International Organizations

The annual opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) is a noisy affair and, like Churchill’s pudding, often lacks a coherent theme. This year is different. World leaders will convene two special sessions to address the flood of refugees and migrants from global conflict zones—and make promises to alleviate their suffering. Expectations for the first meeting, hosted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, are low. It will produce no more than a consensus declaration that is long on platitudes and short on action. The second, led by President Obama, is more promising. It should generate meaningful national pledges of aid. But to make a real dent, the assembled nations must get serious about ending chronic displacement, by focusing on cures rather than palliatives. And that, alas, is unlikely to happen. Globally, humanitarian needs have never been greater. From Afghanistan to Syria, Libya to the DRC, and South Sudan to Yemen, grinding conflicts have driven a record 65.3 million people from their homes. Nearly two-thirds, or 40.8 million, are internally displaced persons (IDPs). The remainder include 21.3 million refugees who have fled across national borders and 3.2 million asylum seekers. This displacement surge has outstripped the response capacities of the international system.  Emergency appeals by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action secure only a fraction of the financing required to meet basic human needs. Last January a UN high level panel documented a $15 billion annual shortfall in global humanitarian funding. Lacking sufficient money, agencies like the World Food Program have slashed rations and other services to displaced populations. Unfortunately, lack of funding is just one of several cracks in the foundations of humanitarianism. Six others stand out. First, combatants are increasingly targeting aid workers and their civilian beneficiaries, in violation of international humanitarian law. This is most egregious in Syria, where Bashar al-Assad’s army has repeatedly bombed hospitals and attacked relief convoys destined for beleaguered residents of Aleppo and other cities. But it is a worldwide phenomenon, and its perpetrators are not being held to account. And it is leading aid groups to pull out of some of the most desperate situations, leaving civilians in peril. A second defect is the failure of UN member states to live up to their obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Human rights groups, for instance, accuse Australia of shirking its responsibilities by holding asylum seekers indefinitely in offshore detention centers (including on Nauru, where some have been victims of child abuse) and transferring refugees to third countries (like Cambodia) where their safety cannot be guaranteed. On the other side of the world, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has criticized the EU-Turkey deal to stem the flow of refugees and other migrants as a potential violation of the legal principle of non-refoulement, since it risks returning refugees to countries where they have a legitimate fear of persecution. Third, the Refugee Convention itself has troubling gaps. It offers protections for refugees but not for IDPs, and it does not address the often blurry line between refugees and economic migrants—categories that begin to merge the farther refugees get from their country of origin. Nor does it address the growing phenomenon of “survival migrants”—those who cross international borders to escape deprivation, even death, thanks to collapsing governance or climate change-induced famine. A fourth deficiency is a churlish resistance by many UN member states to admitting refugees in situations where return to home countries or integration in place are not options. Globally, the number of refugees officially resettled amounted to 107,100 in 2015, according to UNHCR, a drop in the bucket considering the worldwide caseload. Rising populism and nativism are partly to blame. Last year EU member states, led by Eastern European countries, rejected a proposed quota system to share the refugee burden equitably. Bucking the trend is the United States, long the world leader in refugee admissions. The Obama administration recently announced its plans to raise the annual ceiling for admissions to 110,000 (up from 85,000 in FY16 and 75,000 in FY15). This could quickly be reversed, however, if the next occupant of the White House is Donald Trump, who like congressional Republicans has roundly (if speciously) criticized refugees as a threat to U.S. national security. Fifth, existing arrangements for assisting refugees have not adapted to the reality of prolonged displacement. Today, the average duration of displacement is an astonishing seventeen years. Rather than simply warehousing populations until they can be returned or resettled, humanitarian actors must take a longer view, working with aid agencies to encourage development in place. This includes investing in health and education, as well as working with host governments to provide livelihoods that leverage the skills and initiative of the displaced and contribute to local economies, and in a manner that benefits host nations. Most egregiously, UN member states continue to employ humanitarian action as a substitute for riskier forms of diplomatic and military intervention that might reduce, contain, or even end the underlying violence that is the root cause of this human suffering. This indictment may come across as glib, as if there were some straightforward, cost- and danger-free way to end war in Syria, say, or in South Sudan. But the hard truth, as David Rieff has written, is that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. The causes and solutions to these complex emergencies are inherently and fundamentally political. Viewed in this light, the current global displacement crisis is the logical outcome of political choices by powerful nations, including the United States, that have calculated that the cost of alleviating symptoms is less risky and onerous than attempting to end violent conflicts through other, more coercive means. Given this dynamic, we should expect no breakthroughs in New York. Monday’s “Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants”, hosted by Ban, will be a vapid affair. Member states will endorse by consensus an “outcome document.” The final draft, released in early August, contains some important language on upholding humanitarian law and treating refugees and migrants with respect. But overall it is a disappointing mélange of high-minded banalities with little operational significance. To his credit, the Secretary-General had pushed for something more substantive—notably, a commitment by UN member states to resettle 10 percent of the global refugee caseload annually. European nations, as well as Russia, shot down that idea. More generally, countries deferred specific commitments for protecting refugees and migrants until 2018, at which point member states are to draft two separate global compacts (one for refugees and another on migrants). The end result is a missed opportunity. Those hoping for more concrete action will need to wait a day longer. On Tuesday, September 20, the United States will convene a smaller meeting of several dozen UN member states. The event, cosponsored by the governments of Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, Mexico, and Sweden, is designed to generate firm national pledges from participants to do more to confront the global humanitarian crisis. In calling for this meeting, President Obama is hoping to replicate the successful special session on peacekeeping he held at last year’s UNGA, and which generated major new commitments from troop contributing countries (including China), among other breakthroughs. The president is employing the same pragmatic “mini-lateral” model of international cooperation this year, convening a subset of UN members who share common objectives and have tangible capacities to bring to the table. Call it “global pay to play.” The White House has established several tangible goals for the event, seeking commitments to: Increase global response to UN humanitarian funding appeals by 30 percent Increase the number of regular humanitarian donors by at least ten Double (at a minimum) the number of slots for refugee resettlement globally Increase by at least ten the number of countries admitting refugees Enroll one million refugee children in school and provide one million refugees with lawful employment Hitting these targets would go a long way toward alleviating the immediate plight of the world’s more than twenty million refugees. But to turn the tide of the global displacement crisis, UN member states will need to devote more than resources. They will need to get serious about preventing and ending the violent conflicts that generate such misery in the first place.

Byron Holland is president and CEO of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, which manages the .ca domain. Like many foreigners, I follow U.S. politics closely. What happens in Washington, DC on trade, economics, foreign policy, and security matters can often have ripple effects across the world. This is also true with respect to internet policy, and like many who work in the internet industry, I am getting increasingly concerned by some of the news coming out of Washington. I find the rhetoric surrounding the IANA stewardship transition mind-boggling. How is it possible that the IANA transition, a process that will protect the internet from being captured by authoritarian governments, is being presented as a plan for government takeover of the internet? It reminds me of Orwellian doublespeak where war is peace and freedom is slavery. Only this isn’t fiction and the consequences could be detrimental to the interests of the United States and its closest friends. The IANA stewardship transition is a crucial step in the evolution of the internet. While some people in Washington would have you believe the opposite, the transition will protect the internet from capture by Russia, China, Iran and others. I fear the transition is being used as a pawn in a play for political gain. The fact is, no government can take over the internet. To say otherwise is not just misleading, it’s simply untrue. This is not how the internet was designed, and it’s not how the internet works. The people who actually built the internet—those that know it inside and out—are the ones who worked on the plan to transition oversight from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) to a multistakeholder body. They all agree that the plan, which received NTIA’s approval, is in the best way to protect the free and open internet. This plan was not written by governments, and it is not a part of a grand conspiracy to give the internet away to Russia or China. Some of the best and brightest people that help the internet run smoothly, including many Americans, put this plan together with the continued security and stability of the internet in mind. The IANA stewardship transition has become a distraction from the real fight for internet freedom. I was in Dubai at the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012 when the United States and its allies successfully prevented the United Nations from trying to take control over parts of the technical operations of the internet. Like-minded nations stood side-by-side with their American counterparts again at the United Nations in 2015 when, through the process to review the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society, we were successful in protecting internet freedom. If history tells us anything, it is that this fight will have to be fought again. Now we’re facing a flurry of activities to block the very action—the IANA stewardship transition—that will continue to allow us to protect the free and open internet. Blocking or delaying the transition at the eleventh hour can only weaken the U.S. position at forums where authoritarian regimes—Russia, China, Iran, and others—are actively continuing their fight for control over the internet. Some of our allies, the countries that have stood side-by-side with U.S. delegations fending off those authoritarian regimes, may not be there for us when the next fight happens. They have participated in the two-year process to see the transition completed, and for the United States to now halt the process at the eleventh hour puts that support at risk. The truth is, there are a number of nations who are actively seeking to exert their interests over the internet. Unfortunately, too many people in Washington are putting politics ahead of protecting it. This IANA stewardship transition process must be allowed to proceed as planned. We need to let the contract between the NTIA and ICANN expire, and let the multistakeholder community carry on. A free and open internet depends on it.

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. Later this week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and his counterparts from around the world will gather in London to assess the state of UN peace operations. The meeting is a follow-up on a summit hosted by President Obama on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in 2015. At that event, nearly fifty world leaders committed to modernizing UN peacekeeping, pledging over 40,000 troops as well as critical enablers such as helicopters and hospital units to missions around the world. Coming on the heels of a seminal review of UN peacekeeping, the conference also generated a new optimism that after years of inaction, member states were finally prepared to close the gap between the expanding mandates of and the resources and capabilities devoted to peace operations. To ensure that countries made good on their pledges, then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that Britain would host a follow-up ministerial meeting in September 2016. As with the 2015 summit, participating countries must offer tangible commitments to peacekeeping to earn a seat at the table. Much has happened over the intervening year, both within the UK—where the Brexit vote precipitated a change in government—and across the peacekeeping landscape. So where do things stand today? The good news is that a surprising number of countries have lived up to their 2015 commitments. By June 2016, two-thirds of countries had delivered their pledged troops and assets, though a leaked internal UN report showed that several countries, including Brazil, Norway, Spain, and Vietnam, were dragging their feet. China, which stole the 2015 show by committing to develop an 8,000-strong standby capacity, is expected to announce its timetable for standing up that force. In the run up to the London meeting (and perhaps to boost its bid for an elected Security Council seat), Canada has announced its own intention to return to peacekeeping, pledging to make hundreds of troops and police available to UN missions. The effort to mobilize contributions from a wider range of countries seeks to address the high tempo of contemporary peace operations—as well as allow the United Nations to be more selective about which contingents it deploys. As the scale of UN peacekeeping has grown—over 100,000 uniformed personnel are now deployed globally—the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations had no alternative but to rely on the troops on offer, regardless of whether troop-contributing countries had provided them with appropriate training or equipment. This placed the UN in an awkward position when peacekeepers either failed to perform their duties, or worse, engaged in misconduct, including (most egregiously) abhorrent instances of sexual abuse and exploitation. Sending troops home risked drawing the ire of the relevant member state, which might then withdraw all of its personnel, leaving the United Nations even more desperate. By contrast, increasing the numbers of well-resourced and trained uniformed personnel would allow the United Nations to be picky about the troops it deploys—and to turn away undisciplined units. Unfortunately, demand for peacekeeping over the past year has continued to outpace supply, suggesting that a focus on additional resources alone cannot overcome the challenges that plague peace operations. Nowhere are these problems more evident than in South Sudan, where a tenuous peace agreement unraveled in early July as fighting erupted between forces loyal to President Salva Kiir and then-vice-president and opposition leader, Riek Machar. Amidst the violence, at least seventy-three civilians were killed and hundreds of women were raped, some just outside of UN protection camps. Peacekeepers in the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) were criticized for failing to implement their protection mandate. In at least one instance, UN troops reportedly looked on as a woman was dragged away. Foreign aid workers were also targeted and calls to UN peacekeepers for help went unanswered. Chinese, Ethiopian, and Nepalese quick-reaction forces all reportedly refused to intervene. Subsequently, the government of South Sudan resisted a U.S.-led effort to add a more robust protection unit to UNMISS, only agreeing to the new force during a rare Security Council visit to Juba. However, the government quickly announced additional restrictions on the force’s deployment, suggesting that it may frustrate efforts to deploy the new peacekeepers. The entire episode has laid bare inconvenient truths about UNMISS. Despite their mandate to protect civilians, peacekeepers proved unwilling to act in the face of violence. To be fair, the peacekeeping mission is operating in almost impossible circumstances, expected to shelter hundreds of thousands of civilians in protection camps in the face of restrictions on its actions by the South Sudanese government and aggression from government and rebel forces alike. Yet the protection mandate in and of itself is serving as a lowest common denominator form of intervention. In the absence of agreement among Security Council and regional powers on a political strategy for actually resolving the conflict, UNMISS reflects a minimalist approach, designed to keep the magnitude of violence contained. But even that mandate may exceed what UNMISS can deliver. Sadly, the dynamics at play in the July violence were not a one-off. The UN’s own investigation into a massacre in a UN camp in February faulted the mission for significant failures, including in protecting civilians. (The UN has since announced another independent investigation to look into the events in July.) A number of observers are beginning to ask if the UN should be more willing to withdraw from seemingly intractable situations—and whether that point had been reached in South Sudan. While South Sudan may be the most difficult environment in which UN peacekeepers are currently deployed, missions elsewhere are also operating in more complex contexts, including increasingly insecure environments. Simultaneously, the UN’s defensive reflex to recent scandals reveal what the New York Times and the Guardian have called “a culture of denial” that harms the credibility of the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions. An independent inquiry on the UN’s handling of allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers judged the organization’s response to this “gross institutional failure” to be “seriously flawed.” In another blow to its reputation, not until last month did the United Nations admit that its peacekeepers had brought cholera to Haiti six years ago, sparking an  epidemic which has claimed ten thousand lives, infected more than 800,000 people, and shows no sign of abating. To be sure, blame for peacekeeping’s failures falls also at the feet of member states, who bear primary responsibility for failing to mobilize and equip sufficient numbers of troops and to discipline those contingents who have committed crimes. For instance, member states balked when Ban Ki-moon advanced proposals to strengthen peacekeeping capacities in line with recommendations from the 2015 high level review of peacekeeping. Meanwhile, it took over four months for member states to make the first deposit into a fund established to support the victims of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. The nations assembled in London this week deserve a pat on the back for generating more funding, troops, and other assets for UN peacekeeping. That so many have stepped up to fulfill their pledges is a hopeful sign, as was the UN’s repatriation of an entire contingent of peacekeepers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo after seven of its soldiers were implicated in sexual abuse in the Central African Republic. But these tentative steps in the right direction should not detract from the bigger issues laid bare over the past year. These include fundamental questions about whether the United Nations is capable of protecting civilians in dangerous environments, and, if not, what role peacekeepers can be expected to play in the world’s most intractable conflicts. The status quo risks charging missions with impossible mandates that they will fail to implement, putting civilians in danger and further undermining the credibility of the United Nations.

In 2014, following the first revision of Nigeria’s gross domestic product data in two decades, Abuja announced that its economy had overtaken South Africa’s as the largest in Africa. Using the rebased data, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that that Nigeria’s economy grew at 12.7 percent between 2012 and 2013. Thereafter, there was some triumphalist rhetoric about the size and strength of the economy from personalities in then-president Goodluck Jonathan’s administration in the run up to the 2015 elections and among those promoting foreign investment in Nigeria. However, in 2016, reflecting the dramatic fall in petroleum prices and the value of the national currency, the naira, the IMF concluded that Nigeria’s GDP had fallen behind that of South Africa. The Economist noted that foreign investors are likely to be discouraged by the latest figures. A clear-eyed August 22 editorial, Vanguard, an independent, national-circulating newspaper based in Lagos, argued that Nigeria’s economic was “never as strong as the 2014/15 rebasing of the GDP had portrayed.” Instead, Nigeria’s economy was “like a clay-footed elephant that could collapse under the slightest pressure. Thus, it took just a slide in oil revenue compounded by ineffective policy responses to it…to bring the elephant down.” Among the home truths cited by Vanguard: —Even when its GDP was higher, Nigerians were “almost four times poorer” than South Africans. —Nigeria has been unable to exploit its domestic market because of low production capacity. —Nigeria’s huge population is not sufficiently channeled into economic productive activity. —Vanguard concludes that Nigeria must diversify its economy and develop local industrial production if it is to thrive. Nigeria’s current population estimates are in the range of 187 million. A UN agency estimates that by 2050, the country’s population will be around 400 million, making it the largest country in the world. It is the current size of the Nigerian market, and its potential future size, that has fascinated investors. Yet, far from being a blessing, a huge population that is growing rapidly is a drag on national development when education, health, and other basic infrastructure is inadequate to engage it in productive activity.

The below remarks come from a speech delivered on August 16, at an Area Studies Seminar at the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Foreign Service Institute, Arlington, Virginia. I would like to open with thanks to the Foreign Service Institute for the opportunity to talk about U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Sahel and West Africa. I would hope that these formal remarks will help to frame our subsequent discussion. To state the obvious, we Americans are having elections. Again, to state the obvious. The whole world is watching. During a recent trip to Africa, my interlocutors always moved the conversation as quickly as possible to the American elections, to Hillary Clinton and to Donald Trump. Indeed, the election campaign is shaping international perceptions of the United States. It is hard to judge how lasting the impact will be on African perceptions. All election periods are uncertain. This one is especially so. The presidential winner is hard to predict. Hillary Clinton usually leads Donald Trump in the polls but by a margin that could be reversed by unpredictable events. “Brexit,” the referendum by which the British people voted to leave the European Union, defied conventional wisdom and reminds us of the fallibility of polls. Should Mrs. Clinton win, Mr. Trump has already called into question the legitimacy of her victory by raising the specter of election rigging. Hence, the current paralysis between the executive and legislative branches could endure for some time. With respect to U.S. foreign policy, Mrs. Clinton’s policies are familiar, and with the possible exception of on trade, represent continuity with the Obama administration in which she served as Secretary of State. Her foreign policy advisers are well-known. By contrast, Mr. Trump might mean new foreign policy directions. He has already indicated shifts with respect to NATO and Vladimir Putin’s Russia. His foreign policy advisers are largely unknown. Whoever wins, there will be a transition – and transitions are always difficult, even when they take place within the same party. It can easily take a year before a new administration fills its top policy positions. During a transition, typically, there are few new foreign policy initiatives, but programs already in place do continue. Foreign policy has played a muted role in this campaign. Africa has figured hardly at all. During the upcoming transition we who are concerned about Africa will be working to get the continent on the new administration’s radar screen. While acknowledging the present uncertainty, where are American short, medium, and long term priorities in seeking to advance peace in the Sahel? First, the short-term. We are concerned to contain and roll back violent extremist movements such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the self-proclaimed Islamic State, and Boko Haram. This includes strengthening African state capacity and that of African multilateral institutions so that they can better respond to security challenges. It also includes working to counter trafficking of narcotics, arms, and people, an important source of funding for violent extremism. In the medium term, American policy goals include the reform of the security services (military, police). Security service abuse is a driver of violent extremism. Over the longer term, U.S. policy is to promote better governance, democracy framed by the rule of law, protection of human rights, and economic development. As for activities, U.S. involvement in the Sahel is growing because of security issues associated with violent extremists. The U.S. military’s Africa Command is perhaps the best example. At the request of host governments, we have established a few drone facilities. Peacekeeping operations training continues, as does U.S. diplomatic and financial support for multilateral peace efforts. But, the bottom line is that the U.S. security presence remains small. The Leahy amendment limits our training of foreign military and police. More generally, U.S. involvement in the Sahel is limited by the indirect threat to U.S. security posed by violence extremist groups. There has also been caution in Washington in the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan. Small programs to promote democracy and the rule of law, support the electoral process, and advance education for women continue. There are larger heath programs. Power Africa and the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) have been signature Obama policies. The first seeks to address Africa’s deficit in the production of electricity, the second to promote leadership skills within a democratic context. There are numerous examples of “soft diplomacy” that have worked well, ranging from various exchange programs to the promotion of mutual cultural understanding. Our disadvantage is that our diplomatic establishments are underfunded and understaffed – and “soft diplomacy” requires resources. Sometimes, newly elected presidents will ask for a briefing from organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations. The time allowed is very short, perhaps ten minutes. If I were asked to brief on the Sahel, I would make the following six points: Violent extremism, in the Sahel is a direct threat to U.S. interests. It destabilizes friends and partners in the region and has caused a humanitarian disaster. It does not yet pose a threat to U.S. security, but it could in the future. Hence, the U.S. cannot walk away from security engagements in the Sahel. That engagement is best achieved through a partnership with African states and organizations and other stakeholders, including the United Kingdom, France, China and the European Union. Unlike in the South China Sea, there is no strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. in Africa. There is a humanitarian disaster in northeast Nigeria to which the American people will demand a response once it is better known. Estimates are that there are up to two million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and up to 600,000 children face famine. Over the next six to twelve months – the election and transition time – where could international coordination and cooperation best take place? I would suggest starting with humanitarian relief in northeast Nigeria, and the delivery of food and medical supplies. This will not be simple. There will be the need for the closest coordination with, and support for, the Nigerian authorities. Any such multilateral effort must begin in Abuja. It would also involve international agencies such as the World Food Programme and the World Health Organization. There will be logistical challenges. Humanitarian efforts would take place in areas that are far from secure. If the Nigerian, Chadian, and Nigerien forces have driven Boko Haram out of the territory it has occupied, Boko Haram is still far from having been destroyed. Over the past few days the Nigerian military has said that it thwarted Boko Haram plans for attacks in Abuja and Lagos. Further, how do we ensure that humanitarian aid does not fall into the hands of Boko Haram? But, if successful, coordination and cooperation could advance multilateral cooperation is responding to the challenges of the Sahel – in a way similar to the coordinated effort against Ebola. And it might be do-able during a time of U.S. political transition.

Gabriella Meltzer is a research associate in the Council on Foreign Relations Global Health program. From Ebola to Zika, recent global health crises have been defined by unpredictable outbreaks of mysterious pathogens. However, the yellow fever epidemic currently sweeping across Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was not only predictable, but could have been stopped by the World Health Organization (WHO) with the necessary political will and logistical organization. Like Zika, yellow fever is carried by the Aedes mosquito, and is endemic to tropical parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, along with South and Central America. Most cases are asymptomatic or mild with fever, chills, nausea, and fatigue, but roughly 15 percent become more severe. About half of these cases prove fatal. Similar to other mosquito-borne diseases, yellow fever is typically transmitted between infected mosquitos and non-human primates in jungle environments. However, deforestation and general climate change often create more hospitable breeding grounds closer to human populations. Yellow fever then enters an urban cycle, whereby people and mosquitos infect each other. Unlike in the jungle, the virus is no longer naturally contained—transmission occurs quickly in overcrowded environments ripe for mosquitos where people are constantly in motion. The Central African cities of Luanda, Angola and Kinshasa, Congo have been at the epicenter of the most recent outbreak. Since December 2015, there have been 3,818 suspected cases and 369 deaths in Angola, and 2,051 suspected cases and 95 reported deaths throughout Congo. Both of these nations are plagued by weak health systems with average life expectancies of fifty-three and sixty, respectively. The collapse of global oil prices has forced Angola to cut public spending by 40 percent over the past two years, allowing Luanda’s trash collection and water sanitation services to fall by the wayside and mosquitos to proliferate. Meanwhile, Congo has only one lab with diagnostic capabilities for a country with a population of nearly sixty-eight million, ten million of whom are located in densely populated Kinshasa. It is shocking and disappointing that this epidemic continues to escalate while a yellow fever vaccine exists—one that not only provides lifelong immunity, but is safe and inexpensive to produce. There are five manufacturers worldwide, and production costs are just over one dollar. The WHO-led International Coordinating Group for Yellow Fever Vaccine Provision (ICG) only maintains a small emergency vaccine stockpile of six million in the event of an outbreak. In 2015, UNICEF reported a 42 percent shortage of supply relative to global demand before this epidemic even began. The WHO, plagued by mismanagement and lack of accountability, has once again found itself scrambling to contain a quickly spreading virus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Not only have administered doses been diluted by 80 percent to maximize emergency coverage, but of the six million emergency doses sent to Angola in February, one million disappeared entirely—a claim the agency has publicly denied. Many of the shipments that did reach the region were sent to areas with no cases, arrived without proper materials, or were not kept cold enough to ensure effectiveness. Angola, Congo, and many other at-risk countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa must take proactive measures to strengthen their weak health systems to counter the growing threat of mosquito-borne and other viruses. But in the interim, these nations must rely upon the support of a WHO that is failing them.

Global trade and the supply chains that support it are undergoing a period of profound change. Supply chains face threats including a resurgence of protectionism, climate change, decaying infrastructure, and human rights abuses. The Development Channel’s series on global supply chains will highlight experts’ analysis on emerging trends and challenges. This post is from Dr. Sherry Stephenson, senior fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD).  We live today in a networked economy led by investment flows where business-to-business intermediate trade accounts for over two-thirds of the goods and nearly three-quarters of the services exchanged worldwide. Global value chains (GVCs) now define how companies do business and how world trade is structured. These complex chains mean different things to different actors and the “governance” of GVCs is understood in various ways. It can be viewed from at least three perspectives: of firms; of individual countries; and of the international trading system. At the firm level, governance of a supply chain refers to management, or how the activities in a production network are organized and carried out among participating firms. Usually the lead firm sets and enforces the parameters under which other firms in the network operate, through deciding what will be produced and in what location, the type of quality controls that must be followed, and the management structure. Companies are most concerned with generating efficient production to maximize profits. How they position themselves in a given value chain and what type of management or governance structure they adopt will depend partly on the type of activity in which they are involved. Sovereign nations look at the governance of global value chains as a policy issue. Their goals are to create an environment that will bring in investment, enhance economic growth, and stimulate the transfer of technology and skills. Governments aim to create the most conducive and enabling set of policies that will allow firms to engage in GVC operations. Both domestic and international policies matter. Domestically, a liberalizing trade policy is a necessary first step to integrating into GVCs. Education, too, is needed for a country’s labor force to contribute high-quality services, or add high-quality inputs to goods and services going into value chain networks. Other enabling policies and factors include: a competitive services industry investment-friendly policies strong government institutions with mechanisms for legal recourse in the case of disputes a robust digital infrastructure customs and border management for efficient logistics non-discriminatory domestic regulation Governments must push these reforms, all the while balancing domestic politics, which may or may not support this open trade agenda. Finally, the international trading system governs GVCs through rules negotiated between countries in trade agreements and addresses decisions that affect trade and investment flows between several trading partners or the trading system as a whole. This form of GVC “governance” has been little explored and discussed by analysts and policy officials. Some argue there is a "supply chain governance gap" at the multilateral level due to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) preoccupation with the Doha Round agenda of 20th century trade issues, and with a WTO system characterized by: outdated trading rules—the WTO came into force in 1995 when the internet was considered “emerging technology” and the World Wide Web had just appeared; lack of rules on investment, competition policy, and e-commerce and digital trade, all vital to GVC operations; trade rules that are structured in silos, with no cross-cutting forum to discuss horizontal issues that affect GVC operations. In the WTO’s absence, preferential, plurilateral and mega-regional trade agreements have stepped into the governance void. The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), being negotiated by fifty countries, covers all services sectors as well as key 21st century trade-related issues. Investment, competition policy, and digital trade/data flows are all included in new, deeper preferential trade agreements, such as the recently-concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). If ratified, the TPP should create an enabling environment for GVCs among its members. However, it will further splinter the WTO system. If followed by other preferential trade agreements, it will lead to more fragmentation in GVC governance.

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. This week the UN Security Council will conduct a second straw poll in the race to select the ninth secretary-general (SG) of the United Nations. António Guterres, who recently stepped down from a ten-year run as UN high commissioner for refugees, emerged as the surprise early frontrunner after the first poll. However, the Council’s final choice likely won’t be known until the fall, and those watching the race should expect many twists in between. More important than who is selected is whether the process paves the way for real reform in how the UN chooses its senior leaders. This year’s race has already broken new ground. For the first time candidates to lead the United Nations have been required to be formally nominated, to provide vision statements, to conduct public interviews, and to participate in a town hall debate. These new requirements have introduced unprecedented transparency in the selection process, as well as attracting perhaps the most qualified slate of candidates for the position yet, including a former president, several former prime ministers, and officials with deep UN experience. With the start of Security Council straw polls, however, the process has taken a more traditional, closed turn, and observers have once more turned to watching the Council’s smoke signals. (The results of the first straw poll were not officially disclosed, but were quickly leaked.) Still, the unprecedented media scrutiny and the expressed desire of many member states for a strong SG may make it harder for the Security Council to choose a weak reed of a candidate that bends to their needs. It is possible, as Richard Gowan notes, that a more protracted battle among the Council’s five permanent members (or P5) may favor “lowest-common denominator figures.” But interest in a stronger SG comes at a time when the UN is facing multiple crises. The war in Syria, which has unleashed a humanitarian and refugee crisis, is obviously at the top of the list. But spikes of violence and political turmoil in Burundi, South Sudan, and elsewhere also demand the UN’s attention. The past year also witnessed the historic adoption on the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris agreement on climate change, which urgently need to be implemented. At the same time, the UN is mired in controversy, not least for its belated response to shocking sexual abuse perpetrated by its peacekeepers. The next SG will need to deliver on the UN’s ever more ambitious mandate while ensuring that the institution upholds its values. To have any prospect of success, Ban’s successor will need to rely upon the UN’s 44,000 international civil servants both in Turtle Bay and around the world both to implement policies and programs and to raise the alarm in the event of crises. The problem? The personnel systems in place for recruiting and deploying these experts are badly broken. Greater transparency may be finally arriving to the SG selection process, but the same principle has not been extended to other senior appointments within the UN, where patronage politics still prevail. Member states lobby on behalf of their nationals for senior leadership positions, often bypassing competitive recruitment processes. The system favors powerful states, especially the P5, who must approve both the SG’s initial selection and the renewal of his or her term. Member states covet these appointments as part of what Foreign Policy’s Colum Lynch calls “the transactional nature of international diplomacy at the UN, where plum assignments are used to lubricate the wheels of statecraft.” Although SGs often seek to push back against member state efforts to determine senior-level UN appointments, the UN’s own investigators have found that no SG has been “immune” to this pressure. Indeed, high-level appointments within the UN secretariat are increasingly “sticky,” meaning that positions are successively held by nationals of the same country, despite multiple General Assembly resolutions against the practice. For instance, the top UN peacekeeping post has been filled by France since 1997, when Paris was reportedly offered the position in exchange for withdrawing its veto over Kofi Annan’s appointment. Similarly, for nearly ten years the United States has claimed the top spot in the Department of Political Affairs, just as the United Kingdom has held the UN’s top humanitarian post, and China the top spot in the Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Russia held the senior position in the UN’s Geneva office for seventeen years before assuming leadership of the Vienna office in 2010. The P5’s hold over these top positions only encourages other influential countries to lobby to fill positions down the chain of command with their own nationals. As for the mass of UN members, their desire to open up the choice of important senior positions was on full display during the SG candidate interviews. Gender, as well as nationality, remains a pivotal consideration. Overwhelmingly, the top spots are given to male candidates, particularly those positions that are controlled by the P5. In 2015, more than 80 percent of all senior UN appointments were male, erasing gains toward gender parity made earlier in Ban Ki-moon’s tenure (though statistics from the first half of 2016 show some improvement in this regard). In a year when so much attention has been paid to selecting a female SG, this imbalance in other senior positions is striking. The end result is an in-built tendency to select men from powerful countries to staff senior positions at the United Nations. The current system, beyond disadvantaging more than half the population, harms the UN’s credibility—a complaint raised by UN staff members in a recent open letter. For experienced UN-watchers, this is hardly news. But it matters more this year as candidates for the UN’s top spot engage in longer and more open campaigns, increasing the likelihood that member states will demand exclusive rights to certain senior positions in exchange for political support. The risk will be even greater if P5 members disagree on who should be selected—a distinct possibility, based on the results of the first straw poll this year. To make matters worse, the rest of UN staffing is also in disarray, afflicted by recruiting delays and an uncompromising bureaucracy. In a scathing critique penned on his departure in February, senior UN official Anthony Banbury excoriated the UN’s “sclerotic personnel system,” which often requires breaking rules just to get urgently needed staff to crisis situations. Banbury is not alone. The 2015 High Level Panel on Peace Operations found that there is “no topic that elicits greater frustration in the field across all levels of staff.” Peace operations demand the ability to move staff flexibly and bring on board specialists quickly. Instead, processes for recruiting essential staff have become even more rigid and inflexible. It now takes on average over two hundred days to fill a position—and changes introduced this year are expected to drive that figure still higher. Although staffing issues may seem a dry, administrative issue, the next SG would be wise to exploit his or her early window of opportunity to push for a timely, competitive, and merit-based recruitment model. This campaign may touch a nerve with member states that mistrust a stronger secretariat. But if the UN has any intention of delivering on the ambitious pledges it has made over the past year, member states will need to take an honest look at how the institution can bring in the right people to get the job done. By shedding new light on the SG selection process, member states have generated the strongest and most qualified group of candidates ever to aspire to lead the United Nations. It is time to bring similar transparency to the selection of those whom he or she will lead.

Nathan Birhanu is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. The June 2016 border clash between Ethiopia and Eritrea reflected renewed tensions between the two countries that have been mutually hostile since their 1998 – 2000 war. Shortly after the clash, tensions escalated as Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalgn claimed further retaliation will be administered if “destabilizing efforts” continued, while Eritrea accused the Ethiopian administration of human rights abuses. However, recent developments are promoting a welcome de-escalation, reducing the likelihood of  continued fighting. First, in July 2016, Ethiopia was elected to  the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a non-permanent member for the next two years. Considered the most powerful body of the UN, the UNSC can authorize military action, impose international sanctions, and mandate peace keeping operations. Ethiopia had been actively lobbying for the seat, not least because election enhances the prestige of the Addis government. Second, also early in July 2016, Eritrea allowed a consignment of food aid from the UN World Food Program (WFP) to transit its port of Massawa  for humanitarian relief operations in South Sudan. The cargo was the first to pass through Eritrea’s port in a decade. WFP used Massawa to avoid the congested port in Djibouti, thereby accelerating the flow of  aid to a humanitarian disaster area. Finally, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (Commission) in June 2016 released a scathing report on Eritrea, detailing rampant human rights abuses by Asmara. Taken together, these three developments appear to have encouraged a certain stabilization. Ethiopia had previously served on the UNSC in 1967 and 1989, well before the establishment  of the current regime in 1993, now led by Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn. The prime minister likely wants to avoid compromising his bolstered international reputation  by instigating conflict with Asmara at the border. Ethiopia will take its seat on the UNSC in January 2017. The potential influence of Ethiopia on the UNSC is not lost on Eritrea. On July 1, 2016, the UN Human Rights Council (Council) passed a resolution requesting that the UN General Assembly submit the Commission’s report on Eritrea’s human rights abuses to the “relevant organs of the UN for consideration and urgent action.” Earlier drafts had explicitly designated the UNSC, but several countries objected, including the United States and China. Eritrean Presidential Advisor Ghebreab Yemane has raised concerns that Ethiopia could use its seat on the UNSC to push for a resolution against Eritrea related to border issues.  By  allowing WFP cargo to transit its major port, Eritrea is offering something of an olive branch to the UN and the international community.  Despite the Council’s report, which Asmara denounces as false, Eritrea is signaling that it is  willing to work within the established system, at least with respect to certain humanitarian crises.

Nigeria’s notorious corruption was a centerpiece of the 2014-2015 presidential campaign of Muhammadu Buhari, and fighting it has been a centerpiece of his administration. Abuja is an important Washington partner, and a successful Nigerian campaign against corruption is in the American interest. However, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow Matthew Page argues that the United States is not doing nearly enough in a hard-hitting, thought-provoking brief on corruption, “Improving U.S. Anticorruption Policy in Nigeria.” Page deftly sketches out the magnitude of corruption in Nigeria and its threat to democracy and good governance. Then he turns to the heart of his brief, why U.S. help has been largely ineffective. He notes that U.S. policy since the restoration of civilian government in 1999 has largely been focused on security cooperation, economic growth and development, and democracy and governance. But, not corruption. In an important insight, Page sees a divergence of approach between senior administration policy makers and U.S. working-level officials. Hence, President Obama, Secretary Kerry, Attorney General Lynch and Treasury Secretary Lew have publicly stated that anticorruption efforts are a U.S. policy priority in Nigeria. Yet diplomats cultivate relationships with as wide a range of elites as they can, including those who are corrupt. There are also perennial issues of interagency coordination. Page’s bottom line: “U.S. anticorruption policy remains broad-based and untargeted, centered on modest assistance programs for police investigators and civil society watchdogs.” Page’s specific recommendations repay careful consideration. They are all practical: Establish a U.S. interagency working group on Nigerian “kleptocracy” that would facilitate coordination and cooperation among the relevant U.S. agencies; Establish within the U.S. Embassy in Abuja a FBI special agent tied to the Bureau’s International Corruption Unit in Washington; Issue an executive order on Nigerian kleptocracy that would enhance efforts to restrict Nigerian financial transactions in the United States related to corruption. A vigorous U.S. anticorruption policy requires the closest partnership with the Nigerian authorities. However, in the past, corruption – often blatant – infected the highest reaches of the Nigerian government. Too many high level officials were making too much money from corruption. Under Buhari, that has changed, but “corruption fights back.” Buhari has made it clear that he seeks outside assistance. That provides a special opportunity for a new U.S. anticorruption campaign.

Savings are essential for growth: domestic savings finance productive investment, provide a safety net for the future, and are strongly associated with long-term growth prospects. Sadly, a new report from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) makes the convincing case that Latin America has fallen behind, with repercussions for development in the region for decades to come.  National savings result from the combination of decisions by individuals, businesses, and the public sector. On all of these fronts, Latin America does relatively poorly, as shown in Table 1: gross public savings are only a bit more than one-third those of emergent Asian economies, while private savings are 69 percent those of advanced economies and only 57 percent of emergent Asian economies. Latin America’s only saving grace (pun intended) is that external savings partly compensate for low national savings. But foreign savings such as foreign debt are less desirable than domestic savings, not least because they may be comparatively expensive and may also make national economies more susceptible to foreign shocks. Source: Cavallo and Serebrisky, Ahorrar para Desarrollarse, p. 30. Who is to blame for low savings? The report notes that Latin America and the Caribbean did poorly at saving during the region’s demographic boom, with the result that average savings are about 8 percent lower than where they could have been. Low levels of trust in the financial sector contribute: only 16 percent of the region’s adults have savings accounts, against 40 percent in emerging Asia and 50 percent in the advanced economies. Banks in Latin America only loan around 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to the private sector, as compared with 80 percent in Asia and 100 percent in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the absence of good financial sector options, citizens and businesses may turn to options that are less desirable for long-term development, like sending money abroad, purchasing durables, or simply consuming instead of investing. Also problematic is the rapid aging of Latin America, which will put pressure on pension systems, many of which do not yet cover even half of the national population. Government consumption is also a significant part of the problem, in part because the region so desperately needs to increase investment in long-term infrastructure projects that governments may be better positioned to provide. The IADB estimates regional economies need to increase such investment by 1 to 2 percent a year. But for a variety of reasons, governments have found it easier to bias spending toward consumption: between 2007 and 2014, total government spending increased by 3.7 percent of GDP, but the report notes that 90 percent of this increase went to current expenditure, and public investment accounted for only 8 percent. The report minces no words when it comes to the problems of tax arrangements: tax evasion accounts for more than half of potential tax revenue in the region, which places much of the burden on compliant citizens, who then have every incentive against saving, with pernicious effects on aggregate investment and productivity. What can be done? The answer, according to authors Eduardo Cavallo and Tomás Serebrisky, lies in a combination of pension reform, infrastructure investment, more targeted tax policies, efforts to build productivity, and financial sector reform. As though this were not a daunting enough list, they also suggest that Latin America needs to create incentives for a “savings culture,” including by improving access to the financial system, developing new and more accessible savings products, and adopting microeconomic policy to provide better incentives. It is a daunting agenda, and at times seems to include everything but the proverbial kitchen sink (in this case, the kitchen sink would be a greater discussion of the role of political institutions that get in the way of building the proper regulatory environment, institutional trust, and compliance). Overall, the report provides policymakers with a useful framework for thinking about the conditions for Latin American development over the long haul, and a reminder that Latin American leaders must pay far more attention to strategically selecting long-term economic policies, particularly as the demographic boom eases away and the turn-of-the-century boom times recede into memory.

It is early to assess the long term consequences for sub-Saharan Africa of the United Kingdom’s (UK) vote to leave the European Union (EU) on June 24. However, in the short term, it is useful to look at the performance in the exchange rates and stock exchanges of Nigeria and South Africa since the referendum. They provide something of an indication of the wider impact Brexit had on Africa. Nigeria and South Africa together account for more than half of sub-Saharan Africa’s gross domestic product. Both have long had close ties with the UK, especially with respect to trade and financial services. In addition, there are myriad other ties between the UK and Nigeria and South Africa. For example, there is a large British expatriate community living in South Africa. The Nigerian expatriate population in the UK is also significant, and wealthy Nigerians have long favored the UK for education, health services, and second homes. Stock Market Exchange: Source: Bloomberg Terminal Foreign Exchange Rates:  Source: Bloomberg Terminal Highlights of the above figures show:   As of June 28, the decline in the selected stock exchanges has had a narrow range, between 3.5% (UK –the lowest) and 4.81 percent(Nigeria—the highest). The second greatest decline was the New York Stock Exchange. Forward exchange rates for the pound (UK) and the dollar (U.S.) are stable, but investors foresee continued fall in the value of the naira (Nigeria) and a small decline in the value of the rand (South Africa). Beyond the statistics, there can be a silver lining in the clouds. In the aftermath of Brexit, according to Bloomberg, foreigners acquired shares in South African companies at the highest rate in the past seven years. Especially popular were shares in gold producers. South African companies that earn dollars but report profits in British pounds sterling have particularly benefited from the fall in sterling against the U.S. dollar. Those companies include SABMiller PLC (beer) and British American Tobacco, according to Bloomberg. For now, this data would indicate that the direct, short-term impact of Brexit on sub-Saharan Africa will not be as large as had been anticipated. This data also reflects the assumption that Brexit will actually happen. That remains to be seen.

This piece has been co-authored by John Campbell and Nathan Birhanu. Nathan is an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. He is a graduate of Fordham University’s Graduate Program in International Political Economy & Development. International attention is focused on Brexit, the resulting turmoil in the international financial markets, and the resignation of UK Prime Minister David Cameron. There is the risk of overlooking a dangerous confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea that could lead to war and further destabilize the Horn of Africa. After sixteen years of cease-fire from a border war, Eritrea and Ethiopia clashed on June 12. Hundreds have been reported dead. Both countries are pointing fingers at the other as the original instigator of the incident while maintaining a tenuous, tactical stalemate position. The border war Eritrea and Ethiopia fought against each other from 1998-2000 left approximately 80,000 dead. The war over claims to border towns was largely due to cultural and historical differences between the two states in the aftermath of Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. The disputed border towns had no significant economic value, with the fight once described as “two bald men fighting over a comb.” After a final attack by Ethiopia, the war came to a halt, and the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement to implement a ceasefire. The Algiers Agreement was the vehicle for establishing an independent adjudicator titled the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC). Both countries agreed to accept the decision of the EEBC. The EEBC ruled in favor of Eritrea’s claim over the main border town; Ethiopia was unsatisfied with the decision and requested a political dialogue before withdrawing from the disputed territory. The disputed territory thereupon became in effect a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea with sporadic skirmishes over the past sixteen years, until Sunday’s significantly larger clash. What could have caused the recent clash to occur, as either country has little to benefit from a renewed conflict? Ethiopia’s Information Minister, Getachew Reda, has speculated that the attack came from Eritrea to divert attention away from a new UN report that claims Eritrea is guilty of crimes against humanity, including indefinite forced conscription. Reda’s comments also insinuate Eritrea initiated the border incident to legitimize its need for mass conscripts and to win enhanced domestic support. In a similar vein, Eritrea’s Ambassador to Kenya, Beyene Russom, alleged the attack came from Ethiopia in hopes of taking advantage of the negative spotlight focused on Eritrea from the UN report. Ambassador Russom has denounced the UN report as false. In addition, Eritrean Presidential Advisor Yemane Ghebreab told the UN Human Rights Council that Ethiopia is preparing to start a full scale war. In fact, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has recently stated publicly several times that he was prepared to use military force against Eritrea in response to its “provocations.” Investigation of the clash is still underway. Ambassador Russom has acknowledged that satellite imaging could help identify the initiator of the clash, as any large-scale motion of military equipment would be observed. Eritrea has requested the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene to prevent escalation of the border conflict and to initiate dialogue. What is clear is that little, if any, would be gained by either country from continued escalation of conflict. Ethiopia’s current administration is proud of the growth of Ethiopia’s economy over the past fifteen years. Part of Ethiopia’s growth strategy is attracting additional international investors, which renewed conflict would undermine. On the other hand, many in the Ethiopian political class have never really accepted Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia. As for Eritrea, it currently faces a loss of youth fleeing the country: Eritreans account for a sizable percentage of refugees arriving in Europe. The hemorrhaging of the youth would likely escalate if a border war were to restart. The Eritrean government appears to wish to avoid a renewed border war. Eritrea’s approach to the UNSC indicates Asmara’s willingness to work for a diplomatic resolution. The sooner communication and dialogue is started, the better. Even in the aftermath of Brexit, Washington needs to keep this potentially nasty conflict on its radar screen.