Regional Organizations

Three new annual reports, from the U.S. State Department, Freedom House, and Reporters without Borders, add further evidence to worries that much of Southeast Asia is experiencing an authoritarian revival. Released this week, Freedom House’s annual Freedom of the Press report (for which I served as a consultant for several Southeast Asia chapters) reveals that in nearly all the ten ASEAN nations, press freedom regressed significantly last year. Freedom House’s findings are similar those of Reporters Without Borders annual Press Freedom Index, which was released earlier this month. In it, the scores of Thailand, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian nations dropped, as compared to their scores in 2015. Like Freedom House’s report, RSF’s analysts use a range of indicators to reflect the overall level of press freedom in each nation. These falls are not surprising---Malaysia has shuttered major publications that have reported on the 1MDB scandal swirling around Prime Minister Najib tun Razak, Thailand’s junta is proving increasingly intolerant of dissent, Brunei has promulgated harsh new sharia-based laws, and other Southeast Asian nations like Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam remain highly intolerant of independent reporting. And these declines in press freedom are indicative of a broader trend. As I have written, much of Southeast Asia has regressed from democratic transition over the past decade; its retrenchment is symptomatic of a broader, global authoritarian revival. Finally, the State Department’s annual country reports on human rights provides more evidence of the democratic downfall of a region that was once touted as an example of political progress. While Myanmar made significant strides toward democracy in 2015, and Indonesia and the Philippines remained vibrant democracies, the country reports show that most of the rest of the region regressed in terms of rights and freedoms. Thailand came in for a particularly harsh assessment, with the State Department noting, “The interim [Thai] constitution remained in place during the year, as did numerous decrees severely limiting civil liberties, including restrictions on freedom of speech, assembly, and the press.” The country reports further noted that in Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Brunei, among other Southeast Asian nations, there were signs of growing repression in 2015. In the coming months, Southeast Asia’s political trajectory will become even clearer. The NLD-led government in Myanmar is beginning to develop a policy agenda, and its actions will clarify how successfully it can manage a difficult transition from military rule---whether Myanmar becomes more like Thailand, where the armed forces never really returned to the barracks, or like Indonesia, where the power of the armed forces has been curbed significantly. Thailand will hold a referendum, in August, on a new constitution midwifed by the junta. The Thai coup government has essentially barred any open discussion of the new constitution, which contains clauses that could perpetuate the military’s influence and drastically weaken the power of elected members of parliament in the future. However, it seems unlikely that the coup government will resort to outright rigging the constitutional referendum, though it will try its hardest to sway Thais to vote for the draft. The junta has cracked down on most types of dissent, so Thais may use the referendum to voice their frustrations. If the new constitution passes by only a small percentage of the vote, or is even defeated, it would suggest that there is sizable antigovernment sentiment bubbling up in Thailand. Finally, there are the upcoming elections in the Philippines, to be held next week. Some Philippine civil society activists worry that strong popular support for vice presidential candidate Ferdinand Marcos Jr, son of the former dictator, and for presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte, who allegedly oversaw brutal anticrime strategies as mayor of Davao, marks a rising popular frustration with the difficulties of democratic government---a longing for a strongman who can just get things done, ignoring institutions or checks on power. Since the Philippines is the most established and vibrant democracy in the region, the results of its presidential election will be another powerful signal of regional trends.

Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  India and Brazil see themselves as power brokers in international cyber diplomacy. For years, the United States has courted both countries to promote its preferred norms for cyberspace, hoping that Brazil and India will bandwagon in support of the U.S. vision of an open, global, free and resilient cyberspace. Russia and China have been doing the same, hoping they can elicit Delhi’s and Brasilia’s support for greater UN control of the Internet and cyber issues writ large. Recognizing this, India and Brazil try to play a bridge-building role between the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other, hoping that they can moderate Moscow and Beijing all while reaping the influence-enhancing benefits that come with being honest brokers. But is this approach effective? Indian cyber experts Samir Saran and Arun Mohan Sukumar at the Observer Research Foundation seem to think so. Last week, the Indian, Russian, and Chinese foreign ministers issued a communiqué at the end of their annual meeting. It dedicates a section to cyber issues, outlining the foreign ministers’ views with respect to the applicability of international law to cyberspace, the use of the Internet for terrorist recruitment, and reducing the risk of conflict. It also includes a reference to multistakeholder Internet governance, which is unusual as Russia and China only tend to agree to such references in documents they negotiate with United States et al., not statements among BRICS partners. Saran and Sukumar argue that its inclusion is a testament to Indian diplomacy’s ability to inject western concepts such as multistakeholder Internet governance into a communiqué that Russia and China will support. They see India playing a strategic bridge-building role between the West and Russia and China on cyber issues, possibly reducing the animosity and mistrust between both camps. This line of thinking also applies to Brazil, and Brazilian officials do their best to ensure that they act as a moderator between both camps. At the acrimonious 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications treaty conference, Brazilian officials chaired the cybersecurity working group that aimed to reconcile the position of the United States, which didn’t want a security reference in the final treaty, and Russia and China, which did. In 2014-15, Brazil chaired the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts and tried to reconcile the gap between both camps’ views on appropriate cyber norms. The same happens at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the United Nations General Assembly, where Brazil consistently argues that multilateral and multistakeholder approaches to Internet governance are not mutually exclusive, and can coexist. There are two significant problems with India’s and Brazil’s approaches. First, China and Russia are unlikely to ever moderate their position on certain cyber issues. Russia has long advocated that the Internet should be managed by the United Nations system and that the free flow of data can pose a threat to its information space. China sees the Great Firewall as paramount to regime stability and is even willing to export its net of censorship via its Great Cannon. Both wholeheartedly reject the U.S. approach to Internet governance, so there’s no way that India or Brazil can facilitate a rapprochement. Don Quixote has a better shot at defeating a windmill. Second, by attempting to moderate the Russian and Chinese positions, India or Brazil risk lending legitimacy to them. A statement that supports a multilateral role for the management of the Internet, even if watered-down thanks to Indian or Brazilian intervention, is still antithetical to supporting an open and global Internet. According to the Russia-China-India foreign ministers communiqué, ministers emphasized the need to ensure Internet governance based on multilateralism, democracy, transparency with multi-stakeholders in their respective roles and responsibilities. They noted the need to internationalize Internet governance and to enhance in this regard the role of International Telecommunication Union. A statement like that eventually leads the United States, European countries, Australia, Canada and others to constantly question where India really stands. Last year, Indian Communications and IT Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad expressed India’s support for the multistakeholder model. With the latest communiqué, western policymakers could easily interpret it as a reversal of India’s position, despite the awkward reference to "multi-stakeholders." Clunky attempts at moderation seem to dilute the India’s position while confusing everyone else. Brazil has done similar things in the past by endorsing BRICS foreign ministers statements with similar language. All of this isn’t to say that India and Brazil should not play a bridge-building role in the international cyber debate. They absolutely should. Policymakers in Delhi and Brazil should identify issue areas where their contributions can make the biggest impact. Internet governance is probably not a good choice given the polarizing nature of the discussion. Cyber norms offer more promise, as positions aren’t nearly as entrenched. Furthermore, there’s room for negotiation as all countries have an interest in avoiding escalatory state-sponsored cyber activity that leads to conflict. It may be time for the foreign ministries in Delhi and Brasilia to reassess their efforts.

Peru’s Presidential Candidates Head to Second Round On June 5, Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, will face former finance minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru’s presidential runoff election. Questionable decisions by Peru’s electoral board in the first round—disqualifying two competitive candidates and dismissing charges of vote-buying against Fujimori and Kuczynski—boosted Fujimori and clouded the vote’s legitimacy. Now the question will be the anti-Fujimori vote and whether Kuczynski (not a natural campaigner) can consolidate her opposition—much as current president Ollanta Humala did when he beat her in 2011’s second round. Although Fujimori is popular among the rural poor, many remember the corruption and human rights abuses of her father’s presidency, and fear that she could follow in his footsteps. Corruption Arrests in Argentina and Brazil Argentine and Brazil corruption probes widened this week with new arrests in both countries. In Argentina, police detained Lázaro Báez, a wealthy businessman with close ties to former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, on charges of money laundering and embezzlement. Federal prosecutors now want to investigate Kirchner herself in the case. In Brazil, police arrested former Senator Gim Argello on evidence he accepted at least $1.5 million in bribes from two construction companies to shield their executives from facing congressional testimony. This recent round of Lava Jato raids come as Brazil’s lower house moves to impeach the president this weekend. Brazilian judges and attorneys promise the investigations will continue, whatever the outcome. Governments Respond to Panama Papers with New Laws In response to the Panama Papers, governments and international organizations are proposing new legislation to catch tax evasion, money laundering, and graft. The European Union (EU) wants to require multinationals to share tax data from their operations beyond Europe, in countries considered to be tax havens. Germany and France go further, proposing the creation of a global public registry for shell company ownership. They also call for cutting blacklisted countries off from the international banking system. Though the more ambitious efforts may falter, transparency and legal cooperation look to grow in the face of the leaks.

Tyler Falish is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program, and a student in Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. On March 22, at the request of the Moroccan government, the United Nations (UN) closed its military liaison office in Dakhla, a city in Western Sahara, the disputed stretch of sand in northwest Africa claimed by the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front. Two days earlier—also prompted by Rabat—seventy-three UN personnel were “temporarily reassigned” away from the headquarters of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). These steps—along with the threat from Rabat to call home the 2,300 soldiers and police it contributes to UN peacekeeping missions—are the kingdom’s reaction to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s use of the term “occupation” to describe the Moroccan presence in the territory on his recent visit to refugee camps in southern Algeria, home to an estimated 150,000 ethnic Sahrawis. One million Moroccans marched in Rabat on March 13 to protest the secretary-general’s remarks, calling to mind the nationally heralded Green March in 1975, in which 350,000 Moroccan civilians—escorted by 20,000 troops—walked into what is now the Western Sahara. The march led to the Madrid Accords (under which Morocco and Mauritania were given control of the territory) and to a low-intensity war fought mainly between Morocco and the Polisario Front (with the support of neighboring Algeria) that lasted until a ceasefire in 1991. That ceasefire has since been monitored by MINURSO, and the Polisario Front has threatened war unless the UN peacekeeping mission is fully restored, a decision Morocco claims is “irreversible.” The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), created by the Polisario Front in 1976, claims the entirety of Western Sahara, but controls only a thin strip—east of a 2,700 kilometer long, landmine-peppered sand berm—it calls the Free Zone. Morocco controls the remaining territory, referred to as its Southern Provinces, where most of the roughly 570,000 inhabitants of Western Sahara live. The Moroccan-held side includes the lucrative fishing of a long Atlantic coastline, all major settlements including the capital of Laayoune, and a phosphate mine contributing one-tenth of Morocco’s output. (Morocco possesses over half of the world’s phosphates reserves.) Morocco is serious about retaining control over what has been called “Africa’s Last Colony.” Morocco is the only African country not in the African Union (AU), and refuses to join unless SADR’s membership is revoked. However, the AU has reiterated its commitment to the Sahrawi right to self-determination. Although the UN Security Council has called for the hasty return of UN personnel to MINURSO, it did not release a strong statement on Western Sahara. Morocco’s plan for autonomy—and not independence—enjoys the support of the U.S. government, and Secretary Kerry recently reaffirmed that support. Although the Polisario Front enjoys some diplomatic support, Morocco has a clear military advantage, so renewed armed conflict is unlikely. This long-stalled territorial conflict will continue to play out in diplomatic statements, and there will be pressure from various parties on the Moroccan government through economic channels, as recently occurred when the European Court ruled an EU-Morocco farm trade deal to be invalid, based on a suit brought by the Polisario Front. Morocco has long been an important partner to the U.S., and the kingdom’s economic relationship with the EU continues to grow; Rabat is counting on the primacy of those factors. However, tens of thousands of Sahrawis remain in the effectively permanent refugee camps in Algeria, some entering their fifth decade of residence there. And, this issue stands in the way of the normalization of relations between Morocco and Algeria and a more integrated Maghreb, as well as the full integration of Morocco in the African community through the AU.

Tyler Falish is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program, and a student in Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. On February 6, four people—including a child—were killed and twelve injured in a coordinated grenade attack in Burundi’s capital, Bujumbura. Republican Forces of Burundi (FOREBU), an armed group opposed to President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term bid, claimed involvement in separate attacks on February 5. The recent violence continues a trend that began nine months ago, when Nkurunziza first announced his intention to seek a third term. On February 4, the African Union (AU) announced the appointment of five African heads of state to a panel tasked with convincing Nkurunziza to accept a proposed AU peacekeeping mission, called the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU). Nkurunziza has vehemently expressed his opposition to the proposal—discussion around which did not until recently directly include him—and there’s little reason to believe that the panel will change his mind. Further, there is no timeline yet associated with the panel’s charge. Despite the recent release of compelling evidence that Burundi’s security forces extrajudicially killed dozens of people on December 11, the AU has backpedaled since the December approval to send five thousand troops to Burundi under MAPROBU. Why the change of heart? In the AU’s Constitutive Act, Article 4(h) grants the AU the right to intervene in a member state, given an Assembly decision “in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.” The Peace and Security Council (PSC), which, unlike the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is composed of members elected to three- or five-year terms, invoked Article 4(h) when it initially approved MAPROBU. So one can assume that the AU’s December fact-finding mission found evidence of “grave circumstances.” But the authorization requires an affirmative Assembly decision—as well as the explicit backing of the UNSC—and driven by the Burundi government’s opposition, the AU failed to authorize the proposal at the recently concluded summit in Addis Ababa. This could indicate the PSC has little sense of the AU membership’s collective pulse. Meanwhile, Burundi won reelection to its PSC seat, running unopposed in the East Africa region. After the failed vote, PSC Commissioner Smail Chergui said, “There is will neither to occupy nor to attack,” but one could question the will of member states to participate in MAPROBU at all, especially without Burundi’s permission, as Nkurunziza has stated he would consider MAPROBU an invading force. If executed, the mission would likely be staffed by soldiers from Burundi’s immediate neighbors via the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). Questions remain as to the capacity of the EASF, but Director Ismail Chanfi announced in December that EASF “forces are ready for engagement to maintain the peace process in the region, anytime.” While the AU spins its diplomatic wheels, and the UNSC encourages “inclusive dialogue,” violence and unrest continue in Burundi. A leaked UN report suggests Rwanda is providing military training to Burundian rebels, which, whether true or not, will only strengthen Nkurunziza’s cries against “invasion.” In the “African Year of Human Rights,” the way the AU handles the situation in Burundi— with kid gloves or a firm hand—will stand testament to the strength of the Union and its resolve to pursue “African Solutions for African Problems.”

Here is a quick round-up of this week’s technology headlines and related stories you may have missed: 1. Press speculation gives misleading account of attack on Israel Electric Authority. Israel’s Electricity Authority, and not its power grid, was the target of a cyberattack this week. Employees of the agency, Israel’s utility regulator, opened emails that infected their computers with ransomware. What consisted of no more than a phishing attack on government employees was reported by the media to be an attack against the country’s electrical grid. The misunderstanding is thought to be rooted in a statement made by Israel’s Minister of Infrastructure, Energy and Water, Yuval Steinitz, who told Cybertech conference attendees in Tel Aviv that a “severe cyberattack” was ongoing against the utility regulator. The reporting of this attack is a prime example of how, even as cyberattacks become more prevalent—including actual attacks on the power grid, such as the recent incident in Ukraine—media coverage of cyber incidents frequently continues to be confused or misleading. 2. Search engine highlights problems with Internet of things. Intimate glimpses of thousands of individuals’ private lives can now be viewed by all thanks to Shodan, which launched a tool that allows users to access any webcam that isn’t password-protected. Computer security researchers have long used Shodan to identify Internet-connected devices that perhaps shouldn’t be--like certain industrial control systems. Shodan’s ability to find unprotected webcams is probably the tip of the iceberg with the Internet of things. As more and more manufacturers build devices such as refrigerators, home alarm systems and cars that connect to the Internet, the likelier it will become for just about anyone to find them online and access them.  3. Amendments to Judicial Redress Act could complicate Safe Harbor negotiations between the United States and European Union. The U.S. Senate is considering a bill--the Judicial Redress Act-- that would grant EU citizens the same privacy protections as people in the United States. The act is the centerpiece of negotiations between the United States and European Union to replace the Safe Harbor framework invalidated last fall. The bill, headed for the Senate floor, has a provision that could prove problematic for the negotiations. Inserted by John Cornyn (R-Tx), the provision requires the U.S. attorney general to certify that participating countries do not have policies that “impede the national security interests of the United States.” Although negotiators from both sides have said they want to release Safe Harbor 2.0 by the end of the month, the amendment may make it difficult to come to an agreement that would satisfy the standard set by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its ruling last October. 4. Does the self-declared Islamic State have an encrypted messaging app? Islamic state militants have allegedly created an app called Alrawi, which purportedly encrypts communications to evade foreign intelligence services. Ghost Security Group, an organization that claims to fight the Islamic State online, first brought attention to the app earlier this month, but has been unable to provide a version of Alrawi that has any cryptographic abilities. The Daily Dot--the online news website--looked into the claim and found that the app was impossible to find online and that all supposed screenshots of Alrawi were actually images of other apps. 5. Head of the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit speaks publicly. Rob Joyce, the chief of the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations--the unit that develops the tools NSA uses to access foreign networks to gather intelligence-- explained his group’s methods, the steps they take to break into systems and the challenges they face. Joyce gave his remarks at the USENIX Enigma conference, which took place this week in San Francisco. You can view his full remarks here.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Earlier this month, al-Shabab attacked an African Union (AU) base deep into AU controlled territory. This was followed up last week with an attack on civilians in AU controlled Mogadishu. The attacks reminded the world, again, that although al-Shabab has lost some of its previous stature, it remains resilient. But, a new threat looms. Recently, al-Shabab has been struggling to counter the new threat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s growing influence in East Africa. As the Islamic State gains momentum, and the rival groups compete for recruits and jockey for position, they may both use attacks on AU troops and civilians to prove their legitimacy.  Paul D. Williams recently pointed out that al-Shabab has mutated in the past several years after the AU Mission in Somalia pushed al-Shabab out of Mogadishu. The terrorist group, which Williams calls “an increasingly extremist and transnational network,” uses large scale, isolated, and sometimes international attacks to maintain relevance. The Westgate Mall attack, the attack on Garissa University, the 2010 bombings in Uganda, and the AU base attack last September are all part of this pattern. He also noted al-Shabab’s increased interest in destabilizing parts of Kenya. As the Kenyan government has often overreacted to al-Shabab attacks by targeting ethnic Somalis in Kenya, whom it blames for supporting al-Shabab, it seems likely that al-Shabab will continue attacking Kenyan targets in the hope of pushing disenfranchised Somalis toward their cause. What is perhaps more worrying is the introduction of a new power struggle within al-Shabab’s ranks. Al-Shabab is no stranger to infighting, purges, and leadership changes. But this round of infighting is unique in that it centers on the question of al-Shabab’s allegiance. Long an al-Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic State has aggressively pursued al-Shabab. Given the Islamic State’s global claims and recent expansions into Yemen and West Africa, it is not surprising that it wants to gain a foothold in East Africa. With the exception of a small number of fighters who have defected to the Islamic State, al-Shabab has thus far resisted this merger. Although it is dangerous to generalize, the group is predominately regionally focused. It lacks the global ambitions of the Islamic State. It is possible that this is one area of global jihad that the Islamic State cannot penetrate. But there are factions within al-Shabab that think the group should operate more internationally. If groups sympathetic to or aligned with the Islamic State do begin to emerge and compete for recruits and prestige in Somalia, the tempo of attacks against civilians and AU troops seems likely to increase, potentially thwarting the progress that has been made in the country. Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups will use these attacks to prove themselves. All of this is bad news for the Somali people trying to rebuild their country. Al-Shabab will continue to see these types of attacks as necessary to bolster and support its narrative and legitimacy. Upstart Islamic State groups will see the attacks as necessary for the same reason. In early December 2015, President Hassan Sheikh Mohammad wrote after the Paris attacks that Somalia would “battle against the global phenomenon” that al-Shabab and the Islamic State represent. Unfortunately, Somalia may soon be facing both.

Reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a perennial African chestnut. The UNSC is more involved in Africa than in any other region, and many Africans feel it is acutely unjust that none of the permanent members are from the continent. (The permanent members are the victorious powers in World War II: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States.) Now, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo are weighing-in. At a joint press event marking Obiang’s visit to Harare, Zimbabwe, the two presidents called for Africa to have at least one UNSC permanent member with the right to exercise a veto. Mugabe and Obiang are among the least attractive of Africa’s “presidents for life.” They are rivals for the designation of Africa’s “worst dictator.” Obiang has been chief of state since 1979, Mugabe since 1987. Obiang, whom Freedom House considers “one of the world’s most kleptocratic living autocrats,” has accumulated a personal fortune estimated by Forbes (in 2006) at $600 million, far eclipsing Mugabe, whose net worth is estimated at a paltry (in comparison) $10 million. Security Council reform, with a permanent seat for an African country (or any other for that matter), is not on any realistic agenda, not least because the permanent members are far from a consensus. Among African states, there is no agreement as to which country should get a permanent seat should that ever become a possibility. Nigeria and South Africa both insist that it is the most appropriate candidate. But, the call by Mugabe, the current Chairman of the African Union (AU), and Obiang for Security Council reform may have been intended to burnish somewhat their sordid images before the upcoming AU meeting in Addis Ababa. The 26th AU Summit launches the “African Year of Human Rights.”

A defining feature of twenty-first century multilateralism is the rising prominence of alternative forms of collective action as complements to—and often substitutes for—traditional intergovernmental cooperation. Conventional bodies—chief among them, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions—may persist, but states increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible, ad hoc frameworks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities. These institutions are often “minilateral” rather than universal; voluntary rather than legally binding; disaggregated rather than comprehensive; trans-governmental rather than just intergovernmental; regional rather than global; multi-level and multi-stakeholder rather than state-centric; and “bottom-up” rather than “top-down.” We see this across issue areas, from the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) in the realm of economic cooperation, to the growing importance of regional organizations like the African Union and ASEAN, to the emergence of alternative international financial institutions, like the BRICS New Development Bank. Is this patchwork quilt of international cooperation a good thing? The answer isn’t black or white. Such ad hoc, disaggregated approaches to international cooperation bring certain advantages, including speed, flexibility, modularity, and possibilities for experimentation. Still, the benefits of minilateralism should not be exaggerated—nor should its risks be ignored. Unless used deftly and judiciously, minilateralism could undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of indispensable international organizations and even accelerate the world’s coalescence into rival coalitions. I invite you to explore these themes in my new article [PDF] for Global Summitry, in which I trace the origins of minilateralism, its advantages, and its potential downsides—for the United States, and for global governance more broadly.

This is a guest post by Fily Camara, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. He is a masters candidate at New York University. Intra-African trade has been only eleven percent of the continent’s total trade over the last decade. By comparison, more than sixty percent of Europe’s trade is intra-continental. The equivalent figure for North America is about 45 percent and for Asia it is about twenty-five percent. The small scale of Africa’s intra-continental trade reflects the continent’s dependence on foreign markets for the vast majority of their trade relations. African policymakers, as well as their Western counterparts, have long acknowledged the need for more intra-continental trade. It is a paradox that, for much of Africa’s postcolonial history, it has been a pioneer in regional integration. In addition to the African Union (AU), there are eight, smaller regional economic communities—many of which have successfully implemented common currencies and external tariffs in addition to cooperating on matters of security and justice. Nevertheless, commerce among countries in Africa remains low, with significant negative development ramifications. The emphasis in current African development discourse has been to encourage partnerships in which foreign governments and corporations can help African economies through mutually beneficial cooperation and joint business ventures. This concept is summarized by the phrase, “trade not aid.” Given the political and economic instability many African countries face, their desire to secure agreements and partnerships with the relatively stable and wealthy markets of the European Union, the United States, Japan, or China is understandable. However, when an African country’s economic success is subject to foreign markets, it is at the mercy of factors beyond its control. Such has been the case for much of the past year and a half. In June 2014 the price of oil began its decent from $140 per barrel to below $40 in recent days. For Africa’s crude-dependent countries this has severely troubled governments and economic outlooks. In 2015, China’s slowing growth rate was a factor in the worldwide plummet in demand for commodities highlighting the vulnerability of African states to international shocks. Where the United States and Europe can rely on established domestic consumer markets to spur economic activity, African exporters often have little insulation from the macroeconomic trends and political events afflicting the world. Observers cite a number of causes for the low levels of trade amongst African countries. The legacy of colonialism is, among other things, one of poor, extraction-oriented infrastructure and illogical borders that have left some countries with significant geographic disadvantages. Today, inadequate transportation networks, security concerns, persistent protectionism, poor data collection, and a lack of information sharing exacerbate the consequences of colonialism. Recent initiatives to address intra-continental trade appear promising. In 2012, the AU decided to establish a Pan-Africa Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. It also endorsed an Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade. Tangible steps toward achieving the objectives in these plans were taken in June 2015 when the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area. In late November, the AU reaffirmed its intention to use intra-continental trade to create a “prosperous and peaceful Africa by 2063.” Increasing intra-state trade in Africa would be an important step toward improving the continent’s development outlook. It would encourage competition among states to create an attractive climate for business and industry. Moreover, infrastructure could be improved, and the flow of people and ideas across borders could spur innovation. Eventually, the costs of goods could decline as shipping between African countries becomes easier, and getting certain goods from other continents less necessary. Additionally, a Pan-Africa CFTA would be the world’s largest by population and could provide Africa with the clout necessary to negotiate more favorable conditions in regional and sectoral trade agreements and World Trade Organization negotiation rounds. If properly managed and implemented, linked and diversified economies may be one answer to Africa’s development quandary.

Although President Obama’s Asia trip earlier this month was overshadowed by the international response to the Paris attacks and debates in the United States about refugee policy, the president’s visit to Malaysia and the Philippines did offer several lessons about U.S. relations with Southeast Asia. The Obama visits to Southeast Asia, part of a longer trip that included the G-20 summit in Turkey, were intended to demonstrate the administration’s commitment to the pivot in Southeast Asia. Part of that commitment has included ensuring that high-level U.S. officials, including the president, regularly attend Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summits. Previous U.S. administrations had been criticized in Southeast Asia for not sending top officials to ASEAN meetings. Although the president did make it to the ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the fact that many of his press briefings during the trip focused, naturally, on counterterrorism policy and refugee policy, undermined some of the administration’s efforts to use the trip to highlight the importance of Southeast Asia. There was little Obama could do about this, but even administration officials admitted to Reuters that the timing of the refugee policy debates “could hardly have been worse,” and that the Asia portion of the trip did not happen as the White House had planned. The Southeast Asia visit also confirmed that the White House has developed a strong bond with Malaysian Prime Minister Najib tun Razak. Despite significant evidence of a growing crackdown on dissent in Malaysia---on the eve of Obama’s trip, Human Rights Watch released an extensive report chronicling the intensifying repression of Malaysian activists, opposition politicians, journalists, and other government critics---Obama offered no public critique of Najib’s policies. (The president reportedly brought up the climate for free expression in Malaysia and the need for transparency in government in a private conversation with Najib, and Obama did meet with a group of Malaysian civil society activists.) In contrast, when Obama visited Cambodia in 2012, he spent a significant portion of a private meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen discussing human rights and political freedoms, and Obama’s spokespeople were not shy, after the bilateral meeting, of mentioning that rights had been a focus of the meeting. Despite its domestic challenges, which include not only the reported crackdown on dissent but also scandals swirling around over $600 million deposited into Najib’s personal accounts, Najib’s government has proven an effective partner for the United States in counterterrorism cooperation, in building a potential deterrent to Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and on other strategic issues. (In a new piece, The Diplomat details the extent of U.S.-Malaysia counterterrorism cooperation.) It is unlikely that, were Malaysia’s opposition coalition to take over government sometime in the future, its leaders would be less interested in close strategic ties with the United States. Still, with the Malaysian opposition in turmoil, and no obvious contenders to Najib emerging within the governing coalition, it may appear to the White House that there is little alternative to the prime minister anyway. In addition, the Obama trip revealed that, despite ASEAN’s continuing internal divisions about how to approach South China Sea disputes, the overall level of fear of China within the organization’s members is rising. At the summit in Kuala Lumpur, the United States and ASEAN signed an agreement to create a new “strategic partnership.” Although for now the U.S.-ASEAN strategic partnership is mostly a symbolic document, it sends a signal to Beijing that not only the most aggrieved Southeast Asian nations, like Vietnam and the Philippines, but all of the Southeast Asian nations, are seeking more assertive ways to hedge against China’s rising maritime power.

At an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit last week, Southeast Asian leaders signed an agreement creating an “ASEAN Community.” The Diplomat reports that the “Community,” much discussed by Southeast Asian media and leaders in recent years, will be “a step towards realizing the idea of a three-pillared community to deepen regional integration first proposed in 2003 comprising an ASEAN Political and Security Community; an ASEAN Economic Community; and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.” All the specifics of what these communities will entail have not been finalized, despite long “blueprints” proposed by ASEAN for each of the communities. The most developed idea is the Economic Community, which is supposed to be the creation of a single regional market for goods and services. And yet the three-pronged community, which technically comes into effect on December 31, will not do much to change perceptions that ASEAN, never a strong organization, is now weaker than it has been in years. Although ASEAN had planned to have the Economic Community completed this year, it remains only about eighty percent finished, with the countries yet to reach agreement on the most contentious goods and services. Most of the countries that traditionally lead ASEAN are preoccupied with domestic politics, and the smaller and/or poorer nations cannot step into the void. Thailand is still reeling from years of political turmoil and is ruled by a military regime, Malaysia is consumed by alleged scandals involving a state fund and the prime minister, and Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo, is focused on domestic reforms. Singapore has strong bilateral relationships with countries throughout the Pacific Rim, and also cannot effectively lead ASEAN itself. Meanwhile, ASEAN’S Secretary General, former Vietnamese deputy foreign minister Le Luong Minh, has proven a very reticent leader himself, compared to his predecessor as Secretary General, former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan. And the organization has proven ineffective in addressing several of the most important regional nontraditional security issues of the past year, including a refugee outflow from Myanmar and one of the worst haze crises in decades. ASEAN’s rotating chairmanship only exacerbates these challenges. The organization’s weakness will even more evident next year, when Laos takes over the chair. While Malaysian officials and leaders may have been preoccupied by domestic politics, hampering their ability to handle ASEAN affairs, Laos is perhaps the least-equipped nation in the group to serve as chair. Although Brunei has a much smaller population than Laos, the sultanate has a retinue of capable diplomats, and when Brunei served as chair in 2013, it won applause from Southeast Asian leaders and officials for managing the hundreds of ASEAN meetings effectively. During Brunei’s 2013 chairmanship, ASEAN briefly resolved its internal tensions over the South China Sea, after countries in the group could not agree on a joint statement on the Sea in 2012, a time when Cambodia was ASEAN chair. In contrast to Brunei, Laos has few skilled officials and diplomats---even fewer than Myanmar, which chaired ASEAN in 2014. Laos’ 2016 chairmanship also will highlight the fact that, for all its meetings and its rhetorical commitments to human rights and inclusiveness, ASEAN remains essentially a leaders’ organization---even more so than other regional groupings like the European Union. Laos’ authoritarian government has refused to allow civil society groups from across Southeast Asia to meet in Laos during an ASEAN summit next year. (Civil society organizations from across the regional have been meeting at ASEAN summits regularly.) Radio Free Asia’s Laos service reports that Vientiane refused to allow the civil society meeting, “citing potential criticism by participants against governments in the region and inadequate resources as among reasons for the decision.” While leaders of some of the more democratic ASEAN states, like the Philippines and Indonesia, might offer some token support for civil society groups from their countries, no ASEAN leaders are going to spend much time trying to persuade Laos’ government to allow the meeting.

Following Friday’s horrific assault on Paris—the world’s most vibrant monument to the open society—there is a welcome global determination to crush the Islamic State. There can be no negotiation with this apocalyptic movement. The international response against the perpetrators must be, in the words of French President François Hollande, “pitiless.” Achieving this aim will require a broad coalition, including not only NATO allies but also strange bedfellows like Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. There will be necessary debates, of course—about whether to introduce Western (including U.S.) ground forces in Syria and Iraq, about whether to treat the Assad regime as an enemy, bystander, or partner in this effort, and about how the West can escalate its involvement without sparking the global religious war that ISIS desires. An effective response will require the Obama administration to be out in front: there must be no leading from behind in this effort. For the West, including the United States, three priorities stand out: Invoke NATO’s Article 5: The Paris attacks, which President Hollande termed “an act of war,” clearly justify France’s invoking the collective defense provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that an attack on any of the NATO allies is an attack on all. Although created to defend the West from the Soviets, NATO has invoked Article 5 only once before in its history, following the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington. Invoking Article 5 will have several immediate benefits: broadening the coalition to all twenty-eight NATO member states, enhancing intelligence cooperation among France and its allies, and permitting NATO to coordinate the air war against ISIS, as well as to provide unified command and control for the thousands of troops (beginning with special forces) that the alliance will surely have on the ground in Syria and Iraq within weeks. As in Afghanistan’s Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO will provide a useful platform for other non-NATO partners—including the Gulf states, and hopefully eventually even Russia and Iran—to conduct coordinated strikes against ISIS. As former French President Nicholas Sarkozy noted outside the Elyseé Palace, “There cannot be two coalitions in Syria.” Secure Europe’s Borders while Remaining Humane: Even before the attacks, the European Union was in turmoil over its unpoliced borders, as it grappled with an unprecedented (and ongoing) flow of refugees from Syria and other global conflict zones. The mass influx, like the Eurozone crisis before it, exposed growing fault lines among EU members, dividing Germany and other governments that had thrown out the welcome mat from countries like Hungary, which objected to being forced to absorb alien populations. As sovereignty trumped solidarity, borders and fences have begun to reemerge, threatening one of the EU’s proudest accomplishments—free movement within the twenty-six nations Schengen Area. Just last week Donald Tusk, president of the EU Council of Ministers, warned that “saving Schengen is a race against time.” The Paris attacks have added a third “s” to the mix, more powerful than either sovereignty or solidarity: security. France has reimposed strict border controls, and other countries will surely do the same. This is nothing short of a disaster for Syrian (and other) refugees, who will increasingly find themselves suspected of sympathy for (or complicity in) the atrocities of the very terrorists they had fled. EU leaders must find some way of securing the rights and safety of asylum seekers while their claims are processed, even as they take immediate steps to strengthen the Union’s external borders to stem off more draconian demands from far-right parties. And if Schengen is to be saved over the long term, the price to be paid will likely be the creation of a robust, EU-wide border protection service. Reaffirm the Goals of the Paris Climate Conference: The assault on Paris occurred just two weeks before the opening of the pivotal twenty-first Conference of Parties (COP-21) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The juxtaposition has led some critics in the United States to excoriate the Obama administration for fixating on global warming, even as ISIS expands its reach and its slaughter of the innocents. This critique is absurd and irresponsible. A recurrent challenge in foreign policy is to be able to focus on the immediate and urgent while not losing sight of the long-term and important. ISIS presents a clear and present danger to international peace and the values of civilization. Global warming presents a potentially catastrophic threat to human survival on the planet. As the world’s most powerful nation, the United States cannot afford to choose between one or the other: it must be able to walk and chew gum at the same time. President Obama plans to attend the Paris summit, along with more than one hundred other world leaders. The U.S. goal in Paris must be to achieve a breakthrough agreement among the assembled parties for the most ambitious reductions in greenhouse gas emissions ever attempted—with robust monitoring mechanisms to gauge progress. The attacks in Paris do not change this. November 13, 2015, has joined a growing list of somber dates on the calendar. With each atrocity, terrorists test both the resolve and the wisdom of their targets, and the resilience of civilization itself. Let us endeavor, in crafting a collective response to this latest outrage, to respond firmly and resolutely, without descending into the barbarism of our adversaries.