Foreign Aid

The UN High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, composed of political appointees from every continent, recently issued a highly-anticipated report proposing a new framework for measuring economic, social, and environmental progress and performance. The report urges world leaders to pursue development goals focused on several critical issues that have been sidelined for too long, including governance and rule of law, inequality and social and economic exclusion, and sustainability. As the report makes clear, a rising tide does not necessarily raise all boats, thus a clear commitment to combating inequality and advancing social and economic inclusion must be at the core of the global development agenda. This embrace of social and economic rights indicators presents a direct challenge to the longstanding, wealth-based growth paradigm of development. Furthermore, the recognition that standard growth trajectories are wreaking havoc on the environment, threatening the inheritance of future generations and disproportionately impacting the world’s most vulnerable populations, suggests that sustainability must become a central objective of growth and development policies. This furthers the embrace of sustainable development that began in the 1980s and was eloquently encapsulated in the 1987 Brundtland Report. Lastly, the report puts governance, rule of law, and human rights at the center of the development agenda—both as an ends and as a means to achieving development goals. Still, turning big ideas into actions inherently faces political challenges. The proliferation of various indicators in recent years demonstrates the technical feasibility of measuring everything from rule of law to sustainability. But the data collection process remains controlled by political will and the financial resources made available. Moreover, different indicators can favor some countries over others or incentivize perverse government policies. Therefore, despite the emerging global consensus that multifaceted metrics of development are desperately needed, it remains uncertain whether the international community will be able to come to a consensus around a clear set of alternatives. In my next post I will discuss one set of norms regarding human wellbeing and progress that have already been endorsed and adopted by the global community: human rights.

On August 11 Mali conducted the second and final round of its national elections. The results are expected on August 16. The leading contenders are former prime minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, often called IBK, and former finance minister Soumaila Cisse. Keita is the favorite, having won 39 percent of the votes in the first round to Cisse’s 19 percent. In the first round, voter turnout was higher than in previous elections, though still under 50 percent. In the secessionist north, voter participation was much lower. The Malian political class, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), France, and the United States look to the success of these elections to put to rest the two year crisis that followed a military coup against the corrupt government of President Amadou Toumani Toure. A democratically elected government will also permit donors to resume the aid flow. The coup provided an opening for the secession of northern, Tuareg-dominated part of the country, which declared its independence as Azawad. However, radical jihadists soon subverted more moderate elements and established an Islamist regime. A jihadist push south was stopped by French intervention. French, Malian, and ECOWAS troops pushed the jihadists out of the cities, though they failed to destroy them. Tuareg disaffection from Bamako appears to continue to be widespread. The roots of the current crisis are a Malian political class that was isolated from the mass of the population and that was increasingly corrupt. That reality was disguised by a serious of well-conducted elections that established for Mali the undeserved reputation of being a model African democracy. However, voter participation continued to fall. In the north of the country, there has been a persistent insurrection by the Tuareg peoples and their allies against domination by Bamako for more than a generation. The Tuaregs want a degree of autonomy or even independence. The Bamako government had repeatedly promised “federalism,” but never delivered. The Tuareg insurrection heated up after the collapse of Quaddafi’s Libya regime and the return of some Tuareg mercenaries. Bamako’s military reverses and general mismanagement led to the coup against Toure, which enjoyed significant popular approval. Mali’s persistent challenges include an unresponsive and corrupt political class and its failure to reconcile with the Tuaregs (and other minorities) in the north. It remains to be seen if these elections will address either of those issues. Keita and Cisse are part of the political establishment that runs Mali. Further, Keita is especially popular in Bamako, less so elsewhere. If he wins, he will need to move quickly to open a dialogue with the disaffected north. Some parts of the north, notably Kidal, participated hardly at all in the elections. It remains to be seen whether the elections will be a first step toward national reconciliation or whether they will further alienate the north. As for the jihadists, they are “just over the hill,” and can reassert themselves at any time, especially if the new government in Bamako missteps. The bottom line is that it is far too soon for France, ECOWAS, or the United States to go into self-congratulatory mode over the success of the Malian elections.

Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is by Julie Fisher, a current associate and retired program officer of the Kettering Foundation and author of Importing Democracy: The Role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan and Argentina. Here she discusses how international aid organizations can help democracy take root abroad. Although democracy brings no guarantees, there is growing global awareness that repressive systems of government are incapable of implementing the socioeconomic and environmental changes essential for the survival of humanity. Fortunately, frustrated citizens around the world are taking to the streets and demanding more honest, accountable, and democratic governance. Still, Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization, listed only ninety countries as “free” by the end of 2012--a decline since 2006 and only a slight improvement since the 1990s. And according to Freedom House’s 2013 Freedom in the World report, twenty-seven countries have declined in freedom over the past year. These findings support political scientist Larry Diamond’s claim that the world is experiencing a democratic recession. This is in part because, although they are an important ingredient, demonstrations alone do not build democracy. In order for change to stick, there must be a flourishing community of autonomous non-governmental institutions — in other words, civil society. The good news is that leaders of the global associational revolution, which began forty years ago when nonprofits and NGOs began to address issues ignored by unaccountable governments, are beginning to turn their attention to democratization, as I discuss in my latest book Importing Democracy: The Role of NGOs in South Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. In the 1970s, thousands of NGOs focused on sustainable development were founded. The 1980s saw the rise of human rights NGOs, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union. And, as I chronicle in Importing Democracy, a new breed of NGOs began adopting democratic concepts and revitalizing local democratic traditions, such as village councils, in the 1990s. In Tajikistan, for example, an NGO called Jahan has been able to retrain local police in human rights law and humane treatment of suspects. But, as Will Dobson argues in his book, The Dictator’s Learning Curve, authoritarian governments are now cracking down on NGOs. Ten years ago, most governments, particularly authoritarian ones, were either unaware of civil society or dismissed it as insignificant. Now, however, governments are fearful of political opposition and are systematically suppressing civil society and those who support it in places such as Russia and Egypt. International actors need to think long and hard about how to protect pro-democracy individuals and organizations abroad. Foreign donors must also avoid the trap of assuming that they know what another country needs. A recent report on international support for NGOs in Cyprus, published by the Peace Research Institute Oslo, found that “International donors continue to underestimate the importance of peace-orientated civil society and instead attempt to institutionalize, co-opt or marginalize [NGOs].” The report went on to suggest that “donors would do well to see themselves as servants and guardians of [civil society] and its hidden agency and potential, rather than its managers.” Wealthy donors and international NGOs should learn from and reach out to the thousands of indigenous democratization NGOs promoting change in their home countries. In The Dictator’s Learning Curve, Dobson offers examples of small innovative international NGOs that have successfully reached out to local activists. Otpor, for example, an organization led by the activists who helped overthrow Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, holds clandestine workshops for democracy activists around the world. Similarly, the Albert Einstein Institution (AEI) seeks to encourage nonviolent action and democratization abroad. AEI’s pamphlet From Dictatorship to Democracy, a seventy-nine-page how-to guide, has been translated into twenty-five languages and has been downloaded from the Internet hundreds of thousands of times. International and indigenous organizations should partner on various projects and exchanges, including facilitating internships and skills-transfers between different national and international NGOs; leading anti-corruption programs; coordinating reform of international and domestic law; and bringing together democratization, development, human rights, and grassroots leaders and organizations. In the end, repression must be replaced by robust citizenship in order for a prosperous, peaceful, and equal world to flourish. By building on what democratization NGOs are already doing and supporting their efforts to learn from each other, international actors can contribute to this better future.

The United States has spent about $100 billion rebuilding Afghanistan since 2002 – an enormous amount of money that even a casual observer can tell has fallen far short of its aims. Perhaps the reconstruction efforts were doomed from the start: while aid agencies were discussing rule of law and democracy, U.S. policymakers were cutting deals with warlords who soon dominated the country’s new parliament. The bottom line is that when it comes to economic development, politics matter. This might seem obvious, but it is a lesson that is forgotten, contested, or ignored time and again. A new thought-provoking book, Development Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution, by Thomas Carothers and Diane de Gramont, chronicles the dangers of excluding politics from development aid, and cheers on the trend of development efforts becoming more explicitly political. The book is an important contribution to the existing literature on the politics of development and ties in well with Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic Lessons from Democratic Transitions, a new CFR book I recently co-edited that examines the relationship between development and democratization. As Carothers and de Gramont point out, the modern conception of foreign aid grew out of a political context: Washington’s Cold War efforts to stop the spread of Communism. But in this pursuit, policymakers and aid organizations paid little attention to the political situation in countries receiving aid. The underlying assumption was that, regardless of a country’s cultural and political background, foreign aid would foster civil society and liberal democracy. But, as Carothers and de Gramont recount, this approach proved woefully flawed. In countries around the world, foreign aid has been rendered ineffective due to a lack of understanding of countries’ political dynamics. Even where foreign aid has helped spur economic growth, it has seldom automatically led to democratization. In reaction, beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, the development establishment -- long dominated by technocratic economists eager to stay out of politics – began, gingerly, to take political considerations into account when crafting aid policy. This reorientation toward politically-informed development has been unevenly adopted, which is part of the reason why Carothers and de Gramont set out to write Development Aid Confronts Politics. As Carothers recounts in an interview with The Guardian, “I was struck first by how little communication existed between those working on the political side of assistance and those on the socioeconomic side and second by how much misunderstanding and even suspicion there was between the two camps... For me, this book is one result of a longtime preoccupation with how to achieve more synthetic, integrated approaches to development.” Indeed, the book provides valuable insights into the importance of coordinated campaigns and politically-minded development agendas. To be sure, politically-oriented development efforts have met resistance abroad. The legacy of imperialism in many developing countries perpetuates an understandable suspicion of Western organizations becoming politically involved in foreign countries. And anti-American populism makes for good politics in places like Russia and Bolivia. As a result, political aid organizations have recently been kicked out of several countries, accused of fomenting domestic unrest there; and some aid workers have even been convicted of crimes against the state. In reality, most foreign organizations take part in largely uncontroversial aspects of politics, such as election monitoring. Still, pervasive distrust of Western political aid has led many to call on newly established democracies, such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, to help countries of similar cultural backgrounds stabilize and democratize. Despite these complex geopolitical dynamics, Carothers and de Gramont argue forcefully that it is foolish for aid givers to pull back from or ignore the messy realities of politics. In Pathways to Freedom, my colleague Terra Lawson-Remer and I make a similar point: open and prosperous societies ultimately depend on a well-functioning civil society and rule of law. Those in the aid business who think they can improve economic outcomes over the long term while ignoring human rights and governance issues are kidding themselves.

In a guest post on Micah Zenko’s blog, Amelia Wolf discusses the future of humanitarian intervention. She explains: While the international community is fixated on what world leaders are not doing or could be doing in Syria, their actions in Mali have been overlooked. Since the military-led coup in March 2012, the United States and its allies–particularly France and the Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS)–have been actively engaged in finding a political solution to the instability in Mali. The form of “humanitarian intervention” that has emerged differs greatly from former interventions and will significantly influence those in the future. Read her full post here.

Private capital flows through foreign direct investment and portfolio investment now exceed $1 trillion annually. This has deep income, wealth distribution, and human rights effects for people around the world—creating opportunity for many, but leaving some behind. International economic rules govern these capital flows by regulating banks and multinational investors, determining property rights, and establishing legal claims and mechanisms for redress. Yet vulnerable communities, such as subsistence landholders, informal workers and entrepreneurs, marginalized religious and ethnic groups, and slum dwellers, have virtually no voice in determining the rules of the global economy and lack effective representation to protect their interests within the developing international legal framework. Accountable governance is critical to protecting human rights, advancing shared opportunity, and promoting inclusive and sustainable development, but is fundamentally lacking at the global level. In the United States, organizations like the Legal Aid Society provide pro-bono services to poor clients faced with day-to-day legal challenges. But no such organization or network exists globally to represent poor communities regarding international matters. Although a number of international advocacy groups currently mobilize public action and pressure policymakers regarding some issues, these organizations are not directly accountable to the constituencies they serve because they do not directly represent vulnerable groups or individuals through client-based relationships. Moreover, all these efforts fall far short of addressing the real needs of affected communities in terms of capacity, reach, and scope. This challenge can be addressed by establishing a global network of legal offices to provide pro-bono client-based representation for vulnerable local communities affected by international economic policy. These advocates for local communities would help level the playing the field, improve social accountability, and ensure that the rules of the global economy work better for everyone. Similar to a standard consulting firm or corporate law firm, this network of pro-bono legal clinics would provide advice, lobbying, and counsel at all stages of the legal and policymaking process: including aiding legislative drafting by congresses and parliaments, rule-making by regulatory bodies like the Securities and Exchange Commission, treaty negotiation and drafting, arbitration within dispute-resolution forums like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, policy-setting by international standard organizations like the Financial Stability Board, and litigation through domestic courts. International economic laws are complex and influence the lives of vulnerable groups in several different ways. Expert advocates would represent affected communities on the full range of issues and circumstances in which international laws and norms have significant local effects. This social accountability network should tackle the following challenges: representing communal landholders who are being forcibly displaced by foreign investment “land grabs” and development projects such as hydroelectric dams and oil and mining projects representing local communities whose access to subsistence livelihoods or resources are threatened by global climate change agreements influencing new global banking and finance regulations to protect the interests of small-scale microcredit borrowers and entrepreneurs in the global south protecting local fishing communities whose livelihoods are being eviscerated by the global fishing industry advocating on behalf of communities living near sites of fuel extraction and natural resource exploitation whose livelihoods are threatened by environmental pollution promoting intellectual property rights in trade and investment treaties that advance access to essential medicines and medical technologies A new network of advocates for vulnerable communities would address a critical challenge of global economic governance by advancing social accountability—a loosely based Lawyers Without Borders would ensure the rules of the global economy work for everyone, not just the rich and powerful.

We tend to underrate the importance of racism as a factor in the ongoing crisis in Mali. A short item from Radio France Internationale–English is a good reminder. It reports a statement by a spokesman for the French foreign ministry calling for the release of those arrested “because of the color of their skin” in the Kidal area. Last weekend, residents of Kidal claimed to the press that members of the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) who control the district were attacking black people with the goal of driving them out. Predictably, MNLA spokesmen are saying that they were looking for “infiltrators,” presumably sent by the Bamako authorities against whom MNLA has fought. Tuareg, Arabs, and Berbers regard themselves as “white,” while they tend to see the Bamako political class as “black.” The upcoming late July elections in Mali, which international allies and potential donors are strongly advocating for are likely to exacerbate racial tensions. Many fear that if the elections are rushed, they will provide only a veneer of legitimacy without addressing the core issues facing Mali, such as persistent racism and the alienation of the north that sparked the current crises.

At the Mali Donors Conference in Brussels on May 15 the United States announced $32 million in new humanitarian assistance to support Malian refugees in neighboring countries and to the internally displaced. The same day, the U.S. Department of State spokesman said that the Obama administration will request from Congress $180 million in FY 2014 for bilateral assistance. That funding would kick-in after the Mali elections, scheduled to take place in July. As required by U.S. law, the Obama administration terminated or suspended $188 million in assistance to Mali following the coup in March, 2012. However, the U.S. continued to provide $7 million in democracy assistance programing and $83 million in health support. With the additional $32 million pledged at Brussels, the press spokesman said the United States will be providing $181 million in humanitarian assistance—almost the same amount that had been suspended post-coup. The figures add up to only $122 million; either the he misspoke or did not mention other U.S. assistance. Given Mali’s high profile and ongoing humanitarian disaster, U.S. assistance—both humanitarian now and bilateral after the Malian elections—is very small. But, total U.S. foreign assistance hovers around only 1 percent of the federal budget, though a November 2010 World Public Opinion Poll indicates that the “average” American thinks that it is around one quarter. The July elections and the restoration of constitutional government will make Mali eligible for the projected $180 million in assistance in FY 2014. That may be a significant motivation for the calling of elections in July, which many observers believe to be unwise. Election preparations have hardly started, and security is not yet established in the northern part of the country. Poor elections dominated by southern politicians risk further splitting the country. Africa Confidential has a good overview of the current state of Mali’s politics and the arguments against early elections.

Emerging Voices features contributions from scholars and practitioners highlighting new research, thinking, and approaches to development challenges. This article is from Sir Michael Barber, who is the U.K. Department for International Development’s (DfID) (unpaid) special representative on education in Pakistan, the chief education advisor at Pearson, and from 2001 to 2005, was the chief advisor on delivery to Prime Minister Tony Blair. In the article he discusses an educational reform program he helps lead in Pakistan and the broader debate over the effective delivery of foreign aid. In many countries, there are two camps: those who want less aid because it is ineffective, and those who want more because it is fundamental to global justice. I propose an alternative to this fruitless debate. I support government’s commitment to aid but surely the aim should be to end it in time, not because it has failed but because it was demonstrably successful. This is what we in the development community should want, and it is also what visionary leaders in the developing world, including Pakistan, want. They look forward to their country succeeding without aid. In the meantime they want support that is effective and demonstrates results. This demands a radical and rigorous approach to aid. The Punjab Education Reform Roadmap, which I have been leading along with Shahbaz Sharif, who recently left office as chief minister of the Pakistani province of Punjab, suggests a way forward. When we set the goals for Punjab some donors accused us of being “too ambitious” and “too urgent.” We pleaded guilty. The risks of moving too slowly in Pakistan are much greater than the risks of moving too fast. When we began implementation of the roadmap in August 2011, only 82.8 percent of enrolled students attended school each day, only 80.7 percent of teachers attended class, and only 68.9 percent of facilities had functioning electricity, drinking water, toilets, and boundary walls. The results after two years speak for themselves: as of December 2012, student attendance was up to 92.1 percent, teacher attendance reached 92.1 percent, and 90.9 percent of facilities were up to standards. This translates to approaching 1.5 million extra children now enrolled in school, and another million, who had been formally enrolled but rarely turned up, attending school every day. Schools serving three million children have had their facilities repaired. More than 90 percent of teachers are now present every day, with new lesson plans and coaching to help them teach and new textbooks for every pupil from next month. In addition, the program has given over 140,000 out-of-school children from poor families vouchers that they can take to any registered private school. Non-government providers have been encouraged to set up new schools where government provision is weak or non-existent. It is one of the largest voucher programs in the world, and a model of effective public-private partnership in education. There is evidence of improved outcomes, too. Two years ago Punjab-India and Punjab-Pakistan were level-pegging; now Pakistan is out in front. Perhaps most important of all, more and more people in Punjab believe that this time, after decades of failure, they will succeed. How was this achieved? To start, we set clear, ambitious targets for each district and the whole province and developed a system to monitor progress in real time. By collecting data from all 60,000 government schools monthly, we’ve been able to check regularly whether we are on track to achieving these goals. By focusing on school-level data, we were able to tell district leaders exactly which schools are lagging and even which teachers did not attend school in the prior month. This allows the systems leaders to immediately take action to resolve issues and improve performance.  We’ve avoided the classic error of focusing purely on enrollment and ignoring quality. Second, we established routines to review progress and ensure a constant focus on implementation. In each conversation, we ask officials at all levels of the system whether they are on track to meet their goals and how they respond when they are not. Where they are off track we offer a combination of pressure and support. As a result, we’ve established a system of sharp accountability and tackled corruption head-on by insisting on merit-based appointments. Since the start of the roadmap 81,000 teachers have been hired on merit. Most important of all, the roadmap was never a separate aid initiative; it was a partnership with the committed chief minister, Shahbaz Sharif, to improve the entire schools system, which serves over twenty million children. The aid money certainly helped to bring about this success, but aid is under 5 percent of Punjab’s total expenditure on education. The real keys have been the program’s design, based on good evidence of what works around the world, and the relentless focus on implementation. Through floods, outbreaks of dengue fever, and the many crises that afflict Pakistan, the routine tasks of implementation--checking impact at the front lines, reviewing effectiveness, and adjusting accordingly--have continued. We’ve persisted to deliver the change that was needed. We’ve refined our approach throughout, but we’ve never compromised on our vision or the ambitious goals that we set at the start. We’re starting to see the impact of the “science of delivery,” which Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank, describes as fundamental to delivering development outcomes. The success in Punjab contributes to the evidence of what works. For all the gains, Punjab’s education system remains far short of real quality. The progress is far from irreversible. Although we have moved with breathtaking speed, it is not fast enough. After this month’s elections, Punjab’s new leaders will need to continue what has been started for years to come. Yes, real change is a slog. In the meantime there are three clear lessons for aid policy. First, the case for aid can be sustained only if every penny is spent well. Second, we know quite a bit, and are learning more, about the “science of delivery” required to deliver development aid effectively. Third, if we get the partnership for reform right with developing country governments, transferring the entire responsibility for development, including funding, onto their taxpayers will become possible as well as desirable.

On the new Ask CFR Experts feature today, I consider the question of whether the United States should continue economic aid to Egypt. "The answer," I write, "is a resounding yes." As I add, however: ...Washington is unlikely to increase outright economic aid substantially. Arguably, other forms of assistance, including increased foreign direct investment and trade, and technical and financial support for continued economic reform (particularly on transitioning away from costly and inefficient subsidies), stand to have a bigger positive impact on Egypt’s economy and democratic transition than more monetary aid to the Egyptian government. You can read the full answer here.

Yesterday on his blog, CFR senior fellow John Campbell wrote about Brazil’s involvement in and assistance to Africa. As he argues: Brazil’s expanding role in Africa is overshadowed in the international media by China and India’s larger role. (So, too, is South Africa’s role.) But, Brazil’s approach to Africa appears to be the more broadly based, with important political and developmental aspects, as well as economic. You can read the full post here. The Development Channel has also been following the role of emerging donors through Emerging Voices posts and a Question of the Week series about China and Africa. Last month, CFR senior fellow Isobel Coleman analyzed the proposed BRICS development bank, a potentially important milestone for emerging donors.

Last week on my blog, I reviewed USAID’s Water and Development Strategy, focusing on the link between water and food security. As I write: As the global population continues to climb toward 10 billion, and more people enjoy the higher caloric intake of middle class life, finding sustainable ways to improve agricultural productivity is increasingly important. As the USAID strategy makes clear, more careful water management will be a critical part of the solution. You can read the full post here.

Yesterday on my blog, I discussed the Obama administration’s proposed reforms to U.S. food aid. As I note: A 2010 interview with former USAID administrator Andrew Natsios serves as a sobering reminder of what’s at stake. “I’ve seen children starve to death when there was a surplus of food in their local markets, but there was no one to buy the food because we didn’t have the money to do that, so people died.” You can read the full post here.

Vaccination against polio and measles is opposed by many conservative Islamic elements in northern Nigeria. A consequence is that polio remains endemic; there were 122 cases in 2012, over half of the global total. A measles outbreak in northern Nigeria earlier this year killed thirty-six children and infected over 4,000 between February 16 and March 9. Health officials say this is a direct result of parents refusing to vaccinate their children. While popular opposition to vaccination has many roots, they are primarily political and social in nature. My colleague at the Council on Foreign Relations, Laurie Garrett, has called to my attention an excellent analysis of northern Nigerian opposition to polio vaccination that was published by the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN). In addition to a discussion of the shortcomings of some of the earlier vaccination campaigns, the article correctly identifies the Nigerian suspicion of the West as fed by memories of colonialism, questionable pharmaceutical trials by a Western company almost two decades ago, and what many Nigerian Muslims regard as a U.S. war against Islam in Iraq and Afghanistan. Skeptics in the region allege that a Western motive for promoting vaccination is the intentional decreasing of male fertility through vaccination to reduce Muslim birth rates. IRIN has also issued an excellent analysis of the opposition to the measles vaccination, where the dynamic is similar to that of opposition to polio vaccination. IRIN makes the important point that polio and measles vaccines are often confused in the popular mind. While there is little in the reports that is new to those who follow polio in northern Nigeria, IRIN’s analysis is the most comprehensive and lucid I have seen available to non-specialists. In my view, however, the analysis may over-emphasize the effects of the U.S. role in Iraq and Afghanistan, and not emphasize enough the northern regional suspicion of the federal government in Abuja, which is a primary sponsor of both vaccination programs. I am also a bit skeptical that, more than fifty years after the British left Nigeria, colonial memories play much of a role.

Yesterday I published an article on ForeignPolicy.com posing ten questions about the BRICS development bank, recently announced by BRICS leaders, and its implications for global development. One question is whether developing countries will welcome the bank. As I write: Probably. China is known for extending loans and resources without conditionality around touchy subjects like governance, and if the BRICS development bank follows suit, it’s hard to imagine many countries saying no to easy money. Still, there’s likely to be some skepticism, in no small part because of China’s inevitably outsized role in the new bank and also because of the mixed reviews China gets from its global south trading partners. You can read the article here and an excerpt on my blog here.