Sanctions

Buttressed by input from scholars, diplomats, and observers with an intimate knowledge of U.S. foreign policy, Honey and Vinegar examines "engagement"—strategies that primarily involve the use of positive incentives. The book contends that although engagement has received little scrutiny relative to other, more punitive foreign policy approaches, it has great potential as a tool for modifying the behavior of regimes with which the United States has significant disagreements. Heightened awareness of the costs associated with the use of sanctions or military force has catalyzed a search for policy alternatives. Contributors to this volume have provided seven cases exploring episodes of engagement: relations between the United States and China; Europe's "Critical Dialogue" with Iran; U.S. engagement with Iraq from 1988 to 1990; U.S. efforts to engage North Korea; the combination of U.S. persuasion and coercion toward South Africa in the apartheid era; the lessons of U.S.-Soviet detente; and the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. In addition to contemplating the historical record, the book is forward looking, discussing ways in which incentives might be better introduced as the United States seeks continued or new relations with a variety of problem countries including China, Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Russia, and Syria. While the editors are careful to point out the difficulties of managing strategies of engagement, they nevertheless conclude that incentives should be accorded consideration equal to the more conventional punitive options of sanctions and military force.

The Korean peninsula remains one of the world’s most dangerous places. While North Korea has an army of 1.2 million troops and holds Seoul hostage with its missiles and artillery, Pyongyang is in desperate straits after a decade of economic decline, food shortages, and diplomatic isolation. In 1998, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry traveled to Pyongyang to propose increasing outside aid from the United States, South Korea, and Japan in exchange for North Korea’s promise to reduce military provocations. The third in a series of influential Task Force reports on Korea policy, this study argues that, in spite of tensions, the United States should continue to support South Korea’s engagement policy and keep Perry’s proposal on the table. The Task Force recommends that, should North Korea increase tensions by testing long-range missiles, the United States and its allies should take a new approach to Pyongyang, including enhancing U.S.-Japan and South Korean deterrence against other North Korean threats, suspending new South Korean investment in North Korea, and placing new Japanese restrictions on financial transfers to the North. By suggesting the possibility of gradually reducing the danger on the Korean peninsula, this report represents a crucial addition to the discussion of U.S.-North Korean economic relations.

Read an excerpt of Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy. "Sanctions don't work" is an often-heard refrain. The reality, though, is more complex. Sanctions—mostly economic but also political and military penalties aimed at states or other entities to alter political and/or military behavior—almost always have consequences, sometimes desirable, at other times unwanted and unexpected. What cannot be disputed, though, is that economic sanctions are fast becoming the policy tool of choice for the United States in the post-Cold War world. Indeed, economic sanctions are increasingly at the center of American foreign policy as a policy tool to resolve several issues: to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, discourage aggression, protect the environment, or thwart drug trafficking. Drawing heavily on eight case studies—Iraq, Iran, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Pakistan, China, Libya, and Cuba—this book presents lessons to be learned from recent American use of economic sanctions. It also provides specific guidelines designed to shape future decisions by Congress and the executive branch. A Council on Foreign Relations Book