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The Vatican Takes on Climate Change: Making Sense of the Pope’s Encyclical

Pope Francis’s new encyclical on the environment, “Laudato Si” (“Praise Be to You”), is a profoundly important document. It has the potential to shake up the stalled climate change debate in the United States, not least by broadening the definition of what it means to be a “conservative.” The encyclical arrives at a critical juncture. In five months, world leaders will gather in Paris for the conference of parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where they will devise a climate change agreement to succeed the Kyoto Protocol. Last year, governments pledged to make emissions reductions commitments that collectively will prevent the planet from warming more than 2 degrees Celsius from preindustrial levels. It is clear the world will come nowhere close to that target—and that humanity is on a path to ecological catastrophe. There is, of course, plenty of blame to go around. Most European countries are lagging in meeting targets agreed at Copenhagen in 2009, and big emerging powers—notably China, the world’s largest emitter, and India—continue to resist binding targets. But the United States is also failing to lead, in part because the leadership of the Republican Party refuses to take global warming seriously. Although 68% of the U.S. public agrees with scientists that climate change is real, the majority of GOP leaders remain in denial. Senator and presidential candidate Marco Rubio is a glaring offender. Having once introduced climate legislation in the Florida state legislature—arguably the state most vulnerable climate change—he now dismisses claims that “there are actions we can take today that would actually have an impact on what’s happening in our climate.” The lack of bipartisan consensus on the reality of (much less responses to) global warming has crippled U.S. climate change leadership. The Obama administration has resorted to executive actions of sometimes dubious constitutionality, like defining carbon dioxide emissions as pollutants subject to EPA regulation. But these Band-Aid responses don’t amount to enough. Deadlock will likely continue until Republican leaders feel the heat—in this case, from their constituents. That’s what makes Francis’s foray into climate change so momentous. As the head of the Catholic Church and Christendom’s most prominent leader, the pope wields unrivaled spiritual and moral authority within conservative U.S. faith communities—including many that tend to vote Republican. Francis’s encyclical does what scientists cannot: offer a rationale for climate change action grounded in theology and morality. This is not the first time Francis has championed conservation. In his inaugural mass in March 2013, he appealed to world leaders: “Let us be ‘protectors’ of creation, protectors of God’s plan inscribed in nature, protectors of one another and of the environment.” On another recent occasion, he was more blunt, warning: “Safeguard Creation. Because if we destroy Creation, Creation will destroy us!” The new encyclical makes the battle against climate change a moral responsibility for practicing Catholics. The pontiff pulls no punches about the reality of climate change: It is true that there are other factors (such as volcanic activity, variations in the earth’s orbit and axis, the solar cycle), yet a number of scientific studies indicate that most global warming in recent decades is due to the great concentration of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxides and others) released mainly as a result of human activity. He rails against those who seek to deny or ignore the crisis, writing: “Obstructionist attitudes, even on the part of believers, can range from denial of the problem to indifference, nonchalant resignation or blind confidence in technical solutions. We require a new and universal solidarity.” The underlying cause of climate change, Francis argues, is humanity’s proprietary, shortsighted, and indeed sinful approach to God’s creation, in the form of unsustainable “methods of production and consumption” that despoil the planet. This sister [i.e., Earth] now cries out to us because of the harm we have inflicted on her by our irresponsible use and abuse of the goods with which God has endowed her. We have come to see ourselves as her lords and masters, entitled to plunder her at will. The violence present in our hearts, wounded by sin, is also reflected in the symptoms of sickness evident in the soil, in the water, in the air and in all forms of life. This is why the earth herself, burdened and laid waste, is among the most abandoned and maltreated of our poor. The Pontiff makes the case for combating climate change by linking it to the topic with which, until now, he has been most well-known: the plight of the world’s poor. The two are intertwined, he argues, since the marginalized will suffer most from climate change. The only solution is to be found in a new ethic of global stewardship grounded in reverence for God’s Creation. Francis’s encyclical has already raised hackles on the right wing of U.S. politics. Anticipating the document, leading Republicans have launched preemptive strikes. Last week Senator James Inhofe said: “The pope ought to stay with his job, and we’ll stay with ours.” Meanwhile, presidential candidate and former senator Rick Santorum said that “the church has gotten it wrong a few times on science, and I think that we probably are better off leaving science to the scientists and focusing on what we’re really good at, which is…theology and morality.” And just yesterday, Jeb Bush—considered a frontrunner for the Republican nomination—told an audience: “I don’t get my economic policy from my bishops or my cardinals or my pope,” adding, “I think religion ought to be about making us better as people and less about things that end up getting into the political realm.” What these self-proclaimed conservatives fail to understand is that efforts to mitigate climate change are deeply conservative. The late William F. Buckley, father of modern U.S. conservatism, famously defined the essence of that movement as “stand[ing] athwart history, yelling Stop.” That is, in effect, what Francis is trying to do: to stop us from despoiling the planet. Buckley, of course, had something else in mind—namely, stopping what he viewed as collectivist schemes at social and political engineering at odds with human liberty. What Francis’s encyclical reminds us, however, is that the selfish pursuit of individual gains can create moral blind spots, impose unfair costs on disadvantaged communities, and degrade resources upon which humanity depend. Consistent with Catholic social teaching, Francis reminds us that the logics of capitalism--and broader consumer culture--must be tempered by a longer-term ethic of responsible stewardship. That includes not only advancing social justice today but also ensuring the planet’s viability for future generations. This ethic of ecological conservation is about taking care of what we have inherited, rather than eating our seed corn, if you will. By contrast, the GOP’s infatuation with turbocharged capitalism is anything but conservative. The essence of capitalism, as the economist Joseph Schumpeter observed, is "creative destruction”. Fierce competition—including the sorting of winners and losers—can be good, since it drives innovation and ultimately economic growth. But capitalism can also generate destruction pure and simple, not least to the environment. Global warming is a classic market “externality”—the fancy term economists use to describe costs are created by firms and consumers but borne by all of society (or indeed the planet). What the modern Republican Party has abandoned is any pretense that the government can and should seek to counter such problems through regulation—by developing incentives, standards and rules that channel market behavior in prosocial directions, without undue constraints on liberty. This was not always the case. A century ago, reformist Republican Theodore Roosevelt not only railed against the "malefactors" of great wealth who had amassed vast fortunes and risked subverting the political system, but also pioneered environmental conservation and stewardship, including by establishing the National Park Service. One can only imagine TR’s disdain for what has become of his party, most of whose leading lights refuse to acknowledge the human hand in catastrophic climate change. History aside, can Francis really hope to change the climate debate? Back in the 1930s, the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin famously dismissed the Vatican’s power: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?” Well, Uncle Joe is long gone, but the Catholic Church endures. Francis’s flock includes 1.2 billion Catholics worldwide, including 76.7 million in the United States. His encyclical will carry enormous weight with the faithful—and put pressure on their elected representatives. Fortuitously, Francis will engage U.S. lawmakers on climate change directly in September, when he becomes the first pope to address a joint session of Congress. (The invitation came, ironically enough, from House majority leader John Boehner—a practicing Catholic and climate change skeptic). With the fate of the earth in the balance, the pope’s historic appearance could not come at a better time or place.

Blog Post by Stewart M. Patrick June 18, 2015 The Internationalist
International Organizations

Global Economics Monthly: June 2015

Bottom Line: President Barack Obama’s proposal for trade promotion authority (TPA) hangs by a thread; whatever the outcome, the debate over currency policy will remain center stage on Capitol Hill. A better approach for dealing with serious policy misalignments and destructive exchange-rate policies is to empower the Group of Twenty (G20) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make better use of current tools. On June 12, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected legislation authorizing trade adjustment assistance, stalling a package of measures that would provide trade promotion authority to the president. Without TPA, which provides a streamlined process for congressional consideration of trade bills, agreement is unlikely to be reached on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) deal that is the centerpiece of President Obama’s strategy toward Asia and critical to efforts at expanding trade and demonstrating U.S. leadership. Opposition to TPA/TPP among congressional Democrats reflects several concerns, including the perception that major U.S. trading partners in Asia manipulate their currencies to gain an unfair advantage in trade. The bill that passed the Senate and now sits in the House makes elimination of currency manipulation a principle negotiating objective. However, the bill does not require the United States to pursue dispute resolution or take other retaliatory actions; the inclusion of these measures could have threatened the trade agreement, prompting a veto. There are sound arguments for a more assertive approach to identify and challenge inappropriate currency and trade practices, a point made by my colleague Ted Alden (here and here). Although I am skeptical that legislation is the answer, the fundamental questions about how to address U.S. trading partners’ unfair currency practices remain unresolved and are likely to reemerge in coming months. Disagreement on Defining the Problem Although concern over currency manipulation is far from new, a consensus on its definition has proved elusive. Many economists define currency manipulation with reference to macroeconomic outcomes, including external imbalances or an exchange-rate “misalignment” relative to some estimated equilibrium level. The difficulty with operationalizing this test is that such a misalignment depends on the full range of a government’s economic policies, and there is no accepted threshold above which an imbalance is too large. So, except for the rare cases of extreme imbalances, economic models of misalignment will seldom produce consensus for policy change. At the other end of the spectrum, manipulation could be measured by the observed act of foreign exchange-rate intervention or other direct interventions to prevent markets from reaching their natural levels. The presumption is that such direct action reflects an intent to distort trade. This latter approach is more amenable to legislation, but subject to the critique that it imperfectly captures the unwelcome behaviors, and that countries can easily achieve similar outcomes through other policies. Since 1977, the IMF has sought to bridge these competing perspectives with a seven-part test to determine whether the practices of member countries warrant IMF surveillance. Test factors include protracted, large-scale one-way intervention in the exchange markets, and large and prolonged current account surpluses. This is the approach of current U.S. law and the legislation now sitting in Congress. The U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires the U.S. Treasury to issue a semiannual report identifying countries that “manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” Although the Treasury has provided broad guidance as to how it defines manipulation and relies in part on the IMF definitions, critics have argued that the definition is too general to be effective in deterring manipulation. Further, the unwillingness of the Treasury to cite any country for manipulation in this report since 1994 has strengthened criticism that the current law is ineffective. Any credible definition of currency manipulation should capture the most egregious cases of misalignment and address visible and active episodes of government intervention in the exchange markets. China provides the most obvious example of a consensus that something was wrong: its foreign-exchange reserves rose from just over $200 billion in 2001 to nearly $2 trillion in 2008, and its current account surplus rose from 1.3 percent of gross domestic product to over 10 percent. However, since then, China’s current account surplus has fallen back to around 2 percent and reserve accumulation has slowed sharply. In April, the IMF reported that the Chinese currency currently was not misaligned. Proposed legislation should also exclude the effects of monetary policies such as the U.S. quantitative easing measures from 2008 to 2014 and Japan’s similar measures since 2013. However, monetary policy could have large effects on currency valuations and cause severe problems for trading partners, even if the intent of monetary easing was to spur domestic demand and not necessarily to weaken the currency. In the context of Japan’s experience, the Group of Seven (G7) sought to find a workable distinction between monetary policy and currency manipulation. In their February 2013 statement, G7 ministers and central bank governors endorsed fiscal and monetary policies “oriented towards meeting our respective domestic objectives using domestic instruments,” and reaffirmed their commitment not to target exchange rates. That formulation—allowing monetary easing that is aimed at domestic objectives (e.g., stimulating demand after a recession) as long as the country does not directly intervene in markets—protects monetary policy but potentially justifies a huge range of policy interventions. Further, it ensures that legislation in part driven by anger at Japan (and China) is unlikely to identify either country as a manipulator in the current environment. Legislative Proposals Will Not Address the Problem Given the lack of consensus regarding definitions, it is not surprising that a wide range of legislative proposals exist to address the problem. The existing legislation foresees a beefed-up Treasury review process, backed by the threat of future legislative action. More aggressive proposals, defeated in the Senate, would have required binding dispute settlement or allowed for countervailing duties against countries that are found to manipulate. There are a number of unconventional proposals also being discussed. C. Fred Bergsten, former head of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, suggests meeting manipulation with matching and offsetting sterilized foreign-exchange intervention, and other proposals recommend cutting off an offending country from trade and other benefits. Finally, there is already some language in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements designed to discourage competitive devaluations. Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states that member countries “shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the provisions of this agreement.” In principle, this language could be tested through the dispute-settlement provisions of the WTO. No country has ever brought a case, though the U.S. Trade Representative’s office has examined the possibility in some detail. One problem with all of these proposals is that, if legislated through TPA or other trade agreements, they would only apply to countries participating in the agreement. This makes an agreement harder to achieve, punishes participants in these agreements, and creates impediments to other countries, such as China, joining these agreements at a later date. A broader concern is that this legislation reflects a further turn away from multilateralism at a time when U.S. support for an open, multilateral trading system is in question due to the failure to pass IMF reform and to effectively deal with China’s plans for an Asian infrastructure bank, among other issues. This is a point well made by the Peterson Institute’s Ted Truman and others. Real Progress Will Require Political Will In recent years, the Treasury Department has made a meaningful effort to prioritize exchange-rate policies, pressing China and others on exchange rates in multiple forums. Arguably, these efforts have contributed to exchange rates that are better aligned now than in the past. But these efforts have mostly taken place behind closed doors, reflecting the judgment that public naming and shaming would be counterproductive. As a result, the perception exists that the United States, and the international community more generally, is not doing enough. Criticism has in particular focused on the IMF, given its mandate to oversee exchange rates, and the perception that past IMF initiatives have failed to deliver. This is not to say that the Fund has stood still. In recent years, the IMF has developed new tools to address currency misalignment and analyze the costs of protracted imbalances, including better analytics and reports examining the multilateral effects of exchange-rate misalignments, but the political will has not existed to put them into effect. Critics have pointed out, for example, the IMF’s muted criticism of apparent misalignments in recent years in leading countries such as Korea and Germany. Empowering the IMF to do a better job pursuing exchange-rate policies will require strong international support, which can only be provided by leaders through forums such as the G7 and G20. The G20, in particular, would appear to be an appropriate place to start any initiative, because it includes rising powers such as China, Korea, and Brazil that are essential for any strengthened effort to succeed. No approach, legislative or multilateral, will succeed unless there is political will at the leadership level to support a serious process. Looking Ahead: Kahn's take on the news on the horizon Finding the "Grexit" Greece looks headed to capital controls and a possible exit from the eurozone, as prospects for an agreement with official creditors look remote. Ukraine Default Looms Ukraine’s talks with creditors on a restructuring appear to have stalled, increasing the likelihood the government will stop payments on its debt. A Quiet Taper...So Far Markets expect the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates before the end of the year, contributing to increased market volatility and higher market interest rates, but there is so far little evidence of a new “taper tantrum.”

Report by Robert Kahn June 18, 2015
Sub-Saharan Africa

Nigeria Security Tracker: Weekly Update June 6-June 13

Below is a visualization and description of some of the most significant incidents of political violence in Nigeria from June 6, 2015 to June 13, 2015. This update also represents violence related to Boko Haram in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. These incidents will be included in the Nigeria Security Tracker. June 6: A bomb in Maiduguri, Borno killed sixteen. Boko Haram is suspected. June 6: A suicide bomber in Monguno, Borno killed two. Boko Haram is suspected. June 8: Boko Haram killed nineteen in Askira/Uba, Borno. June 9: Chadian soldiers killed 207 Boko Haram insurgents and lost one of their own. June 9: Three female suicide bombers’ IEDs detonated early, killing them. They are suspected agents of Boko Haram. June 10: Boko Haram killed fourty-three in six villages in Damboa, Borno. June 12: Sectarian violence resulted in the deaths of four in Barkin Ladi, Plateau State.

Blog Post by John Campbell June 15, 2015 Africa in Transition

Europe

Greece’s Bridge to Nowhere

Negotiations continue today between Greece and its creditors, with reports that the government has presented a revised proposal that offers minor concessions in an effort to break the deadlock. A deal is needed in the next week if a package of assistance is to be put in place before end-month payments of $1.7 billion are due to the IMF. While this is not a hard deadline—a short-term default to the IMF need not sink the Greek economy—the government is out of cash and it is hard to imagine how they make critical domestic payments without an injection of cash from creditors. At times like this, the focus is always on getting a deal done, but this negotiation, even if successful, is likely to defer hard choices for a few months in the hope that Greek domestic politics will change to allow a third bail-out program. The two sides are far apart, both in terms of the policies that need to be taken in the short term and the longer term vision for restoring growth. It is hard not to conclude this is a bridge to nowhere. A few points. The two sides are farther apart than the headline numbers suggest. The revised Greek proposal offers a primary surplus of 0.75 percent this year, 1.75 percent in 2016 and 2.75 percent in 2017, compared to the creditor proposal of one, two and three percent, respectively. Seemingly small amounts and one could wrongly conclude the sides are close, but these numbers mask major differences in policy. With current policies, Greece will run a primary deficit this year of around 2/3 of a percent of GDP, and if the government moves ahead with proposed changes to labor and pension laws, the deficit could be substantially larger. Partly this deficit reflects the fall in activity, partly it reflects policy measures from the new government. Thus, even to hit the Greek targets require around 1½ percent of GDP in new measures this year, and substantial additional reforms in subsequent years. This is a lot to ask of a government built on a fragile coalition of interests and elected to do the opposite. Elections have consequences. The core policies in any deal are well known. Creditors have outlined a set of proposals that will need to form the basis for any deal. They reportedly include: (i) an increase in the VAT, currently one of the lowest in the EU, to raise collections by 1 percent of GDP; (ii) public sector wage cuts of 1 percent annually starting next year; (iii) pension cuts of around 1 percent of GDP by 2017 to put the pension system on a fully-paid basis; (iv) a redesigned social safety net system saving ½ percent of GDP per year; and (v) a labor consultation process that would put the brakes on the government’s efforts to roll back previous labor market reforms. There are also privatization proposals, but the program shouldn’t hinge on that element given the inherent uncertainty and lags involved. Creditors have signaled a willingness to negotiate the numbers, but it is hard to imagine a deal that doesn’t include these elements. The pension issue appears the most divisive, though creditors should be willing to accept a continuing pension deficit if the amounts are made up elsewhere. While pro-growth in the longer-term, these policies are a near-term drag on activity at a difficult time. To the frustration of Greece’s creditors, the government has failed on multiple occasions to come up with a coherent or well-developed set of proposals to achieve these savings. The revised Greek proposal reportedly focuses on the headline numbers and comprehensive debt relief, instead of the policies. I have long been supportive of substantial debt relief for Greece (and other overly indebted periphery countries), but I also believe that the creditor’s proposals are a reasonable price to ask in return. That is the grand bargain that should be the goal. But while both sides can be criticized, it is hard not to conclude that the government knows what policies are needed to clinch a deal, but that they are simply unwilling or unable at this point to agree to such policies. Perhaps there is a “Hastert rule” in play in Greece, and the government cannot politically go ahead with a program that does not command a majority of Syriza parliamentarians (opposition parties have signaled their willingness to support a deal). The bottom line here is that while the headline differences are small, the policy and political gulf is vast. The G7 closes ranks. At this weekend’s G7 meeting, there was a strong consensus that Greece needed to make tough and significant decisions to get a deal done. The United States had in recent weeks been seen to be pressing European leaders to compromise, but President Obama’s statement showed little space between him and the other members of the G7: "What it’s going to require is Greece being serious about making some important reforms not only to satisfy creditors, but, more importantly, to create a platform whereby the Greek economy can start growing again and prosper. And so the Greeks are going to have to follow through and make some tough political choices that will be good for the long term." Domestic payments are still the trip wire. Even if most or all external debt payments were deferred or forgiven, Greece would still need additional resources in the near term while negotiations on a longer term program proceed. A bank run adds to the needs. The government proposes to meet the need through additional treasury bill issuance, which in the end would be financed by the ECB’s Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). ELA exposure to Greece now stands at around €80 billion, and it is understandable that the ECB is wary of being the lender of first resort for an open-ended transitional period. But without this support, growing domestic arrears and missed payments will have a damaging effect on an already slowing economy and put further political pressure on the government. Banking controls inevitably would follow. In the end, non-payment to the IMF need not cause huge dislocations for the Greek economy. Not paying pensions or government wages in full would. The inflation tax is becoming more attractive. One often-cited advantage from leaving the eurozone is the growth boost that could come from the resultant depreciation, but that presumes that Greece could develop a vibrant non-tourist export sector with a more competitive exchange rate. That is hard to imagine being done easily given current policies. Perhaps a more powerful near-term argument for exit is simply that it relieves fiscal pressure by allowing the government to print money. The inflation tax that results is hugely distortive, but not necessarily more so than the current situation of widespread and growing domestic arrears. In the end, whether there is a deal or not is a political decision with substantial consequence for Greece and also for Europe. But beyond handicapping the deal, it is important to have a path for Greece that restores growth, and it’s hard to see how we are closer to that outcome now than before the most recent crisis.

Blog Post by Robert Kahn June 9, 2015 Macro and Markets
Cybersecurity

Taking Stock of Snowden’s Disclosures Two Years On

Last Friday marked the second anniversary of the start of Edward Snowden’s disclosures. The days preceding this anniversary highlighted Snowden’s continued prominence. On June 1, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act—the legal basis for the domestic telephone metadata surveillance program Snowden revealed—expired. On June 2, the Senate passed and President Obama signed the USA FREEDOM Act, which the House of Representatives previously approved. This legislation transforms how the U.S. government will access domestic telephone metadata for foreign surveillance. On June 4, the New York Times published a story based on Snowden-disclosed documents claiming the NSA secretly expanded “Internet spying at the U.S. border.” Also on June 4, Snowden published an op-ed claiming that “the world says no to surveillance.” It was a good week for Snowden. But has it been a good two years for the rest of us? Section 215 and the Domestic Telephone Metadata Program Snowden’s signature achievement involved exposing what the U.S. government did under a secret interpretation of Section 215. He defended the principle that the government should not exercise power under secret laws. Although oversight bodies found no NSA abuses, this conclusion did not overcome the rule-of-law defect Snowden emphasized. However, Snowden’s challenge was not the only factor in Section 215’s death. The metadata program was ineffective as a counter-terrorism tool, which led some in the intelligence community to welcome its demise. Had the program contributed to foiling terrorism, its utility might have overcome the taint of its secret jurisprudence. Section 702 Surveillance Against Foreign Targets Snowden also exposed programs operated under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). For example, the Times article on June 4 used Snowden-provided documents to disclose that the U.S. government began conducting surveillance for malicious cyber activities suspected to originate from foreign governments. Section 702 authorizes surveillance against foreign governments, so the cyber surveillance fits within this legal authority. The NSA was interested in conducting cybersecurity surveillance without identifying a foreign target. Such a step might have secretly expanded Section 702, but the Department of Justice blocked the idea. Like Snowden’s other Section 702 revelations, this disclosure did not reveal secret activities that break the law or abuse legal authority. Instead, Snowden’s disclosures provided transparency about Section 702 programs. Information released by the intelligence community and contained in oversight reports brought even more transparency. Controversies about the scope of Section 702 surveillance, the scale of incidental collection of communications of non-targeted persons, and government uses of incidentally collected information existed before Snowden came along. The new transparency rekindled these controversies, but also revealed how valuable Section 702 surveillance is to the U.S. government. President Obama imposed additional restrictions on U.S. government use of incidentally collected information but did not curtail the surveillance. Congress has not, so far, amended Section 702. At the two-year mark, Snowden’s impact concerning Section 702 is less definitive. Section 702 surveillance continues with robust support, leaving advocates of civil liberties lamenting the lack of curtailment of these programs. Further, the new restrictions on the use of incidentally collected information have not placated domestic opponents or foreign governments and nationals. In many ways, pre-Snowden debates about Section 702 continue because the transparency Snowden triggered provides all sides with ammunition. The Global Context Snowden intended to spark global debate by framing expansive surveillance and espionage as threats to universal human rights. His June 4 op-ed claimed a “change in global awareness” is underway and “the balance of power is beginning to shift.” However, the gap between these claims and reality is great, suggesting his impact globally has been weak, if not counterproductive. The latest Freedom on the Net survey does not support Snowden. Between May 2013 and May 2014 (roughly the first year of his disclosures), Internet freedom declined “for the fourth consecutive year, with 36 out of 65 countries assessed . . . experiencing a negative trajectory[.]” Little has happened since May 2014 to suggest this trend has been reversed. Increased surveillance by many states, including democracies, contributed to this trajectory’s momentum. For example, governments in France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom said “yes” to increased surveillance. In the midst of this decline, Snowden damaged the U.S. government’s international standing, created rifts among democracies, and harmed U.S. technology companies. The Snowden-triggered move by tech companies toward stronger encryption pits democratic governments against the private sector and civil society in a looming zero-sum brawl. Meanwhile, unperturbed by Snowden, autocratic countries exploit the disarray within and among democracies, bash the hyposcrisy of Internet freedom’s champions, conduct intrusive surveillance at home and abroad, and strengthen their manipulation, control, and censorship of digital communications. Given these facts, the UN resolution on the right to privacy in the digital age, which represents global progress for Snowden, does not reflect consensus among states on the relationship between surveillance and human rights. An unprincipled but ineffective program is dead. Long-standing controversies about large-scale surveillance programs targeting foreigners continue. Government surveillance powers are increasing, democracies are bitterly divided, and Internet freedom is in retreat. Whether these outcomes mean we have, as a country and an international community, reached a better place is hotly debated—a reminder that history’s arc is longer than two years.

Blog Post June 8, 2015 Net Politics
Sub-Saharan Africa

Amnesty International Calls for International Criminal Court Prosecution of Nigerian Military

In a long expected report, Amnesty International has claimed that the Nigerian security services have detained 20,000 men and boys since 2009 and that 7,000 of those detainees died in detention under inhumane circumstances. Amnesty also reports that 17,000 people were killed in northeast Nigeria in the same time frame, meaning that 41 percent of deaths occurred under Nigerian custody. Amnesty concludes in its report that the highest ranks of the security services were aware of the abuses and were even complicit in some cases. Accordingly, Amnesty calls on the Nigerian government to open cases against nine senior military figures, including the current chief of defense staff. Amnesty reports that it communicated with the Nigerian government on multiple occasions and provided the government with advance notice of its findings. Former President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration appears to have taken no steps in response to the Amnesty findings. The report is fully credible. It details the security services’ flagrant human rights abuses with great precision. For the report, Amnesty conducted six field investigations, 412 interviews, reviewed ninety videos, and studied many photographs. Word of the Amnesty report has been circulating for some time. Amnesty may have delayed its issuance until after the national elections because it is, in effect, a damning indictment of the Jonathan administration. With the June release of the report, nobody can accuse Amnesty of intervention in Nigeria’s elections. Since independence, if not before, conditions in Nigerian prisons have been horrific. Amnesty quotes Nigerian official complaining that they were deprived of funds to run the detention centers, which became grossly overcrowded. This may have led to a policy of deliberate starvation to reduce detainee numbers. In response to the abuses, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari may be encouraged to move quickly to purge the upper echelons of the security services, replacing Jonathan’s appointments with his own. Should he wish to do so, he could also ask the ICC to open an investigation. However, Buhari is a nationalist, and he is unlikely to call in an external judicial body. Instead, he is more likely to reinvigorate existing or create anew Nigerian institutions to address human rights abuses. Amnesty’s statistics cover the period between 2009 to the present and are restricted to northeast Nigeria. The group is known for being conservative with their estimates. Compared to Amnesty’s reported 17,000 deaths, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Nigeria Security Tracker (NST) estimates that since May 2011 Boko Haram has killed 12,138, the security services have killed 5,274, and that 11,441 have died in the fighting between the security services and Boko Haram. However, the NST records events that take place throughout the entire country and events involving Boko Haram in neighboring countries. As such Amnesty’s statistics and the NST’s are not directly comparable. *An earlier version of this post stated that Amnesty International called on the ICC to open cases against military officers, this has been corrected to state that Amnesty International has called on the Nigerian government.

Blog Post by John Campbell June 4, 2015 Africa in Transition

Cybersecurity

South Korea’s Difficult Path as a Middle Power in International Cyber Politics

Last month, I gave lectures on cybersecurity in South Korea shortly after Secretary of State John Kerry delivered remarks in Seoul on "An Open and Secure Internet." This experience provided an opportunity to consider the challenges South Korea faces in cyber policy. I was particularly interested in how South Korea’s desire to influence world affairs as a "middle power" plays out in the cyber realm. Although South Korea engages in active cyber diplomacy, numerous factors limit its ability to affect international cyber politics in a significant manner. South Korea as a Middle Power and Cyber Diplomacy Since approximately 2008, South Korean officials have described South Korea’s role in world politics as that of a middle power: a medium-sized country with resources, capabilities, networks, and willingness to advance strategies that improve international cooperation. According to the East Asia Institute’s Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative, "[m]iddle power diplomacy generally involves the adoption of an internationalist perspective and policy, actively participating in multilateral forums, leading in specific niche areas, and acting as a bridge among nations." Middle power status has traditionally been associated with countries such as Australia and Canada, but, as explored in a forthcoming book by CFR’s Scott A. Snyder on Middle Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda, South Korea has pursued middle power diplomacy in international development, financial stability, nuclear security, and climate change. South Korea’s middle power efforts also have included cyberspace policy. In cyber, South Korea’s middle power diplomacy has included hosting the 2013 Seoul Conference on Cyberspace (an iteration of the London Process) and the 2014 plenipotentiary of the International Telecommunication Union. South Korea has engaged cyber issues diplomatically in the UN as a participant in the Governmental Group of Experts process, in Asian regional cooperation (e.g., through the ASEAN Regional Forum), in the middle power MITKA initiative (involving Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, and Australia), as a founding member of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, and bilaterally with, among others, China, India, Japan, and the United States. Despite the diplomatic activity, identifying South Korea’s middle power contributions to international cyber relations proves difficult. During the time South Korea has tried to exert middle power influence, international cyber politics have become more contentious and dangerous, which undermines, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claim that "the success of the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace 2013 reinforced Korea’s stature as an agenda-setter on global issues." The deteriorating trajectory in international cyber politics is not South Korea’s fault, but a middle power’s ambition and function is to provide leadership when cooperation falters, especially when great powers disagree. Factors Weakening South Korea’s Middle-Power Potential in Cyber Policy South Korea is one of the world’s most wired countries, which demonstrates the country’s embrace of cyber technologies. However, this commitment renders South Korea vulnerable to malicious cyber activities. As has happened in many countries, South Korea has scaled up its domestic cybersecurity efforts to address cyber threats, including the appointment in 2015 of a presidential adviser on cybersecurity. Despite increased attention on cyber defense and resilience, South Korea has not developed approaches that obviously stand out from equivalent efforts by other countries. South Korea struggles with the same problems as other nations, which means its domestic cybersecurity activities do not necessarily boost its middle power ambitions. These ambitions also suffer because South Korea faces threats from North Korea that dominate South Korea’s cybersecurity agenda. Although North Korea is a cyber menace beyond the Korean peninsula, no other country bears the cyber burden Pyongyang imposes on South Korea. Indeed, in no other country is cybersecurity so interwoven as part of an existential security threat. This burden damages South Korea’s middle power aspirations in cyber affairs by highlighting South Korea’s vulnerabilities, forcing Seoul to prioritize North Korean cyber threats, and undermining the idea South Korea has effective strategies other countries can use. South Korea’s close political, economic, and security relationship with the United States also affects its desire to be a middle power on cyber issues. A function of middle powers is to find ways to navigate international cooperation through the shoals of great-power competition. Middle powers should be—or perceived to be—sufficiently independent to be able to broker such cooperation. South Korea remains dependent on the United States in defending against North Korea, which colors perceptions of how autonomous South Korea can be on security issues. South Korea has not followed the U.S. position on all cyber issues. It has not ratified the U.S.-supported Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, nor did it join the United States in rejecting the revised International Telecommunication Regulations negotiated in 2012. However, such differences have not strengthened South Korea’s middle-power status, especially with countries most at odds with the United States on cyber issues, namely China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Rather than exerting influence in global cyber affairs, South Korea’s cyber diplomacy confronts problems that shrink its ability to affect global cyber relations. Mounting pressures from its domestic online vulnerabilities, the unrelenting threat from North Korea, the close alliance with the United States, and deteriorating cyber relations among major powers jeopardize South Korea’s desire to shape international cyber politics as a middle power.

Blog Post June 4, 2015 Net Politics
International Organizations

Guest Post: Looking Forward on UN Peacekeepers Day

Amelia M. Wolf is a research associate in the Center for Preventive Action and the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2002, the UN General Assembly designated May 29 as the International Day of UN Peacekeepers to honor current and former peacekeepers, and well as those who have lost their lives. In the sixty-seven years since the first peacekeeping mission was established, more than one million people have served in seventy-one peacekeeping operations, and 3,358 military, police, and civilian personnel died while serving. Over the past twenty-five years alone, the mandates, composition, and deployments of peacekeeping operations have grown dramatically in size and complexity. The number of UN member states contributing personnel increased from 46 to 122 countries, and total deployed peacekeepers grew from 10,304 to 107,805, a reflection of the more than doubling of overall missions. However, the composition of peacekeeping forces has seen the starkest change. While Eastern European countries, the United States, and Canada accounted for 71 percent of personnel in 1991, those same countries now contribute just 5 percent. Whereas Canada (1,002), Finland (992), and Norway (924) were the top contributors in 1990, they now collectively contribute just 583 personnel. Today, Bangladesh (9,307), Pakistan (8,163), and India (8,122) are the top troop-contributing countries, accounting for almost 25 percent of all personnel. The United States, which pays for 28 percent of UN peacekeeping, provides merely 54 military personnel and 41 police. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) faces numerous challenges, including limited, outdated, or inadequate resources and supplies, a more lethal and asymmetric operating environment that is not reflected in Security Council mandates, and demands for technologies that have not been adequately adopted into missions. As the UN reflects on the “past, present and future of UN Peacekeeping” and reaffirms its “commitment to working ’Together for Peace’,” it should keep in mind a few particularly important issues. First, a persistent problem facing peacekeeping missions is sexual exploitation and abuse, which has garnered international attention. According to DPKO estimates, some progress has been made; reported allegations decreased from 357 in 2006 to 51 in 2014. However, the UN itself does not have the power or jurisdiction to hold suspected perpetrators accountable. Subsequently, the responsibility lies with member states, some of which lack strong judicial systems, have weak laws governing sexual crimes, or simply are not willing to report on the status of a trial. Last year, nineteen allegations were referred to the troop-contributing countries for investigation, seven of which did not reply or declined to investigate. Second, a chronic and significant gender gap still exists at all levels. Women make up less than 4 percent of peacekeeping personnel—3 percent of military and less than 10 percent of police. More importantly, since the UN began collecting gender data for both military (in 2009) and police (in 2005) personnel in peacekeeping operations, the number of women has increased by less than 1 percent. Additionally, between 2011 and 2013, women leading peacekeeping operations decreased from six to four. Gender diversification is important not only because women are more suitable to carry out certain tasks essential to peacekeeping operations, such as working with victims of gender-based violence or child soldiers. It also has other benefits, including enhanced situational awareness and increased acceptance of a UN force by local populations. Third, while the diversification and growth of contributing countries has had great benefits, such as faster deployment in cases of close proximity, or a better understanding of the culture or operating environment, it has also created new challenges. Neighboring contributing countries may have a greater stake in the outcome of a peacekeeping mission or political objectives that differ from the Security Council mandate, or personnel may have biases that affect their ability to impartially fulfill the mandate. Fourth, over 87 percent of UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, but collaboration between the UN and the African Union (AU) remains underdeveloped. In a recent Center for Preventive Action report, Enhancing Support for Peace Operations in Africa, Paul D. Williams, associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, writes that “partnership peacekeeping”— two multilateral institutions or bilateral partners collaborating on an operation—is now the norm. This includes the transition of authority from the UN to AU in Mali, coexisting missions in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, or the hybrid mission in Darfur. “No single actor can cope with Africa’s security challenges,” writes Williams. Therefore, greater collaboration is needed to utilize the unique strengths of the UN and AU. Williams recommends that the United States support these efforts by assisting the AU to “adopt appropriate standards for its peace support operations” and develop training standards. The International Day of UN Peacekeepers provides an opportunity to not only reflect on the service of peacekeepers but also constructively think about how to enhance their safety and better support them in future missions. This is particularly important this year given that the High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, established by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2014, is expected to soon submit a joint report to the UN Secretariat. Though similar reviews and assessments of peacekeeping operations have been undertaken regularly since the late 1990s, subsequent action was inadequate in addressing the challenges listed above. Ultimately, reform will depend on whether member states listen to the panel’s recommendations and do anything to faithfully implement them.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko May 28, 2015 Politics, Power, and Preventive Action
Sub-Saharan Africa

United States Support for African Peacekeeping

Multilateral peacekeeping operations have long been a feature of the international community’s response to African conflicts (most of which are domestic though often with outside meddling). For those concerned about African peacekeeping operations, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action has just published an important new special report by Paul D. Williams titled Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa. It is a must-read for those involved in African security issues. Williams, a faculty member at George Washington University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, has published widely on peacekeeping operations. His new report indicates that successive U.S. administrations have pursued peacekeeping policies in Africa that lack coherence. As a case in point, Washington is the largest financial supporter of UN and African Union operations on the continent and the United States has trained more than 250,000 African peacekeepers, but, it has only fifty-seven uniformed U.S. personnel in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. In comparison, roughly 300 U.S. personnel were deployed in a mission against the Lord’s Resistance Army. While it looks like the primary American response to African peacekeeping needs has been to write a check, Williams offers several alternative recommendations. He groups these recommendations under personnel, financial, assistance, and policy. One short term personnel recommendation is to actively deploy U.S. military specialists such as medics and engineers as contingents to ongoing peacekeeping operations. He argues that this would not only “demonstrate Washington’s commitment to the idea that UN peacekeeping is a global responsibility,” but also provide American soldiers “firsthand knowledge of operational realities in African crisis zones.” Regarding the form of U.S. assistance, Williams argues that the U.S. should switch its focus from training and equipping peacekeepers to building sustainable national peacekeeping institutions. In doing this, he contends that African contributor countries can become “self-sufficient.” He also argues that the president should adopt a new directive that outlines the administration’s strategic approach to peacekeeping operations (the current directive is over twenty years old). Williams’ recommendations are thoughtful and should be seriously considered. Particularly striking is that they can be implemented quickly. Full disclosure: I served on the Council on Foreign Relations’ advisory committee for the work.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 21, 2015 Africa in Transition
Sub-Saharan Africa

Response Needed to Northern Nigeria’s Humanitarian Disaster

In the May 19 New York Times Adam Nossiter reports on the conditions of women and girls newly freed from Boko Haram captivity. He reports that they are among some 15,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) at a camp in Dalori, Borno, outside of the state capital, Maiduguri. Citing relief workers, Nossiter reports that some 200 girls are pregnant, mostly the result of sexual violence at the hands of Boko Haram. Many of the victims betray serious symptoms of physical and mental illness. Nossiter reports that some women are too traumatized to leave their tents. Some have been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS. He also reports the presence of thousands of children, many without visible parents. There are estimates that there are 1,500,000 IDPs in Nigeria, and 200,000 refugees in neighboring countries. Many cannot go home. Boko Haram is still active. According to the Council’s Nigeria Security Tracker, Boko Haram carried out six attacks in the week of May 9, including one in Maiduguri and one in Cameroon. Clearly, this humanitarian disaster requires international assistance. On May 29, Muhammadu Buhari will be inaugurated as president of Nigeria. He has said that Boko Haram is a Nigerian challenge to be met by Nigerians. But, he has also said that he wishes to restore a military relationship with the United States. It is to be hoped that in the early days of his presidency he will seek to coordinate and lead an international assistance campaign with a focus on victims of Boko Haram. And, the international community should respond. In the meantime, Nossiter reports that there is already a small UNICEF and Doctors Without Borders (MSF) presence at the camp in Dalori. At the very least, their presence should be expanded immediately.

Blog Post by John Campbell May 20, 2015 Africa in Transition
Emerging Markets

Expanding Private Sector Engagement in Developing Countries

Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners, highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is by Elizabeth Littlefield, president and chief executive officer of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the U.S. government’s development finance institution. This month marks the 70th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day—when Nazi Germany surrendered to the allied powers and World War II ended in Europe. This occasion is an important opportunity to reflect on how the postwar reconstruction plan shapes our current model of economic engagement with the developing world and to consider expanding the role of the private sector in these efforts. The postwar consensus came together at Bretton Woods. To rehabilitate a ravaged Europe, representatives of the allied powers agreed on a few basic lessons from the war: (1) advanced nations, especially the United States, need to engage with the world; (2) economic instability breeds conflict; and (3) military and economic preparedness of individual nations alone can’t provide stability. These beliefs have informed U.S. post-war policies and led to the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. For decades after, multilateral institutions and national governments led the investment in the developing world. In the early 1970s, official development assistance dwarfed private capital flows into emerging nations. The Bretton Woods consensus continues to shape the approach to economic development. Today, developing countries receive IMF and Bank loans as well as aid from donor governments. But development assistance is no longer the primary source of international capital. For every $1 in official flows, $7 in private investments flow into the developing world. (Official flows are $134 billion, while private flows are $778 billion). Yet, the need remains, and the private sector is well positioned to deliver where aid efforts have fallen short—in meeting immediate demands, especially creating jobs, building infrastructure, and stimulating the economy. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was established in 1971 as a mechanism to help companies enter emerging markets. The U.S. government spun this development finance institution (DFI) out of the U.S. Agency for International Development. OPIC provides financing and political risk insurance to private investors seeking to work in emerging markets. By leveraging U.S. private sector capital and capacity to address critical needs in development countries, OPIC advances U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Today, OPIC’s global portfolio totals $18 billion in financing and insurance, supporting development projects in over 100 countries. Yet, OPIC’s capacity to support these investments doesn’t meet the scale needed today. Nearly $800 billion in global foreign direct investment (FDI) goes to developing economies, but the world’s least-developed countries receive less than 4 percent of global FDI flows. Aid will not satisfy the unmet needs of the world’s least developed regions. Currently, less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget is allocated to foreign assistance, and it is difficult to imagine this figure will drastically increase. Rather, increased private sector investment is the answer. Numerous U.S. companies are ready to invest their capital in emerging markets, but they need support to meet the business challenges and risk common to such environments. OPIC has already played an important role, providing loans and guarantees to mobilize investments and insurance to protect against unforeseen events But, the United States lags behind in economic engagement in developing countries. To expand U.S. private sector engagement, it will be necessary to redouble OPIC’s efforts. It is time for the United States to lead once more in the effort to spread peace and prosperity to the developing world—as we did post-World War II.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Shannon K. O'Neil May 18, 2015 Development Channel
Sub-Saharan Africa

Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Overview The number of UN peacekeepers is at a record high, with nearly 110,000 uniformed deployed "blue helmets" worldwide, most of them in Africa. But the status quo is "untenable," warns Paul D. Williams, author and associate professor of international affairs at George Washington University, in a new Council Special Report, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa. Unrealistic mandates, unsustainable supplies of personnel, hostile host governments, and mission creep have undermined peace operations, Williams writes. "Given the growing interest in fostering a stable and prosperous Africa, the United States should wield its political influence to address these challenges." In advance of the release of recommendations from the UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations later this month, the report from CFR's Center for Preventive Action identifies four main areas that would benefit from changes in U.S. policy: Personnel: With only forty-two uniformed U.S. personnel in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, Washington's "limited deployments" not only impede U.S. government awareness of the continent's unstable areas, but undermine its attempts to lead on this issue, Williams notes. Increasing the number of U.S. blue helmets in combat service and support roles would boost American leadership credentials and help to "build a cadre of troops with distinct working knowledge of the UN peacekeeping system" and provide "firsthand knowledge of operational realities in African crisis zones." Furthermore, "deployment would demonstrate Washington's commitment to the idea that UN peacekeeping is a global responsibility." Finance: "The United States is the single largest financial supporter of UN and African peace operations in Africa," with voluntary contributions to the African Union (AU) and direct support to countries involved in peace operations. Although international treaty obligations mandate contributions, a 1994 congressional cap on financial support makes it difficult for any administration to pay its dues in full and on time. "The cap," Williams argues, "is shortsighted, counterproductive, and breaches U.S. obligations under the UN charter." Williams recommends removing the cap, clearing "the backlog of arrears," and establishing a new, predictable funding mechanism that supports the AU directly—an equivalent to the European Union's African Peace Facility, which provides financial support for the EU's joint strategy with the AU. Assistance: The United States has trained over 250,000 African peacekeepers and provided nearly $1 billion to support peacekeeping activities. However, these programs provide a "broad rather than deep approach to training African peacekeepers" and "have trouble encouraging African contributors to become self-sufficient." In addition, Williams maintains that the focus of U.S. assistance programs "should shift from training and equipping peacekeepers to building sustainable national peacekeeping institutions." Policy: Because the last presidential policy directive was written over two decades ago, Williams urges Washington to adopt a new directive that outlines the administration's strategic approach to peace operations in a single document. "Without a clear intellectual foundation, U.S. policy on peace operations will continue to lurch from crisis to crisis in an ad hoc manner," he points out. Rather than working with individual countries—some with poor governance records—Williams suggests increasing the number of U.S. personnel deployed to the U.S. Mission to the AU, which would strengthen the AU and help to "assess, plan, manage, and evaluate missions." Download maps for Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa [PDF].

Council Special Report by Paul D. Williams May 14, 2015 Center for Preventive Action
Development

Is the UN Finally Moving Beyond Internet Governance to Focus on What Really Matters?

Nick Ashton-Hart is the Executive Director of the Internet & Digital Ecosystem Alliance (IDEA). He has been the senior permanent representative of the Internet sector to the UN and its agencies and member-states in Geneva for more than eight years. Find him on twitter @nashtonhart. Unless you are obliged to follow the intergovernmental calendar of meetings in Geneva, you are probably not aware that a UN body called the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) met last week. The CSTD meets annually to monitor the implementation of targets set in 2003 and 2005 by the World Summit for the Information Society (WSIS). Last week’s meeting was particularly important because it partly defined what the UN General Assembly will consider when heads of state meet in December 2015 to review the last ten years of the WSIS process and decide the next steps. In its beginnings, the WSIS process was aimed at identifying ways to use technology to improve people’s lives. It was widely believed at the time that debates about Internet Governance would consume only a small fraction of WSIS-related follow-up activity. Sadly it has turned out to be the other way around, with development-related discussions sidelined—and at times even taken hostage—by a zero-sum debate underlying two very different views of state sovereignty and the role of the state in regulating the online environment. That tension was clearly on display last week where the first half of the CSTD meeting was spent on sometimes dry, and at other times simply spectacular, presentations and discussions of the myriad ways science and technology improves, indeed transforms, lives worldwide. The last half was spent negotiating the text of a resolution to be forwarded to the more senior bodies of the UN in New York. Last week’s disagreements focused on how to define the debate in the December 2015 review. The WSIS review process is complicated by the fact that this year is also a review of the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), a much higher-profile process that has defined and prioritized the international development objectives for UN and the international organizations that channel tens of billions each year in development aid. This review will rewrite the MDGs into the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”); the SDGs in turn will directly impact decisions on hundreds of billions of dollars of development assistance during the next decade. By contrast, the WSIS review does not have an obvious price tag or significant effect on funding for international development, and this naturally makes it less of a political priority in New York. According to the World Bank, spending on telecommunications that involved the private sector in 2014 alone exceeded US$248 billion. But because WSIS and the MDGs were not linked ten years ago, spending on narrowing the digital divide is not connected to more mainstream development activities. In other words, when mainstream development processes related to the MDGs result in a village getting its first school, there’s no thought given to ensure it gets Internet access, usable tech hardware and services for students and teachers, and training for the teacher to make the most of it all. Nevertheless, there is hope. Countries across the ideological divide on the role of the state in regulating online activity are increasingly committed to linking the post-2015 WSIS process to the implementation of the broader SDGs, thereby sending a political signal that ICT-related development efforts should be fully connected to more bricks-and-mortar development. If that link is made, the entire multilateral development system has a chance to make a quantum leap forward in leveraging technology to improve outcomes because their political masters will have told them to. There’s also hope in the fact that every year more countries at the CSTD grow tired of wrangling over Internet governance, with fewer willing to prioritize the politics of governance of the net over development-focused substance for its users. At the informal negotiations last week, only three countries were really pushing for recognition that states should take all the important decisions related to the Internet—with a couple of dozen on the other side. Even two years ago, the numbers were much more balanced. Even so, the CSTD concluded by adopting a text that was almost entirely a copy of the previous year’s resolution with only minor housekeeping edits. A copy and paste approach may sound like failure but it is much better than a complete breakdown—something that was a real risk during the informal negotiations. That would have sent a very troubling signal irrespective of what view you take of the disputes involved. Nobody should think that the remainder of the WSIS review process will be easy or necessarily end well. Much of the remaining work is explicitly intergovernmental rather than multistakeholder and a few UN agencies are jockeying for administrative control of WSIS-related activities post-2015. There’s still a lot of time for things to go pear shaped before December. Expect the unexpected.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Net Politics May 13, 2015 Net Politics
Sub-Saharan Africa

Kenya’s Al-Shabaab Problem

This is a guest post by Aala Abdelgadir, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relation’s Civil Society, Markets, and Democracy Initiative. On October 16, 2011, the Kenyan army, in an ostensibly joint operation with the Somalian and Ethiopian militaries, crossed the border into Somalia and attacked the insurgent group al-Shabaab. In response to the October 16 offensive, al-Shabaab launched an attack in Kenya on October 24, 2011. The attack killed one person. Nearly four years later, al-Shabaab’s attack on Garissa University in Kenya last month, which killed nearly 150, underscores that despite military success in Somalia the group’s threat in Kenya is far from contained. Al-Shabaab violence against civilians in Kenya doubled between 2012 and 2013 and then again between 2013 and 2014. Already, the death toll of the recent Garissa attack alone has surpassed al-Shabaab’s 2014 civilian targets. Not only are al-Shabaab campaigns in Kenya increasing, but the group is recruiting native Kenyan members, sympathizers, and allies, rather than just importing operatives from Somalia. Indeed, the AFP reports all four gunmen involved in the Garissa attack were Kenyan – a testament to the group’s successful local recuiting campaigns. Critics such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and Kenyan human rights groups have criticized government treatment of ethnic Somalis in state counterterrorism efforts – a major factor pushing ethnic Somali and Muslim Kenyans toward al-Shabaab. This treatment includes ethnic profiling, mass arrests, and extrajudicial killings. It is feared that the Kenyan government will only step up these activities in the aftermath of the Garissa attack. Meanwhile, this heavy handed response has been counterproductive at best. It has bred mistrust of the government and disillusionment with the broader concept of national unity. Even the staunchest anti-Shabaab Somali community in Kenya feels alienated by the security forces’ brutal counterterrorism tactics. And, as a recent International Crisis Group report confirms, al-Shabaab exploits Kenyan Muslims’ grievances over discriminatory and abusive security tactics in recruitment campaigns. If Kenyan forces continue to isolate Somali and Muslim communities, they will push them into the open arms of al-Shabaab recruiters. In the face of rising pressure to combat al-Shabaab and the failure of their existing strategy, the Kenyan government has proposed a new plan: to close the Dadaab refugee camp. They fear that the camp, home to 350,000 Somalis and located in northeast Kenya close to the Somali border, serves as a hideout for al-Shabaab militants. Notwithstanding that there is not enough information to confirm such suspicions, closing the camp and resettling Somali refugees would be disastrous. As the United Nations, UNHCR, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Amnesty, and HRW, point out, conditions in Somalia are inappropriate for repatriation: the country is still insecure, and the life, freedom, and health of refugees would be threatened, if repatriated. Additionally, and perhaps more problematic for the Kenyan government, resettlement could play right into the hands of al-Shabaab, handing the group a population presumably disillusioned with the Kenyan government and defenseless against radicalization and conscription efforts. Kenya needs to rethink its strategy against al-Shabaab. Only by working with local Somali and Muslim populations can the Kenyan government undermine al-Shabaab’s rise in Kenya.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for John Campbell May 8, 2015 Africa in Transition
Human Rights

Rethinking Accountability at the World Bank

Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is by Natalie Bridgeman Fields, Esq., founder and executive director of Accountability Counsel, and Kindra Mohr, Esq., Accountability Counsel’s policy director. Accountability Counsel is a non-profit legal organization that defends the environmental and human rights of communities around the world that are harmed by internationally-financed development projects. The World Bank faces a disconnect between its mission to serve the poor and the effects of its projects, some of which displaced 3.4 million people in the world’s most fragile regions over the past nine years. Last month, World Bank President Jim Yong Kim admitted to known, longstanding problems with the Bank’s resettlement policies and released three internal reviews revealing the Bank’s failure to collect even minimal information on resettlement, such as the number of people displaced and whether they had received remuneration for their displacement. In our own work at Accountability Counsel, we represent people affected by projects funded, designed, or implemented by the Bank. Through their experiences, we have glimpsed how Bank projects not only harm people, but also call the Bank’s legitimacy into question. In response to early resettlement failures, the Bank, in 1993, created an accountability office called the Inspection Panel. The Panel, walled off from Bank management and reporting directly to the Bank’s board of directors, was designed to ensure that projects comply with internal policies protecting human and environmental rights. Since its inception, the Panel has made significant contributions to accountability and transparency, fielding complaints from people harmed by Bank activities and investigating violations of internal policy. However, as recent cases show, the Panel is losing touch with its mission to serve as an impartial check on Bank activities. In one example, the Ethiopian government made use of Bank funding to forcibly evict indigenous people from their land. The Panel’s investigation acknowledged the connection between Bank operations and this displacement. In addition, it found that the Bank did not conduct required project assessments – a flagrant violation of internal policies meant to protect indigenous communities. However, the Panel ultimately failed to find the Bank responsible for the harm, effectively absolving it. Last month, Kim pledged to “do better” and released an action plan outlining steps to “improve the protection of people and businesses that may be resettled as a result of a World Bank-funded development project” and to strengthen accountability. The plan falls short in several ways. It makes no mention of the Inspection Panel and how it can be reformed to realize the Bank’s “renewed” commitment to accountability. The plan was also announced without consultation with the very civil society groups that work on resettlement issues, and thus it does little to quiet lingering distrust of the Bank’s promise to change its ways. A drastic rethink of the Bank’s approach to accountability is necessary. As a start, the Bank should reform the Inspection Panel and make it a robust, independent mechanism to resolve grievances and provide meaningful redress. Specifically, civil society representatives should be involved in the selection of Panel members to safeguard the institution’s independence. Second, to the extent the Panel offers dispute resolution, it must be done by professional mediators adept at dealing with power disparities. Additionally, the Bank must commit to stronger, more comprehensive policies that protect vulnerable communities, taking into account the feedback it has received from civil society groups to ensure that policies better protect human and environmental rights. Finally, the Bank should change the incentive structure for staff. Today, career advancement, in part, depends on quickly completing projects and disbursing money. Going forward, staff should be rewarded based on the benefits that projects bring local communities. These recent failures at the Bank present a legitimacy crisis. To restore its credibility, the Bank needs to rethink its approach to accountability and the reforms needed to achieve it.

Blog Post by Guest Blogger for Shannon K. O'Neil May 7, 2015 Development Channel