• Regional Organizations
    John Kerry’s Visit to Jakarta
    At the end of his current trip to Asia, Secretary of State John Kerry will be stopping in Jakarta and meeting with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretary-General Le Luong Minh. Although his visit in Jakarta will be short, Kerry will undoubtedly emphasize the same themes he is hitting throughout the visit, including pushing to restart talks on North Korea’s nuclear program and prodding China to work more seriously with Southeast Asian nations on a real code of conduct for the South China Sea. Matthew Lee of the Associated Press, traveling with Kerry, has a thorough summary of the trip’s agenda here. At the ASEAN Secretariat, Kerry surely will find a welcoming audience for a speech about a South China Sea code of conduct; although he has thus far taken pains to play the role of regional statesman, ASEAN’s Secretary General does hail from Vietnam, one of the two Southeast Asian nations most involved in disputing areas of the Sea with China. Still, it is hard to see what Kerry can say about a code of conduct that would be new in any way, or that would exert more pressure on Beijing than other strategies tried by the administration. Indeed, Kerry might eventually have better luck getting Kim Jong Un to make a deal on his nuclear program than on getting Beijing to agree to a real and binding code of conduct. (The Secretary also will sign two Memorandums of Understanding with Indonesia’s Foreign Minister. These will deal with more modest issues like working together to help other developing countries improve their human rights records.) Despite the short amount of time Kerry is spending in Jakarta, and the focus on ASEAN and regional issues, it would be valuable for him to dip his toe, slightly, into domestic Indonesian politics. He should meet with Jakarta governor Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, who is almost sure to be the next president of Indonesia, and who provides an excellent counter-example to failing democracy in Thailand and Cambodia and Malaysia—an accountable, successful, and democratically elected Southeast Asian leader. [
  • Human Rights
    The EU’s Mrs. Ashton and the Invisible Jews
    It’s becoming a habit. The EU’s "foreign minister," High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton, cannot seem to see Jews or anti-Semitism or to pronounce the word "Jew." In 2012 a terrorist murdered three Jewish children at a Jewish day school in Toulouse, France. Mrs. Ashton issued a statement saying that "When we think of what happened in Toulouse today, when we remember what happened in Norway a year ago, when we know what is happening in Syria, when we see what is happening in Gaza and Sderot and in different parts of the world, we remember young people and children who lose their lives." It was beyond her to acknowledge what had just happened: the murder of Jewish children in Europe for the crime of being Jewish. She has, amazingly enough, just done it again. Her statement this week on the occasion of International Holocaust Remembrance Day did not mention Jews. That’s worth repeating: she puts out a statement to honor Holocaust Remembrance Day that does not mention Jews-- thereby advancing the project of forgetting the Holocaust and robbing it of meaning. She said this: Today the international community remembers the victims of the Holocaust. We honor every one of those brutally murdered in the darkest period of European history. We also want to pay a special tribute to all those who acted with courage and sacrifice to protect their fellow citizens against persecution. On Holocaust Remembrance Day, we must keep alive the memory of this tragedy. It is an occasion to remind us all of the need to continue fighting prejudice and racism in our own time. We must remain vigilant against the dangers of hate speech and redouble our commitment to prevent any form of intolerance. The respect of human rights and diversity lies at the heart of what the European Union stands for. But if her statements are taken as evidence, the European Union "stands for" erasing the history and the reality of hatred of Jews in Europe. This is shameful, and it remains to be seen if one EU member state objects and demands that she stop making Jews invisible. For Jews in Europe, her conduct can only affirm that she is blind and deaf to the lessons of history-- especially the history of Jews in Europe.      
  • China
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of January 17, 2014
    Darcie Draudt, Charles McClean, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. Explosions hit protestors in Bangkok. Two explosions hit anti-government protestors in Bangkok, Thailand on January 17, wounding more than two dozen people. Some reports claim the explosion was the result of an explosive device, such as a grenade. Since Monday, protestors have taken to the streets in opposition to the nation’s political system, which they demand be overhauled along with the resignation of Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra, whom they accuse of corruption. The protests, which have gathered around seven main intersection in Bangkok, started with 170,000 protestors on Monday and dropped to 60,000 people on Tuesday. By Friday, only 12,000 protesters were still on the streets. Though generally peaceful, the protest has been marred by small incidences of violence between the protesters and police during this week’s demonstration. 2. Buddhist mob allegedly kills Muslims in Burma. Buddhist mobs allegedly attacked members of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine state earlier this week, killing up to sixty people, after the disappearance of a policeman at a Rohingya village. Human rights groups report that security forces joined in the attack. Rakhine state officials denied that anyone was killed, but said that eighty-four Rohingya villagers were arrested. The United States has expressed “deep concern” about the reports and urged the government to investigate. At least 237 people have been killed and 140,000 displaced in the religious violence in the country since June 2012. Most of the victims have been Muslim Rohingya, who are denied citizenship and have less access to health care and education than Buddhists in the country. The Burmese government also uses the term “Bengali” to refer to the Rohingya, claiming that many are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, though many have lived in Myanmar for centuries. The violence takes place as Burma begins its chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As many as 230,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh, and thousands more live in refugee camps in Thailand. 3. U.S. Navy Realigns Carrier Fleet in Japan. On Tuesday, the U.S. Navy announced that the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ronald Reagan will replace the U.S.S. George Washington and become part of the U.S. 7th Fleet of forward-deployed naval forces stationed in Yokosuka, Japan. A specific timeline for the move has yet to be announced, but the Navy said in a press release that “The security environment in the Indo-Asia-Pacific requires that the U.S. Navy station the most capable ships forward. This posture allows the most rapid response times possible for maritime and joint forces, and brings our most capable ships with the greatest amount of striking power and operational capability to bear in the timeliest manner.” The Reagan is well known in Japan for assisting in Operation Tomodachi relief efforts after the March 11 triple disasters struck in 2011, but there are also local concerns about its use of nuclear power. The Washington became the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be sent to Japan as part of the 7th Fleet when it replaced the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in 2008. 4. Lunar New Year in China leads to holiday travel rush. China’s most important holiday, the Lunar New Year, has begun, and government officials estimate that Chinese people will travel by air, road, and railway 3.62 billion times over a forty-day period. The holiday officially only lasts a week, from January 31 to February 6 this year, but for many this is the only opportunity to return home for family gatherings. Travel delays are not the only concern however, as China is revealing a steadily increasing number of H7N9 bird flu cases. Health experts fear that the disease may be spreading, particularly as millions of Chinese will be traveling in the coming weeks. Fourteen new cases were announced this week alone. 5. Activists send balloons with information about the outside world into North Korea. Activists in South Korea, including some North Korean defectors, sent helium-filled balloons stuffed with propaganda materials into North Korea this week, including leaflets on human rights abuses, U.S. dollar bills, and small USB drives loaded with the Korean-language Wikipedia. North Korea has previously threatened to bomb South Korea in response to these actions and released an official statement saying that the launch is reminiscent of a “puppy knowing no fear of a tiger.” Seoul insists it has nothing to do with the launches, which have occurred often in the past. Thor Halvorssen, president of the U.S.-based Human Rights Foundation, participated in the balloon launch and wrote a detailed review of the experience. Bonus: Impressive business card in hand, Chinese billionaire offers to buy New York Times. This past week, news of Chinese recycling magnate Chen Guangbiao’s boastful business card has rivaled coverage of his offer to buy the New York Times, an offer which was rejected on Tuesday. Including such monikers as “Most Influential Person of China,” “Most Well-known and Beloved Chinese Role Model,” and “Most Charismatic Philanthropist of China,” the now-infamous business card is not the only thing working against Chen’s proposal to buy the American newspaper. He claimed to come to New York to purchase foreign media assets, and his capability to run the American newspaper is bolstered because he is “very good at working with Jews.” Business cards with the owner’s photographed visage or such bombastic titling is not uncommon in Chinese culture, but is also considered showy.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Djotodia Goes But Chaos in the Central African Republic Remains
    This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. Michel Djotodia’s long held political aspirations came to an ignominious end last week when he resigned as the Central African Republic’s (CAR) chief of state and went into exile in Benin. Prime Minister Nicolas Tiengaye also stepped down. The 135 members of the Transitional National Council (TNC), many of whom were appointed by Djotodia, were flown to the Chadian capital N’Djamena to attend a summit of the leaders of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The Central African Constitutional Court and ECCAS have charged the TNC with selecting the new leadership of the CAR. They have fifteen days. Whoever is selected as interim president will be ineligible to run in the next elections. Alexandre Ferdinand Nguendet, the head of the TNC, is expected to be among those who put their names forward. Full elections are to be held by February 2015. There were celebrations in the capital Bangui on the announcement of Djotodia’s resignation. Their rapid degeneration into violence and score settling, however, highlights that little has changed. While the TNC deliberates, the majority of Central Africans continue to struggle with the consequences of government failure. Violence, chaos, poverty, and disease are rife. Nearly one million people have been displaced by the current round of fighting, over two million (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance, and over one thousand have been killed. Ex-Seleka (“Alliance”) and rival anti-balaka (“anti-machete”) militias, as well as local vigilantes scour the country. A tent city has sprung up in the shadow of the camp for the France’s 1,600 peacekeeping troops outside Bangui as residents flee continued violence. The camp grew more than five-fold from mid-December and currently shelters over 100,000 people. Others are disbursed throughout the country, fearful of returning home. Doctors Without Borders says hygiene is a “disaster” and “epidemics of all sorts” are highly likely. Nguendet’s recent statement that “the anarchy [is] over” is false. Whatever the culmination of the current discussions within the TNC, any successor government will be hard pressed to reverse the state failure. While politicians, and even some militia leaders, appear to be fully engaged in wrangling for their own power, the CAR continues to implode. David Smith, a regional expert, suggested in South Africa’s Daily Maverick that a UN transitional administration, such as was set up in Kosovo, might be the best option to ensure long term national stability and reconciliation in contrast to another short term political stop-gap. With the growing concern of a potential repeat of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the international community and the African Union should give serious consideration to Smith’s suggestion. In addition to Kosovo, Namibia is a successful African precedent for a UN transitional administration during its transition from South African rule to full independence in 1990.
  • Middle East and North Africa
    Protests About Palestinians
    There were protests this week about some construction notices issued by the Government of Israel. In tandem with the release of murderers from Israeli prisons--something the United States has indefensibly pushed--the Netanyahu government has sought to appease complaints within Israel by announcing new construction in settlements. Mind you, whether the construction will actually take place, or when, is unclear; the protests come nevertheless. The New York Times reported that Palestinian leaders threatened that any new settlement activity could lead them to seek membership and sue Israel in the International Criminal Court, a move they had promised not to take during peace talks that started this summer. European diplomats warned the Israelis in a series of high-level meetings over the past week against pairing the prisoner release with a construction announcement, as was done twice before. The Jerusalem Post reported that The European Union will strongly object to any new announcements of Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank, a senior EU diplomat told Channel 10....The unnamed diplomat said "there will be very little understanding from the European governments" if Israel plans to announce further construction beyond the Green Line next week following the release of a third group of Palestinian security prisoners. "Israel needs expect a harsh reaction from the European governments if it intends to go in that direction," the official said. What makes these threats and protests noteworthy is the context. For the Daily Star of Beirut reported this today: At least 15 Palestinians have died of hunger since September in a besieged refugee camp in the Syrian capital Damascus, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees told AFP on Monday. "Reports have come in over the weekend that at least five Palestinian refugees in the besieged refugee camp of Yarmuk in Damascus have died because of malnutrition, bringing the total number of reported cases to 15," UN Relief and Works Agency spokesman Chris Gunness told AFP. He warned of a deteriorating situation in the camp, where some 20,000 Palestinians are trapped, with limited food and medical supplies. No threats from the EU about this. No reports of a "harsh reaction." No "series of high level meetings." Israel announces plans for constructing homes and the threat to Palestinians gets the EU into high gear. In Syria, Palestinians starve to death and no one at "high levels" in Europe appears to notice. This is not "new news," of course; it has long been obvious that most of the tears about the suffering of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are crocodile tears. But the events this week certainly drive the point home: more attention is paid, more protests are lodged, when Israel issues a press release than when Syria starves Palestinians to death.  
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Presidents Obasanjo and Jonathan on the State of Nigeria
    On December 2, former president Obasanjo sent a letter to President Goodluck Jonathan cataloguing the shortcomings of the latter’s administration. Eighteen pages in length, it is a thoroughgoing indictment of the Jonathan administration, cataloging shortcomings ranging from security to corruption to the president’s leadership of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Altogether, President Obasanjo’s letter is a familiar critique of Nigerian governance under Jonathan, if perhaps more bluntly stated than is usual in public among Nigeria’s establishment. Though ostensibly private, the letter soon appeared in the media, and it looks as though it was Obasanjo’s intention that it should eventually become public. In a letter dated December 20 that appeared in the media on December 22, President Jonathan, has replied. While President Jonathan says that because of the press of business, he cannot provide a point-by-point response, his reply is lengthy and detailed. His bottom line: “…you have done me grave injustice with your public letter in which you wrongfully accused me of deceit, deception, dishonesty, incompetence, clannishness, divisiveness, and insincerity, amongst other ills.” The two letters, read together, constitute a debate on the state of Nigeria. There are very few points of agreement between the two. Jonathan flatly denies some of Obasanjo’s most pointed accusations, e.g., that the sitting president has developed a “security watch list” with a thousand names on it. Jonathan notes that Obasanjo’s claim that almost U.S.$50 billion in oil revenue is unaccounted for is “spurious,” and based on a letter from the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria Lamido Sanusi that (per Jonathan) its author now says is “misconstrued.” Jonathan also claims that many of Nigeria’s problems began before he entered office: he dates Boko Haram from 2002 and the first major kidnapping for ransom in 2006. Jonathan lists what he sees as his security achievements in the northeast: the re-organization of the security forces, a “carrot and stick” approach to Boko Haram that leaves the door open for negotiation, and even the establishment of numerous new universities in the North to address the education deficit. As for the troubles within the ruling Peoples Democratic Party, Jonathan says they are largely the result of the run-up to the 2015 elections, and that they have been fomented by politicians pursuing their own agendas--including Obasanjo. A point-by-point analysis of these letters, with their accusations and refutations, is far beyond a blog post. In the short term, it is clear that the break between Obasanjo and Jonathan is profound. It is also evident that the superficial unity among Nigeria’s hitherto competing but also cooperating elites is gone. The political structures of post-1999, when civilian government was constituted, will need to be rebuilt. That will be a challenge. According to the Nigerian press, the new, big opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), is putting out feelers to Obasanjo. In response, Nobel Laureate Wole Soynka on December 22 warned, “Shipwreck Ahead.” Soyinka quotes Lagos state powerbroker and a leader of the APC Bola Tinubu as saying that the APC had resolved to rescue Nigeria, appealing to Obasanjo to lead the mission: “We’re resolved and determined to rescue Nigeria. We want you as navigator.” Soyinka, long a bitter critic of Obasanjo and the Nigerian political establishment, added, “If [Tinubu’s] attribution is correct, may I urge you, as an urgent public service, to advise families to begin the stockpiling of life-belts for the guaranteed crash. Don’t forget to alert the coastguards—ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African states), AU (African Union), UNO (United Nations Organization) etc. to be on the alert for possible salvage operations.”
  • India
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of December 13, 2013
    Darcie Draudt, Will Piekos, and Sharone Tobias look at the top stories in Asia this week. 1. North Korea announces execution of top official. The Korean Central News Agency announced yesterday the execution of Jang Song-taek, a top North Korean official and uncle of leader Kim Jong-un. The announcement follows Jang’s highly publicized arrest, which was unprecedented in North Korea; at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party, Jang was charged with “anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts” against the “unity and cohesion of the party.” The execution and associated purge may indicate Kim Jong-un has consolidated power among upper party cadres. Some analysts believe the removal of Jang will have deleterious effects on Sino-North Korean relations, as Jang was considered to have been a proponent of economic reforms and sought business with China. 2. India’s Supreme Court reverses a lower court ruling, recriminalizes homosexual acts. India’s Supreme Court reversed a 2009 ruling of the Delhi high court that decriminalized gay sex, saying that only parliament should be able to change the law. The court upheld the validity of a British colonial-era law that sentenced anyone acting upon “carnal sex against the order of nature” to life in jail. Though prosecutions under the old law, Section 377 of the Indian penal code, were very rare, the law was often used by police to harass gays and lesbians. Some religious groups welcomed the court’s decision, but many politicians and Indian newspapers condemned the ruling. 3. Trial of a former prime minister further raises tensions in Thailand. Former Thai prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva was charged on Thursday with premeditated murder connected to a military crackdown on protesters in 2010. The charges against Abhisit, who is now the head of the Democrat Party, relate to a crackdown on “red shirt” supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra in the spring of 2010. Thaksin, himself a former prime minister brought down in a 2006 coup, is the brother of the current prime minister, Yingluck Shinawatra. The Democrat Party announced this week that it was resigning its seats in parliament and joining protests in Bangkok against the government. Abhisit was granted bail and will return to court in March 2014. 4. Bangladesh executes opposition leader, protests erupt. At least five people have died in protests following the execution of sixty-five-year-old opposition leader Abdul Qader Mollah, the former leader of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party. He was hanged on Thursday after the Supreme Court rejected his appeal for a review of his death sentence. Abdul Qader Mollah was the first of five Islamist leaders to be executed; they have all been sentenced to death by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal for crimes committed during the country’s war of independence in 1971. Jamaat protestors proceeded to torch businesses and cars, blockade roads, and attack ruling party supporters. Though many secular activists support the trials, the opposition claims that the tribunal exists to eliminate its leaders and weaken Jamaat before January 5 elections. 5. Abe seeks closer ties with ASEAN at Tokyo summit. In his latest effort to court Southeast Asia, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe will meet with top national leaders from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Tokyo from December 13 to 15; he will be trying to garner support from Southeast Asia in the face of China’s declaration of a new air defense identification zone that overlaps areas claimed by Japan and South Korea. China and Japan are both seeking sway in Southeast Asia, motivated by interest in trade and investment partners as well as territory and security concerns. Since taking office in late 2012, Prime Minister Abe has visited all ten ASEAN nations, making him the first Japanese prime minister to do so while in office. Bonus: New research indicates Terracotta Warriors were inspired by Greek art. Newly translated ancient records suggest that the thousands of life-size statues buried in the mausoleum of Qin Shi Huangdi, the first emperor of a unified China in 221 BC, were the result of early contact between Greece and China. The study, done by Lukas Nickel, a reader with the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London, indicates that the First Emperor was impressed by twelve giant statues from the West, likely created and influenced by Alexander the Great’s campaigns. They were then duplicated in front of his palace and eventually inspired his Terracotta Army.
  • Regional Organizations
    Latin America Charts Its Own Course: Reflections on the Mexico City CoC Meeting
    For more than two centuries the United States has loomed—for good and ill—over its southern neighbors. But that longstanding hegemonic role is fading. After two decades of robust growth and democratic consolidation, Latin America is increasingly charting its own course, not only in the hemisphere but, increasingly, around the globe. The diverse and dynamic region below the Rio Grande may still be America’s “backyard”, but it’s no backwater. And it’s evident that the United States is only beginning to adjust to these realities. This was the clear message of the fourth regional conference of the Council of Councils, titled “The Future of the Americas in Global Governance,” which was convened in Mexico City on November 24-26. Co-hosted by the Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI) and Brazil’s Gitulio Vargas Foundation (FGV), the meeting united the CoC’s global network of think tanks and the parallel Hemispheric Councils of International Relations. Two questions guided our agenda and deliberations: What is the state of regional integration in the hemisphere? And how can Latin America contribute to global governance? Our discussions—in the grand confines of the Mexican Foreign Ministry—included keynote addresses from José Miguel Insulza, the director-general of the Organization of American States (OAS), and José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. The panel sessions focused on five issues: whether a “Latin American” region actually exists; how regional and global trade initiatives should relate to one another; what role Latin America can play in the Group of Twenty (G20); whether it is time for new approaches to combat drug trafficking and criminal violence; and how the Americas should respond to the revolution in global energy markets. In the coming days, we’ll describe these deliberations in a comprehensive meeting report. In the meantime, I’ll try to summarize the most compelling take-aways:                           Latin America exists, but in various guises: The conversations in Mexico City revealed a common “Latin American” identity but also the limits of that unity. To be sure, the countries of the region have broadly shared economic and other interests, but their political values often diverge, as evinced by frictions between Venezuela and other members of the Bolivarian Alliance and more conservative states like Colombia or Peru. A major point of contention remains the limits of national sovereignty, particularly when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights norms. Coherent regional policies are also complicated by the proliferation of competing frameworks of cooperation. As in Asia, Latin America is awash in regional and sub-regional institutions. These sometimes overlapping bodies include the OAS (of which the United States and Canada are members), the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (of which which they are not), the Pacific Alliance, Mercosur, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA)—to name just a few. While such diversity has advantages, it also suggests a politically fragmented region, in which institutions are weak by design. Latin America’s coherence—and future—will depend on relations between Brazil and Mexico: As the continent’s only Lusophone country, Brazil has long been ambivalent about its status as a “Latin American” country. That is slowly changing, as it emerges as (by far) the most powerful nation in South America . Brazil’s challenge is to balance its natural leadership role in the region with its growing global ambitions. Meanwhile, north of the isthmus, the center of gravity focuses increasingly on Mexico, which has recently enjoyed impressive growth of its own. Today, Brazil and Mexico account for some 60 percent of Latin America’s total GDP. Yet, while the two countries are linked by growing commercial and cultural ties, their diplomatic relations remain underdeveloped—correct but distant. Unless these two giants develop a more sophisticated strategic partnership, it will be difficult for Latin America, per se, to develop a coherent, independent international voice, underpinned by robust institutions. Preferential trade agreements present both opportunity and risk: The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) suggest a world that has given up on global multilateral trade “rounds” through the WTO and instead moved toward the more easily grasped benefits of “plurilateral” trade liberalization. The response in Latin America has varied by country. Most governments have moved to open their economies and pursued preferential trade agreements, with the Pacific Alliance nations of Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile at the forefront. Others, including the ALBA nations, are clinging to more defensive, protectionist policies that show little promise. The risk is that a “two-speed” Latin America may emerge, with more closed economies left behind. There is also a danger that Latin American countries will be pulled in one of two directions—across the Pacific, to take advantage of trade with Asia—or across the Atlantic—to exploit openings with Europe. More generally, all participants stressed that TPP, TTIP, and other such arrangements must remain open, in principle, to Latin American economies (including Brazil) that are currently excluded. Latin America is determined to seek new approaches to drugs and crime: In Carl Sandburg’s epic poem The People, Yes, a little girl watching soldiers march in a parade muses, “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.” Governments and opinion-makers across Latin America are increasingly adopting that very attitude toward Washington’s bankrupt, forty-year old “war on drugs.” In 2012, at the request of its member states, the OAS produced a groundbreaking report, The Drug Problem in the Americas. It documented, in meticulous detail, the devastating impact that current supply side approaches to combating the illegal drug trade have had in both producer and transit countries, generating—among other things—horrific levels of violence in Mexico and Central America. The report—and the conversations in Mexico City—revealed a growing appetite among Latin American countries for alternative approaches to crop eradication and interdiction. From Guatemala to Colombia to Uruguay, sitting political leaders are, for the first time, considering alternatives to criminalization and prohibition—mirroring experimentation occurring among some states in the United States itself. Conference participants agreed that the time had come to take a public health approach to the drug problem and focus more on harm reduction—including lowering levels of violence in the most affected nations. (By coincidence, today the United States celebrates the 80th anniversary of the 21st Amendment, which repealed Prohibition. We might consider the lesssons of that failed policy in the context of the ongoing drug war). The United States lacks a strategic approach to the Western Hemisphere: Repeatedly, participants complained of the drift that seemed to characterize Washington’s policy towards Latin America. The Obama administration appears to operating by the seat of its pants, they noted, rather than developing a coherent, strategic approach to its southern neighbors. Washington’s clear preferences are to deal with individual nations on a bilateral, case-by-case basis; to ignore troublemakers like Venezuela and other ALBA members in hopes their influence will fade; and to work behind the scenes to extinguish fires like the diplomatic fallout from the Snowden affair, which have alienated many Latin American leaders, not least Brazilian president Dilma Roussef. The conferees in Mexico City had searched in vain, they said, to find a more positive U.S. agenda for the hemisphere—including on the vexing issue of migration.  
  • Regional Organizations
    Wherefore Art Thou ASEAN? Typhoon Haiyan’s Teachable Moment
    Below is a guest post by Jeffrey Wright, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program. On November 8, Typhoon Haiyan blasted through the heart of the Philippines, leaving thousands dead and the country’s midsection flattened. One of the most powerful storms in recorded history, Haiyan carved a path of destruction reminiscent of the Asian tsunami in 2004 that demolished Indonesia’s Aceh province and other coastal areas in the Bay of Bengal. Similar to that disaster, the poorest citizens bore the brunt of calamity in the archipelago, their matchstick homes and enterprises reduced to rubble. Natural disasters are revealing phenomena, and Typhoon Haiyan is no exception. The damage they inflict often unveils systemic domestic problems, especially in poor countries. In the Philippines, a lack of storm protection facilities and decrepit infrastructure on the islands of Leyte and Samar not only exacerbated the devastation and loss of life but now reminds people that entrenched corruption in Manila continues to exact an unsettling toll. Disasters also reveal the capacities of actors to respond effectively. In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, it is clear that the region’s most prominent organization possesses no such resilience. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) carries a mandate to respond “to all forms of [security] threats.” But it lacks the political will and resources to fulfill its Charter obligations. Indeed, ASEAN’s role in the Philippines has been limited to basic information-sharing functions. Prior to Haiyan making landfall, the Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance—ASEAN’s disaster management unit—monitored the storm’s movements and deployed logistics personnel to Manila and Tacloban to help coordinate relief efforts with national authorities. Now in the typhoon’s aftermath, ASEAN lies in the shadows altogether, wielding neither the power nor funds to play a substantial part in the humanitarian response. In the absence of a strong ASEAN, the Philippine recovery is simply more fragile and harder to execute, relying on a range of actors to fill the void. The leading international organization in the relief effort is the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but OCHA is heavily constrained by having to raise voluntary contributions from member states for every crisis it tackles. Meanwhile, individual countries have pledged extensive aid, with a recognizable cast of donors topping the list, including Australia, Britain, Japan, and the United States. Yet depending on the generosity of foreign governments does not seem a sustainable (nor politically astute) approach to disaster management. Not only do climate scientists predict storms to strike Southeast Asia and elsewhere with increasing frequency and severity—foreshadowing the limits of future aid—but sadly geopolitics have been a factor in decisions to extend humanitarian assistance (read: China’s embarrassingly paltry initial pledge of $100,000). It goes without saying that the politics of help have no place in times of crisis. More importantly, Typhoon Haiyan raises larger questions about the state of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. What is the role of ASEAN in providing regional security, and what is ASEAN’s place in the broader architecture of Asian security? How does ASEAN best leverage the competencies of its partners and allies? Can the organization improve its capacity to respond to emerging threats, including national disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan and the risk of infectious disease in its aftermath? How can states close the development gap in the region? These and other queries were the subject of an enlightening workshop held in Jakarta this past June on “Rising Regionalism: Trends in Southeast and (Wider) Asia.” Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, the workshop convened scholars from the United States, Indonesia, and Singapore to discuss future directions in Southeast Asia. A summary report appears online, but here are a few highlights: ASEAN’s effectiveness suffers at the hands of a weak secretariat and consensus decision-making: The regional organization has lofty ambitions for deepening integration in Southeast Asia, aiming to complete the single market by 2015. Though achieving this goal and making progress in other areas of the ASEAN Community, namely the political-security and socio-cultural pillars, will prove extraordinarily difficult without moving toward some form of majority voting and empowering the secretariat with greater resources. A changing strategic environment threatens the integrity of ASEAN’s centrality: As China continues to amass strength and the United States rebalances toward Asia, ASEAN must promote unity from within its ranks if it intends to manage dynamism in the region. The juxtaposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—two overlapping regional free trade agreements—may threaten the integrity of ASEAN, particularly if the TPP is able to grow its membership with Southeast Asian nations. Consolidating the ASEAN Economic Community will represent an important step to navigating the future of regional trade. ASEAN has responded to public health threats with national strategies at the expense of regional approaches: Since the global SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak in 2003, public health regulators around the world have focused on improving the capacities of governments to respond to emerging threats, such as novel coronaviruses, pandemic influenza, and non-communicable diseases. But in Southeast Asia, countries have concentrated efforts on national rather than multilateral solutions, undermining regional security. ASEAN should use its extensive intergovernmental forums to identify regional health deficiencies as a prelude to further cooperation. In conclusion, it bears mentioning that there are historical reasons for ASEAN’s institutional weaknesses. Borne out of Southeast Asia’s colonial past, norms of sovereignty and noninterference are inviolable pillars of foreign policy in the region. These principles are unlikely to diminish anytime soon. Nevertheless, ASEAN cannot afford to remain sidelined as both cooperation and conflict take shape in Southeast Asia and the broader region. It would risk tarnishing its credibility and backsliding on much of the progress made during its near fifty-year history.
  • Iran
    Weekend Reading: The GCC and Iran,The Tale of Two Generals, and Deserts...The Final Frontier
    Marwan Kabalan says that GCC countries will need to rely on their own power to ward off Iranian influence. The European Space Agency posts photos of Middle Eastern deserts from space. Nervana gives the “tale of two generals”—and why not just any military officer enjoys Egyptian public support.
  • Regional Organizations
    Start Spreading the News: Can Cities Govern the World?
    Benjamin Barber doesn’t just love cities. He’s convinced they hold the secret to effective, democratic global governance. As nation-states and international institutions flail in addressing transnational issues, today’s dynamic urban centers are poised to fill the breach. Such is the message of Barber’s lively and provocative new book, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities. He overstates his case, but his arguments are original and thought-provoking. As Barber sees it, nation-states will never rise to the cross-border challenges posed by interdependence. They’re too consumed with sovereign prerogatives, too preoccupied with national interests, to make the necessary compromises to mitigate climate change, arrest nuclear proliferation, or redress appalling global inequalities. Nor should we put much stock in international organizations, like the United Nations and the World Bank, that Barber regards as fatally outdated, functionally sclerotic, and fundamentally undemocratic. Fortunately, there’s another political entity that he says can fill this leadership vacuum—the vibrant city. Urbanity now defines humanity. In 2009, for the first time in history, more than half of Earth’s inhabitants lived in cities. By 2050, that figure will surge to 75 percent, given massive rural-to-urban migration in the developing world. Cities, Barber reminds us, are so much more than chaotic agglomerations of bodies and buildings. They are the pulsing heart of innovation, the motor of economic growth, the epicenter of arts and culture, and the laboratory for practical, participatory governance. It’s no accident that mayors, alone among public officials, enjoy consistently high approval ratings. They’re too busy focusing on delivering daily services like trash collection and safe streets, on solving problems like traffic congestion and poor school performance, to waste their constituents’ time with partisan posturing and destructive demagoguery. Mayors are a diverse lot—as Barber shows in eleven short, but colorful profiles of prominent civic leaders like Michael Bloomberg of New York, Boris Johnson of London, Antanas Mockus of Bogotá, and Sheila Dikshit of Delhi. But they share something in common: a pragmatic streak coupled with reformist zeal. Simply put, they get things done. And because they live among their constituents, they are far more responsive to voters’ needs than politicians in capitals. This combination of civic idealism and practical problem-solving are the missing ingredients for inclusive and effective global governance. But the problem is how to leverage the blessings of urbanism? The solution, Barber argues, is to create a transnational network of cities. This isn’t as far-fetched as it sounds. During the middle ages, he reminds, cities often made common cause, banding together in associations like the Hanseatic or Lombard Leagues. And they are doing the same thing today, under the radar screen, by joining networks like the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) or the organization Metropolis­­—“a global hive of intercity associations,” based in Barcelona. Such networks allow cities to share best practices on common challenges, whether reducing gun violence, improving early education, or instituting bike-share programs. Most intriguingly, cities are turning their attention to issues that are both local and global. The premier example of such “glocality” may be the C-40 Cities Climate Leadership Group. Established in 2005 and now boasting fifty-eight “global cities”, this coalition seeks “meaningful and sustainable climate-related actions locally that will help address climate change globally.” Indeed, concrete commitments by the G40 coalition were among the few tangible results of the disappointing2012 “Rio plus 20” UN Conference on Sustainable Development. The gathering showed what can happen when mayors leapfrog the dysfunctional state system that has dominated world politics for too long. Barber’s vision is to expand, elevate, and formalize these existing patterns of inter-urban cooperation, with the ultimate goal of creating “a global parliament of mayors—call it a World Assembly of Cities.” This would be a loosely confederal arrangement, in which cities would cooperate on an entirely voluntary basis, without coercive authority or binding legal obligations. To ensure balanced global representation, such an assembly could reserve seats in three tranches apportioned on the basis of urban size (megacities above 10 million, cities from 500,000 to 10 million, and smaller cities between 50,000 and 500,000). Initially, the assembly would meet three times a year, and membership would rotate, to accommodate all the world’s many cities, with composition chosen by lot. Most importantly, any commitments made within this parliament would be consensual. Cities would be at liberty to “opt into” or “opt out of” specific initiatives. Barber reckons that placing global governance in the hands of cities would not only make it more effective, but also more democratic—for cities are, in his view, the natural incubators of democracy. Such an evolution in global political organization would bring the story of democracy full circle. Just as democratic governance began in the ancient Athenian polis, it will find its global expression today in a global network of metropolises—urban nodes linked together by synapses both formal and informal. There is an whiff of urban boosterism in all of this, though Barber seeks to preempt a number of obvious critiques. Yes, he allows, many cities are crippled by corruption at the highest levels. Yes, cities are often rife with inequality: there will be more than two billion slum dwellers worldwide by 2030. But Barber insists fervently that cities are capable of rooting out venality, of addressing injustice, of broadening economic opportunity, and empowering the politically marginalized, including by expanding participatory governance and using smart applications of information technology. There are bigger obstacles to Barber’s audacious vision, however. The biggest is state sovereignty. Nation-states may well be dysfunctional, but they jealously guard their prerogatives, and they have ample jurisdictional and fiscal means to constrain ambitious mayors seeking to conduct, as it were, their own foreign policies. No doubt, cities will play an expanding role in “multi-level” frameworks of global governance. But national governments will control the terms of that role. Another hole in Barber’s argument is the explicit assumption that mayors, in playing their assigned roles, will come to regard themselves not as “mere delegates of the special interests of particular cities,” but instead “embrace their potential as our global conscience” and their “obligation to serve a greater good.” It’s an enticing vision. But it places a lot of faith in a collection of local pols well aware of Tip O’Neill’s maxim that all politics is local. If state leaders have been unable to transcend national interests, can we really expect mayors to transcend the often narrow concerns of their constituents?  
  • International Law
    In Africa, It’s About Governance
    Many friends and observers of Africa, including myself, see shortcomings in governance as key to the slow rate of economic, social, and political development in some African countries. The converse is also true. Where governance is better, development can be rapid. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation has published its annual ranking of African states. The top five in descending order are Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, Seychelles, South Africa, and Namibia while the bottom five, going from bad to worse, are Zimbabwe, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, and Somalia. For a second consecutive year, the Foundation has announced that there is no winner of the Ibrahim Prize for outstanding leadership by a chief of state. Established in 2006, the prize’s independent and highly distinguished judges have awarded the prize only three times, to the former chiefs of state of Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. They have also recognized the work of Nelson Mandela, out of office long before the prize was established, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, both of South Africa. Subsequently, I will be blogging on the Ibrahim Index and the Ibrahim Prize. Here I cite them to support the point about the relationship between good governance and social and economic progress, and to point out that poor governance remains a significant challenge for Africa. Essential to good governance is accountability, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) promotes it. In an interview with Radio Netherlands, retired Archbishop Desmond Tutu, an icon of South Africa’s liberation movement, said, “The ICC has been a powerful force for justice, peace and accountability not just in Africa but around the world. Far from targeting Africa, it has served and protected Africa.” Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta and deputy president William Ruto have been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 elections. Though they are cooperating with the court, they are seeking to avoid standing trial, either until their time in office ends, or forever. Accordingly, at a special summit of the African Union (AU), Kenyatta argued that the Western countries, especially the UK and the United States, had turned the court into a neocolonialist tool. He called for a mass walkout from the Treaty of Rome that established the court and which thirty four African countries have ratified. He argued that the ICC was contemptuous of the African Union, and the African Union accordingly resolved that the two should not appear before the ICC. London’s Daily Telegraph is reporting that “European diplomats” are seeking to have the UN Security Council direct the ICC to put the Kenyatta and Ruto trials on hold. A British Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokesman, however, says that there has been no change in the government’s support for the ICC. It remains to be seen whether African states will follow the AU resolution. Adherence to the Treaty of Rome is a matter for individual sovereign states. Kenya’s parliament has already called for Kenya to withdraw, and I believe there is a good chance this will happen. If so, it is difficult to see how the trials of Kenyatta and Ruto can proceed. Legally, their indictments still stand and their trials should go forward. It also remains to be seen whether the efforts by “European diplomats” to seek the trial’s postponement by the UN Security Council will be serious.
  • Kenya
    Kenya and the International Criminal Court
    Significant African opinion appears hostile to the International Criminal Court at The Hague (ICC). In Kenya, President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Ruto, both under ICC indictment for crimes committed during post-election violence in 2007-2009, included in their campaign rhetoric that the ICC was a tool of Western imperialism. This view is shared by many. Others argue that the ICC is somehow “unfair” because its current cases all involve Africa. In Kenya, the parliament has called for the withdrawal from the Treaty of Rome that established the ICC. The African Union has called for the Kenyatta and Ruto cases to be referred back to the Kenyan judicial system. A special African Union (AU) summit meeting is convening in Addis Ababa on October 11-12 to discuss the Union’s relationship with the ICC. Some hope that the AU member states will withdraw as a block from the Treaty of Rome, though few expect that will actually happen. Misunderstandings, even outright lies, about the ICC and the Kenyatta and Ruto cases in particular are underpinning much of this current anti-ICC sentiment in Kenya and elsewhere. Under those circumstances Human Rights Watch (HRW), a distinguished non-governmental organization based in the United States, has performed a service by publishing a short primer on October 7 entitled Perceptions and Realities–Kenya and the International Criminal Court. It sets out eight common perceptions about the Kenyatta and Ruto ICC prosecutions–and then demolishes them. Along the way it shows that the Kenyan judicial system does not have the capacity to prosecute Kenyatta and Ruto and that it has failed to hold perpetrators of electoral or political violence accountable throughout its post-colonial history. It also exposes a lack of substance to the Kenyan government’s cooperation with the ICC in the Kenyatta and Ruto cases–despite the two’s formal cooperation with The Hague court. The HRW primer is the first place to go when looking at the alleged legal arguments for delaying the trials, either by transferring them to Kenyan jurisdiction or through UN Security Council action. HRW also discusses the consequences for the future of Kenya’s failure to hold accountable perpetrators of human rights violations. Impunity in the past implies impunity in the future. Archbishop Desmond Tutu has also weighed in on the key role of the ICC in ensuring that perpetrators of violence are met with justice not impunity. In an op-ed published in the New York Times on October 10, Tutu states that “without this court, there would be no brake on the worst excesses of these criminals.” He also highlights the fact that while the ICC has so far prosecuted only African cases, the ICC could also “not be more African if it tried.” The United States is also a signatory of the Treaty of Rome, but it has never been ratified by the Senate. U.S. policy is, however, highly supportive of the International Criminal Court. In light of non-ratification, many African critics view U.S. support for the ICC as fundamentally hypocritical.
  • Japan
    Friday Asia Update: Top Five Stories for the Week of October 11, 2013
    Will Piekos and Sharone Tobias look at the top five stories in Asia this week. 1. China surpasses U.S. in oil imports. According to EIA data, China has surpassed the United States in oil imports, taking the number one spot. The United States still uses more oil than China, consuming an average of 18.6 million barrels per day compared to China’s 10.9 billion, but imports less thanks to increased domestic production. According to analysis by the Wall Street Journal, China’s increased imports of Middle Eastern oil have caused tensions with the United States, because it leaves the U.S. navy to continue policing trade choke points for China’s oil shipments without much help from Chinese forces. 2. Kerry focuses on South China Sea disputes at summits. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry pressed China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders to come to an agreement on disputes in the South China Sea during a meeting of the East Asia Summit in Brunei. Beijing responded by warning the United States to stay out of the disputes; China has resisted negotiating territorial disputes with ASEAN, an organization with ten member states, preferring bilateral negotiations in which it usually has the upper hand. China claims nearly all of the disputed territory in the South China Sea, competing with claims by Vietnam, the Phillipines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. Beijing agreed earlier this year to agree to hold a dialogue towards a "code of conduct" with the other nations, though critics argue that these dialogues lack substance. 3. Fukushima radiation levels hit a two-year high. Radiation levels in seawater near Japan’s damaged nuclear plant jumped to thirteen times the previous day’s reading, reaching its highest point since 2011. The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which is in charge of the plant, said that the increased radiation levels were a result of nearby construction. Also this week, six workers were exposed to radiation after a pipe connected to the water treatment system was mistakenly detached. TEPCO, which stores saltwater to cool reactors, has struggled to contain the radioactive water since the power station was hit by a massive tsunami in March 2011. 4. Kim Jong Un replaces military chief again. North Korean media referenced a new chief of general staff of the Korean People’s Army, signaling that the country’s young dictator, Kim Jong Un, has once again switched the head of the military. The new chief, Ri Yong Gil, is the Hermit Kingdom’s fourth since Kim came into power in December 2011, and little is known about him. His predecessor is believed responsible for attacks on South Korea in 2010 that killed fifty people, so some hope that that his removal represents a move away from a more hard-line approach to South Korea by Pyongyang. Analysts suggest that the move solidifies Kim’s grip on power and the military. Unrelated, North Korea granted permission this week for the mother of Kenneth Bae to visit her son, an American who has been held in North Korea for nearly a year and is in failing health. 5. U.S., Vietnam ink nuclear deal. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Vietnam Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh initialed a nuclear agreement while at the East Asia Summit this past week. If the deal is signed by President Obama and passed by Congress, it would allow American companies to sell nuclear fuel and technology to Vietnam, and Vietnam would be prohibited from enriching or reprocessing plutonium or uranium. Vietnam has plans to build as many as thirteen nuclear power stations in the next two decades; said Secretary Kerry, “Vietnam has the second-largest market, after China, for nuclear power in East Asia, and our companies can now compete.” Bonus: National Cricket Fighting Championships held in Beijing. More than twenty teams from across China competed in the two-day National Cricket Fighting Championships this week. The crickets, with only a one-hundred-day lifespan, are in their prime in autumn; they are fed a high-protein diet and trained regularly in preparation for their bouts. The traditional Chinese sport is more than 1,000 years old, and the rules of cricket fighting date back to the thirteenth century.
  • Regional Organizations
    Missing the Boat to Indonesia: Shortchanging a Strategic Partner
    An unfortunate casualty of President Obama’s cancelled trip to Asia was the missed opportunity to cement stronger U.S. ties with Indonesia, the emerging giant of Southeast Asia. The bilateral relationship will survive, of course, as will the “comprehensive partnership” the two countries launched in 2010. But the president’s no-show for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali deprived the United States of a symbolic occasion to highlight how much unites these two boisterous democracies. It also sowed doubts among Indonesian elites about how seriously they should take the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, at a time when the United States and China are offering competing visions of the region’s future. The Obama administration should recall that the key to success in diplomacy (as in life, according to Woody Allen) is mostly just showing up. When it comes to rising powers, most official and expert attention has focused on Brazil, India, and especially China. But a singular focus on the behemoth “BICs” ignores the economic dynamism and growing political maturity of an emerging middle tier of countries in the developing world. Among the most impressive is Indonesia, which since its transition from dictatorship in 1999 has enjoyed not only political stability but also impressive economic growth. Indeed, despite the global recession, its economy grew more than 6 percent per annum from 2008-2012, making it the world’s sixteenth largest today. Boasting the world’s fourth biggest population, with some 250 million inhabitants, Indonesia is also the largest Muslim-majority country and third most populous democracy in the world (after India and the United States). Indonesia’s combination of democratic stability, economic vitality, and strategic position astride critical shipping lanes led the Center for New American Security and the German Marshall Fund in 2012 to designate it one of four critical “global swing states” (along with Brazil, India, and Turkey). Viewed from the outside, Indonesia would seem poised to play an influential role on both regional and global stages. But how are Indonesians themselves coming to terms with their burgeoning power? Do elites in that country have a coherent strategic view of their nation’s future within ASEAN, much less wider Asia? What contributions is Indonesia prepared to make to regional and global security?  How do Indonesia’s daunting internal development challenges influence its priorities for global trade and finance, including its behavior as a member of the G20? Finally, what sort of long-term relationship does Indonesia desire with the United States? These questions were the focus of a fascinating workshop in Jakarta this past June, titled “Emerging Indonesia: Implications for World Order and International Institutions.” A detailed summary of this event, which the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) co-sponsored with its host, the Indonesian Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), can be found online. But here are a few of the most salient highlights: Indonesia is grappling with how to balance its regional commitments and global ambitions: For years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the main platform for Indonesian foreign policy, and Indonesia comes closest to being the leader of that heterogeneous, ten-nation forum. Jakarta has shown leadership in seeking a code of conduct to defuse tensions in the South China Sea, and it will continue to rely on ASEAN as a vehicle to establish norms of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. At the same time, it is looking beyond that grouping to fulfill its broader international ambitions, including in the framework of the G20 and bilateral strategic partnerships with the Australia, Brazil, China, and the European Union, as well as the United States. Increasingly, Indonesia will act apart from, not simply as part of, ASEAN. Indonesia is punching below its weight on global security: If one hallmark of an emerging power is growing contributions to international order, Indonesia’s grade is “incomplete.” On the positive side, the nation has increased its contributions to UN peacekeeping, expressed vocal support for the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, and been a strong advocate a Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. Indonesia has also sponsored  the Bali Democracy Forum, designed to help former authoritarian governments (including Arab nations) navigate the treacherous transition to democracy. Less helpfully, the nation has been largely silent in the face of the proliferation challenges posed by Iran and North Korea. Finally, participants remained divided on the practicality of the Indo-Pacific “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” that Jakarta proposed in May 2013, conceived as a parallel to ASEAN’s existing Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Jakarta views global trade and finance through the lens of its own development: Indonesia’s economic priority is sustaining a high rate of growth while continuing to reduce poverty and income inequality. Indonesia’s progress to date has been remarkable: Since 2006, the nation’s poverty rate has fallen from 18 to 12 percent, thanks in part to the largest community-driven development (CDD) program in the world. Its challenge now is to diversify from over-reliance on export commodities by reinvigorating its manufacturing base—something that will require major investments in human capital. Although Indonesia weathered the global economic downturn well, this shift to a higher-value-added economy will require attracting long-term foreign direct investment—in part by fighting corruption and streamlining bureaucratic impediments. Indonesia’s sustainable development will also require a much more vigorous approach to combatting deforestation, particularly illegal logging, that threatens to destroy one of the world’s largest remaining tropical forests. Prospects for Indonesian-U.S. partnership have never been brighter. When the United States first explored a comprehensive partnership several years ago, suspicion about U.S. intentions was rife in Indonesia. This initial wariness has subsided, however, given the broad congruence of strategic, political, and economic interests between the two countries. The two nations have recently expanded defense cooperation, as well as educational exchanges, but much more remains to be done, particularly in building commercial ties between the United States and Indonesia. (Bilateral trade comprises just 10 percent of U.S. trade with ASEAN today). While no formal alliance is on the horizon, particularly given Indonesia’s insistence on retaining good relations with Beijing as well as Washington, the United States has a golden opportunity to achieve a long-term partnership with a dynamic fellow democracy and the linchpin of Southeast Asia.