International Organizations

In 2012 radical, jihadist Islamist groups overran northern Mali with Taureg allies. Before they were defeated by French and Malian troops in 2013, the al-Qaeda linked rebels governed the territories they controlled according to what they represented as the principles of Salafist Islam. One prominent group was Ansar Dine, which continues to be active in northern Mali. While the group occupied Timbuktu its governance resembled that of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. One of the similarities was the destruction of ancient monuments associated with other religions or varieties of Islam. The Islamic State’s destruction of ancient monuments in Palmyra, Syria, and Mosul, Iraq, are notorious. So, too, has been Islamic State looting and selling of ancient artifacts. Similarly, Ansar Dine radicals destroyed ancient tombs of local Muslim saints and a number of mosques in Mali. They also destroyed (or sold) ancient manuscripts. Individuals involved in such looting and destruction may be held personally accountable. The International Criminal court (ICC) has determined that the destruction of cultural heritage is a war crime. On September 18, 2015 the ICC issued a warrant for the arrest of Ahmad al-Mahdi al-Faqi, charging him with ordering the destruction of ten buildings of cultural, historical, and religious importance in Timbuktu between June 30, 2012 and July 10, 2012. The Niger authorities arrested al-Faqi and delivered him to the custody of the ICC on September 26. His first hearing was today. ICC prosecutors say that as a member of the radical group Ansar Dine, he played an active role when it occupied Timbuktu. Al-Faqi, a Malian, fled to Niger when the French and Malians drove Ansar Dine out of Timbuktu. The ICC’s chief prosecutor is Fatou Bensouda, herself an African. A citizen of The Gambia, she received her legal training in Nigeria. In a September 28 statement from the ICC, Bensouda said, “intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes.” She is quoted by the Financial Times as saying that the destruction was “a callous assault on the dignity and identity of entire populations, and their religious and historical roots.” Mali and Niger are parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC. In 2013, Mali asked the court to investigate possible war crimes associated with the radical occupation of the north. That investigation resulted in the indictment of al-Faqi. Niger as a signatory of the Rome Statute was legally obligated to apprehend al-Faqi if it could and hand him over to the custody of the ICC. It did so. Al-Faqi’s arrest and trial is a welcome step forward to holding accountable those who destroy cultural heritage. However, with respect to the Islamic State, neither Syria nor Iraq is a party to the Rome Statute, which limits any ICC role if and when the Islamic State is destroyed.

For the past six years, President Barack Obama has dominated the annual opening of the UN General Assembly, his words and initiatives driving the agenda and media coverage. This year, it was Russian President Vladimir Putin, making his first UN appearance in a decade, who stole the diplomatic show. Putin’s call for a “grand coalition” against the Islamic State, an idea backed by even some U.S. allies, has placed the Obama administration, which has long clung to an “Assad must go” position in Syria, on the defensive. Although it would require at least a partial U.S. climb-down, Putin’s initiative could help resolve a grinding conflict that has killed more than 200,000 people, facilitated the rise of the Islamic State, and generated a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria and neighboring states and the worst migration crisis in the history of the European Union. At the same time, Putin’s address underscored how different the world looks from Moscow’s vantage point—and how inconsistent Russian authoritarianism and realpolitik is with President Obama’s dream of an open, rule-based international order. Taking the podium as the morning’s second speaker (after Brazilian president Dilma Roussef), Barack Obama described a turbulent world, balanced precariously between stability and chaos. At this critical juncture, the nations of the world had a choice to make. Would they rededicate themselves to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded seventy years ago, seeking shared security, prosperity, and human dignity through international cooperation? Or would they follow the siren song of those who still believe that “might makes right,” both at home and abroad? Implicitly referring to Russia and China, the President Obama castigated oppressive regimes that seek the illusory order of tyranny, the “strongmen” who refuse to trust their people, who seek vainly to strangle the idea of freedom, and by their actions simply spark the “revolutions of tomorrow.” Abroad, those same governments too often abandon the international rule of law for the law of the jungle, ignoring that power politics inevitably backfires in an “integrated world.” Consider, for example, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, which had brought such economic pain (in the form of sanctions) to Russia itself. How much better would Russia have fared, the president asked, had it simply pursued its goals through diplomatic means? Not for the first time, Obama seemed genuinely perplexed that Putin—or any other world leader—would regard realpolitik as a legitimate form of statecraft, rather than an atavism no longer appropriate in a world of shared transnational threats like climate change, Ebola, and uncontrolled migration. The problem, of course, is that Putin never got the memo that power politics is obsolete. In recent days the Obama administration has repeatedly warned that Russia’s use of the UN Security Council (UNSC) veto in Syria threatens the credibility of that body. In his own speech from the UN podium, Putin reminded listeners that the postwar international order agreed at Yalta was founded explicitly on big power privilege. Each of the five permanent members (the P5) was endowed with a veto precisely to prevent a subset of the P5 from using the UNSC’s enforcement power contrary to the will of one of its members. Putin also suggested that the United Nations should think long and hard before undermining or infringing upon state sovereignty through military interventions or the “export” of democratic revolutions. As evidence, one need look no further than the Middle East and North Africa. According to Putin, “instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster,” as outside interventions in Iraq, Libya and Syria had created “power vacuums” filled by “extremists and terrorists,” most notably the Islamic State. Implicitly addressing the West, he asked: “Those who have caused this situation: Do you realize now what you have done?” Rather than continuing down this path, the time had come for the international community to form “a broad international coalition against terrorism,” akin to the one that defeated Hitler seventy years ago. The government of Syria, he insisted, must be part of this coalition against the Islamic State. Putin’s realpolitik was also on display in his discussion of the Ukraine conflict (a topic that caused the Ukrainian delegation to the UN to walk out). It was NATO’s expansion into the post-Soviet space, he claimed, had created a “logic of confrontation” between “West” and “East.” Indeed, he implied, the West had engineered the coup against Yanukovich that set off Ukraine’s turmoil, seeking to force its exclusive alignment with the West. This was clearly too much for Moscow. As he made clear in his 60 minutes interview with Charlie Rose on Sunday evening, Putin is determined to protect the rights of the twenty-five million Russian compatriots that the collapse of the Soviet Union left outside of Russia’s borders. In sum, Russia will insist upon some degree of sphere of influence over its “near abroad.” Despite their contrasting world views and testy personal relationship, Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin may be forced to find some common ground on the way forward, at least when it comes to Syria. Russia’s military buildup in that country has given it some leverage in negotiations with the United States, which was also taken by surprise by yesterday’s agreement among Russia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria to share intelligence related to the Islamic State. Moreover, a slew of foreign governments—including not only big emerging countries like China and India but also close U.S. allies like Germany—are now convinced that Assad must be part of the solution in Syria. Given the apparently abject (and expensive) U.S. failure to train “moderate” Syrian forces, and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of failing to resolve the Syrian conflict, the Obama administration may have little choice but to reach tacit agreement with Russia that Assad’s government can play a part in the coalition against the Islamic State. The cost of that acquiescence should be some U.S. insistence on Assad’s eventual exit following a defined political transition, including the reconstitution of an eventual successor government in Syria. Still, any U.S-Russian cooperation in Syria is unlikely to change facts on the ground in Ukraine. Russian cooperation in Syria may, in fact, further constrain U.S. desire and ability to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine. In the end, it appears Russia—not China—poses the greatest challenge to the rules-based international order on which the UN is based.

Bruce W. Jentleson is a professor at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy and the 2015-16 Kissinger chair at the Kluge Center in the Library of Congress. Jenna Karp is a Duke University senior studying public policy and global health and an intern in the State Department Foreign Service Internship Program. As the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opens its seventieth session, you’ll hear “never again” rhetoric regarding genocide and other mass atrocities, while witnessing the “yet again” reality. The UNGA passed a resolution two weeks ago establishing an International Day of Commemoration and Dignity for past victims of genocide. One week before, it had held a dialogue marking the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Unfortunately, while R2P was reaffirmed as “a vital and enduring commitment,” the gap between rhetoric and reality is all too evident in Syria, South Sudan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other countries. Closing the gap between rhetoric and reality is going to take a three-part strategy involving military intervention (when necessary), crisis diplomacy (when possible), and early prevention (steadily, systematically). Military intervention will continue to be necessary in certain situations. This was the only means by which to stop Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011 from delivering on his threat to slaughter civilians. Although the immediate objective was achieved in the Libya case, the post-intervention dilemma—what R2P cofounder Gareth Evans calls the “responsibility to rebuild”—has been an abject failure. Libya thus shows both what late-stage military intervention can and cannot achieve. Crisis diplomacy, also largely a late-innings effort, is a second strategy for prevention. In Kenya’s 2013 elections, coordinated diplomacy by the United States, Europe, and the UN helped to prevent replays of the mass violence witnessed in the 2008 elections. More frequent, though, have been cases like Burundi, South Sudan, and Guinea, in which crisis diplomacy has been too little too late—arriving only after atrocities are unfolding, subsequently having limited impact. The final component to closing the gap is early prevention: acting when the number of options are greater, risks are smaller, and potential costs are lower. This basic logic underlies the original conceptualization of R2P put forth by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Even though such logic runs counter to the political reality of postponing action until the bodies begin to pile up, more progress is being made by individual states, international institutions, regional bodies, and even non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to build capacities for R2P early prevention than is often acknowledged. In 2012, the Obama administration established the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB), based in the White House, which is charged with coordinating the State Department, Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other federal agencies to ensure the steady attention needed for policy development and pre-establishing a mechanism for crises and other urgent situations. While short on resources and prey to bureaucratic turf battles, the APB has made a positive impact on U.S. preventive policies. Within the UN system, spurred particularly by the 2009 mass killings in Sri Lanka, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Human Rights Up Front initiative in 2013, seeking to make human rights and atrocities prevention more of a “system-wide core responsibility…to act with moral courage to prevent serious and large-scale violations.” Here, too, the results have been limited thus far, but provide the basis upon which further progress can be built. Regional institutions have also made their mark. The European Union (EU) has a number of initiatives including the EU Situation Room, which monitors the global political climate and assesses current crisis awareness. Individual EU member states like Denmark have developed their own R2P-related national action plans. The African Union’s (AU) Peace and Security Council provides a regional decision-making mechanism linked to the Continental Early Warning System, a data collection and analysis center tasked with monitoring potential conflicts and threats to peace and security. Its “Panel of the Wise” draws on a group of distinguished African leaders who focus on conflict prevention. In West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Conflict Prevention Framework and the Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN) came into play in Guinea in 2008, Niger in 2010, and Mali and Cote d’Ivoire in more recent years. Countries have also taken initiative independently. Ghana has its own National Peace Council, and Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Zambia all have their own national committees. In Asia, there has been less region-wide initiative, although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) convened a high-level advisory panel in 2014 that issued recommendations for “mainstreaming” R2P in Southeast Asia. Australia has been especially active, regionally and internationally, by adapting its civilian corps from a solely natural disasters mission to a conflict prevention one, for example. For its part, China has been showing more flexibility than is often acknowledged by Western states, with an increasingly conditional rather than absolutist approach to intervention and state sovereignty. Latin America has a Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, which includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and fourteen other countries. Brazil has also formulated its own variation of R2P, “Responsibility while Protecting” (RwP). While initially somewhat of a dilution of R2P, it has evolved into a serious component of the policy mix. The NGO community has played a useful and creative role. The Focal Points Initiative led by the Global Centre for R2P now has fifty-one country members with broad, geographic representation. Each is developing internal capacity for promoting R2P at the national level and collectively serving as a like-minded network. The Obama administration must use its remaining time in office to assure the continuity and effectiveness of the APB—Washington is full of doubts about its future—as well as of the State Department Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other executive branch counterparts. At the UN, as Ban Ki-moon finishes his final term, strengthening the Human Rights Up Front Initiative provides a sorely needed opportunity to leave more of a legacy. Regional bodies also have much work to do, including the EU, both directly and in its assistance to Africa and other regions, the AU and the other African initiatives, ASEAN, and Latin American initiatives. And as is so often the case in twenty-first century global affairs, NGOs have their own crucial role to play, as has been the case with the Global Centre’s Focal Points Initiative. To be sure, such early prevention measures will not resolve the Syria of 2015; that requires targeted, more immediate initiatives. But they can help prevent the next Syria. If there is one thing that the world can be sure of, it is that there will be more Syrias unless greater R2P early prevention capacity is built full-spectrum. The world may not achieve “never again,” but it is certainly possible and necessary to have fewer “yet agains”—and to narrow, even if not fully close, the rhetoric-reality gap.

In evaluating the cybersecurity agreement the United States and China announced on Friday, we can ask ourselves three questions: did Beijing accept there should be a norm against the cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property to help individual firms? Will the agreement lead to a decrease in cyberattacks on the United States? And is the agreement a diplomatic step forward for the United States and China?  We will have to wait and see for more conclusive answers, but for now I think they are: looks likely; very uncertain; and yes, but will have to be built on. Outside analysts, myself included, have long argued that China does not distinguish between cyber espionage directed at military and political secrets and the cyber-enabled theft of business plans and intellectual property. Both types of espionage, in this view, were part of building comprehensive national power, and the role of state-owned enterprises in the economy blurred the distinction between public and private gain. The United States has for years tried to create a norm against economic theft for competitive advantage, but made little progress, especially in the light of the Snowden disclosures about NSA operations. Last year, former NSA Director Michael Hayden described the problem with the U.S. argument as: "Look, you spy, we spy, but you steal the wrong stuff." [My colleague David Fidler analyzes the joint statement and its impact on norm development here.] As Jack Goldsmith notes, the Chinese government has said it opposes online theft several times before, but it is important that the opposition to online theft is coming from Xi Jinping himself and not lower level officials or a foreign ministry spokesperson. Beijing now appears to have accept there is good stuff and bad stuff to steal. Moving forward, as many have noted, the central issue will be implementation and the question of attribution in particular. President Obama said, "the question now is, are words followed by action." As the United States has become increasingly confident in its ability to identify attackers, the Chinese have been equally vociferous that attribution remains difficult, if not impossible. Claims that Beijing was behind the hacking of the Office of Personnel Management and the data theft of over 20 million federal employees were met with a response from a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman that "it’s irresponsible and unscientific to make conjectural, trumped-up allegations without deep investigation." The agreement could quickly bog down over what arguments of what evidence China will accept and what the United States is willing to provide. In response to a reporter’s question, President Xi Jinping warned that the two sides should not "politicize" the issue, which is often a claim levied by China when it is criticizing U.S. attribution. The other big issue is will the agreement increase, or reinforce, Beijing’s reliance on proxies to conduct cyber espionage. As a recent investigation in the Wall Street Journal shows, there is overlap between PLA and freelance hacking groups. During their press conference, President Obama said that President Xi told him, "with 1.3 billion people, he can’t guarantee the behavior of every single person on Chinese soil." But what portion of hacking is government controlled is already murky and now there are reasons to muddy the waters even further. It is important that the two sides have committed to "further identify and promote appropriate norms of behavior in cyberspace," to create a senior experts group to discuss international security in cyberspace, and are establishing a high-level joint dialogue on cybercrime. But implementation remains to be seen, and what, or who, is missing from the statement is notable. The high-level joint dialogue involves the Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Justice, and the State Internet and Information Office on the Chinese side, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, U.S. Attorney General, representatives of the intelligence community, and FBI on the U.S. side. Maybe they will make up the experts senior group, but the joint fact sheet has no mention of the DoD, State Department, and, most important, the PLA as being involved in cyber discussions. Expectations before the summit for any progress on the cyber issue were low, so the agreement is a significant outcome, even if question remains. As Herb Lin puts it, "progress has been made towards a better cybersecurity relationship between China and the United States, and more doors are open today than they were last week."

Few global summits can compete with the opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). All the world’s a stage, but the spotlight shines brightest each September in Manhattan, as global leaders gather for UN’s “back to school” night. But while most attention will focus on speeches from the green marble podium, the real action will occur offstage. This year’s most important side event is a special Monday afternoon session on UN peacekeeping, convened by President Barack Obama himself and involving leaders of fifty countries. Its outcome will help determine whether the United Nations gets serious about updating the most important weapon in its arsenal to the realities of the twenty-first century. Surprisingly, “peacekeeping” wasn’t even mentioned in the UN Charter of 1945. The concept was invented to describe so-called “Chapter 6 ½” operations falling between pacific settlement of disputes (under Chapter 6) and coercive enforcement action (under Chapter 7). By now, peacekeeping is the UN’s bread and butter. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) commands the world’s largest globally deployed military force—more than 105,000 “blue helmets” and another 15,000 police and civilians, scattered across sixteen operations. These complex and multidimensional missions bear scant resemblance to the UN’s early peacekeeping forays, which tended to involve the insertion of lightly armed observers between parties who had already laid down their weapons. Today’s peacekeepers often find themselves drawn into combat with, and outgunned by, heavily armed groups, even as they try to protect civilian populations from slaughter. Unfortunately, UN peacekeeping is in deep crisis. The heavy demand for missions is outstripping the UN’s capacity to mobilize adequate funding, troops, equipment, and logistical support. Individual operations are repeatedly undermined by unrealistic UN Security Council mandates, unclear rules of engagement, weak mission leadership, and unprofessional—even criminal—conduct by UN troops themselves. The shortcomings have been on display in flailing UN operations from South Sudan to Mali to the Central African Republic. The president’s message on Monday afternoon will be clear: these gaps can and must be closed. Strengthening UN peacekeeping is no humanitarian act of charity, no mere expression of global “social work.” It is of fundamental importance to U.S. and international security. This is particularly true when it comes to the “arc of instability” that now spans west and central Africa, the Sahel, the Horn, the Middle East, and southwest Asia. Across this broad expanse, states are failing, humans are suffering, conflict is erupting, and extremists are plotting, generating regional instability, aiding criminals and terrorists, and even facilitating diseases like Ebola. And increasingly, peacekeeping is the instrument of choice for addressing these threats. President Obama’s commitment to UN peacekeeping runs deep. Six years ago at his first UN peacekeeping summit, he convened a meeting of major troop contributing countries (TCCs) like Rwanda and Bangladesh, the unsung heroes who place their own soldiers on the line in peacekeeping missions. Last year he asked Vice President Biden to convene a similar meeting. This year, the president has asked each of his fifty counterparts to show up with specific national pledges to improve UN peacekeeping, including offers to contribute more soldiers, increase funding levels, provide airlift and other logistics, or help train peacekeepers. As an initial down payment, Secretary of State Kerry and his Indian counterpart on September 22 announced a joint initiative to train troops in six African nations, as part of the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership launched at last year’s U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit.  On Monday, the president plans to announce a far more comprehensive package of U.S. commitments. Still, the president will stress that the shared threats cry out for burden-sharing among UN member states. The summit’s success will depend not just on the individual contributions countries bring to the table, but on their collective commitment to structural reforms. To equip peacekeepers with the tools and training required to fulfill their mandates, the peacekeeping summit should begin by implementing the needed reforms identified by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), which delivered its report to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in June. Top reform priorities include: persuading more nations to become troop contributing countries; increasing the number of troops that current TCCs provide; improving pre-deployment training of national contingents; ensuring that UN Security Council mandates are clear and realistic, particularly when it comes to protecting civilians; specifying rules of engagement that are aligned with the conflict situation; providing peacekeepers with high-end military capabilities to defend themselves and thwart “spoilers”; adapting peacekeeping doctrine to counterinsurgency and counterterrorist threats; and holding TCCs accountable both for their performance in the field and any misconduct—particularly when it comes to crimes of sexual violence. The beauty of UN peacekeeping, if properly managed and resourced, is that it can deliver the stability that the world wants without having any one country (including the United States) bear all the costs and risks. But peacekeeping will only succeed if UN member states redouble their commitment to give the United Nations the tools it needs to do the job in a professional and accountable manner.

Six months ago today, the White House announced U.S. support for the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen via press release: “President Obama has authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support to GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council]-led military operations.” As is true for all interventions, U.S. officials offered a buffet of justifications and objectives for backing the GCC side in Yemen’s chaotic civil war. In an earlier piece, I counted seven. Unsurprisingly, these are no longer mentioned by officials. Rather, they call upon all parties in the conflict to halt their fighting, failing to mention that the United States military is one of the parties by providing material support, without which the GCC would not be able sustain airstrikes over Yemen for any period of time. When pushed by reporters about U.S. responsibilities, they reply “we continue to discuss with Saudi authorities….We’re in constant and close communication with them,” or simply deflect, “I would refer you to the Saudis.” First and foremost, understand that the United States undertook this obligation without any comprehension of what the Saudi-led coalition was attempting to accomplish. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), said in March, “I don’t currently know the specific goals and objectives of the Saudi campaign, and I would have to know that to be able to assess the likelihood of success.” He added that he was simply contacted by the Saudi chief of defense a few hours before operations began. So much for taking the time to think through the consequences of the U.S. political and military commitment. Nevertheless, since March 25, the United States has been providing in-air refueling, combat-search-and-rescue support (including the rescue of two Saudi pilots whose helicopter crashed in the Gulf of Aden), detailing forty-five intelligence analysts to help advise on target selection, and redoubling weapons exports and contractor support to the GCC countries. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States is primarily as a source of cash for weapons. Since October 2010 alone, the Obama administration has agreed to sell $90.4 billion in weapons to the Gulf kingdom, according to the Congressional Research Service. That President Obama would so enthusiastically endorse arming such a brutal authoritarian government is unsurprising, since the United States is by far the leading arms dealer (with 47 percent of the world total) to what an annual State Department report classifies as the world’s “least democratically governed states”—those in the lowest quintile based upon Freedom House’s “political rights” ranking and the World Bank’s “voice and accountability” score. Thus, the flow of weapons and contractor support sustaining the GCC intervention has not merely continued, but the Pentagon has actually sped-up preexisting orders to assure there are sufficient bombs to drop on Yemen. Two weeks into the U.S. involvement, Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken proclaimed while in Riyadh that, "Saudi Arabia is sending a strong message to the Houthis and their allies….As part of that effort, we have expedited weapons deliveries, we have increased our intelligence sharing.” In total, the State Department has authorized $8.4 billion in foreign military sales to GCC countries since the start of the air war, $7.8 billion to the Saudis alone. Here is a list of major arms and logistical support sales to GCC countries since March 25: • On May 27, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control was awarded a $12,037,639 contract for post-production support services for the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command Modernized Target Acquisition Designation Sight/Pilot Night Vision Sensor program. • On June 11, Boeing Co. was awarded a $41,146,387 contract for Apache helicopter post-production services and maintenance in Saudi Arabia. • On June 24, L-3 National Security Solutions was awarded a $95,000,000 contract for air operations center training to Royal Saudi Air Force personnel. • On July 24, Raytheon Co. was awarded a contract for 355 AGM-154 Block III C Unitary Joint Stand-Off Weapon missiles for Saudi Arabia, including associated supplies and services. • On July 13, Booz Allen & Hamilton was awarded a $12,386,000 contract for support services in the areas of training and education, engineering, technical, and management support services to the Saudi navy. • On July 29, the State Department approved the sale of $500M “for ammunition for the Royal Saudi Land Forces and associated equipment, parts and logistical support.” • On July 31, DynCorp International was awarded a $17,313,518 contract for maintenance support to the Royal Saudi Land Forces Aviation Command aviation program. • On September 24, Boeing Co. was awarded a $22,311,055 contract for 13 Harpoon lll-up round tactical missiles and seven Harpoon air launch missile containers to Saudi Arabia. Most disturbing has been the GCC’s use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, or cluster munitions, which are manufactured by the Textron Systems Corporation. Those were sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in recent years, and have been used in numerous attacks that killed civilians. Cluster munitions were banned in 2008 by the UN Convention on Cluster Munitions, though Saudi Arabia and the United States have not ratified the agreement. On August 20, State Department spokesperson Rear Admiral John Kirby stated that the administration had “discussed reports of the alleged use of cluster munitions with the Saudis” and considered them “permissible” if they are “used appropriately and according with those end-use rules.” Unfortunately, civilians have disproportionately suffered in the air war. Of the 5,239 people killed or injured by explosive weapons between January and July, 86 percent were civilians. According to the UN, between the start of Saudi operations and June 30, a total of 971 civilians were killed by GCC coalition air strikes, accounting for more than 60 percent of all conflict-related civilian deaths—clearly, U.S. weapons are not being “used appropriately.” Moreover, 1.5 million people have been displaced and over 90 percent of the remaining population is in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. Earlier this month, Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, conveyed what was an astonishing observation about U.S. support for, and detachment from, what was happening: With respect to Yemen, we have very deep concerns. We are able, because it’s the nature of our relationship, to again provide certain types of support to the efforts in Yemen, but also, I think, to be frank, when we believe that more care needs to be taken to avoid civilian casualties. And that will be an ongoing position that we take. And look, we have to hold all of ourselves to the highest possible standard when it relates to preventing civilian deaths, and that will continue to be a part of our dialogue as it relates to Yemen. What is disturbing about such comments is that the Obama administration is establishing a troubling precedent, whereby it has no obligations for military operations conducted by other countries for which the United States is playing an essential, enabling role. U.S. officials keep “calling on all sides” to end hostilities without recognizing that the United States itself is one of these sides. Though Congress and the media appropriately monitor and evaluate uses of force when conducted by U.S. armed forces, citizens should be equally concerned and vigilant about operations for which U.S. logistical, intelligence, and weapons support are instrumental, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and air refueling to the French forces in Mali, GPS-guidance kits to the Colombian government to help fight insurgents, and drone surveillance for Turkish fighter jets bombing northern Iraq. These types of military operations, with the United States providing a crucial supporting role to partner militaries, will become far more common into the future. One research side note: The Pentagon will not reveal how much this support for Saudi operations is costing American taxpayers. On June 30, I first sent a request to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, which directed me to submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to CENTCOM. A public affairs officer at CENTCOM then suggested redirecting the FOIA to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, which has not yet responded to the request. This is not classified information, and given that CENTCOM and the Department of Defense (DOD) consistently update the total cost operations for Operation Inherent Resolve, they should do the same for DOD support to GCC forces. Finally, the United States is not bound by a mutual defense treaty to defend Saudi Arabia. President Obama’s decision six months ago to provide apparently unlimited military support for the air war in Yemen was therefore a war of choice. The air war, which the Saudis bizarrely dubbed “Operation Renewal of Hope” on April 21—a disastrous word choice—is one for which Obama is personally responsible and could stop immediately by turning off America’s overwhelming, expedited, and vital direct support. Weapons sales are supposed to build a relationship between supplier and recipient, which is supposed to provide some leverage for the supplier over how the recipient uses those weapons. Either President Obama is fine with how U.S.-supplied weapons are being used in Yemen, he is refraining from using leverage to stop their use, or there is no leverage to speak of. In which case, all the United States has gained over the past six months is participating in and extending a civil war, which has been an enormous humanitarian disaster.

World leaders descend on the United Nations (UN) next week for the annual opening of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The confab gets off to a bang on what might be called “Super Monday,” with addresses in rapid succession from U.S. President Barack Obama (who by tradition speaks second), Chinese President Xi Jinping (fourth), Russian President Vladimir Putin (sixth), and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (eighth). Given U.S. tensions with all three nations, the crowded morning offers ample opportunities for fireworks. The sequencing poses a particular predicament for President Obama, who (on this day at least) won’t get the last word. If he’s too tough on any of the three, he risks verbal retaliation from the podium. If he’s too conciliatory, his legion of domestic critics will depict him as an invertebrate. The trick for the president is to show sufficient spine on fundamental issues but signal willingness to compromise on details. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama famously promised to “extend a hand” to U.S. adversaries. As president, his open hand has often been met with a mailed fist. The “reset” with Russia never materialized. Moscow instead seized Crimea, launched a proxy invasion of Ukraine, and shielded Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad from UN Security Council (UNSC) action to end his atrocities. Meanwhile, the administration’s much-ballyhooed “pivot” to Asia failed to dissuade China from aggressive policies ranging from state-sponsored cyberattacks to outrageous territorial claims in the South China Sea. Similarly, early U.S. overtures to Teheran were met by political repression, Iranian meddling in the Middle East, and pursuit of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. After a rocky start, the Obama administration has found its footing. It has tightened sanctions with the EU on Russia, pushed back on Chinese cyberespionage and maritime sea-grabs, and painstakingly negotiated an agreement that (if enforced) will end the Iranian nuclear weapons program. Obama arrives in New York in a far stronger diplomatic position than any of his erstwhile rivals, bolstered by the unmatched military, economic, and technological dominance of the United States, its unequalled network of global alliances and partnerships, and the enviable vibrancy and dynamism of its free, democratic society. The president’s task on Monday is to leverage these strengths to get Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran to play by the rules and meet their commitments, while also signaling flexibility in a few particulars. A few words on Obama’s opposite numbers. Monday marks Xi’s first appearance before the General Assembly. Having consolidated power at home to a degree unknown since the days of Deng Xiaoping, Xi has reason to feel triumphant. He arrives in New York following a state dinner at the White House, and on the heels of a Seattle summit with U.S. technology leaders intended to underscore U.S. commercial dependence on China. Behind this gilded façade, however, cracks have appeared in China’s economic and political model, casting doubt on its continued, meteoric rise. At UNGA, expect Xi to outline China’s vision of a more egalitarian (i.e., less-Western dominated) world order, as well as herald Chinese contributions to mitigating climate change and supporting UN peace operations. Putin returns to UNGA after a decade’s absence, in full swagger. The Russian strongman shows no sign of backing off on intervention in eastern Ukraine, much less reversing the annexation of Crimea, despite the country’s bleak economic fortunes. Putin has also doubled down on Assad, airlifting additional Russian troops and engineers to Syria with the intent of preserving that country as a bastion of Russian influence in the Middle East. Most recently, the Kremlin has floated the notion of a “grand coalition,” including Russia, Iran and the United States, to crush their common enemy, the self-declared Islamic State. The Russian proposal creates a quandary for President Obama, who long ago tied himself to the principle that “Assad must go”—and would face a revolt among the Gulf States as well as U.S. conservatives should he align the United States explicitly with Tehran in Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, Obama needs Putin’s continued cooperation on the Iran nuclear deal, of which Moscow was a chief architect. Finally, there is Rouhani, whose remarks will be scrutinized both for tone and substance. Will the Iranian leader depart from the Islamic Republic’s traditional anti-American (and anti-Israeli) rhetoric, adopting a tone of rapprochement and conciliation? More substantively, will Rouhani signal a firm commitment to abide by the IAEA monitoring and verification provisions to which Iranian negotiators have agreed, or rather introduce further ambiguity and conditionality into its obligations? Finally, is there anything Rouhani can possibly do from the podium to persuade critics that the ultimate course of Iranian conduct—both toward nuclear (dis)armament and regional (in)stability—depends not on what the Iranian president himself says, but upon the whims of Supreme Leader Khamenei? These circumstances place Obama in an unenviable position. The United States can certainly find much to protest in the behavior of China, Russia, and Iran, but the president cannot afford to make enemies of Xi, Putin, and Rouhani at the UN. That’s why Obama needs to explicitly call out transgressions of international rules while emphasizing that there is still room for cooperation among erstwhile adversaries. With reference to China, Obama should reiterate that land reclamation in the South China Sea is counterproductive, and that state-sponsored cyberespionage is harmful not only to U.S. economic interests, but also the future of the bilateral relationship. Xi’s recent commitment to work with the United States to tackle cybercrime is a good starting point. At the UN, Obama should call on Xi to make good on that pledge. On Iran, Obama needs to walk a tightrope between commendation and condemnation. On the one hand, Obama should convey his high hopes for the Iran nuclear accord while maintaining that the United States will, in the words of Ronald Reagan, “trust but verify” that Iran complies. On the other hand, the president should emphasize that the United States continues to take issue with Iran’s destabilizing regional behavior and egregious human rights record. Russia may present the biggest dilemma. For all its disagreements with Russia in Ukraine, the United States still needs Moscow’s cooperation on a range of issues, including the Iran nuclear deal and combatting the Islamic State in Syria. Even so, the convergence of U.S. and Russian interests in these specific areas doesn’t mean that Obama should give Putin a free pass at the UN. The president needs to signal that Russian incursions in eastern Ukraine are blatant violations of international order, and that U.S.-Russia rapprochement will require a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Obama and Putin are scheduled to meet one-on-one on the sidelines of UNGA next week. Although the two presidents will likely use the time to discuss Russia’s military buildup in Syria, Obama should seize this opportunity to make headway on the Ukraine crisis, as well. The trickiest issue may be with respect to Syria, where Secretary Kerry recently held out the hope that Russia may yet be part of any diplomatic solution. As painful as it is to contemplate, Obama may wish to signal some flexibility on at least a transitional role for Assad, particularly given the unending human suffering and migration crisis that the grinding Syrian conflict has generated.

Brendan Howe is a professor at Ewha Womans University’s Graduate School of International Studies. From September 25 to 27, South Korean President Park Geun-hye will be attending the United Nations (UN) Development Summit in New York, where she will be giving the keynote address. Much of the summit will focus on the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The SDGs are a set of proposals that look to build on two high profile international governance agendas: [1] international development cooperation, dominated since 2000 by the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set to expire at the end of 2015; and [2] twenty years of environmental cooperation since the landmark United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). In 2014, the UN General Assembly’s Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) forwarded a proposal for the SDGs to the Assembly, with intergovernmental negotiations on the post–2015 development agenda lasting from January to August 2015. Following the negotiations, a final document entitled “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” was prepared for adoption in the upcoming development summit. This conference marks an opportunity for South Korea to pursue areas of niche diplomacy in which the country has already had a major impact as a middle power. Middle powers such as South Korea lack the capacity to influence global discourse across every dimension of international governance. As such, to maximize their relevance, middle powers need to pursue “niche diplomacy,” concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the entire spectrum of international governance. Doing so allows middle powers to “punch above their weight.” To a great extent, middle power activism is about visibility on the international stage, but being a middle power is also about playing by the rules of the global normative consensus and demonstrating a willingness to be a good global citizen. Thus, conference diplomacy and agenda setting are also vital roles played by middle powers. Middle powers have greater capacity to influence international discourse and policy than small powers, but a more limited capacity for independent action than great powers. As noted in a recent Council on Foreign Relations book, Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda, development cooperation has played a central role in South Korean policy initiatives aimed at influencing international governance, reflecting both the national interest and an operational niche within which South Korea can punch above its weight. Since joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996 and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010, South Korea has worked assiduously to boost its aid and to contribute to global development efforts. By the time of the first DAC peer review of South Korea in 2012, the country had tripled its official development assistance over the preceding five years to $1,325 million per year. South Korea has also been active in international debates and global processes regarding global development. The country hosted the G20 summit in 2010 and played a leading role in expanding the G20 agenda to include development issues. During the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) at Busan in 2011, South Korea paved the way to enhance the partnership between DAC members and recipients. At the same time, the Republic of Korea has been at the forefront of “green growth” initiatives. President Lee Myung-bak founded the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) in 2010. The institute later evolved into a treaty-based international organization in 2012 at the Rio+20 Summit. In January of the same year, the GGGI, the OECD, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the World Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding to formally launch the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP). The platform aims to enhance and expand efforts to identify and address major knowledge gaps in green growth theory and practice and help countries design and implement policies to move toward a green economy. This approach reflects that of the Knowledge Sharing Partnership (KSP) flagship program through which Seoul has endeavored to share South Korean experience and expertise and to export the South Korean development model since 2004. Hence, the upcoming UN Development Summit marks an opportunity for South Korea to continue its previously successful niche diplomacy and agenda-setting in these fields. At the same time, Seoul must be careful not to undermine its middle power diplomacy by pushing too hard in pursuing South Korea’s own national interests, failing to build sufficient consensus among the summit partners, having an inconsistent internal policy, or lacking coordination among Korean government agencies. For more on South Korea’s growing role in global development, please see Brendan Howe’s chapter in Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda.

Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and United Nations Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Broadband Commission released its annual report on Monday, with statistics on the state of Internet access. Here are some highlights: Approximately 3.2 billion people will have Internet access by the end of this year, representing just over 43 percent of the world population. The vast majority of those people are in the developed world, where 82 percent of people are online. The developing world only has about 35 percent Internet penetration. The growth of Internet usage is slowing. This can largely be explained by the fact that most urban areas, where it is more economically viable for providers to deploy equipment, now have some form of Internet access. Rolling out broadband to rural and remote areas will likely take more time, hence the slowdown in growth. Most of the developing world’s first interaction with the Internet will probably be on a smartphone as mobile broadband subscriptions outpace fixed broadband subscriptions. Internet access is getting considerably cheaper, with a majority of the world’s countries having reached a target of fixed broadband service available for 5 percent of gross national income per capita. Although the report praises the growth of Internet access, it also provides an overview of the major challenges that will continue to impede broadband rollout to the roughly 4 billion people without access. On the supply side, providing access to people in rural areas makes it less commercially viable for providers to deploy equipment, often requiring government investment to incentivize providers. On the demand side, many in the developing world don’t necessarily perceive a need for Internet access. According to the report, "a significant number of national languages (such as Hindi and Swahili) are used by less than 0.1%" of the ten million most popular websites in the world. It’s hard to grasp the value of the Internet if the content or applications are in a language that someone can’t comprehend. It’s a bit of a chicken and egg problem. Developers won’t create local applications and services unless there’s a market for those services, but it’s hard to gauge whether a market exists if people don’t see the utility of getting online. With the release of the zero-draft of the WSIS+10 outcome document earlier this month and the negotiations slated to begin in earnest next month, countries are likely going to use the report to their advantage. Russia and the G-77 (UN-speak for a grouping of developing countries) could use it to argue that the 57 percent who continue to lack Internet access justifies new targets and international mechanisms to get 4 billion people online. Their respective position papers submitted to the UN in advance of the negotiation process include references to the need for a new multilateral body to manage Internet issues, a position they have consistently taken over the last decade. Opponents of new mechanisms, including most Western countries, could point to the Broadband commission as proof that the digital divide is narrowing. And while they will probably argue that more work needs to be done, alternative solutions such as regulatory environments that favor broadband deployment and spectrum policy are more likely to bridge the divide than new international institutions. For example, the U.S. government is slated to announce a new "Global Connect" initiative in the next two weeks at the UN General Assembly, which will aim to bring 1.5 billion people online over the next five years with the help of the World Bank. You can read the report in its entirety here.

Coauthored with Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. On Monday, Chinese President Xi Jinping will deliver his first address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The historic moment is an opportunity to marvel at how dramatically China’s attitude toward the United Nations (UN) has evolved since the days of Mao. Four decades ago, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dismissed the UN as an instrument of U.S. (and broader Western) imperialism. Today, its leaders regard the world body as a useful vehicle for pursuing China’s national interests, demonstrating responsible Chinese behavior, and checking U.S. power and interventionist tendencies. For Beijing, the UN offers a platform to showcase China’s aspirations and growing capacity for constructive global leadership. Accordingly, expect President Xi to trumpet China’s contributions to world order from the podium on September 28. It’s easy to overlook how pro-UN the Chinese have become, given the hubbub over new Chinese-led institutions like the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—bodies which could in principle undermine more encompassing organizations like the UN and the World Bank. But Beijing is hardly alone in selective multilateralism. The United States itself frequently sidesteps formal bodies to pursue its interests in narrower alliances like NATO or “minilateral” coalitions of the willing like the Proliferation Security Initiative. To be sure, China’s embrace of UN norms remains uneven, particularly when it comes to human rights. Beijing is also skeptical of Western-led armed humanitarian intervention, even in the case of mass atrocities. Still, it frames this resistance as fealty to the core UN Charter principles of territorial integrity, sovereign equality, and nonintervention. On balance, Beijing has come to view the United Nations as a valuable instrument to advance its burgeoning global interests, while reassuring other member states that it will exercise its power responsibly. China’s increased UN activism is particularly apparent in three spheres. Peacekeeping: When the People’s Republic of China first joined the United Nations in 1971, it refused to contribute any troops to peacekeeping operations. Today, it provides far more peacekeepers than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. Indeed, it ranks eighth globally among the UN’s 193 member states. Last December Beijing stepped up its game by committing its first full infantry battalion of seven hundred troops, this time to UNMISS, the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. Strategic interests no doubt played a role here, inasmuch as 86 percent of combined Sudanese and South Sudanese oil exports go to China. But Beijing’s support for peacekeeping—and UN collective security generally—is not simply situational. China has built two major peacekeeping training centers, and is increasingly seeking to shape peacekeeping operations. Still, it remains to be seen if China’s enhanced contributions to peacekeeping operations further expand when its strategic interests are less directly involved—or where there are fewer opportunities for investment. Combatting climate change: At both the Kyoto (1997) and Copenhagen (2009) climate change conferences, China’s opposition helped sink any hope of a global agreement containing binding emissions targets for developing countries. In contrast, China has adopted a far more constructive attitude in the run-up to the pivotal UN climate conference in Paris in November-December 2015. The reasons are both domestic and international. At home, the dire consequences of climate change and air pollution are increasingly obvious. Abroad, the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have abandoned the quest for a uniform approach to mitigation and adaptation, endorsing instead the principle of national flexibility. This has provided policy scope for China to make meaningful commitments tailored to its own circumstances. In November 2014, China signed the historic U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change. More recently, ahead of the Paris summit, it submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), promising to reduce Chinese CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 60-65 percent from 2005 levels by 2030 (Beijing had already committed in 2009 to a 40-45 percent cut by 2020).  By any measure, China has come a long way from its stance during the Kyoto negotiations—where it insisted that, as a developing country, it would not reduce its carbon emissions. Sustainable Development Goals: Finally, China has played an active role in formulating and supporting the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), intended to guide the world’s fight against poverty and inequality for the next fifteen years. China, of course, is itself one of history’s greatest development success stories. By lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty, the country made a disproportionate contribution to the Millennium Development Goals. At the multilateral level, China in 2013 endorsed UN leadership in organizing and coordinating the post-2015 global development agenda. In July 2015, it outlined its own vision for global development cooperation, declaring that the SDGs must be “open and inclusive” and “transformative and innovative.” At the same time, China emphasizes the need to respect national sovereignty and diversity in development models, rather than accept a one-size-fits-all approach based on a single checklist. It has also championed the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” for implementing the SDGs—meaning all countries embrace the same goals, but their relative burdens must reflect their material circumstances and individual development priorities. This orientation plays well with many developing country governments, including those reliant on Chinese aid, but many traditional donors remain concerned that this “no strings attached” approach to development cooperation may run athwart of established international norms and fuel corruption in recipient countries. On balance, China’s increased engagement with the UN system is something that the United States should welcome. Ten years ago this week, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick famously called upon China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in world politics. That phrase has never been a popular one in Beijing—where it struck Chinese leaders as arrogant condescension from a superpower all too often given to bouts of irresponsibility. But Zoellick was onto something. Provided it is conceived as a universal principle, the notion of great power responsibility is at the core of world order. As global power diffuses, the United States and other established powers increasingly rely upon China and other emerging economies to advance shared goals, including protecting civilians in conflict zones, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and improving the quality of life for people around the world. Of course, China’s active participation in the UN system offers no guarantee that Chinese and U.S. preferences will converge, or that they will share a similar interpretation of the UN Charter. The biggest clashes have been, and likely will remain, over the boundaries of national sovereignty in an age of universal human rights, including the appropriate enforcement role of the UNSC in responding to situations of mass atrocities. In the wake of the Libya operation, in which China (as well as Russia) felt burned by the West, Beijing (and Moscow) have resisted authorizing firm UNSC steps against the Assad regime in Syria. China can claim that it is defending the core UN principle of sovereignty, but the end result is to paralyze the world’s leading body for international peace and security. The UN system has of course evolved since 1945: sovereignty is not the only principle upon which the organization rests. In 2005, UN member states unanimously endorsed the “responsibility to protect,” recognizing that traditional state sovereignty must be contingent on a state protecting its citizens from mass slaughter. China’s expanded participation in the UN system offers an opportunity to encourage China to play by all of the UN’s rules—provided, of course, that the United States is willing to do likewise.

The conflict with Boko Haram has resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe in northeastern Nigeria and adjacent parts of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, with estimates of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees sometimes approaching two million. In addition, acute malnutrition is widespread. On August 21, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) issued a useful fact sheet that profiles the severity of the crisis, drawing largely on United Nations (UN) statistics. It also provides useful facts and figures on U.S. humanitarian assistance. Some highlights of the USAID fact sheet are given below. The figures provided by USAID are bound to be imprecise because of the circumstances under which they are gathered. But, they provide a benchmark. (The figures describing U.S. assistance reflect the U.S. budget process and may be assumed to be accurate.) The crisis by the numbers: • 1.4 million internally displaced persons in Nigeria as of June 2015 (down from 1.5 million earlier in the year) • 172,400 Nigerian refugees in neighboring countries • 3.5 million Nigerians face food insecurity • 1.5 million malnourished children under the age of five and pregnant and lactating women • 24.5 million people subject to recurrent Boko Haram attacks Of the ten largest donors the United States has provided approximately half of the humanitarian funding to Nigeria in 2015. The figures below are for the current calendar year, up to August 21: • United States- $63,831,160* • European Commission- $24,646,961 • United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF)- $9,889,075 • United Kingdom- $6,164,606 • Netherlands- $5,724,355 • Japan- $5,700,000 • Sweden- $4,342,586 • Germany- $3,733,313 • Canada- $2,942,975 • Switzerland- $2,350,156 * U.S. numbers reflect the current fiscal year which runs from October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2015.

Toby Dalton is the co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced this week that the Republic of Korea will chair the December 2016 ministerial meeting on nuclear security in Vienna, Austria. South Korea will also chair the forty-eight-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) next year and is slated to host the group’s annual plenary meeting in Seoul. 2016 is shaping up to be a critical year for South Korea’s nuclear diplomacy. Seoul will again bring its substantial organizational and diplomatic capabilities to bear in managing the agendas for both events, as it did previously when it hosted the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in 2012. In 2016, however, the demands on South Korea will be greater, particularly since both the NSG and the IAEA ministerial confront thorny political issues. In order to lead both events successfully, Seoul will need to leverage its nuclear expertise in creative ways. South Korea’s experience with the 2012 NSS demonstrated the country’s considerable talents with “host diplomacy,” but the 2016 IAEA ministerial is a different kettle of fish. The meeting will confront squarely political differences among IAEA member states over the proper nuclear security roles and functions for the Agency. South Korean diplomats will find themselves managing high expectations from the United States and other countries that helped build the Nuclear Security Summit process, while addressing the “non-aligned” politics that are a feature of multilateral diplomacy at the IAEA. The NSG plenary will be a more congenial and private affair, yet the major debate on the horizon within the group—whether to invite India to become a member—is no less challenging politically. The United States and several other countries would like to see India become a member in 2016. Other NSG members have lingering concerns that inviting India, which is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, will weaken both the group and the broader nonproliferation regime. South Korea will again have to utilize deft diplomacy to avoid a meeting that ends in acrimony. Most of the burden for these two events will fall on South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will need to draw on an interagency team of technical, legal and policy experts to manage both events successfully. To date, South Korea’s international nuclear diplomatic profile seems to have outpaced the country’s domestic capability, as discussed in a recent Council on Foreign Relations book, Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda. South Korea has built an impressive reputation as host and organizer of major events, but this international profile has not yet translated into a national infrastructure that allows Seoul to exert leadership beyond “host diplomacy.” Perhaps the weight of managing two such major events in the same year will drive South Korea toward building its technical, policy and legal expertise and bureaucratic infrastructure. Some evidence suggests Seoul is moving in this direction. Recently, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a new bureau for managing nuclear policy issues. The bureau may permit the development of a permanent cadre of nuclear policy experts within the ministry and could have salutary effects on other government agencies dealing with nuclear matters. With better-organized and trained nuclear experts, South Korea can begin to play a more assertive role in technical cooperation, regional training, and other modes of activity that will expand the gains of the country’s nuclear diplomacy. For more on nuclear governance and South Korea, please see Toby Dalton’s chapter in Middle-Power Korea: Contributions to the Global Agenda.

The civil war and associated humanitarian disasters in South Sudan is reawakening Congressional interest and concern for South Sudan. A bipartisan group of seven congressmen have introduced a bill, HR 2989, “to encourage the warring parties of South Sudan to resolve their conflicts peacefully.” The congressional sponsors are Thomas Rooney (R-FL), Michael Capuano (D-MA), Michael McCaul (R-TX), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Maxine Waters (D-CA), James McGovern (D-MA), and Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE). The bill recalls the involvement of the United States in South Sudan coming to independence. It then chronicles the dreary history of the fighting that started in late 2013 between President Salva Kiir and his former vice president Riek Machar, and the resulting humanitarian disaster. It also recalls the numerous efforts to broker a peace, especially by South Sudan’s African neighbors. The bill calls on the Department of State to develop a South Sudan strategy and would require the department to report regularly to Congress on developments in South Sudan. Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have now both signed a peace agreement that would involve power sharing between their two factions and a cease-fire. Both parties, however, are already claiming that the other has broken the cease-fire. While friends of South Sudan can only hope that this peace agreement will stick, the numerous failures in the past provide little ground for confidence that Salva Kiir and Riek Machar are committed to making it work. Hence, in part, the revival of Congressional interest that HR 2989 represents. The events leading up to the 2011 separation of South Sudan from Sudan were a focus of intense American popular interest. The “lost boys of Sudan,” orphans of the fighting between the South Sudan liberation forces and the Khartoum government of Omar al-Bashir, became a focus of humanitarian concern and congressional engagement. Since South Sudan’s independence, however, U.S. popular interest in South Sudan has waned, and the most recent congressional hearing took place in February 2014. It is too early to say what the future of HR 2989 will be. As yet, no hearings have been scheduled. However, the bill’s introduction with bipartisan sponsorship is a sign of congressional reengagement.

Jacob Zuma’s term as president of South Africa’s governing African National Congress (ANC) ends in 2017; his term as South Africa’s president ends in 2019. Zuma’s successor as ANC president will almost certainly be South Africa’s next president, unless there is an electoral upset of an enormous magnitude. Among foreign observers, the leading candidate for succession within the ANC has been Cyril Ramaphosa, an architect of the 1994 transition from apartheid to “non-racial democracy.” Ramaphosa was close to Nelson Mandela and has subsequently become a highly successful and internationally respected businessman. At present he is the deputy of both the ANC and the national government. But, there has long been speculation that Ramaphosa is falling out of favor with Zuma. The view is widespread that Zuma’s primary succession concern is to protect himself against prosecution for alleged corruption and to protect the wealth he has accumulated for the benefit of his children. According to Africa Confidential (August 28, 2015, vol. 56, no. 17), Zuma has concluded that Ramaphosa cannot or will not do this. Accordingly, Zuma is behind the recent ANC Women’s League declaration that the next president of South Africa should be a woman. Two women often seen as potential future presidents of South Africa are Baleka Mbete, the speaker in the National Assembly and current chairperson of the ANC, and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the chairwoman of the African Union Commission. Mbete briefly served as deputy president of South Africa under former President Kgalema Motlanthe. Dlamini-Zuma is the former minister of health in the Mandela government (she is a medical doctor.) She was also foreign minister in the Mbeki government. She is Jacob Zuma’s former wife and remains close to him politically. The Zuma government mounted a serious campaign to secure her election as chairwoman of the African Union Commission. As president of the party and the nation, presumably she would look out for the interests of the by-then former president and their children. Mbete and Dlamini-Zuma are both plausible candidates if the party leadership is to go to a female. Of the two, Dlamini-Zuma would appear the stronger candidate because of her ministerial and African Union background. Baleka Mbete has never held a ministerial position. However, neither would appear to be as strong as Ramaphosa. Dlamini-Zuma was minister of health during the early days of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and her chairmanship of the AU Commission thus far has not been particularly noteworthy. Mbete in her position as speaker has appeared weak in the face of the parliamentary antics of the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters. Dlamini-Zuma is a Zulu, the largest ethnic group in South Africa, and campaigned extensively for the ANC and Jacob Zuma in KwaZulu Natal during the 2014 election campaign, even though she was chairman of the African Union Commission at the time, and Jacob Zuma faced little opposition among his fellow Zulus. Her campaigning may have been an early effort to strengthen her credentials as the future president of the ANC and of South Africa.