Regional Organizations

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addresses the 53-member African Union at the AU's headquarters in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, June 13, 2011. (Courtesy Reuters/Stringer) There seems to be a new flurry of Obama administration diplomatic engagement with Africa. While it is not necessarily in response to African criticism that President Obama, whose father was Kenyan, does not pay enough attention to sub-Saharan Africa, it highlights the complexities of balancing our sometimes contradictory interests in Africa. Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Tanzania, Zambia, and Ethiopia, becoming the first secretary of state to address the African Union. The purpose of her trip was to emphasize the Obama administration’s commitment to democracy, good governance, economic development (in particular, the African Growth and Opportunity Act), and public health. Michelle Obama, along with her daughters and mother, will tour the continent from June 21 to 26, with planned stops in South Africa and Botswana. The first lady’s trip to South Africa will emphasize the role of African youth and underscore the country’s democratic transition: she will speak at forum on women leaders in Africa; tour Robben Island, where Nelson Mandela was incarcerated for eighteen years; and meet with South African President Jacob Zuma, among other activities. The trip will bound to have a very high profile in Africa. In Washington, President Obama recently received Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Ali Bongo Ondimba of Gabon. Both have oil and the latter has a notoriously poor record on corruption and human rights abuses, contrary to the democracy and good governance agenda highlighted by the first lady and secretary’s African travel, though the White House reports that President Obama raised human rights issues during his latter meeting.

Toys depicting troops of different nations are seen on a plan for the "Peace Mission 2010" exercises at the Matybulak military range in southern Kazakhstan (Shamil Zhumatov/ Courtesy Reuters). The Internationalist spent last week in Beijing, where Chinese officials were feverishly anticipating Wednesday’s tenth annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Astana, Kazakhstan. But their excitement may be premature; considerable hurdles of internal rivalry and foreign reticence to cooperate with the SCO may stymie its emergence as a major regional institution. The SCO began in 2001 as a successor to the Shanghai Five group with the limited agenda of promoting confidence-building and ensuring regional security in Central Asia among China and Russia (clearly in the drivers’ seat) and the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Over time it’s also acquired four “observer” states—India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan—and two “dialogue partners”—Belarus and Sri Lanka, and its activities and aspirations have expanded considerably. It’s become a broader forum for a range of security, political, and economic issues, from drug trafficking to trade, as well as for expressing anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiments. Ministerial networks now link senior officials in fields from commerce and transport to culture and internal security. The SCO conducts biannual military exercises (dubbed “peace missions”), which are dominated by Chinese and Russian troops and typically simulate a response to regime collapse or major terrorist attack. The United Nations now welcomes the SCO as an observer, and ASEAN has signed a memorandum of understanding with it. But Chinese-Russian rivalry is real, and growing. While both disapprove of the post-2001 surge of U.S. presence in Central Asia and united in 2005 to call for the elimination of U.S. military bases in the region, bilateral relations deteriorated after the Russian invasion of Georgia. The two actively compete for influence among the SCO’s weaker players, especially as China deepens economic and political presence in Kazakhstan. Furthermore, Russia and the Central Asian members are enthusiastic about India’s bid for membership, which will be considered at the 2011 Astana summit, whereas China remains lukewarm, given its growing strategic competition with India. The group will also consider creating an “energy club” at Astana, though Russia envisions a cartel that would benefit producers, while China is more interested in ensuring the security of sufficient supplies to meet its ravenous national demand. More broadly, the two countries differ on the SCO’s primary value. China wants the organization to promote economic cooperation. Over the past decade, China’s trade with SCO members has soared seven-fold, from $12.1 billion to $90 billion. Still, Beijing remains dissatisfied with the pace of economic integration, which has been slowed by Moscow’s general reticence and Central Asian countries’ hesitance to expose their economies to Chinese competition. Russia, by contrast, values the SCO as a counterweight, and potentially even a geopolitical rival, to NATO. After initial skepticism, the United States is increasingly willing to engage with the SCO. After the SCO issued its 2005 communiqué calling for a U.S. timeline for withdrawing from Central Asian military bases, the United States went to great lengths diplomatically “to make sure that the organization didn’t repeat that call,” as my colleague Evan Feigenbaum notes. (The United States was, however, evicted from the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan). Although the United States was denied observer status in the SCO in 2005, Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake this March expressed interest in cooperating with the organization, including on counterterrorism and counter narcotics efforts. Still, the SCO’s emergence as a true military alliance and coherent geopolitical rival to the Western alliance seems implausible, given rivalry between Beijing and Moscow. (This will be even more so if India joins, further complicating the picture.) Accordingly, as Zhao Huasheng of Fudan University observes, the SCO will not coordinate member state strategy across Eurasia, nor attempt to influence the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific. Close cooperation with international partners could also be deeply problematic. One of the most disturbing aspects of the SCO, from a U.S. and broader Western perspective, is its status as a caucus of authoritarian states that categorically reject universal norms of human rights and political liberty, apparently intent on cementing an “autocratic peace” in Central Asia. As the New York-based group Human Rights in China points out in a new white paper, members have repeatedly used the bogeyman of terrorism to crush internal political dissent. Like a latter-day Holy Alliance, the SCO has stood firm against any whiff of “color revolutions.” In May 2005, the body backed bloody repression by the Uzbek government in Andijon. Four years later, the SCO secretariat declared complete support for China’s crackdown on ethnic riots in Xinjiang province. For this reason, Washington should encourage Indian membership, since it would add at least one democracy—and U.S. strategic partner—to the organization. The Astana summit will also consider Afghanistan’s application for observer status—a prospect that leaves U.S. officials wary. While Washington has repeatedly encouraged Afghanistan’s neighbors to become more involved in reconstruction efforts there, the United States has little interest in seeing that country fall into China’s orbit. Still, it seems inevitable that the SCO will expand its presence in Southwest Asia, the source of many of its non-traditional security concerns, including border security, terrorism, drug trafficking and other transnational crimes.  In addition, the winding down of Operation Enduring Freedom will leave a vacuum, one likely to draw the SCO more into the region. Viewed in this light, Afghanistan’s SCO affiliation could provide a stabilizing (if non-democratic) influence, as well as assistance for reconstruction, as some Chinese observers have endorsed. As the United States prepares to leave Afghanistan, Washington will be looking for a platform for dialogue among the major players in the region, and should keep cooperation with the SCO in its playbook. While I won’t join the chorus calling the SCO a “NATO of the East,” the United States can’t ignore it.

ASEAN leaders walk after they held a retreat at the 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta May 8, 2011. (Supri Supri/Courtesy Reuters) This past week’s ASEAN Summit in Jakarta only further highlighted the organization’s continuing impotence at a time when the United States is reengaging with ASEAN and, Indonesia, returning to its role as regional power, is trying to make ASEAN work more effectively. The first U.S. ambassador to ASEAN has arrived, and Indonesian officials have become more involved in everything from Myanmar to the ongoing border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Yet the organization itself still lacks coherence, strong leadership, and speed, and it increasingly appears likely that it will never have these characteristics. Despite Indonesia’s best intentions, ASEAN mediation has produced few results in the Thai-Cambodian dispute, and the organization has not been able to resolve another lingering problem: Myanmar is in line to host the 2014 ASEAN summit, which would almost surely mean the U.S. president will not attend any meetings with ASEAN that year, since he or she will not want to appear to support Myanmar. Some of the more democratic members of ASEAN, including the Philippines and Indonesia, wanted Myanmar to relinquish this right, as it had in the past, but as usual with ASEAN, the organization could reach no consensus--ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan just endorsed Myanmar’s right to host --and so the likely result will be some kind of muddle. ASEAN’s leadership abilities are only going to get weaker. Though Singapore’s recent election was a step forward for open politics in the city state, it did result in the loss of a seat for longtime foreign minister George Yeo, who has been a driving force for stronger ASEAN leadership and action. Moreover, in the next few years the organization will absorb Timor Leste as its eleventh member, a correct decision, given Timor’s tough history, but one that will only slow down policymaking even more.

An anti-government protester flees after riot police fire rounds of tear gas to disperse them in the mainly Shi'ite village of Diraz (Hamad Mohammed/Courtesy Reuters) After being completely unplugged and out-of-touch for the better part of last week, I have returned to find that among a number of interesting (really, horrifying) developments in the Middle East, a Bahraini military court has sentenced four protesters to death for the alleged murder of two policemen. The fact that all four are Shia is only going to aggravate already rather tense relations between the Sunni minority and the Shia majority.  I traveled to Bahrain a bunch of times in the mid-2000s  and while it had a reputation for being a more open and generally laid back place than either Saudi Arabia or Qatar, the ruling Khalifa family have long ensured the island’s security with an iron fist.  Although the protests in Bahrain have coincided with uprisings around the region, they are nothing new.  The Bahraini authorities have often resorted to the use of force to keep the streets quiet. King Hamad made a good show of undertaking political reform in 2001, promulgating a new constitution in 2002, and also in 2002, reinstating a parliament that had been suspended for 27 years.  It did not amount to much.  Parties were banned, though something called “political societies” were permitted.  Human rights activists who highlighted the shortcoming of the Bahraini system were often harassed and arrested.  The whole window dressing quality to Hamad’s reform was brought into sharp relief for me in 2005 when I visited members of the Shura Council—the upper house of the parliament.  They didn’t seem to know exactly what they were supposed to do and broke into an argument about it among each other as I munched on sweets and watched the back and forth . At around the same time, Bahrain’s heir apparent, Crown Prince Salman (The American University in Washington  class of 1991), sought to ameliorate the sectarian tensions on the island with a program of “Bahrainization” of the workforce.  The goal was to create more employment opportunities for the Shia majority in order to give them a “stake in the system” thereby reducing political tensions.  Salman asked the consulting firm McKinsey to help out, but the Crown Prince’s efforts did not have the desired effect. This was mostly because, Bahraini employers have become hooked on cheap labor from South Asia and were reluctant to pay the higher wages—Bahrain’s overvalued dinar makes Manama the London of the Middle East in terms of cost of living and doing business— that citizens demand. Although Salman deserves credit for trying to address Shia economic dislocation, he made the fundamental mistake that Middle Eastern leaders have long made by emphasizing economic solution to political problems.   These guys are either the last Marxists—they believe every political development has some underlying economic explanation—or they are manifestly unable to confront reality.  To be sure, Bahrain’s Shia have economic grievances as do many people all over the Middle East, but we shouldn’t lose sight of the importance of ideas in this season of Arab unrest.  Bahrain’s protests like those in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are about politics—people are demanding their freedom and basic human rights.  If it was anything else, Bahrain’s military tribunal would not be sentencing protesters to death.

An anti-Gbagbo protester holds a portrait of presidential claimant Alassane Ouattara during a demonstration in Abobo. (Luc Gnago/Courtesy Reuters) As of mid day on April 6, Laurent Gbagbo, the French government, and Allasane Outtarra are still maneuvering around the terms of Gbagbo’s departure. International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo is seeking support from at least one of the members of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) to refer alleged human rights abuses in Cote d’Ivoire to the ICC at The Hague. Ocampo mentions “alleged mass killings in the Western part of the country”—clearly a reference to the hundreds found dead in the Ivorian town of Duékoué. While both sides share responsibility for killings in Cote d’Ivoire, in the western media at least, Gbagbo’s Young Patriots (irregulars loyal only to himself) appear most culpable. The potential for new ICC involvement in Cote d’Ivoire may complicate negotiations for Gbagbo’s departure and make the latter more intransigent. Gbagbo’s allies and supporters are likely to argue that  the ICC does not respect Ivorian sovereignty. There are over twenty cases at The Hague related to crimes committed in Africa—and none anywhere else. Some African leaders on this basis allege that the ICC’s prosecutors are biased against Africa.

A street vendor sells nuts during a demonstration against the government in Amman (Muhammad Hamed/Courtesy Reuters) Tabler on Syria Assad: Reformer no more? What is it about assassinations? MEI editor blog and Zeinobia on Sadat’s assassination What will get you arrested in Bahrain these days Mahmood’s Den What’s happening in Jordan Blogger Black Iris on reform One of the worst articles on the Middle East in recent history Vogue on Asma al-Assad Check here in the Wall Street Journal for a great response.

A boy watches as residents prepare to leave Abidjan from a bus station in Adjame March 20, 2011. (Luc Gnago/Courtesy Reuters) Despite the intense media coverage of the conflict in Libya and the relative neglect of Cote d’Ivoire, the crises are remarkably similar. Both have overwhelming humanitarian dimensions. Fighting has led to internal displacement and refugee flows as well as civilian bloodshed. But international response has been dramatically different. In Libya, western powers have engaged in military strikes while in Cote d’Ivoire, they have limited their response to diplomatic statements and sanctions. Relevant regional organizations have similarly been inconsistent. The African Union, early in the crisis, suggested intervention might be an option in Cote d’Ivoire, which it has since backed away from. The AU came out strongly against it in Libya. The Arab League came out in support of a no-fly zone in Libya, but has since begun to express reservations. The question is why has the international community reacted so differently?

A member of the European Union Election Observation Mission stands beside his luggage as he arrives in the Nigerian capital Abuja. (Afolabi Sotunde/Courtesy Reuters) In advance of Nigeria’s elections in April, the European Union Election Observation Mission has deployed 52 Long Term Election Observers to cover rural and urban areas of the country, with an additional 60 Short Term Observers arriving prior to the general election period. I will be paying particularly close attention to what they report. In my view, in 2007 the European Union Election Observation Mission provided the most straightforward account of the largely fraudulent elections in Nigeria. The EU team’s successful coverage of the 2007 elections stemmed not only from the early deployment of Long Term Observers but also because their coverage of the country was so extensive.

[cetsEmbedGmap src=http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&hl=en&msa=0&ll=7.885147,13.535156&spn=101.383764,158.027344&z=3&msid=215110937314986215762.00049ec76b411dfaf6c29 width=570 height=425 marginwidth=0 marginheight=0 frameborder=0 scrolling=no] Click on map placemarks for more details. Zoom in and out for a better look. I have been paying particular attention this past week to the following: Libya The Arab League and the African Union have taken diametrically opposed positions on a Libyan no-fly zone or other forms of foreign intervention for humanitarian purposes. With the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, we anticipate that some Western nations and possibly others will start military action this weekend. Libyan strongman Qaddafi is calling for a cease-fire, but it’s not clear what that means. We will be watching closely for the reaction from African governments to the prospect of outside military intervention, particularly any formal response from the African Union. Note, however, that the African countries currently serving as non-permanent members on the UN Security Council—Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa—all voted in favor of the resolution. Cote d’Ivoire Gbagbo is still hanging on to power, with speculation that if he can get through March he may remain in office for a long time. We continue to watch Cote d’Ivoire’s apparent descent into civil war and the high likelihood of appalling humanitarian consequences. Along with the New York Times, I continue to be concerned that Cote d’Ivoire has lost the international community’s attention. Note, however, that on March 17 UN officials requested increased “effort and funding" to deal with the worsening humanitarian situation in the country. Kenya Kibaki’s attempts to sideline the current International Criminal Court cases against Kenyan political leaders—the “Ocampo Six”—have largely failed. The Hague issued summons on March 8 for the six suspects’ Pre-trial Chamber appearances on April 7 and 8, and we will be observing the legal proceedings closely, not least because of the political effects in Nairobi. I am skeptical of claims from Kibaki’s party that the ICC trials would exacerbate ethnic conflict in Kenya.

Zimbabwe's President Mugabe attends the 16th African Union summit in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa. (Thomas Mukoya/Courtesy Reuters) Despite Qaddafi’s use of African mercenaries and the subsequent backlash against African migrant workers, the African Union has condemned the potential use of foreign intervention in Libya. This decision contrasts starkly with the Arab League’s recent call for a no-fly zone. The AU’s decision implies some support for Qaddafi and highlights sub-Saharan Africa’s strong opposition to outside military intervention. This is not entirely surprising: Qaddafi has been an important financier of the AU in the past, and he has backing within the organization, notably from Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. There is probably some implicit support as well among at least a few African strong men who have an interest in the failure of North Africa’s popular uprisings.

Suspected African mercenaries stand in a room within a courthouse as they are held by anti-government protesters in Benghazi February 25, 2011. (Suhaib Salem/Courtesy Reuters) Numerous, credible reports suggest Muammar Qaddafi has employed sub-Saharan African mercenaries against his own people in order to hang on to power. Some commentators even say that his mercenaries will fire on civilians at Qaddafi’s behest, in contrast to Egyptian soldiers who refused to kill their fellow countrymen to protect then-president Hosni Mubarak. Qaddafi has long had sub-Saharan African ambitions, employing grandiose pan-African rhetoric and promoting national unification schemes that never materialized. He has also meddled in the internal affairs of his weak sub-Saharan neighbors. Qaddafi even took on Nigeria, the West African hegemon. When Nigeria was experiencing religious and sectarian conflict last year, he publicly advocated the division of the country in two. He has also paid a significant share of the African Union’s bills. Qaddafi’s use of mercenaries as his personal security force demonstrates the darker side of his pan-African ambitions. Apparently, Qaddafi built up his personal African mercenary corps while he starved the regular Libyan military for funds. However, even if Qaddafi is able to hang on to power, his use of mercenaries will likely greatly diminish his stature among sub-Saharan African leaders. Qaddafi’s private military force also highlights the impotence of the 1977 Anti-Mercenary Convention, a regional treaty from the Organization of African Unity (the African Union’s precursor). Qaddafi’s use of mercenaries may also provoke an ugly reaction to Libya’s large sub-Saharan migrant worker population, most of which are drawn to the availability of jobs in the oil-rich, under-populated country. Should such a reaction materialize, I suspect many sub-Saharan Africans will try to flee the country, creating another humanitarian challenge for neighboring African governments and the international community.

Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Equatorial Guinea's President and new African Union (AU) Chairman, speaks during a news conference at the closing ceremony of the 16th African Union Summit, in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa, January 31, 2011. (Thomas Mukoya/Courtesy Reuters) The appointment of Equatorial Guinea president Teodoro Obiang as chairman of the African Union will likely hinder theAU’s ability to resolve the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire. Obiang, in power since 1979, has regularly been accused of corruption, election rigging, and human rights abuses. In November 2010, French courts opened investigations into his personal wealth, and the U.S. Senate issued a report early last year, “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States,” that includes a detailed case study on Obiang’s son’s suspected money laundering in the United States. The shift of AU leadership comes at a time when the unity among African leaders has also begun to fracture. Despite ECOWAS’ insistence that challenger Alassane Ouattara was the electoral victor in Cote d’Ivoire and early threats of military intervention from neighboring countries, Ghana and Nigeria have both backed away from the direct use of force. In southern and eastern Africa, South African president Jacob Zuma and Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, supported by Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos, have called for an investigation into the electoral results, which appears to be underway. Reports have also surfaced that Zimbabwe supplied arms to Gbagbo near the end of 2010. In the meantime, Cote d’Ivoire’s stalemate will continue with the accompanying violence and economic decline. h/t to Asch Harwood.

National flags of the U.S. and China are seen in front of an international hotel in Beijing January 17, 2011. (Jason Lee/Courtesy Reuters) In the most recent issue of Current History, I have an article that examines the truth and myths of the idea that the 21st century will be dominated by Asia. Though China, India, and other rising Asian powers obviously have made major economic gains over the past two decades, and have begun to use their economic might to expand their diplomatic and military reach, their ultimate ascent to equality with the United States is still far from assured. In addition, though Asia has come some ways in regional integration, led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in many ways its divisions still loom larger than its unifying forces.

Of all the actors implicated in the release this past weekend of Aung San Suu Kyi, surely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations was among those who reaped the least benefit. Since admitting Myanmar in the late 1990s, ASEAN has realized that the decision was an enormous mistake, since the junta’s behavior wound up dominating ASEAN meetings, discussions with the United States and other outside powers, and tarnishing the group’s reputation. By getting the Obama administration to meet with ASEAN leaders even though Myanmar sat at the table, ASEAN thought it had finally extracted itself from being beholden to the junta in Naypyidaw. But no. With Suu Kyi’s release, which puts pressure on the junta to allow her to travel and re-form her political organization and puts the international spotlight on Myanmar again, ASEAN will again be dominated by the Myanmar issue, which will paralyze meetings of the organization and, potentially (if the junta commits another atrocity against Suu Kyi and her party), will create a new divide between ASEAN and Western partners like the United States and the European Union. ASEAN hasn’t exactly helped itself, either. ASEAN head Surin Pitsuwan, who as a Thai official was known for relatively principled stances on human rights, all but endorsed the Myanmar election before it happened, even though it was sure to be rigged. Following the poll, Vietnam, who holds the rotating chair of ASEAN, praised the obviously flawed election as a “significant step forward,” a statement reflecting the overall ASEAN position. Before Suu Kyi was released, ASEAN foreign ministers discussed her imprisonment with the Burmese foreign minister, who simply told them Myanmar would follow the law on her case, as if Myanmar were Britain or Japan, with a real functioning legal system. The foreign ministers did little more. To be sure, a few ASEAN members, like the Philippines, have consistently criticized the Myanmar junta’s human rights abuses, but they are relative outliers among the group, most of whom, of course, are either authoritarian states or have suffered their own regressions from democracy in recent years. But even the more repressive members of ASEAN can see that Myanmar does not even follow the limited and basic rules set down for the group, instead flouting all of its norms. Perhaps ASEAN should think, once again, about whether it might kick Myanmar out. (Photo: Na Son Nguyen/Pool/courtesy Reuters)

Istanbul—I arrived late last night to this stunningly beautiful city. The rain was a welcome change from choking hot Cairo. Keeping with the food theme of my first post from Egypt, the dish pictured above was today’s lunch—Iskender Kebab—a heart stopping combination of thinly sliced meat, yogurt, and grilled tomatoes and peppers all served over slice of thick crusty bread. Not for the cholestorally challenged… There has been a lot in the news recently about Turkey’s identity. Has Turkey been “lost”? is a question that people in Washington have been asking a lot recently. The answer is no, but Ankara’s traditional relationships are changing. This has prompted me to think about the European Union—passé, I know. It’s hard to imagine, especially among Turks, Americans, and Europeans who are committed to Turkey’s EU project, but maybe, just maybe, we’ve (I include myself in this category) been wrong all along. Turkey does not need to be a member of Europe to be a fully democratic and prosperous country. It’s long been an accepted truth in the Turkey-watching community that the EU was an anchor of Turkish political reform. The structure of Turkish politics was such that Ankara needed the incentive of EU membership to drive democratic change. Many Turks believe this as well, but after 58% of voters said “Evet” (Yes) to a series of constitutional amendments in a September 12th referendum, some commentary—by no means a consensus—began popping up here arguing that Turkey no longer needs the EU to drive its political change. The amendments, the most important of which has to do with the selection of judges to Turkey’s highest judicial bodies, raised legitimate concerns about the government’s ability to pack the courts. Yet, the perception among many is that with the changes to the constitution, the Justice and Development Party government took an important step toward a more open and democratic government that (unlike an array of reforms undertaken in 2003 and 2004) were not specifically in response to Europe’s membership criteria. Add to Turkey’s apparent ability to undertake change on its own; falling support for EU membership—between 45-50%, which is down 30 points from 2004; a younger generation of Turks who have no vested interest in joining Europe; and imploding EU economies, in contrast to Turkey’s solid growth, it may be time to rethink Ankara’s relationship with Brussels. I am not suggesting that Turkey cut its ties to the West. Europe remains Turkey’s most important trading partner and source of foreign direct investment. Turkey could, after all, continue to harmonize its political and economic systems with the EU, but not take the ultimate step toward membership. That’s what Norway did, and it was enormously beneficial. I know “privileged partnership” is a dirty phrase for many Turks, but if someone came up with a better name, the arrangement might work to everyone’s benefit. Any suggestions?