International Organizations

The Islamic State’s exploitation of the Internet and social media continues to bedevil U.S. policymakers, legislators, and tech companies. Problems with State Department efforts to counter Islamic State online propaganda have produced another overhaul of U.S. counter-messaging efforts. A legislative proposal in June 2015 to increase company reporting of online terrorist activity was dropped, but it reappeared after the San Bernardino terrorist attacks. Executive branch pressure on companies to do more against terrorist use of social media has increased, most recently in a meeting last month between federal officials and tech company leaders. Attention on the U.S. government’s struggles has overshadowed that terrorist online activities affect many countries. Meetings of the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in mid-December 2015, which I attended, focused on these global dimensions. The CTC Executive Directorate organized a technical meeting involving representatives from governments, civil society, and companies to discuss terrorist use of the Internet and social media. Then, the CTC held a special meeting for UN delegations and representatives from regional and international organizations to consider the technical meeting’s input and share perspectives on confronting this threat. The CTC has long addressed terrorist exploitation of information and communication technologies (ICTs). In Resolution 1624 (2005), for example, the Security Council urged UN member states to combat incitement to commit terrorist acts. In tracking implementation of this resolution, the CTC reported difficulties countries face mitigating online terrorist activities. However, the Islamic State increased this threat in ways the CTC has decided to address more directly. The December meetings were designed to inform “strategies to guide States and the private sector in their efforts to prevent terrorists from exploiting the Internet and social media to recruit terrorists and incite terrorist acts, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The meetings were wide-ranging and populated with calls for more international cooperation. However, turning these calls into effective strategies confronts challenges because, beneath the diplomacy, tensions exist, including in the following areas: Strategic considerations Friction between support for government-led strategies, and preferences for multi-stakeholder approaches; Interest in more counterterrorism regulation of cyberspace, amidst warnings from human rights advocates about the dangers of further empowering governments to act under expansive notions of “terrorism;” Identification of the need to build global trust in fighting terrorism in cyberspace, against the backdrop of disagreements among governments--and between the public and private sectors--over Internet governance, cybersecurity, privacy, and freedom of expression; Support for the argument, made a UN official, that “the UN Charter and international human rights law form the basis for effective preventive and counter-terrorism measures,” contrasted with the sense that, so far, these instruments have not produced effective measures; and Interest in addressing online terrorism as a threat on its own terms, versus assertions that attacking the “root causes” of terrorism, which arise in the real world not cyberspace, is the only way to mitigate this problem sustainably. Role of the United States and U.S. companies Recognition of the importance of the United States, complicated by concerns that strict U.S. constitutional protection of freedom of speech, other federal laws, and the global dominance of U.S. social media companies inhibit international cooperation; and Frustration with U.S. social media companies, countered by claims the companies are acting appropriately with all stakeholders. Counter-content and counter-messaging approaches Gaps among governments, and between governments and companies, about what criteria should guide taking down content from online platforms on counterterrorism grounds; and Interest in more effective counter-messaging campaigns, versus skepticism global collaboration in this area can be cohesive, consistent, or achieve the scale and speed needed to have strategic impact against the Islamic State. Law enforcement issues Consensus that mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) need reform to support countering online terrorist activities, but without clear direction on how reform moves forward globally; and Statements from law enforcement officials that encryption poses a threat to their efforts against terrorism and crime, versus support for encryption from civil society and companies. These, and other, issues do not mean the CTC’s commitment to address terrorist use of the Internet and social media faces insurmountable obstacles. In concluding the special meeting, the chair stated the CTC would: Monitor terrorist use of the Internet, social media, and other emerging technologies; Identify and share good practices developed around the world; Continue to assess UN member states’ implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including those urging measures against incitement to terrorism; and Support governments, the private sector, and civil society in counter-messaging activities. Guided by the Security Council, the CTC will work to turn these commitments into strategies that, as its December meetings demonstrated, have not yet materialized amidst global reactions to the Islamic State’s online onslaught. Whether this onslaught confounds the Security Council and the CTC as it has the United States will now be determined.

The following is a guest post by my colleague Yanzhong Huang, senior fellow for global health at the Council on Foreign Relations. As one of the single biggest funders in global health, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has not only helped renew the dynamism and attractiveness of global health, but also played an important part in improving health conditions in developing countries. What role do policy and advocacy play in shaping the global health and development agenda, particularly as it relates to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)? What are the implications for development and governance following the adoption of the health-related SDGs? Finally, what role is the foundation playing in pandemic preparedness following the Ebola crisis? In this podcast, I discuss these and other questions with Mark Suzman, president of Global Policy, Advocacy, and Country Programs at the Gates Foundation.

The World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos was different in tone that previous meetings. First, the emphasis has finally shifted from all-things-finance to all-things-digital with the publication of founder Klaus Schwabb’s The Fourth Industrial Revolution and discussions on current and future digital disruptions to both industry and employment. Google’s Eric Schmidt forecast that the Internet as we know it will cease to exist as everything around us connects. Facebook’s Sheryl Sandberg, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and others discussed the opportunities inherent in a world where another billion people come online. Nonetheless, the mood was grim, not only because of volatile stock markets and slowing global growth but also because the viability of Donald Trump’s candidacy in the United States suggested to participants that growing inequality posed an existential threat to society. Another report dealt with the future of jobs and many discussions wrestled with projected vulnerability of up to 50 percent of today’s jobs as a result of artificial intelligence, robotics, and virtual reality. Also casting a pall was a sense of a governance crisis--that states and multinational corporations haven’t been able to deal with cross-border flows of data and refugees or cross-border challenges of climate change and terror. The WEF published a 2016 Global Risk Report that covered these and other topics. Meanwhile, on the sidelines, European and U.S. government officials negotiated and postured on Safe Harbor. And in front of the cameras, the encryption debate continued. At a press conference Loretta Lynch said she didn’t want a backdoor--but then confused matters when she said she wanted "to work with Silicon Valley and the tech industry to make sure that, as we preserve encryption, we also preserve what we currently have, which is the ability for companies to respond to law enforcement warrants, court-ordered, court-authorized requests for information." The number of women participants remained disappointing to the organizers, at 18 percent, despite the fact that the WEF offers strategic partners an extra ticket if they bring a woman. A report on the gender gap suggested that if the proportion of women at Davos is tied to the proportion the of women at the highest levels of corporate America, we won’t see a big improvement any time soon.

This is a guest post by Alex Dick-Godfrey, Assistant Director, Studies administration for the Council on Foreign Relations Studies Program. Earlier this month, al-Shabab attacked an African Union (AU) base deep into AU controlled territory. This was followed up last week with an attack on civilians in AU controlled Mogadishu. The attacks reminded the world, again, that although al-Shabab has lost some of its previous stature, it remains resilient. But, a new threat looms. Recently, al-Shabab has been struggling to counter the new threat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State’s growing influence in East Africa. As the Islamic State gains momentum, and the rival groups compete for recruits and jockey for position, they may both use attacks on AU troops and civilians to prove their legitimacy.  Paul D. Williams recently pointed out that al-Shabab has mutated in the past several years after the AU Mission in Somalia pushed al-Shabab out of Mogadishu. The terrorist group, which Williams calls “an increasingly extremist and transnational network,” uses large scale, isolated, and sometimes international attacks to maintain relevance. The Westgate Mall attack, the attack on Garissa University, the 2010 bombings in Uganda, and the AU base attack last September are all part of this pattern. He also noted al-Shabab’s increased interest in destabilizing parts of Kenya. As the Kenyan government has often overreacted to al-Shabab attacks by targeting ethnic Somalis in Kenya, whom it blames for supporting al-Shabab, it seems likely that al-Shabab will continue attacking Kenyan targets in the hope of pushing disenfranchised Somalis toward their cause. What is perhaps more worrying is the introduction of a new power struggle within al-Shabab’s ranks. Al-Shabab is no stranger to infighting, purges, and leadership changes. But this round of infighting is unique in that it centers on the question of al-Shabab’s allegiance. Long an al-Qaeda affiliate, the Islamic State has aggressively pursued al-Shabab. Given the Islamic State’s global claims and recent expansions into Yemen and West Africa, it is not surprising that it wants to gain a foothold in East Africa. With the exception of a small number of fighters who have defected to the Islamic State, al-Shabab has thus far resisted this merger. Although it is dangerous to generalize, the group is predominately regionally focused. It lacks the global ambitions of the Islamic State. It is possible that this is one area of global jihad that the Islamic State cannot penetrate. But there are factions within al-Shabab that think the group should operate more internationally. If groups sympathetic to or aligned with the Islamic State do begin to emerge and compete for recruits and prestige in Somalia, the tempo of attacks against civilians and AU troops seems likely to increase, potentially thwarting the progress that has been made in the country. Both al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups will use these attacks to prove themselves. All of this is bad news for the Somali people trying to rebuild their country. Al-Shabab will continue to see these types of attacks as necessary to bolster and support its narrative and legitimacy. Upstart Islamic State groups will see the attacks as necessary for the same reason. In early December 2015, President Hassan Sheikh Mohammad wrote after the Paris attacks that Somalia would “battle against the global phenomenon” that al-Shabab and the Islamic State represent. Unfortunately, Somalia may soon be facing both.

For nearly five years, the UN Security Council has failed to end Syria’s suffering. The numbers are numbing: The war has claimed 250,000 lives and displaced over 50 percent of Syria’s prewar population of twenty-two million. The grinding conflict has deepened sectarian turmoil in the region and created the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophe. The tragedy has also laid bare an inconvenient truth about the inherent limits of the Security Council in an era of great power rivalry. Because in Syria, the system worked—just not for the Syrian people. By "system" I refer to the rules of the international game set out in the United Nations Charter. At the San Francisco conference of 1945, world leaders established a new instrument to preserve international peace and security. The UN Security Council was empowered to pass resolutions legally binding on the entire UN membership. But its five permanent members (the “P5”) exacted a heavy price in accepting their responsibilities as guarantors of the postwar order. They insisted on the right to block any Council enforcement action that ran counter to their national interests. The rationale for the veto was plain: no structure of peace could be viable if war could be authorized contrary to the expressed wishes of one of the world’s policemen. Throughout the Syrian conflict, many Americans have bemoaned Russian and Chinese vetoes—both actual and threatened—for blocking Security Council action. But it is worth recalling that seven decades ago the United States and the Soviet Union were equally insistent in demanding a veto for the P5. During the Dumbarton Oaks conference of 1944, a U.S. senator complained to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the emerging blueprint for the UN Security Council constituted "a discrimination against small nations.” Hull replied bluntly that the United States "would not remain there for a day without retaining its veto power." That provision was "in the document primarily on account of the Unites States. It is a necessary safeguard in dealing with a new and untried arrangement." Indeed, the veto enjoyed strong bipartisan backing in the United States, including from Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI), the powerful chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On February 16, 1946, the Soviet Union cast the first-ever Security Council veto (in an effort, as coincidence would have it, to hasten the removal of French forces from Syria and Lebanon). “The system worked," Vandenberg told his Senate colleagues, by making great power consensus a requirement for Security Council action. In the ensuing decades, the United States itself would have more recourse to the veto. In the wake of decolonization, it often found itself on the defensive—particularly in safeguarding Israel from what U.S. officials considered one-sided resolutions. Since 1975, the United States has used the veto seventy-three times, more than other member of the P5. What the Syria conflict lays bare, however, is that the "system" is amoral, even when it "works." It is rigged to advance the interests of the great powers—and to reduce the likelihood that major war will break out among them. The system provides a baseline order. That is nothing to sneeze at, given the horrors of the First and Second World Wars. But such an order is a far cry from justice and—as we have seen in Syria—it often fails to deliver peace. Short of an overhaul of the UN Charter to eliminate the veto—a wholly implausible scenario—it is unclear what can be done to ameliorate this situation. The French have proposed a new international norm—the "responsibility not to veto." This would take the form of a voluntary (thus non–legally binding) commitment by each of the P5 not to veto resolutions designed to prevent or end large-scale atrocities, with the exception of when the resolution would run counter to a permanent member’s "vital national interests." And therein lies the rub. For that loophole is one that is broad enough, as the saying goes, to drive a truck through. Indeed, one could make the case that this proposed caveat is already in operation. It’s just that the great powers—being great powers, after all—have expansive views of their vital national interests. To be sure, the average number of vetoes cast each year has declined markedly since the Cold War—a promising sign. But the veto remains a non-negotiable symbol of P5 privilege, employed when core interests are perceived to be at stake, a situation more likely if great power tensions are high. The upshot is that enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter will remain highly selective—focused on those crises and conflicts where P5 interests converge or, conversely, are absent. It is in the interest of all P5 members that additional states not acquire nuclear weapons—and thus they are relatively in agreement on the importance of nuclear nonproliferation. The Security Council has also vigorously expanded peacekeeping missions in recent years (though the results have been far from perfect) in countries where none of the members perceive a vital national interest, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The tough situations will be those like Syria where the P5 are divided, and where advocates of enforcement action will continue to confront an uncomfortable choice of either staying on the sidelines or intervening with an ad hoc coalition that may provide a surrogate—if lesser—form of legitimacy. For these reasons, it’s not surprising that the Security Council has failed for the last five years to restore peace and a political solution in Syria. That’s not likely to change. Syria underscores the futility of attempting to force agreement within a bitterly divided Security Council. Indeed, turning repeatedly to the same body and expecting a different result approaches the colloquial definition of insanity. The Security Council is effective at protecting and advancing the interests of the P5. But, intended to provide order over justice, it fails those caught in the middle of great power conflict. That’s not just a failure of performance. It’s a failure by design.

Reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a perennial African chestnut. The UNSC is more involved in Africa than in any other region, and many Africans feel it is acutely unjust that none of the permanent members are from the continent. (The permanent members are the victorious powers in World War II: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States.) Now, Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and Equatorial Guinea President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo are weighing-in. At a joint press event marking Obiang’s visit to Harare, Zimbabwe, the two presidents called for Africa to have at least one UNSC permanent member with the right to exercise a veto. Mugabe and Obiang are among the least attractive of Africa’s “presidents for life.” They are rivals for the designation of Africa’s “worst dictator.” Obiang has been chief of state since 1979, Mugabe since 1987. Obiang, whom Freedom House considers “one of the world’s most kleptocratic living autocrats,” has accumulated a personal fortune estimated by Forbes (in 2006) at $600 million, far eclipsing Mugabe, whose net worth is estimated at a paltry (in comparison) $10 million. Security Council reform, with a permanent seat for an African country (or any other for that matter), is not on any realistic agenda, not least because the permanent members are far from a consensus. Among African states, there is no agreement as to which country should get a permanent seat should that ever become a possibility. Nigeria and South Africa both insist that it is the most appropriate candidate. But, the call by Mugabe, the current Chairman of the African Union (AU), and Obiang for Security Council reform may have been intended to burnish somewhat their sordid images before the upcoming AU meeting in Addis Ababa. The 26th AU Summit launches the “African Year of Human Rights.”

This is a guest post by John Causey, a private equity and transaction advisor with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. dollar’s dominance in sub-Saharan Africa is no longer certain. Despite the current volatility of the Chinese renminbi an auspicious moment may exist for China’s currency to challenge the dollar’s hegemony in the region. Apart from the structural advantages granted by the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, two factors have historically benefited the dollar in Africa: the dollar denominated nature of virtually all developmental finance and aid institutions, and oil being priced in Dollars. Psychology also played a role. Though a number of today’s ruling national parties, such as South Africa’s African National Congress, were sympathetic to the Chinese and Soviet regimes during their struggles for independence, following independence the U.S. was widely viewed as a role model: its black celebrities and athletes inspired the continent, and a history of fighting for civil liberties and liberal democratic ideals gave Americans moral authority. Adopting the dollar as the preferred reserve currency was hardly a considered choice, it was a foregone conclusion. As Bob Dylan famously sang, the times they are a changin’… The timing now may be opportune for the renminbi to strike at the dollar in Africa for at least three reasons. First, oil’s precipitous drop in price and America’s waning interest in crude – nod to Texas fracking entrepreneurs – has decimated U.S. Dollar foreign exchange (FOREX) reserves in oil rich African nations. Diminished reserves weaken central banks’ abilities to prop up domestic currencies and for foreign companies to repatriate profits. Second, the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank (formerly BRICS Development Bank) aim to rival the traditional developmental finance institutions, and it’s conceivable that these and others will soon move to be Renminbi based. Third, arguably China operates in Africa with greater aplomb and with more nuanced and mutually beneficial relationships than America’s corporations and its federal. The USG’s most visible diplomatic effort in Africa, Power Africa, is sputtering. American businesses haven’t sufficiently picked up the slack. With diminished American interest in Nigeria’s crude, U.S.-Africa export/import figures could worsen further in the new year. Globally, any material retreat in the dollar’s dominance likely means the U.S. can no longer safely run large deficits with key trading partners and remain economically viable. The enormous financial benefits of pervasive dollar internationalization allows America, a country which produces relatively little these days, to remain an influential economic super power. The psychological effects of losing the reserve currency status would complicate diplomatic efforts, and call into question the future role of the United States in global financial markets. Might the U.S. benefit from these de-dollarization events? Although the process likely would be excruciating, some argue that de-dollarization could benefit America. The argument goes this way: removing the ability to mask current account (trading) deficits with a capital account (borrowing) surplus would lead to higher American exports and less domestic reliance on foreign products. By making it more onerous to borrow fresh capital to service old debts, America would be encouraged to deleverage more quickly. Domestic manufacturing would be strengthened and the depreciating dollar would attract higher rates of foreign investment into the U.S. This argument sounds credible until factoring in other realities: approximately 20 trillion dollars in sovereign debt, much larger unfunded future liabilities, and that the United States is entering into an environment of rising interest rates.

President Muhammadu Buhari faces a serious economic crisis related to the plunge in the world price of oil, slow rates of economic growth, the prospect of rising American interest rates, a falling national currency, and declining government revenues. At the same time, he is working to restructure the economy away from undue dependence on oil by increasing infrastructure investment and vigorously pursuing an anti-corruption agenda demonstrated by the arrests of high-profile public figures. Boko Haram terrorism persists, placing huge demands on government spending. (About one hundred deaths were associated with Boko Haram and the security services over Christmas week. In addition, Boko Haram kidnappings continue.) To address short-term fiscal needs, there has been speculation that Buhari will further devalue the national currency, the naira, and seek international loans. During her Nigeria stop, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Christine Lagarde strongly endorsed President Buhari’s policies, ranging from restructuring the economy away from oil to the fight against corruption to cutting waste to capital expenditure to stimulate growth. She said the IMF will audit Buhari’s current budget “to assess whether the financing is in place” and “whether the debt is sustainable, borrowing costs are sensible, and what must be put in place in order to address the challenges going forward.” Her highly supportive tone seems to foreshadow a positive audit outcome. Her bottom line was widely quoted in the Nigerian and international media: “Frankly, given the determination and resilience displayed by the presidency and his team, I don’t see why an IMF programme is going to be needed.” Lagarde’s endorsement strengthens Buhari’s hand politically against his rivals at home, many of whom must be chafing at his anti-corruption campaign. It also is bound to strengthen Buhari‘s hand with international credit markets, should he in fact seek to enter international bond markets.

A defining feature of twenty-first century multilateralism is the rising prominence of alternative forms of collective action as complements to—and often substitutes for—traditional intergovernmental cooperation. Conventional bodies—chief among them, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions—may persist, but states increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible, ad hoc frameworks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities. These institutions are often “minilateral” rather than universal; voluntary rather than legally binding; disaggregated rather than comprehensive; trans-governmental rather than just intergovernmental; regional rather than global; multi-level and multi-stakeholder rather than state-centric; and “bottom-up” rather than “top-down.” We see this across issue areas, from the Group of Seven (G7) and Group of Twenty (G20) in the realm of economic cooperation, to the growing importance of regional organizations like the African Union and ASEAN, to the emergence of alternative international financial institutions, like the BRICS New Development Bank. Is this patchwork quilt of international cooperation a good thing? The answer isn’t black or white. Such ad hoc, disaggregated approaches to international cooperation bring certain advantages, including speed, flexibility, modularity, and possibilities for experimentation. Still, the benefits of minilateralism should not be exaggerated—nor should its risks be ignored. Unless used deftly and judiciously, minilateralism could undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of indispensable international organizations and even accelerate the world’s coalescence into rival coalitions. I invite you to explore these themes in my new article [PDF] for Global Summitry, in which I trace the origins of minilateralism, its advantages, and its potential downsides—for the United States, and for global governance more broadly.

From the breakthrough at the Paris climate change conference to the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals at the UN General Assembly, summits in 2015 heralded major progress in international cooperation. As we ring in the New Year, it’s time to look at what lies ahead for global summitry. In the latest Council of Councils Global Memo, I preview the seven summits that deserve your attention in 2016: 1. The Nuclear Security Summit (Washington, DC, March 31–April 1) 2. UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (New York, April 19–21) 3. World Humanitarian Summit (Istanbul, May 23–24) 4. Group of Seven Summit (Shima, May 26–27) 5. Group of Twenty Summit (Hangzhou, September 4–5) 6. Habitat III (Quito, October 17–20) 7. Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Marrakech, November 7–18) To learn why these summits made the cut, check out the Global Memo.

This is a guest post by Fily Camara, an intern for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Program. He is a masters candidate at New York University. Intra-African trade has been only eleven percent of the continent’s total trade over the last decade. By comparison, more than sixty percent of Europe’s trade is intra-continental. The equivalent figure for North America is about 45 percent and for Asia it is about twenty-five percent. The small scale of Africa’s intra-continental trade reflects the continent’s dependence on foreign markets for the vast majority of their trade relations. African policymakers, as well as their Western counterparts, have long acknowledged the need for more intra-continental trade. It is a paradox that, for much of Africa’s postcolonial history, it has been a pioneer in regional integration. In addition to the African Union (AU), there are eight, smaller regional economic communities—many of which have successfully implemented common currencies and external tariffs in addition to cooperating on matters of security and justice. Nevertheless, commerce among countries in Africa remains low, with significant negative development ramifications. The emphasis in current African development discourse has been to encourage partnerships in which foreign governments and corporations can help African economies through mutually beneficial cooperation and joint business ventures. This concept is summarized by the phrase, “trade not aid.” Given the political and economic instability many African countries face, their desire to secure agreements and partnerships with the relatively stable and wealthy markets of the European Union, the United States, Japan, or China is understandable. However, when an African country’s economic success is subject to foreign markets, it is at the mercy of factors beyond its control. Such has been the case for much of the past year and a half. In June 2014 the price of oil began its decent from $140 per barrel to below $40 in recent days. For Africa’s crude-dependent countries this has severely troubled governments and economic outlooks. In 2015, China’s slowing growth rate was a factor in the worldwide plummet in demand for commodities highlighting the vulnerability of African states to international shocks. Where the United States and Europe can rely on established domestic consumer markets to spur economic activity, African exporters often have little insulation from the macroeconomic trends and political events afflicting the world. Observers cite a number of causes for the low levels of trade amongst African countries. The legacy of colonialism is, among other things, one of poor, extraction-oriented infrastructure and illogical borders that have left some countries with significant geographic disadvantages. Today, inadequate transportation networks, security concerns, persistent protectionism, poor data collection, and a lack of information sharing exacerbate the consequences of colonialism. Recent initiatives to address intra-continental trade appear promising. In 2012, the AU decided to establish a Pan-Africa Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. It also endorsed an Action Plan for Boosting Intra-African Trade. Tangible steps toward achieving the objectives in these plans were taken in June 2015 when the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community launched the Tripartite Free Trade Area. In late November, the AU reaffirmed its intention to use intra-continental trade to create a “prosperous and peaceful Africa by 2063.” Increasing intra-state trade in Africa would be an important step toward improving the continent’s development outlook. It would encourage competition among states to create an attractive climate for business and industry. Moreover, infrastructure could be improved, and the flow of people and ideas across borders could spur innovation. Eventually, the costs of goods could decline as shipping between African countries becomes easier, and getting certain goods from other continents less necessary. Additionally, a Pan-Africa CFTA would be the world’s largest by population and could provide Africa with the clout necessary to negotiate more favorable conditions in regional and sectoral trade agreements and World Trade Organization negotiation rounds. If properly managed and implemented, linked and diversified economies may be one answer to Africa’s development quandary.

Over the next few days, Net Politics will countdown the top five developments in cyber policy of 2015. Each policy event will have its own post, explaining what happened, what it all means, and its impact on cyber policy in 2016. In this post, the WSIS+10 process.  Alex Grigsby is the assistant director for the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program at the Council on Foreign Relations.  In the very niche world of Internet governance, the ten year review of the World Summit on the Information Society process (WSIS+10) was one of the biggest events to happen in 2015. Over the course of the year, UN member states, civil society actors, academics and private sector representatives reviewed objectives set in 2003 and 2005 to bridge the digital divide and improve access to information and communications technologies (ICTs). UN agencies issued a series of reports with fancy graphs and metrics pointing out bright spots, such as the fast adoption of mobile broadband technologies and the over three billion people connected, and highlighting areas where more needs to be done, such as closing the Internet access gap between men and women. All of this work and review culminated in an outcome document that UN member states adopted last week. In it, they reiterated their commitment to the goals and objectives they set out ten years ago and noted that, despite improvement, much more needed to be done. Most of the reviews on the WSIS+10 outcome document are mixed. Access, a digital rights advocacy organization, praised the outcome document’s language on human rights and privacy but criticized it for not including any language on net neutrality. The Internet Society and Byron Holland of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority applauded the fact that the document explicitly recognizes the multistakeholder model of Internet governance, despite the fact that references to the multistakeholder model are often accompanied by text suggesting stakeholders stick to their respective "roles and responsibilities." That language is important as it’s often used as code to kick non-state actors out of discussions where states don’t want their input. There is also a requirement that the UN system conduct yet another study on the meaning of "enhanced cooperation," a term first used back in 2005 as a compromise between those who wanted states to manage the Internet and those wanted the status quo. In a decade, no one has ever figured out what the term means. There have been at least four reports, one working group and countless meetings on the issue. In a seemingly desperate move, the WSIS+10 document calls for the creation of another working group to "develop recommendations on how to further implement enhanced cooperation." I wish the working group members luck in what will almost certainly be another exercise in futility. Despite my pessimism, the WSIS+10 review process led to two important outcomes. First, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) was renewed for another ten years. In spite of criticisms and its flaws, the IGF is still the only UN venue where member states, civil society, and the private sector can debate Internet policy issues, ranging from cybersecurity, improving broadband access in the developing world, surveillance and privacy, intellectual property and copyright, and zero-rating. The IGF sensitizes participants, particularly governments, to the complexity of the issues at play and that government-mandated responses to Internet policy challenges are unlikely to work. That may seem small but it is definitely beneficial if the IGF can help a few countries to craft good Internet policy, or at least prevent bad policy that has cross-border implications. Second, the WSIS+10 document doesn’t contain anything particularly offensive. The craziest proposals, like breaking up the Internet into national segments or calling for new international law to regulate online activity were thankfully left on the cutting room floor. Much of the cybersecurity language from previous drafts, some of which hinted at a need for new global cybercrime treaties, was paired back to something more reasonable. In fact, some of the unfortunate language that has plagued the WSIS process since 2005 seems to have vanished. According to the New York Times, China tried but failed to include language "that would have made authority for Internet-related public policy issues ’the sovereign right of states.’" That was a reference to the Tunis Agenda that governments like China, Russia and others used to argue for more state control in the management of the Internet. Going into the WSIS review process, many Western governments were concerned that it could lead to the adoption of unsavory language on cybersecurity or Internet governance. The benign and rolled-back nature of the text is reassuring. An outsider might look at this process and express bafflement that a review of ten years of work led to a commitment to talk more and that success is defined as having a final text that isn’t as bad as feared. Unfortunately, that’s how most international discussions on Internet policy and governance unfold: people agree to keep talking in multilateral venues when most of the actual work of improving access to ICTs occur thanks to the work of private sector actors and civil society groups. Expect more of the same in 2016.

The big takeaway from the second annual World Internet Conference was Xi’s speech and his promotion of cyber sovereignty, which I wrote about here. The rest of the meeting was a bit of letdown, though the infrastructure and logistics were formidable, Wuzhen a very picturesque city to walk around, and the blue-coated volunteers friendly and helpful. But before moving on to the next conference, two quick comments on organization, and one on content. The Chinese were clearly sensitive about the lack of high level participation from the United States and its friends. The day after the conference ended, China Daily quoted a representative from a European business association saying, “Those who did not show up at this conference have made a mistake. Because they are not present, they don’t know what the conference is really about. At this conference, I find Lu Wei is quite open and willing to listen to foreigners’ ideas.” Besides the he “doth protest too much” quality of this quote, my experience was that the format did not allow for interaction. All of the panels had way too many people on them, very rarely did speakers address a point raised by another, and few left any time for questions and answers. (There were parallel sessions so I maybe I missed more lively meetings, but everyone I spoke with complained of the same problem.) This of course may have been a conscious decision, a reflection of a format that Chinese speakers are more comfortable with for political or cultural reasons. There was reportedly a more free-flowing discussion in a closed door session on cybersecurity, with many who wanted to participate turned away at the door. But if Wuzhen is truly going to become an important venue for discussions of the future of cyberspace the organizers should take the large demand as a spur to hold more conversations of this type next year. At most conferences the most interesting conversations are in the hallways, at dinner, and late at night. Last year all the delegates stayed within the Wuzhen complex, and, from what I’ve heard, people ran into each other in the bars and managed to have impromptu exchanges. This year there was a large contingent who were put in a hotel about 3 km away. This was probably inevitable since the conference was almost twice as large as last year, but the Cyberspace Administration of China needs to create some venue for random encounters and discussions next year. Quick thoughts on content: Next year I think we can expect to see an even more robust promotion of the ITU’s role in cybersecurity from China. This was signaled in Xi’s insistence that the current rules do not reflect the desires of the majority of people and the subsequent need to develop new forms of multilateral governance. The UN and the ITU are already China’s multilateral venues of choice, but comments from Zhao Houlin, ITU Secretary General, suggested a new intensity of engagement. In a panel on cyberspace governance, Zhao argued there was a distinction between Internet governance, which would involve public and private stakeholders, and cybersecurity, which would be dominated by states. Zhou called out other forums, including the London Process, which is a more inclusive set of discussions begun by the UK Foreign Ministry, as doing a good job of raising the issues.  He also said the world did not need more discussions, but instead must come together to solve real problems. The ITU would serve that role, and Zhao then said he hoped he could count on China’s support. This is a bit of a throwaway phrase, but it certainly overlaps with what the New York Times reported last week about China’s efforts to get a UN document to recognize the “leading role” of states in cybersecurity. Unfortunately, no one at the conference got a chance to ask Zhao what that meant or what role he saw China playing.

Here is a quick round-up of this week’s technology headlines and related stories you may have missed. Given the upcoming holiday season, please note that this will be the last week in review post of the year. 1. The European Union agrees to a revamped data protection law. After nearly four years of negotiation, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and EU member states have agreed to a data protection legislative package. The package will provide EU residents with a right to know when their personal information held by a third party, such as a social network or data broker, has been compromised, a right to require the deletion of information collected about them, and a right to easily transfer data from one provider to another. Companies will be required to be more explicit in how they use customer data and seek customer consent every time the company wishes to use the data in a manner the customer has not explicitly authorized. Firms that run afoul of the new rules are liable to a fine of up to four percent of their global revenue. According to Ars Technica, if ever Google were found to have violated the law, it could face fines of about $2.5 billion. On the bright side, firms that collect personal data now only have to answer to one European-level regulator, not data protection authorities in each of the twenty-eight member states. Once the European Parliament provides final approval of the legislation in early 2016, EU member states will have two years to incorporate the changes into domestic law. 2. The UN General Assembly adopts WSIS+10 resolution. The review of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) goals concluded this week in New York, with UN member states adopting a resolution noting progress in improving access to information and telecommunications technologies (ICTs) but highlighting that more needs to be done. Launched in 2003 and 2005, the WSIS aims to bridge the digital divide and improve access to ICTs. (For a backgrounder on the WSIS, check out this Council on Foreign Relations interactive). As expected, cybersecurity, human rights and Internet governance were the main sticking points. Human rights groups, the United States and its allies were pleased that the resolution has strong references to the multistakeholder Internet governance model and reiterates that the same rights that people have offline apply online. According to the New York Times, China tried but failed to include language "that would have made authority for Internet-related public policy issues ’the sovereign right of states’" despite the fact that world leaders had agreed to identical language in 2005. However, China got a win when it obtained recognition that governments have the lead role "in cybersecurity matters relating to national security." Net Politics will have more analysis on the WSIS outcome next week. Stay tuned. 3. China hosts second World Internet Conference. The Chinese government held a conference promoting their view of the Internet this week in Wuzhen, China. The conference drew an even bigger crowd (and more foreign delegates) than last year, which China will likely use as evidence of the conference’s success. Chinese President Xi Jinping used parts of his remarks to rebutt the cyber norms promoted by the West and foreign delegates got swanky Xiaomi phones pre-loaded with credentials to bypass the Great Firewall. Last year, China tried to get conference attendees to sign onto a last-minute joint declaration that endorsed China’s views of "cyber sovereignty." So far, it seems like the organizers have learned their lesson as there haven’t been any last minute shenanigans this year. You can find my take on the Xi’s speech here. 4. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) sneaks its way into an omnibus bill. CISA, the subject of much hand wringing over the past year despite being mostly a red herring, made its way into a must-pass budget bill that keeps the U.S. government running. Paul Rosenzweig at Lawfare has the essential details. In a nutshell, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) becomes the hub for information sharing, meaning that companies looking to share cyber threat information with the U.S. government will have to go through them, not the NSA or the FBI. Information DHS receives could only be shared within government for cybersecurity purposes or preventing a specific threat of "death or serious bodily injury" or "serious economic harm." That last provision has some advocacy groups and some legislators up in arms. They would have preferred only allowing DHS to share information for cybersecurity purposes and requiring the private sector to implement more stringent requirements to strip out personally identifiable data from information being shared with government. 5. Facebook, Google and Twitter agree to a mechanism to remove hate speech in Germany. As a result of the deal, the U.S. companies will remove hate speech from their websites within twenty-four hours of being flagged, using the hate speech standard established by German law, not the companies’ terms of service. German authorities believe the deal will help stem the tide of hateful and xenophobic speech directed at the over 1 million refugees that have settled in Germany this year. The deal with German authorities comes at a time when some U.S. legislators want to create legal requirements for social media companies to report terrorist activities to the FBI.

The following is a guest post by Megan Roberts, associate director of the International Institutions and Global Governance program at the Council on Foreign Relations. As the scrum of U.S. presidential candidates clamors for attention, another important election kicked off on Tuesday: the selection of the next secretary-general (SG) of the United Nations. As Ban Ki-Moon prepares to step down at the end of 2016, after two five-year terms UN watchers have been speculating for months about his successor—and the process by which he (or she) will be elected. After eight male secretaries-general, pressure is mounting for a woman to take the helm in Turtle Bay. Many expect Ban’s replacement to hail from Eastern Europe, the only region that has not filled the post. Whoever succeeds Ban will confront a daunting global humanitarian crisis, resurgent great power politics, and unprecedented strains on UN peacekeeping. She or he will need to sustain global momentum behind the Paris climate agreement and the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals, while deftly responding to fast moving crises throughout the world. Firing the starter’s pistol for the SG race, this week the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council jointly released a letter inviting member states to nominate candidates. Traditionally, the selection of an SG has been a closed-door affair negotiated among the great powers. The process is likely to differ markedly this year, given growing attention from civil society, increased interest among UN member states, and changes in the process for selecting heads of other international institutions since Ban himself was chosen in 2006. The UN Charter gives scant guidance on how the secretary-general should be selected, stating only “The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.” Since 1946, the Security Council has closed ranks during each election, offering the General Assembly only a single candidate to confirm. The process whereby the Security Council selects this individual has been shrouded in secrecy, with Council members using informal straw polls to test out candidates without putting names to a vote. Often a candidate’s nationality has proven as important as his qualifications, with appointments following an informal, but not guaranteed, system of regional rotation. The entire arrangement limits the General Assembly (with 178 members not represented on the Council) to a rubber stamp role in the selection process, while excluding any input from civil society. Pressure has been building for a more open and inclusive selection process. These demands have only grown as other major international institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have adopted tentative, if still controversial, steps to select their leaders in a more transparent and competitive manner. Within the UN system itself, a number of executive positions, including the International Labor Organization and the World Health Organization, have explicit criteria and timelines, and candidates are interviewed, all characteristics that the election of the UN secretary-general has lacked. Complementing these official efforts, several prominent civil society campaigns, including 1 for 7 Billion and the Campaign to Elect a Woman UN Secretary-General, are demanding greater transparency in SG elections. The Elders, composed of eminent retired statesmen and women chaired by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, are also calling for a number of changes to make the procedure more inclusive. Within the wider UN membership, meanwhile, a cross-regional coalition called the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group—which brings together countries as diverse as Ghana, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland—is focusing the General Assembly’s attention on the need for an improved process. These disparate efforts have put pressure on the Security Council to yield some of its privileges to the broader UN membership. In September the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to kick off the SG selection process with a joint letter. The resolution noted that the General Assembly would meet with all SG candidates, and that gender and geographic criteria should be considered in the selection process. After much discussion within the Security Council, the jointly authored letter was released this week. Among other things, the letter refers to voluntary, informal meetings between candidates and the membership of the General Assembly. This joint letter, coming so early in the calendar, suggests that the selection of the next SG could be a less opaque and exclusive process in 2016. Despite this apparent progress, a number of unanswered questions remain. The first relates to timelines. Civil society activists, as well as the ACT group, are requesting that countries adhere to a clear deadline for nominating SG candidates. In the past, late entrants have been brought to the fore to break deadlocks after multiple rounds of voting showed Council paralysis. In 1981, for instance, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar emerged at a late stage after it became clear that other candidates did not have the support of the permanent members of the Council. The lesson? “Wait your way through enough rounds of voting and the Security Council will take anyone who doesn’t seem out and out objectionable,” advises David Steven. While it might make for a winning campaign strategy, the General Assembly will have less time to review late entrants. The most obvious obstacle to this potential reform is Russia, which has so far resisted efforts to articulate a specific timeline for nominating candidates. The second uncertainty is whether specific criteria for the position will be articulated. Though the secretary-general leads a global force of more than one hundred thousand peacekeepers and manages a multi-billion dollar annual budget, precise qualifications for the position have never been developed. The September General Assembly resolution was vague on this front, simply calling for candidates with “proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills.” The joint letter went no further in defining qualifications. Ideally, subsequent negotiations will be more specific as to the skills and experience required for the position. A third unknown is whether the Security Council will finally agree to present more than one candidate for the General Assembly vote. The Elders have advocated for three names, while the1 for 7 Billion coalition argues for at least two candidates. Enabling the full UN membership to choose among multiple candidates would increase the perception of a competitive process. There could, of course, be downsides. Candidates (and their governments) would be tempted to curry favor with particular blocs of UN members. In the aftermath of a tightly contested race, moreover, the winning candidate could find it difficult to secure the support of those who had opposed him or her. For their part, the permanent members of the Security Council understandably seem inclined to keep the current, one-candidate arrangement. This would be unfortunate, however. For while a competitive election carries risks, it promises to increase the perceived legitimacy of the resulting choice. The most likely scenario is that the 2016 selection of the next UN secretary-general will be the most open and transparent yet, while falling well short of the one-country-one-vote aspirations of most members of the General Assembly. Like many outcomes at the United Nations, it will be a messy amalgam of great power privilege and the illusion of inclusion. All this uncertainty hasn’t stopped more confident UN watchers from placing their bets on the eventual winner—at the time of writing, the odds favor Irina Bokova, a Bulgarian, who currently leads UNESCO.