• Sub-Saharan Africa
    Human Rights Watch and Northern Nigeria
    The distinguished human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch has issued an anticipated report on Boko Haram and security force abuses in northern Nigeria; Spiraling Violence.  It provides a close analysis of Boko Haram and the government’s disastrous response to date. Its analysis is supported by impressive research and on-the-ground interviews in a region currently inhospitable to outsiders. The report is an authoritative must-read. Many Boko Haram atrocities have been described before, but not with the precision of Human Rights Watch. However, new to me were the instances of Boko Haram affiliates posing to individual Christian men the choice of conversion to Islam or death, usually by having their throats cut.  Such episodes are more “upfront and personal” than, say, church bombings, even if the casualties from the latter are greater.  In echoes of third century persecution of Christians in the arenas of Rome, Human Rights Watch documents instances in which Christians chose death rather than the forced embrace of Islam. Their narratives of martyrdom–probably better known inside northern Nigeria than outside–must fuel the anti-Islamic rhetoric to be found among many Nigerian Christian leaders. The second half of the Human Rights Watch report deals with the reported abuses committed by the security services. It provides a greater degree of specificity than I have seen before, and demonstrates that the government’s heavy handed security approach to the political issues in the north is dysfunctional and counter-productive. In what is bound to be highly controversial, Human Rights Watch suggests that the International Criminal Court assess whether crimes committed in Nigeria both by Boko Haram and the security services fall under its jurisdiction as crimes against humanity. At least some in Nigerian official circles are likely to be hostile to Human Rights Watch’s observations about the security forces, seeing them as, somehow, aiding Boko Haram. Such criticism is misplaced. Human Rights Watch’s goal is to find out the truth.  Only with the establishment of the truth can concrete steps be taken to address the “spiraling violence” that so disfigures the North.
  • International Law
    The International Criminal Court: A New Approach to International Relations
    Play
    Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), discusses her vision for the ICC, her current caseload, and the court's role on the international stage.
  • International Law
    The International Criminal Court: A New Approach to International Relations
    Play
    Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), discusses her vision for the ICC, her current caseload, and the court's role on the international stage. This meeting is part of the David Rockefeller Lecture Series.
  • International Law
    Ten Critical Human Rights Issues for the Next President
    Last week, twenty-two human rights organizations and activists released a list of the ten most pressing human rights challenges for the next U.S. president. The U.S. president remains one of the most influential public figures in the world—if not the most influential—and the enormity of the challenge to protect human rights around the world should not deter President Obama or President Romney in 2013. As the introduction notes: “U.S. leadership is critical to effectively address international human rights issues. International responses to gross violations and systematic abuses of human rights around the world tend to have the greatest impact when the United States plays a prominent role or is otherwise actively engaged in promoting a rights-based response. Multilateral human rights institutions similarly make the greatest progress in drawing attention to abuses and maintaining human rights standards when the United States exercises leadership.” The list offers the next president a guide to prioritizing today’s greatest human rights challenges—and learned experience from past efforts to promote fundamental rights around the world: 1)      Prioritize U.S. leadership on international norms and universality of human rights: Despite the flaws of multilateral bodies like the UN Human Rights Council, they provide crucial legitimacy to U.S. pressure for human rights. Notably, the report points out that engagement is necessary, however frustrating it may be: “By withdrawing from these institutions or restricting funding, the United States forfeits its leadership…and undermines of [sic] its ability to advance its own interests.” 2)      Act to prevent genocide and mass atrocities and ensure accountability:  The next president should build on the painstaking progress that NGOs and governments have achieved over the past decades by sustaining political will and “matching resources to rhetoric…The next administration should support the APB [Atrocities Prevention Board] and provide it with the necessary resources.” In addition, going it with others, versus going it alone, lends legitimacy to U.S. atrocity-prevention efforts and helps defray suspicions that the United States is purely acting  for self-interested political reasons. 3)      Pursue policies that protect people from the threat of terrorism while respecting human rights both at home and abroad: Balancing human rights and terrorist prevention remains an enormous challenge. Specifically, the report recommends two steps: end indefinite detention without charge or trial, and publicly clarify the criteria for lethal targeting and rendition. While terrorism understandably prompts desire for urgent and harsh action, sacrificing human rights at home and abroad carries dangerous, long-term consequences. 4)      Oppose the coordinated global assault on civil society, including the murder, criminalization, and vilification of human rights defenders: This is not a simple task, but the authors offer five actionable steps to mitigate the worst effects of repressive regimes from Ethiopia to Belarus to Venezuela, such as U.S. funding to civil society and media organizations and guidelines for U.S. agencies to support human rights defenders. 5)      Proactively address the democracy and human rights opportunities and challenges presented by the Arab Uprisings: Among a number of recommendations, the report notes that the Obama administration’s “limited pressure for reform” toward Arab monarchies has been disappointing, and that the next administration should condition military aid to Bahrain on progress toward political reform, more forcefully pressure Egypt’s military to transfer power to an elected government, and step up diplomatic and economic pressure on Syria’s Assad regime. 6)      Ensure that corporations avoid contributing to human rights violations in their operations and through their supply chains: The ten actionable steps presented in the report provide feasible options to reduce horrifying violations of human rights in many corporation’s global supply chains. They include implementation of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and ensuring that it “is not amended to erode the core intent of the law” as well as releasing “final rules for Sections 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act” (PDF) and implementing the law “in line with congressional intent.” 7)      Bolster accountability and access to services and justice for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence: The horrors of mass rapes, sexual assault, female genital mutilation, human trafficking, “so-called ’honor killings,’ ” forced marriage, and domestic violence require a “deeper and more thorough response.” Along with continuing to press for accountability and enforcing a zero-tolerance policy for gender-based crimes perpetrated by U.S. government employees or contractors, the next administration should “expand support for international programs that increase access to health care, educational opportunities, and judicial institutions for girls and women” and increase visas for victims of gender-based violence. 8)      Review the United States’ relationships and alliances with governments that violate human rights:  This has consistently been one of the most difficult lines to walk. Regarding relationships with authoritarian regimes, the authors argue that “Washington policymakers often underestimate the political and moral capital America has, or refuse to use it.” They add, “Despite the recognition that the United States’ largely uncritical partnerships with repressive regimes in the Middle East undermined long-term U.S. interests, old mistakes are being repeated around the world. The United States has largely neglected human rights as it collaborated on counterterrorism with Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and other authoritarian partners.” Therefore, the authors call on the next U.S. president to review U.S. relations with authoritarian governments with a fresh perspective. In addition, U.S. diplomats on the ground should engage with democracy activists or civil society groups. The administration should also introduce targeted visa bans and asset freezes on foreign government officials implicated in rights violations. 9)      Support international justice and accountability for human rights violators present in the United States: To reduce impunity for gross violations of international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, the United States must support accountability for leaders or compatriots who carry out heinous abuses. As I have written previously, the false peace-justice tradeoff is no reason to go easy on the most violent dictators. To further this progress, the report urges the next administration to “close legal loopholes in the federal war-crimes law and press for crimes against humanity committed abroad to be a federal crime so human rights violators in the United States can be held to account.” 10)   Support policies at home and abroad that respect the rights of asylum seekers, refugees, migrants, and immigrants: The authors lament that the United States “has failed, in a number of ways, to protect the human rights of refugees and migrants.” Regrettably, the report continues, “the United States detained nearly 400,000 asylum seekers and immigrants last year, often without individual assessments or prompt court review of detention” and the list goes on of documented U.S. violations of migrant and refugee rights, as confirmed by both bipartisan domestic reviews and international observer missions. As the report lays out, the next administration must reform the U.S. immigration detention system, stop fostering racial profiling through immigration enforcement, and ensure accountability for human rights abuses by the Border Patrol and at points of entry. Protecting human rights must start at home. 
  • International Law
    Guest Post: No Slaves Were Used in the Writing of This Blog Post
    Below, my colleague Isabella Bennett, a research associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, offers an assessment of how to reduce human trafficking. The latest estimates by the International Labor Organization state that nearly 21 million people are victims of forced labor—and a significant amount of this suffering is fueled by every day products available on American shelves. In Bloomberg Business Week, E. Benjamin Skinner documents how fish caught by slaves made their way onto plates in the United States. The path is convoluted: Indonesian recruiters deceived desperate men looking for work. Ship captains on the Korean Melilla 203 ship abused the laborers—forcing them to toil for as long as thirty consecutive hours, subjecting them to sexual abuse, and refusing to properly compensate them. New Zealand companies purchased the fish (and New Zealand environmental inspectors reportedly overlooked the slavery and responded to a plea for help by saying, “Not my job”). Finally, U.S. distributors bought the catch, which wound up on American dinner tables. By ratifying the Trafficking in Persons protocol to the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (TIP protocol), 151 countries around the world have agreed to criminalize human trafficking within their borders. Article 10 of the protocol also commits states to exchange information with foreign authorities and cooperate with foreign law enforcement agencies to prevent and detect human trafficking. Meanwhile, at sea, the vast majority of major economies engaged in global trade have ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). (The United States stands as an important exception and is not party to UNCLOS, but has ratified the TIP Protocol.) Part VII, Article 99 of that accord requires states “to take effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag.” And yet, these international frameworks are loosely monitored and do not foster enough cooperation among international law enforcement agencies. In particular, this case underscores one of globalization’s major challenges: the number of sovereign jurisdictions involved in one crime. Indonesian authorities were either not aware of the crime, or chose to overlook it. Korean authorities, under whose flag the ship sailed, did not investigate the labor standards onboard Melilla 203 (South Korea has not ratified the TIP protocol, but did neglect its treaty obligations under the UNCLOS, which it has ratified). And New Zealand authorities failed to identify the slave labor on ships docked in their harbor. Human trafficking is notoriously difficult to investigate and prosecute due to its clandestine nature, corruption of local authorities, mobility of traffickers, and underreporting because victims fear for their safety or that of their families. However, challenges are compounded when only one country oversees a single link in the chain.  Separate law enforcement agencies charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes are constrained by national boundaries, while the illicit actors permeate borders with ease. The regime is wildly vulnerable to exploitation. In theory, Interpol coordinates among sovereign jurisdictions, but with an annual budget of $78 million (59 million euros) in 2010, the organization hardly makes a dent in human trafficking worldwide. Indeed, in all of 2011, Interpol reports only one operation on its website. In that operation, Interpol agents assisted Ghanaian police to rescue children between the ages of five and seventeen who were forced to work on fishing boats in Lake Volta. Given that Ghana exports roughly 11 percent of its fish, it is probable that the catch traveled well beyond its national jurisdiction. In total, the Interpol-supported operation rescued 166 children. That amounts to .0000079 percent of the estimated victims worldwide. Law enforcement operations cannot be expected to tackle human trafficking alone, and rescue is not always a viable solution. High demand for cheap goods, opaque supply chains, and low consumer awareness are underlying structural conditions that contribute to the prevalence of labor trafficking. Seventy-eight percent of U.S. families reported choosing organic foods in a November 2011 survey, despite the fact that they are often more expensive. In a new Gallup poll, 5 percent of Americans identify as vegetarians for environmental reasons or because they object to the inhumane practices of many meat producers. Is there even a word to describe people who choose to eliminate slave-made goods from their daily lives? How often do we see asterisks and a note that ingredients in a meal were harvested freely by people being compensated according to domestic or international law? The American Humane Association has trademarked the “No Animals Were Harmed” ® disclaimer, and yet, no such tagline exists for cruelty to people. In the Melilla 203 case, McDonald’s refused to purchase the fish from the New Zealand supplier because it requires all of its suppliers to submit to third-party audits on its labor standards. The 2010 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 requires companies that operate in California with an annual worldwide profit that exceeds $100 million to “disclose what efforts, if any, they have taken to eliminate human trafficking from their supply chains.” This is a laudable first step. Companies like McDonald’s that prioritize the elimination of slave labor from their supply chains would benefit from printing the fact on their products. As consumers become more conscious of their purchases, a label on a box that distinguishes their product—“This company and its suppliers submit to third-party audits on its labor standards” or “No slaves were used”—would go a long way. For their part, countries, or even U.S. states with large economies where multinational companies have a large stake, should lead the way by requiring companies to publish such taglines on products.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Mali Descends into Hell
    Under the best of circumstances, life for Malians has been hard for millennia. The country faces recurrent drought and the Sahara encroaches. The social and economic statistics are poor. That in part was why the country’s stable governance for two decades was so remarkable, and its subsequent collapse such a tragedy. In the capital, Bamako, a political settlement between the military junta that overthrew the constitutional government and an interim civilian government supported by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is still elusive. The interim president has just returned after two months of hospitalization and recuperation in France following a beating by a mob in his own palace. Amnesty International has released a report documenting atrocities committed by junta forces in response to a failed counter coup. The Malian government – a state party to the International criminal Court (ICC) – has asked that body to investigate, prosecute and try perpetrators of crimes in the North because it lacks the capacity to do so. In the northern part of the country, the radical Islamist group Ansar Dine and other groups have destroyed West African Islamic monuments that are World Heritage Sites – because they were apparently not Islamic enough. And over the weekend, Ansar Dine stoned to death an unmarried couple in front of 300 witnesses, according to graphic and chilling reportage by the New York Times. Meanwhile, ECOWAS is trying to put together an intervention force of 3,000. Yet, as the president of Chad told the French foreign minister, only France (or NATO or even the U.S.) has the necessary capacity to make such a force effective. According to the press, however, there is little West African enthusiasm for French participation in an ECOWAS force and, presumably, even less for NATO or the U.S. Even with outside assistance, it is difficult to see how even a well supplied international force could impose order on the trackless deserts in the North. It could, however, retake Timbuktu, Gao and a few other population centers. But guerrilla fighting could continue indefinitely. Conventional wisdom among those outsiders who watch Mali is that a political settlement is needed first in Bamako before the Islamist tide can be rolled back in the North. However, while there may be little West African enthusiasm for a French role in an international military force, Ansar Dine atrocities may generate popular support in France for some form of intervention. Other than providing limited logistical support for an international force, I doubt there would be much political support in the U.S. for involvement in Mali, especially during election season. So, while ECOWAS may be able to broker a political settlement in Bamako, and the ICC acquires yet another African case, for the time being, it looks like there are no limits to the barbarism and atrocities in the North.
  • International Law
    Frequently Asked Questions about the International Criminal Court
    This publication is now archived. How did the court begin? The concept of an international court was first discussed in the aftermath of World War II. However, it wasn’t until the 1990s that the first ad hoc international criminal tribunals were set up to deal with war crimes in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. The ad hoc tribunals were limited in their efficiency and deterrent capability, which spurred the need for a permanent court to deal with the world’s most serious crimes. A statute to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC) for creating such a body was approved at a United Nations (UN) conference in Rome on July 17, 1998. After receiving more than sixty ratifications by April 2002, the treaty became legal on July 1, 2002. On March 11, 2003, the ICC opened with Canadian Philippe Kirsch as judge-president, and Elizabeth Odio Benito of Costa Rica and Akua Kuenyenia of Ghana as vice presidents. Who does the court aim to prosecute? The ICC seeks to try individuals who perpetrate the world’s most serious crimes, such as genocide (the intentional and systematic annihilation of an ethnic, racial, or religious group) war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression. War crimes are violations of the international Geneva Convention to protect prisoners of war, as well as other laws that apply to international armed conflict. Crimes against humanity include those crimes that systematically exterminate, enslave, torture, rape, and persecute victims based on political, gender, religious, ethnic, national, or cultural differences. Crimes of aggression consist of the use of armed force by a state against the territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence of another state, or violations of the Charter of the United Nations. What is the relationship between the United States and the ICC? At the time of statute negotiations, the United States opposed the court, fearing U.S. soldiers could be subject to trivial or politically motivated prosecutions. After the establishment of the court, the United States insisted on immunity for all its military personnel operating in UN peacekeeping missions, particularly in East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This immunity was denied in East Timor. However, after increased pressure from the U.S. veto of a UN-extended peacekeeping mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina--and a threat to block future UN missions, starting with Bosnia, if the Security Council did not accept the terms of immunity--Washington was granted a one-year exemption from prosecution to be renewed every year, as a compromise. The United States also formed bilateral agreements with other nations obliging them not to hand over U.S. personnel to the ICC; in 2002, Congress passed the American Service Member’s Protection Act, authorizing the president to use all means necessary to free U.S. personnel detained by the ICC. Though former President Bill Clinton signed the treaty at the end of his second term, President George W. Bush withdrew the U.S. signature in 2002. What other countries are not involved? Seven countries voted against the statute: China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, the United States, and Yemen. China objected on grounds that "the statute is an attempt to interfere with the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation." Other non-members include India, Iran, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and Turkey. While most Western European and South American countries are signatories, there are only two Arab nation members—Jordan and Tunisia. There are eighteen Asian members of the ICC. What cases are on the docket now? The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has been referred cases from Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the UN Security Council gave its first referral for the Darfur region of Sudan to the OTP in March 2005, followed in 2011 by a unanimous referral for Libya. The OTP is conducting investigations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Libya. The investigation in the Democratic Republic of Congo resulted in the July 22, 2012 sentencing of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to fourteen years in prison for war crimes, the first ICC sentencing. The OTP also opened investigations proprio motu in Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, after the country reconfirmed its acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction, and in Kenya, after the prosecutor’s request to open investigations into the post-election violence was granted in 2010. What is the relationship between the International Court and the national courts? The ICC is based on a principle of complementarity. This means that the ICC can only act when a national court is unable or unwilling to carry out a prosecution itself because the ICC was not created to supplant the authority of the national courts. However, when a state’s legal system collapses or when a government is a perpetrator of heinous crimes, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. What is the difference between the ICC and other international courts such as the international criminal tribunals and the UN’s International Court of Justice? The international criminal tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia can only try individuals who committed crimes against humanity in those territories over a specific period of time. The International Criminal Court, on the other hand, can rule on all crimes committed against humanity regardless of its location so long as they have occurred after July 1, 2002. The role of the International Court of Justice is to rule on arguments that occur between governments. Unlike the International Criminal Court, it does not have the ability to try individuals. Who funds the court? The ICC, as an independent body, is funded primarily by its member states. The contributions of each state are determined by the same method used by the UN, which roughly corresponds with a country’s income. Additional funding is provided by voluntary government contributions, international organizations, individuals, corporations, and other entities. The United Nations may provide funding if it is approved by the General Assembly and is related to a "situation" referred to the court by the Security Council.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Malawi: Justice versus Impunity and the African Union
    This is a guest post by Asch Harwood. Asch is the Council on Foreign Relations Africa program research associate. Malawi has decided not to host July’s African Union (AU) summit because of demands that Sudan’s al-Bashir be permitted to attend. It’s a heroic effort toward ending impunity on the continent. Despite explicit statements that Malawi’s new president, Joyce Banda, was concerned about offending international donors, her position in support of the ICC’s arrest warrant for al-Bashir is principled. Malawi is a signatory to the Rome statute and intends to fulfill its obligations. Of course, when your country’s budget is dependent on aid (40 percent before donors cut off support last year), international opinion is a real concern. But as Peter Fabricius writes, “(Banda) probably intended to mollify Malawians, who are very annoyed at losing the summit and the business opportunities that would have gone with it.” As any Africa watcher knows, one of the biggest holds on sub-Saharan economic and political development is impunity. So any champion, particularly one in a position to benefit from impunity, should be supported accordingly. The AU does face a conundrum though, which can easily be lost on ICC supporters. As Simon Allison writes, due to AU’s own internal governance, all heads of state must be invited. But Malawi, rightly, has chosen to value its commitments to justice over AU rules, even if it makes her unpopular in Africa. “By taking the opposite view, Banda - a relatively young, female leader in a group of old, grumpy men - is openly defying the African consensus, something sure to make her unpopular amongst her counterparts,” notes Allison. While it will certainly lead to some grumbling, I doubt Malawi’s decision will do any serious long-term diplomatic damage. And, in turn, perhaps other African countries will follow suit to help bring al-Bashir before the ICC.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Rwanda’s Eastern Congo Involvement
    On Friday I blogged about the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ report that internally displaced people in Congo-Kinshasa number more than two million, mostly in North and South Kivu. I also cited a BBC report based on UN sources of Rwandan involvement with mutineers whose violence is engendering the displacement—a report vigorously denied by the Rwandan foreign minister.  Today, the respected human rights non-government organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch issued a press release stating credibly that Rwandan military officials are arming and supporting the mutiny of Gen . Bosco Ntaganda and a (supposedly) separate one by Col. Sultani Makenga.  HRW’s conclusions are based on on-the-ground interviews. HRW reports Ntaganda, Makenga, and their followers frequently crossing the border into Rwanda to avoid capture and to be supplied with weapons.  It also reports Rwandan soldiers impressing "volunteers" at cinemas and other public places for service with Ntaganda and Makenga. HRW also reports summary execution by Ntaganda’s forces of those who refuse to fight. The UN Security Council’s arms embargo on Congo prohibits providing weapons or ammunition to Ntaganda or Makenga.    The relevant resolution requires all states to prevent the direct or indirect supply of such ordinance by their citizens to “nongovernmental entities” operating in Congo. Parts of the Rwandan military appear to be contravening the UN Security Council resolution, notwithstanding the foreign minister’s protests. The question is, to what extent is Rwandan military support of Congolese mutineers occurring with the support of the Kagame government. Or whether it is simply looking the other way, or whether it cannot control its own military.  Whatever the answer, it is the people of the eastern Congo who are suffering.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    It’s Bad (Again) in Eastern Congo
    The UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that internally displaced people (IDP) in Congo-Kinshasa numbers more than two million, as of March 31.  That is up from 1.7 million IDPs at the end of December. Most of this increase is in the two eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. The UN Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO) is stepping up efforts to protect civilians, especially in North Kivu, in the aftermath of a mutiny led by Bosco Ntaganda. Ntaganda is a Tutsi warlord whose forces had been incompletely incorporated into the regular Congolese army as part of a deal between Kinshasa and Kigali.  MONUSCO refers to "significant" displacement of civilians and refugee flows into Uganda and Rwanda. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seeking new charges against Ntaganda for war crimes. BBC reports cite UN sources of Rwandan involvement in training fighters engaged in the civil strife in eastern Congo, presumably associated with Ntaganda and the Tutsis.  This has resulted in a blistering denial by Rwanda’s foreign minister, who is bitterly critical of MONUSCO. She said, "This billion-dollar-a-year operation makes up one quarter of the UN’s entire peacekeeping budget, and yet it has been a failure from day one...MONUSCO has become a destabilizing influence, primarily concerned with keeping hold of its bloated budgets and justifying its ongoing existence." A useful analysis published by Pretoria’s Institute for Security Studies (ISS) recalls the role of armed groups associated with the Tutsis and the Hutus and the complex relations between the governments of Joseph Kabila in Kinshasa and Paul Kagame  in Kigali. It was Kigali, ISS argues, that appointed Ntaganda as the head of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) that supports the Tutsis, especially against the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu group associated with the Rwanda genocide.  It is apparently Ntganda’s CNDP that has mutinied. The Rwandan genocide still casts a long shadow, and the people of eastern Congo continue to pay the price.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Charles Taylor Sentenced - a Step Forward?
    In April, the Special Court for Sierra Leone in The Hague found Charles Taylor guilty of many crimes against humanity related to his involvement with the civil war in Sierra Leone. (Taylor was not tried for his activities in Liberia where he was a major warlord as well as chief of state.) On May 30, three justices sentenced Taylor to prison for fifty years. As he is 64 years of age, he will spend the rest of his life incarcerated. He will serve his sentence in the UK. The Samoan presiding judge was appointed by the government of Sierra Leone. The other two—one from Northern Ireland and one from Uganda—were appointed by the UN Secretary General. The reserve judge, also appointed by the Secretary General, is from Senegal. Taylor’s conviction and sentencing will be widely viewed as a step toward ending the impunity of African "big men." He is the first former chief of state to be tried, convicted, and sentenced by an international court since the post-World War II Nuremberg tribunal, and also the first African. Reflecting what is likely to be a widely held view among human rights activists, Human Rights Watch staffer Annie Gell commented that the verdict "marks a watershed for efforts to hold the highest level leaders accountable for the greatest crimes." Others will have reservations. Taylor’s defense barrister, the Jamaican-born Courtenay Griffiths, is a criminal lawyer, not a specialist in international law. In a media interview, he argues that the process and evidence were flawed, stating: "One of the things that I discovered...is that international criminal law is not about law at all. It’s all about the politics of power.” There are other aspects of the Taylor trial likely to give Africans pause: it took place in The Hague—not in Africa; Taylor was not prosecuted for crimes committed in Liberia, raising the specter of selective prosecution; Taylor will serve his sentence in the UK, not in Sierra Leone; and of the three sentencing judges, only one is from Africa. There was also the curious episode at the sentencing, reported by the press, in which the reserve judge, El Hadji Malick Sow, apparently tried to interrupt the hearing to voice opposition, but his microphone was cut off. More generally, many Africans are concerned that all of the cases at present before the International Criminal Court (which in a sense is the successor to the Special Court for Sierra Leone) involve Africans. The press quotes Justice Sow as saying that the international justice system is "in grave danger of losing all credibility." For most of us, Taylor is a monster and justice has been done. But the criticisms voiced by Griffiths and others highlight the difficulties in creating a system of international jurisprudence—including procedures and evidentiary standards—that is in accordance both with justice and political reality. And at present, Justice Sow’s warning about Africans losing confidence in the international justice system must be a concern.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Guest Post: Convicting Charles Taylor: Justice for Sierra Leoneans
    This is a guest post by Mohamed Jallow, a former interdepartmental associate at the Council on Foreign Relations, and now a program development specialist at IntraHealth International. Mohamed came to the United States as a refugee from Sierra Leone in 2003. After an unprecedented trial that lasted almost four years with 115 witnesses testifying, the one-time convicted criminal, jail breaker, ruthless warlord, and former president of Liberia was finally convicted on eleven counts of terror, murder, rape, sexual slavery, and crimes against humanity. This verdict, though long overdue, will certainly bring some solace to his many victims in both Sierra Leone and Liberia as the former celebrated its 51st independence anniversary on Friday. Nevertheless, though Mr. Taylor’s crimes against the people of Sierra Leone finally caught up with him, the scars of his crimes have still not completely healed from a war that lasted for eleven painful years. To the children of Sierra Leone, he is the man whose rebel army and its Revolutionary United Front (RUF) proxy robbed them of their childhood, turned them into child soldiers, and forced them to not only destroy their own country, but to commit untold atrocities against their own people. To the women of Sierra Leone, he is the man who stripped them of their dignity by supporting a rebel group that used wholesale rape and sexual slavery as weapons of war. To the thousands of amputees who still roam the streets of Freetown, he is the man whose actions cost them their limbs and robbed them of their livelihoods, sentencing them to a lifetime of poverty and despair. Personally, as a young man growing up during the civil war in Sierra Leone, I knew the name Charles Taylor and what it represented before I could even read or write. My whole life and that of millions of my countrymen was shaped by Mr. Taylor’s actions, both directly and indirectly. I lost loved ones who were struck down by bullets Mr. Taylor supplied to the RUF. I lost friends who were turned into killers by Mr. Taylor’s rebels and their proxies who wanted Sierra Leone to taste the bitterness of war. I lost the memories of my childhood at the hands of thugs Mr. Taylor trained, equipped, and supported. Like the poet Sidney Lanier, I have still not completely come to terms with my experiences during the conflict, and always seem to ask myself, “How does God have the heart to allow it?” How does he allow people like Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, and others to bring so much death, so much destruction, and so much suffering to so many people? Yet, many have opposed international trials for people like Mr. Taylor at the Hague. They see these trials as a conspiracy against African leaders and Africa’s sovereignty. Whatever our political or philosophical differences might be, the fact remains that Mr. Taylor should be held accountable for what he has done. For the thousands of amputees in Sierra Leone, it was a day of justice. For the tens of thousands who lost their homes and livelihoods, it was a chance to finally bring closure to the sad memories of war. And for the estimated fifty thousand Sierra Leoneans that lost their lives during the decade long upheaval that Mr. Taylor supported, it was a day to finally rest in peace. Happy Independence Day Sierra Leone!
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Guest Post: KONY 2012, Beyond the Buzz
    This is a guest post by Melissa Bukuru, CFR Africa program intern. After 50 million views and a media buzz that shows no sign of dying down quickly, backlash to Invisible Children’s KONY 2012 video campaign was inevitable. Many African journalists are protesting the “imperialist” undertones of the video, arguing that the video presents only a “single story”and ignores the community-based organizations already at work in Uganda and its neighbors (not to mention plenty of important details about the LRA.) Invisible Children’s campaign appears to be a cash machine: as of now the ’action kit,’ a $30 pack that contains a t-shirt, a bracelet, and other gear is sold out. For all the popular attention generated by the video, there has been less attention paid to the actual solution the advocacy group is pushing for-- to have Kony arrested, and brought to the ICC to stand trial. The International Crisis Group’s excellent report (pdf) on the LRA published in November explains that while advocacy groups and others should press for the arrest of Kony and the other LRA leaders, “this could leave many LRA fighters in the bush [who] would continue to be a threat to civilians.” Its final assessment is that while US involvement is promising, “African buy-in” is required. But, the strengthening of the Ugandan army in particular could have the undesirable consequence of helping Museveni hold on to power after thirty years in office, as well as supporting a continued culture of impunity within the army. (He spent $740 million on new Russian fighter jets last summer.) The danger here is best articulated by Ethan Zuckerman who wonders if the fundamental shortcoming of the Invisible Children approach is that it “forces [us] to engage only with the simplest of problems? Or to propose only the simplest of solutions?” Yesterday, the State Department’s spokesperson fielded five questions about the KONY 2012 campaign -- the same number of questions she answered about defections in the Syrian government -- and reiterated that the US is "quite aggressive in trying to support the governments that are going after the LRA." The fragile East and Central African region is complex, and the LRA is more than just Kony. One possible benefit of the video’s visibility is the space it has created to educate Americans with a counter narrative about the complexities of the conflict in central Africa (which the blogosphere has made a commendable effort to do).
  • International Law
    The Synthesis of Law and Politics and the Evolution of International Justice
    Play
    Ambassador David Scheffer and former State Department legal adviser John Bellinger will discuss how international justice over the last two decades has affected international politics, including the U.S. role in assisting local war crimes prosecutions in Libya and elsewhere. Related readings:Regime Trials Belong in Libya's Courts by John B. Bellinger IIIPartners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Institutions, A Council Special Report
  • International Law
    The Synthesis of Law and Politics and the Evolution of International Justice
    Play
    Ambassador David Scheffer and former State Department legal adviser John Bellinger discuss how international justice over the last two decades has affected international politics, including the U.S. role in assisting local war crimes prosecutions in Libya and elsewhere.