Development

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering September 10 to September 17, was compiled with support from Becky Allen, Anne Connell, and Lauren Hoffman. Women and the Syrian transition                                                            Last week, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov negotiated a two-day extension of the ceasefire in Syria, which began September 12. A UK-based monitoring group recorded no casualties in the areas covered by the ceasefire during its first forty-eight hours, but the calm was marred by Friday morning as severe clashes were reported near Damascus. The cessation of fighting was intended to allow aid to reach civilians in besieged areas, including rebel-held portions of Aleppo, where residents are in desperate need of baby formula, flour, fuel, medicines, and wheat. The Syrian Women’s Advisory Board to the UN Special Envoy for Syria, established in February of this year, recently suggested that Syrian women bear the brunt of the humanitarian crisis, with member Insaff Hamad asserting that “women can and may well be the backbone of the Syrian reconciliation.” Last week, the High Negotiation Committee (HNC), an alliance of more than thirty moderate Syrian opposition groups, introduced a twenty-five-page transition plan for the conflict’s end. Along with proposals for a transitional governing body, the formation of a joint military council, and a commitment to democratic non-sectarian values, the plan emphasized the importance of women’s participation in the transition process, including through a 30 percent gender quota for state institutions and decision-making bodies. Female jihadists arrested in France                                                                                    Three young women who were part of a French cell of the so-called Islamic State group were arrested in Paris on charges related to a planned attack on Gare de Lyon, a main train station in the city’s center. Several others—primarily women—were later detained in connection to the plot. The arrests followed the discovery of a car packed with containers of gas and diesel beside Notre Dame cathedral. Authorities suggest that the women-led extremist cell may mark a shift in Islamic State tactics toward promoting women as terrorist agents.  As prosecutor Francois Molins stated, “if at first it appeared that women were confined to family and domestic chores by the Daesh terrorist organization, it must be noted that this view is now completely outdated.” Until recently, the extremist group barred the deployment of women in martyrdom operations.  Reports estimate that more than one-third of the approximately seven hundred French citizens who have joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq are women, and those returning to Europe from Iraq and Syria—as well as self-radicalized women—pose a growing challenge for law enforcement. Global Fund prioritizes gender equality                                                                    Earlier this month, the Global Fund launched its 2017-2022 strategy, which for the first time includes the promotion of gender equality as one of its four top-line strategic objectives. Previously, the Fund’s efforts to advance the health and status of women and girls were guided by a parallel Gender Equality Strategy (2008) and Action Plan (2014). The new, integrated strategy aims “to scale up programs to support women and girls and invest to reduce health inequities.” With its newly proposed allocation strategy, the Global Fund will hone investments on the ground, seeking in particular to reduce HIV prevalence among adolescent girls in sub-Saharan African countries with the highest infection rates. Target countries in which the Global Fund will address gender-related health barriers include Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The announcement of the new strategy came days before the opening of the Global Fund’s Fifth Replenishment Conference, held September 16 to 17 in Montreal, where world leaders gathered to set funding priorities.

Nigeria is famous for the delight in display taken by the governing class and the rich. Hence, native dress for women and men is made of rich fabrics and bedecked with jewelry, residences often have gold-plated taps, and, at one point, the Hummer appeared to be the vehicle of choice. President Muhammadu Buhari, by contrast, values simplicity: plain dress, a private house appropriate to a retired military officer who never made money on the side, and a modest private vehicle. Most Nigerians are poor, and the current economic downturn is exacerbating poverty. There is little doubt that the president’s personal simplicity contributes to his continued popularity on the “street” and adds credibility to his anti-corruption campaign. When Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg recently visited Nigeria, President Buhari took the opportunity to challenge the lavish display of wealth. In public remarks when he received Zuckerberg, the president said, “In our culture, we are not used to seeing successful people appear like you. We are not used to seeing successful people jogging and sweating on the streets. We are more used to seeing successful people in air-conditioned places. We are happy you are well-off and simple enough to always share.” Anthropologists will argue that Nigeria’s culture of display has deep roots. But, its over-the-top quality really dates only from the coming of the oil boom and the end of the Biafra war, both in 1970. It was the unimaginable wealth generated by oil, and the lack of institutions to channel it productively, that fed conspicuous consumption. Meanwhile, most Nigerians live simply because of their poverty.

This is a guest post by Zara Riaz, a research specialist in the Politics Department at Princeton University. In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia stands out among neighbors for its political and economic stability. Recent protests and escalating violence, however, expose Ethiopia’s longstanding political tensions and pose a serious threat to the government’s ability to maintain its strong hold. Last November, protests spread across Ethiopia’s Oromia region. The Oromo, Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group constituting over 30 percent of the country’s population, demanded an end to the government-sponsored Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, which would have extended the capital city’s limits further onto Oromo territory. The government, dominated by the Tigray minority group representing only 6 percent of the country’s population, announced plans to cancel the initiative in January. Nevertheless, many Oromo have continued to protest their political, economic, and cultural marginalization. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity is not unique to the Oromo. The Ethiopian constitution explicitly grants self-determination and the protection of cultural rights for all ethnic groups, however, these rights are far from realized for the majority of the country’s population. For example, speaking Oromiffa is frequently used to identify actual or suspected members of the Oromo Liberation Front, an organization to promote Oromo self-determination that has been labeled as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government. As a result, many Oromos do not feel free to speak their language in public. Protests over officially sanctioned land grabbing have also spread across the Amhara region, home to Ethiopia’s second largest ethnic group, the Amhara. Demonstrations among both groups are highlighting that though the country is celebrated for its strong economic growth, only an elite minority benefits. For example, fertile land in Oromia generates roughly 60 percent of Ethiopia’s economic resources, yet the Oromo are repeatedly denied the benefits accruing from these resources. In fact, Oromo land is being used for flower farms in an effort to compete with Kenya for the European market, yet a local resident claims that the government “took 90 percent of the payment and gave 10 percent to the people.” In response to demonstrations, the government is brutally cracking down on dissenters. During the first weekend of August, protests resulted in over one-hundred civilian causalities, while the death toll since the initial protests in November exceeds five-hundred. In the past, government opposition has been routinely interpreted as a threat to national unity and addressed as an act of terrorism. But, current demonstrations by two groups representing over 60 percent of the country’s population will make it more difficult to employ such tactics without igniting further unrest and anger. Though the government in the past has taken advantage of the decades long rivalry once characterizing the relationship between the Oromo and Amhara, the protests are giving birth to a sense of solidarity between the groups in demanding greater representation. These protests across Amhara and Oromo regions and the deteriorating human rights situation in the country cannot be ignored by the international community. Up to now, Western reluctance to condemn the government’s actions has been tied to Ethiopia’s important role in the fight against terrorism in the region. The Western response, which has so far included urging the government to allow international observers in parts of the country and expressing “concern” over the government’s actions, is weak, given the country’s deteriorating situation. The international community should act now to curb the government’s brutality against the protesters to decrease the likelihood of long-term instability in Ethiopia.

Gabriel Walker is a research associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is the final part of a series on China’s role in international development. Read the first and second parts on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and green bonds. On the eve of this year’s Group of Twenty meeting in Hangzhou, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping formally ratified the Paris Agreement, the UN’s landmark treaty on fighting climate change. So far 180 countries have signed the document and now, including the world’s two largest carbon emitters, twenty-seven have ratified it. If the Agreement garners enough ratifications to enter into legal force by next April, it would formally bind the signatories to staunch global warming by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, encouraging green financing, and promoting climate resilience. Each signatory’s commitment under the Agreement is self-determined, and China has already made headlines by promising to peak carbon emissions by 2030. But China’s Paris commitments go beyond greenhouse gas caps; they also include pledges to bolster sustainable development abroad. In its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution, submitted ahead of the 2015 Paris climate change conference, China promises to promote green, low-carbon development and innovation; to provide financing, technology, and capacity-building to other developing countries; to foster more equitable access to sustainable development for developing countries; and more. China’s far-reaching Belt and Road endeavor will be a litmus test for these commitments: whether and how it aligns with Paris values is an important opportunity for China to display environmental leadership and establish its geopolitical character. The Belt and Road initiative (also known as “One Belt, One Road”) is a massive trade and infrastructure development project on a scale the world has never seen. Specifically, it aims to connect Eurasian nations and their adjacent seas, establish trans-regional partnerships, and “realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable developments” throughout the continent. Its two components are an overland Silk Road Economic Belt, stretching from Beijing to Europe, and a Maritime Silk Road, snaking all the way from the Bohai Sea to the Mediterranean. Transportation infrastructure, such as railways and ports, will feature prominently in the plan, but development projects in many other sectors such as energy, agriculture, and industry will also take shape. For the Chinese government, the Belt and Road strategy is both economically and geopolitically significant. From Beijing’s perspective, it ideally will stimulate the Chinese economy by creating new export markets, offloading excess industrial capacity, and focusing Chinese companies’ international business ventures. Geopolitically, Belt and Road strategists hope that it will counter perceived growing American, Japanese, and European influence over the Eurasian continent, and boost China’s global standing by fostering bilateral trade relationships. The Belt and Road plan is not only potentially transformational for catalyzing development across Eurasia, but is also China’s most clearly articulated international foray to date. The Chinese media have already trumpeted the environmentalism of some early Belt and Road projects, calling them a realization of the “Green Silk Road” ideal. Chinese engineers working on a railway in Tajikistan, for example, took special measures to reforest the site to prevent soil erosion, even when local regulations did not require it. A Chinese-built cogeneration power plant in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe uses some of the world’s most advanced dust-filtration and sulfur-scrubbing technologies. Some private companies have even joined together to found a Green Ecological Silk Road Investment Fund, which will direct capital toward solar panel construction, clean energy development, and ecological remediation. At the same time, international Chinese projects have a poor environmental track record: dams in Southeast Asia have intensified drought; oil field development in Chad caused more than $400 million in environmental violations; and banana plantations in Laos have polluted groundwater, not to mention domestic examples of development-related pollution. For Belt and Road projects, the potential for harming fragile ecosystems through railway and road construction, and coastal air quality through increased shipping traffic, for example, is dangerously high. Redirecting excess Chinese industrial capacity—by relocating factories or by laying down thousands of miles of railroad tracks—will also fuel demand for carbon-intensive products such as steel and concrete within China. Belt and Road pipelines and shipping lanes that satiate China’s increasing need for imported natural gas and crude will certainly bolster the international fossil fuel industry. Because the Belt and Road initiative could easily perpetuate inefficient and dangerous modes of development, Beijing fundamentally needs to reinvent how Chinese companies operate abroad. Consistent indicators in a few areas would prove China’s commitment to environmentally conscious Belt and Road projects, including:                               Prioritizing low-carbon or carbon-neutral development projects; Implementing comprehensive measures to protect land, coastal, and marine ecosystems from gradual decline, and effective crisis management procedures to remedy unforeseen accidents; Continuing to transfer low-carbon technologies and technological know-how to other developing countries; Working with development banks with proven track records of good environmental governance, such as the Asian Development Bank and potentially the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; Displaying leadership by not engaging in environmentally detrimental projects, such as certain hydroelectric dams, even when the potential for profit is high; And setting a good example by holding domestic Belt and Road development projects within China to the highest environmental standards.   China’s Paris commitments to sow the seeds of sustainable development are lofty and laudable, especially because they involve more than greenhouse gas pledges. Whether or not the Agreement comes into force next year, China has much to gain by putting its ambitious rhetoric into practice and much to lose if its grand plans go awry. If China is indeed able to promote sustainable Belt and Road ventures throughout Eurasia, it would garner a renewed respect on the international stage for its tenacity in upholding global environmental norms.

Welcome to “Women Around the World: This Week,” a series that highlights noteworthy news related to women and U.S. foreign policy. This week’s post, covering August 13 to August 19, was compiled with support from Becky Allen and Lucy Leban. Aid Workers Raped in South Sudan News reports emerged this week suggesting that South Sudanese troops attacked, raped, and abused foreign aid workers and local civilians at a residential compound in Juba this past July. A local journalist was killed during the rampage, while many other individuals were beaten, looted, and gang-raped. According to the Associated Press, neither the local UN peacekeeping force nor embassies responded to pleas for help during the four-hour targeted assault. Ambassador Samantha Power described the United States’ outrage over the attacks and concern about the lack of response by UN peacekeeping forces. In an August 15 statement, she wrote, “[i]t is especially reprehensible that the perpetrators appear to have targeted those who came to South Sudan despite risks to their own personal safety to help the country and its people.” UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for an investigation into the UN peacekeeping force’s failure to respond. Boko Haram releases video of Chibok girls More than two years after Boko Haram abducted nearly three hundred schoolgirls from Chibok, Nigeria, the terrorist group released a video of about fifty of the abductees and demanded that the Nigerian government release militants in exchange for the girls’ return home. Since the abduction in 2014, a few girls have escaped and numerous others allegedly have been killed in airstrikes, but about two-hundred of the kidnapped girls are still believed to be held captive by Boko Haram, with many reportedly subject to forced marriage and sexual abuse. While the Chibok incident galvanized significant media attention with the hashtag BringBackOurGirls, human rights groups report that the kidnapping of children continues, with nearly 2,000 girls and boys abducted by Boko Haram since 2014. Gender equality and the Olympic Games A review of ninety-eight nations revealed a strong, positive correlation between gender equality and the number of Olympic medals won by athletes in countries around the world. The analysis drew upon data from the UNDP’s annual Human Development Reports, which measure gender equality in the health, economic, social, and political sectors, as well as data from the International Olympic Committee between 1996 and 2012. The results suggest that increased gender equality not only provides women with greater opportunity to bring home medals, but also is associated with more medals for men. The findings corroborate a 2014 study, which found that a ten-point increase in gender equality is correlated with two to three additional medals won by male athletes and four to five more won by female athletes, even when controlling for known predictors of Olympic success, such as a country’s population or GDP.

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from August 13, 2016 to August 19, 2016. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. var divElement = document.getElementById(’viz1472494980128’); var vizElement = divElement.getElementsByTagName(’object’)[0]; vizElement.style.width=’100%’;vizElement.style.height=(divElement.offsetWidth*0.75)+’px’; var scriptElement = document.createElement(’script’); scriptElement.src = ’https://public.tableau.com/javascripts/api/viz_v1.js’; vizElement.parentNode.insertBefore(scriptElement, vizElement); August 13: Herdsmen killed six in Jema’a, Kaduna. August 14: Nigerian troops killed sixteen Boko Haram militants in Kukawa, Borno. August 15: Boko Haram attacked a convoy of immigration officials and traders in Dikwa, Borno. They killed five traders, but security personnel returned fire killing "some" militants (estimated at five). August 16: Robbers attacked a bullion van, killing two police officers in Riyom, Plateau. August 16: Nigerian troops killed three Boko Haram militants in Bama, Borno. August 17: The Multinational Joint Task Force killed twenty-seven Boko Haram militants in Fokotol, Cameroon. August 18: Two prison guards and seventeen inmates were killed in an attempted jail break in Abakaliki, Ebonyi.

Nathan Birhanu is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. In recent years, the mining industry has struggled to turn a profit due to a slowdown in demand from China’s economy and an oversupply from producers. South Africa’s mining companies, who export primarily platinum, iron ore, gold, coal, and manganese, have been heavily affected by the downturn. While industrial mining conducted by large-scale companies has seen a decline in operations and profits, artisanal mining (small-scale mining by single individuals using hand tools and limited technology) has increased in South Africa in way of “zama zamas.” Zama zama, a colloquial term which stems from Zulu, means “to try again” or “take a chance.” The term now refers to artisanal miners that conduct illegal mining in mines that have been discontinued. A majority of them are migrants from neighboring countries, while others are South African miners who have lost their jobs during the economic downturn. An estimated six thousand zama zamas are in the ground at any one time. Often, they pay low-level mine employees to gain access to a company’s disused mines. Due to the entrance fee and security risks, zama zamas can stay underground for months at a time, occasionally more than a mile deep, having food delivered down at exuberant prices and sending excavated minerals back up. The minerals they mine, usually gold, are sold to local dealers within South Africa and, if large enough, to exporters. (Investors even fund the equipment for zama zama ventures in turn for a portion of profits.) Such hard labor has considerable risks. The unregulated and illicit nature of the work has brought about violence, corruption, and turf warfare. Rival zama zama factions have been known to fight over profitable territory, rob fellow miners at gunpoint for excavated spoils, and trap one another in the mines to deter competition. Mine collapses and rock falls have also killed hundreds. The South African government sees the increasing trend of artisanal miners as unfavorable, and it is taking efforts to inhibit or stop such operations. However, the security services and government regulatory agencies do not have the wherewithal or experience to enforce laws on illegal mining. Police are also unwilling to take the considerable risk required to go into the deep mines to confront zama zamas. Others have called for the government to sanction artisanal mining, regulate it, and tax it. Some zama zama investors have even gone to the Department of Mineral Resources to obtain licenses to mine legally only to be turned away. In 2010, the South African government lost $500 million in tax and export revenue in gold alone from illegal mining. In addition, the unemployment rate in South Africa is 26 percent, and 66.2 percent of the population over the age of 20 has less than a high school education. Such a high unemployment rate, coupled with a dearth of highly skilled technical labor, is a significant challenge to economic growth and decreasing poverty. Artisanal mining could alleviate part of this issue. Finally, proposals have been presented in the past for the government to nationalize mines, and may have discouraged investment in the industry. However, if freelance artisanal miners were authorized to mine in shafts abandoned by companies, popular pressure for nationalization might diminish. The increasing trend of zama zamas does not seem to be abating anytime soon, and regardless of what policy is set, there are profits to be made in South Africa’s mines. If zama zamas won’t get them, the government, mining companies, or international investors will.  

Global trade and the supply chains that support it are undergoing a period of profound change. Supply chains face threats including a resurgence of protectionism, climate change, decaying infrastructure, and human rights abuses. The Development Channel’s series on global supply chains will highlight experts’ analysis on emerging trends and challenges. This post is from Dr. Sherry Stephenson, senior fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).  We live today in a networked economy led by investment flows where business-to-business intermediate trade accounts for over two-thirds of the goods and nearly three-quarters of the services exchanged worldwide. Global value chains (GVCs) now define how companies do business and how world trade is structured. These complex chains mean different things to different actors and the “governance” of GVCs is understood in various ways. It can be viewed from at least three perspectives: of firms; of individual countries; and of the international trading system. At the firm level, governance of a supply chain refers to management, or how the activities in a production network are organized and carried out among participating firms. Usually the lead firm sets and enforces the parameters under which other firms in the network operate, through deciding what will be produced and in what location, the type of quality controls that must be followed, and the management structure. Companies are most concerned with generating efficient production to maximize profits. How they position themselves in a given value chain and what type of management or governance structure they adopt will depend partly on the type of activity in which they are involved. Sovereign nations look at the governance of global value chains as a policy issue. Their goals are to create an environment that will bring in investment, enhance economic growth, and stimulate the transfer of technology and skills. Governments aim to create the most conducive and enabling set of policies that will allow firms to engage in GVC operations. Both domestic and international policies matter. Domestically, a liberalizing trade policy is a necessary first step to integrating into GVCs. Education, too, is needed for a country’s labor force to contribute high-quality services, or add high-quality inputs to goods and services going into value chain networks. Other enabling policies and factors include: a competitive services industry investment-friendly policies strong government institutions with mechanisms for legal recourse in the case of disputes a robust digital infrastructure customs and border management for efficient logistics non-discriminatory domestic regulation Governments must push these reforms, all the while balancing domestic politics, which may or may not support this open trade agenda. Finally, the international trading system governs GVCs through rules negotiated between countries in trade agreements and addresses decisions that affect trade and investment flows between several trading partners or the trading system as a whole. This form of GVC “governance” has been little explored and discussed by analysts and policy officials. Some argue there is a "supply chain governance gap" at the multilateral level due to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) preoccupation with the Doha Round agenda of 20th century trade issues, and with a WTO system characterized by: outdated trading rules—the WTO came into force in 1995 when the internet was considered “emerging technology” and the World Wide Web had just appeared; lack of rules on investment, competition policy, and e-commerce and digital trade, all vital to GVC operations; trade rules that are structured in silos, with no cross-cutting forum to discuss horizontal issues that affect GVC operations. In the WTO’s absence, preferential, plurilateral and mega-regional trade agreements have stepped into the governance void. The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), being negotiated by fifty countries, covers all services sectors as well as key 21st century trade-related issues. Investment, competition policy, and digital trade/data flows are all included in new, deeper preferential trade agreements, such as the recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If ratified, the TPP should create an enabling environment for GVCs among its members. However, it will further splinter the WTO system. If followed by other preferential trade agreements, it will lead to more fragmentation in GVC governance.

New Yorkers who have been used to the annual UNGA sessions (which typically last two weeks and attract over one hundred heads of state and government) in September will probably have difficulty understanding why the two-day G20 summit—to be held in Hangzhou early next month—is such a big deal in China, as tight security measures appear to be causing a great deal of inconvenience to local residents. These measures can be rationalized when we take into account the fact that this will be the first ever G20 summit hosted in China and the second international summit since President Xi Jinping took the reins of the Chinese Communist Party and the military in 2012. An equally important, but less well-known factor to reckon with is the changing landscape of global governance—since the 1990s, summit-centered plurilateral institutions have become a significant forum to address major global challenges. These institutions are part of the rise of worldwide governmental and social networks characterized by less formal links among public, private, and nonprofit entities cum formal relationship among states. Unlike formal, inclusive international organizations such as the United Nations, summit-level clubs such as the G7 and G20 feature limited membership, more flexibility, and less cheap talk. The smaller number of key stakeholders in an informal, more authoritative setting not only allows for more substantive discussions over global challenges that member states have to confront, but also makes it easier for them to overcome collective action in reaching consensus and implementing decisions. As a club of the twenty largest economies in the world, the G20 accounts for 85 percent of global GDP, 75 percent of world trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. The sheer size of its member countries’ populations and economies give the G20 more legitimacy than the G7 in global governance issues. Legitimacy of the G20 is further beefed up with the shift of its agenda toward sustainable development over the past years. Because of its role as a contributor to and a beneficiary of development, global health is integrally linked to the G20’s mandate of economic growth. The vulnerability of G20 economies to major disease outbreaks notwithstanding, an argument can be made that in the context of globalization, even development-related health issues that are noncommunicable are increasingly cross-border in nature, requiring international cooperation and collective action. In that sense, global health could be a topic that galvanizes the interest of G20 leaders. As early as 2004, when Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin trumpeted the need for a “Leaders’ 20” or “L20” as an alternative to the G8, global health was one of the common themes under discussion. In July 2016, civil society leaders of the twenty major economies (C20) issued a communique calling for G20 leaders to achieve quality and affordable healthcare and closer international cooperation over major disease prevention and control. Yet for almost a decade, the summit has focused overwhelmingly on traditional financial and economic issues, and global health issues have been only indirectly addressed on the G20 agenda. Until 2013, the G20 had not tackled global health challenges in a substantial way other than promises to meet the Millennium Development Goals (which expired in December 2015) and to strengthen healthcare and social safety nets. Global health issues became prominent for the first time in the 2014 Brisbane summit, when G20 leaders issued a separate statement on the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It is also encouraging that the 2015 Antalya summit began to target global health risks, including antimicrobial resistance and weak health systems as key concerns. This year, however, Beijing has made it clear that the focus of the summit will be on global economic growth. Indeed, “health” is not even mentioned once in the eighteen-page document on themes and key agenda items of the summit issued by the Chinese government. Why is that the case? The G20 was elevated to the leaders’ level as an international response toward the 2008 global financial crisis. From the very beginning, it has been viewed as a forum to discuss pressing global economic and financial issues. If we believe history matters, it makes sense to consider G20 agenda setting to be a path dependent process in which global health becomes a victim of the “lock-in” effect. Also, including global health in the G20 agenda entails member states committing extra financial resources to improving global health. As my colleague Laurie Garrett notes, since G20 is not a club of rich nations only, attending the summit is no longer viewed as “the Great Global Guilt Trip” (which gives the G7/8 nations moral incentive to contribute financially to global health), and rich nations driven by their own interests would be happy to delink global health from the summit agenda. Although global health will not feature prominently on the Hangzhou summit agenda, it is in China’s interest to play a constructive role in pushing global health as one of the key deliverables at the 2017 Hamburg summit. An area of particular interest to China and other G20 leaders is the financing of the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the health targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  China could work closely with other G20 countries to find innovative solutions to conjure the money necessary to fulfill the targets while maintaining commitments to existing programs such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the WHO Contingency Fund for Emergencies. Against the backdrop of dwindling financial resources for global health, China’s push to expand the G20 agenda to include global health would boost its image as a global leader in tackling issues of common concern, thereby beefing up its soft power abroad. Indeed, compared to the lavish spending on the Confucius Institutes and other existing soft power projects, a global health initiative led by China would be a more cost-effective and powerful testimony to China’s benevolent intentions internationally.  

Gabriel Walker is a research associate for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This is the second part of a series on China’s role in international development. Read the first part here. One month from today, leaders and policymakers from the world’s largest economies will be rubbing shoulders in Hangzhou for the eleventh annual Group of Twenty (G20) summit. For China, which presides over the group in 2016, the event is the culmination of nine months of diplomatic hard work to realize broad goals like “breaking a new path for growth” and fostering “inclusive and interconnected development.” One important development innovation that China has brought to this year’s proceedings is promoting the concept of “green finance.” Throughout the past year, China has spearheaded the meetings of the newly created “G20 Green Finance Study Group,” whose final report the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors officially welcomed into their agenda last month. One aspect of green financing in particular—fostering the nascent “green bond” market—offers China an important opportunity to display international leadership while contributing to global sustainable development. Green bonds are debt securities whose proceeds fund projects with environmental benefits. Eligible initiatives include anything from energy-efficient buildings and pollution remediation to consumer loans for clean vehicles and renewable energy infrastructure. Multilateral development banks first issued green bonds in 2007 to satisfy investors’ growing appetite for globally conscious financial products. Since then, the issuance of green bonds has grown from just $807 million to $36.6 billion. By 2020, the value of global green bonds could be as high as $1 trillion, nearly a third of which could come from China. Chinese institutions have shown a sustained interest in becoming world leaders in the green bond market. Just over a year ago, wind energy firm Xinjiang Goldwind issued China’s first green bond of $300 million—attracting sixty-seven investors who oversubscribed the bond by nearly five times. In late 2015, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and National Development and Reform Commission each issued their own guidelines on green bonds, establishing a relatively unified concept of how the bonds should be used to maintain environmental standards. In March 2016, China’s 13th Five-Year Plan specifically mentioned “developing green credit and bonds” as a top priority within its overall agenda for environmentally conscious industrial development. Soon after, the Shanghai Stock Exchange launched a green bond pilot initiative that requires issuers to follow specific certification, reporting, and accounting guidelines. In total, Chinese green bonds issued in the first half of 2016 amounted to 75 billion RMB ($11 billion), making China the largest market for green bonds anywhere in the world. China’s ambition for green bonds stems largely out of necessity. Ma Jun, chief economist of the PBOC’s research bureau (not to be confused with Ma Jun the environmentalist), has estimated that China needs at least $320 billion of additional capital every year to clean up domestic pollution and fund green development projects. Currently, the Chinese government is only able to meet 15 percent of that demand. Furthermore, Ma has stated that using green financing for Belt and Road projects is in the long-term interests of Chinese investment institutions. However, China is not only embracing green finance for its own purposes—it is leveraging its G20 leadership to encourage other countries to follow suit. Chinese policymakers are in a good position to further clarify and cohere the green bond market, and doing so would show leadership and bring about tangible development benefits within and outside of China. Chinese institutions can effectively formalize the international green bond market by:                   Clarifying what kinds of projects will be funded. Currently, Chinese standards allow green bond proceeds to fund clean coal projects. But should a coal-fired power plant, for example, especially one that uses relatively dirty, subcritical technology, really qualify as “green”? Chinese policymakers must either convince other stakeholders that fossil fuel–based projects are necessary for developing countries, and can be carried out with minimal environmental impact, or abandon the allowance altogether. China’s two sets of standards also differ over whether green bond revenues should fund nuclear energy projects. Determining how proceeds will be allocated. Chinese and international guidelines agree that green bond proceeds must be either earmarked or “ring-fenced” (deposited in their own account) to ensure they are used properly. However, guidelines differ in their transparency requirements for how unallocated funds are invested. Transparency is not a hallmark of Chinese financial institutions and corporations, so Chinese issuers must go above and beyond to maintain high standards for disclosure set forth by any international consensus on fund allocation. Standardizing the environmental reporting process. External reviews are crucial in maintaining the trustworthiness and reliability of green bonds for investors. Chinese and international standards encourage these reviews, but do not necessarily require them. Wholly independent and rigorous third-party “greenness” verification is essential for developing the green bond market, and Chinese policymakers should require it as the international gold standard.   September’s G20 summit is a meaningful moment for Chinese leadership on the world stage, and could also mark an important occasion for clarifying international norms of green finance. Over the past year, the Chinese government, financial institutions, and corporations have already shown their enthusiasm for green bonds. At the summit, Chinese leaders have a new opportunity to further define rules of the road for green bond project selection, proceeds allocation, and environmental reporting. Doing so would not only illustrate that China can deliver real results when leading a prominent multilateral forum, but also set the stage to mobilize vast resources for sustainable investments around the world.

Global trade and the supply chains that support it are undergoing a period of profound change. Supply chains face threats including a resurgence of protectionism, climate change, decaying infrastructure, and human rights abuses. The Development Channel’s series on global supply chains will highlight experts’ analysis on emerging trends and challenges. This post is from Wolfgang Lehmacher, head of supply chains and transport industry at the World Economic Forum (WEF) USA. Global trade volumes have plateaued over the past eighteen months, after decades of expanding twice as fast as gross domestic production (GDP) and driving economic growth. Supply chains were crucial to that trade expansion, as countries increasingly linked into the procurement, manufacturing, and distribution networks that constitute the chains. Amid current stagnation, the question is where trade goes next. Public opinion on trade will matter, as will several major shifts in global supply chains. Diverging Public Support for Trade Europe is turning inward, despite the fact that 90 percent of global demand will come from outside the European Union (EU) in the next decade. In voting to leave the EU, British citizens rejected one of the strongest multi-nation, regional economic blocs. And European countries’ fragmented response to the migrant crisis bodes badly for EU plans for deeper integration and coordinated borders. In the United States, both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump have taken strong stands against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a preferential free trade agreement binding twelve nations and 40 percent of global GDP. In contrast, Asian nations are embracing international trade. For them, the TPP is largely understood as an opportunity. China—not a TPP member—is working to create its own bloc, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as an alternative to the U.S.-led pact. RCEP, composed of sixteen countries, would be the world’s largest free-trade area, reducing barriers to trade in goods and services as well as investment. Meanwhile, the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is guiding the region towards a single market, envisioning the free flows of goods, services, labor, investments, and capital across the ten member states. And bilateral agreements proliferate—for example, earlier this year, Vietnam finalized a free trade agreement with the EU. On the multinational front, World Trade Organization (WTO) members are in the process of ratifying the Trade Facilitation Agreement (FTA) concluded at the 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference. The TFA should make international trade easier, quicker, and less costly by removing red tape at borders, such as measures on the release and clearance of goods, and by enhancing cooperation between border agencies. According to WTO estimates, the TFA could cut worldwide trade costs by between 12.5 percent and 17.5 percent and create around 20 million jobs—the majority in developing countries. Trends in Global Supply Chains    Amid this ongoing debate, the very nature of trade is changing owing to three distinct shifts in global supply chains: the “fast economy” is on the rise, new technologies are proliferating, and e-commerce is expanding. Many sectors now prioritize speed to meet customer demand. Brands have adapted to a market for faster products—for example, Zara can design, manufacture, and get clothes to its stores in just two weeks. This model allows brands to avoid high inventory and costly bets, instead only producing more of what sells best. Since fast products require shorter and more regional supply chains, they involve less intercontinental trade. Technology is making supply chains more dynamic. Information technology, the internet of things, big data, and the cloud enable new management processes that allow for longer and more complex supply chains. The Flex Pulse Centre is one example—it streams data on everything from inventories to quality checks to transportation and delivery statuses, allowing central and local teams to remain updated and prepared to address potential disruptions and risks. This global visibility helps companies to decentralize production and open up new factories and distribution centers across the world, which results in a mix of short, medium, and long distance shipments. Other technological innovations localize and shorten supply chains. 3D printing can move production from factories to shops and homes, and some companies are re-shoring and nearshoring to relocate manufacturing to where technology is most advanced and productivity highest. Both trends reduce cross border trade. Finally, e-commerce and the rise of digital supply chains may boost international trade. Amazon, eBay, and Alibaba, among other e-commerce platforms, enable companies and consumers to buy things globally. They connect millions of manufacturers and billions of consumers, giving even the smallest seller and most distant buyer access to the global market. These connections require logistics and transportation networks that can support the growing number of cross-border transactions as well as regulation suitable to enable transnational e-commerce without jeopardizing sales. The English economist David Ricardo argued that combining international free trade with industry specialization around a country’s comparative strengths would produce widespread benefits. For this, trade’s slowdown is problematic. While in part due to converging capabilities—developing countries catching up with mature economies in terms of education, skills, infrastructure and logistics—the slowdown is more likely a result of digitization and suspicions among Western publics. But we might be unnecessarily worried: between 1980 and 1985 trade growth slowed dramatically, only to revive. Today, global production processes are evolving rapidly, and there is still room for deepening supply chains and trade links. The current slowdown represents more a shift than a permanent change.  

Breanna Wilkerson is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations. She graduated from Spelman College with a degree in Women’s Studies and is the founder of GlobeMed at Spelman. Ghana gained independence from Britain in 1957, making it the first nation in sub-Saharan Africa to shatter the chains of colonialism, and it is now considered a success story of African development. It has been named the seventh most prosperous and second safest nation in Africa. However, Ghana is not exempt from the global problem of widespread domestic and sexual violence. Ghanaian women face barriers in reporting violence. These obstacles are rooted in a cultural belief that domestic and sexual violence is a private matter that should be addressed outside of the criminal justice system. A public health report shows that 33 to 37 percent of women in Ghana have experienced intimate partner violence in the course of their relationship (this includes physical, sexual, and emotional violence). In Ghanaian schools, studies found that 14 percent of girls are victims of sexual abuse and 52 percent have experienced gender-based violence. These numbers are likely understated, as girls tend not to report crimes for fear of reprisal. Under the international human rights law, the Ghanaian government is obligated to address, prevent, investigate, and punish domestic violence perpetrators. It has taken critical first steps, one of which is the establishment of the Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit (DOVVSU). DOVVSU is a department within the Ghana police service established to protect the rights and promote the welfare of women and children by preventing and prosecuting crimes committed against them. The unit has been instrumental in bringing a once private matter into the public sphere. Today, DOVVSU has eighty-seven offices across the country and plans for continued growth. The unit provides the main entry point into the justice system but recognizes that its efforts are more effective when it works in partnership with other ministries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). DOVVSU and NGOs at the grassroots level have created culturally sensitive workshop curriculums directed at sexual assault against women and children. They have been taught in over 150 primary schools across the country since 2010. These dynamic curriculums work toward deconstructing cultural victim blaming stigmas by defining domestic and sexual violence, educating pupils on the warning signs, and directing them toward safe avenues of counseling if assaulted. Although grassroots level organizing has been initiated to reduce stigma around gender based violence, there is still more work to be done. For instance: Ghana should improve the guidelines and procedures used in handling reported cases to promote the best interest of victims; More in-depth sensitivity training of DOVVSU staff should be implemented; Greater evidence-based research and advocacy needs to be conducted; and, The implementation of alternative dispute resolutions should be established, coupled with in-camera hearings for sensitive cases to reduce stigma. Sexual and gender based violence isn’t just a problem for women, but the entire community at large. It will take a collective effort to ensure a large-scale prevention of its occurrence, but Ghana’s DOVVSU is a good start.

Last week, U.S. President Barack Obama hosted a White House Summit on Global Development to map the future of U.S. development efforts. The meeting took place just as the United Nations has begun to measure progress toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, an ambitious set of goals to eradicate poverty adopted by the United States and 192 other nations last year. As development leaders assess how to meet these goals and improve U.S. foreign assistance, they ought to elevate a priority that has long been marginalized: advancement for women and girls, which is chronically underfunded and lags far behind when compared with other development objectives. The gender gap in development assistance persists despite a substantial body of evidence confirming that investment in women yields high returns on poverty eradication and economic growth. Research demonstrates, for example, that reducing barriers to women’s economic participation decreases poverty and increases GDP. Promoting gender equality also enhances food security: a study by the Food and Agriculture Organization shows that equalizing women’s access to productive resources increases agricultural output and could reduce the number of hungry people in the world by 150 million. In addition, improving women’s health has demonstrable economic effects: access to family planning, for instance, helps fuel economic growth, and increased female educational attainment not only raises household income but also lowers national health expenses and rates of infant and child mortality. Read the full article in Foreign Affairs online.