Regional Organizations | Council on Foreign Relations

Sub-Saharan Africa

State of Emergency in Northern Nigeria

Having cut short a trip to South Africa and annulled a planned state visit to Namibia, President Goodluck Jonathan has declared a “state of emergency” in the three northern states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. In announcing this step, Jonathan acknowledged that there is an “insurrection” in northeast Nigeria, and that the government has lost control of certain geographic areas to “Boko Haram,” a defuse Islamist movement. It remains to be seen if the declaration will have any practical effect. Jonathan has promised to increase the number of troops operating in the three states, but it is unclear where he will find them. The military is overstretched already. It is not clear whether Nigeria has even met its commitment to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for a Mali force that is being placed under the UN authority. In his declaration, Jonathan indicated that he will be seeking international support; already at the Baga massacre Nigerien and Chadian forces were involved, as well as Nigerian. During previous states of emergency, the state governor was removed. This time, Jonathan has stated explicitly that the governors and other officials of the three states are to continue to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities. Borno and Yobe have governors from the opposition ANPP. Adamawa’s governor is from Jonathan’s PDP. According to the Nigerian media, traditional opinion leaders in the North opposed a state of emergency. However, in the immediate aftermath of Jonathan’s declaration they have been cautious. Within the National Assembly, which must approve a declaration of a state of emergency, there appears to be support for Jonathan’s move. The declaration of a state of emergency may be linked to proposals of an amnesty for Boko Haram–the amnesty would play the carrot to the state of emergency’s stick. Jonathan earlier established a committee to explore the modalities for a possible amnesty. Thus far, however, Islamist spokesmen have shown no interest. Over the weekend an alleged Boko Haram spokesman said that there would be no talks unless or until the government released the Boko Haram women and children it is holding. Islamists are themselves now kidnapping women and children, apparently holding them as hostages for the release of their own. Jonathan’s acknowledgement that there is an insurrection in the North is a step toward realism. Up to now, the government has treated Boko Haram as terrorist episodes. However, the declaration of a state of emergency appears to be a further step toward responding to the crisis in the North through military rather than political means. In the aftermath of the massacre at Baga and the New York Times reports of masses of corpses in Maiduguri; the increased militancy is a step backward. Up to now, the brutality of the Nigerian security services appears to generate support for the Islamists. That could continue.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 15, 2013 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

UN Security Council Unanimously Authorizes UN Mission in Mali

On April 25, the Security Council approved a UN “peacekeeping” force of 12,600 for Mali. They asked the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative for Mali, and called on member states to provide troops, police, and the necessary equipment. It also authorized the secretary general to approve cooperation between the UN mission in Mali and the UN missions in Liberia and Ivory Coast for the temporary sharing of logistical and administrative support. The new mission will be called the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It is to begin operations on July 1, taking over from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)—unless there is a major military operation “or a continued threat from terrorist forces on the civilian population.” The Security Council also authorized French troops to “use all necessary means to support MINUSMA if it falls under imminent threat and if so requested by the secretary general.” MINUSMA’s mandate is extensive. It is to “use all necessary force” to “stabilize the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali…to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” It is mandated to support the Malian government’s sovereignty throughout the country. According to Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Herve Ladsous, MINUSMA will assist the Bamako government in re-establishing a “full constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” He said this would include the projected July national elections. However, Russia has been concerned that UN peacekeepers are assuming a more aggressive role than the usual monitoring of cease-fires. According to the New York Times, Russian ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin said that placing UN forces in the midst of a civil war would have “unpredictable and unclear consequences,” especially for the safety of UN personnel. Ladsous emphasizes that MINUSMA “is not an enforcement mission. This is not an anti-terrorist operation.” But, MINUSMA’s mandate includes establishing security, which likely means anti-terrorist and statebuilding operations, including a role in national elections. At present, there is no peace to keep in northern Mali. MINUSMA’s sweeping mandate appears to go beyond the UN’s traditional peacekeeping role, though there are precedents for each piece of it. Nevertheless, Russia voted for the resolution, and there seems to be little alternative to MINUSMA and its extensive mandate if peace and security are to be restored in Mali. The French have indicated that they contemplate no permanent presence in Mali, and the regional African body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), lacks the necessary capacity. But the Russian ambassador is right: MINUSMA and its extensive mandate in a civil war environment can have “unpredictable consequences.”

Blog Post by John Campbell April 26, 2013 Africa in Transition
Syria

Europe’s Syria Prevarications

The West’s overall approach to Syria since the uprising began in March 2011 has been a combination of empty sloganeering (“we strongly and unequivocally condemn this violence”), wishful thinking (“it is only a matter of time before Assad falls”), and hand wringing (“Syria is not Libya”). Yet recently, there seems to have been a subtle, yet important shift that would augur a more active American and European role in managing the conflict. The recent Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul gave Secretary of State John Kerry an opportunity to signal an evolution of U.S. policy and the British and the French have publicly entertained the idea of lifting the arms embargo on the rebellion. This all seems to be good news, yet it may be more apparent than real. This is not to suggest that Washington will renege on the pledge that Kerry made in Turkey or that the Foreign Office and Quay d’Orsay are not serious about the prospects of supplying weapons to the Free Syrian Army, but this support is far from unequivocal. The rethinking in Europe about how best to assist the rebellion masks a continuing deep ambivalence about Syria’s civil war and the prospects for bringing it to an end. Like American officials, Europeans tend to mouth all the right words about the “cost of doing nothing being too high” and that “Assad has to go,” but it is hard to be convinced that they believe what they are saying. If you listen carefully and parse the Europeans’ comments about Syria, they actually contradict the more robust policy they are suggesting by lifting the embargo. They say: 1) There is no magic formula for resolving the conflict in Syria; 2) While Assad has already lost, the opposition can only win at high cost; 3) As a result of 1 and 2, plans must be made for a “political transition” central to which is “re-opening political space.” This strikes me as European prevaricating at its best. In essence, they are calling for that mythical “Russian solution,” which would have Bashar and Asma living out their days in the company of other discredited dictators on the outskirts of Moscow while the rebels make a deal with regime loyalists who were not part of Assad’s inner circle. In the abstract there is, of course, a compelling logic to this plan. If you want to mitigate the possibility that Syria rips itself apart in a post-Assad maelstrom of factional violence, you have to avoid the mistakes the United States made in Iraq with de-Baathification. Fair enough, but both the regime and the rebellion have taken the Russian solution off the table and Moscow has little influence over Assad’s decision-making. Who exactly from the opposition is willing to talk to whom within the regime? It is clear that the fight has become existential for both sides, making compromise difficult even with the intervention of the most skilled diplomats. There is a sense that the Europeans know they are being unrealistic, leaving one to wonder why they are even peddling the idea. Even though they emphasize the importance of a political solution when pressed, the Europeans freely admit that the prospects for a negotiated transition “may have been overtaken by events.” Indeed, they have. Many months ago. Syrians are thus left to draw the conclusion that despite some movement in Washington, London, and Paris, they remain on their own.

Blog Post by Steven A. Cook April 25, 2013 From the Potomac to the Euphrates

Sub-Saharan Africa

"New Deal” Has Potential to Provide New Solutions for Fragile African States

This is a guest post by Hamish Stewart, a co-founding Director of the Centre for African Development and Security. The world is optimistic about Africa’s future, but to unlock its economic potential concerted efforts must be made to engage with its most fragile states. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is a country-led peace and statebuilding framework agreement aimed at stabilizing and developing the world’s most fragile states. The agreement is sponsored by the g7+ grouping of fragile states and accepted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. It provides a mechanism or approach for fragile states themselves in order to build political support for those countries transitioning from conflict and to maintain stability where regional tension threatens renewed conflict. The New Deal is a long-term framework. In addition to security, its goals include access to justice at the domestic level, as well as job creation in the continent’s burgeoning private sector. Many fragile states are resource-rich. While they have the potential for growth, transparent resource management is essential if they are to curb corruption and control illicit money flows that retard economic and social development. That, too, is a goal of the New Deal. The return of conflict in Mali and the recent unrest in central Mozambique underline the fragility of even successful transitions to peace. And no low-income or fragile state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. The New Deal for Fragile States represents a new, long term approach. Its potential is illustrated by the positive developments in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the decade following civil wars. Somalia’s newly elected government has announced that it will conduct all future development cooperation through the New Deal. The New Deal is, among other things, a follow-on to the Millennium Development Goals and involves a new conversation. On April 18, the International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building convened a stakeholder meeting in Washington, DC to promote The New Deal as a framework for development and peace building.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell April 23, 2013 Africa in Transition
International Organizations

Introducing the Global Governance Report Card

As Mayor of New York, the late Edward Koch famously asked constituents, “How’m I doing?” He got an earful. But he valued the instant feedback and even adjusted occasionally. As we commemorate Earth Day, we might ask the same question of ourselves – but on a planetary scale. When it comes to addressing the world’s gravest ills, how are we doing? Not so well. That is the big takeaway from the first Global Governance Report Card, released today by the Council on Foreign Relations. Designed in the old grade school style, Report Card grades the international community and the United States on how they are responding to six big challenges: global warming, nuclear proliferation, violent conflict, global health, transnational terrorism, and financial instability. Click here to continue reading this article on CNN: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/22/grading-the-world-on-our-biggest-problems/

Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick April 22, 2013 The Internationalist
Middle East and North Africa

Why Europe Can’t Bring Peace to the Middle East

Lady Catherine Ashton, the EU’s top foreign policy official, has received a remarkable letter from the "European Eminent Persons Group on the Middle East Peace Process." This self-selected collectivity might more accurately be called the "Formerly Eminent Persons Group," inasmuch as the first word describing each one of its members is "Former," but I suppose that these Formerly Eminent Persons do indeed also represent the views of Currently Eminent European Persons. The letter and its list of signatories are copied below. The letter is important in one way: it shows that European official and elite thinking continue to blame Israel for everything related to the so-called Peace Process. To take one example, the letter states that We have watched with increasing disappointment over the past five years the failure of the parties to start any kind of productive discussion, and of the international community under American and/or European leadership to promote such discussion. We have also noted with frustration and deep concern the deteriorating standards of humanitarian and human rights care of the population in the Occupied Territories. The failure of the parties? Five years? Five years ago, in the spring of 2008, the parties were negotiating, apparently seriously, as part of what was then called "the Annapolis process." That failed when Mahmoud Abbas refused an extremely generous offer from Israeli Prime Minister Olmert. The Formerly Eminent Persons appear to have forgotten this, or far more likely to be seeking to avoid that truth. Equally inaccurate is their line about the "failure of the parties," a phrase which refuses to acknowledge that only the Palestinians have refused to negotiate in the last four years, not "the parties." In any event, the Formerly Eminent Persons soon arrive at their key insight, which is "that the Peace Process as conceived in the Oslo Agreements has nothing more to offer." What does this mean, actually? Turns out, rather unsurprisingly, that it means we must all get tougher now with Israel. We must all insist that Israel’s borders are the 1967 lines and everything beyond that is illegal and illegitimate. Everything-- including, therefore, such things as Israel’s control of the Western Wall and the Jewish sector of the Old City of Jerusalem, from which Israelis had been kept away when Jordan controlled the Old City. The Formerly Eminent Persons wish above all to erase the letter to Prime Minister Sharon from President Bush in 2004, where he called the major settlement blocks "new realities on the ground" that all efforts at negotiation had acknowledged Israel would keep. There is more in the letter that is wrong, such as the notion that human rights conditions in the West Bank are deteriorating due to the Israeli occupation. One can make a good argument that they are deteriorating, in Gaza due to Hamas and in the West Bank due to the growing pressure from the PA against journalists. The letter does not appear to consider the possibility that any problem in Palestinian areas might possibly be the fault of Palestinians. The letter’s greatest sins are those that are quite familiar in letters from Europe, whether from Formerly Eminent Persons or from Currently Eminent Persons: the sin of blaming everything on Israel and blaming nothing on the Palestinians, demanding nothing of the Palestinians, and treating the Palestinians like objects rather than people. Nowhere does the letter mention the issue of anti-Semitic broadcasting and hate speech in Palestinian official media, nor the matter of the glorification of terrorism and terrorists by the PA, and the impact such conduct has on prospects for peace. The letter takes a shot at President Obama, saying that all he said and did during his trip to Israel "gave no indication of action to break the deep stagnation." Just talk from the Americans, you see; we are all, including Mr. Obama, seen as coddling Israel (and we do not even have Formerly Eminent Persons writing letters). This letter is a useful reminder of European attitudes, at least at the level of the Eminent: Blame Israel, treat the Palestinians as children, wring your hands over the terrible way the Americans conduct diplomacy. The Israelis will treat this letter with the derision it deserves, and the Palestinians will understand that because this kind of thing reduces European influence with Israel, the EU just can’t deliver much. Indeed it cannot, and the bias, poor reasoning, and refusal to face facts in this letter all suggest that that won’t be changing any time soon. ----------------------------------------------------- THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS Dear High Representative We, the under-signed members of the European Eminent Persons Group on the Middle East Peace Process, are writing to you to express our strong concern about the dying chances of a settlement based on two separate, sovereign and peaceful states of Israel and Palestine. The Eminent Persons Group is composed of a number of former Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers and senior officials of EU Member States who have decided to concert their efforts to encourage a lasting settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. We have watched with increasing disappointment over the past five years the failure of the parties to start any kind of productive discussion, and of the international community under American and/or European leadership to promote such discussion. We have also noted with frustration and deep concern the deteriorating standards of humanitarian and human rights care of the population in the Occupied Territories. The security and long-term stability of Israel, an essential objective in any process, cannot be assured in such conditions, any more than the legitimate rights and interests of the Palestinian people. President Obama made some of these points during his March 2013 visit to the region, particularly in his address to the people of Israel, but he gave no indication of action to break the deep stagnation, nor any sign that he sought something other than the re-start of talks between West Bank and Israeli leaders under the Oslo Process, which lost its momentum long ago. We are therefore appealing to you, and through you to the members of the Council of Ministers, to recognise that the Peace Process as conceived in the Oslo Agreements has nothing more to offer. Yet the present political stalemate, while the situation deteriorates on the ground, is unsustainable, given the disturbed politics of the region and the bitterness generated by the harsh conditions of life under the Occupation. The concern of the European Union at this deterioration, clearly expressed in a series of statements, not least the European Council Conclusions of 14 May 2012, has not been matched by any action likely to improve the situation. The aspirations of Palestinians and Israelis and the interests of the European Union, prominently referred to in those Conclusions and in other relevant EU documents, cannot be met by the current stagnation. It is time to give a stark warning that the Occupation is actually being entrenched by the present Western policy. The Palestinian Authority cannot survive without leaning on Israeli security assistance and Western funding and, since the PA offers little hope of progress towards self-determination for the Palestinian people, it is fast losing respect and support from its domestic constituency. The steady increase in the extent and population of Israeli settlements, including in East Jerusalem, and the entrenchment of Israeli control over the OT in defiance of international law, indicate a permanent trend towards a complete dislocation of Palestinian territorial rights. We have reached the conclusion that there must be a new approach. Letting the situation lie unaddressed is highly dangerous when such an explosive issue sits in such a turbulent environment. A realistic but active policy, set in the context of current regional events, needs to be composed of the following elements: - a sharper focus on the essential need for a two-state solution, as the most likely outcome to offer lasting peace and security for the parties and their neighbourhood and the only one recognised by UN resolutions as just and equitable; - an explicit recognition that the current status of the Palestinian Territories is one of occupation, with responsibility for their condition falling under international law on the occupying state; - an insistence that Israeli settlements beyond the 1967 lines are illegal, must cease being expanded and will not be recognised as one of the starting points in any new negotiations; - a stipulation that any representative political organisation with a valid claim to participate in negotiations must renounce the use of violence outside established UN norms; - the renewal of efforts to establish a unified Palestinian representation of both the West Bank and Gaza, without which a comprehensive peace cannot be successfully negotiated and the absence of which serves as an excuse for inaction; - the encouragement of reform of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, including representation of all the main Palestinian parties committed to non-violence and reflecting the expressed wishes of the resident Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza; - a vigorous international drive for the implementation of much improved humanitarian and human rights conditions in both the West Bank and Gaza, monitored by the United Nations, whatever the state of peace negotiations might be at any time; - a reconsideration of the funding arrangements for Palestine, in order to avoid the Palestinian Authority’s present dependence on sources of funding which serve to freeze rather than promote the peace process; - a clear and concerted effort to counter the erasing of the 1967 lines as the basis for a two-state outline. This should include a clear distinction in EU dealings with Israel between what is legitimate – within the 1967 lines – and what violates international law in the Occupied Territories; - a clearer willingness within the EU to play a political and not just a funding role and to resume a more strategic dialogue with the Palestinians. For all the good sense of EU statements on this issue over the years, the EU’s inactivity in the face of an increasingly dangerous stagnation is both unprincipled and unwise. European leaders cannot wait for ever for action from the United States when the evidence accumulates of American failure to recognise and promote the equal status of Israelis and Palestinians in the search for a settlement, as accepted in United Nations resolutions. Later generations will see it as unforgivable that we Europeans not only allowed the situation to develop to this point of acute tension, but took no action now to remedy the continuing destruction of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination. We regard it as essential for EU interests that the Council of Ministers and you take rapid action to correct this unacceptable state of affairs. We are sending copies of this letter to Members of the Council of Ministers and to the US Secretary of State. Members of the EEPG send you their respectful greetings. Signed Guiliano Amato, Former Prime Minister of Italy Frans Andriessen, Former Vice-President of the European Commission Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Former Vice-Prime Minister of the Netherlands John Bruton, Former Prime Minister of Ireland Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Former European Commissioner and Former Foreign Minister of Austria Teresa Patricio Gouveia, Former Foreign Minister of Portugal Jeremy Greenstock, Former UK Ambassador to the UN and Co-Chair of the EEPG Lena Hjelm-Wallén, Former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden Wolfgang Ischinger, Former State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry and Co-Chair of the EEPG Lionel Jospin, Former Prime Minister of France Miguel Moratinos, Former Foreign Minister of Spain Ruprecht Polenz, Former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag Pierre Schori, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Sweden Javier Solana, Former High Representative and Former NATO Secretary-General Peter Sutherland, Former EU Commissioner and Director General of the WTO Andreas van Agt, Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Hans van den Broek, Former Netherlands Foreign Minister and Former EU Commissioner for External Relations Hubert Védrine, Former Foreign Minister of France and Co-Chair of the EEPG Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Former President of Latvia

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams April 20, 2013 Pressure Points

Sub-Saharan Africa

A Way Forward for Mali?

The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) has done Africa watchers and policy makers an important service by publishing David J. Francis’s analysis of the Mali crisis with his suggestions as to the way forward. Titled “The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali,” Francis teases out for the educated non-specialist the highly complicated Malian narrative, identifying key players, groups and events. The study is especially strong on the French domestic political dimensions of President Hollande’s military intervention, and what the likely consequences may be. Americans will note with interest that he raises the potential for “mission creep” with respect to the U.S. drone base in Niger if the military conflict between French-led forces and the radical Islamists persists: “Possible counterinsurgency warfare will include the increasing use of U.S. drones against terrorist and militants, like the U.S. use of drone warfare in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.” That is precisely what so many in West Africa fear. Francis’s recommendations range from the exceedingly practical–coup leader Amadou Sanogo should be removed from the Malian equation by sending him to France on a fully-funded scholarship for five years–to the more obvious: the Mali crisis should be seen “as a regional problem that requires a regional approach to dealing with Islamist extremists, as well as addressing the depressing regional socioeconomic and development issues of poverty, injustice, drought, and famine.” There are generic recommendations, recommendations for the French government, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the UN, and the European Union. There are also specific recommendations for Norway, a reminder of the important role engaged European states and non-governmental organizations can play. Francis recommends that Norway should renew its assistance to Mali with verifiable benchmarks, collaborate with the Norwegian Church Aid mediation group to promote political dialogue involving the Tauregs and the Bamako government, and in partnership with the international community, promote governance reform. David Francis holds the Professorial Research Chair in African Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Bradford in the UK. NOREF is a resource center and think tank with ties to the Norwegian foreign ministry. It has an extensive list of publications available online in English.

Blog Post by John Campbell April 11, 2013 Africa in Transition
Israel

Irish Teachers Teach Hatred of Israel

The Teachers Union of Ireland voted last week to commence a full boycott of Israel. At its Annual Congress on Thursday 4th April 2013, the Teachers’ Union of Ireland (TUI) became the first academic union in Europe to endorse the Palestinian call for an academic boycott of Israel. The motion, which refers to Israel as an “apartheid state”, calls for “all members to cease all cultural and academic collaboration with Israel, including the exchange of scientists, students and academic personalities, as well as all cooperation in research programmes” was passed by a unanimous vote during today’s morning session. Now, in the exchange of "scientists, students, and academic personalities" between Ireland and Israel it is perhaps not so difficult to guess who benefits. Israel is a world leader is science and high-tech, and any exchange must be entirely one-sided. So what the teachers have done is to cut themselves off from knowledge and advancement. Far worse, of course, they have deliberately tried to cut their students off. The head of the Teachers Union, Jim Roche, added this comment: Mr. Roche pointed to the desperate situation of Palestinian education under occupation saying that: “Palestinians are struggling for the right to education under extremely difficult conditions. They are eager for it, as shown by the large numbers of students in third level education inside and outside the occupied Palestinian territories. Education has always been a target of the Israeli occupation...." A few facts. When Israel took over the West Bank in 1967 literacy was about 88 percent; now it is about 93 percent, according to the CIA Factbook. In Jordan, just across the river and with a large Palestinian population, it is almost exactly the same--which suggests that Israeli "targeting" of education isn’t working too well, or more likely that Mr. Roche is simply motivated by ignorance and hatred of Israel. It is also the case that according to UNICEF, the youth literacy rate in Jordan is 99 percent and in Gaza and the West Bank it is exactly the same, 99 percent. This is despite the fact that per capita income in Jordan is twice as high as it is in the West Bank and Gaza, suggesting again that Israeli "targeting" of education is a nonsensical accusation. One could pile statistic upon statistic, but that would be a vain effort when it comes to minds like those of the members of the Teachers Union of Ireland, who voted unanimously on the boycott; not one soul had the wit or independence of mind to object or to question. One can only pity the poor Irish student who might think for himself or for herself, might wish to spend a term in Israel at a place like the Technion, and might not share in the biases of the teachers. The message from teachers to students is pretty clearly "shut up." And meanwhile, of course, no mention (much less boycott) by the Irish teachers of China, Saudi Arabia, Cuba or anyplace else where students are "struggling for the right to education under extremely difficult conditions" that include repressive governments, no academic freedom, political tests for admission to higher education--and in the Saudi case greatly restricted opportunities for girls. What a lesson to their students: ignorance, bias, bigotry, narrow-mindedness, and anti-Semitism wrapped in self-righteousness.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams April 7, 2013 Pressure Points
Sub-Saharan Africa

How to Stabilize Northern Mali

Lori-Anne Theroux-Benoni, writing for the Institute for Security Studies from their office in Dakar, has written succinct analysis of the different approaches to peacekeeping employed in Africa. She contrasts the seeming inactivity of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) when M23 rebels overran Goma in November 2012, with the dynamism of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISO) moving against al-Shabaab. She notes that UN operations have traditionally been contingent on the consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and the non-use of force, except in defense of the mandate and in self-defense. The UN has been adjusting these principles to reflect intra-state conflicts where civilians may be deliberately targeted, but there is still work to be done. The African Union’s Constitutive Act, by contrast, authorizes forceful intervention in a member state in the event of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or at the request of the state government. The AU calls its operations “peace support,” not “peace keeping,” as the UN does. Hence with respect to northern Mali, Theroux-Benoni suggests that the initial “peace support” efforts should be undertaken by the African International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) with robust UN-organized financial and logistical support. A UN peacekeeping force would take over only when conditions were ripe. So, she argues credibly that the UN and AU mandates should be seen as complementary, and that both have a role to play in Mali. However, both the UN and the AU would require significant financial and logistical support from UN member states, which has so far been slow to finance the UN’s humanitarian appeal for the region.

Blog Post by John Campbell March 15, 2013 Africa in Transition
Terrorism and Counterterrorism

The EU+Hizballah=Cynicism

Hizballah has been in the news recently. The group that a senior U.S. government official once described as the “ ’A-team’ of terrorism,” took a back seat to al-Qaeda over the last decade. Prior to the attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, Hizballah was responsible for more American deaths than any other organization on the State Department’s list of terrorists. The most spectacular of Hizabllah’s operations since the organization’s founding in 1982 was the destruction of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in the spring of 1983. More recently, the Bulgarian government fingered Hizballah for the July 2012 bus bombing that killed five Israelis and a Bulgarian bus driver in the resort town of Burgas. Also, the New York Times reported last week that the Lebanese newspaper, al Akhbar—a pro-Hizballah daily—has been engaged in an effort to intimidate prosecution witnesses set to appear before the International Criminal Court, which is trying four members of Hizballah for the murder of former Prime Rafik Harriri. Then there are the thousands of Hizballah fighters in Syria supporting the Assad regime in that country’s civil war. By far the most interesting Hizballah-related development is the trial of one of the organization’s operatives, Hossam Taleb Yacoub, in a Cyprus court. The trial, which ended a week ago, shed light on Hizballah’s efforts to track Israelis and locate Israeli targets not just on Cyprus, but throughout Europe. Yet neither the revelations in the Limassol courtroom nor the Bulgaria bombing has yet moved EU officials to designate Hizballah a “terrorist organization.” That’s right, despite its long and bloody history, Hizballah is not, according to EU-acrats, a terrorist group. Yes, the organization has engaged in violence, but it is more complicated than that. One might surmise that officials in Brussels have embraced ideas about Hizballah, mostly associated with Western academics with the help of local “informants,” that because the organization is deeply-rooted in Lebanese society, has military and political wings, is part of the government, and is engaged in “resistance,” it cannot simply be qualified as a terrorist organization. I am all for many shades of gray, but these claims about Hizballah, which are at base an effort to explain away its violent history, are both debatable and highly unlikely to be the reason for the EU’s approach to the organization. Instead, the EU’s reluctance to designate Hizballah a terrorists organizations fits into a broad European pattern in which principle is set aside in favor of expediency to prevent terrorists from bringing their violence to European streets. This is nothing new. Italy’s prime minister in the mid-1980s, Bettino Craxi, perhaps best exemplifies this kind of cynicism. In the fall of 1985, Craxi did everything possible including ordering a larger Italian police force to prevent U.S. Special Forces operators from capturing the perpetrators of the Achille Lauro hijacking. The Italians claimed sovereignty over the NATO airbase where American warplanes had forced the EgyptAir flight that carried the terrorists to land. Although Craxi ordered the arrest of the four terrorists who took the ship and who subsequently spent years in Italian prison, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Abu Abbas, who had masterminded the plot, was quickly released. It is possible that Craxi, who led the Italian socialists, felt some sort of vague ideological connection with Abu Abbas and his Marxist PLF or that he was taking a stand against the United States, but it is more likely that the Italian government did not want to invite any trouble onto themselves. Abu Abbas was convicted in absentia in 1986 (how convenient for Abbas and Craxi), but it was not until 2003 and the invasion of Iraq when the American forces captured him outside Baghdad. The Italians are not the only ones guilty of accommodating terrorists and extremists. The Germans harbored members of the Front Islamique du Salut during Algeria’s lost decade much to the dismay of the French. Until September 11 and then the London bus bombings in 2005, the Brits were generally laissez-faire when it came to those who were suspected of engaging in violence or at the very least encouraging violence. Europe is also a bastion of Kurdistan Worker’s Party (known as the PKK) fundraising. The problem with the “let’s not make trouble by arousing the ire of terrorists by calling them what they are” is that it does not work. According to the evidence gathered in Cyprus after the arrest of Yacoub, who is a Swedish citizen, Hizballah has vast and sophisticated intelligence and operations networks in Europe. If the resistance to identifying Hizballah as a terrorist organization is because Europeans fears blood on their soil, the Burgas bombing indicates it is too late and the Yacoub trial suggests there is more to come.

Blog Post by Steven A. Cook March 15, 2013 From the Potomac to the Euphrates
Sub-Saharan Africa

Mali Intervention Becoming a Partisan Issue in France?

French former president Nicolas Sarkozy criticized the French intervention in Mali in a March 6 magazine interview. He is quoted as saying, “the rule is never to go into a country that has no government,” and, “What are we doing there if we’re not just supporting putschists and trying to control a territory four times larger than France with four thousand men?” Sarkozy’s comments highlight the awkward reality that French intervention was at the request of the Bamako regime that had overthrown the legal government. He is also likely to continue to make partisan political statements the longer the French stay in Mali and the intervention inevitably becomes unpopular in France. That process will accelerate if French casualties mount. Thus far, however, only four French soldiers have been killed. Times change: Sarkozy is a politician of the French Right, which historically has supported a French forward role in its former colonies. It is the Left, now led by Francois Hollande, the French president, that was skeptical in the past. From the start, French president Francois Hollande has said the intervention would be short and that French troops would be replaced by a UN-approved African regional force. On March 6 Hollande said French troops would start to leave Mali in April, a month later than initially foreseen. He characterized this as the “final phase” as African troops take over. It remains to be seen whether the African regional force will be ready to take over from the French as soon as April. Fighting, sometimes fierce, continues, and the Islamists appear far from defeated in the desert. But, Hollande will be aware of the domestic political costs he may face if the French intervention drags on.

Blog Post by John Campbell March 8, 2013 Africa in Transition
Middle East and North Africa

Europe and Hamas

The London newspaper Al Hayat carried a story on February 21 about the intentions of EU states to support Hamas participation in a Palestinian "national unity government." It seems that "the European boycott of the Palestinian Government formed by Hamas after winning the 2006 elections will not be repeated," according to someone described as a "senior European diplomat." France and Britain want to relaunch the "peace process," and this time "on a new basis and without preconditions." The diplomat is quoted as saying "today there exists an international consensus on the need for the establishment of a Palestinian State....we welcome the entry of Hamas into the PLO and the fact that it accepted the PLO charter." If the story is accurate, it represents a significant change in EU policy. Previously, the EU--as part of the Quartet, with the United States, Russia, and the UN--had staunchly supported the "three Quartet principles." These required that Hamas abandon violence and terror, accept all previous Israel-PLO agreements as binding, and accept Israel’s right to exist. Now it seems the Europeans are asking far less of Hamas--in fact, appear to be asking nothing at all before applauding a role in the Palestinian Authority (PA) and in the PLO for what is officially regarded in the EU as in the United States as a terrorist group. The dangers here are great. In an article in the Weekly Standard, I discussed the legal problems that Hamas’s participation in the PA would create for the United States because it is a terrorist group. In Tested By Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, the book I’ve just published, the story of what transpired in 2006 is told. What the Quartet decided then was that Hamas could run in the Palestinian parliamentary elections but could not participate in the government unless it met the three conditions noted above. Hamas refused to meet any of them. It didn’t bargain, nor did it lie; it simply refused. That meant that the Russians and Europeans, whom I thought would have abandoned the "Quartet principles" at the drop of a hat, could not do so; Hamas refused to drop a hat. Now seven years later, Hamas hasn’t changed but the Europeans may have--and may simply be dropping any conditionality. They appear to believe this is the road to successful peace negotiations. Their theory is that President Abbas and his Fatah Party will be afraid to make the necessary compromises unless they are confident Hamas will back them--instead of accusing them of treason. This may well be true, as far as it goes: Abbas, like Arafat before him, may be afraid to make the necessary compromises. But why do the Europeans, or anyone else, believe that Hamas will back any compromises at all? Will they compromise on Jerusalem? On abandoning the so-called "right of return?" On determining a border that allows the large settlement blocs to become Israeli territory? What’s the basis for that belief? And how can the inclusion in the Palestinian government of a terrorist group that is still committing, and justifying, acts of terror persuade Israelis to make the compromises they would need to make? I have no secret information telling me whether the Al Hayat story is true or false. But if it is true, the Europeans are heading in very much the wrong direction. Giving Hamas a greater role will make peace even harder to attain, because Hamas does not seek peace.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams February 22, 2013 Pressure Points
Sub-Saharan Africa

What’s Happening With the ECOWAS Force in Mali?

It’s hard to get the details on the logistical arrangements, or numbers, of the ECOWAS force in Mali. The majority of Nigeria’s promised 1,200 troops are reportedly deployed to a military base in Niger, or still stationed in Bamako. However, the Nigerian media organization Premium Times reports that the Nigerian troops actually in Mali are suffering from inadequate provisions, especially food. Citing a “defense source,” Premium Times reports that Nigerian soldiers are resorting to, in effect, shaking down their Malian hosts under the guise of making “courtesy calls.” Apparently, they ask for–and receive–food, in one case a cow and fifty bags of rice from a prefect. The story is roundly denied by a Nigerian defense spokesman who is quoted, “we have provided the contingent with enough food and funds to last them for the initial three months. Is Nigeria not bigger than that?” Another Nigerian defense spokesman claimed to a different newspaper that Malian “community leaders” are expressing gratitude to the Nigerian troops “by donating cows to them.” Absent much independent media presence in Mali, it is hard to know where the truth lies. Countries contributing to the ECOWAS force moved quickly to send troops to Mali in the aftermath of the January French intervention. Initially ECOWAS had planned to deploy in September, allowing time for equipping, training, and making the necessary logistical arrangements. Given the haste of the deployments, it is credible that there have been glitches in supply delivery and that some troops are going hungry. Moreover, it is also credible that Malians in Bamako are grateful for the ECOWAS troop presence, and give them gifts. However, given the cost, the idea of Malians freely gifting cows to foreign troops stretches credibility.

Blog Post by John Campbell February 15, 2013 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Boko Haram and Nigerian Military Abuses in the North

Mali and Algeria have largely driven Nigeria out of the headlines over the past several days, except with respect to Nigerian troop commitments to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention force. Serious and informed speculation about the relationship between Boko Haram, militants in Mali, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has also been largely absent. Yet Boko Haram activity continues in northern Nigeria. Last week, for example, the emir of Kano survived an assassination attempt that took the lives of his driver and two body guards and wounded two of his sons. The Nigeria Security Tracker, which seeks to chart instances of political violence, including Boko Haram, runs about a month behind. Next month, it should indicate whether there was a significant change in Boko Haram activity during the Algerian In Amenas crisis. However, stories about human rights abuses perpetrated by the Nigerian security services in their struggle against Boko Haram are becoming both more common and more open. The chief complaints are of the military indiscriminately firing into crowds, rounding up young men from near the scene of a Boko Haram incident, and detaining them without charge and in inhumane conditions. There are also claims of the use of torture. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of even wealthy families sending their young men away from the northeast to avoid the security forces. I have heard credible reports of members of elite northern Nigerian families being killed by the security services. Reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch provide external validation of many of the charges. Journalist Sani Tukur on January 13, published, “How Nigeria Military Arrest, Torture, Exploit Innocents at Giwa Barracks” in the online Nigerian journal The Premium Times. There is credible detail here describing arrest sweeps, shocking over-crowding of prisons, food shortages, and the use of torture. “Bail” amounts, normally given in the range of N200,000 to N300,000 (U.S. $1,300 to $1,900), may be a bribe rather than a security of the suspect’s return. Even in a country as poor as Nigeria, elites can raise such a sum, though many non-elite families cannot, condemning young men to the shadowy prison system, which rarely ends in trial. Tukur and many others have observed that such human rights abuses are a potent recruiting tool for Boko Haram: “[Giwa Barracks] is a place one will become more radical and prefer to be a member of the Boko Haram even if you are not one.” The security services staunchly deny accusations of human rights abuses. Others excuse security service rough methods as required to suppress Boko Haram. The debate in Nigeria between human rights and security necessity recalls that associated with Abu Ghraib in the United States during the second Iraq war, or between those who support the Algerian government’s methods at In Amenas and those who argue that a more sophisticated approach could have saved lives. In the aftermath of In Amenas, I am not yet ready to comment on ostensible links between Mali, Algeria, AQIM, and Boko Haram. However, I continue to see Boko Haram as primarily a domestic response to the alienation and poor governance of northern Nigeria.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 22, 2013 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigeria Accelerates Involvement in Mali

What a difference a fortnight can make. On January 7, 2013, the eve of the Islamist feint south, the Jonathan government announced that it was reducing its troop pledge for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mali intervention force that was to be deployed in September 2013. Nigeria would contribute 450 troops, not 600. It also signaled that it would be unable to bear the lion’s share of the costs, as it had in previous ECOWAS interventions in African states to restore or maintain security. But, in the aftermath of the French intervention, the Jonathan government reversed its course to significantly increase that contribution. On January 17, the Nigerian Senate approved deployment of 1,200 troops. Some Nigerian troops have been on the ground in Mali for a few days already, according to the Abuja government. Press comments by the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika may provide some insight into Abuja’s thinking on the crisis in Mali, and its relationship to the grass-roots insurrection in northern Nigeria labeled Boko Haram. Ihejirika on January 18, commented that “we have evidence” that terrorists operating in northern Nigeria were trained in Mali. Further, “as of yesterday, we are aware of the influx of some chaps trained in Mali into the country.” Hence, his perspective is that Nigerian participation in the ECOWAS Mali intervention force will promote security in northern Nigeria. Ihejirika’s position reflects that of the Jonathan government which has long claimed the Boko Haram insurrection is linked to the international al-Qaeda movement. Given the widespread deployment of the Nigerian army within Nigeria, it remains to be seen where the Jonathan government will find the troops and equipment necessary to fulfill its new pledges.

Blog Post by John Campbell January 18, 2013 Africa in Transition