Regional Organizations

In an article just published by Foreign Affairs, Naomi Egel and I argue that the OECD’s approach to engaging emerging powers as “key partners” is a smart way to remain relevant as the global balance of power shifts. Other multilateral organizations should learn from its example. For the past decade, a quiet experiment has been underway at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Paris-based body composed of the United States and other advanced market democracies. Although it is often dismissed as sleepy and technocratic, the OECD has found a way to remain relevant in a quickly shifting global landscape, and other multilateral organizations would be wise to pay attention. The OECD, like numerous other international bodies, must adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics that have left new major global players outside its ranks. Its response is a so-called “key partner” initiative that allows it to engage—and seek to influence—pivotal nonmember states. This method strikes the right balance between maintaining the OECD’s symbolic role as the enforcer of Western norms and meeting its practical need to maintain a foothold on the global stage. Read the full article here.

The Council on Foreign Relations is hosting a conversation with Giovanni Buttarelli, the European Union’s newly-appointed data protection supervisor. Mr. Buttarelli will discuss his strategic plan for the next five years as European Data Protection Supervisor along with the right to forget, trade negotiations, and other issues relating to data protection both in Europe and around the world. You can watch a live-stream of the discussion with Mr. Buttarelli below or by clicking here.

The UN Human Rights Council has convened for its 28th regular session, and its agenda includes revisiting Snowden-sparked debates about the right to privacy in international law. In explaining his actions, Snowden appealed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and human rights treaties. He wanted to expose the peril he believes pervasive government surveillance poses to the right to privacy, and his leaks catalyzed many privacy-related controversies. For example, Snowden’s revelations about U.S. and British signals intelligence programs launched efforts in the UN and the European Union (EU) concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), EU privacy law, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteur for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism issued reports. The EU made demands on the United States in the context of data-sharing relations. Privacy advocates challenged UK  surveillance activities under the ECHR before a British tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights. But, after much deliberation, debate, and diplomacy, where do things stand? Have the key Snowden villains—the United States and United Kingdom—altered their approaches to their international legal obligations? Has the UN succeeded in illuminating how international law handles privacy challenges posed by digital technologies? Have countries spared by Snowden’s disclosures, including authoritarian states notorious for not respecting privacy, embraced UN interpretations of the right to privacy and improved compliance with international law? Looking across the post-Snowden landscape suggests that little has changed despite all the activity. UN human rights bodies have done what they often do—highlight painful gaps between what the UN claims international law requires and what governments do. In many countries where privacy has long been an empty right, it has been business as usual, or worse. The British government believes it has effectively defended its position in domestic litigation and wants stronger surveillance powers from Parliament. Changes in U.S. signals intelligence have occurred, some of which are unprecedented, but they owe more to factors other than international law. In the United Nations UN activities have followed a familiar pattern. The General Assembly’s resolution was contentiously negotiated, was claimed as vindication by countries that did not agree about what the resolution meant, and, tellingly, was adopted without a vote. UN officials asserted that existing international law provided compelling answers to all privacy-related questions raised by member states—an assessment, critics observed, that lacked analysis of state practice on complex issues, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, what "arbitrary and unlawful" interference with privacy means, balancing secrecy and transparency in surveillance programs, and the extent of discretion governments have in confronting security threats. And, as often occurs and is happening again this month, a UN human rights perspective disconnected from the way states behave comes before the Human Rights Council, the membership of which typically includes a rogue’s gallery of states renown for their lack of interest in human rights, including privacy. In Authoritarian Countries Authoritarian governments do not appear to have had any "come to Snowden moments." Human Rights Watch condemned a proposed new Chinese counter-terrorism law  because it would establish "a total digital surveillance architecture subject to no legal or legislative control" inconsistent "with international law and the protection of human rights." Just as Snowden began his temporary asylum in Moscow in the fall 2013, researchers described Russian surveillance capabilities as "an Orwellian network that jeopardizes privacy and the ability to use telecommunications to oppose the government." In 2014, Human Rights Watch asserted that Russia "took a leap backwards demonstrating little respect for its human rights obligations." In the United Kingdom A British tribunal rendered decisions in December 2014 and February 2015, which held that, after the British government provided transparency on safeguards it had in place, it was in compliance with the ECHR concerning receipt of surveillance information from the NSA. Given the storm Snowden stirred up about the UK’s signals intelligence activities, the change required for the tribunal to consider the government in full ECHR compliance was strikingly limited. Although they claimed victory, privacy advocates were upset the tribunal did not strike down the U.S.-UK information-sharing arrangement on substantive grounds. Whether the European Court of Human Rights reaches a different conclusion remains to be seen. To complement its recent wins in the courts, the British government has expressed interest in new legislation that would expand its surveillance powers. In EU-U.S. Data-Sharing Relations The EU used the Snowden-generated controversies to make demands on the United States in negotiating data-sharing arrangements, namely the Safe Harbor and "Umbrella" agreements. This scenario replays difficulties the EU and the United States have long had on privacy.The EU has not re-interpreted EU privacy law because of Snowden’s actions, but it has exploited the disclosures to strengthen its negotiating position with the United States. For its part, the United States has not altered its stance on its ICCPR obligations because it negotiates privacy deals with the EU. In the United States A February 2015 progress report from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) highlights changes implemented since President Obama announced reforms in Presidential Policy Directive-28 (PPD-28) in January 2014. Some changes address concerns about the privacy of U.S. persons that are anchored in U.S. law not international law. Other changes relate to EU negotiating demands, such as the commitment to pursue legislation to permit nationals of designated countries to seek redress in U.S. courts for inappropriate handling of personal data. Some reforms relate to debates about international law, particularly whether U.S. treaty obligations on privacy apply outside U.S. territory. Under PPD-28, the U.S. intelligence community now treats information collected on foreign nationals outside the United States under rules equivalent to those on the treatment of information on U.S. persons. David Medine, Chairman of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, argued that this decision is unprecedented because “no country on the planet [...] has gone this far to improve the treatment of non-citizens in government surveillance.” But the Obama administration has not expressly grounded this move in international law. PPD-28 and the DNI’s progress report do not link this change to international law. Nor does the decision seem inspired by the UN’s, ECHR’s, or EU’s respective approaches to privacy in international law. Rather, this shift might reflect a claim of American exceptionalism—the United States is undertaking something exceptional with privacy in the digital age that only America would dare to attempt, even after events as damaging as Snowden’s leaks. And, like all claims of American exceptionalism, it is highly provocative but, nevertheless, consequential for reasons well beyond international law.

The eurozone, once seen as a crowning achievement in the decades-long path toward European integration, continues to struggle with the effects of its sovereign debt crises and their implications for the future of the common currency.

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. Earlier this week, after thirteen months of civil war, South Sudan’s warring factions signed an Agreement on the Establishment of a Transitional Government of National Unity. President Salva Kiir and his rival, former vice president Riek Machar, recommitted to a cease-fire. The two factions also agreed to a transitional power-sharing government that will rule for thirty months beginning in July 2015, and they approved the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and a judicial body to investigate and address human rights abuses. The particulars of the transitional government, such as the identities of the executive leadership and the proportion of government positions each side will receive, will be negotiated throughout February, and a final peace deal is expected by March 5. South Sudan descended into conflict in December 2013 when President Kiir accused Vice President Machar of plotting a coup and dismissed him and eleven other senior political figures. Machar interpreted Kiir’s actions as a bid to consolidate political power and created an opposition movement to counter him. This elite political division incited fighting among the security forces and escalated into an all-out armed conflict, which soon took on an ethnic tinge, pitting ethnic Dinkas who supported Kiir against ethnic Nuer who backed Machar. The war is estimated to have killed upward of 10,000 and displaced over one million people. The United States, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as special envoys from the East African Intergovernmental Authority in Development (IGAD), played an instrumental role in facilitating the independence of South Sudan. Given their protracted involvement, some have placed the blame for South Sudan’s swift descent into chaos on their shoulders. While they bear some responsibility, U.S., European, and African partners have expended considerable time, effort, and resources on trying to repair the political rift between Machar and Kiir. They brokered a ceasefire agreement in January 2014 and hosted several rounds of peace talks, all of which failed to stop the fighting. Peacemaking efforts have been continually impeded by Kiir and Machar. Ultimately, only South Sudanese leaders can put an end to the deadly conflict that has ravaged their country since late 2013. This recent agreement is a step in the right direction. Given the history of failed negotiations between Machar and Kiir, skepticism abounds over whether it will lead to a sustained peace. It is not merely a question of Machar and Kiir’s political will, but also whether these two leaders can convince their armies, unaffiliated militias, staunch advocates, and political allies to honor a peace agreement. Yet, IGAD and South Sudan’s other international partners are determined to help achieve a final resolution on March 5. To incentivize good behavior, the United Nations, African Union, and IGAD have threatened sanctions against anyone who undermines the peace process. Whether sanctions or a desire to alleviate civilians’ suffering will compel South Sudanese leaders to sign a final deal by March 5 will remain to be seen.

Alexander Klimburg is senior research fellow at the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and an affiliate of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.  It is close to two years to the day that the European Union published its first-ever Cybersecurity Strategy. The document included such high-flying mouthfuls such as “achieving cyber resilience,” “drastically reducing cyber crime,” and developing coherent cyberdefense and international cybersecurity policies. What has happened since? A fair amount, as it turns out—though it is good to keep in mind that EU institutions generally stumble forward instead of marching in unison thanks to their highly fragmented mandates. The Cybersecurity Strategy set the direction for the three main legs of EU cyber policy: the Directorate General for Home Affairs (cybercrime), the European Council and European External Action Service (common foreign and defense policy), and the Directorate General for Economic Affairs (network and information security). As these three legs not only often fundamentally disagree with each other, but also are of different lengths—each has vastly different competencies according to the EU treaties, with Home Affairs the least integrated and Economic Affairs the most—it is a minor miracle that anything has happened at all. Every leg can claim to be on solid footing. In foreign policy, the European Council, which represents the governments of EU member states is about to adopt a new Cyber Diplomacy Strategy—probably one of the first times this word has ever been used in an official context. The details of the strategy are still confidential, but it will include a commitment to supporting norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, Internet freedom and human rights, cyber capacity building as well as participating in Internet governance. The EU has made substantial progress on the capacity building front in the last twelve months. In collaboration with the Council of Europe, which is pushing for the adoption of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the EU is starting to implement its first projects in Africa and in the Balkans. Internet governance—which will be a particularly decisive issue in 2015—will also be part of the European External Action Service mandate, although squabbles regarding the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers’s new top-level domain policy (in particular dot-wine) have created strife among a few members of the Council. To date, the EU has also established five bilateral discussion groups with certain countries and has deepened cooperation with NATO on a range of cyber issues. These discussions have been assisted by the operational expansion of the European Cybercrime Centre, which facilitates law enforcement cooperation and is increasingly becoming a useful tool in cyber diplomacy. The European Defense Agency (EDA), responsible for funding research into common defense requirements, has expanded upon previously extremely limited efforts to build both national and whole-of-the-union cyberdefense capabilities. This includes supporting research in areas outside of its core field, for instance supporting capabilities for common crisis response. It was revealing that the first major exercise of the new Integrated Political Crisis Response (ICPR) instrument, which itself fulfilled a long-standing demand to field a single EU point of contact for major crisis events, piggy-backed off a long-standing EU cyber crisis management exercise known as Cyber Europe in December 2014, and was supported by the EDA. The EU crisis management capabilities are also being given a considerable boost by the planned Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The NIS Directive is not only much more ambitious than any other part of the Cybersecurity Strategy—it is further reaching then many similar national legislative proposals, including the ill-fated Cyber Information Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) in the United States. In addition to a number of rather specific requirements for governments such as mandating the creation and minimum capabilities of national Computer Emergency Response Teams, the NIS directive makes significant demands on the private sector. Most remarkably, it states that all “market operators” will be forced to disclose serious cyber incidents on their systems to both their national regulator as well as to the European Network and Information Security Agency. The directive leaves the term “market operator” ill defined, making it unclear who needs to abide by the reporting requirement. While it would certainly include critical infrastructure operators and internet service providers, it could possibly also include social media companies such as Facebook or similar digital services companies. The exact definition of what constitutes a “market operator” is still a stumbling point, but the extensive lobbying on this issue will most likely not trip up the directive, which is expected to be enacted largely unchanged later this year. The most recent version of the directive seems to imply that the term has been replaced by the phrase "national critical infrastructure," which indeed would refer to a much tighter group of affected companies. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy was intended to be comprehensive, and address both external as well as internal cyber challenges. Although the EU is still far away from projecting anything akin to “cyber power,” there is little doubt that significant progress has been made in its promotion of a cyber foreign policy, as a report pointed out in August 2014. The strategy’s most significant contribution is undoubtedly the NIS Directive. When enacted later this year, it will represent one of the most comprehensive pieces of cyber legislation anywhere in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. While the EU treaties tightly limit how effective an EU cyber foreign policy can really ever be, developments such as the NIS Directive and the revised General Data Protection Regulation will represent significant developments in Europe’s cybersecurity, as well a potential challenge for the private sector. It shows that even stumbling forward can really get Europe quite far, even though some businesses might contend that it’s stumbling in the wrong direction.

Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier this week, Canada’s parliament passed legislation that would allow it to finally ratify the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, more commonly as the Budapest Convention. The Budapest Convention is the only legal instrument specifically designed to facilitate international cooperation to fight cyber crime. It provides: (1) common definitions and criminal prohibitions, (2) unified procedures and rules to ensure the preservation of evidence, and (3) a streamlined legal process to facilitate international cooperation, more formally known as mutual legal assistance, on cyber crime investigations. Canada was one of the countries that originally negotiated the treaty in the late 1990s and was one of the original signatories in 2001. Despite being one of its earliest promoters, it took over thirteen years for Canadian legislators to pass the necessary domestic legislative changes to allow Canada to ratify the treaty. The delay can be attributed to packaging the legislation with controversial lawful interception provisions and successive minority governments throughout the 2000s. The lag put Canada in a tough spot in international venues when working with the United States and European partners to repel BRIC-efforts to launch a negotiation of a new cyber crime treaty under UN auspices, something that could take another decade to negotiate. For Canada, it became hard to argue that a new treaty is premature when it had not ratified the existing one. Russia has long argued that the Budapest Convention is fatally flawed, arguing that particular provision violates state sovereignty, a claim that has been recently debunked by the committee that oversees the treaty. Brazil, China and India argue, in short, that a treaty negotiated by Europe is inherently inapplicable to non-European countries, despite the fact that non-European countries are party to the convention and that whole swaths of international law—still valid today—stem from negotiations amongst Europeans. No word yet as to when Canada will officially ratify the Convention. When it does and unless another country beats it to the punch, Canada will be the seventh non-European country to do so, joining Australia, the Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, and the United States.

—Djibouti, East Africa The slogan of “African solutions to African problems” has long been a seductive mantra, attractive to African and Western governments alike. The phrase suggests a new era of continental responsibility in which African countries themselves—rather than former colonial powers, the United States, or even the United Nations (UN)—play a bigger role in delivering regional peace and security. The vision of a self-confident, united, and capable Africa has obvious attractions on the continent. But it also appeals to Washington, which increasingly views instability and violence within Africa’s many fragile states as enabling conditions for terrorists and violent extremists ranging from Boko Haram to al-Shabab to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Realizing this vision, however, will require vast improvements in the capabilities of the African Union (AU), the continent’s most important regional institution. It will also require clearer division of labor between the AU and the UN, as well as between the AU and Africa’s several regional economic communities (RECs). The Obama administration, which has elevated U.S. diplomatic and military engagement with Africa to unprecedented heights, now faces a tougher task: persuading African governments to take the hard decisions and invest the resources necessary for the AU to live up to its potential as a pillar of continental security. Since 2000, no area of the globe has made more progress on regional security cooperation than Africa. In 2002, African states replaced the venerable Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the African Union. Whereas the OAU had been obsessed with upholding sovereignty and non-intervention, the AU endorsed the principle of “non-indifference” in the affairs of member states. The AU’s Constitutive Act condemned “irregular changes of government” and held out the prospect of sanctions in response to them. Even more strikingly, the AU became the only regional organization to explicitly recognize the right to intervene militarily to protect populations from mass atrocities, as had occurred in Rwanda in 1994. Beyond these normative shifts, AU members endorsed a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Cornerstones of the APSA included a new, fifteen-member Peace and Security Council (PSC), a Panel of the Wise to conduct mediation efforts, and a proposed rapid reaction African Standby Force (ASF), military staff committee, and Peace Fund. Over this past week, I had the opportunity to assess the AU’s progress in implementing these ambitious goals at a conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, cosponsored by CFR and the Institute for Security Studies. These conversations made painfully clear that the AU—and its foreign supporters—have a long way to go toward bringing to fruition the vision of a united Africa capable of addressing its greatest security threats. Four priorities stand out: 1. Closing the AU’s aspirations-capabilities gap: There is an alarming chasm between the AU’s ambitions and its capacities to achieve these objectives. This ends-means gap is most obvious when it comes to funding: despite a decade of robust African economic growth, the AU still depends on external sources for more than 90 percent of its budget. Yes, Africa remains the world’s poorest continent. But it also possesses tremendous riches. Current funding patterns suggest that at least some African governments are determined to keep the AU weak. And weak it remains. The AU has glaring shortcomings when it comes to analyzing and predicting violent conflict, formulating military doctrine, planning peace operations, mobilizing and deploying troops, providing logistical support, ensuring effective command and control, and distilling lessons learned and best practices from ongoing and completed operations. Professional standards vary widely across troop contributors, interoperability remains uneven, and many member states are reluctant to participate in AU missions. The ASF is nowhere near being constituted [PDF], leading a number of AU members to push for the stopgap measure of a purely military African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), which would take a “coalition of the willing” approach to interventions. In sum, the AU must close the gap between what is written on paper and what exists in practice. 2. Clarifying AU and UN roles in peace operations: Cooperation between the AU and UN on peace operations has been ad hoc and turbulent. The AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS) struggled mightily, and was eventually replaced by the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2008. More recently, the AU-led intervention in the Central African Republic, known by the acronym MISCA, was succeeded this September by a UN mission, MINUSCA. Because the AU has a higher tolerance for casualties than the UN, it’s tempting to contemplate a sequential model, whereby a robust initial AU intervention force yields to a longer-term peacekeeping operation. If so, the AU will need to work harder to ensure the appearance of neutrality. In the case of MISCA, AU peacekeepers from neighboring Chad were accused of supporting the Sekela rebels. The longest-running and largest AU operation to date has been the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). After a very rocky start, AMISOM has succeeded [PDF] at heavy cost in clearing al-Shabab from Mogadishu and other parts of the country. These achievements would have been impossible, however, without the logistical support provided by the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), established in 2009, and most importantly, an unprecedented decision by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to support AMISOM with assessed UN peacekeeping contributions. Going forward, the AU-UN partnership needs to shift from improvised, seat-of-the-pants arrangements to more regularized cooperation. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has recently announced another major review of UN peace operations. A central objective of this initiative should be to place AU-UN cooperation on peace operations on a sounder strategic as well as financial footing. Beyond these practical issues of comparative advantage and burden-sharing, there is the tricky question of authorization. The UN Charter is clear on this matter: it acknowledges the role of regional organizations under Chapter VIII, but requires that the UNSC endorse any use of force except in situations of self-defense. Nevertheless, the AU’s Constitutive Act and some AU policy statements appear to envision scenarios whereby the Peace and Security Council could independently authorize an intervention. Such ambiguity puts the PSC and the UNSC on a potential collision course. 3. Clarifying the roles of the AU and the RECS: In asserting primacy for peace and security on the continent, the AU also faces competition from below, from some of the continent regional economic communities (RECs), notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Notwithstanding their AU membership, many African states chafe at granting real authority to a continent-wide regional organization and prefer to address African conflicts through subregional groupings. The fact the RECs predate the AU reinforces this instinct. However, the RECs often have overlapping memberships, vary tremendously in their capabilities, and they are susceptible to domination by their most powerful members (Nigeria, for example, in the case of ECOWAS). In 2008, the AU signed a memorandum of understanding on peace and security cooperation with key RECs, suggesting that they should be governed by principles of complementarity and subsidiarity while retaining the AU’s harmonizing and coordinating role. Alas, this MOU has done little to clarify their division of labor. 4. Ramping up the regional dimension of U.S. policy toward Africa: Security threats in Africa, from terrorism to crime to disease, are increasingly transnational. They demand, by definition, regional approaches. This presents a particular challenge for the U.S. State Department, which—notwithstanding its creation in 2006 of an AU diplomatic mission—still engages African countries primarily on a bilateral basis. By contrast, the U.S. Defense Department maintains a standing combatant command for Africa (AFRICOM, based in Stuttgart, Germany), which holds annual staff talks with the AU, as well as a hub in the East African nation of Djibouti, home to several thousand U.S. troops comprising the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). These platforms provide the Pentagon with powerful tools to encourage regional and subregional cooperation among otherwise mistrustful African governments. Indeed, CJTF-HOA’s support of the AMISOM mission in Somalia is intended not simply to help the AU root out and defeat al-Shabab, but also to forge new patterns of cooperation among the governments of the Horn. The State Department has neither the resources nor the personnel to create its own, forward-deployed platform in Africa (much less a counterpart to AFRICOM). But it can and should devote greater attention to promoting and rewarding African progress on regional security cooperation. This will of course be a decades-long endeavor. But U.S. diplomats have at least one thing going for them: the rhetorical commitment of African leaders to the same goal.

The annual APEC summit is underway in Beijing. Perhaps the most notable absentee is India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who received an unprecedented invitation in July from Chinese President Xi Jinping to attend the gathering. Despite growing to become the world’s third largest economy in PPP terms, India is not a member of APEC, and as a result would not normally attend the summit. But this year President Xi used his platform as the summit host to extend invitations to non-members India, Pakistan, and Mongolia. While Pakistan and Mongolia’s leaders made the trip to Beijing for APEC, Prime Minister Modi decided not to do so. It’s a missed opportunity for India’s economic diplomacy at a time it could use a boost. For India, APEC, a grouping of twenty-one member economies across the Asia-Pacific region, has a complicated history on the membership front. Due to a moratorium that ran from 1998 through 2010, the forum did not consider any aspirants for membership during years of strong global economic growth. Following the expiration of the moratorium, APEC discussions on membership appear to be stuck in endless deliberation over regional balance and representation from sub-geographical areas within the forum. The result: in 2014, once again there are no moves to induct new member economies. As I wrote last summer, given the size of the Indian economy—now among the world’s largest by any measure, and dwarfing those of many current APEC members and aspirants—an APEC with India inside the tent makes economic sense. Especially since APEC is not a binding negotiating forum, but rather a community of norms and commitments to free and open trade. So why isn’t India, a $2 trillion economy, on the fast track to APEC membership? Last July, following the news of President Xi’s APEC summit invitation to Modi, I thought the prospects looked brighter than ever in the past. As many have noted, the summit invitation is an implicit endorsement of membership. Having China’s support would seem to be an important step. But other countries, including the United States, have said little to reinforce India’s case and propel its candidacy forward. Unfortunately in this case, it’s all about the politics, and here India’s multilateral economic diplomacy over the summer did not help its case. India’s role in torpedoing the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement negotiated at Bali created a new and very unfortunate precedent in India’s multilateral track record. As I wrote at the time, it was always possible in the past to say that India upholds its multilateral commitments, but its decision to walk away from the Bali agreement rendered that statement false. The ongoing difficulties in reaching a path forward with India to preserve the Bali agreement have resulted in a crisis within the WTO about not only the limited accomplishments of the Doha Round, but more deeply about the principle of consensus on which it operates. India’s stance has also reinforced the notion among many countries, in both the developed and developing world, that India often plays the spoiler in global trade talks. With the WTO crisis in the foreground, and with India as the key protagonist, it’s no wonder that a groundswell for Indian membership in APEC has simply not materialized. In the longer run, that’s a strategic and tactical mistake, as APEC will benefit from having India inside the trade tent—as will India, from becoming more fully integrated with a forum focused on promoting open trade. But more time will need to elapse—and the Bali agreement will need to be rescued in some fashion—before APEC member economies will likely take up the question of Indian membership. That’s why the Beijing APEC summit would have been a good opportunity for Modi to clarify his views on the open trading system and help keep India on the agenda for expansion. This missed opportunity can be recovered, but it will take time.

On November 7, Japan and China revealed they had reached an understanding on their differences that would allow for a resumption of diplomacy. After several years of a virtual shutdown in bilateral talks, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping are preparing to meet face-to-face at next week’s APEC meeting. Economic needs may be driving Xi, but strategic concerns are on the top of Abe’s agenda. The basic understanding Beijing and Tokyo announced today was outlined in carefully crafted language, and suggests a cautious first step for Xi and Abe at the upcoming APEC meeting. Nonetheless, the two governments agreed on four points. First, Beijing and Tokyo noted their desire to return to “a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” the phrase used to describe the forward-looking relationship announced in the May 2008 summit meeting between President Hu Jintao and then Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in Tokyo. Second, they recognized the need to overcome “political difficulties,” and included here the need to follow the “spirit of squarely facing history.” This ostensibly would include potential Yasukuni Shrine visits by the Japanese prime minister. Third, and perhaps most difficult, the two countries found a way to express their differences over their East China Sea island dispute that did not in fact back away from each country’s official position on the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu Islands as China calls them). Beijing and Tokyo acknowledged their different views on “the emergence of tense situations in recent years in the waters of the East China Sea, including those around the Senkaku Islands,” and then went on to say they would build a crisis management mechanism and prevent deterioration in the situation. Finally, Japan and China agreed to meet bilaterally and in multilateral settings to gradually resume relations, and to “make an effort to build a political relationship of mutual trust.” That they stressed the need to meet in normal diplomatic settings reveals just how deep the break has been. After decades of diplomatic ties, it would seem that Beijing and Tokyo feel they need to start all over in an attempt to build trust. After having their militaries face off across the East China Sea, this may take some time. In Tokyo, the question remains whether this is a tactical shift by China in advance of the APEC meetings, or if it signals a true desire to address longstanding differences and solve shared problems. The potential breakthrough follows a period of mounting tension. Within a space of four years, the region and indeed the world watched with growing alarm as Japan and China seemed increasingly poised for military conflict. Competing sovereignty claims over the Senkaku Islands  stoked intense and complex domestic emotions in both countries. Passions in Japan grew heated when a Chinese fishing captain deliberately rammed two Japan Coast Guard vessels in 2010 near the disputed islands. In China, longstanding anti-Japanese sentiment boiled over once again in 2012 when the Japanese government decided to purchase the islands from their owner to keep them out of the hands of a nationalist governor determined to demonstrate Japanese sovereignty. It was at this point that the Chinese government decided to send its own maritime patrols to the islands to demonstrate their sovereignty. Neither government had experience handling the military tensions that grew along with the worsening territorial dispute. By the end of 2012, Chinese planes began to fly near (and at times above) the territorial airspace; Japanese jets scrambled in response. Japan clarified its air defense rules of engagement, telegraphing to Chinese aircraft how it would respond to incursions into Japanese airspace. A Chinese naval vessel locked its fire control radar on a Japanese MSDF ship, prompting a formal protest and a Chinese Ministry of Defense investigation into what happened. And in November of 2013, the Chinese MOD announced it would enforce a new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that overlapped with Japanese and South Korean ADIZs. There has been no contact between Abe and Xi to date. Indeed, very little diplomacy has been possible, leaving many worried about the lack of available channels for managing crises. While the two countries had begun to consider risk-reduction measures after the 2010 fishing trawler incident, including a hotline between defense officials and a maritime dialogue involving various government agencies, the eruption of severe tensions in 2012 precluded their realization. Political transitions in both countries also contributed to the lack of diplomatic initiative. Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in Beijing and the return to power of Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party in Tokyo meant that the two leaders had no personal ties and that the new governments needed time to develop their thinking on how to restore balance to Sino-Japanese relations. The economic interdependence between Japan and China continues to ground the relationship, although in recent months the rate of Japanese investment in China has diminished. Two-way trade was valued at over  $300 billion in 2013. This year the amount of FDI from Japan, valued at $2.83 billion through July remains high relative to other foreign investors, including the United States, which only accounted for $1.8 billion of Chinese FDI. But overall foreign direct investment in China slowed by 17 percent in the first half of 2014, and Japan’s FDI was 45 percent lower than in the previous year. Japanese companies are increasingly diversifying their global FDI with China only attracting 5 percent of outward Japanese investment in the second quarter of 2014. The quiet consultations that led to this week’s understandings involved some of Japan’s most senior China hands – including one former prime minister who oversaw the last phase of high level reconciliation summitry. Moreover, most of the consultations involved Japanese visiting Beijing rather than Chinese envoys visiting Tokyo. Former Foreign Ministers Masahiko Komura (now vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party) and Katsuya Okada (now acting president of the Democratic Party of Japan) led a group of parliamentarians to Beijing in May of this year. In an interview after his China trip, Komura disclosed that his conversation with Zhang Dejiang, the third highest ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party’s powerful Politburo Standing Committee, included a discussion of the prime minister’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine. Following up on this, former Prime Minister Fukuda made two visits to Beijing, one in July and one on October 30 at the Boao Forum for Asia, meeting with Xi Jinping on both occasions. During his first visit, Fukuda also discussed the Yasukuni Shrine, but included too the need for risk reduction efforts in the East China Sea. On September 24, the two countries resumed working level talks on maritime confidence building for the first time since May, 2012. A final visit to Beijing by Abe’s national security advisor, Shotaro Yachi, this week finalized the language for today’s announcement. The timing of a Xi-Abe summit during the APEC meeting remains to be seen. With this groundwork behind them, there is not likely to be any further substantive discussion of the territorial dispute or shrine visits. But just this past week, hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels appeared off of the Ogasawara Islands, prepared for illegal coral fishing. Chinese Coast Guard patrols around the Senkaku Islands have regularized, and the two coast guards have grown more accustomed to each other. Maritime interactions may not be as tense as they once were, but they are in no way diminished. Incidents at sea remain a serious concern. For now, it seems, Xi and Abe have agreed to meet on the sidelines of one of Asia’s biggest multilateral gatherings, but figuring out how to build that “political relationship of mutual trust” will require far more time and sustained attention by Asia’s two leaders. Managing the growing proximity of Asia’s two maritime powers, one established and one emerging, will also require new frameworks of regional confidence building.

Herman J. Cohen recently wrote an article for American Foreign Policy Interests discussing Africa’s “surrogate wars.” The revolt against Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore and his departure from office under duress make this article essential reading. Cohen looks at the “insurgencies” in Liberia, Rwanda, and Cote d’Ivoire. He argues that the “insurgencies” were essentially surrogate wars waged by Compaore against Liberian President Samuel Doe using Charles Taylor as a proxy; by Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni against Rwanda using the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) to “export” his domestic ethnic conflicts; and Compaore (again) against Cote d’Ivoire. All three wars have been humanitarian disasters, setting back development for decades, if not generations. Cohen argues that Africans ignore the “surrogate nature” of some “insurgencies,” and that the United States tends to follow their lead. Because the foreign sponsors of “insurgencies” remain clandestine, the African Union can regard them as civil conflicts requiring “conflict-resolution.” Sometimes, perpetrators even receive international praise for “resolving” the very conflicts that they have caused (Compaore in Cote d’Ivoire). Cohen concludes with the observation that the African Union has never seriously considered surrogate wars, and the perpetrators have not been called to account. Good riddance to Compaore! Herman J. Cohen was one of the most distinguished Africanists in public service. He was Ambassador to Senegal, with dual accreditation to the Gambia, from 1977-1980. Among his other positions, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 1989 to 1993. He was also Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, and served as senior director for Africa on the National security Council.