Donald Trump

You tend not to notice oxygen until it’s gone. That saying came to mind as I read the results of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’s annual survey of American attitudes on foreign policy, which was released this week. (Full disclosure: I sit on the survey’s advisory committee.) Since taking office, President Donald Trump has sought to translate his America First campaign promises into policy. Yet the Chicago Council’s survey results suggest that rather than rallying to the president’s side, Americans have grown fonder of the foreign policy approach he is trying to upend. The public’s newfound appreciation for the old way of doing business—let’s call it liberal internationalism—can be seen across a broad range of survey questions. Take the question on what role the United States should play in the world, where the numbers favoring an “active” role hit highs not seen since the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks: Or whether the United States should remain committed to NATO, where overall support remains unchanged and the percentage of Americans favoring an increase in the U.S. commitment grew: Or whether Americans benefit from trade, where the numbers also hit all-time highs: Or whether President Trump made the right call in leaving the Paris climate agreement or the Iran nuclear deal, where two in three Americans say no: Or whether it is wiser for the United States to intimidate other countries or entice them, where Americans prefer to be admired rather than feared by a large margin: The perhaps most interesting aspect of the survey is one the Chicago Council doesn’t tout in its report: support for liberal internationalism is up across the political spectrum. When the survey is broken down by partisan self-identification, it turns out that Democrats, Independents, and Republicans all have, to varying degrees, moved away from the positions that President Trump has staked out. (One of the benefits of sitting on the survey’s advisory committee is I get to see the raw survey results.) In all, despite the benefit of holding the presidential bully pulpit, President Trump is losing, not winning, the public debate over America’s role in the world. These findings don’t mean that President Trump will suddenly reverse course on foreign policy. As Ivo Daalder and I argue in our forthcoming book, The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership, he is deeply wedded to his America First views. Like all presidents, he has considerable discretion to act as he sees fit abroad, regardless of what Congress or the public prefers. His unilateral steel and aluminum tariffs are evidence of that. And poll results like the Chicago Council’s will not automatically change the conversation on Capitol Hill. Members of Congress pay more attention to voters with intense preferences than to the average constituent. So while voters hostile to trade are a (shrinking) numerical minority, they command attention because they likely are to punish lawmakers who don’t share their views. Just as important, politicians, much like generals, tend to fight the last war. And the conventional wisdom in Washington, DC, is that 2016 showed that Americans have turned inward, resentful of ungrateful allies and unwilling to shoulder the burdens of global leadership. What the Chicago Council’s survey results do show is that a large majority of Americans continue to understand the importance of U.S. leadership in the world. They want to work with others and understand that the United States has to give in order to get. We’ll see whether any of the contenders for the presidency in 2020 try to mobilize this silent majority in favor of liberal internationalism.

U.S. administration is coming out on the wrong side of anti-corruption and migration in the hemisphere, with potentially lasting consequences for U.S.-Latin American relations.

The U.S. congressional midterm elections are just six weeks away. The good folks over at ChinaUSFocus.com noticed all of the talk about a Democratic win after all the votes are counted on November 6. (Fivethirtyeight.com puts the odds of a Democratic takeover of the House at three in four and of the Senate at one in four as of today.) So they asked me and Ivo Daalder, my co-author on the forthcoming book The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership, how a Democratic victory might change the debate in the United States on trade policy with China. Our answer, which ChinaUSFocus has kindly allowed us to reprint below, is not much. Washington is gearing up for a “blue wave” election on November 6. If polls are right, Democrats will retake the U.S. House of Representatives and possibly the Senate as well. Even if Republicans avoid a sweep, a return to divided government will upend American politics. After two years in the political wilderness, the Democrats will regain an institutional base from which to challenge President Donald Trump on issues ranging from immigration to tax policy to spending priorities. A Democratic victory won’t remake every policy debate, however. One issue likely to see more continuity than change is U.S. policy toward China. Odds are that Trump won’t abandon his get-tough policy with Beijing even in the face of a Republican defeat, and that Democrats will be neither able nor inclined to make him, even as they complain loudly about his tactics. Consider the president first. His hostility to trade agreements and institutions, his belief that China has “raped” the U.S. economy, and his faith in what tariffs can achieve all run deep. He’s convinced that he has Beijing over a barrel because, as he put it in a tweet, “When you’re already $500 Billion DOWN, you can’t lose!” He’s looking to tariffs to turn the trade deficit with China into a surplus, which won’t happen any time soon, if ever. Add to this mix Trump’s instinct to fight rather than fold, and it’s easy to see why he is far more apt to double down than back down in his dealings with China. Some Democrats, seeing the harm his policies are creating in terms of rising prices and lost jobs, might want to challenge Trump. But they know, or will quickly discover, how difficult it is to rein him in. One obstacle is that Congress has no authority to cut deals with foreign powers. Presidents alone decide whom to negotiate with, what the negotiations will cover, and when to reach a deal. Congress can complain about how the White House is answering each of these questions, but it cannot compel presidential action on any of them. True, the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” But over the past seven decades Congress has delegated much of its trade authority to the White House. That delegation didn’t threaten congressional power as long as presidents hesitated to restrict trade. Indeed, Capitol Hill’s traditional complaint was that free-trading presidents refused to use the authority Congress had given them to punish predatory trade policies. Trump has flipped that script on its head. He has interpreted Congress’s often broad and vague delegations of its trade power to maximize his authority to remake U.S. trade policy as he sees fit. That was clearest when he imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports on national security grounds and subsequently threatened to impose duties on imported autos for the same reason. Trump brushed aside both Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s argument that steel and aluminum imports did not jeopardize national defense requirements and the fact that few Americans worry that imported Mercedes and Mazdas endanger their security. Congress can, of course, try to reclaim its trade authority. That, however, requires passing legislation. And that’s the rub. Lawmakers gridlocked by partisanship aren’t likely to come together suddenly on trade policy. Even if Congress could agree on a legislative fix, Trump would almost certainly veto it. Congress has overridden just one foreign-policy related veto over the past three decades. With failure virtually guaranteed from the start, most lawmakers will wisely turn to other legislative endeavors. The difficulty that congressional Democrats would face in compelling Trump to soften his China trade policy is compounded by a political reality: many of them agree with what he is trying to do, if not necessarily how he is doing it. The optimism of the Clinton-Bush years that China would embrace open markets and rule of law has faded on Capitol Hill. Many Democrats, like Trump, see China as pushing unfair trade practices, seeking to coerce and steal trade secrets from American firms, and subsidizing Chinese firms to give them an unfair advantage. Broad congressional support this past summer for expanding the authority of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) attests to genuine Democratic concern about China’s economic intentions. The anger many Democratic voters feel toward U.S. trade policy further diminishes the incentives congressional Democrats have to challenge Trump for being too tough on China. Although such voters are a minority in the party, they wield outsized power because they hold their views so intensely. Bernie Sanders tapped into their anger in 2016 with a trade platform that echoed Trump’s, while Hillary Clinton thought it wise to abandon her previous support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership rather than antagonize them. Democratic trade hawks on Capitol Hill like Senator Sherrod Brown of Ohio have applauded Trump’s tariffs. As a result, Democratic congressional leaders would prefer to prioritize issues such as healthcare that unite their caucus rather than issues like trade that could divide it. The incentives Democrats have to favor a tough line on China won’t necessarily lessen if Trump strikes a deal with China. They might even intensify. Depending on what the agreement stipulates, Democrats could see it as good politics and good policy to attack Trump for failing to deliver the great deal that he has promised. That was how Capitol Hill reacted earlier this spring when rumors circulated that U.S. and Chinese negotiators had brokered a deal to increase Chinese purchases of U.S. products but without addressing the bigger issues of intellectual property and subsidies. Barring a sharp economic downturn that could plausibly be blamed on Trump’s tariffs, institutional and political incentives will push Democrats to target their anger at Trump’s tactics rather than his objectives. Democratic lawmakers will, with good reason, criticize Trump for interpreting his trade authority too broadly, for failing to anticipate how his tariffs would trigger retaliation against U.S. exporters, and for failing to enlist U.S. friends and allies in a joint effort that would be far more effective in pressing China to change its ways. They won’t step in, however, to block Trump from pressuring China. So the blue wave, should it come, may change the tone of the U.S. debate over China trade policy. But it won’t provide an off-ramp for what is shaping up to be a years-long struggle between Washington and Beijing for economic and global supremacy.  As always, you can let me know what you think of our argument by tweeting me at @JamesMLindsay.

Critics are panning the president’s new trade deal with Canada and Mexico as a minor update. They’re wrong—it’s a significant accomplishment.

On his last day in office President Barack Obama left a note on the Resolute desk in the Oval Office for his successor. The note offered congratulations and extolled democratic institutions and values. The note also highlighted the importance and indispensability of American global leadership. “It’s up to us, through action and example,” Obama wrote, “to sustain the international order that’s expanded steadily since the end of the Cold War, and upon which our own wealth and safety depend.” It was heartfelt advice from the outgoing president. But twenty-one months later, it’s clearly not advice Donald Trump has followed. That should not be a surprise. Trump campaigned on the argument that U.S. global leadership wasn’t the solution to what ailed America but the cause. Since taking office, he has been good to his word. He has focused on beating and not leading friends and allies, believing that they free ride on America’s security guarantees and pick its pockets on trade deals. As Ivo Daalder and I argue in our forthcoming book, The Empty Throne: America’s Abdication of Global Leadership, Trump’s America First foreign policy represents a tectonic shift in America’s relations with the world, and one likely to leave the United States confronting a more dangerous and less prosperous future. The question is, how should America’s friends and allies respond to a president motivated by the logic of competition and domination rather than the logic of cooperation and coordination? After all, they have as much to lose, if not more, if the world order the United States created more than seventy years ends up on history’s ash heap. Ivo and I tackle that question in “The Committee to Save the World Order: America’s Allies Must Step Up as America Steps Down,” an article that will appear in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. You don’t have to wait for that issue to hit the newsstand, though. Foreign Affairs posted the article online today. Here’s our argument in nutshell: “Trump’s hostility toward the United States’ own geopolitical invention has shocked many of Washington’s friends and allies. Their early hopes that he might abandon his campaign rhetoric once in office and embrace a more traditional foreign policy have been dashed. As Trump has jettisoned old ways of doing business, allies have worked their way through the initial stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, and depression. In the typical progression, acceptance should come next. But the story does not have to end that way. The major allies of the United States can leverage their collective economic and military might to save the liberal world order. France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the EU in Europe; Australia, Japan, and South Korea in Asia; and Canada in North America are the obvious candidates to supply the leadership that the Trump administration will not. Together, they represent the largest economic power in the world, and their collective military capabilities are surpassed only by those of the United States. This “G-9” should have two imperatives: maintain the rules-based order in the hope that Trump’s successor will reclaim Washington’s global leadership role and lay the groundwork to make it politically possible for that to happen. This holding action will require every member of the G-9 to take on greater global responsibilities. They all are capable of doing so; they need only summon the will.” I encourage you to read the entire piece and let me know what you think by tweeting me at @JamesMLindsay.

With President Trump advocating for deep cuts to U.S. foreign aid, debate has renewed over the role of foreign assistance funds in boosting growth, promoting democracy, and saving lives.

Trump’s address to the UN highlighted his narrow-minded, transactional approach to diplomacy. He may have been speaking at the United Nations, but the emphasis was clearly on the second word—nations—rather than the ties that bind those independent countries.

Trump has revealed himself to be a man resistant to compromise, with few qualms about going it alone when he doesn’t get his way. For the leaders gathering for the UN General Assembly this week, the question hanging in the air is simple: Is that all there is to American diplomacy?

Next week Donald J. Trump returns to the United Nations for the annual opening of the UN General Assembly. While Trump exceeded expectations during his first UN appearance last year, he will face more pushback this time around. The president will encounter a more skeptical global audience, woke to the reality that his administration's diplomacy is all take and no give.

Big obstacles remain but surprise move offers hope.

On August 27, the Financial Times reported that, after President Trump met with Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari at the White House in April, the American president said that he never wanted to meet someone so lifeless again. The Financial Times says it had three sources for the story, but does not identify them. Sahara Reporters, a credible Nigerian diaspora publication based in New York, picked up the story. It went viral in Nigeria. Nigerian social media is already having a field day. Buhari’s health is a major issue in the current presidential campaign now underway, as the national elections in February 2019 draw near. In what was widely seen as a refutation of persistent reports of Buhari’s poor health, he recently publicly walked about 800 meters from one event to another. The opposition to Buhari is applauding the White House for its “frankness,” while supporters of Buhari are indignant that, among other things, their president is insulted after having paid hundreds of millions of dollars to U.S. manufacturers for Super Turcano aircraft. The office of the Nigerian presidency brushed off the comment, casting doubt on its authenticity and calling it “unsubstantiated” and “unverified” and suggesting that “anybody could have planted it.” It should be noted that, unlike the notorious “shithole” comment, President Trump was speaking in private, presumably with no expectations that his off-the-cuff remarks would become public. So, why did somebody (or somebodies) at the White House see fit to share the story with the FT? Who knows? While the comment was allegedly made shortly after Buhari’s visit months ago, it seems to have only just surfaced shortly before Trump’s second meeting with an African head of state, Uhuru Kenyatta. But, that the White House is the venue of personality and other conflicts and is hardly a well-oiled machine is no news. The Nigerian political opposition will use the story to their advantage, while supporters of President Buhari will do their best to dismiss it.   

President Donald Trump will receive President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya in Washington, D.C. today, the second African chief of state to make a bilateral visit since becoming president in 2016. The conversation will reportedly focus on trade and investment—the reason for Kenyatta’s visit to the United States—with specific attention paid to China's increasing involvement in Kenya, and security issues with a focus on Somalia.  The visit is an opportunity for both presidents to burnish their damaged international reputations. In 2012, Kenyatta was charged by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity linked to violence associated with the 2007–8 election cycle (though the charges were dropped in 2014 after alleged witness intimidation). The 2017 national elections in Kenya were “irregular,” to put forward the most favorable of interpretations; the country seemed to be on the brink of serious ethnic conflict, with plenty of blame to be shared by Kenyatta and his long-time rival, Raila Odinga. For his part, President Trump’s rhetoric on Africa has been disastrous, from his infamous “shithole” comments to his recent mischaracterization of land reform and white murders in South Africa. So, too, have his comments on African-Americans, to which many Africans pay attention. U.S. policy, however, has shown remarkable continuity with that of previous administrations.  So, Rose Garden pictures and a press conference will likely boost President Kenyatta’s standing on his home continent and improve President Trump’s African image. There is media speculation that the visit will result in a closer economic relationship between the two countries. Kenya is an important trading partner of the United States, but that aspect of the bilateral relationship is not as salient as the security relationship, which is one of Washington’s most important in Africa. UK Prime Minister Theresa May is also looking for an expanded economic relationship with Kenya. She will visit Nairobi and meet with Kenyatta later this week as part of a swing around Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. According to British media, she is looking for enhanced British export possibilities in the aftermath of Brexit. Kenyatta’s rehabilitation of himself would appear to have been a success in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, it should be noted that Kenya is heavily indebted to China, which owns more than seventy percent of its debt and is involved in many large infrastructure projects. This would seem to limit Kenya’s capacity to buy more goods and services from the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, after his meeting with May, Kenyatta is travelling to Beijing for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, which has occurred in varying forms every three years since 2000, and over which President Xi Jinping will preside.