene in the foreign exchange market to resist adjustment. That kind of approach puts an undue burden of adjustment on those emerging economies that have market exchange rates, that contribute to the weakness of demand and intensify the risk of inflation and asset bubbles in those economies with undervalued exchange rates.As G-20 countries follow through on their recent commitment not to target exchange rates for competitive purposes, it's extremely important China take additional measures to increase the flexibility of its exchange rate regime. Last year the band was widened modestly and the full band was used for the first time. But intervention subsequently has risen. China's path towards market determination implies further widening along with significantly greater transparency on reserves and intervention.Going forward, that will be the continued emphasis of our global efforts, action to support domestic demand and making sure that the pursuit of growth in each of the G-20 and G-7 economies supports growth more broadly.So let me wrap up there. And then, Faryar, I think we're going to take some questions. Thank you.SHIRZAD: Lael, thank you for that comprehensive overview. What I'll do is I'll ask questions for a few minutes and then we'll turn to the audience.So let's start with Europe. You talked about sort of the imperative of Europe becoming a part of the economic growth picture. The Wall Street Journal this morning described them as the weak link. Even with all the steps that Europe has taken to try to put in mechanisms of rescue, are you fundamentally optimistic or pessimistic in terms of their ability to undertake the necessary structural reforms to become a part of the growth picture over the long haul?BRAINARD: You know, I think the past few years have shown that European leaders can make very important decisions when it's necessary. And the steps they've taken to restore financial stability, I think, have been extraordinarily important, not just for Europe, but of course for us in the U.S., for financial markets globally.But the focus now really needs to be on demand. You see unemployment rates up 25 percent in several southern European countries, large countries, you see youth unemployment of 55 percent; that's not sustainable. And that's certainly not sustainable for an economy that accounts for one fifth of the global economy. So the focus now really needs to be on restoring demand.And we're seeing a debate in Europe. We're seeing some welcome moves. We've seen moves in the direction of adjusting fiscal consolidation paths to better support recovery. We think there's more room there. We think that surplus economies have a tremendous capacity to boost demand in Europe and in the world through mechanisms that really operate through private demand. We think that unclogging the credit channels in southern European countries are vitally important for getting young people back to jobs.And of course, we think that the debate on banking union needs to move forward with greater urgency and a comprehensive banking union is necessary, not in five years, not in four years, but now.SHIRZAD: You know, it's interesting, the OECD recently put out a study essentially arguing that the two primary mechanisms for stimulating the economy, monetary policy and fiscal policy, have run their course and that structural reform is ultimately the recipe for sustained growth in Europe and elsewhere. Do you feel like the reforms that have been undertaken as a part of these various rescue mechanisms -- Spain, Portugal, Italy, places like that -- are these fundamentally going to bear fruit in any time soon in a way that promotes the kind of growth we're all looking for?BRAINARD: Well, I think the last few years, we've seen significant structural reforms that over time, will bear fruit in boosting the potential of many European economies. The difficulty of course is, right now, what's needed is demand.And so you know, our general view is that they have now anchored their credibility, they have important structural reforms that are in place. And it gives them space to do more -- to do more in terms of stretching out fiscal consolidation paths and using fiscal space where they have to do more on private demand. Wage growth in some countries, where wages have grown slower than productivity for many years, could grow faster and that could provide a boost to the overall euro area. You know, we've seen that important recent academic debates have real bearing here. You know, we've seen that fiscal multipliers, the impact of fiscal withdrawal on the economy is much sharper under current circumstances when monetary policy is close to the -- to the zero bound and when there is synchronized consolidation. And so all of those things would suggest not only that there is the case for doing more, but that there is space for doing more.SHIRZAD: A lot of the issues you talked about are the kinds of issues that at least in theory or at least in principle are the kinds of things on which you should -- you could or you would hope to get agreement at the G-7 table, the G-20 table, essentially trading a coordinated framework for economic recovery.Can you talk about those mechanisms and what role they play? Has the consensus fundamentally broken down in a way that bilateral diplomacy, the trip that you and Secretary Lew took recently to Europe, are ultimately the mechanisms by which these policies get advanced, or should we still look at the multilateral mechanisms?BRAINARD: You know, I think that there's always -- as you know, because you have been the chief negotiator for some of these meetings in the past -- there's always the public record of what takes place and the commitments that members are willing to sign up for. And then there are the very important discussions in the room. In terms of what members are willing to sign up for, that, of course, is a more contentious process, but we saw in February in Moscow extremely important commitments on rules of the game on both exchange rates in the G-7 going into Moscow, and then on the G-20 more broadly in Moscow. And I would not understate the significance of that.At a time when, I think, the public debate was quite contentious, that that really provided an important path forward that would help guide members as they were undertaking their own macroeconomic policy choices. In terms of the discussions on the pace of fiscal consolidation -- the need for surplus economies to do more, the relative prioritization of demand versus longer-run fiscal consolidation, that's the most important debate right now in the international arena. And I think you've seen a shift -- the most recent communique coming out of the G-20 clearly prioritized employment and demand, but I anticipate that that argument, that debate will continue in the months ahead.SHIRZAD: The problem you have, or one of the challenges you have is that you have the central banks and all the major economic regions of the world all pursuing accommodative monetary policy, and as you said, you know, there's a bit of a better beggar thy neighbor dimension to that that's unsustainable over the long term, and the domestic demand has to be a part of the -- a critical part of the picture.Do you think -- do you have some hope that there is a balance that will be found on that, or are -- where are we going to go?BRAINARD: So I think there is a very important distinction that has come out in this debate between what has traditionally been viewed as beggar thy neighbor policies -- policies that are designed specifically to operate on the exchange rate, to promote growth in one country by changing relative prices, by promoting net exports in a way that fundamentally leads to a race to the bottom.I think that it's important to distinguish between that and macroeconomic policy that is designed to achieve clear domestic targets using clear domestic instruments, and that's what the G-7 statement does. It's very clear, both in the G-7 now and the G-20, that members will not target exchange rates, which has really been the traditional locus of problems on competitive devaluation.And what we know from studies at the IMF and elsewhere is that when accommodative macroeconomic policies, monetary and fiscal, are designed in such a way to promote domestic demand, that the spillovers are overwhelmingly positive, and we've seen that in the case of the U.S. And of course, as we've had discussions more recently, as Japan has moved forward on its three-arrow framework, the focus has really been on channels of transmission through domestic demand.SHIRZAD: So Europe is an important test case for that framework, to see how it's applied? Another one that you mentioned earlier is China. There's a new leadership there; you've talked to them. Secretary Lew has as well. Can you give us a sense of where they're headed? Are they really looking at building a -- more of a domestically -- demand-oriented economic growth model, or is it going to be a -- more of an export model, as we've seen in the past?BRAINARD: Well, Secretary Lew was out, really, in the first few days of office of the new team and had a really good opportunity to meet with all the top leadership and hear from them. And then, subsequent to that, of course, we're now in planning for the July meeting of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue -- the first -- the first meeting with new teams on both sides.But the leadership in China is very focused on promoting consumer-led, domestic-led demand, and it's a -- it's a very important shift in terms of what we're hearing. And of course, we're hearing this at a time when you can see major shifts under way in their economy as their labor force starts to slow, and of course, will reverse as wages have been growing, as domestic consumers have demanded better standards of living -- less pollution, more focus on standards of living at home, less distortionary policies that rely excessively on very resource-intensive, and of course, for us, export-intensive investments.So that debate, I think, has changed quite a lot. We've seen some policies oriented in that direction, but a great deal more, I think, will be necessary to make sure that the micro structure of incentives, the price structure of the economy really pushes in that direction. That's why we've pushed so hard. The exchange rate is one of the most powerful tools. And we've seen 15 (percent), 16 percent appreciation of the RMB against the dollar in real terms, but more is needed there. Again, they need to take the next step in terms of allowing their exchange rate to move within a wider range, to move to greater market determination. But it's also true that they're state-owned enterprises, who are doing a lot of this investment, still have much different dividend policies than private enterprises. Credit is still allocated with administered interest rates and rationed to enterprises that might not be serving domestic consumers. So all of those things, I think, are going to need to be changed in order for that very important machine of the Chinese economy to reorient to the domestic consumer. And of course, for our companies to give them a more level playing field, we've got tremendous capacity in areas across services -- financial services, across the services area as they open up services, which they need to do to lift the lives of their consumers, our companies will also be able to bring their innovative products to bear.SHIRZAD: You know, one interesting thing in your recent speeches has been the degree to which trade has now featured very prominently. You talk about the International Services Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and a new trade agreement with Europe that you're all developing the framework for. Could you talk about the trade initiatives and how they fit into the broader framework of it?BRAINARD: Absolutely. Yeah, no, this is an extraordinarily important part of the president's overall agenda for growth -- for restarting growth, really globally. And, you know, as you'll recall, early on in the administration he set this very ambitious target on exports, and it's served to focus, I think, all of us on what more we can do through all the various parts of the U.S. government to support our companies, our workers as they are working to sell into growing markets abroad. Right now, as you know, we are engaged in a very important set of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has the potential to unlock the most dynamic economies in the world and to sign up for, I think, some of the best in-class standards across a whole host of areas where increasingly we'll need to have a level playing field in order to bring the biggest benefit to consumers and to lift growth. And of course, the most recent announcement is that Japan sees the TPP as a vital part of its structural reform agenda, and that could go a long way for both sides.Now on the other side -- on the one side we've got the Pacific, on the other the Atlantic -- a critical part of Europe's growth agenda is also going to be unlocking greater trade opportunities, and that's why we're so excited about the potential for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. We're still in the stakeholder consultation phase, but there's a lot of excitement there, too, and a lot of potential to set the highest standards.And of course, given that our services, producers are the most competitive, the most innovative in the world, we're very excited about the trade and investment services agreement that is being discussed at the WTO. That, again, has the potential to unlock sectors that have traditionally lagged in terms of the trade liberalization agenda, and we think there might be a little bit of a window of opportunity there to make a big difference for our companies, and again, for growth.SHIRZAD: You know, as a guy who's been involved in trade for a while, I was both impressed and a little bit fretful on your behalf in the sense that, you know, with the U.S. and Europe, there are very few border measures that are at issue in terms of trade between the two economies. It's really sort of fundamental sovereign decisions that each side has made regarding the shape of regulation that a trade agreement could help harmonize so that you create a more coherent regulatory framework that then allows a more -- for a more integrated set of economies. Is the -- is the administration really ready to take that on? I mean, these are hard issues, and all the various sectors that would help ultimately become the elements of a deal like this.BRAINARD: Well, I think first, as you know, there have been certain trade sectors that have -- even though our trade with Europe is already extremely important, among the biggest trading relationships in the world, there are sectors that have not been really part of the trade liberalization agenda and very protected in Europe, as we know. So I'm hoping that we unlock some of that. But you're right, that regulatory convergence has also got to be a central part of the conversation in any trade agreement -- in any deeper trade agreement in today's world. And that's why everything in the regulatory convergence agenda across a whole variety of sectors is being discussed right now. And hopefully we'll make some progress. Of course, it's very important to converge on a high level of standards. And I think there is going to be a very rich agenda going forward on that front. SHIRZAD: Are the -- one of the things that Secretary Lew had as a welcoming kind of gift when he became secretary was a letter from seven, eight of his colleagues, admonishing the United States for problems with extraterritoriality in terms of financial regulation. Could you talk about that? Do you think that was a fair kind of concern that the finance ministers raised? And what do -- what is the administration trying to do to deal with that?BRAINARD: You know, I will say that the G-20, the FSB have a very, very ambitious agenda across the whole set of financial reform initiatives that are encompassed in Dodd-Frank. And the work that is underway there -- and of course I participate on behalf of Treasury and the FSB piece, but it's really our regulators who are working with their European, Asian, Latin American counterparts -- that that agenda has progressed. It has -- it has not progressed as quickly as it needs to. I think the U.S. is out ahead of other jurisdiction in terms of implementing in a number of areas. And in particular, the U.S. has moved forward -- according to its Dodd-Frank timelines -- on putting in place comprehensive reform of the derivatives space for the first time -- very significant -- for the first time really putting in place incentives to move things to central clearing, reporting, trading, you know, a whole set of extraordinarily important reforms.And of course, the world has signed on for those through the G-20 and the FSB. Now what we need to see is other jurisdictions move to the same level. And Europe has lagged in that respect. And so I will say that our regulators are very closely engaged. And we've been part of those conversations in our role through the FSB and the FSOC in trying to get the greatest convergence possible because these are inherently global markets. We know it's important for market participants that there not be big distortions that cause business to move to one side of the border or the other, for artificial reasons. And so my sense is actually conversations there between the regulators are very engaged, and they are progressing. So you know, I think we have to guard against extraterritoriality. We are dismayed by the extraterritorial aspects of the financial transactions tax that has been passed in France and has -- also in Italy. We're working on that. We think it's extraordinarily important that that be removed. But I will say, in the derivatives space, conversations are granular and they are progressing and we are seeing a convergence that we think is going to be critically important for these markets.SHIRZAD: You know, there were news reports that said at the last G-7 meeting there was a lot of discussion about dealing with "too big to fail" resolution planning, making sure that large financial institutions that get into trouble are ultimately able to be wound down in a way that doesn't create systemic implications. Can you give us a sense of what the discussion was and where it's headed?BRAINARD: Well, I think recent events in Cyprus only highlighted that this is a part of the reform agenda that's extraordinarily important to move forward in Europe. As you know, European banks tend to be much larger, relative to their home markets, relative to their sovereigns -- the largest banks -- than -- certainly than is the case here in the U.S. And they are still quite a bit farther behind in terms of putting in place a legal regime on resolution that provides certainty to financial institutions, to investors. And it is extraordinarily important that they do so. In the G-7 discussions, Secretary Lew had a chance to go into some depth on the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority. And you know, the FDIC itself has tremendous experience in the area of orderly resolutions. And now, with Title 2 orderly liquidation authority, they believe they have the capacity to wind down even the largest, most complex institutions, through a single point of entry model which other regulators around the world see as having tremendous promise not just domestically but also in terms of the cross-border area, which is extraordinarily important, as we know from the crisis.So there was a general consensus that this is a good model; it's extremely important to see ex-ante clear party of claims with depositors getting preference, strong deposit insurance systems. And because of the interconnected nature of the European banking systems, that that really should take place at the Euro area level, which is why the discussion about full banking (in union ?) has to move in conjunction with the discussion about resolution and what resolution means for bank funding models as well.SHIRZAD: Let me ask you another Europe question. You know, you talked about -- earlier about the fact that Europe has the capacity, and it has made incredibly difficult decisions to deal with its sort of internal challenges. It seems, though, to play the devil's advocate, that as they make their decisions, they make their processes of decision-making even more complicated -- add layers of bureaucracy, mechanisms of decision-making that require national ratification each time a big crisis is confronted. Is the European model fundamentally -- I mean, is it -- is it fundamentally sustainable given how, as they make difficult decisions, they seem to make their system more complicated than they started with?BRAINARD: Well, I think the financial crisis demonstrated, you know, in ways that were not fully foreseen, that, in fact, it is quite complex to have a monetary union encompassing very disparate economies, without greater risk-sharing, greater centralization on the banking front and on the fiscal front.And so that is going to continue to be an institutional process of evolution. If you think about it, the -- you know, in full, kind of firefighting mode, there's only one institution that has the capacity -- has the instruments across the entire Euro area, and that's the ECB. And yet, there were -- you know, there were constraints on the ECB's ability to deploy that set of instruments across the Euro area.So I think, you know, as the -- as this very important partner of ours -- very important strategic partner, very important economic partner moves forward, they're going to grapple with this broader question of institutional design. And we're seeing it very actively on the banking union. Of course, you know, at the moment of crisis, you need to use the instruments you have, and create, you know, instruments.And of course, the creation of the ESM, the creation of the OMT -- those were critically important moments. The, you know, decisions that were made to keep Greece within the Euro area -- critically important not just for the Euro area but for the world. But in order to solve the demand deficiency, in order to make this a really vibrant and stable Euro area, I think that discussion about institutional changes will continue.SHIRZAD: I'll ask you one more question, and then we'll open it up to the audience. The G-20 meeting under the Russian presidency -- the leaders meeting is, I guess, set for the fall. Can you give us a sneak preview as to what will happen at that meeting, both on economic coordination as well as on financial regulation or any other issue?BRAINARD: Yeah, I think Petersburg -- you know, we have a -- at least on the -- on the finance side of the agenda, we have a pretty clear, already, view about that trajectory. I think the discussion is going to continue (to ?) intensify about how we do a better job of coordinating so that we make sure that countries are doing the right policies in terms of boosting demand, and that as a result, we grow together. And that's important not just for the G-20 -- not just for the economies in the room, but it's really vitally important for the developing economies, smaller economies that are not in the room.I think, you know, we'll want to see the consensus on exchange rates continuing to be upheld, and further movements, as has been committed, on market-determined exchange rates, not targeting exchange rates. On the financial regulatory agenda, there are a number of commitments that have been made across the spectrum that really now are in the implementation phase. So we've -- you know, we've had the systemically important designations for the banks, but we have to do that in the nonbank arena.At the G-20 level, we need to see derivatives reforms, as we were saying earlier, put in place in a way that's convergent and consistent with the timelines that we're committed to. So that discussion will be very robust. And you know, of course, I think the trade discussion is also going to be very robust. There's just so much excitement about the initiatives that the U.S. is undertaking with various members of the G-20, and the questions about what can the multilateral system do, I think, will be on the table.SHIRZAD: Great.OK, why don't we turn to the audience. If you have a -- Hamid, why don't you wait for the microphone. When you're about to ask you question, make sure you identify yourself, as well as any affiliation you may have.QUESTIONER: Hamid Biglari. There have been repeated incidents of cyberattacks against financial institutions, cross-border cyberattacks. And while each financial institution has been responsible for its own security, there is a point at which this gets elevated to the point of national security. How is the U.S. government thinking about it? Who has primary jurisdiction? What is the role of the Defense Department versus the Treasury versus our various national intelligence agencies, if you could give us some guidance on that?BRAINARD: Yeah. Well, as you know, the president has put out an executive order in this space. We're working on legislation. We think this is a matter of very high national priority, from a perspective of our critical infrastructure, financial infrastructure, but more broadly, as well as, of course -- this is core to our -- one of our greatest competitive strengths, our intellectual property and our innovation.So we're working very tightly across the administration on these issues. We work with the Department of Homeland Security and the other agencies on the security side.And of course, this has also become one of the top priorities in our deep discussions with the Chinese. This is an issue that the president raised in his first conversation with President Xi. This is an issue that Secretary Lew had good conversations on, as did Secretary Kerry. And you know, for us, it's important that we make progress so that our Chinese counterparts understand that in particular, cyberintrusions from state-involved entities create a real -- real difficulties in terms of trade secrets and intellectual property more generally, and reputational risk, we think, for them. And so, you know, this is an area where we think we have to make progress over the next little while. Of course, separately, we're working with the private sector to help the private sector work together and work internally to protect itself to the greatest extent possible.So we're working all of those fronts. And it'll continue, I think, to be a very high priority in years to come, for all the reasons you said.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Patrick Dirkin, Barclays. Nice to see you. Combining your comments on financial reform in the trans-Atlantic trade discussions, would you put financial institutions and markets in a trade deal? If yes or no, why? And if we do arrive at dislocations in regulations, would including it give us a chance to come back a second time and create better harmonization, whether it's in resolution, cross-border derivatives, capital rules, which seem to be going, at least from a markets perspective, to a certain degree in different directions? Also, the financial transaction tax. Thank you.BRAINARD: Yep, so on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, we are right now in the period of consultations. So we're in listening mode. And you know, we're talking to members of Congress. We're talking to the business community, to labor, to all the various stakeholders, consumer groups that have an interest in this. In terms of what the scope of those discussions should be -- you know, I can tell you that from my own perspective, obviously, financial services needs to be part of the conversation. It's very important to make progress on market access, to nail down access that we've already secured. So I think, at least in terms of our inclination, it would be to make sure that's a very important part of the conversation.On the regulatory convergence front, you know, we are already signed up for very tight timelines, most of which are in the next year to 18 months. And we're already engaged in very detailed conversations with clear commitments on regulatory convergence. And we're -- those conversations are partly bilateral because, you know, we have important depth of engagement of our private sectors across the Atlantic. But they are, by necessity, multilateral.Asia is just going to be an increasingly important market, and Latin America already is an important market. So there are -- there are a variety of reasons why, partly because the time is now, these things need to get done now -- I don't think -- I don't think the business community wants to wait another several years for certainty; I don't think we can afford to -- and partly because we need other partners in the room that we want to use the G-20 and the FSB to get these things as far along as we possibly can in the near term.QUESTIONER: Hi. Massimo Gaggi from the Italian Daily Corriere Della Serea . Mario Monti two years ago was welcomed also here in the States almost as a hero. I remember a cover story on Time magazine: This man can save Europe. Now his policies are considered one of the major reasons for the deepening of Italian recession. Do you think that Italy in its current fiscal conditions has room for initiatives from the new Letta government for sustaining the internal demand and the growth and that Europe should do something to lower the -- at least the short-term limits on its budget deficit, and if there is any possible role for United States in this area? And I know that President Obama after the G-8 in Britain is going to Berlin. Thank you.BRAINARD: So I think, you know, Italy is a very important economy and a very important player within the broader euro area. If you look at the course of the crisis over the last two years or so, you know, Italy has put in place important reforms. They've moved very rapidly on the fiscal front. They've put in place some structural reforms. But as you say, Italy is struggling with rising unemployment and continued demand contraction, and it's part of this broader picture of very disappointing demand. And, you know, I think the entire euro area really is facing the need for decisive action or the risk of protracted stagnation, which is not in the interest of Europeans. It's certainly not in our interests or the world's interest.We think there are things that can be done, and I spoke a little bit about those earlier, that there is space in many countries. You know, Italy is now engaged in a process of paying off some of the very substantial arrears that are weighing on the small business sector. We think that is important.So, you know, again as countries in the euro area continue to move forward on structural reforms, which will bear fruit in the longer run, we think it's important to stretch out fiscal timelines where possible or provide fiscal space where possible, better balance that need for longer-term consolidation with short-term support for the recovery, and of course for employment.SHIRZAD: Stay back there.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Good morning. (Name inaudible) -- from Chinese Taichi (ph) Media. You talk about S&ED talk. What are the most important issues does the United States think they want to address with their Chinese counterpart? And also, last year you talked about greater access to high-tech components, but that doesn't seem to have any substantial progress after last year's talk. Could you explain on that? Thank you.BRAINARD: So our agenda for the Strategic and Economic Dialogue on the economics side -- I won't speak to the strategic side -- but on the economic side, you know, there are very important areas where we think we need to make further progress for the bilateral economic relationship to be strengthened. And, you know, those are areas that we think for the most part are beneficial for both sides and closely aligned with the Chinese leadership's own agenda.The Chinese leadership talks about a higher value, more innovation in their economy. We talk about how important it is to strop trade secret theft and to provide protection for all intellectual property, not just indigenous intellectual property, that that will be positive both for growth and the value of production in China, but also important -- critically important for giving fair access to private enterprises and foreign enterprises, U.S. companies. We have very much heard the Chinese leadership as they talk about the domestic consumer and making domestic demand-led growth the kind of central thrust of their policies. Well, of course, the exchange rate has to be central to that. And allowing the exchange rate to fully reflect market forces is something they've made some progress on, but there's still some distance and there's scope to move now.The way that credit is allocated, still a lot of administrative controls that distort capital to large investments, to state enterprises that choke off more innovative, more competitive private enterprises -- foreign enterprises but also domestic private enterprises. So that's an extraordinarily important part of it.Cybersecurity has got to be front and central. That is just simply too much of a threat, really, to our competitiveness and to critical infrastructure not to make that a central part. We'd like to make some progress on the bilateral investment treaty. It's an area of great potential for both sides. And so we'd like to see how fast and how far we can push those discussions.We'd like to see some services sector access. You know, we got equity caps lifted for the first time. In very important parts of the financial services market there is ample opportunity to allow greater foreign participation and thereby have a more dynamic financial sector, services sector more generally, by lifting equity caps and lifting investment restrictions.SHIRZAD: Let's actually go down here.QUESTIONER: Thank you. Allen Batkin (sp). I wanted to ask about Japan and the weakening of the yen. There's been some press recently about the impact on the economies and exports of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines from the weaker yen. So my questions are: How serious are those implications, the impact on their economies? Can that affect our economies -- our economy and our export markets if those countries are weakened? And how does this strategy of Japan fit into your comments earlier about the G-7 and the -- not using exchange rate mechanism?BRAINARD: So we have had extensive conversations in the G-7 more broadly. It is extraordinarily important that when countries are pursuing macroeconomic policies, that their fiscal and monetary policies be oriented very clearly to domestic objectives, to domestic demand, and that they are oriented in that way under clear rules, using domestic instruments, not targeting exchange rates.We think those rules are important to make sure that those policies actually boost global growth and are not -- are not going lead to a downward spiral. So you know, in the current context, we think Japan has said they're going to move forward with their third arrow, structural reform. That's going to be a vital component in order to restore growth. And we've only seen the beginnings of that with the TPP, but it's extraordinarily important to see a very robust structural reform agenda.Japan's growth is important obviously to the world, but the way they pursue it, we want to make sure is through the domestic channels. Now, more broadly in Asia, of course, it's important that countries not fall back on undervalued exchange rates and export-led growth strategies. Those haven't worked. They haven't worked for the world and they certainly are not the path forward. And so we're going to continue to push for a clear commitment to exchange rates that are market-determined and growth strategies that are demand-led. QUESTIONER: Glenn Gerstell from Millbank, Tweed. Thank you very much for your comments this morning. One country that the discussion this morning hasn't touched on is India. And I wondered if -- I know you recently hosted a delegation of some senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Finance. Could you comment on prospects for India opening up a little more to trade and investment?BRAINARD: Yeah. I think our engagement with India is also -- glad you raised it -- has also really deepened over the last few years, with a lot of bilateral engagement, you know, both through economic channels, but more broadly between the -- President Obama's broader administration.And what we've seen there is, you know, some forward momentum on the reform front, but not enough. There, too, you know, if the Indian government can move forward on the reform agenda that it has articulated, and get public support for it -- we think it would very meaningful in terms of spurring growth there. They have huge infrastructure needs, but they need to be able to catalyze private investment into infrastructure, and right now, there are a whole host of impediments why private investors are reluctant to participate.But the kinds of scale of infrastructure investments they need requires -- inherently requires, we think, private capital to be unlocked for that, and so our conversations have very much been around reform in the financial sector, reform of their regulatory environments to make investment much more predictable -- more predictability about the tax regime.And -- you know, as you know, we've made some progress there, but , you know, India has ambitious growth goals, and we -- our companies and -- you know, we would -- we would like to help be part of that. It's a very exciting potential growth story, but it's going to require continued and much deeper reforms. And we'll keep pushing for them, because we think it's important. But they're still -- they've got quite a ways to go.SHIRZAD: In the corner.QUESTIONER: (I work for ?) -- (inaudible) -- (Blackrock ?). You mentioned several times about China's desire to increase their economic growth through increasing consumer spending. That would seem like an extremely easy to do with a savings rate that is estimated to be 35 percent. However, to get that savings rate to decline and consumption to increase, one would think that they would have to put in some safety net provisions that I'm not sure they've put in.My question is, how quickly are they moving to put in these safety net provisions and also whether -- how are they going to communicate that to the Chinese public in order to get the savings rate down and to turn it into domestic consumption? MS. BRAINARD: Well, I think this is a central challenge -- is, you know, providing enough of a social safety net and providing clarity about who's responsible for that -- at what level? Is it the, you know, traditional state-owned enterprise, is it the locality, is it the, you know, urban area where migrant workers have moved into but still have really no rights in some cases? That clarity is going to be critically important for Chinese consumers to consume, to feel like they don't need to build up really massive amounts of precautionary savings.So of course, it's also important that they earn a real return on their savings, and right now, what we know is that they have interest rate caps that don't give them the kinds of returns that they would normally earn. And of course, they don't have access to the full suite of savings -- products that we would -- you know, our companies would love to provide and do so such a great job of providing elsewhere.So there is a whole set of important reforms there that, you know, you'll see in our strategic and economic dialogue commitments. You know, we made a big deal last year about their commitment to ensure that state-owned enterprises would pay out dividends at the same rate as a publicly-listed company. Why is that important?Because a lot of that funding is just sitting in state-owned enterprises -- massive build-up of savings that might get directed, in some cases, to noneconomic investments -- and this is part of the -- you know, excessive reliance on investment, but is not getting put into the government coffers to provide health and pension kinds of insurance education, insurance that would give Chinese consumers the comfort they need to go out and actually raise their living standards.QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Faryad. Thank you very much, Lael. Carol Brookins (sp). You've spent a lot of time focused on Europe, and I'm glad to hear that, but we've seen in the past -- and the past being a prologue to the future, this kind of crisis lurching forward -- being able to do something, but only after several iterations of things that may not have been the right things to do. Given that the timelines and the urgency of this agenda going forward for domestic demand to be increased -- are you optimistic, pessimistic, neutral, given the timeline of the German elections?BRAINARD: What -- you know, what I said earlier I think is the dominant kind of approach on our end, which is to say, look, this is important to us, it's important to you, it's -- you know, it is not sustainable to have 55 percent youth unemployment. That has long-lasting damage that gets inflicted on the economy. You know, nobody -- it's in nobody's interest for the euro area, which is such a vital partner strategically and economically, to be in protracted stagnation. So we just think it's extraordinarily important that these issues be squarely on the agenda.And, you know, we are seeing these debates. We think there is a path forward. I think I talked about the four key areas that we think would have the most impact in the short run. And so, you know, we'll continue to offer our views based on our own crisis playbook and recovery playbook and what worked, what didn't work, in an effort to help that debate move forward, recognizing that their institutional constraints are quite different and, you know, challenging -- 17 national parliaments; you know, we are challenged with one, so I think -- I think it -- I -- you know, we take seriously that it's a complicated institutional environment. We think we -- they have capacity to act, and they need to act.SHIRZAD: So Lael, let me take the prerogative last -- ask the last question. We only have about 60 seconds. Big question, short answer. We have a new World Bank president, a huge development agenda that you inherited and you guys are pursuing. Can you talk about the development agenda?BRAINARD: Yeah, so, we're -- we, you know, have been pretty excited about what we've been able to do with our partners in development countries on lifting the lives of the poor, on addressing gradual states. And that's both through the bilateral as well as the development banks.We -- in the last year we recapitalized every single one of the development banks. That's never happened before, and it's at a time when people say that, you know, Congress won't move forward. And I think it was on a bipartisan basis that we recapitalized every institutions because of their performance in the wake of the financial crisis. They really stepped up. They helped countries keep trade finance at a time when trade was plummeting. They helped countries keep in place safety nets, infrastructure projects. They really proved their worth.And Jim Kim is really bringing a lot of energy, a lot of focus. You know, he's very focused on what more middle-income countries can do to lift their poor populations, because that's, of course, where most of the poor live today. Very focused on some of the win-wins between addressing environmental challenges like climate change and poverty, improving resilience of agriculture. And that squares very closely with, you know, our own food security agenda. We've got a terrific new trust fund at the World Bank called the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program that's part of the broader present Food Security Initiative. We think he can do more on empowering women, on locking the productive potential of women. We're really encouraging that at the World Bank because it's such a flagship.And of course, we have emphasized that the World Bank is most powerful not through its -- not primarily through its lending but through its knowledge products. And there is no better example of that than doing business report -- it's -- very simple benchmarking exercise, which has helped numerous countries, from Colombia to Sierra Leone, to slash red tape and really see rates of business formation double in some cases.SHIRZAD: Great. Lael, thank you very much. Our meeting is adjourned.BRAINARD: Thank you. Good to see everybody. (Applause.) (C) 2013 Federal News Service
  • United States
    A Conversation with Lael Brainard
    Play
    Lael Brainard, undersecretary for international affairs at the U.S. Department of Treasury, discusses the outlook for the global economy.
  • Economic Crises
    C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics with Jeffrey M. Lacker
    Play
    The C. Peter McColough Series on International Economics is presented by the Corporate Program and the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies.
  • Economic Crises
    A Conversation with Jeffrey M. Lacker
    Play
    Jeffrey M. Lacker discusses "too big to fail" protection for financial institutions and credible alternatives to this policy.
  • Economic Crises
    Benn Steil on Federal Reserve Exit Strategy
    Podcast
    MICHELLE CARUSO-CABRERA: Hi, everyone. Thanks so much for joining us on this call about this op-ed piece written for The Wall Street Journal by Benn Steil and Dinah Walker, "Bernanke Should Follow the Advice He Gave to Japan." Joining us is the director of international economics at he Council on Foreign Relations, Benn Steil, the author of that op-ed. He also wrote the book "The Battle of Bretton Woods," and there's a longer version of the op-ed at -- (inaudible) -- at the bottom of the email that you received, "Exiting from Monetary Stimulus: A Better Plan for the Fed." This is part of the Policy Innovation Memorandum series that is put out by CFR. So Benn, let me start with something basic. You write the op-ed and policy memorandum because there's a particular problem the Federal Reserve has right now. Please describe. What is it? BENN STEIL: Yeah. That's right. The piece Dinah and I wrote for the journal last week was specifically motivated by the debate which has heated up, not least within the Federal Open Market Committee, about the future problems which the Fed may be creating for itself through its extraordinary monetary stimulus efforts, in particular the accumulation by the end of this year of about $1.5 trillion in mortgage-backed securities. We emphasize in the piece that it's the composition of the Fed's balance sheet that's the problem. It's not the size. The Fed's balance sheet will be very large by the end of the year, about $4 trillion. But if it were comprised of U.S. Treasury securities -- normally the Fed's balance sheet is comprised overwhelmingly of Treasury securities -- when it comes time to tighten monetary policy in the future, it would just sell those securities at a measured pace into the market. The problem specifically derives from the $1 1/2 trillion in mortgage-backed securities. The -- selling MBS when you want to tighten monetary policy is problematic. And I'm going to emphasize two factors in particular. First, by the end of the year, the Fed's going to control almost 30 percent of the MBS market. They're really going to dominate this market. And selling MBS, particularly into a market as thin as this one will be, will have a much more direct impact on mortgage rates and housing prices than selling Treasuries. In other words, selling MBS when you want to tighten monetary policy can be expected to push up mortgage rates and push down housing prices, precisely the opposite of what the Fed has sought to achieve over the past few years. Second, the FOMC is specifically concerned with the capital losses that the Fed would bear in selling mortgage-backed securities in an environment of rising interest rates. They're concerned about this not merely from an economic perspective but from a political perspective because it might mean a steep decline in remittances to the U.S. Treasury, and that could of course stoke political conflict about what the Fed is doing and whether new restrictions have to be put on their activities. Now, with regard to this second issue concerned within the FOMC about capital losses on its own balance sheet, we've been through this before. Ten years ago Chairman Bernanke, then-Governor Bernanke, was forthright that Japan was mishandling its own very similar situation when the BOJ, the Bank of Japan, was worrying about its own exposure to interest rate risk through its massive holdings of JGBs, Japanese government bonds. He argued at the time at the BOJ was doing precisely the right thing to combat deflation and should not get sidetracked by essentially an accounting issue, that is, which balance sheet within the Japanese government was holding these JGBs. And so he proposed that the BOJ should simply enter into an interest rate swap with the Japanese treasury, which would take this risk off the balance sheet of the Bank of Japan. And we argue that the Fed needs to conduct a similar swap with the U.S. Treasury today, that is, the Fed would swap its portfolio of $1.5 trillion of mortgage-backed securities with the U.S. Treasury in return for an (actuarially ?) equivalent amount of U.S. Treasuries. Now, what if they don't do this? Because Chairman Bernanke has already argued that the Fed has alternatives to selling its MBS. It doesn't need to sell the MBS in order to tighten monetary policy. But we think that the proposals that he've made -- he's made had some flaws to them. The one we emphasize is the use of so-called term deposit auctions. These are like certificates certificates of deposit, or CDs. These would be used to entice banks to lock up their funds with the Fed for a fixed period. The problem with term deposit auctions is that the Fed has to allow the market to determine short-term interest rates. In other words, the banks will tell the Fed what it wants in terms of an interest rate return in order to lock up its money and not make it available for lending out. And the Fed is highly unlikely to be willing to lose control over short-term interest rates. How do we know that? Well, the ECB uses term deposit auctions. They've used quite a few over the past several years. And we've documented that seven of those auctions have failed. That is, the banks have demanded a higher interest rate than the ECB was willing to pay. Now, this hasn't caused any great problems in the market because the ECB hasn't been in a tightening mode, but if the Fed were in a tightening mode and the auctions failed, this might damage its credibility significantly. The final thing I would say is that there is indeed legal precedent for what we are suggesting. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 explicitly gave the Treasury authority to purchase mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. So what we're proposing would not in any sense be legally revolutionary. CARUSO-CABRERA: You talked about this a little bit, but I'm just going to ask, very basically, how exactly would the swap work logistically? STEIL: Yeah, it's actually not very complicated. The Treasury would issue new Treasury securities that are equivalent in value to the mortgage-backed securities held by the Fed. There is a determination to be made about what the maturity of those securities would be. For example, if they were overwhelmingly short-term securities, say, like, three-month Treasury bills, then that portfolio would actually run off very quickly, and the Fed would effectively be tightening monetary policy very quickly. If the swap comprised mainly longer-term securities, let's say, like 30-year Treasury bonds, then the Fed would sell those bonds into the market at a measured pace over time in order to tighten monetary policy. We suspect that the Fed and the Treasury would naturally agree that the Treasury would create a stock of Treasury securities for them that's somewhere in the middle there. CARUSO-CABRERA: Doesn't this expose the taxpayer to risk if when Treasury sells, then end up selling at a loss? STEIL: Well, and one of the reasons that we support this proposal is because we don't expect Treasury to sell the securities. It's much more likely that the Fed would wind up selling the securities, and that's where the problems would -- (inaudible) -- CARUSO-CABRERA: So the Treasury would hold them to maturity -- (inaudible) -- STEIL: Treasury would hold them to maturity. That's right. CARUSO-CABRERA: Have you gotten any response -- do you know if this is moving through the halls of the Federal Reserve or Treasury and what they think about it? STEIL: Yeah, I mean, we have gotten some responses, including some former FOMC members. I think the -- the response has been generally very favorable. There have been some objections raised. For example, aren't we essentially proposing to increase U.S. debt? And the answer to that is no, that the U.S. net debt is completely unaffected by this swap. That is, new Treasury securities are indeed being created, but in return for them, the U.S. Treasury would be receiving financial assets of equivalent value, so the U.S. net debt is not affected by this. CARUSO-CABRERA: You hinted at this a little bit when Bernanke was critical of Japan, but give us a little bit more of the tonality. He was scathing, wasn't he, about what Japan was doing wrong at the time? STEIL: That's right. And Bernanke believed that Japan needed to be more aggressive in countering deflation, and he was very concerned with what he was reading about the debate within the policy board of the Bank of Japan about the potential impact of capital losses on BOJ's holdings of JGBs on the balance sheet of the BOJ and therefore its political relationship with the government. He argued, essentially, this is polluting the thinking behind the conduct of monetary policy at the Bank of Japan. And indeed, we're seeing exactly the same thing today. And a -- with -- in the January minutes of the FOMC meeting, you actually see members expressing concern about the risks involved in asset purchases, things like what would happen if our remittances to the U.S. Treasury were to decline significantly. And this is precisely the sort of warning sign that triggered Bernanke to intervene, as it were, in the Japanese debate 10 years ago. CARUSO-CABRERA: So -- and -- so could it have negative effects both -- when I think about the thinking in the Federal Reserve and the members of the board, when they say -- if they're nervous, one is being nervous about the exit strategy and what that would do to the mortgage market, but could it also make them nervous in not doing enough because they're so worried about the exit strategy they don't want to go even higher than 85 billion (dollars) a month? (Inaudible.) STEIL: Yeah, I mean, that concern has already been expressed. In fact, you see it in the January minutes. You have members expressing concern that the risks of asset purchases might cause the Fed to, quote, "taper or end its purchases before improvement in the outlook for the labor market had occurred," unquote. So what we see here is what is in essence an accounting issue coloring debate within the Fed about how to conduct monetary policy, both in the loosening phase and in the tightening phase to come in the future. That's what we find worrying, and that's what we think needs to be addressed now. CARUSO-CABRERA: Let's turn this over now to the participants on the call to ask questions. We'll get some instructions on how you can do that. OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We have a question from Cy Jacobs with Jacobs Asset Management. QUESTIONER: Hi, Benn. It's Cy Jacobs. How are you? STEIL: Hi, Cy. Very well. How are you? QUESTIONER: I'm doing well. I have a series of questions, so let me just get them out in one question, then have you respond. You mentioned several times the better alternative of doing the Treasury sales, and I feel like with great -- you make it sounds with great ease that the Treasury can sell at a, quote-unquote, measured pace. STEIL: The Fed -- the Fed can sell at a measured pace. QUESTIONER: Oh, at a -- at a measured pace -- but you know, the Fed has been the largest buyer, and when the largest buyer becomes a big seller, what makes you think that selling Treasurys can be done at a measured pace, whereas MBSs can't be sold at a measured pace? That's the first part. Secondly, you know, the advantage of holding the MBS and unwinding, I would think, is that they amortize on their own; you know, people move and pay down their mortgages or pay off their mortgages, and the balance will shrink over time faster than Treasurys will shrink -- (audio interference) -- the Fed having to (hit bid ?). So isn't that a more attractive holding? The last part of it is -- and related is selling Treasurys -- again, the largest buyer becoming a large seller -- you will pressure -- I would think, will pressure MBS anyway. They trade at a spread versus Treasurys. There's a huge seller of Treasurys. You know, MBS prices will come under pressure, and interest rates will rise, and housing market will get hurt anyway. So why not just sell what you have instead of swapping into one and selling that? STEIL: OK. Well, there are a lot of good questions there. The first one, selling Treasurys -- whether you do it at a measured pace or a more robust pace, the underlying point we're making is that the U.S. Treasury market is the deepest and most liquid in the -- in the world. So this is the market in which you would want to be conducting asset sales. If they do it in a sector-specific market like the MBS market, they are going to be hitting one specific sector of the economy, and they're going to be hitting it specifically hard -- particularly hard because the Fed represents such a significant portion of that market. The second question you had was about whether the Treasury could just sit tight on its MBS. And indeed, it could conduct its initial tightening entirely through the sale of Treasury securities. The problem is -- and the Fed has already acknowledged this -- at some point they're going to be concerned about their balance sheet being overwhelmingly dominated by mortgage-backed securities, which is why Bernanke has proposed that the tightening could occur through means other than securities sales. I already talked about term deposit options. In the policy innovation memorandum that Michelle had mentioned at the outset, we talk about reverse repos, which really are conceptually identical. So the point I'd emphasize there is that there are more problems involved in those unconventional methods of tightening, such as the possibility of failed options. Your third point, selling Treasuries will of course impact the MBS market. Any form of monetary tightening is going to affect the MBS market and, indeed, all asset markets. That's inevitable. But it will not have a disparate impact on the MBS market, the sort of impact you would have when you're selling specifically mortgage securities into, again, a very thin market. QUESTIONER: OK. Great. Well, thanks for that, Benn. OPERATOR: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. (Gives queuing instructions.) Question from Mark Scradley (ph) with Nesow Capital (ph). QUESTIONER: Hi, Benn. What impact would a rating change have, whether it's an upgrade or downgrade, once the swap took place? STEIL: A rating change in terms of -- QUESTIONER: U.S. sovereign debt. STEIL: -- U.S. sovereign debt? QUESTIONER: Yes. STEIL: Well, as you know, the last time we got a major ratings change, it was a complete nonevent in the market. In fact, Treasuries rallied. So my view is that a ratings event as such would probably not be significant. What would be significant is if we were in an environment of rising interest rates generally. That could have a very significant impact on the Fed's balance sheet and remittances to the Treasury. And in fact, the FOMC has already expressed concern about that. QUESTIONER: Thank you. OPERATOR: Thank you. (Gives queuing instructions.) We have a question from Jay Collins with Citigroup. QUESTIONER: Hi. Just two questions related to what you just said. In terms of the threshold at which people would become concerned of the proportionality of MBS to Treasuries, do you have some sense of where that is? And in terms of the amount of absolute selling in the -- in the Treasury market, at what point -- I mean, just give us an order of magnitude of how much could be sold you would feel that you needed to use the MBS. STEIL: OK. I think perhaps the best way to look at it is to think about what a normal Federal Reserve balance sheet looks like. Before the crisis, the Fed's balance sheet was about $800 billion. By the end of the year it's going to be $4 trillion. Now, even if the Fed worked to sell off all its Treasury stock, which is obviously not something it would ever want to do, it would have a balance sheet of $1.5 trillion, again comprised of an asset that the Fed would be very uncomfortable having, that is, mortgage-backed securities. That -- the mortgage-backed portfolio alone would be twice the normal size of the Fed's balance sheet. And that's why we argue that one way or the other, the Fed's going to have to deal with this stock of mortgage-backed securities as part of the process of monetary tightening and normalizing both the composition and size of its balance sheet. Does that -- does that address your question? QUESTIONER: Yes, very much. OPERATOR: (Gives queuing instructions.) We have a question from Steven Toddler (sp) from CFR. QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. Hello, Benn. STEIL: Hi. QUESTIONER: What if the new normal is not 800 billion (dollars) but 8 trillion (dollars) or 10 trillion (dollars) or 14 trillion (dollars)? What if all the rules of the game change and the Fed basically says, we're going to run a $10 trillion balance sheet? STEIL: Well, the Fed could say that. QUESTIONER: Why won't they say that? STEIL: Well, they have suggested that the Fed balance sheet will be a lot larger than the old normal for some time to come. And that's why Bernanke has sought to emphasize to the market that he has other means of conducting monetary tightening besides asset sales. So to go back to the point I made before, we agree with him in principle that there are other methods that could work. But they would require a radical shift in the way the Fed conducts monetary policy. Again, with term deposit auctions, the short-term interest rate which the Fed has sought to control, the fed funds target rate, since 1994 -- that short-term rate would now be determined entirely in the marketplace. Now, we think that the Fed will have particular difficulty explaining this to the market and justifying it to Congress that the Fed no longer controls short-term interest rates because these are being set entirely by an auction process involving the major U.S. banks, who, as you know, are not in great favor in Washington at the moment. So -- and if we're right, the Fed will almost certainly do what the ECB has done and put caps on the rates that it will pay in those auctions. And we are very concerned that if those auctions start failing that the Fed would really lose significant credibility in the market, and that could lead to a spike in interest rates on its own. So that's why we say that a conventional approach to Fed tightening, that is, selling securities from an oversized balance sheet, is the right one, and in order to allow the Fed to do that, we need to normalize the composition of the Fed's balance sheet, that is, make it overwhelmingly U.S. Treasury securities. QUESTIONER: Thank you. OPERATOR: Thank you. (Gives queuing instructions.) And Ms. Cabrera, did you have any questions for Mr. Steil? CARUSO-CABRERA: Well, I was going to say that there are a number of formal (sic) Federal Reserve governors, leaders, et cetera, involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, Bill McDonough, Alan Blinder also, an economist who's involved. If you are at liberty to say, have you shown -- have they responded to this, seen it in the journal or had any commentary about it? STEIL: Yeah, well, I'm not going to name specific names and associate them with specific comments because that wouldn't be fair to them. They'll -- they have to decide what issues they want to comment on publicly themselves. But yes, I have spoken to Bill McDonough. Yes, I have spoken to Alan Greenspan -- Alan Blinder. (Laughter.) I've spoken to a number of former members of the FOMC, and you know, there are -- there are technical concerns that have been raised about this: What impact will it have on the debt debate in Washington? What impact could it have on the deficit? But I haven't yet received any, shall we say, conceptual complaints about it. I think there's a generally positive disposition towards the idea of trying to normalize the composition of the Fed's balance sheet before the tightening process has to start. CARUSO-CABRERA: What do you think the chances are that this will actually happen? STEIL: Well, look, there will be a political debate about it in Washington if we want to go forward. This is not a legal revolution we're proposing. As we emphasized, this has been done before in a slightly different context through the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. Treasury was specifically given the authority to buy mortgage-backed securities backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and they obviously had to issue Treasury securities in order to do this. They issued hundreds of billions. So we know how to do this. We know how to do it practically and we know how to do it legally. Now, I'm not naive, and I'm sure that there will be issues raised so that, for example, even though we may be absolutely right that this has no impact on the U.S. net debt, it could become part of the whole debt ceiling debate just because the debt ceiling debate is defined in rather blunt terms with reference to the amount of Treasury securities that are issued. We would naturally find this unfortunate because it's certainly not our aim to increase U.S. debt; far from it. All we're seeking to do is address an accounting issue that we believe is polluting the conduct of monetary policy, and we would emphasize we believe that Ben Bernanke himself believes has polluted the conduct of monetary policy in another setting: Japan. CARUSO-CABRERA: Well, Ben, this has been terrific. Thanks so much for taking the questions. This ends the call. A reminder, if you click at the -- on the link at the bottom of the email that you received you can read the policy innovation memorandum that Ben has written, "Exiting from Monetary Stimulus: A Better Plan for the Fed." And thanks so much for joining us. STEIL: Thanks, Michelle. (C) COPYRIGHT 2013, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC., 1120 G STREET NW; SUITE 990; WASHINGTON, DC - 20005, USA. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. ANY REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION IS EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED. UNAUTHORIZED REPRODUCTION, REDISTRIBUTION OR RETRANSMISSION CONSTITUTES A MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER APPLICABLE UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW, AND FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO PURSUE ALL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT IN RESPECT TO SUCH MISAPPROPRIATION. FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, INC. IS A PRIVATE FIRM AND IS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. NO COPYRIGHT IS CLAIMED AS TO ANY PART OF THE ORIGINAL WORK PREPARED BY A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AS PART OF THAT PERSON'S OFFICIAL DUTIES. FOR INFORMATION ON SUBSCRIBING TO FNS, PLEASE CALL 202-347-1400 OR EMAIL [email protected]. THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
  • Europe
    Cyprus Votes Yes
    Cyprus today passed the €10 billion EU-IMF bailout deal by a 29 to 27 vote, so it will receive its first installment of aid next month.  Capital controls (though eased a bit) will remain in place until at least the fall, when the bank restructuring is completed.  New financing gaps are likely to emerge quickly, as the economic assumptions still look too rosy, but the risk of default has diminished for now.
  • Portugal
    Portugal’s Austerity Malaise
    Recent developments in Portugal provide yet another example of the growing political strength of anti-austerity forces in Europe.
  • Europe
    A Growth Strategy for Greece
    The EU and IMF should loosen the austerity requirements of Greece’s bailout package to allow the indebted country to implement needed growth-enhancing policies, says former prime minister George Papandreou.